ML20211L071
| ML20211L071 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/14/1983 |
| From: | Potapovs U NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Robert Lewis NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20011C460 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-656, REF-QA-99900334 NUDOCS 8612150294 | |
| Download: ML20211L071 (2) | |
Text
r OCT 141983
??/
MEMORANDUM FOR:
R. C. Lewis, Director, Division of Project and Resident Programs, Region II FROM:
U. Potapovs, Chief, Vendor Program Branch, Division of Vendor and Technical Programs, Region IV
SUBJECT:
CLOSEOUT OF AITS NO. F02700183 (VITS NO. 82-38) - TVA AUDITS OF TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INC. (TDI) FOUND CORRECTIVE ACTION FORMS SIGNED OFF AS HAVING BEEN COMPLETED WITHOUT EVIDENCE THAT CORRECTIVE ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN i
A Vendor Program Branch (VPB) inspection was conducted on July 11-15, 1983, at r-
-m -
TDI, Oakland, California, which included the subject item in the scope.
The results of the inspection are documented in the attached VPB Inspection Report No.
Review of this item indicated that open audit findings were closed out by TVA during an audit conducted at TDI in June 1982.
Examination of measures taken to preclude recurrence resulted in verification that the current QA program is confirming implementation of corrective actions prior to closeout of nonconforming conditions.
This AITS item has now been closed by the VPB.
Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact J. Sutton (728-8175) or I. Barnes (728-8176).
Uldis Potapovs, Chief Vendor Pragram Branch
Attachment:
As stated
(
cc:
R. L. Baer, IE R. F. Heishman, IE b~
J. T. Collins, RIV R. L. Bangart, RIV j
bec:
VPB 7010 File JWSutton l
l 8612150294 861203 PDR FOIA ELLISB6-656 PDR RIV R& CPS SC:R& CPS BC:VPB t{f D:V&TP JWSutton/1k IBarnes UPotapovs RLBangart
% Q /83
'/ B7f83
@ /gy83
/ /83
&.)
en
.7...
J.
j.
. v.
.vr
.m~ v an.urius o mer i.n..n...:
q%lsm.g
) g. w..
.c;rw er +.,.e.
y..
- '~w:W a I?.M%h?Wi " -
- t.
.C:~ '.'.
?. ~'..
& iQfg' 17.t.,.7.^ *... :.
6,.
.F:~
oan o,ooco-eur a ?,:.
i no.,, y;o 7 -
oan nici.vio p%,i %.u.
i 4;P;s-r.
..~...u...,.,.
,9
..L.J.:
g
... s a. :: '...
. i.
r2/1/82',,A. m W,.'>VITS N61-82-38
...z..r -a ' a., u 2/1/82
.W-s, Sequential Nor 82-069 /
y.
- 3.. om,,;
t,,
.,'g
,N,
..N.=6.a;, v. a l
2s'
- [,
I e-F02700183 f, & ;:,' - -
.a..
ro cu.ai c
.f.c.t a. n oaa a~minio ac,,o.. c.. a.,
.h-F No aCf.o. htcessany ' o '
com.a'ar ~4l5M f :. 0.".b h. MM, -
ti I 'N ' !
T :
g;"l'G@#WM%..',','"?-
.:.$8%A M %2N&k%%t
...p.
. DESCRIPf 6om; Inseet se uassassif.eet.
. =
ng,spntoTo.
DATE
- 'C-t REettVtoevi'?O* a catt i
Subj^ctEDR-Transamerica Delaval.:TVA audited
.. xv. w,
.w e
L',ffl6 f.?.u?E>f.h3tM.. iM 77 and found. corrective actions forms had been og _ _ _
signed.offJas corrective actions having
'm.
.c
.+.f._
' :' M,?N4.F F*l,WM? dN'.
b'e;n completed when in fact no evidence d; ';,.- ' " -
c-f.%
A/t e
that aeopeeotive action nad Deen taken.
t'-w n-
- diiFN//#a 3.fM'.
c S
F:',rs642 $5ia.%4.i M
Hartsville.jPhippsBend,Bellefonte.
o 4, eve,1%:~. T~ui RII-Lewis
,p4gfp/p <wl. 4 j..y;: ?;$pWh$$.r&$,4);
s
', ',. *'.'.2::+
M. ~,.c.{kW t
Wt.,
V t.
.?.....
t
^ Is. c
,..i i N.
.Q *'. ; 'v. -
t..
,~1 Y f. ', ',*:[,,l **.
't
~.?h4k' &Y
& ". b5',- N'Ne,'f-
[
- f o[o7 Closeout' Mao.bh i '. U
@5Ik M.
.h N}3 $Nbk,:
p io ourS
!.f}
', c'
><(
,. 5 G.
- v. s hucuan nicutatonv co.w1sjon
- . td,A,L.CONTROi,'FOR N-
'..a - e.f c
{ & 'g*
'.. ;" f tj5 h:....%.'. '* ***
' t.
- .(u %
- .:Jes; &s...K gz f
M
- .'. n.y m,.. t.
- &:.n4,,r,*}
.f ;.g.ptr. 'r =.
+
e.
a
. r.y:n....
- 44'n : 4,.:.*;J.., w: g r 8:n
.t..w.- fo pe.#
aa-j,.
s:
a b e' U b IhEUI*
't >
't d' f i _ *. If,, ___,
.L.
~!* f DUE DATE TO COGNIZANT INDIVIDUAL OR COORDINATOR:
3 6.-.. -
SP-
.g REQUESTED DUE DATE (INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE):
Open CORRECTED DUE DATE:
DATE ACTION COMPLETED:
Rsw.Rxs:
@ liv 1.1s<t
-A,,sa,- M 9 9 9 s p a a </ n -. o /.
/
V j
t..
.n
TRANSAMERICA UtLAVAL, INCORPORATED OR6AgIZATION:ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA INSPECTION INSPECTION REPORT 99900334/83-03 DATE(S):
10/17-21-83 ON-SITE HOURS: 102 NO.:
SPONDENCE ADDRESS: Transamerica Delaval, I'ncorporated C0 Engine and Compressor Division ATTN:
Mr. C. Matthews, Vice President and General Mgr.
550 85th Avenue Oakland, C-alifornia 94261 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTACT: Mr. R. E. Boyer, Manager, Quality Assurance TELEPHONE NUMBER:
(415) 577-7422 NCIPAL PRODUCT: Emergency diesel generators.
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ACTIVITY: Transamerica Delaval, Incorporated (TDI) has one inprocess contract for domestic nuclear emergency diesel generators.
ASSIGNED INSPECTOR:
M 2E %
/
,5
- n, g(4-J. W. Sutton, Special Projects Section Date i
OTHER INSPECTOR (S):
L. E. Ellershaw, Reactive Inspection Section (RIS) j I. Barnes, RIS i
APPROVED BY:
I N _.,.s s - es - p o.
I. Barnes, Chief, RIS Date XNSPECTION BASES AND SCOPE:
A.
BASES:
10 CFR Part 21 and 10 CFR Part 30, Appendix 8.
8.
SCOPE:
This inspection was made at the request of both NRC Headquarters and Regional Offices as a result of the identification of numerous deficiencies in emergency diesel generators (EDGs) that have been furnished to various sites.
Reactive inspection subjects addressed l
during this inspection included:
(1) failure of engine mounted fuel oil (cont. on next page)
PLANT SITE APPLICABILITY:
Engine mounted fuel oil line failure:
50-416/417.
Use of commercial cable in IE systems:
50-416/417, 50-424/425.
Failure of cylinder head exhaust l
bolts:
50-322, 50-312, 50-458, Exhaust pipe flange capscrew bottoming out:
50-322, 50-416/417, 50-458/459, 50-400, 50-413/414, 50-206, 50-440/441, dcont. on next page) l qqo2Go$a9 255 ig.
r2pp d#
m
y ORGANIZATION: TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INCORPORATED ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA REPORT f
INSPECTION NO.:
99900334/83-03 RESULTS:
PAGE 2 of 12
- s-f '
SCOPE:
(cbn t.')
fp line, (2) use of commercial cable ln IE systems, (3) failure of cylinder head exhaust bolts, (4) leakage 6f itarting air check valve during seismic test, (5) bottoming out of exhaust pipe flange canscrew, (6) potential bottoming out of starting air valve capscrews,f )) crankshaft failure G
at Shoraham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS), and (8 potential failure of piston skirt castings.
The inspection additionally included a review of procurement control and material identificatiori and control.
PLA$fSITEAPPLICABILITY:
(cont.),,
507438/439, 50-460/513, 50-445/446,/ 50-424/425, 50-329/330, 50-518/519/520/521, 50453/554.
Leakage of starting af r~ check valve:
50-440/441, 50-553/554, 50-518/519/520/521, 50-329/330, 50-438/439,,50-445/446..'
/
y 1
A.
, VIOLATIONS:
,1
~-
f l
-Nont e
B.
P.ONCONFORMANCES:
1 t<
1.
Contrary to,Critorion V of Appe'ndix B t'o 10 CFR Part 50 and paragraph 4.1, subparagraph 4.1.1.2 in 3ection 4 of the Quality
,' ~,
Assurance Manual (QAM), the'enginedring specification sheets (i.e.,
- f purchased inaterial specifications)~ which were utilited for procurement of engine mount.cd electrical centrol cables required only commercial grades of cable and'did not include the IEEE standOes that were invoked by customer specifications.
2.
Contrary to Criierion V of Appendix fj tk'.0CFRPart50, l
paragraph.5.'3 in Section 5 of the QAii and paragraph 2.1 in Section II of QC Prccedure I.P.300:
7 a '.
Written instructions and provisions for ihdication of inspection act:eptance were not provided to.ManufW turing by Manufacturing Engineering with respect to welding of Sh.earon Harris EDG fuel oil line clamps / brackets.>
I b.
A Welding Roport was not made available' fer the fuel oli line l
clamps / brackets which would allow conff kation that monitoring by a. weld inspector had been performed hnd that a qualified procedure and welding operator had been used.
3.
Contrary to Critarion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 and paragraph 3.4 in Section 3 of Quality Control.(QC) Manual I.P.500:
/
2So m
ORGANIZATION: TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INCORPORATED ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION
[ e OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA C
REPORy INSPECTION 99900334/83-03 RESULTS:
No.
PAGE 3 of 12 r
There was no evidence to indicate that materials which were used a.
to fabricate EDG ASME Section III Code Class 3 component supports (Midland) and fuel oil systems (Midland and Grand Gulf) were procured from vendors who were either identified on the list of approved suppliers or had been subject to audits by a quality control representative.
b.
Prior to 1982, ASME Section III Code Class 3 fasteners were procured from vendors for which there was no evidence to indicate that either audits had been performed by a quality control representative or that the vendors were identified on the approved suppliers list (ASL) as being approved for supply of this product.
4.
Contrary to Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 and paragraph 3.6.4 in Section 3 of QC Manual I.P.500, review by the Receiving Inspector of material certifications for ASME Section III Code fasteners did not assure compliance with the purchase order as evidenced by acceptance of certifications with:
(a) identified chemical composition not conforming to material specification requirements, (b) incomplete mechanical test data, and (c) material heat treatment not reported as required by paragraph NCA-3867.4 in Section III of the ASME Code.
5.
Contrary to Criterion V of Appendix 8 to 10 CFR Part 50 and paragraph NCA-3867.4(e) in Section III of the ASME Code, TDI accepted and subsequently certified stock materials (i.e., materials procured from manufacturers without specification that the material be produced using a Quality System Program that had been verified by survey to be in accordance with the requirements of Article NCA-3800 in Section III of the ASME Code) as being in compliance with Section III of the ASME Code.
Material specification requirements other than those applicable during melting had, however, not been
{
performed on either a piece or heat basis and product analysis was l
not performed on each piece of stock material.
6.
Contrary to Criterion V of Appendix 8 to 10 CFR Part 50, paragraph 4.2.2 in Section 4 and paragraph 9.2 in Section 9 of QC Manual I.P.500, a comparison between 45 Material Verification Sheets (MVSs) and the Material Control Records (MCRs) for material issued for use in the fabrication of piping systems component supports on Midland Diesel Engine S/N 77002 revealed 11 discrepancies in material identity.
l 257
Y ORGANIZATION: TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INCORPORATED j
ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.:
99900334/83-03 RESULTS:
PAGE 4 of 1 There were ten cases where the MCRs showed various heat numbers being issued for particular production orders; however,.different heat numbers were recorded on the applicable MVSs as being used for those production orders.
There was one case where, for the same production order, two~ pieces from the same heat number were recorded on the MVS as being used; however, the MCR showed that just one piece from that heat number had actually been issued.
7.
Contrary to Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 and paragraph 5.1.2 in Section 5 of the QAM, prior to October 1981, manufacture of piston skirt castings did not comply with engineering component drawing instructions with respect to performance of specified stress relief heat treatment.
C.
UNRESOLVED ITEMS:
None D.
STATUS OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS:
The findings contained in Inspection Report No. 99900334/83-01 were not reviewed during this inspection because of issuance of the report immediately prior to this inspection and correspondence, accordingly, being incomplete.
E.
OTHER FINDINGS OR COMMENTS:
1.
Failure of Engine Mounted Fuel Oil Line:
TDI issued a 10 CFR Part 21 report on September 21, 1983, as a result of an evaluation performed in regard to a fuel oil line failure at Grand Gulf.
The failure occurred at a "swagelock" fitting in the fuel oil line between the engine mounted fuel transfer pump and the engine fuel oil header and has been ascribed to have resulted from excessive line vibration.
Documentation review by the NRC inspector established that the failed fuel oil line did not have the installed line supports that are required by TDI Drawing No. 02-450-13.
It was additionally reported that required line supports had not been installed by TDI on the other EDG at Grand Gulf, Unit 1.
Examination of the assembly drawing confirmed that support clamps / brackets were required at three different locations on the fuel oil line and were to be attached to the engine using 1/4 inch fillet welds.
As a result of this failure to comply with TDI engineering drawing requirements, the NRC inspector reviewed the inprocess Shearon Harris EDG contract with 2B n_
ORGANIZATION: TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INCORPORATED ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.:
99900334/83-03 RESULTS:
PAGE 5 of 12 respect to fuel oil line clamp installation.
From this review, it was ascertained that this operation was not included as a route sheet operation and, accordingly, documented provisions were not made for inspection acceptance.
Welding records were requested by the NRC inspector. for the installed clamps / brackets in order that a verification could be made of both the use of a qualified welding procedure and qualified welding personnel, and also to ascertain whether a weld inspector had monitored the welding operations and inspected the welds.
Records were not made available by TDI to allow confirmation that clamp / bracket installation was an operation that was controlled in accordance with QA program requirements.
As a result of the NRC inspector findings, one nonconformance was identified (see paragraph B.2 above).
Fron this inspection, the NRC inspector ascertained that the absence of required process controls for clamp / bracket installation was applicable to all TDI furnished EDGs that were referenced in their 10 CFR Part 21 report dated September 21, 1983, and, thus, assurance does not currently exist with respect to both accomplishment of clamp / bracket installation and adequacy of attachment welds.
2.
Use of Commercial Cable in IE Systems:
TDI issued a 10 CFR Part 21 report on September 27, 1983, and a a.
supplement on October 20, 1983, in regard to the potential exceeding of the manufacturer's temperature rating for en'gine mounted control cable insulation at operating temperatures.
The 10 CFR Part 21 report identified that replacement cable with a higher insulation temperature rating would be furnished to each I
affected nuclear facility.
This condition was identified during a review performed during August and September 1983 in regard to the EDGs furnished to the Alvin W. Vogtle Station.
During review of this subject by the NRC inspector, it was I
ascertained that TDI had procured and installed commercial grades of cable and had not invoked various customer requirements (e.g., IEEE Standards, IPCEA Standards) in their procurement specifications.
The NRC inspector confirmed that appropriate revisions had been made to TDI purchased material specifications to require supply of cable both in accordance with IEEE Standard requirements and manufacture to have utilized a quality assurance program which was in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.
259
ORGANIZATION: TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INCORPORATED ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.:
99900334/83-03 RESULTS:
PAGE 6 of 12 b.
Mississippi Power and Light Company (MP&L) notified NRC, Region II, on December 14, 1982, in regard to receipt of TDI Service Information Memorandum (SIM) No. 361 dated October 21, 1982, at Grand Gulf Station, Units 1 and 2, which recommended replacement of EDG panel circuit cable that had been established to have failed an IEEE-383 flame test.
MP&L made a final 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) report on this subject on January 13, 1983, for Unit 2, with Unit 1 being reported under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21.
Review of correspondence by the NRC inspector identified a TDI letter to Bechtel Power Corporation Los Angeles Power Division dated November 4, 1982, which indicated that TDI had handled the IEEE-383 flame test failure as a SIM, rather than as a 10 CFR Part 21 report, because it was believed that loss of the cables would not adversely affect the ability of the engines to perform their specified function.
Review of various TDI custoner specifications by the NRC inspector confirmed that the control cables should have been procured invoking a QA program that had been accepted as complying with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 8 and requiring proven flame test properties.
As a result of the inspection findings, one nonconformance was identified (see paragraph B.1 above).
3.
Failure of Cylinder Head Exhaust Bolts:
Review of the subject problem which occurred at SNPS indicates that bolting failures resulted from thermal expansion and limited clearances in the exhaust manifold area.
The problem has been established to apply only to the Model DSR 48 engines and has been corrected at SNPS.
This item will be further reviewed during a subsequent inspection to verify that this problem has been reviewed with respect to the other sites that have received Model DSR 48 EDGs; i.e., River Bend and Rancho Seco.
4.
Leakage of Starting Air Check Valve During Seismic Test:
This l
inspection was a followup to previous inspections on this subject l
which were documented in Inspection Report Nos. 99900334/82-01 and 99900334/82-02.
The NRC insoector verified that all customers had now been notified and that corrective actions were under way, with some customers obtaining replacement kits and others returning the valve to TDI for repair.
Inspection of this subject is now considered complete.
2S)
A
7 ORGANIZATION: TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INCORPORATED
/
ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.:
99900334/83-03 RESULTS:
PAGE 7 of 12 5.
Bottoming Out of Exhaust Pipe Flange Capscrews:
This problem was reported by SNPS and answered by a letter dated February 3,1983, to Long Island Lighting Company.
TDI engineering review confirmed that the finished. flange thickness used for the SNPS engines (i.e.,
3/4 inch) could allow a " bottoming out" condition to occur.
This review also established..that this condition pertained only to the Model DSR 48 engine and only to SNPS in that category.
TDI engineering issued a change order on February 9,1977, which increased the finished flange thickness to 7/8 inch from 3/4 inch.
This action precluded a similar " bottoming out" condition in the Model DSR-48 engines furnished to the River Bend and Rancho Seco sites.
The NRC inspector additionally confirmed that appropriate length bolting had been supplied to SNPS to eliminate this condition.
Within this area of inspection, no nonconformances were identified.
6.
Potential Bottoming Out of Starting Air Valve Capscrews:
TDI issued a 10 CFR Part 21 report to the NRC on May 13, 1982, pertaining to the potential " bottoming out" of the capscrew which holds the-starting air valve assembly in the cylinder head.
" Bottoming out" of a capscrew in the tapped hole in the cylinder head prior to proper seating of the assembly will result in an erroneous applied torque reading and could lead to failure of the assembly capscrew.
NRC inspector review confirmed that customers had received the 10 CFR Part 21 notification and that TDI engineering had issued a l
change order on May 13, 1982, which appropriately modified the length of the capscrew to elir.inate the potential for this condition.
7.
Procurement Control:
a.
Materials Used in Component Supports and Fuel Oil Lines - A review of available audit records for vendors who supplied materials used in the fabrication of ASME Section III Code component supports and fuel oil lines revealed the following:
(1)
Pacific Pipe Company - Records were not available to substantiate any audit activity by TDI.
This vendor had, however, been placed on all ASLs dating back to December 22, 1975.
Numerous items had been supplied by Pacific Pipe which were subsequently certified by TDI as meeting ASME Section III Code Class 3 requirements.
1 261
1P ORGANIZATION: TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INCORPORATED ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.:
99900334/83-03 RESULTS:
PAGE 8 of 12 (2) Key Pipe and Supply Company - The only available records denoting qualification of this vendor were two, one page Vendor Quality Program Surveys dated, respectively, March 31, 1975, and March 22, 1982, and which were vendor self evaluation forms.
The first survey form was completed by the Key Pipe and Supply General Manager.
It was noted that the General Manager had checked off that there was no QC Manual and that his quality program had no written procedures for:
drawing, specification and contract change control; calibration of gages and tools; control of purchased and subcontracted material; and indication of inspection status.
The General Manager had additionally checked off "No" to the following:
"Do you maintain raw material control procedures which include:
i Certification of raw material composition by your suppliers?
ii Periodic laboratory verification of raw material certification?
iii Segregated storage of raw materials?
iv Lot control of raw material, traceable to the item?"
The second survey form was completed by a Key Pipe and Supply Sales Department employee and was received on March 22, 1982, by TDI.
The TDI QA Manager had made the following written notations on this form, "Not acceptable for Code or Non Code Safety Related Material." This vendor was placed on the TDI ASL as early as December 7, 1977, and l
had supplied numerous items which were subsequently j
certified by TDI as meeting ASME Section III Code Llass 3 l
i requirements.
(3) Braman Dow and Company - The only available record denoting qualification of this vendor was a one page Vendor Quality Program Survey (self evaluation) form which was dated October 12, 1976.
Braman Low was placed on the TDI ASL dated December 7, 1977.
Numerous orders for material were i
placed with Braman Dow prior to their inclusion in the ASL and which were subsequently certified by TDI as meeting ASME Section III Code Class 3 requirements.
262 l
m
lf ORGANIZATION: TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INCORPORATED ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION d
0AKLAND, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.:
99900334/83-03 RESULTS:
PAGE 9 of 12 (4)
E. M. Jorgensen Company - TOI approved this vendor on the basis of a one page Vendor Quality Program Survey (self evaluation) form which was dated March 2,.1976.
In this self evaluation form, Jorgensen stated that their program was in compliance with MIL-Q-9858A.
b.
Fastener Materials - A review of available audit records and material certification for a sample of ASME Section III Code f~astener procurement revealed the following:
(1) Prior to 1982, no vendcrs were identified on the ASL as being specifically approved for the supply of ASME Section III Code fasteners.
Review of purchase orders established that ASME Section III Code fasteners had been procured from Sargent Nut and Bolt since 1977.
This company was stated by TDI personnel to be an individual who was acting as an agent for fastener suppliers.
No survey records were made available with respect to this company.
From the sample of purchase orders examined, it appeared that the majority of ASME Section III Code fasteners ordered prior to 1980 from Sargent Nut and Bolt were supplied by Cardinal Industrial Products Corporation.
The only available record seen with respect to qualification of this vendor was a Vendor Quality Program Survey (self evaluation) form which was approved by TDI QC on January 24, 1980.
Subsequent to early 1980, ASME Section III Code fasteners ordered from Sargent Nut and Bolt were supplied by Power and Engineered Product Company (PEPCO) which holds an ASME Quality System Certificate.
The TDI QA program permits approval of ASME Certificate Holders without survey.
(2) Review of Cardinal Industrial Products Corporation certified material test reports (CMTRs) which were furnished to TDI indicated various anomalies.
No information was seen that would indicate TDI personnel had questioned or rejected the CMTRs on receipt.
Examples noted included rejectable composition values; e.g.,
(a) carbon content of 1-8 nuts, Purchase Order 87613, Item 2; (b) carbon and sulfur contents of 3/4-10 nuts, Purchase Order 87046, Item 3; and (c) rejectable phosphorus and sulfur contents and missing carbon content for 1-8 nuts, Purchase Order 85747, Item 2.
Examples of other anomalies noted included missing hardness data (Purchase 263 s~
v ORGANIZATION: TRANSAMERICA._LAVAL, INCORPORATED ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.:
99900334/83-03 RESULTS:
PAGE 10 of 12 Order 87631, Item 8, 1.1/4 x 2 3/4 hex capcrews), failure to identify proof loads used (e.g., Purchase Order 85747, Items 1, 4, and 5; Purchase Order 14434, Items 1 and 2) and no reference.to use of a QA program in production of materials furnished prior to 1979.
Numerous CMTRs furnished by Cardinal Industrial Products Corpor.ation and some furnished.by PEPCO material manufacturers were also observed to not comply with the requirements of NCA-3867.4 in Section III of the ASME Code with respect to reporting of material heat treatment.
As a result of the inspection findings in 7.a and 7.b above, nonconformances B.3, 8.4, and B.5 were identified.
8.
Material Identity and Control:
A review of MCRs and MVSs which were associated with 45 specific production orders related to component supports fabricated for oce on Midland Diesel Engine, S/N 77002, revealed 11 discrepancia n material identity.
The MVS, a document used to record the heat...bers of specific items in a production order, was signed off by the Authorized Nuclear Inspector just prior to the attachment of the NPT symbol.
The MCR is established for each heat number and each size of material as it is received.
When material is to be issued for use in fabrication, the quantity and production order numbers are entered; thus, maintaining a running account for inventory purposes.
It was during a comparison between the MVSs and MCRs that nonconformance B.6 was identified.
9.
Potential Failure of Piston Skirt Castings:
An initial review of this subject was made during the July 11-15, 1983, inspection of TDI which is documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 99900334/83-01.
An additional review was performed during this inspection to more fully identify the circumstances pertaining to this problem and to ascertain what requirements had been imposed by TDI Engineering for production of the piston skirt castings.
Piston skirt, P/N 03-341-02-AN, was released for production on April 21, 1978.
This piston design utilized a Belleville washer system and was introduced to replace a previous spherical washer system which had produced piston crown separation problems.
The material specified by TDI Engineering for the piston skirt was an 80,000 psi tensile strength nodular iron.
The indicated required hardness range was, however, equivalent to a 100,000 psi tensile 254 A
r ORGAN 8ZATZON: TRANSAMERa 4 DELAVAL, INCORPORATED ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.:
99900334/83-03 RESULTS:
PAGE 11 of 12 strength.
This was noted by the TDI Foundry in December 1978 and TDI Engineering was stated to have opted for the 100,000 psi tensile strength to reconcile the specified mechanical properties.
To accomplish this, the,TDI Foundry introduced fan cooling of the castings from the normalizing range.
Review by the NRC inspector of TOI inform'ation indicated that a total of 45 piston skirt failures have occurred between_ April 1980 and May 1983 with the Belleville washer design.
Failures have been attributed by TDI personnel to have resulted from a combination of operation stresses and residual stesses introduced by the fan cooling method.
A stress relief range heat treatment was initiated by TDI for the piston skirt castings in October 1981 which was stated to have resulted from a machining study.
Recommended corrective actions for fan cooled piston skirt castings produced prior to October 1981 included stress relieving and nondestructive examination.
Review by the NRC inspector of piston skirt engineering drawings for various designs indicated, however, that all the drawings contained a note requiring that the castings be stress relieved.
The failure of the TDI Foundry to comply with this requirement prior to October 1981 has been identified as nonconformance B.7.
The specific heat treatment practices used prior to introduction of fan cooling could not be verified as a result of the unavailability of previous revisions of heat treatment procedures.
A design change was also made on August 10, 1982 (P/N C3-341-04-AE) to a half stack Belleville washer system which was stated to increase the thickness in the area where most cracking problems have occurred.
The identities of which nuclear engines have the type
"-AN" and which have the type "-AE" piston design were not determined during the inspection.
10.
Shoreham Crankshaft Failure:
A review was performed of TDI 1975 design data for the torsional' dynamic response of the original 13 x 11 crankshaft utilized in the SNPS engines.
This review was made as a result of the receipt of preliminary information from the Failure Analysis Associates investigation of the crankshaft failure which indicated that the 13 x 11 crankshaft did not satisfy Diesel Engine Manufacturers Association (DEMA) recommendations with respect to induced superimposed stresses resulting from torsional vibratory conditions.
The design data indicated a nominal stress of approximately 2600 psi for the most significant order of vibration (i.e., 4th order harmonic) which is considerably below the DEMA recommended limit of 5000 psi.
In discussion, it was established 265 adL
Y ORGANIZATION: TRANSAMERIC. JELAVAL, INCORPORATED ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA INSPECTION 99900334/83-03 RESULTS:
PAGE 12 of 12 that an improved analytical technique was introduced subsequent to shipment of the SNPS engines which was used for all remaining nuclear application diesel engines furnished by TDI.
Of the enginas furnished, only SNPS and San Onofre, Unit 1, were analyzed by the original approach.
The SNPS engines were stated to have not been reanalyzed.using the revised approach until August 1983; i.e., subsequent to the SNPS crankshaft failure.
Review of this data showed that the nominal stress'for the 4th order harmonic had increased to approximately 5300 psi which is marginally above the OEMA recommended limit. The NRC inspector additionally examined the torsional design data from the currcnt analytical method for the SNPS replacement 13 x 12 crankshafts.
This data indicated a 4th order harmonic torsional stress of approximately 3000 psi which is considerably below th'e DEMA limit.
Review of similar data for the other TDI furnished nuclear application engines did not indicate any harmonic torsional stress values that were in the vicinity of the DEMA recommended limit of 5000 psi.
The San Onofre, Unit 1, analysis which used the original approach will be subject to further review in order to assure design adequacy.
During the exit meeting, TDI management informed the NRC. inspector that they had no prior experience of crankshaf t failures in eight cylinder diesel engines.
It was additionally indicated that torsiograph measurements made on the SNPS engines during plant performance testing showed satisfactory results.
I m
266
Transamenoa l'n';':""!;"%';f,'"3
,n gglgggl 550 85th Avenu3 4
P.o. Box 2161 oakland, Ca!ifornia 94621 7
(415) 577 7400 Novsber 9,1983 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 83-01 Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76001 Docket No. 99900334/83-01 NOV 1 a 198 Gentlemen:
Please refer to your letter of October 3, 1983 covering the inspection of our facility July 11-15, 1983. We received your letter October 11, 1983. In a telephone conversation with your Mr. J. Sutton, he advised that the 30 days in which we are re-quired to respond started when we received your letter.
Attached are our Corrective Action, Preventive Action, and completion dates for the 2 violations and 8 of the 9 non-conformances. On nonconformance G we request you review our ccanents and advise us of your decision.
Sincerely, R. E. Boyer, Manager Quality Assurance i
REB:hw Enclosures gqoiz3os+L 1 PP d49
Transamenca l','","a";as',;,'o",i i,
Delaval
= 8 = ~'-
P.o.kox 2161 Oaklar.d. California 94621 (415) 577 7400 VIDIATIONS 1.
Jacket Water Pu::o Shaft Failure -
Corrective Action - On July 20, 1983 Transamerica Delaval submitted a 10CFR21 Report on the Water Pump Ass mbly in question to the NRC.
Preventive Action - Transamerica Delaval has re-examined its position of what is reportable. As stated in the above mentioned 10CFR21 Re-port, the specific Water Pump Assembly failure was reviewed for re-portability.
It was decided not to report, since the Assembly was unique to Shoreham and would be replaced before any qualification testing was started. Therefore, a substantial safety hazard would not be created. All future problems similiar to this will be reported.
Ca:pletion Date - The actions were ccrnplete July 20, 1983.
2.
Fuel Injection Line Corrective Action - On July 20, 1983 Transamerica Delaval sub-mitted a 10CFR21 Report on the Fuel Injection Line in question to the NRC.
Preventive Action - Transamerica Delaval has re-examined its position on what is reportable. As stated in the above mentioned 10CFR21 Report, the Fuel Line failure was reviewed for reportability when the failure occured. The conclusion of the review was that the failure was not reportable. This failure was isolated to Shoreham.
The cause was a defect on one piece of stock. Hundreds of lines were manufactured from this batch of material for both Cocmercial as well as Nuclear Engines. No other failures have been reported.
Any future failures of this type will be reported.
The inspection procedure for injection line material has been re-vised to prevent any defective material being used.
i Completion Date - The Corrective Action was completed on July 20, 1983.
l The Preventive Action was completed on Novecber 2, 1983.
Transamerica Delav3 Inc.
gg g
Engine and compr:ssor [
]n hglgggl 550 85th Avenue P.O. Box 2161 oakland, California 94621 (415) 577 7400 NONCONFOR&NG.S A.
Mill Test Report for P.O. 45333 Corrective Action - The Tubing which was received on P.O. 45333 has been inspected to insure compliance to the material requir ments.
Chmical analysis, hardness, and non-destructive testing has been perfomed. All material in stock meets the material requirements of the Purchase Order.
Preventive Action - A letter has been written to the Quality Control Supervisor with copics to the Purchasing Department and the Quality Engineering Supervisor.
In this letter the Quality Control Super-visor was instructed to reviea this matter with the Receiving Inspectors, give the adequate training to prevent reoccurance, and to document the training. The Quality Engineering Sumrvisor was instructed to make this subject a point of review for tae next internal audit of Receiving Inspection. The Purchasing Department was asked to notify the Supervisor of Quality Engineering of any current orders for this material so that he may insure compliance to our QA Program.
In addition to this letter, additional inspections will be performed on material received to insure compliance to purchase material speci-fications of this material.
Cmpletion Date - The Corrective Action and Preventive Actions were completed on November 4, 1983. Follow up and auditing will continue thru the next 6 months.
l B.
Lay Out Drawings Corrective Action - The Drafting Rom practice will be changed to l
l indicate that marked prints may be used in lieu of layouts for minor j
redesigns if the intent of the redesign can be clearly conveyed. The marked print, along with the Request for Drafting Action, and the re-l lease mmo are sufficient documentation.
l Preventive Action - Training will be conducted by the Manager of Design for the Designers and the Manager of Product Engineering on the Revised Drafting Room Practice. Training will be documented.
l l
Completion Date - The Corrective Action and the Preventive Action will be complete by December 6, 1983.
t
Transamenca Delaval I
T Page 2 C.
Design Calculations Corrective Action - Calculations for the 1979 Design will be reviewed, signed and dated by the Manager of Design for the Designer who did the calculations. The Manager of Engineering will witness these calculations. This Designer is no longer with the Company.
The calculations for the 1982 Design will be transfered to the appropriate fom and signed and dated by the Designer. The Manager of Design will witness the design.
Preventive Action - Training will be conducted by the Des Manager for the Designer on design calculations. This training 1 specifi-cally cover E0P 4, Drafting Room Practice Paragraph II.A.6, and the Design Calculations Book. This training will be documented.
Completion Date - The Corrective and Preventive Action will be com-plete by December 6, 1983.
C.
D Sheets Corrective Acticn - Engineering Release Notices will be prepared properly executed, and released for D-4956 and D-4986.
Preventive Action - An Engineering Depart: ment Procedure will be prepared covering the preparation, review, issue, purpose and control of D-Sheets. Training will be conducted and documented on this new procedure for related personnel.
Completion Date - The Corrective Action will be emplete by Dece:Iber 6, 1983. The Preventive Action will be c eplete by January 16, 1984.
Transamenoa Delaval
)
T NONCONFOIEANCES Page 3 E.
Jacket Water Pump Assembly Route Sheets Corrective Action - The Route Sheet for the Jacket Water Pump Assembly has been lost or misfiled. A recent inspection of these Assmblies has been perfonned at the job site. A copy of the Field Inspection Record will be filed with a copy of the Assa:bly Route Sheet master in our files. This will document inspection of the Pump Assenbly.
Preventive Action - A training program will be conducted on Route Sheets for all personnel whose jobs have any relationship to the use of Route Sheets. Coordination and interdepartment actions will be stressed. Responsibility for control of all Route Sheets will be assigned and documented. Follow up will be a part of the next internal audit for related departments.
Completion Date - The Corrective Action will be completed by December 6, 1983. The Preventive Action will be carplete ' by January 16, 1984.
F.
Jacket Water Purm Parts Route Sheets Corrective Action - On the Jacket Water Punp Shaft, operation 90 stated " inspect". Operation 80 stated "deburr".
Inspector 20 said he did operation 90 when he stanped operation 80. He has added a note to the Route Sheet stating this and stamped off operation 90 with date 11-8-83.
On the Ecute Sheet for the Jacket Water Pump Shaft and for the Seal Retainer, Inspector 20 stamped off the final sta::p with the date 11-8-83.
Preventive Action - Inspector 20 will attend the training pro-gram on Route Sheets mentioned under Nonconformance E, Preventive Action above.
Camletten Date. - The Corrective Action was completc.d 11-8-83.
The Preventive Action will be completed by Januarj 16, 1984.
Transamenca Delaval i
T Page 4 G.
Jacket Water Pump Analysis Coments - Paragraph 15.3.1.5 states that the Engine Jacket Water Pump will bt shake tested. The heading of this Paragraph is " Seismic Testing of Cag lex Auxiliaries". Paragraph 15.4 of E0P-1 states:
"it may be noted that any it ms or assemblies, once qualified for one contract, need not be requalified for subsequent jobs provided the response spectra are of comparable levels.
The response spectra of the original Pump and the redesigned Pump are of comparable levels.
The qualification stat ment for 03-425-03 Jacket Water Cooling Pump revision dated October 18, 1983 states, in part, "we submit that these changes do not have any negative effect on the seismic qunlification of the subject Pu=p....."
A letter dated October 13, 1982 from David Beck to John Gee / Dave Wulf, which was reviewed by Mr. Foster during the Audit also addresses the matter of the Pmp being qualified by similarity.
It is our opinion that this finding is not a nonconformance.
We respectfully request that you review this matter and advise us of your decision.
H.
Purchase Material Specification RL-019-000 Corrective Action - The Purchase Material Specification has been approved by the Manager of Product Engineering on Novmber 8,1983. The original Spec. Release was made on 10/6/82. The Release Slip (Form E-241) was signed by the Manager of Product Engineering on 10/11/82.
Transatiserica Delaval T
NONCONFORMANCES Page 5 H.
Yeventive Action - The Product Fn@% Manager has been informed of the requirements of EDP 7.
He has reviewed this Preventive Action and Corrective Action and understands his responsibility.
Ccepletion Date - The Corrective and Preventiva Action was ccepleted on November 8,1983.
I.
10CFR21 Report, Coucling Elements, Dated June 23, 1983 Corrective Action - The 10CFR21 Report dated June 23, 1983 stated that a copy of the report would be sent to each affected site by July 15; 1983. The letter was sent, late, on August 18, 1983.
Since the sites were notified, although late, no effective action can be taken at this time.
Preventive Action - Training will be conducted on 10CFR21 and the Division 10CFR21 policy. Responsibility for empliance will be clearly established. This training will be documented. A
" tickler" file will be established to insure that dates established on 10CFR21 Reports are met.
l i
I l
l
o
\\
DEC 02 993
- Docket No. 99900334/83-01 Transamerica Delaval, Incorporated Engine and Compressor Division ATTN: Mr. C. Mathews General Manager 550 85th Avenue Oakland, CA 94261 Gentlemen:
Thank you for your letter of November 9,1983, in response to our letter dated October 3, 1983. As a result of our review, we find that additional information, as discussed with your Mr. R. E. Boyer during a telephone call on November 22, 1983, is needed. Specifically, please describe with respect to items B, C, D, F, H, and I in the Notice of Nonconformance (NON) what actions have been or will be taken to assure committed personnel training has resulted in required quality program understanding and compliance. With resp?ct to item G in the NON, we will review this subject including the information presented in the referenced telephone call during a future inspection.
Please provide the additional information within 25 days of the date of this letter.
Sincerely, p.at BT.3
.a_a tAapova Uldis Potapovs, Chief Vendor Program Branch bec:
JTCollins RLBangart JEGagliardo TFWesterman JWSutton DMB-IE:09 RIV
- 5' A,
RIS SC:RIS BC:VPB D:V(Tf/s JWSut n/rc IBarnes UPotapev RLBangart 11/$/83 11/ic/83 11gg83 11/s /83 y M
c946\\%CTO&
\\P Qw
WUwfun;\\m uuurwuuum 7
'Qglgygl 550 85th Avenu)
P.o. Box 2161 oakland, californ's 946.
)
,=
(415) 577 7400
/
Deced er 8, 1983 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cocznission
~ ~
Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive Suite 1000 ECI 3W Arlington, Texas 76011 Attention:
Uldis Potapaus, Chief "l
Vendor Program Branch J
Gentlemen:
Please refer to your letter of Decenber 2, 1983 which was in re-sponse to our letter of Novecber 9.
Following are our couments describing the steps we will take to insure the training conducted has resulted in the required Quality Program understanding and coupliance:
B.
Each Designer and the Manager of Product Engineering will be interviewed to insure that they understand the revised drafting room practice. This interview will be conducted at least 2 weeks after the training mentioned previously has been coupleted. The interview will be h m ted.
C.
The Design Calculation Book will be checked once a conth for the next 3 months to insure that the Designers are couplying with E0P4, Paragraph II, A.G.
D.
All new releases of D sheets will be reviewed for com-j pliance to the new D sheet procedure for the next 3 months.
F.
Route Sheets from Inspector 20's area will be reviewed during the next 3 months to insure that all operations are signed off. This will be done when the Route Sheets are filed. Any problem Route Sheets will be returned for correction to Inspector 20 and hmted by his Supervisor.
ReviewofMaterialSpecificationsheetswillbd.anitem H.
of review during the next internal audit of the Engineering Department.
I.
The only 10CFR21 Report sent out since the Tickler File was set up was sent out to the Customers involved on the same
-%t2,30605 0>7/
Ddaval
)
/
Elli a
Decenber 8, 1983 Page 2 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccxmission I. (Contirmed) date as tha 10CFR21 was sent to the NRC. No additional information was required by the Custcnners. All future 10CFR21 Reports will be handled in the same manner, thus eliminating this major problem. The Tickler File will be used when additional information is required by the Customer.
This area will be reviewed during the next internal audit of the Q.C. Department On my response to Item G; in the third paragraph the date October 18, 1983 should be 1982. This was discussed in the telephone conversation with Mr. Sutton on November 22, 1983.
If additional information is required, please contact me.
Sincerely, 3.E. 6m w R. E. Boyer, Manager Quality Assurance l
REB:hw e
f l
Docket flo. 99900334/83-01
- JAN 0; g Transamerica Delaval, Incorporated Engine and Compression Division ATTH: Mr. C. Mathews Vice President and General Manager 550 85th Avenue Oakland, CA 94261 Gentlemen:
Thank you for your letters of December 8 and November 9,1983, in response to our letters dated October 3 and December 2,1983. We have reviewed your reply and find it responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice of Violation and Notice of Nonconformance. We will review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future inspection te determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be maintained.
Sincerely,
Original Signed byl C. J. HALE
Uldis Potapovs, Chief Vendor Program Branch bec:
JTCollins RLBangart JEGagliardo TFWesterman JUSutton DMB-IE:09 e
BC:VPBN/[
D:V5TP;'
- SPS bB UPotapovs RLSekgart 7 I
JWSu on/rc $\\,1/[arnes
/84 1/6/84 1/;g/84 f 1/H /84
$4o1130502 6;7