ML20214V398

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Rev 0 to TVA Employee Concerns Task Group,Other Sites.Sqn Refuel Procedure Violation
ML20214V398
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 10/10/1986
From: Debbage A, Gass K, Knightly J
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20214T770 List:
References
SWEC-SQN-11, SWEC-SQN-11-R, SWEC-SQN-11-R00, NUDOCS 8612090671
Download: ML20214V398 (4)


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l TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP OTHER SITES CEG Element

Title:

SQN Refuel Procedure Violation Source Document: NRC Report 328/84-32-01 1

SWEC Concerns: A02 841123 007-001 ,

Report Number: SWEC-SQN-11 Evaluator: #f M /c /o - P 6 K. R. Gass Date Reviewed by: M4 (- Ol s c [ic [f8 J. J. Knightly Date

'l r Approved by: Mv to /ro/f 6 A. G. Debbage Date 1283T 8612070671 861120 +

PDR ADOCK 05000327 P PDR

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Report SWEC-SQN-11 NRC Report 328/84-32 and 328/04-36 I. INTRODUCTION 4

During a special unannounced inspection (Reference 1) of fuel handling activities conducted October 26-28, and 31, 1984, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspector identified an unresolved safety item (328/84-32-01), which was included in the Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) systematic analysis:

AO2841123007-OO1 Failure to follow procedural controls during refuel transfer system.

II. VERIFICATION OF THE SWEC ISCUES A. Background During the inspection, the inspector reviewed the events which led to the bending of the control rod during the transfer from the refueling pit side to the reactor side. During this inspection, NRC identified an area of concern (328/84-32-01), which subsequently (Reference 2) was closed as an unresolved safety item, but upgraded to a violation (328/84-36-01), failure to follcw procedure resulting in an unwarranted challenge of the fuel transfer conveyor interlock and inadequate verification of conveyor position. SQN's Fuel Handling Instruction (FHI)-7 l requires the operator to verify, before raising the fuel transfer

side upender, that the " conveyor at reactor" lamp is illuminated on
the reactor side console and that the fuel assembly is clear of the transfer tube,

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i Contrary to the above FHI-7 was inadequately implemented in that the conveyor interlock was challenged by raising the reactor ~ side upender without the conveyor at reactor lamp illuminated. In addition, verification was not adequately performed to ensure the required conveyor location before raising the reactor side upender.

B. Corrective Actions Taken i SQN stated (Reference 4) that immediately after damaging the Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) in the fuel assembly (FA),

refueling operations were stopped for investigation. To correct

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the binding near the reactor side upender, plant instruction change number 84-1687 for FHI-7, dated October 29, 1984, was issued to raise and lower reactor side upender before receiving the FA to j' remove small alignment offsets of the upender with fuel transfer l canal.

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Page 1 of 2

F C. VERIFICATION METHODOLOGY The SWEC concern identified for Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG) verification was stated as follows:

RIMS # ISSUE RIMS ITEM A02841123007 Failure To Follow Procedure 001 Controls During Refuel Transfer System.

A review was conducted of Sequoyah compliance correspondence, NRC inspection reports and status reports, and the applicable SQN procedure concerning refueling operations.

D. Verification Analysis 5: sed on the ECTG verification activities described in II-C, it was determined that the SQN corrective actions have been completed and are being implemented; and that the SWEC issues on fuel handling have been adequately resolved. NRC item 328/84-32-01 was upgraded to violation 328/84-36-01 and was closed by report No.

50-328/85-44 (Reference 3), which stated:

The licensee has specified in fuel handling instructions. . .

that all interlocks are to be checked out and functional.

Also, if it is necessary to bypass an interlock, the procedure requires approval by the refueling SRO and clear documentation of the event. Further, before raising the upender, the licensee's instruction requires visual verification that the fuel assembly and any inserts will clear the transfer tube flange. The verification is done by means of an underwater TV system. The violation is considered closed.

E. Completion Status Based on SQN corrective action and NRC closure of the unresolved

safety item and violation, the SWEC concern can be closed.

j III. REFERENCES j 1. NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-327/84-32 and 50-328/84-32, dated November 20, 1984, D. M. Verrelli to H. G. Parris, l

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2. NRC Inspection Report No. 50-328/84-36, dated January 23, 1985, J.-A. Olshinski to H. G. Parris i 3. NRC Inspection Report nos. 50-327/85-44 and 50-328/85-44, dated l January 14, 1986, D. M. Verrelli to H. G. Parris a
4. TVA Memorandum " Response - NRC-OIE Inspection Report No.

50-328/84-36 3. A. Olshinski's Letter to H. G. Parris dated l January 23, 1985," dated February 19, 1985 H. L. Abercrombie to i J. W. Hufham

Page 2 of 2 i

TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUNBEE: SWEC-SQN-11 SPECIAL PROGRAN REPORT TYPE: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Element REVISION NUMBER: 0 TITLE: SQN Refueling Procedure Violation REASON FOR REVISION: N/A SWEC SUNNARY STATENENT: The item in this report was identified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and was included in the Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) systematic analysis. The item evaluated within this report was verified to be adequately addressed and was closed by the NRC.

PREPARATION PREPARED BY:

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DATE REVIEWS PEER:

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J /[*M~[h N/A ECSP ! TANAGER DATE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)

  • SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.

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