ML20212N502
| ML20212N502 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/31/1981 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8703130052 | |
| Download: ML20212N502 (7) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION QUARTERLY REPORT ON NON-DISCLOSURE OF SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION Section 147 of. the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of specific types of Safeguards Information.
This section also directs _ the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) to prescribe such regulations as necessary to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards Information. NRC's regulations implementing Section 147 were published in the Federal Register on October 22, 1981 (46 FR 51718) and are enclosed. The attachment to this report identifies the specific types of information, documents, and reports that are protected from unauthorized disclosure.
Section 147 also requires that the NRC report on a quarterly basis the Commission's application during that period of every regulation or order prescribed or issued under this section. As required by Section 147, the following items indicate the type of Safeguards Information withheld from public disclosure under the provisions of the implementing regulations.
This first report covers the period July 1,1980 through December 31, 1981. Subsequent reports will cover the previous three-month period.
I. Type of Information Withheld On five occasions information was withheld from public disclosure which identified local law enforcement response capabilities, safe havens for use during safeguards emergencies, and communications shortcomings along particular routes used to ship irradiated nuclear reactor fuel (spent fuel). On one of those occasions the withh61 ding was challenged in court. The NRC's position was upheld by the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (Virginia Sunshine Alliance, et al. v. NRC, No. 81-1381 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 8,1981)).
Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact The public disclosure of local law enforcement capabilities (LLEA),
the safe havens, and the information identifying communications shortcomings could reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect j on the health and safety of the public, because public disclosure would significantly increase the likelihood of theft, diversion, or i sabotage of spent fuel shipments. The LLEA response capabilities
! contain detailed information about the expected timing and extent l
of LLEA response to an incident or emergency involving a spent fuel shipment. LLEA response is an important aspect of the safeguards measures required for spent fuel shipments to prctect the public, and knowledge of LLEA capabilities could be of considerable value to a potential saboteur in considering or planning a sabotage l
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-2 attempt. Furthermore, public release of information concerning LLEA capabilities that was obtained in~ confidence by NRC could reduce the effectiveness of local police with regard to crimes not
&ssociated with the shipment. The listing of safe havens could reveal to a potential saboteur an aspect of a. licensee's contingency planning in case of emergency, as well as potential route vulnerabilities revealed by the absence of nearby safe havens. Communications shortcomings reveal specific vulnerabilities in the route which could be of significant assistance to a saboteur in planning an attack.
Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld The NRC makes publicly available spent fuel routes shortly after l they have been approved by the NRC. The routes are published periodically in NUREG-0750, and have also been made available to the public in response to Freedom of Information Act requests.
The withholding of information about LLEA response capabilities, safe havens, and communication vulnerabilities does not deny the public basic information about spent fuel transportation, but does leave information gaps for a potential saboteur. The potential saboteur may risk detection in attempting to discover the additional information. On each occasion the documents which contain the withheld information were reviewed on a line-by-line basis to
, ensure that the minimum amount of information necessary to prevent possible diversion was withheld.
II. Type of Information Withheld On two occasions information was withheld from public disclosure which was contained in NRC inspection reports and which identified various details of the physical security system, such as guard procedures, access controls, alarm systems, and record keeping requirements regarding alarm annunciations at licensed facilities.
Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact The public disclosure of this type of information would significantly increase the likelihood of illegal entry into the facilities and l undetected access and removal of special nuclear material.
I Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld The security requirements that a licensee is required to maintain are contained in 10 CFR Part 73 of NRC's regulations. In those two cases, all of the information in the inspection reports, except for the limited Safeguards Information, was made available to the public.
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The withholding of this type of Safeguards Information does not deny the public basic information concerning the level of protection '
afforded material at facilities but does leave information gaps. i A line-by-line review was conducted of the documents to ensure that j only the minimum amount of information was withheld. '
III. Type of Information Withheld On one occasion information was withheld from public disclosure which was contained in an NRC inspection report and which identified various details of the physical security system for transportation vehicles such as type of vehicle, armament of guards, and the type of communication equipment used.
Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact The public disclosure of this type of information could reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect on the health and safety of the public because public disclosure would significantly increase the likelihood of theft, diversion or sabotage of special nuclear material shipments. Knowledge of the number of guards, quantity and type of armament they have available, and the vehicle's communication capability could be of considerable value to a potential saboteur in considering or planning a sabotage attempt.
Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld All of the information in the inspection report, except for the limited Safeguards Information, was made available to the public.
The withholding of this type of Safeguards Information does not deny the public information concerning the provision for safeguarding special nuclear material shipments. A line-by-line review was conducted to ensure that the minimum of information was withheld.
IV. Type of Information Withheld On one occasion information was withheld from public disclosure which consisted of the detailed physical security plan for an NRC licensed university research reactor possessing formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material.
Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact The physical security plan contained detailed description of measures used to protect the reactor and the highly enriched uranium fuel elements against theft and sabotage. These measures included equipment and procedures used to control access, intrusion detection
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- devices, communications capabilities, and procedures for response to safeguards emergencies. Disclosure of such information would significantly increase the probability of undetected access and removal of special nuclear material, undetected intrusion into the reactor core area, and bypass of f orces for responding to an illegal entry.
Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld The reactor physical security plan was a document included in a Freedom of Information Act request for 15 categories of information associated with a license renewal. Of the 15 categories of information requested, the only document withheld was the detailed physical security plan. Release of this document would have been contrary to the intent of Section 147a(3) of the Act.
V. Type of Information Withheld On one occasion information was withheld from public disclosure which was contained in an NRC investigation report which described details of the physical security plan such as access controls and guard orders used to protect a licensed nuclear power reactor, and contingency security measures employed by the licensee subsequent to the discovery of an abnormal incident. '
Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact Subsequent to the conclusion of its investigation of the incident, NRC prepared a comprehensive report that set forth details of the '
event, estimate of potential impact, investigative data, interview summaries, and conclusions. The report also contained a description of the additional security measures placed in effect by the licensee, and as background data, a description of certain normal security equipment and procedures. The information was withheld on the basis that disclosure would significantly decrease the effectiveness of the vital area access control system used to insure that only authorized individuals having work related needs are permitted access to certain sensitive safety-related equipment.
Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Infonnation was Withheld The remainder of the report was released for public disclosure. The staff believes that withholding the security related data was justified under the provisions of Section 147, and that this information was not necessary in order for the public to assess the cause and impact of the event and the adequacy of the licensee's response to the incident. A detailed line-by-line review of the report was conducted.
VI. Type of Information Withheld On one occasion an NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board's decision and underlying record was withheld from public disclosure which identified various details of the physical security system, such as size of the utility's armed response force, communications systems, alarm systems, and the utility's liaison with local law enforcement authorities for the Diablo Canyon facility.
Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact The public disclosure of this type of information would significantly increase the probability of unauthorized entry into the facility.
This type of information would be of considerable value to a potential saboteur in considering or planning a sabotage attempt.
Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld The Commission conducted an adjudicatory proceeding regarding whether the physical security at the Diablo Canyon facility was adequate. Those proceedings were conducted in camera because the hearing focused on specific details of the utility's physical security plan. Intervenors, including Governor Brown, and their expert witnesses were given access to the physical security plan after they executed affidavits of non-disclosure. There is a motion-pending before the Commission to release those portions of
- the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board's decision which do not contain protectable Safeguards Information. While that motion is being acted upon, the entire decision is being withheld from public disclosure.
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ATTACHMENT IDENTIFYING SPECIFIC TYPES OF INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE
- 1. Physical Protection at Fixed Sites Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relating to the protection of facilities that possess formula quantities of strateg's special nuclear material and power reactors.
Specifically:
(1) The composite physical security plan for the nuclear facility or site.
(ii) Site specific drawings, diagrams, sketches, or maps that substantially represent the final design features of the physical protection system.
(iii) Details of alarm system layouts showing location of intrusion detection devices, alarm assessment equipment, alarm system wiring, emergency power sources, and duress alarms.
(iv) Written physical security orders and procedures for members of the security organization, duress codes, and patrol schedules.
(v) Details of the on-site and off-site communications systems that are used for security purposes.
(vi) Lock combinations and mechanical key design.
(vii) Documents and other matter that contain lists or locations of certain safety-related equipment explicitly identified in the documents as vital for purposes of physical protection, as contained in physical security plans, sefeguards contingency plans, or plant specific safeguards analyses for production or utilization facilities.
(viii) The composite safeguards contingency plan for the facility or site.
(ix) Those portions of the facility guard qualification and training plan which disclose features of the physical security system or response procedures.
(x) Response plans to specific threats detailing size, disposition, response times, and armament of responding forces.
(xi) Size, armament, and dispositon of on-site reserve forces.
(xii) Size, identity, armament, and arrival times of off-site forces committed to respond to safeguards emergencies.
- 2. Physical Protection in Transit Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relative to the protection of shipments of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material and spent fuel.
Specifically:
(1) The composite transportation physical security plan.
(ii) Schedules and itineraries for specific shipments. (Routes and quantities for shipments of spent fuel are not withheld from public disclosure. Schedules for spent fuel shipments may be released 10 days after the last shipment of a current series.)
(iii) Details of vehicle immobilization features, intrusion alarm devices, and communication systems.
(iv) Arrangements with and capabilities of local police response forces, and locations of safe havens.
(v) Details regarding limitations of radio-telephone communi-cations.
(vi) Procedures for response to safeguards emergencies.
- 3. Inspections, Audits and Evaluations Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relating to safeguards inspections and reports.
Specifically:
(i) Portions of safeguards inspection reports, evaluations, audits, or investigations that contain details of a licensee's l or applicant's physical security system or that disclose uncorrected defects, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities in the system. Information regarding defects, weaknesses or vulnerabilities may be released after corrections have been made. Reports of investigations may be released after the investigation has been completed, unless withheld pursuant to other authorities, e.g. , the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).
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