ML20212P308

Quarterly Rept on Nondisclosure of Safeguards Info for Apr-June 1984

ML20212P308
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/30/1984
From:	NRC
To:
References
NUDOCS 8703160063
Download: ML20212P308 (4)

Text

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'V NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION QUARTERLY REPORT ON N0NDISCLOSURE OF SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, prohibits,the unauthorized disclosure of specific types of Safeguards Information.; This section also directs the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to prescribe such regulations as necessary to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards Information. NRC's regulations implementing Section 147 were published in the Federal Register on October 22, 1981 (46 FR 51718). The attachment to this report identifies the specific types of information, documents, and reports that are protected from unauthorized disclosure.

Section 147 also requires that the NRC report on a quarterly basis the Comission's application during that period of every regulation or order prescribed or issued under this section. As required by Section 147, the following items indicate the Safeguards Information withheld from public disclosure under the provisions of the implementing regulations during the period April 1, 1984 through June 30, 1984.

I. Type of Information Withheld In response to a Freedom of Information Act request, information was withheld from public disclosure which was contained in several NRC Safeguards Regulatory Effectiveness Review reports and related records for several nuclear power plants which identified the

. location of vital areas, the size and armament of the on-site guard forces, the identities of and communication capabilities with off-site response forces, details of the alarm systems and information which would disclose weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the security systems.

Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact The public disclosure of this type of information could significantly increase the probability of unauthorized entry into the facilities, and the information could be of considerable value to a potential saboteur in considering or planning a sabotage attempt.

Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld The withholding of this type of Safeguards Information does not deny the public basic information concerning the level of protec-tion afforded material at facilities but does leave information i gaps. A line-by-line review of the documents was conducted to ensure that only the minimum amount of information was withheld.

8703160063 840630 PDR MISC 8703160063 PDR

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II. Type of Information Withheld In response to a Freedom of Information Act request, inf&m'ation was withheld from public disclosure which identified local law enforcement response capabilities, safe havens for use during safe-guards emergencies, and communications shortcomings along particular routes used to ship irradiated nuclear reactor fuel (spent fuel).

Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have. Adverse Impact The public disclosure of local law enforcement agency (LLEA) capabilities, the safe havens, and the information identifying communications shortcomings could reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect on the health and safety of the public, because public disclosure could significantly ' increase the likelihood of theft, diversion, or sabotage of spent fuel shipments. The LLEA response capabilities contain detailed information about the expected timing and extent of LLEA response to an incident or emergency involving a spent fuel shipment. LLEA response is an important aspect of the safeguards measures required for spent fuel shipments to protect the public, and knowledge of LLEA

- capabilities could be of considerable value to a potential saboteur in considering or planning a sabotage attempt.

Furthermore, public release of information concerning LLEA capabilities that was obtained in confidence by NRC could reduce the effectiveness of local police with regard to their response to other crimes. The listing of safe havens could reveal to a potential saboteur an aspect of a licensee's contingency planning in case of emergency, as well as potential route vulnerabilities revealed by the absence of nearby safe havens.

Communications shortcomings reveal specific vulnerabilities in the route which could be of significant assistance to a saboteur in planning an attack.

Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld The withholding of information about LLEA response capabilities, safe havens, and communication vulnerabilities does not deny the public basic information about spent fuel transportation, but does leave information gaps for a potential saboteur. The potential saboteur may risk detection in attempting to discover the additional information. The documents which contain the withheld information were reviewed on a line-by-line basis to ensure that the minimum amount of information necessary to prevent possible diversion was withheld.

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ATTACHMENT IDENTIFYING SPECIFIC TYPES OF INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE

1. Physical Protection at Fixed Sites Infomation not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relating to the protection of facilities that-possess formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material and power reactors.

Specifically:

(1) The composite physical security plan for the nuclear facility or site.

(ii) Site specific drawings, diagrams, sketches, or maps

'. that substantially represent the final design features of the physical protection system.

i (iii) Details of alam system layouts showing location of intrusion detection devices, alam assessment equipment, alam system wiring, emergency power sources, and duress alarms. ~

(iv) Written physical security orders and procedures for members of the security organization, duress codes, and patrol schedules.

(v) Details of the on-site and off-site connunications systems that are used for security purposes.

(vi) Lock combinations and mechanical key design.

I (vil) Documents and other matter that contain lists or locations of certain safety-related equipment explicitly identified in the documents as vital for purposes of physical protection, as contained in physical security plans, safeguards contingency plans, or plant specific safeguards analyses for production or utilization facilities.

(viii) The composite safeguards contingency plan for the facility or site.

(ix) Those portions of the facility guard qualification and training plan which disclose features of the physical security system or response procedures.

(x) Response plans to specific threats detailing size, disposition, response time, and armament of responding forces.

fq (xi) Size, armament, and disposition of on-site reserve forces.

(xii) Size, identity, armament, and arrival times of off-site

-forces comitted to respond to safeguards emergencies.

2. Physical Protection in Transit i

Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relative to the protection of shipments of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material and spent fuel.

Specifically:

(1) The composite transportation physical security plan.

(ii) Schedules and itineraries for specific shipments.

(Routes and quantities for shipments of spent fuel are not withheld from public disclosure. Schedules for spent fuel shipments may be released 10 da after the last shipment of a current series.) ys (iii) Details of vehicle imobilization features, intrusion alarm devices, and comunication systems.

(iv) Arrangements with and capabilities of local police response forces, and locations of safe havens.

(v) Details regarding limitations of radio-telephone comunications.

(vi) Procedures for response to safeguards emergencies.

3. Inspections. Audits, and Evaluations Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relating to safeguards inspections and reports.

Specifically:

Portions of safeguards inspection reports, evaluations, audits, or investigations that contain details of a licensee's or applicant's physical security system or that disclose uncorrected defects, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities in the system. Infor1 nation regarding defects, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities may be released after corrections have been made. Reports of investigations may be released after the investigation has been completed, unless withheld pursuant to other authorities, e.g., the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).

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