ML20210T327

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Forwards Containment Sys Branch Request for Addl Info Re Containment & Subcompartment Analysis & Combustible Gas Control,Containment Spray,Isolation & Shield Bldg Ventilation Sys,Per Review of PSAR
ML20210T327
Person / Time
Site: Satsop
Issue date: 09/30/1974
From: Tedesco R
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To: Deyoung R
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
CON-WNP-1804 NUDOCS 8605300057
Download: ML20210T327 (4)


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'r:C MQUgST- NOR ADDITIONAL IN70EMATION POR WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM, WWP-3 6 g (

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. Plant Mes:-- Washington Public Power Supply System, WNF-3 & 5 ~ g;

.. Docket Nos. : 50-508/509, .f.Su,,. a. -

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{NSSS Suppliers Combustion Engineering

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, Architect Engineer Ebasco I

contain= ant Type: Dry, dual 6 Esepensibla Branch le Project Manager: LWR 1-3; P. O'Reilly i

Esquested Completion Date: September 27, 1974 ..  !

' Applicant's assponse Dates November 29. 1974 1

.Beview Status
. Awaiting Information

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. The enclosed request for additional information (Q-1) for the subject

plaats has been prepared by the Contsi:1aent Systems Branch after reviewing *

~the applicable portions of the WNP-3 PSAR. Our questions pertain to tho' contain===t analysis, subcompartment analysis, combustible gas control -

system, contain= ant spray system, isolation system, and shield building ventilation system.

A draft of these questions was provided to the Project Manager on September' 13, 1974. _ .

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Robert L. Tedesco - ; ,i,

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{ 042.0 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BRAN m

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! 042.1 - Tabl.E 5.3-2 gives the pressure of the secondary side of the

, j: (6.2.1) steam generators as 1070 psig for full power and 1170 psig for j zero power. These pressures are higher than those used in the l' stema line break analysis. Justify the pressures used in the

'l steam line break analysis or redo the analysis using the higher pressure values.

1 042.2 In the analysis of steam line breaks you analyzed a spectrum (6.2.1) of double-ended breaks at various power levels. For breaks smaller than the full double-ended break, the assumption of slot breaks would appear to be more appropriate. Discuss the effect on your calculations if slot breaks were assumed.

042.3 Provide the following information regarding the steam line break (6.2.1) analysis:

(1) Discuss possible single failures in the main and auxiliary feedwater systems by which additional

> fluid could.be added to the steam generator following a steam line break. The failure of an i isolation valve in the main or auxiliary feedwater lines and the addition of fluid stored in the lines and injected by the feedwater pumps should be

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considered.

(2) If the above single failure analysis indicates that additional fluid mass and energy should be included in the steam line break analysis, redo the analysis and provide the revised mass and energy release data.

042.4 Provide the results of the subcompartment pressure response (6.2.1) analyses; i.e., the calculated pressure differentials as a function of time for the most severe pipe break in each sub-compartment.

l 042.5 Provide analyses of spray line and surge line ruptures in the s

(6.2.1) pressurizer compartment.

042.6 Provide a tabulation of the flow coefficients used in the reactor (6.2.1) cavity subcompartment analysis. Using two representative vent flow path examples from the reactor cavity model, show how the flow coefficients were determined.

l 042.7 Provide and justify the break type and area assumed for the (6.2.1) reactor cavity analysis which results in the maximum reactor L cavity pressure. Provide plan and elevation drawings showing the assumed break location, and give the dimensions of the pipe i4

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i l 042.7 penetrations, reactor cavity annulus, upper and lower reactor j

(6.2.1) cavities, and insulation. , _

i 042.8 Identify the model volumes shown in figures 6.2.1-49 through (6.2.1) 6.2.1-51B for the pressurizer, steam generator, and reactor

.; cavity subcompartment models. I l

4 042.9 Describe how movable obstructions to vent flow, such as in-

-l (6.2.1) sulation, ducting, plugs and seals, were treated in the sub-compartment analyses.

042.10 Provide plan and elevation drawings of the containment sumps j (6.2.2) showing the protective screen assemblies over the sump suction i points. Compare the design of the assemblies to the guidelines j of Regulatory Guide 1.82.

1 042.11 The statement is made on page 6.2-126, that if the operator (6. 2.' 2) determines that containment spray system initiation was in-advertent, he may terminate spray flow. Discuss the information that will be available to the operator to make this determination, and describe the procedure the operator must follow.

042.12 The statement is made on page 6.2-126 that actuation of the (6.2.2) containment spray system is initiated by the coincidence of a two-out-of-four containment high-high pressure coincidence l circuit signal and a safety injecti>n actuation signal. Discuss the adequacy of this approach to limit containment pressures i for postulated main steam or feedwater line breaks inside containment for both small and large piping ruptures.

042.13 Discuss the proposed capability of the shield building to (6. 2. 3) resist exfiltration and maintain a negative pressure under wind loading conditions characteristic of the plant site.

042.14 Specify and discuss the basis for establishing the design inward (6.2.3) leak rate of the shield building.

l 042.15 The statement is made on page 6.2-165 of the PSAR that contain-(6.2.3) ment isolation will be initiated by means of a Containment Isolation Signal (CIAS), which occurs on containment high pressure.

Discuss the adequacy of this approach, where there is no diversity in the containment isolation signals. Discuss and justify your reasons for not including the safety injection and main steam isolation signals as containment isolation signals. Discuss and justify your reasons for not wanting the main feedwater lines j to be isolated upon receipt of a containment isolation signal.

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. 042.16 Discuss when during normal plant operation purging of the '

i (6.2.4) . containment would be required, including the frequency and duration of purge operations. Identify the instrumentation

, and,setpoints that will initiate containment isolation, including purge and vent valve closure. Provide assurance that containment isolation will occur.

042.17. Discuss the essential specifications that are used in the i (6.2.4) design of the containment vent and purge valves; e.g. , design

~j temperature, pressure, differential pressure, radiation i exposure and dynanic loads. Describe the tests that have or

! will be conducted to demonstrate that the valves will operate i as specified.

4 j Justify that test conditions are representative of conditions that would be expected to prevail following a pipe break accident. Provide the test results.

042.18 Specify the mass and area of aluminum and zinc in the contain-(6.2.5) ment and the mass of zirconium cladding in the core.

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