ML20214C984
| ML20214C984 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1986 |
| From: | Sieber J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Matthews D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| References | |
| TAC-45925, TAC-45996, TAC-46068, TAC-46284, NUDOCS 8611210312 | |
| Download: ML20214C984 (6) | |
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Telephone (412) 393-6000 Nuclear Group P.O. Box 4 Shippingport, PA 15077-0004 November 3, 1986 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:
Mr. Dave Matthews, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Branch Office of Inspection and Enforcement Division of PWR Licensing - A Washington, DC 20555
- Mail Stop 340 -
Reference:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Emergency Response Capability Gentlemen:
By letter June 19, 1986 NRR indicated that licensing actions have been completed for our Emergency Response Facility (i.e. Technical Support
- Center, Operational Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility) and Meteorological Data upgrade (TAC 45925, 45996, 46068, and
- 46284, respectively).
The TAC items have been closed by NRR, subject to post implementation review by tha office of Inspection and Enforcement in conjunction with Region 1.
Per telecon with Mr.
Jerry Simons (I&E) and our NRC project
- manager, Mr.
Peter
- Tam, it was identified that an open item still existed regarding our ERF.
This item is in regard to the location of our ERF and the travel distance from the control room, as previously noted in your letter of May 17, 1984.
It was our understanding that the issues and concerns addressed in the letter had been mutually resolved based on previous discussions with NRR, through site tours by the project manager, and observations of our 1984 and 1985 annual emergency exercises.
This submittal provides the required information and describes the compensatory measures presently in place to ensure easy access between the control room and the ERF in the unlikely event emergency response personnel would be required to travel from one facility to another during an emergency.
8611210312 861103 kl PDR ADOCK 05000334 F
Banvar Valloy Powsr Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Emergency Response Capability Page 2 The following items will be addressed as presented in the subject letter:
Item No. 1 The protective measures tbat will be taken to limit radiation dose received by personnel traveling between the TSC and control room during severe accident sequences.
The estimated dose that would be received by these personnel in transit during such accident conditions.
Response
Two calculation packages have been prepared which determined the estimated doses that could be received by personnel during the trip between the Control Room and the TSC (ERF) during a severe accident (LOCA).
The travel routes and their respective travel times are discussed in item 2 below.
The results concluded that at time = 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> following a DBA LOCA, the 10 CFR 20 radiation dose limits would not be exceeded and that the transit could be made utilizing the various routes dependent on the actual emergency conditions (i.e.
wind direction, type and duration of
- release, etc).
Protective measures that have been taken to limit the dose personnel could receive if the travel between control room and the ERF were required include security contingency procedures which would permit easy access to each location by appropriate personnel and avoid unnecessary delays.
Item No. 2 The time required to travel from the TSC to the control room and the type of transportation that will be provided under all emergency conditions.
The route or routes to be taken in traveling between the TSC and control room and the availability of the transport to be provided.
Response
The TSC is located outside the protected area of both Unit 1 and Unit 2
on Duquesne Light property.
Refer to Figure 1 for a
site plan diagram.
At present, the general routes which can be taken from the Tsc to the control room include:
through the Unit 2
security area, entering Unit 1 at the security Alternate Access Facility (AAF) and proceeding to the control room.
using the public highway between the ERF and the Unit 1 parking area, entering Unit 1 at the AAF and proceeding to the control room.
~.
Beaver Valley Powar Station, Unit No. 1 e
-Docket No. 50-334, Licensa No. DPR-66 Emergency Response Capability Page 3 A
study was conducted to determine the time it would take to travel from the TSC to the control room following the above routes.
Three variations of the above routes were utilized and 4'
in all cases pre-arranged security measures were taken to minimize delays.
A discussion of security measures taken are described in response to item 3.
The travel variations with their respective times are as follows:
(Refer to Figure 1)
Route 1:
utilizing a
staged Unit 2 security vehicle with driver and driving through the Unit 2 security area, parking in the central parking lot, passing through the Unit 1 1
AAF and proceeding to the control room (Time:
3 minutes, 10 seconds).
i Route :2:
utilizing a private vehicle and following the same path as route 1
(Time:
3 minutes, 50 seconds).
A person jogging the same route (time 5 minutes, 15 seconds).
Route 3:
utilizing a
private vehicle and the public highway following route 3
shown on Figure 1, parking in the Unit 1
north parking lot, passing through the Unit 1 AAF and proceeding to the control room (Time:
5 minutes, 40 seconds).
With the nearing completion of our Unit 2 facility, optional access routes will become available which decreases the travel distance between the control room and the ERF.
The optional route would be directly through the Unit 2 site protected area, exiting through the PAF or vehicle gate and proceeding along the roading to the ERf (See Figure I).
1 Item No. 3 The special physical security arrangements that will be established to provide rapid ingress and egress from the i
protected area during emergencies by TSC personnel.
Response
The security contingency procedures discussed in items 1 and 2 above are presently in place to allow for rapid ingress and egress from the protected area during emergencies.
The security arrangements include provisions for securing a
vehicle to transport the emergency response personnel, providing escort if deemed necessary, a badge identification system for easy display, j
and designated routes to avoid unwarranted delays.
Depending on the actual emergency conditions, primary and alternate routes have been established to allow undelayed transit between the control room and the TSC.
Item No. 4 i
The availability of specific data and information from the control room which demonstrates that there is a limited need to send TSC personnel to the control room for this purpose.
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Benvar Vcllsy Powar Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334, Licnnsa No. DPR-66 Emergency Response Cability Page 4
Response
As previously stated in past correspondence, sufficient data and information is available in the TSC.
Based on past exercises, we have demonstrated the ability to provide the necessary management interaction between control room personnel and TSC personnel.
The TSC has been equipped with data collection equipment (SPDS and computer displays of appropriate Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev.
2 parameters) which significantly enhances our existing capabilities for obtaining information from control room instrument channels.
Based on the above and NRR's review and observations noted in their June 19, 1986 letter, we believe adequate provisions are available to satisfy the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix E for emergency facilities and equipment.
Item No. 5 other measures (i.e.
face-to-face communication using closed circuit TV) that would limit the need for TSC personnel to travel to the control room.
Response
our use of the one-way television circuit in the Unit 1 control room provides for an independent method of transmitting specific plant data from the control room to the TSC.
This system was a carry-over from our previously established interim TSC in the Administration Building prior to the construction of the permanent ERF.
With the inclusion of sophisticated computerized data acquisition systems installed in the TSC, the need for the televised circuit is no longer required.
We will continue to utilize the system for the useful life of the equipment.
We also added the position of " Operations coordinator" to the emergency response organization.
This individual is responsible for directing control room and in-plant operational activities and advises the Emergency Director in the TSC of operational matters.
This individual will be located in the control room and thus further limits the need for TSC personnel to travel to the control room to obtain information.
As previously noted in our April 15, 1983 letter, we believe that the establishment of an alternate TSC in the service building will not enhance our capability to perform emergency operations.
Therefore, we reiterate our intention to retract the commitment for maintaining an alternate TSC.
w e Bomvar Valley Powar Station, Unit No. 1 Dockst No. 50-334, Licensa No. DPR-66 Emergency Response Capabilities Page 5 Our backup
- EOF, presently located outside the 10 mile radius, will be maintained as a
holding point for emergency response personnel in the event accessibility to the permanent EOF location is restricted for a
short period of time.
The facility has communications capabilities to obtain information from plant personnel.
Sophisticated data acquisition systems are not available nor necessary based on the intended use of this facility.
We will maintain this facility as a temporary holding location as described
- above, but we do not consider a backup EOF as being necessary based on our design accident conditions, If there are any questions or clarifications in this matter, please feel free to contact my staff.
Very truly yours, V
[. D. Sieber yVice President Nuclear Operations cc: Mr. W. M. Troskoski, Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Beaver Valley Power Station Shippingport, PA 15077 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission c/o Document Management Branch Washington, DC 20555 Director, Safety Evaluation & Control Virginia Electric & Power Company P.O. Box 26666 One James River Plaza Richmond, VA 23261 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:
Mr. Peter S. Tam, Project Manager Project Directorate No. 2 Division of PWR Licensing - A Washington, DC 20555
- Mail Stop 340 -
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