ML20214V628

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Rev 0 to TVA Employee Concerns Task Group,Other Sites: Operational Safety Verification. Source Documents Insp Repts 50-327/85-27 & 50-328/85-28
ML20214V628
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 10/01/1986
From: Debbage A, Knightly J, Sauer R
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20214T770 List:
References
SWEC-SQN-44, SWEC-SQN-44-R, SWEC-SQN-44-R00, NUDOCS 8612090763
Download: ML20214V628 (9)


Text

.

's s TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT

i. EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP OTHER SITES CEG Element

Title:

Operational Safety Verification SWEC Concerns: A02851007012-001, -002, -003, -004, and -005 Source Document: NRC Inspection Reports 50-327/85-27 and 50-328/05-28 Report Number: SWEC-SQN-44 Evaluator:

J. J. Knightly 9 '

toe Date

/h Reviewed By: U /0 /0/ [f(,

A. G. Debbdje Ddte /

Approved By: a IMu

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R. C. Sater/ D6te/

8612090763 861120 7 1953T DR ADOCK 0500

! Report SWEC-SQN-44 NRC Reports 50-327/85-27 and 50-328/85-28 I. Introduction During a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection of August 6, through September 5, 1985, the NRC identified (Reference A) three violations, one inspector followup item, and one area of concern which were included in the Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) systematic analysis:

A. A02851007012-001, Failure to follow procedure during diesel generator maintenance (violation 327/85-27-01, 328/85-28-01);

B. 402851007012-002, CVCS letdown line crack not found in LP test

[ (violation S5-27-04);

l C. A02851007012-003, Technical Specification LCO noncompliance for hot standby (violation 328/85-28-05);

I 4 -

D. A02851007012-OO4, DG Maintenance Procedure lacks guidance (IFI327/85-27-02 and 328/85-28-02); and E. A02851007012-005, Uncalibrated current bridges for RCS Resistance Temperature Detectors (no violation).

Information on the backgro s-j, the corrective actions taken, the verification methodology and analysis, the completion status, and any l pertinent references for these items is included in this report.

II. Verification of SWEC Items A. A02651007012-001, Failure to Follow Frocedure During DG Maintenance

$ 1. Background - The NRC inspector determined that a technician did not follow portions of MI-10.1, " Diesel Generator Inspection,"

during an inspection of the Diesel Generator on August 14, 1985, q resulting in NRC violation 85-27-01 and 85-28-01. The g technician did not use low pressure air to remove dust from the diesel generator collector rings and stator (step 5.4.1.1); used knit material without bound ends to clean the diesel generator 1 collector (step 5.4.1.2); and did not check the tightness of the l frame hold-down and foundation bolts and record the results on the appropriate inspection sheet (step 5.4.1.8).

3) 4 2. Cerrective Actions Taken - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) stated

- (Reference B) that the technicians involved have been counseled

[ on the errors made and attention to details. Temporary changes j to MI 10.1 were made to (1) add signoff for use of low-pressure d air, if needed, to remove dust and for bolt inspections and (2)

'i remove the requirement for bound-end cloths because the standard cleaning cloths carried by Power Stores are fully adequate for the job. The revised MI 10.1 was issued on December 4, 1985.

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3. Verification Methodology - The SWEC concern identified for {

Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG) verification was stated as follows:

RIMS Number Issue RIMS Item A02 851007 012 Failure to follow RIMS-001 procedure during diesol generator maintenance - cleaning and bolt tightness check requirements not followed.

ECTG reviewed the Sequoyah Compliance Licensing files for internal and external correspondence related to this issue, and the applicable maintenance instruction. This review of the pertinent documentation formed the basis for this verification activity.

j

4. Verification Analysis - The ECTG review indicated that the NRC item was adequately resolved. The NRC found the SQN response to be acceptable (Reference D) and the maintenance instruction MI-10.1 (revision 28, December 4, 1985) was found to contain all provisions outlined in II.A.2 above.
5. Completion Status - Based on SQN corrective actions, compliance with requirements, and NRC acceptance of the corrective action, no further action on this item is required. Following NRC closure, this SWEC issue can be closed.

B. A02851007012-OO2, CVC Letdown Line Crack Not Found in LP test

1. Background - The hRC inspector determined that Technical Inr truction TI-51, " Liquid Penetrant Examination," was not adequately implemented on July 31, 1985, during a nondestructive liquid penetrant test of the weld area for Unit l's Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) letdown sample line. This resulted in the failure to identify a crack which existed approximately

, one third of the way through the wall thickness and led to a I CVCS letdown line leak on August 11, 1985. Since independent analysis identified both dye penetrant and developer inside the crack, it appeared that the crack existed at the time of the liquid penetrant test. This was reported as NRC violation 85-27-04.

2. Corrective Actions Taken - SQN responded (Reference B) that tha tests were performed in accordance with the procedure by NDE Level II certified inspectors. It was agreed that the crack either did not exist at the time of the test or was too tight to detect at the time of the test, or a personnel error resulted in -

l the crack not being detected. The cracked pipe in the sample I connection was removed and replaced with new material. A I detailed corrective action / evaluation plan to detect and prevent Page 2 of 7 l

. t future similar failures was prepared and submitted to NRC on August 28, 1985. The event was discussed in depth with the involved inspectors, who demonstrated through discussion and performance of mock penetrant test inspections that they knew and could adequately implement the TI-51 procedure.

3. Verification Methodology - The SWEC concern identified for ECTG verification was stated as follows:

RIMS Number Issue RIMS Item A02 851007 012 Failure to adequately RIMS-002 perform LP test resulted in not detecting CVCS letdown line wall crack.

ECTG reviewed the-Sequoyah Compliance Licensing files for internal and external correspondence related to this issue.

This review of the pertinent documentation formed the basis for this verification activity.

4. Verification Analysis - The ECTG review of the pertinent documentation indicated that the NRC item was adequately resolved. SQN's planned corrective actions were accepted by the NRC in Reference D. The NRC inspector verified that the pipe had been replaced and, in addition, requested and observed a sensitivity ' test on the lot of penetrant materials involved in the NDE examination and observed the initial examiner's re-examination of the welds. SQN's corrective action and evaluation plan to detect and prevent future similar failures was submitted to NRC, August 28, 1985. The NRC found the SQN corrective actions to be acceptable and closed the violation in

. Report 85-39, dated December 12, 1985

5. Completion Status - Based on the SQN corrective actions, compliance with requirements, and NRC closure of the violation, no further actions on this SWEC item are required. This SWEC item is closed.

C. A02851007012-003, Technical Specification LOO Noncompliance for Hot Standby i

1. Background - The NRC inspector determined that on L

August 9-10, 1985, for a period of time of seven hours and 40 minutes, the unit 2 number 3 loop cold leg injection accumulator was technically inoperable in that it did not contain between 7857 to 8071 gallons of borated water or a concentration of i boron between 1900 and 2100 ppm as required by technical specification 3.5.1.1. This period of time exceeded by forty j minutes the time limit to be in hot standby condition within

, seven hours after initial entry into the limiting condition for operation (LCO) as required by Technical Specification 3.5.1.1,

! and was reported as NRC violation 85-28-05.

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2. Corrective Actions Taken - SQN stated that the deficiencies were due to a deficient instruction, System Operating Instruction L SOI-63.1 " Emergency Core Cooling System," which allowed boron sampling during the filling and draining process and to a personnel error by operations personnel failing to consider the low boron concentration before declaring the cold-leg accumulator operable. The loop 3 cold leg accumulator was brought within technical specification limits in all parameters I
- on September 10, 1985. A caution note was added to both the I 1

draining and filling portions of SOI-63.1 concerning the

potential for uncertainties of boron samples taken during these l processes.

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I 3. Verification Methodology - The SWEC concern identified for ECTG

[ verification was stated as follows:

?

I RIMS Number Issue RIMS Item

! A02 851007 012 Failure to comply RIMS-003 h with Technical k Specifications LCO I resulted in exceeding requirement to be

i. in Hot Standby by

[ 40 minutes.

}. ECTG reviewed the Sequoyah Compliance Licensing files for L internal and external correspondence related to this issue and

[ the applicable operating instruction. This review of the pertinent documentation formed the basis for this verification activity.

4. Verification Analysis - The ECTG review of the pertinent
documentation indicated that the NRC found the SQN response to be acceptable (Reference D). Corrective actions, as outlined in II.C.2 above, have been completed and the issue is considered by SQN to be ready for NRC closure.
5. Completion Status - Based on the SQN corrective actions, compliance with requirements, and NRC acceptance of the corrective action, no further action on this item is required.
- Following NRC closure, this SWEC concern can be closed.

I D. A02851007012-004, DG Maintenance procedure Lacks Guidance.

)

l 1. Background - The NRC inspector noted two deficiencies in the h maintenance instruction MI-10.1, " Diesel Generator Inspection:"

[ (1) insufficient guidance for the space heater check and for the

frame hold-down bolt tightness, and (2) lack of a signoff for l individual procedural steps where several technicians are usually involved. These deficiencies were reported as Inspector p Follow-up Item 85-27-02 and 85-28-02 and are directly related to j violation 85-27-01 and 85-28-01, II.A.1 above, concerning j failure to follow the MI-10.1 instruction.

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2. Corrective Actions Taken - The corrective action for violation 8 5-27-01 and . 8 5-28-01 included several revisions to instruction MI-10.1. In addition, a complete rewrite was to be accomplished to improve work guidance and coordination on the individual procedural steps.
3. Verification Methodoloqv - The SWEC concern identified for ECTG verification was stated as follows:

RIMS Number Issue RIMS Item A02 851007 012 Maintenance procedure RIMS-004 lacks sufficient guidance for some DG maintenance activities.

ECTG reviewed the applicable maintenance instruction and the Sequoyah Compliance Licensing files for internal and external correspondence related to this issue. This review of the pertinent documentation formed the basis for this verification activity.

4. Verification Analysis - The ECTG review of the pertinent documentation indicated that the NRC found the SQN response for violation 85-27-01 and 85-28-01 to be acceptable (Reference D).

This corrective action for the violation also included the clarification changes applicable to this IFI. Maintenance instruction MI-10.1, " Diesel Generator Inspection" was rewritten with revision 28 to clarify the guidance and to provide signoffs for individual procedural steps identified in the SWEC issue,

5. Completion Status - Based on the SQN corrective actions, compliance with requirements, and NRC acceptance of the corrective action for the associated violation, no further action on this issue is required. Following NRC closure, this SWEC item can be closed.

E. A02851007012-005, Uncalibrated current bridges for RCS Resistance Temperature Detectors.

1. Background - During observation of the calibration of the unit 1 l reactor coolant systems (RCS) loop resistance temperature detectors (RTD), the NRC inspector noted that two current bridges (TEC LCSR numbers USTVA 393132 and 432675) were found to be uncalibrated. Since the current rating of the RTD is well below that generated by the current bridges and the current output of the bridges were checked with a multimeter prior to commencing the RTD calibration, no violation or IFI was reported.
2. Corrective Actions Taken - At the time of this NRC concern, SQN was in the process of implementing more effective controls over calibrations. SQN Administrative Instruction AI-31, " Control of Measuring and Test Equipment," was revised (revision 2) to establish clearer lines of authority and responsibility Page 5 of 7

O

  • forhandling out-of-tolerance measuring and test equipment.

Results of a special study by SQN of calibration problems was reported to the NRC, November 1985, (Reference F). Tracking, ,

trending, and management reporting improvements were initiated '

(Reference G) to correct seve' 1 calibration problems identified in NRC inspection report 85-0. , dated February 25, 1985.

3. Verification Methodology - The SWEC concern identified for ECTG verification was stated as follows:

RIMS Number Issue RIMS Item A02 851007 012 Uncalibrated current RIMS-005 bridges used for calibration of RCS resistance temperature detectors.

ECTG reviewed the Sequoyah Compliance Licensing files for internal and external correspondence related to this issue.

This review of the pertinent documentation formed the basis for this verification activity.

4. Verification Analysis - The ECTG review indicated that the NRC item was adequately addressed. At the time of this ECTG verification, the SQN plant responses (Reference G) to NRC Inspection Report 85-05 concerning calibration program corrective actions had been found acceptable to the NRC (Reference H).
5. Completion Status - NRC closure on this item is not required because no violation or IFI was reported. Based on the SQN corrective actions and compliance with requirements, this SWEC item can ba closed.

. III. References A. NRC Report Numbers 50-327/85-27 and 50-328/85-28, dated October 1, 1985, from R. D. Walker to H. G. Parris B. TVA memorandum "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - NRC-OIE Region II Inspection Report 50-327/85-27 and 50-328/85 Response to Violations," dated November 1, 1985, from R. H. Shell to J. N. Grace C. NRC Report Numbers 50-327/85-27 and 50-328/85-28, dated November 14, 1985 from R. D. Walker to H. G. Parris D. NRC letter " Report Numbers 50-327/85-27 and 50-328/85-28," dated November 14, 1985, from R. D. Walker to H. G. Parris Page 6 of 7 L

  • I e

E. NRC Report Numbers 50-327/85-39 and 50-328/85-39, dated December 12, 1985, from D. M. Verrelli to H. G. Parris  ;

F. TVA memorandum, " Supplemental Response to Violation (85-05),"

dated November 15, 1985, from R. H. Shell to J. N. Grace G. TVA memorandum, "Sequoyah Nuclear Plants Units 1 and 2 - NRC - OIE, Region II Inspection Report 50-327/85-05 and 50-328/85 Response to Violation," dated March 22, 1985, from J. A. Domer to J. N. Grace H. NRC memorandum, " Report Nos. 50-327/85-05 and 50-328/85-05," dated April 11, 1985, from R. D. Walker to H. G. Parris J

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TVA EMPIAYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: SWEC-SQN-44 SPECIAL PROGRAN REPORT TYPE: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Element REVISION NUMBER: 0

} ..

TITLE: Operational Safety Verification REASON FOR REVISION: N/A r

SWEC

SUMMARY

STATENENT: The items in this report were identified by the Nuclear i Regulatory Comunission (NRC) and were included in the Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) systematic analysis. All items evaluated within this report were verified to be adequately addressed and SWEC concern A02851007012-002 was closed by NRC. Concerns A02851007012-001 -003, -004 are now ready for closure. Corrective action for concern A02851007012-005 is in progress, i

PRRPARATION PREPARED BY:

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MortoA>;  : u-is-r0 NiA l ECSP NANAddR DATE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE 1 CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)

  • SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.

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