ML20214V673
| ML20214V673 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 10/10/1986 |
| From: | Debbage A, Knightly J, Sauer R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214T770 | List: |
| References | |
| SWEC-SQN-46, SWEC-SQN-46-R, SWEC-SQN-46-R00, NUDOCS 8612090780 | |
| Download: ML20214V673 (7) | |
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT I
EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP n
OTHER SLIES CEG
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Element
Title:
Cable Tray Support Systems CVCS Sampling Line Cracks SWEC Concern:
A02851101011-001
-002
-003 Source Document: NRC Inspection Report 50-327,328/8G-29 Report Number: SWEC-SQN-46 I
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Evaluator:
~dds CW7N 10!1[f5' J. J., Knightly Date Reviewed by:
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A. G.
Debb6ge Date
/0//o[([p Approved.by:
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I Raport SWEG-SQN-46 NRC Report 50-327,328/85-29 I.
Introduction i
During the time period of August 20-23, 1985, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) performed an inspection concerned with cable tray support systems. NRC identified (reference 1) two violations in this area and an unresolved item from an event follow-up which were included in the Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) systematic analysis:
'A.
A02851101011-001, Cable tray support calculations inadequate B.
A02851101011-OO2, Anchor bolt hole size errors C.
402851101011-003, Design analysis error-CVCS Sampling Line Information on the background, the corrective actions taken, the verification methodology and analysis, the completion status, and any pertinent references for these items is included in this report.
II.
Verification of SWEC Issues A.
A02851101011-001, Cable Trav Support Calculations Inadequate
===1.
Background===
NRC Violation 50-327/328/85-29-01 noted that the rigidly designed cable tray support systems in the two diesel generator buildings were not properly designed because the design failed to consider the effects of the response spectrum zero-period-acceleration (ZPA) or the ground acceleration in the design analysis.
2.
Corrective Actions Taken SQN stated (reference 2) that all cable tray support calculations in the Diesel Generator and Additional Generator Buildings were checked for failure to take the ZPA into account.
When the originally calculated acceleration was less than the ZPA, the ZPA was applied in the reanalysis.
Results of these calculations showed that with these additional loads, all member stresses, weld stresses, and anchorage loads were well within allowables.
Accordingly, no structural modifications were required. Sample calculations for the reanalysis effort were sent to the NRC Region II Office (reference 2).
Page 1 of 5
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i 3.
Vyrificatien Methodology. The SWEC concern idsntified for Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG) verification was stated as follows:
RIMS Number Issue RIMS Item A02051101011 Cable tray support systems RIMS-OOL for the two diesel generator l'
buildings, were not designed to appropriate l
quality standards.
ECTG reviewed the Sequoyah Compliance Licensing files for l
internal and external correspondence related to this issue.
This review of the pertinent documentation formed the basis for this verification activity.
4.
Verification Analysis The ECTG review of the pertinent documentation indicated that the NRC item was adequately resolved. The SQN planned corrective actions were found acceptable to the NRC (reference 3) and were verified by the NRC (reference 4) to have been implemented.
The NRC inspector concluded that TVA had determined the full extent of the subject violation, performed the necessary survey and follow-up actions to correct the present conditions and developed the necessary corrective actions to preclude recurrence of similar circumstances.
Following this verification, the NRC closed the item in Reference 4.
5.
Completion Status.
Based on the SQN corrective actions, compliance with requirements, and NRC closure of the violation no further actions on this SWEC item are required. This SWEC item is closed.
B.
A02851101001-002, Anchor Bolt Hole Size Errors
===1.
Background===
NRC Violation 50-327/328/85-29-02 noted that the design requirements for anchor bolt / baseplate interaction specify a baseplate hole size 1/16-inch larger than the nominal anchor bolt size. However, sixteen baseplates for the cable tray support systems in the auxiliary building were improperly designed, constructed and installed in that every hole in the baseplates was drilled 3/8-inch larger than the requis ed hole size. This was due to a design error shown on design drawing 48N1369, Revision 2.
1-3/16-inch diameter holes in the i
baseplate were specified for the 3/4-inch diameter anchor bolts rather than the correct hole size of 13/16 inch.
As a result, the NRC stated that the baseplates as installed may not be able to serve the function required by the design.
Page 2 of 5
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2.
Cirractive Actions Tek*n SQN stated (reference 2) in their response to the NRC that (1) The oversized holes were repaired by welding a square washer plate with 13/16-inch-diameter hole (PL 1/4" or 3/8")
over the existing oversized holes to provide the correct clearance for the 3/4-inch-diameter wedge bolts and (2) All drawings in the Auxiliary and Control Buildings made by this draf ter were checked and the drawing error appeared to be an isolated instance.
3.
Verification Methodology The SWEC concern identified for ECTG verification was stated follows:
1 RIMS Number Issue RIMS Item A02851101011 Baseplates for cable RIMS-OO2 support system were improperly installed.
Holes drilled larger than required to design error on drawing.
ECTG reviewed the Sequoyah Compliance Licensing files for internal and external correspondence related to this issue.
This review of the pertinent documentation formed the basis for this verification activity.
i 4.
Verification Analysis.
The ECTG review of the pertinent documentation indicated that the NRC item was adequately resolved. SQN planned corrective actions were accepted by the NRC (reference 3), and the violation closed (reference 4), NRC stated in reference 4:
The inspector held discussions with licensee's representatives and examined the corrective actions as stated in the letter of response. The inspector cor cluded that TVA had determined the full extent of the subject violation, performed the necessary survey and follow-up actions to correct the present conditions and developed the necessary corrective actions to preclude recurrence of similar circumstances. The corrective actions identified in the letter of response have been implemented.
I 5.
Completion Status.
Based on the SQN corrective actions, 8
compliance with requirements, and NRC closure of the item, f
no further action on this issue is required. This SWEC item 4
is closed.
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C.
A02851101011-003, CVCS Pipe Crrcking
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===1.
Background===
NRC Unrosolved Item 50-327/328/85-29-03 concerned the need for additional analysis by TVA to determine if supports were required for the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) sampling lines (3/4 inch lines).
Preliminary NRC analysis indicated that an error was made in the flexibility check, and that a corrected analysis would show the need for supports.
SQN was to pursue a more detailed analysis to determine if a support was needed.
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2.
Corrective Actions Taken bj NRC unresolved items are not tracked at present on the SQN
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compliance tracking system.
Engineering personnel referred ECTG
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p to the SQN startup list which identifies as ITEM 548 an open item to perform reanalysis and necessary modifications for CVCS systems.
3.
Verification Methodology.
The SWEC concern identified for ECTG verification was stated as follows:
RIMS Number Issue RIMS Item
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A02851101011 Design contained an RIMS-OO3 error in flexibility check.
With error corrected design showed need for a support which was not required, or installed.
3
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ECTG reviewed the Sequoyah Compliance Licensing files for NRC L
correspondence related to this issue, and the NRC status and L
tracking system for the issue. This review of pertinent i
documentation in addition to interviews with engineering personnel formed the basis for this verification activity.
4.
Verification Analysis TVA has undertaken an extensive piping reanalysis effort which includes this SWEC item within its scope.
5.
Completion Status 0
Following the planned reanalysis and modifications if necessary, this item will be ready for closure.
III.
References E
1.
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-327,328/85-29, dated October 25, 1985, Revised November 5, 1985, R. D. Walker to H. G. Parris TVA letter, NRC Inspection Report No. 50-327/328/85 Response to 2.
Violations, dated November 25, 1985, J. W. Hufham to J. N. Grace Page 4 of 5 l
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3.
ERC 1stt:r, R: port No. 50-327/328/85-29, dated Deccuber 16, 1985, R. D. Walker to H. G. Parris 4.
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-327/328/85-49, dated February 6, 1986.
Page 5 of 5
TVA EMPIDYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: SWEC-SQN-46 SPECIAL PROGRAN REPORT TYPE: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Element REVISION NUMBER: 0 TITLE: Cable Tray Support Systems; CVCS Sampling Line Cracks REASON FOR REVISION: N/A SWEC SUNNARY STATENENT: The items in this report were identified by the Nuclear Regulatory Comunission (NRC) and were included in the Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) systematic analysis. All items evaluated within this report were verified to be adequately addressed and SWEC concerns A02851101011-001, and
-002 were closed by NRC. Corrective action for concern A02851101011-003 is in progress.
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