ML20056G983

Comment on Whistleblower Protection Issue

ML20056G983
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	08/27/1993
From:	Wollesen E AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
References
FRN-58FR41108, RULE-PR-30, RULE-PR-40, RULE-PR-50, RULE-PR-60, RULE-PR-70, RULE-PR-72 58FR41108-00035, 58FR41108-35, NUDOCS 9309080032
Download: ML20056G983 (44)

Text

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hd TO: 'IEE CHIEF, RULES REVIN AND DIRECTIVES ERANCH

!CAIL S~CP: P-223 FRW: E N ARD S. WOLLETN 420 Winona Blvd.

ff3 E u.S. NUCLEAR RecuthIDRY CCt44ISSION Rochester NY 14617-374.

g WASHINGTON DC 20555 (716) 266-1156 'g l OBJECTIVE:

To Identify Regulatory Activities perforned By The Nuclear Regulatory Carmission (NRC)

That Lessened the Protection Of Er:ployees And Cantinues To Enforce Known Fear That I Retaliation Is Taken Against Those Who Report and Bring Up Safety Issues In Nuclear power Facilities, Especially Florida Power Corporation's Crystal River Unit #3 (m-3).

HIGHLIGHTS OF ISSUES:

SB'rION I Answers to the questions asked of the public [7590-01].

SECTIgLII Incidents in where the NRC aided the Employer and destroyed enployees. The NEC docrented that a plant was not required to follow procedures nor required to docu~ent violations, nor to develop and take corrective action to preclude recurrence

of the violations. These NRC activities and others included in this report CHILLED any g employees frcrn any reporting, intemal or to the NRC; even an ex-NRC Inspector will not 3 raise safety or quality issues.

The NRC investigated ccrnplaints alleging lessening of the Quality Assurance program at G-3 and harassnent, f ound one of the alleged harassed persons abruptly terminated the day before the NRC investigation started; and that NRC report was never issued.

I The Region II Allegations Coordinator and the Inspector General were notified of violation cover-ups by the NRC. No action is known to have been taken.

g These actions show that the NRC is not acting independently, is not taking actions E required and authorized to enf orce the requirerrents and the license to operate a nuclear power plant; thereby creating an atrosphere cantrary to the intent where individuals with safety concerns feel free to engage in protected activities without fear of retaliation.

The f ollowing report is issued in response to and in of f ort to assist in the resolution I of the disastrous conditions that exist likely to enst in cthers.

at least in one nuclear power plant and is Report [7590-01] Titled NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO!44ISSION, Whistleblower protection; Request for Corrent, Cover letter Dated July 30, 1993, with a response date of no later than Septecher 1,1993, issued by Ja es Liebernan, Director I office of Enf orcecent.

Respectfull' r uhnitt - ,

l i _ -A g l Edward' <S. Wo b sen August 27, 1993 E Terminated Senier cuality Auditor, From cR-3 3 (copy list attached) pS Again, I repeat my request to address the NRC in person on these issues and to assist in the costructive resolution of the atmosphere contrary to the intent and to share the independent cooperative problem solving techniques by education.

9309080032 930827 I PDR PR 30 SEFR41108 PDR A

I Edward S. Wol1esen Report to the IGC August 27, 1993 SFITIm I Cmtrents on the SUPPLDerrAL INFORMATIm page 3:

Para. 1 -

True the IEC nust rely on the observations and reports of the many sployees in the plants. This response shows that the NRC did not use the information to resolve the problems. And the Imc condoned plant employees to disregard procedures. TEC actions are contrary to the IEC expectations that sployees in the nuclear industry to be free to raise potential safety issues. The IEC even expressed that an employee reporting potential safety and quality issues was a thorn in the IEC's I side.

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True that the Licensee has the responsibility for the safety of the plant and,for fol1owing procedures and requirements. When people f al1 to their death and managment approved and tranagement required provisions, known to violate OSHA rules, that allowed the circumstance for a person to fall in a nuclear plant, managment must be looked at closely. Managment signed that the review of the procedure was ccuplete and ALL requirments were ret. When in f act those same management personnel were made aware of the OSHA deviations contained in the procedure. We must rmeTber, these same persons are making decision for all procedures and signing that all reviews are complete; but docuTents prove that these signatures repeatedly are signatures with NO action required by the procedure process.

l In the past several years at G-3, several employees lost life, careers l 1 l

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I Edward S. Wollesen I Report to the IEC August 27, 1993 l

and f amily over the stress created by the management at CR-3 refusing to acknowledge safety, quality, and procedures. To have the public and the personnel of CR-3 obtain the protection and assurance that the CR-3 plant I will operate safety and in event of an accident, when using the docments at the EOF with assurance of current data, the IEC MUST start to use the l cmplaints of the workers and take those words seriously; not conjecture by plant management; get the facts, and act.

Para. 3 -

This topic is wel1 and good, BUT TOO LCNG of a process. With the evidence and the actions performed in front of the NRC in May 1991, the

!EC failed to perform. Now the IEC is waiting for the Department of Labor; over two years and the terminated employees are being blacklisted, I the !EC sits back and does nothing.

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Facts the IEC knew in May 1991:

Mr. Wollesen was harassed in 1987, badge pulled and sent for j evaluation, and FpC ignored the evaluation suggestion

• Mr. Wollesen was reporting issues internally

• Mr. Wollesen spoke to the IEC on May 9,1991 I + Mr. Wollesen was the topic of an IEC investigation into Mr. Wollesen's g 1987 haras m t camTencing Monday May 13, 1991 5 Mr. Wollesen was intimidated on May 10, 1991

• Mr. Wollesen was terminated under suspicious circumstances May 10, 1991 Mr. Wollesen was not given any disciplinary action including any warning, just imTediate termination without just cause.

TheIEC discovered that FPC put aside the Humn Resources Manual sections 2

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! for employee protection because the Human Resources Manual, in that i

section, was considered to be just a guideline. FPC also determined that for Mr. Wollesen, other sections of the Human Resources Manual were " law"

! and without progressive discipline contained in the by-passed Human l

Resources Manual, temination was the only discipline. While giving Mr.

Hollesen and Ms. Collins (Burgess) stif f sentence, FPC learned that Mr.

Kamann, Ms. Collins imediate Supervisor, conducted rrany facets of his outside private corporate business us.ing many FPC assets and that Mr.

I Karann furthered Ms. Collins business on FPC time, premise and Mr. Eamann was not disciplined in the 1 east for months. When the IEC 1 earned of this gross miscarriage of justice the IEC should have acted. The IEC's lack of action scares the current workers at CR-3. Most workers knew Mr.

Wollesen to be fair, understanding, following the rules to the tee, and

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very supportive of FPC. The mployees learned that IF a person of Mr. 4 l

Wollesen's 10 years of solid, unsoiled service, who advanced through the l corporation, assisting FPC through NRC violations properly could be teminated without warning, then anyone could be terminated for any i little thing. These meloyees are scared.

With these facts, why did the IEC choose to wait to investigate? Why did the IEC choose to hide the report developed the week of May 13, 1991, showing that Mr. Wollesen was harassed and that the Quality program was reduced? Why did the NRC accept an unqualified Quality Programs Director explanation of the thought to be improvements to the Quality program, t

, when in f act the Director had no idea what quality in nuclear power plants is, and the NRC had allegations substantiated by IEC investigation to the contrary? This very Director terminated Mr. Wollesen and was the

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Eh d S. Wollesen heport to the NRC August 27, 1993 Outage Shif t Manager who threatened two Quality personnel (one being Mr.

Wollesen) for addressing the " Gamna-Metrics" issue where undetemined parts and personnel were used on safety related systems for correcting 10CFR part 21 deficiencies. This Director of Quality was the Manager of staff who knew in June 1990 the safety procedure had potential violations of OSHA Regulations and that Director allowed the problem to remain, and sent harassing statements to Mr. Wollesen through supervision. In the Fall of 1990 Mr. Dennis O. Johnson fell to his death. Mr. Hickle harassed Mr. Wollesen and used his position of authority to teminate Mr. Wollesen for identifying safety and gatlity problems.

TL enployees are not safe today. And employees who report lose their job, career, all assets, family and virtually their life. Is this the way the nuclear industry should treat these eTployees who report safety issues. This is not the free feeling addressed by this report. Make Nuclear power safe, resolving these issues.

I Ccruents on the SUPPLDOTTAL INFORMATION page 4:

I middle para. -

The DOL process is time consuming and the total discrimination process I is backwards. The DOL does not understand the technical issues of a nuclear power plant and therefore they do not understand when a person is reporting safety and quality issues; nor do they understand the seriousness. An e ployee reporting violations of procedures, policies and license requirenents means little to the DDL representatives; as seen in my particular case, and I'm sure others.

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Edward S. Wol1esen  !

Report to the !GC August 27, 1993

- The DOL stumbles through the legal court action; not nuclear safety. The

- corporate high priced lawyers make legal issues of process, putting aside the truth, nuclear safety and rights of the crrployees. The IGC can not 1

follow-up and try to make a determination of discrimination. We must i u consider the difference in attorneys and the finances available to the dif ferent parties. The corporations stand to loose substantial stms with u a discrimination determination. The truth would be so cheap, except for j

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the reputation of the plant, and the upper managers , along with the fine l i

imposed. Therefore the corporate lawyers are highly paid to prove, at any cost, that the plant was in some way correct. The emple ee must find I an attorney to represent him or her on a contingency basis in rcst cases.

While the ex-employee runs out of money and keeps getting turned down i frca employment, the corporation continues to thrive. Tirre and truth is l l

critical, but not the way of the present system, i 1

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bottom para. - l Here is a significant problem with the process. "The IEC responds to technical ' aspects' of allegations. However, to a large degree, the IEC relies on the DOL for investigating all allegations of discrimination...."

i i The DOL investigations are not addressing the nuclear safety, procedures, I quality and other issues quite essential for safe nuclear power. HOR CAN THE DOL EE D~pECTED TO DETERMINE DISCRIMINATION WHEN THEY ARE NOT TRAINED IN THE NUCLEAp pORER GENERATION pKUIRDENTS? The DOL never sees the l truth nor all of the facts until the hearing (s). Even then the Administrative Law Judge has others prepare his Decision And order. HOR l

CORRECT IS THIS PROCESS? NOT GOOD AT ALL. In the case of Florida power l 5 i

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'I l I Edward S. Wo11esen I Report to the NRC August 27, 1993 Corporatien vs Wol1esen and Col 1 ins, al1 of the requirements for I discrimination were met. The ALJ's decision, prepared by others was l

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swayed by issues that had little bearing and were not the issues in front  !

of the ALJ for decision. In the ALJ's own report, the evidence showed discrimination to be willful and deliberate by the Corporation. The SOL l l was required to render his finding in 30 days af ter the response briefs I were received. They were received in February 1993 and no action has i occurred as the SQL, as reported to Congress, is too busy. The process  !

1 is too lang and ineffective controls to keep the process running. Only I the terminated enployee and the attorney lose by the time delay.

Replacing a life long great AA credit rating is not done by money alone; l but it takes a lot of money of live with out credit and s ployment.

THE REMAINING EMPLOYEES ENCR WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY. NO ONE WILL CCEE FORTH IN THAT PLANT. MUCH EFFORT AND TIME IS AND WILL BE SPENT ON i tE7#ING THE PLANT, NOT OPERATING THE PLANT. NCfr ONLY IS THE UNIRONMENT CHITJRD BUT FROZEN; M.'D THE PROCESS ALONG WITH TFE NRC ARE CAUSING THIS FREZZE.

The NRC is the only agency with the expertise to determine technical

'I nuclear issues, the DOL should be able to detennine fair sployee l

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1 treatrent practices by corporations f ollowing their Huran Resources I Manual procedures. A ccrrposite panel with both sides having the ability l to hear and respond could get to a resolution sooner. Also allowing the sployee to have unlimited access to doctrnents would help. A reassessrent of the penalties and fines assessed to the utilities to j lessen the penalties for corporations assisting in the resolution - no matter what that resolution is could help. In the case of FPC, the cost 6

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'E August 27, 1993 l of loosing was greater than the cost of untrue sworn documents and fancy I lawyers, the truth was no contest for the utility; only impression and I

winning. A review of the facts and unwarranted actions by corporate representatives shows behavior to disregard ernployee rights thereby wi11ful discrimination has occurred. <

I Discrimination cases could be clearly identified by the following:

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+ Humn Resources policies put aside. WHY? Corporations were required to have the Human Resources Manuals for protection of the employee and l to show that the Corporation fol1 owed Iogical path to termination.

putting aside those rules and procedures shows deliberate and willful j disregard for the employee and the governing bodies that required the procedures. One of the bodies is the DOL. A showing of gross misconduct is when the DOL allows putting aside the Manual for a minor excuse.

• Great latitudes for sorre employees and others no latitude nor warnings.  !

• intimidation of employees and repeated threats of loosing their job.

. untrue notarized statements frcrn directors, and other officials. l

• audit reports not containing all deficiencies and no other deficiency l

document used were used.

+ untrue, or kind-of-true testimony. When the "right" question proves the perceived truth to be not true, scmeone was telling untruths to hide i

the truth; this is very serious. Will the "right" truth be known in a i

! critical time of the plant excursions; likely not. people who are not wholly truthful are dangerous in the nuclear plant. Case of Wollesen and Collins vs Florida power Corporation depositions and testimony show rrany remaining plant staff were telling untruthful informtion that made FpC' l position look great; this included the director of the quality programs -

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ll l Edward S. Wol1esen Report to the IGC

August 27, 1993

he does know better. When the "right" answers were learned they did not ,

look so well . Which truth do we, the United States, wish to operate j nuclear power plants by? '

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Cctrents on the SUPPIE4 ENTAL INFJRMATION page 5:

.I middle para. , last sentence -

The two agencies are normally working together for the protection of the employees to assure freedom of reporting. Conditions at CR-3 are not so i free and the NRC and the DOL are showing that FPC can and will harass employees leaving the employees helpless; therefore reporting is not a way of life at all.

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Part of the problem stems frcm the poor investigation of the real issues l and the reasons given by the cccpany; furthered by the financial pressure if the ccnpany was found to have discriminated. FPC therefore let it be known to workers that FPC would not let Mr. Wollesen be declared a whistleblower at all cost. Largely due to the previous whistleblower harassment FPC conducted, not just Mr. Wollesen's case nor history. This further lead into the IRC loss of independence and objectivity.

Pressures such as these are dangerous.

The Review Team Charter is good. I have hopes that the result and my ecnnents could just streamline the processes and resolve the issues sooner.

The plants and the employees want quicker but thorough investigations to bring out the truth instead of legal terminology and process battles.

Arbitration using trained NRC and DOL personnel would be very advantageous.

Ccnbining the efforts of the NRC and the DOL in the investigations should i

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reveal all of the required f acts in 10% of the time. The discriminated E erployee, in many cases knows the exact questions to be asked for the t

"right" truth; so let than work with the teams.

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The folIcwing are responses to questions _an pages 7-16. The answers fol1ow the ntrgber_ing and titles as listed _an these pages.

A. Responsiveness and receptiveness of licensees to eToloyee concerns so that erployees will feel f ree to raise safety issues without fear of retaliation.

1. a. I do not have the knowledge of the program particulars as the I referenced program was created in light of my termination, and because of my terrnination. However the person who developed the method told me he would not use the system as is would trean certain j he would be singles out. FPC showed that written Human Resources  ;

Manual procedures (written to protect employees were and can be in the future put aside to terminate an erployee bringing up safety and quality issues, therefore these hTA procedures had no better weight.

FPC will put aside any benefit to the employee as soon as the I 1

employee starts to reports issues as deep as Mr. Wollesen. )

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b. No knowledge, but caution must be used to assure that a third person is not only trained but proficient in nuclear power provisions ,

procedures, whistleblower protection, human rer>ources , and DOL regulations.

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c. In my experience the attitude of the managenent has been that 9 l I l l

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Edward S. Wol1esen

![ Report to the NRC

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anything in writing can be put aside. FPC had shift supervisors throwing I away nonconfotrance reports until a director told the shif t supervisor j to write the nonconformnce. The persan identifying the nonconformance, 5 Mr. Dale Turcott, was terminated and hired several times (of course these were only told to Mr. Turcott and not written) but the final result af ter the issue was before the SCL, FpC gave Mr. Turcott another job not in the i nuclear plant. To me Mr. Turcott, for identifying and persistent fol1ow-up en a nonconformance, should be working in the nuclear plant those who l were a party to the harassment and throwing away a nonconformance should not be permitted to work in nuclear power. Research of the persons l removed and terminated and out of CR-3 for medical reasons, will show the terminated were following the rules, those who did the terminating were violating the rules.

d. FPC's judgement was distorted and the informtion was proven purposely tampered with. Even to the termination of Mr. Wollesen. Mr.

Wolleren was citing too many nonconforrances that were too serious, thus showing a poor plant managment. Without Mr. Wollesen and by using scare tactics, no one will make FpC leck bad again. This is regardless of the I written programs. The NRC and the DCL have given written acceptance that FPC management can use any doctrrented procedures when they want and put aside those that protect the mployee when the managenent needs to.

These ideas are good, but any evidence no matter how slight that supervisors ar.d higher managment have put aside written procedures and have purposely and willfully made f alse and/or misleading statments required for plant operations, huran resources, testimony for or against an employee, or any other critical dt wnt, shows individuals who nee-10

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' to be recoved frcrn the nuclear plants. This would clear up trany of the probles, get rid of the prestigious seekers in exchange for the devoted

I L nuclear power plant workers and managers. There is a very ethical way to control and document all nonconformances, FpC has never realized that i point to date. FpC does not desire to understard that point either; FPC r

learns how to get rid of employees and make cthers fearful.

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e. HO?EST management working in the plant. Any cover-up is not going to allow the plant to conduct this program. NRC Cover-ups, which have occurred in Mr. Wollesen's case, are the worst. They give example to the plant on the legality of cover-ups.

- l The NRC assisted in the cover-up.

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E Reove any dishonesty that exists. Nuclear power is very important and sworn testimony related to the plant and the mployees SHALL be correct. l Willful incorrect information must be dealt with strictly. j

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f. Rewards are not a proper motivator. Watching tranagement responsively E handle the safety or quality issue is gratitude and reinforcetent that the management wants to resolve the problems. For root cause resolutions the mployee should receive special recognition form higher levels of  !

managment, letter of thanks in the employees files. More training and responsibility for the mployee to encourage nore resolution of the real problecs. Rewards in themselves are seldem positive motivators for long.

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g. NO. Mr. Wollesen stood for the programs at FpC CR-3, used them as 11 l

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they were designed and was harassed, his wife was harassed (and she is I still harassed to have Mr. Wollesen drop the DOL case), then intimidated then te:=inated. FpC nanagement made notarized documents that were proven f alse in DOL hearit.,s. So The basis for my cpinion is my on going task to return to the work force scme where since I have been black listed frcn the nuclear field, and lost everything I ever worked for; including my f amily.

Take a hard look at Mr. Wollesen and Ms. Collins case, do you have any cor.fidence. In another case, an employee at CR-3 had health concerns and he also saw violations. He brought them to his management. That was a mistake. He has been scorned ever since.

A Senior Quality Auditor was threatened by director; not only to his face but the director told the auditors supervising director. The auditor wrote the incident and sent it to file. The auditor was on the carpet.

If directors of a nuclear plant can make direct threats to Quality program Auditors trying to get information, there is no program that will instill confidence. Management must take individuals (corporate I representatives managers directors and supervisors) violating programs, law, polices, harassing and intimidating employees and move them so they I can in no way place those pressures on the work force.

h. Honesty in the plant. Management working for resolving the problems.

Management encouraging IEC and employees to freely resolve issues.

Honesty in the plant is the primary f actor. Secondarily be careful of using nonconformances and other deficiency numbers as a rating of the L 12 E

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I Report to the NRC August 27, 1993 plant. Rating the plant based on nuThers instead of actual plant l

I conditions causes nanaganent to require numbers to be in a certain range; you can not do that. The Ntrnber of nonconformances does not determine the strength of the plant, nor the weakness But the rating systems causes the non-nuclear accounting type high level managers to force the plants to lower number of identified nonconformances by not identifying sace. When the numbers are too high the managanent takes their actions out on the identifier not correcting the problem.

Example: When the corporation offers a Vice President a bonus of $1-200,000 based on the number of nonconfonrances and other nurbers. Does the VP work honestly? Maybe and maybe not. What does the VP tell his subordinates? What can subordinates tell the VP? At FPC if subordinates indicate nunbers dif ferent that the VP wants, the VP asks if the subordinate can do the job. If the subordinate responds negative the job is scrneene else's. We have seen the extent that FPC did go to falsify their position. The NRC followed by hiding investigation reports ,

i condoning nuclear workers do not have to follow procedures during normal work activities, and corrective action to preclude recurrence is not required.

1 NO: There is more than enough requirements in the nuclear work I

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place. The NRC MUST be honest and do their job thoroughly and l

compl et ely. What purpose would a NEW policy statenent serve when the j persons described above are in the plant and the NRC? It would be l useless paper work. More ef fort should be taken to Educate and train (two distinct functions) all personnel . With proper education and training and managenent working to make the nuclear industry safer, 13 1

( Edward S. Wol1esen Feport to the IGC August 27, 1993 little more could be asked for.

Rhen anyone wants new or more legislation on top of legislation that is not working the effort is counter-productive. Take a root cause look at the problems. Is the problem frcxn not enough laws? Be sure that is the only way to resolve the issue. Many laws take time and money away frcan

, the work required to be acccanplished.

j. NO! If the actions of people are not being regalated by the regulations in place, therefore more are not the answer. As a matter of fact maybe there are too many laws, regulations and policy statements.

When I started in nuclear power, we did not have the regulations handy

{ nor did we have the time to read thern. However, supervision made the requirements simple and very clear-. So more regulation is not required.

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An exaaple used in training to determine if training courses were the

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problem, was to ask the question: "If the incentive was right, could the employees perform the task correctly?" In many cases the answer was YES.

Why did he (or she) perform substandard work? Motive and incentive.

[ They did not care or the incentive was the same for good work as poor work. Management does things for their bosses desires, or the perceived bosses desire -often the subordinate is too spineless to ask the boss.

_ k. NO! The IRC, DCL, plant and the employee should be enough. Pany times the issues surrounding the inctance are complicated to bringing in

[ an untrained or unf amiliar person into the situation, that just adds confusion. We, the nuclear power workers and supporters 'of the United States, need to work on Honesty in the plant and the NRC and the DOL.

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Edward S. Wollesen Report to the NRC August 27, 1993 With honesty and openness, the problems will reduce in numbers and

frequency.

A. Responsiveness and receptiveness of licensees to employee concerns so that employees will feel free to raise safety issues without fear of retaliation.

2. a. Honesty, hek of measurenent by nonconforrances, positive nuclear importance posture, and encouraging erployees to take any problem to higher levels, with or without managements concurrence. Let the ecployee take the issue to the level where they can be handled.

Bringing safety issues to the inmediate supervisor is where the problem starts.

b. Judgement of the plant attitude and activities to doctanent and correct deficiencies and nonconformances. When the inspectors are working at the plants, the inspectors get a feeling, see responsiveness, watch corrective actions; these all play an important part of judging managements strength and conviction to report safety issues. We have seen that numbers are a root of evil that leads to tennination of the whistleblowers. Therefore, judgenent is not .the number of nonconfontances but the type, and the actions taken. The inspector must determine if the resolution will only cover over the single mistake or is the resolution correction of the root cause and other problems will be eliminated as well. As I have stated before, added regulations do not solve any real problems. In many cases the addition of procedures, policies, staterents help to confuse the issues and the real problem.

CR-3 was in the posture of too many precedures and no real link from one 15

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Edward S. Wollesen Report to the NRC August 27, 1993 to the others. A major nonconformance was the result of the too many procedures trying to do close to the same thing. A change to an original procedure would have been all that was required. Instead the new procedure was created and only identified for occasional uses in certain safety related procurment and work activities. When it was needed a redley of errors occurred. The procurment engineer did not know about .

the procedure, he used one that was a part of the process and not the whole. At the plant Review Ccnmittee meeting, the Quality Assurance Representative questioned an engineer responsible for the installation if the correct procedure was used. No one knew and the correct procedure was not used. This second engineer used an uncontrolled, out of date document frcn an uncontrolled data base to determine the procedure

{ referenced by the OA person was not needed. The issue was dropped and the PRC apprcved the procedure. A process to repair 10CFR part 21

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reported deficiencies was perforned with no paper work for the installer, parts, and only partial for the process. No CA inspections were performed, no marking of the bottles of fluids (and improper fluids were b

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the original problems causing the progressive deterioration) and oi.her deficiencies.

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The solution to this problmi is better education, training on concepts and organized procedures, with procedures chronically together. As has

- been brought up before and will ccrre up again, providing adequate nuclear safety confidence is not hard nor cumberscrre nor does it require a

, lengthy procedure, just a strong working knowledge of the requirments,

_ and ccmpetence in the field of expertise.

[ c. Quarterly measures would be the most beneficial frequency, unless (or

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Edward S. Wol1esen I Feport to the tac l August 27, 1993 1

tmtill problems surf ace. My reasoning is based on the f act that the l

- Resident inspectors are normlly in the plant and need to determine the l

- 1evel of surveil 1ance needed for the plant. Quarterly report preparation l would bring the attitudes and actions in a rather timely fashion to have u enough infermation and duraticn for the data, but not too long that the particulars are not over looked.

I further suggest that the inspectors reviaw the internal reports and take them to the plant and see what the plant knows and understands about the issues and the resolutions. Allot of feelings and attitudes, that i

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are important to a point of being critical, will be seen. Frcm these l i

issues the inspector can select his surveillance areas. '

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d. Total open door policy, in plant and with the imC, where the l empioyees are asked in regular 1y. If management responds positively to

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the issues, not holding the individual finding the safety concern

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responsible, then the employees will feel free to report.

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r IGC and the plant need to drop the " cop" and " bad guy" attitude. The IEC r

and the plant are supposed to be working for the same thing safe nuclear

- power. By the NRC representative and the plant working together to identify the issuas and the plant resolving the issues, even with ccTmants from the !ac, nothing is lost only gain-l. FE Ginna plant had a good working relationship with all inspectors, and management was eager i to find and properly correct all problems -no matter how small If the nirrbers of nonconformances rose but the significance was low or the reason was unavoidable, management understood. CR-3 was totally

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Edward S. Wollesen Report to the IEC August 27, 1993 Nir-bers and Cops were the attitude at CR-3. Employees were harassed into using the wrong procedures, not reporting, told not violations were not important , told that telling the supervisor was all you were required to do. Talking to the IEC or using the IEC modules was thought of poorly by the NRC and the FPC management, professional conduct at CR-3 was viewad as a threat.

B. An anony nous letter to the NRC is another reason I was terminatal, FPC thought I sent the letter. During their harass: rent and intimidation I was asked point blank if I wrote to the tac recently.

Keeping the reporting anployee's identification may lead to the wrong enployee getting terminated in the atte5npt.

1. Lets start with more time spent in person with the employee and the domrrents and serie knowledgeable inspectors. So much was lost because either the faC inspectors purposefully looked the wrong way or the IEC was not understanding the issue at hand.

When the ecoloyee requests to address the raC do so. I have requested many times and the !aC will not meet. I have asked for the doctrents to be present and the inspectors so I could brief the inspectors as to the people and the specific questions to get the correct answers.

Responsive as related to titre, the IEC must act prcxTptly and start as soon as the DOL. The NRC should assist in the prompt resolution of the DOL case by finishing their case first. Since the raC is required to moniter the nuclear power plant for safety of the employees and the public and the envirorrrent, then the IGC is recuired to ba assured that 18

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1 1

I Edward S. Wollesen Report to the IEC I August 27, 1993 al1 ARE SAE. If there is a DOL case open and evidence the Imc has not I seen, how could the NRC even consider the plant safe? If there was no issue the case would have bean closed quickly. If there are open issues the Imc needs to see the testimony and the case to determine other violations not directly addressed in the DOL case determination.

Such was the case of the violations at CR-3 for the out of date doctr ents . From this issue the tac and the Plant determined there is no requirement to follow procedures at CR-3, only during audits. This concept is totally wrong and not expressed anywhere except in a letter frcxn an IGC Director and in testimony of FPC manageTent. How could responsible, accountable people honestly make this statement?

2. Referring safety issues to the Licensee only allows the licensee to spend more tirre determining who made the allecations than correcting the problem. From my experiences the plant makes the difference. At CR-3 this practice is dangerous for the other ernployees; as explained in B.

1.

Inspector follow-up and conducting a curveillance would be better way of resolving the allegation. Plants tend to develop doctrrents and L

staterrents to look nice and sound nice and really are not as true as the paper they are written on.

This was the case in my termination. FPC managerent and auditors trade many doctrrents to formulate a heavy case against me. Testimony showed tFe documents to ba false, misleading, untrue. Developed because the

[ plant had to respond to the allegation of discrimination. More benefit 19 c

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I i I Edward S. Wol1esen i

I Eeport to the !EC August 27, 1993 would have cme from f act finding by the IRC and the DOL. Fact finding I would have reducad case time by years and the real safety issues would have been addressed by the !GC and would have been resolved. ThefECnay never resolve the issues.

3. This was addressed in E. 2. The NRC must minimize the potential for the Licansee t' ' rv to identify the employee. The best way is for the inspector to develop an inspection module for the topic and interview as normal including the employee. Find all of the facts around the issue and notice the attitude of ranagement and ths ; responsiveness.

This exact issue was a key contributor into termination of Mr. Wollesen. )

FPC thought he reported to the IEC. For that and other issues FPC terminated Mr. Wollesen. It was Mr. Wollesen's history to report issues, especially when a response to a report is issued that is not correct; as l

was the fGC report about only one person ever harassed by FPC, there were  !

i several .  ;

i I 4. Access to the !EC is imperative, and with no toll . If local ntrrbers can net be used by all employees than the 800 tmbar nay be the way. Try it and see what the response shows. Since power production is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> j then 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> coverage is needad.

i

5. No. At FPC managers threatened employees with termination for saying l anything to the rec. The managers are still employed, but not so for the employee threatened. In normal plants where the Imc is not the " COP" l

this might work. We must look at the real plant environment.

20 1

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Edward S. Wollesen Report to the fGC August 27, 1993 When managers can intimidate employees, the IEC would have to be sharp to notice evasion of the questions. Even though the answers are expectable, the !EC needs to be sharp on human reaction, voice changes, attitude changes, and most of all be an investigator with plenty of questions in a relaxed environment.

Som plants issued surveys , they proved to ba more harassment of the employae than good for tha inforration gainad.

C 1. The !eC should infonn the employee that they need to doctrmnt all information they can, and the tac should start a file and start an investigation. If the programs discuss 3d in the earlier questions were implemnted, the fEC inspector has good base data to deter:rdne attitude of the plant. This may be an indicator of plant position or

-tust one er two individuals.

Tim of contact establishes a chilling effect at a particular plant. Any parsonnel changes should ba checkad. Are qualified persons being moved to respcnsible positions? If the changes do not make good sense, IEC investigation should coramnce innediately. More happenings are very likely, and the employee or others rray be terminated under questionable ciretrnstances . Investigate to get the facts.

Ideall y , if the amol oyee can provide evidence. The IEC should step forward and documant that the employee is now protected and will work with the !ac to resolve the issues, while the licensee keeps the employee on the payroll and keeps the employee imnune to retaliation for a given tim fram long enough that the issue would be forgotten. Five (5) or 21

Edward S. Wollesen Report to the TEC August 27, 1993 Ten (10) years. If no positive action is taken then the employee ends up like myself; out of work, no one will hire, I must change careers, credit is destroyed, f amily broken apart, and in total c2ebt that will take over 20% more income than I was making at the time of termination.

Imediate protection is the needed addition for a start.

2. YES. but the rac needs to inform the licensee that the rec will be watching ALL employmant actions, transfers, and the NRC will be protecting certain employees from termination or any other career harassment, or any wage deviations.

The notice should ba a meeting with the highest managment, followed by a letter to document the treeting. Watching the responsiveness will show true colors. A Plant wanting to have open doors and is working with the mpleyees wi11 have no problen with the issue. However other plants wilI be trying to identify the guilty individuals. It is totally attitude of the plant managment again.

I D. 1. Yes the tac and the DOL need to work together and the investigations need to be conducted together. For either group to wait any time is helping the licensee and hurting the issues and the employee exactly opposite to the desired actions.

Let's get back to basics. What is the real, most urgent problem, nuclear

_ safety. There is no reason for delay. A parson has brought up a safety concern, the rec should ba getting all of the f acts pronto, not just the aspects of the allegation. Secondly the amployee is very important and neads irrrediate response.

a 2, w

____-.__._____._____.________m. _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Edward S. Wollesen I Report to the IEC Aucust 27, 1993 There is a lot to ba discovered by watching others extract and present facts. Therefore, I still condone that the ICL and the tac must work t ogethar. Determinations will ba cuicker, more accurate, inore meaningful . and batter for all involved.

2. The DOL decisions are too timaly and not representative of the f acts.

To base actions of the ?EC on the DOL activity or lack of activity serves no purpose. If a probleni exists it requires attention. The problem identified will not always be the only problem out there. Many problems idantified at CR-3 were only the tip of the " ice berg". Many more deficiencies and violations were there for the identification, reporting and correcting.

The NFC and the DOL nead to develop exchange of information paths in order to get full impact of all information. Sworn testimony in a DOL case identified violations needad to be Followed by the IEC, the SOL and DOL don't care. These issues in the case of Wollesen and Collins vs Florida power Corporation are holding up both decisions and the I identification of more violations. How safe is the nuclear plant? How chillad are the ramaining emolayees? They are f rozen! It has been 2 years and the effect is still holding the employees frozen.

How should the faC get the evidentiary record in the case that nothing has started. Use the help of the terminated employee. Have provisions to require the license to allow, under IEC escort, the ex-suployee to get all records needed.

3. NO, NO, NO. Time is of the essence, why wait.

23 I

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l L Edward S. Wollesen Report to the imC Aucust 27. 1993

, E. 1. As soon as the f acts are known and a deterTnination is made the 1

- enforement should st art , why wait? Such dat eminations and

- enforement will impact the DOL process sme, but the same l determination should ba reachad by the DOL as appropriate. And the L DOL would be assistad by a deterTnination from tha NRC. If there are enforcement actions to be taken, there should be sme weight that there is a DOL case in f avor of the employee.

f~~

L 2. The issue of penalties is serious. and needs to ba looked into.

Another rechanism for panalty of the licensae is required. Any method to reduce the time and expense to all parties involved is needed badly.

m i i Cooperation batween the licensee, the NRC , the DOL, and all employees i s required. In the Case of Mr. Wollesen and Ms. Collins, FPC was prcrpted to do what ever is required not to show discrimination. The l

cost to FPC will be astronomical . Therefore FPC hired a very impressive ,

! +

l I attorney, let the case go as long as possible, and addressed untruthful docu ents as if they were credible.

.I Whan money pushes a decision , we all loose. The penalty for I

l discrimination neads to require heavy financial penalties regardless of 1 l the outcame. Then the plant would be more driven to get to the truth i with less expense. There must be other rethods of solving the issues before they get identified as " Whistle blower" discrimination.

F. (page 14)

1. NO. In a case I am very f amiliar the plant made great looking l

1 I

24 I 4

Edward S. Wol1esen Report to the NRC August 27, 1993 programs and trained people and did wondrous things. Let's look at the p facts. FPC has a very good Httran Resources Manual to protect the enployee frcm rnnagement over powering the situation and not giving the employee any chance to resolve the issue. These doctments are very of ficial and are to ba followed. WERE THESE PROCEDURES FOLIINED AT ALL?

N3. THE M-WATMENT DECIDED THAT THEY COULD ELECI' 'IO PUT THD4 ASIDE. I rest my case. No natter how pretty the actions look the effect was thit the ranagacent could get tocether and eliminata any rights of the amployae at a drop of the hat; and they did exactly that.

I

2. In certain plants thase letters and tha actions that follow are worthl ess. Actions of the NRC to Block tentination are required.

Quicker action for fact finding is required. Refer to F.1. for nore.

I

3. This is the best thought of al1. Both should share infonstion a11 the way along the discovery path. Make this happen and a lot of time will be gained and rcre f acts disclosed.

I 4. NO. F?C suhritted af finration statements that were false and the State of Florida Unamoloyrent, knowingly, the DOL and the NRC were all I using the letter as fact. In reputable plants, affinraticas and cath reans a lot, others it reans nothing. This is another case where I feel that the increased regulations wil1 get on1y more complication. The reguletory bodies must take firm action against those individuals who rake willful , delibarate f alse statarrents. This is easy because the evidence is all collected in some cases. Just take action.

5. The attitude of the plant is the critical issue here. The only way

- 25 u

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Edward S. Wollesen Report to the IEC Aumist 27, 1993 to assure that the mployees are not getting a chilling ef fect, the NRC must protect nuclear whistle blowers. There are many mathods open for molcyaes to report. More 1etters wi11 not help. More programs wi11 not help. IEC actions and protection will help. The delay in getting appropriate action in my case is evidence that the IRC and the DOL s respond to the licensee. The licensee took away the Human Resources policies that the licensee teaches all employees to be in place. Did the DDL look at this, yes, however, tha DOL gave the distinct following that ernployees do not have rights to f air conduct under the corporate Hurrea Resources Policy Manuals. Did the faC look at this? There is no evidence that the IEC respondad as this panel would have them respond.

If the NFC was responsive the NEC would notice that FpC not only chilled an emloyaa but teminated an emloyea who was not given any chance to explain. That action on FpC's part Froze the whole plant. The plant representative who developed the NEF reporting program will not use it.

He will not tell you that, he is too worried about his job.

F. (page 15)

1. There naeds to be a stiff penalty for the licensee no matter how the DOL or IEC case is found. Stiff penalties for losing campels the licensee to spand a lot of money to not have the extreme burden of the penalty. CR-3 has so much to loose that they went to unbelievable ends to harass, intimidate, destroy, and twist the truth to prevent paying the penalty to the NRC.

There could be a method that the NRC could have a base penalty for the al1egation. More al1egations the penalty goes up. Bil1 the 1icensee for all of the time spent by the DOL and the IEC fer the fact finding and the 26

Edward S. Wol1esen Report to the TEC August 27, 1993 determination. All employee expenses would be covered so the employee could assist the team investigation as needed.

This type penalty would try to get the resolution sooner. Don't put the emphasis on the out ecme for the strength of the penalty. Lessen the penalty for a quicker truthful resolution.

On this idea, billing the licensee for the tim for extraction of the facts / investigation with a lesser amount for the aiserimination should make the attorney expense have a greater impact, . thus potentially limiting the case.

2. As in F. 1. penalties should be stiff for the allegation of discrimination. The rmre alleaations the stiffer the penalty.

Mitigating f actors should be used sparingly. If the managerent manages the employees properly there will not be discrimination cases. If the managemnt is abusing the emoloyees and the systems there will be many discrimination cases. To lessen the effect of the win lose penalties, the pena 1ty should ba on the a11egation. The p1 ants then would be very inclinad to follow the programs and want to have better relationships with the employees.

3. I don't know the penalties, only the win-lose effect the penalty has on FPC at this tirne. As in the other sections, the penalty should be present no matter how the case ended. This would relieve the plant of the financial reason for winning. We all will benefit frcxn the truth and not a money war to determine discrimination.

27

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1 Edward S. Wollesen Report to the NRC August 27, 1993 H. 1. Deliberate, willful false or directly misleading statements, and testimonies. Any one found to have contributed to the discrimination by the before mentioned methods, Licensee or NRC or DOL personnel, should be f acing Deliberate Misconduct. Any manager, director and or Vice president should have the trost severe penalties. These are corporate representatives, deliberate misconduct can not be allowed, as we rely on these persons to be honest and truthful, without question. Betraying that trust requires severe penalty.

2. When supervision denonstrates they can not be trusted to be supervisors then that is exactly what that means. There must be sanctions for any employee found to have conducted deliberate and willful misconduct involving discrimination to be reduced to position not having responsibility over nuclear plant conditions nor any employees.

As with so many rules and reculations, enforcerient is a requirenent for any effect to be successful . Rules, procedures and regulations mast be in place and adherad to not put aside. Httran Resources policies put aside are an exact example of deliberate misconduct involving discrimination.

SECTION II RESpCNSE TO: "Whistleblower protaction; Request for Caririent" The following are definite indicators that the intended environent is WJr present today nor in the past for the Florida power Corporation's Crystal 28

Edward S. Wol1esen Report to the TEC August 27, 1993 River Unit 3 nuclear power facility; and the NRC did not follow its reculatory activities within its statutory authority to have the environumt ba that of f readan to report to the !EC or internally.

Several direct concerns show that the present process destroys the g individuals: tha NRC could hava mada the atmnsphere without fear, but the opposite exists today -and has for tha past 7-10 yaars.

Incident 1 - Mr. Wollesan was thraatened with his job in a nuclear plant in 1987 Tha imC vas notified of this and Mr. Dale Turcott's termination with evencal job relocation in 1991. Facts showed that FPC felt that Mr. Wollesen reported to the NRC, FPC intimidated Mr. Wollesen, threatening to expose family problems if Wollesen went to the authorities (meaning IEC) then FPC tetvinated WOLLESEN. Facts also showed that FPC felt threatened that Wollesen was ready to expose more safety issues. The safety issues were the on1y feasible reason for FPC's actions of termination.

I IEC Response- The NRC's investigation revealing that not only did Mr.

I Wollesen get threatened in 1987, but he was fired the day before the NRC was to ba on site to conduct tha investigation into the threat against I Mr. Wol1esen.

Fesult- !MC's raport was navar issued. The IEC naver saw the letter in that Mr. Wollesen brought safety issues to the Plant Manager. Why did the report get stopped? There were f acts and violations and misconduct.

HERE is a great problem. NO indepandence.

E L 29 L

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Edward S. Wollesan Report to the NRC August 27, 1993 Solution- DO AN I!NESTIGATION- PRINT THE REPORT. If all of the facts were known, all of the parties interviewed, suspicious activities looked into, the anvironment the NRC wants can happen. Most of all PROTECT 'mE PEOPLE KtaucrING SAFETY ISSUES. How can the people reporting feel protected when they are not involved in tha process of the investigation?

Did the NRC talk to: Mr. Jesus (Pings Alderdi, Mr. Paul F. McKee, Mr.

Joe Lander (don't foroet to ask Mr. Lander why he lost his job af ter he pulled Mr. Wollesen's badge - he had a history of harassing employees, FPC counseled him many times, af ter he threatened Mr. Wollesen FPC took his job away [that position change took about 6 months], Mr. Lander does not directly supervise any personnel any nere - but he was not fired),

Mr. Wo1lesan was in 1991 (Mr. Lander, not associatM with nuclear in 1991 was in direct contact with Mr. Pelham each noon to get up-dates on Mr.

Wellesen's case; why? Was Mr. Lander also still pushing Mr. Wollesen?

The NRC had the perfect opportunity to get many facts, but they failed to call me. There are many questions that must be asked a certain way to get to the truth. Each enployee at FPC was judged by how you responded to any question presented to thern.

I The feeling is that employees mist practice " law" to get around identifying the f' acts. I was called frcrn Atlanta by Oscar DeMiranda, why could not the inspectors call I tre in Crystal Pdver from Crystal Plyer? It doesn't make sense.

I Incident 2 - The NRC was noti fied about Errergency Off-Site Facility documnts out of date with no docuTentation nor actions to preclude recurrence. This apolies as Ms. Bonnie Collins 30

Edward S. Wollesen Report to the NRC Aucust 27, 1993 (Burgess) was terminated in 1991 for trying to report out of date manuals in the EOF. Of course the plant developed a strong case of scmething else which was partially supported in court.

NRC's Response- The NRC Investigation found another documnt out of date, issued an NCV due to the " quick" (?) response, and the NRC Doctrrented the incident addressed of previous out of date materials not documented, as being acceptable - VIOLATIONS ARE NOT REQUIRED 'IO BE DOCUMENTED NOR ACTIONS TO PRECLUDE REwxxETICE RRUIRED was told to be acceptable to the plant. Congress would not agree.

Did tha NRC investigate the recurrence of the out of date docu-ents? If they had they would have found yearly out of date doctrrents found. What kind of a system is that.

Result- The NRC (by their actions) told the plant workers that they do not naad to folIow the reporting procedures, Problem Reports as the !EC documented that the plant was right in just fixing the out of date doctrients found (a violation) and leaving the system that caused the (recurrent) problem alone. The NRC agreed that this was okay because the plant was not in an audit when the violatian was found. This strengthened FPC's position that Mr. Wollesen's reporting was not required, therefore termination was warranted; This concept and action by the NRC is AGAINST THE NRC POLICY N PROTECTION FOR REPORTING.- The NRC is required to enforce the requiren ats, not cover up violations.

31 f

Edward S. Wol1esen Report to the NRC August 27, 1993 Solution- The NRC MUST understand the 1aws, rules and the methods the plants are to comply with the issues, putting aside violations only enforces nonecrcliance. Any time a plant does not docurent a violation and sht aorrective action to precluda recurrence the rac should take core time to resolve the situation. If during the situation, more violations are found, a thorouch investigation must be conducted to get to the root cause - not the symptom. When plant managerent tells the NRC the plant is not required to docunent violations (and follow the plant procedures) the NRC should start to look at what the managarent of the plant is and is not doing in ecrnpliance with the reporting requirarents.

When the managemnt is bold enough to " Cover up" violations in one area:

what reports are you gdng to find? In an accident the records will not be there. We can not tolerate thr.

l Incident 3- Timing of edions. To review a case taken to the DOL, the NRC waits until the DOL resolves the case. In Mr. Turcott's case where the plant settled just before the Secretary of Labor decided, did the NRC get involved? It was very apparent that I the NRC f ailed to even look into the incident.

The Wollesen and Collins case will be over tuo, maybe closer to 3 years old when the DOL finishes the case. By law the Secretary of Labor is requirad to review the case in 30 days it has be 150 days:

the SOL is too busy.

YES this is pressure on the employees sti11 empioyed at the plant.

Mr. Wollesen worked with many people in the plant site; both fossil

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, _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^

I Edward S. Wol1esen Report to the NRC August 27, 1993 plant and nuciear plant. Wol1esen was very concerned for safe, I 1ega1, and efficient operation. Mr. Wo11esen had more students advance in the plant due to knowledge than most instructors.

E Wol1esen had supervisors enjoy survei11ances and audits Wol1esen l l

l l

perforned for his devotion to the company. The remaining personnel ,

1 do not trust the plant managanent nor NRC. This condition is i extreme pressure in the wrong direction.

I i

NRC Response- ?

I Result- ?

I Solution- We (all americans in support of safe, efficient, le 'l nuclear power) must work together to get a timely resolution of any problem raised. How do we as grcun, professional adults accomplish this? As soon as possible, get to the truth and educate all persons involved, and make available the issue t: others who could be effected. DROP THE BARRIERS AND GE THE TRUTH ON THE ABLE. AIMIT THE ACTION AND THE REASONS. DON'T LOOK FOR BLP'E JUST FACTS AND RESOLUTIONS. WHAT COULD BE SO HARD?

Does this maan that the NRC works he plant? It could nean that.

His Is there indepandence? Sure. The No uust not over look violations, but could watch the resulting activities of tha plant to determine the significance of the violations based on tha plant responses and continued l comoliance. Attitudes are a good indicator of conmitment.

The time would be reduced and the ongoing pressure to the remaining 33 i

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FAward S. Wollesen Feport to the NRC August 27, 1993 workers would be lessened. Renerber, an issue raised is an issue. The longer it is unresolvad the more pressure is felt and direction is not known for the duration; scary in nuclear power.

Incident 4 -

A Senior Quality Auditor (Ex-!EC Resident Inspector - for another utility) was asked by the current resident inspector to provide copies of his internal reports directly to the NRC. This worked well as the reports issued by the plant were not containing enough information. The plant (FpC CR-3) did not want to continue. The plant threatened the Senior Quality Auditor. Due to the current pressure and the auditor needing his job /inectre, he did not file any reports.

NRC Response- The resident inspector needed the information and he was upset with the auditor. The NRC knew of the pressure and failed to respond to assure an atmosphere giving the auditor freedom to report.

Resul' - The NRC did not get the infornation they needed. Other audit reports are not representing the actual conditions in the plant. This was a basis for the termination of Mr. Wollesen approximately one year and a half later.

Solution- When the information needed by the NRC is not readily available, the NRC needs te spend time and have a rnechanism that the IRC can freely talk to the employees. If the employees are moved or are subjected to other actions not seeming appropriate, issue must be investigated.

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Edward S. Wol1esen Report to the IRC Auaust 27, 1993  ;

Incident 5 -

The sane Auditor ( when he was a OA Specialist) referred to in #4 above was threatened to stop his assionad activity by the Manager of Nuclear comoliance. The threat was presented to the OA Manager. The auditor issued a letter to the Director of Quality Programs. The Auditor was told to never do that again. This is pressure. Why not reported to the NRC- Fear of retaliation.

W, C Response- None available, were not notified due to pressure.

Result- Bnployees are not free to report threats to the NRC. In this case the person was an Ex-NRC Inspector. If he was not canfortable to report to the NRC, who would be. Af ter Mr. Wollesen was terminated frcm this same plant no one is free to report.

Solution- Make a method that the TGC and the plant work better tocether to assure safe, leaal nuclear power. Why should reporting be such a threat to the plant? A low level reporting method must be made. An employee today, especially in the plant referred to must spend more time building evidence than working, just to save his job.

Incident 6 -

The Inspector General was notified that the NRC was referring to a terminated nuclear power worker as a thorn in their side. From the issues brought to the attention of the NRC, and a request to directly appear (by the terminated auditar) to assure the NRC fully understood the issues and the nethod to cet the information from the plant (due to the 35 r

Edward S. Wol1esen Report to the NRC August 27, 1993 plants evasive methods), and the NRC inference, the Inspector General should have gone to a different agency to oet the real answers. The IEC was complaining of the pressure they were under. Why was the NRC under pressure? Frcm who? And Why.

NRC Response- No real problem; but the NRC did not contact the right people not ask the right questions. The NRC did not have the terminated editor appear as was requested. There were violations identified but down played because the plant " responded prcmptly". However, the NRC never asked the right questions.

Result- The plant pressures employees and does not report the actual cenditions of the plant; therefore nuclear safety is ccmpromised as well as the atnesphere of feeling free to go the NRC.

Solution- This very action to reexamine the NRC's regulatory activities to determine if suf ficient steps are in place to create an atmosphere where individuals with safety concerns feel free to engage in protected activities without fear of retaliation, MUST BE CrMPLETED. And I am recruesting to appear to the group working on this natter to assist in the rectification of the problens out in the work place, BUT with as little as possible addition of regulations. I can evaluate effectiveness of

) regulation imposed, and can offer reasonable resolutions.

THEJOLIMING ARE FUR'IHER_TOPICSRT_THE NRC_._IS ANARE_OP OR_WOULD BE_ AWARE OF_IP_THE_RECCMGNDATIONS_ABOjlE_WERE_IN PIACE._

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Edwat,d S. Wol1esen Report to the NRC i August 27, 1993

• using untrained personnel in the harassnent of nuclear workers; occurrences: 1987 Mr. Wo11esen by Mr. Lander; 1991 Mr. Wollesen and Ms.

Col 1 ins by Mr Pelham on tape.

• conflicting testimony from auditors (who know better, what was their R gain? exposure to their part in hidino nonconformances being exposed by Mr. Wollesen) and Corporate Directors: occurrence 1991 against Mr.

Wol1esen and Ms. Col 1 ins.

• FpC Security Specialist goes right into a building . to one office cubicle on the second floor, to a locked drawer and finds documents of unknown origin, unknown ownership, frcn an unknown office and deelares them to be frcm Mr. Wollesen. FPC Security Specialist had no knowledge:

• that Mr. Wollesen was not even working in that building

• who Mr. Wollesen was working for

• what assignment Mr. Wollesen working on

• who Mr. Wol1esen was reporting to I

• Scarad Director for the Nuclear Training Center harasses employees:

occurrences: Mr. Dale Turcott (for bring up an equiprrent violation known to the plant and the NRC for 10 years) - 1990, Mr Turcott was performing duties as a nuclear trainer and discovered the violation from pictures i and investigated the requirenents awl the actual plant. Why did he get harassed if the violation was preser,t for 10 years? :

I Mr. Wollesen and Ms. Collins (buroess) - 1991, Mr. Kelley testified that he was concernad that Mr. Wollesen was performing a secret audit; when the facts carre out that Mr. Wollesen was working on a technical paper for L

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I Edward S. Wol1esen Report to the IEC

( August 27, 1993 the Instrument Society of America, which his staf f knew, Mr. Kelly had no reason for his actions. NOTE: for several years the Emergency Off-Site Facility documents and records have been out of date. The fac has investigated that the violations still exist and that the plant staff have found the violations and just fixed the errors found and that the l procedures required for the identification, documentation and resolution of these violations were not followed. This determination by the Imd is

!- contrary to the license to operate a nuclear power plant.

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t a conspiracy; occurrence 1991 and continues against Mr. Wollesen and Ms.

Collins. A review of the information and testimony and the actions of the Vice President, Directors, other employees and the IEC, shows that, knowing or unknowing, several persons from several organizations conspired to build a case around nuclear workers trying to perform their jobs and keep nuclear power safe. From that incident and others, employees suffered, but more important the plant gained more power to put aside the rules and strictly harass nuclear power plant workers.

lI It is mentioned that the .EC is in part a portion of the conspiracy because failure to cite significant violations. ie: 1) training doctrnents out of date has recurred for years, 1990, 1991, 1992 and IEC gave a non-cited violation. The FPC actions taken and non-documenting the occurrences violated the " problem Reporting" procedures. the TEC did

not even nention that; but instead told the plant the non-doctnenting of i violations was okay because the plant was not in an audit. There is 130 direction frem Congress that allows the rec's position.

SIDE ficfrE: The TEC report that condoned the out of date doctrrbnts not

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I Edward S. Wollesen I Report to the NRC August 27, 1993 l

reportad and not doctrneted on the problem report forms because the plant  !

was not in an audit was brouoht up to the Region II Allegation I i

j Coordinator Mr. Oscar DiMiranda, with a follow-up to Mr Lyle Smith Special Agent from the Office Of the Inspector General. No action has l been taken to my knowledge. This whole scenario shows a lack of understanding of the basis of PROBLD4 REPORTING, Plant operations, Procedures, and the requirerents for operating nuclear power. The NRC demonstrated poorer compliance to the requirements than the utility.

This GILLS the Employees; the NRC does not back the very procedures the NRC required a few years prior - Problen Reporting Procedures, and always required procedures for Records. Due to the NRC response, plant j l employees were told, by examole, that problem reports, documentation and i corrective action to preclude recurrence for violations are only needed IF an audit is being conducted. NOTHING OOULD EE FARTHER FRCt4 THE TRUTH, BUT THE NRC PUT IT IN WRITING. VERY GILLING FOR ANY D4PLOYEE TRYING 'IO WRITE A PROBLD4 REPORT SUG AS MS. COLLINS (BURGESS) FDR THIS VERY ISSUE

- OUT OF DATE DOCUMENTS IN THE EOF. Ms. Collins (Burgess) confronted her imrediate Boss Mr. Terry Kamann of the issue a week or so prior to her tentination. Lax enforcement of the violations adds to the NRC Chilling of the employees.

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• Equiprent nonconformance for ten (10) years. Identification of this issue was reason for an employee to be harassed, terminated and pursue litigation to get a job. The NRC treated the issue as minor. Had an accident occurred the equignent was not in the required configuration.

MORE than that, the attitude of the workers and plant administration to i

i THROR AWAY nonconforrnances more than once is not . iimuce act of defiance 39 l

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Edward S. Wol1esen Report to the NRC August 27, 1993 for the requirements of the plant but dangerous threat to the safety of the plant, workers and the public. This is an action that hurt the ease to report violations. Mr. Turcott's harassment effected many nuclear workers rights to report; thus made a significant chance to the way the

' employees work. (Scary and very Dangerous). The NRC made light of this

- situation.

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• When notified, in 1991, of other anployees harassed, the NRC contacted one of the anployees, then two working days later cane to FPC CR3 to investigate. Found one of the employees terminated, abruptly, without warning, and for no apparent reason. The investigation revealed that harassment and lessening of the Quality Assurance Frogram had occurred as was reported to the NRC. The result was that the investigators were redirected and sent back to the site to investicate other issues. This drastically hurt the employees right to report. FPC was acting under the thought that Mr. Wollesen wrote the letter to the NRC that prcmpted the investigation. I did in 1987 just that write a letter and I was

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threatened to never bring up anything over my supervisor or I would be

^

fired, especially to outside agencies. By not documenting and issuing

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the report the NRC put aside the Nuclear Whistle-Blower Protection and I

let the Corporation tenninate a nuclear whistle-bicuer and the IEC backed away. Frcm this one issue, anyone can see how the environment is not free for a person to report nor speak up at CR3. No where else does the I NRC react as in Recion II.

• The NRC determined that Mr. Wellesan was correct in determining scme doctrrents used by the Plant Review Contnittee (PRC) 1) were not controlled 40

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I Edward S. Wol1esen I Report to the NRC August 27, 1993 but were required to be, and 2) that the documents were not up to date I but were required to be up to date. The NRC's action was a NON-CITED VIOLATION due to cuick response; this determination is totally absurd.

FPC PRC mubers (one was the first plant manager for CR3) knew of the out

]

of date and uncontrolled doctrnents and those PRC members were angry with 1 Mr. Wollesen for even bringing up the issue. These people did not understand the requirenents. The PRC is required to review procedures and work processes on the safety related equipment: how can they not be 1'

trained in the basics of nuclear power and remain in position? One of the subject doctraents was a result of an NRC action to have control of the FRC FPC did developed the document but the PRC either used the procedure with out of date information and several revisions of the same l

procedures or the PRC msnbers failed to use the very document the NRC required because the PRC was not performing to standard. Either way, the l 1

PRC set a poor standard of nuclear practice and they also violated the j trust of the NRC, while violating all kinds of license requirements.  !

ONLY under threat of serious NRC violation did FPC respond to fix what they should have understood. Does FPC understand the basis for the j violation - I DO NOT believe so. In the time I was working with FPC many i 1

of the senior managers danonstrated a lack of understanding of the recuirements for operating the nuclear power plant; they responded to violations by creating what the regulatory acencies required only. These people pieced tocether procrams, added procedures that looked nice, but I in the long run they never used the procedures.

I A SIDE N frE: This is meant to help the situations in Crystal River, and other utilities if they exist, undetstanding the basis is more important than responding to a stimulus (such as a reaulatory agency).

41 I

I Edward S. Wollesen I Report to the Imc Aucust 27. 1993 Understanding the basis for any regulation, procram, process allows for I ef ficient handling of the situation with minimum controls. What could be simpler? Nothing. A Campany responding to stimulus will have so many separated ccrnplex procedures and processes that violations surface and failure to fol1ow procedures result; no one understands the basis therefore no one follows the need for the procedures, or the procedures are followed blindly (blind verbatim compliance). This condition id dangerous in nuclear power.

+ Florida Power Corporation f ailed to use the document required by the imC, or were they following 2 or 3 revisions of the docurrents at the same time? Why did a trained OA Auditor see what the plant of ficials did not?

This is not a minor problem.

• Mr. Wollesen discovered several issues leading to incidents which could have had serious consequences, the one above and others dealing with nuclear maintenance and Environmental Qualification. FPC tenninated Mr.

Wollesen before he could finish on these and other PRC issues.

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= Mr. Wollesen also identified problems in several programs. The NRC investigated but the NRC report did not show investigation in the problem areas identified by Mr. Wollesen. Mr. Wollesen carmunicated and requested to be with the NRC planning team in order that the proper issues would be covered. The NRC thought is was a good idea but it never happened. The right questions were not asked as of ten as they needed to be.

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