ML20212N472

Quarterly Rept on Nondisclosure of Safeguards Info for Oct-Dec 1982

ML20212N472
Person / Time
Issue date:	12/31/1982
From:	NRC
To:
References
NUDOCS 8703130038
Download: ML20212N472 (5)

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, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

!. QUARTERLY REPORT ON NONDISCLOSURE OF SAFEGUARDS'INFORMATION Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, prohibits the a unauthorized disclosure of specific types of Safeguards Information. This

section also directs the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to prescribe l such regulations as necessary to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of- ,

Safeguards Information. NRC's regulations implementing Section 147 were published in the Federal Register on October 22, 1981 (46 FR 51718). The

attachment to this report identifies the specific types of information,  ;

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documents, and reports that are protected from unauthorized disclosure.

! Section 147, also requires that the NRC report on a quarterly basis the

Commission's application during that period of every regulation or order prescribed or issued under this section. As required by Section 147, the

.' following items indicate the Safeguards Information withheld from public disclosure under the provisions of the implementing regulations during the period October 1, 1982 through December 31, 1982.

I. Type of Information Withheld ,

On one occasion information was withheld from an NRC inspection .

I report for a nuclear power plant which identified details of the l physical security system, such as the control of access to vital i areas, the number of persons on the guard force, type and brand 1 of locks used, procedures used to prevent compromise of keys and-

] lock combinations, and procedures for the search of packages being j brought into the facility. ,

) Unauthorized Disclosure could Have Adverse Impact

! The public disclosure of this type of information could i significantly increase the probability of unauthorized entry into the facility, and the information could be of

considerable value to a potential saboteur in considering i or planning a sabotage attempt. Disclosur'e of 'this type of information also could reasonably be expected to signifi-cantly decrease the effectiveness of the vital area access i

control system used to ensure that only authorized individuals l

having work related needs are permitted access to certain sensitive j safety related equipment.

j Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld . ,_

The security requirements that a licensee is required to maintain are contained in 10 CFR Part 73 of NRC's regulations. In this case, all of the information in the inspection report, except for the limited Safeguards Information, was made available to the i public.

l j The withholding of this type of Safeguards Information does not i deny the public basic information concerning the level of protection afforded material at facilities but does leave information gaps.

1 A line-by-line review of .the document was conducted to ensure that 1- only the minimum amount of information was withheld.

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II. -Type of Information Withheld On one occasion information was withheld from public disclosure which identified local law enforcement response capabilities, safe havens for use during safeguards emergencies, and communi-cations shortcomings along particular routes used to ship irradiated nuclear reactor fuel (spent fuel).-

i Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact

! The public disclosure of local law enforcement agency (LLEA) capabilities, the safe havens, and the information identifying communications shortcomings could reasonably be

!. expected to have an adverse effect on the health and safety .

of the public, because public disclosure could significantly -

increase the likelihood of theft, diversion, or sabotage of spent fuel shipments. The LLEA response capabilities contain detailed information about the expected timing and extent of LLEA response to an incident or emergency involving a spent fuel.

, shipment. LLEA response is an important aspect of the safeguards measures required for spent fuel shipments to protect the public, and knowledge of LLEA capabilities could be of considerable i value to a potential saboteur in considering or planning a i

. sabotage attempt. Furthermore, public release of information i concerning LLEA capabilities that was obtained in confidence

! by NRC could reduce the effectiveness of local police with regard to their response to other crimes. The listing of

. safe havens could reveal to a potential saboteur an aspect

! of a licensee's contingency planning in case of emergency, as i well as potential route vulnerabilities revealed by the absence '

[ of nearby safe havens. Communications shortcomings reveal

< specific vulnerabilities in the route which could be of signifi-cant assistance to a saboteur in planning an attack.

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' Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld The withholding of information about LLEA response capabilities, i safe havens, and communi, cation vulnerabilities does not deny i the public basic information about spent fuel transpor+ Sn, but does leave information gaps for a potential saboteu . The potential saboteur may risk detection <in attempting to discover l the additional information. The documents which contain the i

withheld information were reviewed on a line-by-line basis to '

l ensure that the minimum amount of information necessary to

! prevent possible diversion was withheld, i III. Type of Information Withheld j

On one occasion information was withheld from public disclosure

• which identified the code used to make changes in the estimated l

i time and date of shipments of spent nuclear fuel.

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Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact Public disclosure of the code, which is used to notify NRC by telephone of en route changes to the shipping schedule, and which at the time withheld was expected to be used again for the next series of spent fuel shipments, could reasonably be of considerable value to a potential saboteur in considering or planning a sabotage attempt.

Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld The NRC makes publicly available spent fuel routes shortly after they have been approved by the NRC. Information concerning the

. time and date of future shipments, or in this case the code used for changes in future en route shipments, is withheld. With-holding this information does not deny the public basic information about spent fuel transportation, but does leave information gaps for a potential saboteur. The documents which contained the withheld information were reviewed on a line-by-line basis to ensure that the minimum amount of information necessary to prevent possible diversion was withheld, and all other infor-mation was made publicly available. -

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e ATTACHMENT IDENTIFYING SPECIFIC TYPES OF INFORMATION

~PROTECTEDFROM(l!NAUTHOR12ED1 DISCLOSURE I

1. PhysicalProtectionathixedSites_

Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National ,

I Security Information relating to the protection of facilities that:

i possess formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material '

and power reactors. l' Specifically: '

(i) The composite physical security plan for the nuclear ~

facility or site.

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(ii) Site specific drawings, diagrams, sketches, or maps that substantially represent the final design features "

i of the physical protection system.

(iii) Details of etarm system layouts showing location of intrusion detection devices, alarm assessment aquipment, alarm system wiring, emergency power sources, and duress alarms. ' - ,

(iv) Written physical security orders and procedures for y members of the security organization, duress cudes, and 9' patrol schedules. -

(v) Details of the on-site and off-site communicat' ions systems that are used for security purposes.

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f (vi) Lock combinations and mechanical kep' design.

1 (vii) Documents and other matter that contain lists or locations

of certain-safety-related equipment explicitly identified in

' the documents as vital for purpotys of physical prhtection.

- as contained in physical security plans, safeguards contingency .

I plans, or plant specific safeguards analyses for production

! or utilization facilities. ,

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! (viii)Thecompositesafeguardscontingency,. plan for the facility ,

j or site. .

! (ix) Those portions of the facility guard q'ualification and , Jl J '

training plan which disclose features of the physical ' ,

security system or response procedures.

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i (x) Response plans to specific threats detailing size, disposition, response times, and armament of responding '

forces. .

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4 h?y (xi) 5127 amament, and'dispositon of on-site reserve forces.

'(di) Site, [dentity, armament, and arrival times of off-site

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forces comitted to respond to safeguards emergencies.

. 'k. Physical Protection in Transit-Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relative to the protection of shipments of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material and t spent fuel. .

'd Specifically:

(i) The composite transportation physical security plan. ,

(ii) Schedules and itineraries for specific shipments. (Routes and quantities for shipments of spent fuel are not withheld from public disclosure. Schedules for spent fuel shipments may be released 10 days after the last shipment of a current series.)

(iii) Details of vehicle immobilization features, intrusion alarm devices, and communication syste s.

(iv) Arrangements with and capabilities of local police response forces, and locations of safe havens.

(v) Ddailsregardinglimitationsofradio-telephonecommuni-i " cations.

Procedures for response to safeguards emergencies.

(vi) i 3.p - 1,nspections, Audits and Evaluations l Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relating to safeguards inspections and reports.

Specifically:

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Portions of safeguards inspection reports, evaluations, e

audits, or investigations that contain details of a licensee's '

or applicant's physical security system or that disclose uncorrected defects, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities in the system. Information regarding defects, weaknesses mr vulnerabilities may be released after corrections have l

been made. Reports of investigations may be released L

i after the investigation has been completed, unless withheld pursuant to other authorities, e.g., the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).

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