ML20214V705

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Rev 0 to TVA Employee Concerns Task Group,Other Sites: Containment Leak Rate Test,Prevention of Inadvertent Procedure Changes to SI-156. Source Documents Insp Repts 50-327/85-44 & 50-328/85-44
ML20214V705
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 11/11/1986
From: Debbage A, Gass K, Knightly J
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20214T770 List:
References
SWEC-SQN-53, SWEC-SQN-53-R, SWEC-SQN-53-R00, NUDOCS 8612090796
Download: ML20214V705 (6)


Text

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP OTHER SITES CEG Element

Title:

Containment Leak Rate Test: Prevention of Inadvertent Procedure Changes to SI-156 SWEC Concerns: A02860115005-001 A20060115005-002 Source Document: NRC Inspection Report 50-327, 328/85-44 Report Number: SWEC-SQN-53 Evaluator: f/M_e - //-//- 9 6 K. R. Gass Date Reviewed by: N Q #f-U-6h J. J. (nightly Date Approved by: M //-//- f[.

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Report SWEC - SQN - 53 NRC Report Numbers 50-327, 328/85-44 I. INTRODUCTION During an inspection covering the period of November 29 through December 6, 1985 (Reference 1), the Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRC) inspector identified two inspector follow-up items (IFI) which were included in the Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) systematic analysis, as follows:

A02860115005-OO1 (IFI-327/85-44-01) NRC to verify Containment Leak Rate Test.

A02860115005-002 (IFI-327/85-44-02) NRC to verify prevention of inadvertent procedure changes to SI-156.

Information on the background, the corrective actions taken, the verification methodology, the verification analysis, the completion status, and any pertinent references for the area of concern is included in this report. l II. VERIFICATION OF SWEC ISSUE A. A02860115005-001, NRC To Verify Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT)

1. Background - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) personnel determined that the outputs from two Mensor precision pressure gauges monitoring the same pressure source were significantly different. Review of the current calibration data with data from previous calibrations showed a change of about 1% had occurred in gauges which are accurate to 0.015% of reading.

When the Mensor calibration performed for the November 1984 test on Unit 2 was used, the gauges yielded consistent readings while monitoring the same pressure source. Based on the above information, SQN decided to use the previous instrument calibration for the Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT) on Unit 1 with the qualification that immediately after the test the prcosure gauges will be recalibrated and the leak rate recalculated using this recalibration data. At the exit interview, SQN management agreed to verify leak rate acceptability based on corrected calibration data prior to plant startup. The NCR inspector identified this matter for followup inspection as:

IFI (50-327/85-44-01): Verify that the Mensor pressure gauges were recalibrated, the CILRT results were recalculated using the corrected calibration data, and the containment leak rate verified to be acceptable prior to requiring containment integrity (reference 1).

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2. Corrective Action Taken - The corrective action for IFI 50-327/85-44-01 (Reference 1) is applicable to this SWEC. SQN l obtained copies of the two (incorrect and corrected) sets of ,

Mensor quartz Manometer pressure gauge calibration reports from l TVA Control Laboratories (Reference 2). TVA engineers adjusted l the final CILRT test results with no effect on the success of l the containment integrated leak rate test.

3. Verification Methodology - The SWEC concern identified for ECTG verification was stated as follows:

RIMS # ISSUE RIMS ITEM A02860115005 New IFI: NRC will RIMS-OOL review TVA's recalibration of Mensor pressure gauges and will verify acceptable containment leak rate.

TVA to recalculate CILRT results.

Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG) reviewed the Sequoyah Compliance Licensing Files for internal and external correspondence related to this issue, applicable procedures, and NEC status and closure files. This review of the pertinent documentation formed the basis for this verification activity.

4. Verification Analysis - The ECTG review of the pertinent documents indicated that the corrective actions for this concern and IFI have been completed and are adequate to resolve the concern and IFI. At the time of this ECTG verification, the NRC IFI remains open, however, the issue is considered by SQN to be ready for NRC closure (Reference 2).
5. Completion Status - Based on SQN corrective action and compliance with requirements this issue is considered couplete and ready for NRC closure.

B. A02860115005-002, NRC to Verify Prevention of Inadvertent Procedure Changes to SI 156

1. Background - The inspector reviewed portions of SI-156,

" Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test," Revision 8, and found that, in general, adequate test controls, acceptance criteria and valve alignments were specified. However, one problem occurred while implementing plant equipment instruction step 6.4.2. Step 6.4.2 requires that the solid state protection system (SSPS) be removed from service to preclude actuation of certain engineered safety systems by high containment pressure.

There are two switches which can be used to defeat the actuation of the engineered safety features: the input error inhibit switch and the mode selector switch. During preoperational Page 2 of 4

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I testing, the CILRT procedure required placing the input error i inhibit switch in the inhibit position. It was recognized that i in this position the switch caused a loss of detector voltage to

'the neutron source range detectors as well as blocking ESF actuation signals. Prior to using procedure SI-156 for the  ;

first periodic CILRT, step 6.4.2 was revised to require placing 4 the mode selector switch in test position. In this manner,

! output signals from the SSPS to actuate certain ECF equipment I

are blocked without effecting the neutron source range detector voltage . In SI-156, Revision 7, step 6.4.2 again required the use of the input error inhibit switch. As a result, when the  !

input switch was placed in the inhibit position for both Trains i A and B logic, the detector voltage was lost for both neutron .

source ranges N31 and N32.

~j Loss of the source range detectors was observed immediately by operations personnel and the action statement which require monitoring the shutown margin every six hours was entered at

< 3:55 a.m. on December 1, 1985. The input switches were repositioned to normal and the LCO was complied with at l 3:56 a.m. (elapsed time of one minute) by returning channel N31 to service (only one source range channel is required in Mode 5). The inspector concluded that the licensee identified  :

the problem and took prompt corrective action.

The review to determine the cause of this event showed that a procedure change made to Step 6.4.2 of SI-156 on October 27, 1982, specified that the mode selector switch will be put into test position. This same requirement is specified ,

in Revision 6 of SI-156. The records further show that no procedure change of Step 6.4.2 was requested for Revision 7 of SI-156. The licensee concluded that somehow in processing certain changes for Revision 7 of SI-156, word processing personnel had called up an earlier Revision in which Step'6.4.2 had not been corrected. No violation was issued in that this i appears to be an isolated event in which the licensee identified the problem and took prompt corrective action. Appropriate action to preclude recurrence of this type of problem was still under review at the conclusion of the inspection. At the exit interview, the licensee agreed to perform a detailed review of SI-156 to verify that no other inadvertent changes were made to

! Revision 7 which could affect the test results. This matter was identified for followup inspection as:

IFI (50-327/85-44-02): Review licensee action to prevent

> inadvertent changes in procedures and verify that no changes were made to SI-156 which affect the test results.

SI-156 was revised December 1,1985, to require that jumpers are used to prevent loss of neutron source range detector voltago when the SSPS is removed from service, i

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2. Corrective Action Taken - The corrective action for IFI-327/85-44-02 (Reference 2) is applicable to this SWEC.

Containment Test Section (CTS) has reviewed the copy of the test procedure used to conduct the CILRT. The review has ascertained that there were no additional typographical errors or changes to the procedure that would affect the validity of the test results.

In the future, CTS will review in detail the working copy of the CILRT procedure prior to use to verify that there are no errors or changes that may affect the conduct or results of the CILRT.

3. Verification Methodology - The SWEC concern identified for ECTG verification eas stated as follows:

RIMS # ISSUE RIMS ITEM A02860115005 New IFI NRC will RIMG-OO2 review TVA action to i

prevent inadvertent changes in procedures and verify that no changes i were made to SI-156 which affect test results.

ECTG reviewed the Sequoyah Compliance Licensing Files for internal and external correspondence related tn this issue, applicable procedures, and NRC status and closure files. This review of the pertinent documentation formed the basis for this verification activity.

4. Verification Analysis - The ECTG review of the pertinent documents indicated that the corrective actions for this concern and IFI have been completed and are adequate to resolve the concern and IFI. At the time of this ECTG verification, the NRC l IFI remains open, however, the issue is considered by SQN to be ready for NRC closure (Reference 2).
5. Completion Status - Based on SQN corrective action and compliance with requirements, this issue is considered complete and ready for NRC closure. I III. REFERENCES
1. NRC Inspection Report Numbers 50-327/85-44 and 50-328/85-44, dated ,

January 14, 1986, D. M. Verrelli to H. G. Parris, j l

2. TVA Memorandum, " Closeout of NRC Inspection Followup Item Numbers 50-327/85-44-01 and 50-327/85-44-02," dated February 5, 1986,

{ J. Hutton to H. G. Parris.

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s TVA EMPIAYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: SWEC-SQN-53 SPECIAL PROGRAN REPORT TYPE: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Element REVISION NUMBER: 0 TITLE: Containment Leak Rate Test; Prevention of Inadvertent Procedure Changes REASON FOR REVISION: N/A SWEC

SUMMARY

STATEMENT: The items in this report were identified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and were included in the Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) systematic analysis. All items evaluated within this report were verified to be adequately addressed and SWEC concerns A02860ll5005-001 and

-002 are now ready for closure.

PREPARATION PREPARED BY:

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SIGNATURE DATE REVIEWS PEER:

M CJq Otfy ,ih116 SIGNATURE DATE TAS:

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CONCURRENCES CEG-H: , lin.eu ////1/f6 SRP: d $ u,,a /-4/M SIGNATURE DATE SIGNATU

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h~ N/A ECSP MANAQ1R DATE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY) l

  • SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.

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