ML20170B022
| ML20170B022 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/2020 |
| From: | Ho Nieh Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Vitale A Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| Guzman R | |
| References | |
| EPID L-2019-LLL-0025 | |
| Download: ML20170B022 (4) | |
Text
July 30, 2020 Mr. Anthony J. Vitale Site Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Indian Point Energy Center 450 Broadway, General Services Building P.O. Box 249 Buchanan, NY 10511-0249
SUBJECT:
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2 - WITHDRAWAL OF INTERIM COMPENSATORY MEASURE B.1.a FROM EA-02-026, ORDER FOR INTERIM SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY COMPENSATORY MEASURES, (EPID L-2019-LLL-0025)
Dear Mr. Vitale:
By letter dated February 25, 2002 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML020500410), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Order EA-02-026, Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures, to all operating nuclear power reactor licensees. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC supplemented the security measures required for protection against the design basis threat at nuclear power reactor facilities through a series of security orders. These orders, including Order EA-02-026, established new requirements for specific training; access authorization enhancements; and enhancements to defensive strategies, mitigative measures, and integrated response.
The NRC amended Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities; 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants; 10 CFR Part 72, Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste; 10 CFR Part 73, Physical Protection of Plants and Materials; and Appendix B, General Criteria for Security Personnel, and Appendix C, Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans, to 10 CFR Part 73 through a final rule titled Power Reactor Security Requirements, which the agency published in Volume 74 of the Federal Register, page 13925, on March 27, 2009 (74 FR 13925). The rulemaking codified generically applicable security requirements that the agency previously issued by orders and updated the existing power reactor security requirements. The rule became effective on May 26, 2009.
By letter dated November 28, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111220447), the NRC partially rescinded Order EA-02-026. The requirements of Interim Compensatory Measure (ICM) B.1.a in Order EA-02-026 involve operator training for specific security-initiated events. These requirements are not covered by proposed or existing regulations and remain in effect.
By letter dated February 8, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17044A004), Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy or the licensee), submitted a notification of permanent cessation of power operations for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3 (Indian Point 2 and 3).
A. Vitale In this letter, Entergy notified the NRC of its intent to permanently cease operations no later than April 30, 2020, and April 30, 2021, for Indian Point 2 and 3, respectively.
Section III of Order EA-02-026 gives the Director of the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation the authority to relax or rescind any or all of the conditions of the orders upon demonstration by the licensee of good cause.
By letter dated July 30, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19232A070), Entergy requested that the NRC rescind ICM B.1.a in Order EA-02-026 for Indian Point 2 and 3 based on the transition of these units from operating reactors to non-operating reactors. Entergy cited the following reasons to demonstrate good cause for rescinding ICM B.1.a in Order EA-02-026:
- Indian Point 2 and 3 will permanently cease power operations no later than April 30, 2020, and April 30, 2021, respectively. Per 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), once the certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from each reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii), the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer authorize operation of the reactor or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. As a result, there is no longer a need to address the specific security-initiated event in ICM B.1.a in Order EA-02-026, which is primarily associated with reactor operation.
By letter dated May 12, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20133J902), Entergy certified that power operations ceased at Indian Point 2 on April 30, 2020, and that the fuel was permanently removed from the Indian Point 2 reactor vessel and placed in the Indian Point 2 spent fuel pool on May 12, 2020. Entergy further acknowledged that the Indian Point 2 10 CFR Part 50 license no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel.
Although Entergy requested NRCs rescission of ICM B.1.a in Order EA-02-026 for both Indian Point 2 and 3 in its July 30, 2019, letter, the NRC staff acknowledges that the Indian Point 3 certification for permanent cessation of operation and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel will not be submitted until after its projected April 30, 2021, permanent shutdown.
Therefore, this determination letter only applies to Indian Point 2. The NRC staff will complete its review for Indian Point 3 upon receipt of the associated certification letter under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii).
The NRC staff notes that since Indian Point 2 is permanently shut down and defueled, the primary security focus is the protection of the spent fuel. The operator training for the specific security-initiated event addressed in ICM B.1.a of Order EA-02-026 does not have any immediate effect on the storage or cooling of spent fuel.
In addition, the NRC staff recognizes that Indian Point 2 will maintain mitigation strategies for the protection of spent fuel under License Condition 2.N. License Condition 2.N requires Indian Point 2 to develop and maintain strategies and staff training to address large fires and explosions, including for protection of the spent fuel. The NRC staff has determined that withdrawing ICM B.1.a in Order EA-02-026 with respect to Indian Point 2 will not reduce the capability of the licensee to mitigate any consequences from the specific security-initiated event described in Order EA-02-026, even in the unlikely case that the event could have some effect on the systems used for storage and cooling of spent fuel. The operations staff will continue to receive training on mitigation strategies related to the protection of spent fuel.
A. Vitale For the reasons discussed above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee has demonstrated good cause to withdraw ICM B.1.a of Order EA-02-026. Therefore, in light of the docketing of the 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) certifications for permanent cessation of operations and removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, the NRC withdraws ICM B.1.a of Order EA-02-026 for Indian Point 2.
Sincerely, Digitally signed by Mirela Mirela Gavrilas Date: 2020.07.30 Gavrilas 16:31:04 -04'00' Ho K. Nieh, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-247 cc: Listserv
ML20170B022 *by e-mail OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL3/PM NRR/DORL/LPL1/LA NSIR/DPCP/RSB/BC* NMSS/DUWP/BC*
NAME RGuzman LRonewicz ABowers (LCubellis for) BWatson DATE 06/22/2020 06/22/2020 06/18/2020 06/22/2020 OFFICE OGC - NLO* NRR/DORL/LPL1/BC* OE/D* NRR/DORL/D*
NAME NStAmour JDanna GWilson CErlanger DATE 07/06/2020 07/08/2020 07/07/2020 07/09/2020 OFFICE NRR/D*
NAME HNieh (MGavrilas for)
DATE 07/30/2020