ML20150E377

Rev 4 to Design Baseline & Verification Program

ML20150E377
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	02/22/1988
From:	TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20150E370	List: ML20150E367 ML20150E377
References
PROC-880222, TAC-62258, NUDOCS 8803310132
Download: ML20150E377 (24)

Text

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I Dt3 ION BASRLINE AND VERIFICATION PROGRA SROWN8 FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT

, REVISION 4

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BFEP DESIGN BASELINE AND VERIFICATION PROGRAM PLAN REVISION 4 REVISION LOG THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF REVISIONS THAT HAVE BEEN iddORPCAATED INTO THE BFEP DESIGN BASELINE AND VERIFICATION PROGRAM PLAN (DBVP). ALL CHANGES ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMMITMENTS MADE IN THE BFN NUCLEAR PERFORMAN'JE PLAN, SECTION III.

o '.'ABLE OF CONTENTS - ADDED ATTACHMENT E - DBVP CALCULATION EFFORT PLAN o PARA 2.0 - ADDED REFERENCE TO ATTACHMENT E.

o PARA 4.1.4 - ADDED REFERENCE TO DBVP CALCULATIO') EFFORT PLAN o PARA 4.4.1 - ADDED REFERENCE TO ATTACHMENT E.

o ATTACHMENT C - ADDED REFERENCE TO ATTACHMENT E o ATTACHMENT D - ADDED CALCULATION MANACER TO DBVP ORGANIZATION o ATTACHMENT E - ADDED DBVP CALCULATION EFFORT PLAN e

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DESIGN BASELINE AND VERIFICATION PROGRAM TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page

1.0 INTRODUCTION

.................................................... 1 2.0 0BJECTIVE....................................................... 1 3.0 SC0PE........................................................... 2 3.1 Prerestart Phase (1)....................................... 2 3.2 Postrestart Phase (2)...................................... 2

4.0 DESCRIPTION

OF PROGRAM (PHASE 1)................................ 2 4.1 Establish Design Basis Input............................... 2 4.2 Establish Configuration....;'............................... 4 4.3 Evaluate Configuration..................................... 5 4.4 Issue 0utputs.............................................. 6 4.5 Independent Review by Engineering Assurance................ 7

5.0 DESCRIPTION

OF PROGRAM (PRASE 2)....................... ........ 8 6.0 PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION.......................................... 8 6.1 Organization............................................... 8 6.2 Change Contro1............................................. 8 6.3 Elements................................................... 9 l 7.0 PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION........................................... 9 l

l 7.1 Program Procedures......................................... 9 l

t i Attachment A - DBVP Scope Phase 1 (Systems).......................... 1-2 i

l Attachment B - DBVP Scope Phaso 1 (Events)........................... 1 of 1 ,

Attachment C - Conceptual Plan for Design Baseline and Verification Program................................. 1 of 1 Attachment D - Browns Ferry DBVP Organization....................... 1 of 1 l Attachment E - DBVP Calculation Ef fort P1an. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 of 6 gg4 1

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This program has been developed to reconcile design control issues described in several evaluations and audits as follows:

o Comprehensive review of the existing program.

o Studies / evaluations performed by TVA and others, o Interviews of key personnel within the TVA organization.

o The corporate evaluation conducted by INPO.

The implementation of this program has been structured into two phases:

prerestart (Phase 1), and postrestart (Phase 2).

'2.0 Obj ective The objectives of this program are to reestablish the design basis and evaluate the plant configuration to ensure that it satisfies the design basis by:

o Verifying the functional adequacy of the plant configuration.

o Ensuring that the configuration of these systems is supported by engineering analysis and documentation.

o Providino confidence that plant configuration is in conformance with licensing commitments.

The essential elements of the overall program are as follows:

o verification of plant configuration.

o Reconciliation of the configuration to engineering design documents including essential calculations, o Reconciliation of the configuration to the FSAR and licensing commitments.

o Performance of system evaluation for the system configuration.

o Issuance of revised key plant drawings for the required systems consistent with the plant configuration.

o Implementation of impraved change control.

These program objectives will be met in two phases. The pretestart phase (Phase 1) of this program will include the systems and portions of systems required for safe shutdown. The postrestart phase (Phase 2) will include implementation of the remaining modifications to the safety systems not required for restart, completion and revision of the design criteria documentation, completion of system evaluations, and implementation of corrective actions to other systems as required. This program's calculation effort is discussed in Attachment E. R4 An improved change control process will be put into offect to ensure that compliance with the design basis continues.

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3.0 SCOPE 3.1 Prerestart (Phase 1)

The detailed scopo of the prerestart (Phase 1) is as follows:

o The list of systems or portions of systems covered in this phase is given in Attachment A. These systems were identified by evaluating the abnormal operational transients, design basis accident and special events from BFN FSAR Chapter 14 and other pertinent chapters, and determining the safety actions utilized for mitigating these events. The systems required to support the systems which perform the safety actions are included. This evaluation includes the required unit 2 systems, common systems, and portions of unit 1 and unit 3 systems to support unit 2.

o The table of design basis events within the scope is shown in Attachment B. The events and safety actions are:

1. Safety actions required for Chapter 14 Design Basis Accidents

2. Safety actions for Abnormal Operational Transients and Special Events

- RPV integrity

- Primary or secondary containment integrity

- Core Cooling

- Overpressure Relief (Safety Relief Valves)

- Decay heat removal (torus cooling)

- Reactivity Control 3.2 Postrestart (Phase 2)

The other systems and portions of systems that aro utilized in abnornal operational transients and special events not covered by the Phase 1 scope are in the Phase 2 program.

4.0 DESCRIPTION

OF PROGRAM (PHASE 1)

The methodology is: (1) establish the design basis input for the evaluation, (2) establish the plant configuration, (3) evaluate the configuration to the design basis, and (4) issue the outputs. Attachment C provides the summary logic of the program activities.

4.1 Establish Desir,n Basis Input The design basis input will consist of a commitments / requirements (C/R) data base, the General and System Design Criteria, System Requirements Calculations to support the Shutdown Analysis, the set of essential calculations within the scope of the Dcsign Baseline and Verification Program (DBVP), and functional testing requirements.

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4.1.1 Commitments / Requirements Deta Best The licensing cor.altments made throughout the plant life will be documented in a data base. Design requirements necessary to achieve safe shutdown will also be data based.

4.1.2 Design Criteria The Design Criteria Documents (DCD) will be developed from a search of the licensing commitments and design requirements data base, and from the review by senior level engineers. The DCD will serve as the basis for engineering requirements and will be used to determine plant modifications required before restart and to evaluato system configuration.

NOTE: In addition to information obtained from C/R source documents, other information will be included in the DCDs as required to conform with Criterion III of 10 CFR50 Appendix B.

4.1.3 System Requirements The Shutdown Analysis (SA) will be based on FSAR Chapter 14 requirements and will identify the accidents, abnormal operational transients, and special events from which the plant must safely shut down.

The System Requirements Calculations (SRC) will be based on the SA and will identify the systems or portions of systems that will perform the shutdown for each event. The SRCs will identify the boundarios for the system. They will provide the system modes and the components for shutdown.

The SRCs will be used to establish the list of essential calculations and estabilsh the scope for the program.

4.1.4 Establish Essential Calculations Phase 1 of the DBVP will specify the essential calculations needed to verify the adequacy of the design within the safe shutdown boundary and will determine if the calculations exist E4 and are adequate to support the design output. If calculations are not in place or are determined to be inadequate, new calculations will be developed. DBVP will ensure that the calculations meet the safe shutdown design basis and aro in place to support the design requirements for the DBVP scope.

The DBVP's calculation effort is discussed in detail in Attachment E.

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l 4.1.5 Est*blish T+ sting R*auirement>

The testing requirements for verification of system capability will be developed using the SRCs and DCDs.

The Test Requirements Documents (TRDs) will establish the testing to support the requirements of the DBVP. Paragraph 4.2.3 discusses testing and 4.3.6 discusses evaluations of the testing.

4.2 Establish Configuration The plant configuration will be established by: walkdown of the Flow, Control and Single Line drawings, review of other programs, verification of electrical logic, and testing.

4.2.1 Walkdown The Flow, Control and Single Line drawings define the portion of the plant that will be walked down to document the plant configuration. The walkdowns will verify the functional configuration of the systems within the boundaries identified in 4.1.3. They will address the arrangement of components, the type of components, and nameplate data on the components. The '

as-constructed (AC) drawings will be marked up to reflect the actual walled down configuration.

The results of the walkdowns will be used in the functional evaluation of drawings, to issue revised AC drawings, and will be used to reconcile nameplate data on the Instrument Tabulation an?. Valve Marker Tabulation drawings (setpoint data will be verified by calculation).

4.2.2 Other Program Walkdowns Other programs at BFN have been performing field verification walkdowns. The information gathered during these programs will be t.csessad and used, if appropriate in determining the functional plant configuration. Examples of these programs include Envircamental Qualification and Appendix R.

4.2.3 Verification of Electrical Logic Electrical systems and the electrical aspects of mechanical systems will be verified by one of two methods:

o Schematic / elementary diagrams will be functionally verified by tests and by review of existing documentation. ,

o Singic lines will be verified by physical walkdown and functional testing.

Based on these results, the electrical schematics will be verified as CCDs and issued.

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4.2.4 T stinx Testing will be performed as part of the Restart Test Program to test specifications based on the Test Requirements Documents (paragraph 4.1.5).

4.3 Evaluate Configuration System Evaluation Reports (SYSTER) will be prepared for the systems shown in Attachment A. A final report will be prepared to demonstrate the plant meets its safe-shutdown design basis.

A review of change documentation will be performed to determine if the partially implemented and unimplemented changes should be  ;

incorporated in the plant to satisfy the design basis. This review will identify any changes required before restart.

4.3.1 Functional Evaluation of Drawings Drawings that will be issued as Configuration Control Drawings (CCDs) will be reviewet'to ensure they accurately depict system functions. The as-designed (AD) drawings will be compared to the revised AC drawings and differences will be reconciled.

Differences will require an Engineering Change Notice (ECN) to document the configuration. Any deviation from the design basis will be identified on the punchlist and resolution identified.

4.3.2 Significant Condition Report /Nonconformance Report / Condition Adverse to Quality Report (SCR/NCR/CAOR)

A review will be performed to ensure adequate corrective actions have been identified for SCR/NCR/CAQRs within the Phase 1 scope and that the corrective actions satisfy the design basis. Open SCR/NCR/CAQRs will be closed in accordance with NEP 9.1 which implements the TVA Condition Adverse to Quality Process. Closed SCR/NCR/CAQRs not supported by an ECN will be evaluated. The results of the review will be included in the SYSTER.

Corrective action will be generated, as necessary.

4.3.3 Evaluation of Other Program Scopes This part of the evaluation will review other programs' scopes to determine if they can be used to satisfy DBVP requirements.

The portions of the system evaluations within DBVP which rely upon the other programs will be identified and documented in the SYSTERs.

4.3.4 Evaluate Acceptability of Unimplemented or Partially Implemented Changes The change documentation will be reviewed on the systems and -

portions of systems required for safe shutdown to ensure that the changes required to meet the design basis are implemented in the plant at restart.

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Chingsa th0t will not bs fully impitmentsd at restart will require that a revised Unreviewed Safety Question Determination (USQD) review be performed based on their status at restart.

Portions of changes not required for restart will be cancelled / voided and closed. ECNs will be written to remove the cancelled / voided changes from the AD drawings. (New ECNs will be written if the changes are to be made after restart).

4.3.5 Component Nameplate Data Data collected by walkdown and records research will be used as required in the performance of the system evaluations to determine whether systems (or portions of systems) meet the design basis.

4.3.6 Evaluate Configuration Through Testing The Test Specifications prepared in the Restart Test Program will be reviewed in the DBVP to ensure that the tests will verify the required chaYacteristics of the configuration. DBVP will evaluate the configuration against the requirements of the SRCs. If testing determines the plant configuration does not satisfy the requirements of the SRCs, the configuration will be modified by the change control process.

4.3.7 Identify Open Items During the DBVP, some open items will be identified which must be scheduled and tracked through completion, for example, unverified assumptions, test discrepancies and the need for supplemental walkdowns. A punchlist will be maintained for all open items. The punchlist will indicate the action plan and who is responsibic for resolution.

4.4 Issue Outputs 4.4.1 Resolve Open Items This will include verifying assumptions, reviewing test results, evaluating changes since the walkdowns and tests were performed, and all other prerestart open items. All supporting essential calculations required before restart will be complete and issued before restart, as discuared in Attachment E. 24 4.4.2 Issue Drawings

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CCDs will be issued to document the DBVP evaluated plant configuration. For Phase 1 (prerestart) of the program, the portions of the systems within the safe shutdown boundaries will be the evaluated portions of the CCDs. Phase 2 will complete the CCD evaluation. '

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4.4.3 Schematic / Elementary Diegrams The schematic and elementary diagrams will be updated to reflect the functional configuration of the plant. The configuration will be determined from testing, drawing comparison and walkdown data.

4.4.4 SYSTER/USOD sjstem Evaluation Reports (SYSTER) will be prepared to address each system. The SYSTERs will be prepared from the evaluations in paragraph 4.3.

Where it is determined that the actual plant configuration is different than the licensed configuration, a USQD w!11 be written.

4.4.5 Final Report The results and conclusions of the program will be documented in a final report for submLssion to the Director, Division of Nuclear Engineering (DNE). The report will consider trending of deficiencies found during the implementation of the program in order to deturmine if other corrective actions are needed. It will recommend postrestart tasks that are identified during the prerestart phase. Based upon review of the report, the Director will determine if the stated objectives of the program have been met, or if additional actions are required.

4.5 Independent Review by Engineering Assurance (EA)

DNEs Engineering Assurance will perform an independent review of the DBVp.

An EA oversight team of experienced technical personnel ' ill independently review, on a sample basis, the DBVp as the project completes its dccument preparation, document revisions, and/or review. The review objectives are:

- Confirm and validate that engineering activities are being conducted in accordance with the approved program plan and procedures established for the DBVP.

- Confirm functional and technical adequacy of system evaluations and completeness / correctness of supporting documentation.

- Verify that corrective actions resulting from these evaluations ,

have been documented and properly implemented er scheduled for postrestart.

This review will provide added assurance that the engineering activities associated with the program are conducted in a technically adequato manner and in accordance with the written procedures prepared specifically for this effort.

The results and conclusions of this review will be documented in a final EA report to the Director, DNE.

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5.0 DESCRIPTION

OF PROCRAM (PHASE 2)

The postrestart (Phase 2) will complete englucaring documentation and evaluations, describing the final functional configurations as CCDs. The change control and management review procedures used during the prerestart (phase 1) will also be in effect during the postrostart phase.

The postrestart (Phase O' will:

o Issue design change package' 1 Sh were not required for pre-restart and complete the related moo;fications.

o Complete the design criteria / design oasis.

o Complete other corrective actions resulting from the restart final report, o Implement the permanent design change concrol system, o complete system evaluation not required for restart.

6.0 PROCRAM IMPLEMENTATION 6.1 Organization Attachment D shows the DBVP organization for the Browns Ferry Project. Consistent with these responsibilities for maintaining a design control program. DNE has taken the lead in order that the design basis and design change control improvements will be implemented.

Within DNE, the project organization onsite will provide the lead for program implementation. The Project Engineer will interface with the Site D!. rector as necessary. Baselino System Engineirs within the Civil. Electrical, Mechanical, and Nuclear disciplines shewn on Attachment D, will be responsible for coordination of all system c'aluation activities on an appropriatt; system or portion thereof. Senior level engineers will be assigned for each system to provide technical assistance and guidance to the system engineers.

6.2 Change Control l

Transitional Change Control Proceduros will be used to allow for i

completion :f modifications initiated before approval of the l Permanent Change C.cntrol Program. Transitional Change control process provides appropriate level of control of changes to the plant configuration until the Permanent Change Control Program is '

developed and implemented.

A Change Control Board (CCB) has been established to limit and ,

control plant modifications. The firct priority of the CCB during I the restert phase is la define, review, 1s+t't, and centrol plant modifications required to be implemented iv ore restart of BFN and to stop all other changes to the selected systems. The CCB will also review nonrestart modifications, and ensure they are scheduled for implementation.

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6.3 Elements A conceptual plan showing the program elements and their interrelationship is presented in Attachment C.

7.0 PROCRAM. DOCUMENTATION 7.1 [pogram Procedures Procedures required to assign specific responsibilities, define mathods, and establish documentation requirements will cover, as a minimum, the following subject areas:

o Change Control Board o Identification of Licensing Commitments o System Walkdowns o Design Criteria / Design Basis o Drawing Comparison Review o Transitional Change Control o Performance of System Evaluations o Review of ECNs and Other Changes o Engineering Assurance Oversight Review o Essential Calculation Effort E4 o Preparation of Configuration Control Drawings o Punchlist o Schematic / Elementary Diagrams o Shutdown Analysis o Systems Requirements Calculation c Tert Requirements Docuinents l

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ATTACHMENT A 1 of 2 DBVP PHASE 1 SCOPE (SYSTEMS)*

System Number System Name Notes 1 Main Steam 2 2 Condensate & Domineralized Water 3 Reactor Feedwater 10 Boiler Drains & Vents and Blowdown SRV Discharge &

RCPB Only 12 Auxiliary Boiler 1 18 Fuel Oil 23 RHR Service Water 24 Raw Cooling Water 25 Raw Service Water 26 High-Pressure Fire Piotection 1 + EECW Interface 29 Potable Water Distribution 1 30 Ventilation 31 Air Conditioning (Heating & Cooling) 32 Control Air 33 Service Air 1 34 Vacuum Priming 1 37 Gland Seal Water 1 40 Station Drainage 1 43 Sampling and Water Quality RPV Isolation &

RHRSW Interface 44 Building Heating 1 47 Turbine Generator EHC Scram Signals only 50 Sodium Hypochlorite EECW Interface Only 53 Backwash Air 1 63 Standby Liquid Control 64A Primary Containment e d Isolation Logic 64B Reactor Building and .imary Containment Ventilation 64C Secondary Containment Penetrations and Isolation Notes:

1. These systems are being evaluated only for their primary / secondary containment penetrations.

• The systems were selected using the BFNP Calculation: System Mode Requirements for DBVP Postart Plan (BFN-BFS3-050) to determine the systems and portions of systems required for Phaso 1.

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ATTACHMENT A (Continued) 2 of 2 DBVP PRASE 1 SCOPE (SYSTEMS)*

System pumber gygtem Name Notes 65 Standby Cas Treatment 66 0FF-CAS 67 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water 68 Reactor Water Recirculstion 69 Reactor Water Cleanup 70 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water 1 71 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RPV Isolation &

Core Cooling for Non-accident Events 73 High Pressure Coolant Injection 74 Residual Heat Removal 75 Core Spray 76 Containment Inerting 77 Radwasto 78 ruel Pool Cooling and Domineralization 79 Fuel Handling and Storage Fuel Pool and Water Level Integrity Only 82 Standby Diesel Generator 84 Containment Atmospheric Dilution 85 Control Rod Drive 86 Diesel Starting Air 90 Radiation Monitoring 92 Neutron Monitoring 94 Traversing Incore Probo 1 99 Reactor Protection 571 125-V DC Distribution 572 208/120 V AC Distribution 573 250-V DC Distribution 574 480-V AC Distribution 575 4-XV AC Distribution Notes:

1. These systems are being evaluated only for their primary / secondary containment penetrations.

• The systems were colected using the BFNP Calculation: System Mode _

Requirements for DBVP P.ectart Plan (BFN-BFS3-050) to determine the systems and portions of systems required for Phace 1.

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ATTACNett37 3 i DBVi Nev .(

Fege 1 of 1 DaVP rbase i Scope (Typical versus safety Actions,i i l l l Irr imar y 15ccenda s y Safety I lother l rose lovespiessure lpeactivity l pry Icontainment [Containwent l Decay Meat 15alety Attlems: Irouiln1 18ellet icoatsel llategelty lintegrliy lintegelty leemoval IActlens

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1 8 l l l 8 l l All lincleteJ IN/A lescept break lincluded lincluJed lIncluJcJ lencept glacluJcJ l Included lincluded b4A32 I loulslJel l llencept lbseek outsidel llesCept break l llas l l 1 l break i I , I lappilcable) s .

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1 I I I I l i I Typical I Its!V Closure I-T/G Talps lufth flaclude all l-Fres Reg INone I-Loss ollsite I-All lNot Appl! cable l Loss of vacuum i er failure 15crans for l l lalls l Feues l Isolation linctated Tsahstents l-rees Reg Falls l-M58V Closure IEvents la Core 8-tmaJoest I l's l Events luutil I-InaJoes t Open SRV l-Fres Seg falls lcoollag and l Ogen l l l-Loss of IAlter I-fW Loss l-Loss of vacuun lovespsessure I Tushine 1 l l Shutdown IRestart 1-5 W control Fal: l-Loss olisite lRellel plus l 3rpass l l l Coollag I l Loss oilsite l rover l-Loss IV lleater l l l 1 l l Power l-tv Control fell I-Shutdown Cool l l l l 1 l l l nallunction I l l 8 l l l l-laaJr. Puep tirassive l l l l 8 I I Stast i Integstty - l l l l l l l-SaJ WithJr. I All Events) l l l l 8 I l Essor I l l I I I I l-sects Fall - I I 1 I l l l l Inca i I I i 1.

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s. e a a a a a s l 1 1 I I I I I Typical l St.utJown outslJe l-oveersessuse 1-overpsessure l-S hs t Jewa ltione 1-Loss Fuel Fool l-Fire (Not j special l Fire l Protection IFSAR l Psotection l OutstJe  ! I Coollag l-ShutJoun fincloJeJ 1 Lvents: I Lasthquale l CH5 Design Basis l-Fire l-Earthquale i I l OutsIJe lUntil I l Eventi l-ShutJuvn I-Loss Fuel l I l-Easthquake lAtter I l-shutdown Outside l Outside l Pool l l l lpestaat l l- Ea s ti.quak e l-ShutJewn l CooIIng i I l l l l 1 u/o soJs I (Pool lategl l I I I I I l-Easthquake . l l l 4 I I l t i I l 1

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• see the system MoJe Beguirements for DB4VP Restart Plan IBFN-SF51-850) to Jetersloe the relationships between events and safety actions regelscJ Ier Phase 1.

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ATTACHVENT C C0KEPTUAL PLAN FOR DESIGN BASELINE A40 VERIFICATION PROGRAM q.,

SCR/NCR/CAQR

> EVALUATIC.1 (4.3.2)

FSAR/SER -

TECMICAL .

REQUIREMENTS ECN

> EVALUATION l

(4.3.4)

C0mliVENTI DESIGN TEST >

+ REQUIREMENTS -> CRITEP.lA (4.2.4)

TEST RESULTS CATA BASE DOC;; VENTS (4.1.1) (4.1.2) i ""# -> hEQUIRED d errc e y (W: TAT'.E:0 E) 00SSICIIYI SHUTOCWN SYSTEM SYSTEW WOCE TEST g Acil0N (4.4.1)

POST R

+ AMLYSIS -> REQUIREVENTS -> REQUIREVENTS -> REQUIREVENTS g

RESTART (4.1.3) CALCULATION FOR DS&VP 00CtXENTS SYSTEN (4.1.3) RESTART PLAN (4.1.5) + EVALUAtl0NS PUNCHLIST (4.1.3) (4.2.4) 4.31 (4.3.7) )

Y (4.4.2)

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(4.4.3)

-  ! > (4.4.4) REPORTS Y

1 PHASE 2

_g IDENTIFY gg (4.4.5) -> RESTART g

& ESSENTIAL 3

CALCULATIONS OTHER

> (4.l.4) PROGRM INPUT (4.3.3)

I WECHANICAL & DPMING ISSUE ELECTRICAL + RECONCillAil04 -) CONFIGURATION HLK00'ns/ TEST (4.3.1) CONTROL (4.2.1) OPMINGS (4.2.3)

A (4.3.21 (4.4.2) -

(4.4.3) 1 n0aPM .

INPUT (4.2.2)

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ATTACHNENT D DSVP Rev 3 Page 1 of 1 BROWNS FERRY DBVP 1 ORGANIZATION BFEP DNE PROJECT -------------------

SPONSOR ENGINEER DSVP PR00 RAM MANAGER PROJECT CALCULATION STAFF SERVICES MANAGER ASSISTANTS

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l CIVIL BRANCH ELECTRICAL HECHANICAL NUCLEAR SPONSOR BRANCH -

BRANCH BRANCH SPONSOR SP0h.'OR SPONSOR CIVIL ELECTRICAL MECHANICAL NUCLEAR '

LEAD LEAD LEAD -

LEAD ENGINEER ENGINEER ENGINEER ENGINEER

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DESIGN BASELINE AND VERIFICATION PROGRAM CALCULATION EFFORT PLAN BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT

~ATTAChdENT E R4

1. INTRODUCTION i TVA has implemented several key steps to correct previous audit findings and reestablish the integrity of Browns Ferry-(BFN) calculations. These include:

- Ongoing programs established to review and regenerate calculations in specific areas of concern, Calculation procedures upgraded to standards that met or exceeded industry practices.

- An Engineering Assurance pr3 gram developed to execute audits and surveillances of calculations to assure compliance with procedures and consistency with designs,

- A Calculation Cross-Reference Information System (CCRIS) established to los all calculations, and define their interrelationships.

The Baseline Program calculation effort brings these key steps together and assures that essential calculations have been identified, and that older calculations (pre-7/1/86) are either technically adequate, or have been superceded by calculations in other ongoing programs. This is necessary in order to demonstrate that proper analytical data exists that either supports or bounds the plant's licensing basis.

This effort foe unit 2 will be executed in two phases. Phase 1 will support BFN unit 2 restart; Phase 2 will complete this program af ter unit 2 restart.

2. OBJECTIVES The objectives of this plan are, as a minimum, to:

a. Identify calculations considered to be ossential,

b. Ensure that essential calculations support the plant licensing commitments and design basis requirements, , ,

c. Ensure that essential calculations are technically adequate and consistent with the plant configuration,

4. Ensure that essential calculations supporting the Design Baseline and Verific. oa Program (DBVP) are consistent with the plant functional configuration.

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e. Implement a process to maintain the technical adequacy and retrievablity of essential calculations,

f. Implement a CCRIS whieb identifies and tracks calculations supporting engineering changes, identifies interactions between calculations and plant modifications and correlates the calculations with design documents.

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SUMMARY

The Phase 1 portion of the calculation effort focuses on essential calculations that:

- Support the DBVP pre-restart boundary and DBVP system functionality, or

- Have known or suspected problems identified through corporate quality programs, or

- Are pre-restart commitments in the other programs defined in Volume 3 of the Nuclear Performance Plan (NPP).

The Phase 2 portion of the effort completes:

- Unit 2 and common essential calculation activities which were technically justified as deferrable during Phase 1.

- The review of essential calculations for safety-related systems, structures, and components outside the Phase 1 DBVP boundary.

- Post-restart commitments in the other programs defined in Volume 3 of the NPP.

4. DEFINITIONS DESIGN BASELINE and VERIFICATION PROGRAM (DBVP) is a program created to reestablish the design basis and evaluate the plant functional configuration to ensure that it satisfies the design basis. .

ESSENTIAL CALCULATIONS are calculations which address plant systems or features (or portions thcreof) whose failure could:

(a) Result in a loss of Reactor Coolant System integrity,

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(b) Result in loss of ability to achieve safe shutdown, or (c) Result in a release of radioactivity offsite in excess of the 10CFR100 guidelines.

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POTENTIAL GENERIC CONDITION EVALUATION (PGCE) is a review for generic implications and is performed for deficiencies identified during the calculation program efforts at other TVA nuclear projects, or ongoing BFN programs which required modifications or functional changes to equipment and/or facilities within a safety-related area.

5. PLAN DESCRIPTION The logic for BFN's Calculation Plan is depicted in Figure 1, and is described in this section. The calculation effort addresses essential calculations for structures, systems, and components within the Phase 1 and Phase 2 DBVP scope as well as other NPP commitments.

The review of calculations, as described below, portains to those calculations generated prior to the implementation of TVA's Nuclear Engineering Procedures on July 1, 1986. The implementation of these proceduces completed the upgrading of Division of Nucicar Engineering calculation process. This procedure, combined with the progra=mstic assessments by Engineering Assurince, has served to ensure the quality of calculation generated since that date.

The calculations which are addressed in Phase 1 of the effort are those within the Phase 1 boundary of the DBVP, as well as other essential calculations, such as civil calculations. The Phase 1 DBVP boundary consists of those portions of safety-related systems that are defined in the BFN System Requirements Calculations as required to mitigate FSAR chapter 14 design basis events and transients defined in the DBVP plan.

During Phase 1, a systems functionality review is being performed of essential calculations in the Phase 1 DBVP boundary. This review of technical adequacy serves to affirm consistency with the plant functioaal configuration at restart.

Also during Phase 1 further review is performed for each type of essential calculation. This review determines whether PGCEs exist, or whether there are other concerns or conditions which would require a closer evaluation of that family of calculations. These latter concerns could stem from internal angineering reviews, previous commitments, design changes or findings from other agencies external to TVA (e.g. ,

NRC. INPO, etc.).

Based upon the review of each calculation type, the disciplines determine whether detailed review is warranted. Reviews, if required, are performed either of all calculations, or of a representative sample within the type, depending on the nature and extent of concerns which '

exist. In all cases, technical justifications are documented for the extent of review required (or not required) for each type of calculation.

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A list of essential calculations ir determined for those types of calculations which require a Phase 1. review. The existence of those calculations are also being confirmed. Any calculations which are determined to be missing are being generated or replaced with appropelate test results, technical justification, or other bounding calculations during the Phase 1 effort.

If deficiencies are found during the review which could affect the design or operation of the plant, the calculation is upgraded by the TVA CAQR process. The disposition of the CAQR will include recommendations for further corrective actions, if oppropriate.

Minor deficiencies in calculations that are discovered, such as editorial problems, improper formats, incorrect references, are being punchlisted for correction after restart. These minor corrections will be part of the scope of Phase 2 under this plan.

A functional review will also to completed during Phase 2 for those portions of safety-related systems and components inside the Phase 2 DBVP boundary. Likewise, calculation's for safety-related structures will be reviewed to confirm the consistency with actual plant configuration.

During this process, remaining essential calculations will be identified. As in Phase 1, deficiencies will be documented by the CAQR process and, where appropriate, the calculations will be upgraded to reflect the as-built configuration.

Certain issues within the scope of the calculation effort are defined in discrete programs in NPP Volume 3. In programt such as IE Bullotin 79-02/14 and Ampacity, activitics extend beyond restart. The Phase 2 work is defined in these program plans.

6. ENGINEERING ASSURANCE TECHNICAL AUDITS Engineering Assurance will perform technical audits of this calculation effort to ensure that this effort is executed in a technically adequate manner in accordance with this plan.

7. CONCLUSION Completion of both phases of the DBVP calculation effort will provide documented evidence that essential calculations support the design basis, licensing commitments, and other NPP Volume 3 commitments.

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FIGURE I LOGIC FOR THE BASELINE CALCULATION EFFORT PHAS U DB & VP SYSTEMS I

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ESSENTIAL BA I4CE OF CAOR/PGCE "I CALC lC SAFETY-RELATED L CONCERNS l IDENTIFICATION l SYSTEMS, STRUCTURES, 5 AND COMPONENTS DOES CALC NO EXIST l

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POS 86 c + D B SI YES NO O II EVALUATE FOR TECHNICAL U ADEOUACY <

UTILIZE 8 FOR jf p RESTART NO ACCEPTABLE CAOR YES If p I f ,

ADD CALC i

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! TO A?JffST, l CLOSURE l TRACK TO CLOSURE qp RIMS FILE l .

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BFEP DESIGN BASELINE AND VERIFICATION PROGRAM PLAN REVISION 3 REVISION LOC THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF REVISIONS THAT HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO THE BTEP DESIGN BASELINE AND VERIFICATION PROGRAM PLAN (DBVP). ALL CHANGES ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMMITMENTS MADC IN THE BFN NUCLEAR PERFORMANCE PLAN, SECTION III.

o PARA 3.1 - CLARIFIED THE REFERENCE TO BFN FSAR - SOME SAFETY ACTIONS ARE DEFINED IN FSAR SECTIONS OTHER THAN CHAPTER 14 o PARA 3.1 - RESTRUCTURED THE PARAGRAPH TO CLARIFY RULES USED FOR ESTABLISHING PHASE 1 SAFE 1Y ACTIONS o PARA 3.1 - ADDED REACTIVITY CONTROL TO THE LIST OF SAFETY ACTIONS BEING EVALUATED IN PHASE 1 - THIS HAD BEEN INADVERTENTLY OMITTED FROM THE PREVIOUS REVISION o PARA 3.1 - REMOVED REFERENCE TO THE PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT (PRA) AS AN INPUT TO THE DBVP o PARA 4.1.2 - ADDED NOTE TO CLARIFY INPUT REQUIREMENTS TO THE DESIGN CRITERIA DOCUMENTS o PARA 4.2.1 - REVISED PARAGRAPH TO DEFINE THE USE OF WALKDOWN DATA IN THE RECONCILIATION OF NAMEPLATE INFORMATION ON THE INSTRUMENT TABULATION AND VALVE MARKER TABULATION DRAWINGS

. o PARA 4.2.3 - CLARIFIED SCOPE OF ELECTRICAL EFFORT INCLUDING THE

! ELECTRICAL ASPECTS OF MECHANICAL SYSTEMS o PARA 4.3 - DELETED DESCRIPTION OF THE FINAL REPORT AS AN OVERALL PLANT SYSTER 4

o PARA 4.3.1 - DELETED A SENTENCE TO CLARIFY THE TIMING OF CONFIGURATION CONTROL DRAWING EVALUATION J

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o PARA 4.3.2 - CLARIFIED THE REVIEW OF CONDITION ADVERSE TO QUALITY REPORTS (CAQRs) TO CONFORM WITH THE EXISTING CONDITION ADVERSE TO QUALITY PROCESS DESCRIBED IN THE TVA NUCLEAR QUALITY ASSURANCE MANUAL.

o PARA 4.3.5 - CLARIFIED THE USE OF COMPONENT WALKDOWN DATA IN ESTABLISHING THE DESIGN BASIS - THIS REVISION IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE C0KMITMENTS MADE IN THE BFN NUCLEAR PERFORMANCE PLAN VOLUME 3. SECTION III o PARA 4.4.2 - REVISED PARAGRAPH TO CLARIFY THE TIMING OF CONFIGURATION CONTROL DRAWING EVALUATION o PARA 4.4.5 - REMOVED REFERENCES THAT ADDITIONAL EVALUATIONS ARE REQUIRED AS PART OF THE FINAL REPORT o ATTACHMENT A - MISCELLANEOUS CLARIFICATIONS AND CORRECTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

SYSTEM 10 - ADDED SCOPE (RCPB) THAT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY OMITTED SYSTEM 39 - 02LETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SYSTEM MODE REQUIREMENTS CALCULATION BFN-BFS3-050 SYSTEM 40 - SYSTEM WAS PREVIOUSLY OMITTED SYSTEM 47 - REDUCED SYSTEM SCOPE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SYSTEM MODE REQUIREMENTS CALCULATION BFN-BFS3-050 SYSTEM 79 - CLARIFIED NOTE SYSTEM 576 - DELETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SYSTEM MODE REQUIREMENTS CALCULATION BFN-BF33-050 REVISED FOOTNOTE TO REFERENCE SYSTEM MODE REQUIREMENTS CALCULATION BFN-BFS3-050 o ATTACHMENT B - MISCELLANEOUS CLARIFICATIONS TO PRESENT THE TABLE AS TYPICAL SAFETY ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO VARIOUS EvdNTS .

AND PROVIDE A REFERENCE to THE SYSTEM MODE $

REQUIREMENTS CALCULA710N Brs BFS3-050 o ATTACHMENT C - MISCELLANEOUS CLARIFICATIONS AND CORRECTIONS o ATTACHMENT D - REVISED CHART TO SHOW THE CURRENT ORCANIZATION 4

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