ML20134G540
| ML20134G540 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/1997 |
| From: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134G513 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9702100447 | |
| Download: ML20134G540 (16) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _
1 1
ENCLOSURE 2 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)
UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) BASES (TS-388)
MARKED PAGES
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I.
AFFECTED PAGE LIST 4
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Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3
- i 3.7/4.7-29 3.7/4.7-29 3.7/4.7-28 j
II.
MARKED PAGES See Attached.
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1 i
I 9702100A47 970205 PDR ADOCK 05000259 P
l O
O M 10 W 3.7/4.7 BASId (cont'd) i j
confirmation that*the valve will at least "nearly close" (within 3' of full closure). The green. light circuit confi ns the valve will fully open. If none of the lights change indication during the cycle, the air operator must i
be inoperable or the valve disc is stuck. For this case, a check light on and red light off con *iras the disc is in a nearly closed position even if one of j
the indications is in error. Although the valve may be inoperable for full l
closure, it does not constitute a safety threat.
If the red light circuit alone is inoperable, the talve shall still be i
considered fully 0FERABLE. If the green and red or the green light circuit j
alone is inoperable the valve shall be considered inoperable for opening. If the check and green or check light circuit alone is inoperable, the valve i
shall be considered inoperable for full closure unless all vacuun breakers can l
be demonstrated to be fully closed by alternate means such as monitoring the
{
decay rate of drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure. If the red and check light circuits are inoperable the valve shall'be considered inoperable,and open greater than 3*.
For a light circuit to be considered OPERABLE the light must go on and off in proper sequence during the opening-closing cycle.
If none of the lights change indication during the cycle, the valve shall be considered inoperable and open unless the~ check light stays on and the red light stays off in which case the valve shall be considered inoperabi
.sr opening.
The 12 dryvell vacuum breaker valves which connect the suppression chamber and i
drywell are sized on the basis of the Bodega pressure suppression system i
tests. Ten OPERABLE to open vacuun breaker valves (13-inch) selected on this test basis and confirmed by the grsen lights are adequate to limit the pressure differential between the suppression chamber.and drywell during postaccident drywell coolir.g operations to a value which is within suppression i
system design values.
t I
The containment design has been examined to determine that a leakage i
equivalent to one drywell vacuun breaker opened to no more than a nominal 3' as confirmed by the red light is acceptable.
On this basis an indefinite allowable repair time for an inoperable red light circuit on any valve or an inoperable check and green or check light circuit alone or a malfunction of the operator or dise (if nearly closed) on one j
valve, or an inoperable green and red or green light circuit alone on two l
valves is justified.
During each operating cycle, a leak rate test shall be performed to verify that significant leakage flow paths do not exist bdtween the dryvell and suppression chamber. The drywell pressure will be incrammad, he,2,t_le_as4 one psi with respect to the suppression chamber pressur
.}
l The two peig setpoint will not be exceeded. The subsequent itssion ~
l j
chamber pressure transient (if any) will be monitored with a sensitive
{
pressure gauge.
If the drywell pressure cannot be increased by one psi over j
the suppression chamber pressure it would be because a significant leakage path exists; in this event the leakage source will be identified and j
eliminated before power operation is resumed.
1 4i BFN 3.7/4.7-29 TS 365 Unit 1 Letter Dated OL 0
!'~
O O
JUL 101995 -
l 3.7/4.7 A&gyd (Cont'd) l confirmation ?, hat the valve vill at least "nearly close" (within 3' of full closare). The green light circuit confirma.the valve will fully open. If j
none of the lights change indicatiou during the cycle, the air operator must j
be inoperable or the valve disc is stuck. For this case, a check light on and red light off confirms the disc is in a nearly closed position even if one of the indications is in error. Although the valve may be inoperable for full closure, it does not constitute a safety threat.
i l
If the red light circuit alone is inoperable, the valve shall still be i
considered fully 0PERABLE. If the green sad red or the gra m light circuit
{
alone is inoperable the valve shall be considered inoperable for opains.
If the check and green or check light circuit alone is inoperable, the valve j
shall be considered inoperable for full closure unless all vacum breakers can l
be demonstrated to be fully closed by alternate means such as monitoring the i
decay rate of drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure. If the l
red and check light circuits are inoperable the valve shall be considered inoperabis and open greater than 3'..
For a light circuit to be considered j
i OPERABLE'the light must go on and off in proper sequence during the l
opening-closing cycle. If none of the lights change indication during the cycle, the valve shall be considered inoperable and open unless the check l
light stays on and the red light stays off in which case the valve shall be i
considered inoperable for opening.
The 12 drywell vacuum breaker valves which connect the suppression chamber and j
j drywell are sized on the basis of the Bodega pressure suppression system j
tests. Ten OPERABLE to open vacuum breaker valves (18-inch) selected on this test basis and confirmed by the green lights are adequate to limit the pressure differential between the suppression chamber and drywell during postaccident drywell cooling operations to a value which is within suppression system design values.
The containment design has been examined to determine that a leakage
~
equivalent to one drywell vacuum breaker opened to no more than a nominal 3*
as confirmed by the red light is acceptable.
On this basis an indefinite allowable repair time for an inoperable red light circuit on any valve or an inoperable check and green or check light circuit 1
alone or a malfmetion of the operator or dise (if nearly closed) on one valve, or an inoperable green and red or green light circuit alone on two valves is justified.
. During each operating cycle, a leak rate test shall be performed to verify that significant leakage flow patTis do not exist between the drywell and suppression chamber. The drywell pressure will be increased _br at_1 %
one psi with respect to the suppression chamber pressurCt hW--" g.
The two psig setpoint will not be exceeded. The subsequent,suppre h chamber pressure transient (if any) will be monitored with a sensitive pressure gauge.
If the drywell pressure cannot be increased by one psi our the suppression chamber pressure it would be because a significant leakase path exists; in this event the leakage source will be identified and eliminated before power operation is resumed.
1 BFE 3.7/4.7-29 TS 365 l
Unit 2 Letter Dated OL.
o o
10 W 3.7/4.7 Balfa (cont'd)
I confirmation that the valve will at least "nearly close" (within 3* of full closure). The green light circuit confirms the valve will fully open.
If none of the lights change indication during the cycle, the air operator must be inoperable or the valve disc is stuck. For this case, a check light on and red light off confirms the disc is in a nearly closed position even if one of
{
the indications is in error. Although the valve may be inoperable for full closure, it does not constitute a safety threat.
1 If the red light circuit alone is inoperable, the valve shall still be considered fully OPERABLE. If the green and red or the green light circuit alone is inoperable the valve shall be considered inoperable for opening.
If the check and green or check light circuit alone is inoperable, the valve shall be considered inoperable for full closure unless all vacuum breakers can be demonstrated to be fully closed by alternate means such as monitoring the decay rate of dryvell to suppression chamber differential pressure. If the red and check light circuits are inoperable the valve shall be considered inoperable and open greater than 3*.
For a light circuit to be considered OPERABLE the light must so on and off in proper sequence during the opening-closing cycle. If none of the lights change indication during the cycle, the valve shall be considered inoperable and open unless the check light stays on and the red light stays off in which case the valve shall be considered inoperable for opening.
The 12 drywell vacman breaker valves which connect the suppression chamber and i
drywell are sized on the basis of the Bodega pressure suppression system tests. Ten OPERABLE to open vacuum breaker valves (18-inch) selected on this l
test basis and confirmed by the green lights are adequate to limit the i
pressure differential between the suppression chamber and drywell during postaccident drywell cooling operations to a value which is within suppression system design values.
The containment design has been examined to determine that a leakage equivalent to one drywell vacman breaker opened to no more than a nominal 3' as confirmed by the red light is acceptable.
On this basis an indefinite allowable repair time for an inoperable red light circuit on any valve or an inoperable check and green or check light circuit i
alone or a malfunction of the operator or dise (if nearly closed) on one valve, or an inoperable green and red or green light circuit alone on two valves is justified.
Luring each operating cycle, a leak rate test shall be performed to verify that significant leakage flow paths do not exist between the drywell and suppression chamber. The drywell pressure will be iner
_ st less j
one pai with respect to the suppression chamber pressur g M f 9 _.
The two peig setpoint will not be exceeded. The subsequent suppress chamber pressure transient (if any) will be monitored with a sensitive j'
pressure gauge. If the drywell pressure cannot be increased by one pai over the suppression chamber pressure it would be because a significant leakage path exists; in this event the leakage source will be identified and 3
eliminated before power operation is resumed.
BFN 3.7/4.7-23 TS 365 Unit 3 Letter Dated 07/10/95 i
-m..
m.
1.
ENCLOSURE 3 4
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY i
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) 1 UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) BASES (TS-388) i REVISED PAGES i
1 i
i 1,
I.
AFFECTED PAGE LIST i
j 1
Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 j
3.7/4.7-29 3.7/4.7-29 3.7/4.7-28 l
II.
REVISED PAGES j
i i
i See Attached, i
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4 i
1 i
Y 3
6
f Technical Specification 388 Unit 1 I
Pemove Insert t
3.7/4.7-29 3.7/4.7-29
{
3.7/4.7-30 3.7/4.7-30*
4 4
- Denotes Overleaf Page
'a 4
k t
4 i
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1 i
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3.7/4,.7 R&agg (Cont'd) confirmation that the valve will at least "nearly close" (within 3" of full closure). The green light circuit confirms the valve will fully open.
If none of the lights change indication during the cycle,.the air operator must be inoperable or the valve disc is stuck. For this case, a check light on and red light off confirms the disc is in a nearly closed position even if one of 4
the indications is in error. Although the valve may be inoperable for full I
closure, it does not constitute a safety threat.
If the red light circuit alone is inoperable, the valve shall still be considered fully OPERABLE.
If the green and red or the green light circuit alone is inoperable the valve shall be considered inoperable for opening.
If the check and green or check light circuit alone is inoperable, the valve shall be considered inoperable for full closure unless all vacuum breakers can be demonstrated to be fully closed by alternate means such as monitoring the decay rate of drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure.
If the red and check light circuits are inoperable the valve shall be considered inoperable and open greater than 3*.
For a light circuit to be considered OPERABLE the light must go on and off in proper sequence during the opening-closing cycle.
If none of the lights change indication during the cycle, the valve shall be considered inoperable and open unless the check light stays on and the red light stays off in which case the valve shall be considered inoperable for opening.
The 12 drywell vacuum breaker valves which connect the suppression chamber and drywell are sized on the basis of the Bodega pressure suppression system tests. Ten OPERABLE to open vacuum breaker valves (18-inch) selected on this test basis and confirmed by the green lights are adequate to limit the pressure differential between the supprefssion chamber and drywell during j
postaccident drywell cooling operations to a value which is within suppression j
system design values.
j i
The containment design has been examined to determine that a leakage j
equivalent to one drywell vacuum breaker opened to no more than a nominal 3*
as confirmed by the red light is acceptabic.
On this basis an indefinite allowable repair time for an inoperable red light circuit on any valve or an inoperable check and green or check light circuit alone or a malfunction of the operator or dise (if nearly closed) on one valve, or an inoperable green and red or green light circuit alone on two valves is justified.
During each operating cycle, a leak rate test shall be performed to verify that significant leakage flow paths do not exist between the drywell and suppression chamber. The drywell pressure will be increased by at least one psi with respect to the suppression chamber pressure. The two poig
.setpoint will not be exceeded. The subsequent suppression chamber pressure transient (if any) will be monitored with a sensitive pressure gauge.
If the drywell pressure cannot be increased by one poi over the suppression chamber pressure it would be because a significant leakage path exists; in this event the leakage source will be identified and e1Leinated before power operation is resumed.
BFN 3.7/4.7-29 Unit 1
__.-_m_---
o o
3.7/4.7 BasEA (Cont'd) l i
i with a differential pressure of greater than one peig, the rate of change of i
the suppression chamber pressure must not exceed 0.25 inches of water per minute as measured over a lO-minute period, which corresponds to about j
0.09 lb/sec of containment air.
In the event the rate of change exceeds this value then the source of leakage will be identified and eliminated before power operation is resumed.
l 1
The water in the suppression chamber is used for cooling in the event of an accident; i.e.,
it is not used for normal operation; therefore, a daily check of the temperature and volume is adequate to assure that adequate heat removal capability is present.
The interior surfaces of the drywell and suppression chamber are coated as necessary to provide corrosion protection and to provide a more easily j
decontaminable surface. The surveillance inspection of the internal surfaces each operating cycle assures timely detection of corrosion. Dropping the torus water level to one foot below the normal operating level enables an inspection of the suppression chamber where problems would first begin to j
show.
1 The primary containment preoperational test pressures are based upon the calculated primary containment pressure response in the event of a LOCA.
The peak drywell pressure would be about 49 psig which would rapidly reduce to j
less than 30 psig within 20 seconde following the pipe break. Following the pipe break, the suppression chamber pressure rises to 27 peig within 25 seconds, equalizes with drywell pressure, and decays with the drywell pressure decay.
The design pressure of the drywell and suppression chamber is 56 psig. The design leak rate is 0.5-percent per day at the pressure of 56 psig. As pointed out above, the pressure response of the drywell and suppression chamber following an accident would be the same after about 25 seconds.
Based on the calculated containment pressure response discussed above, the primary containment preoperational test pressures were chosen. Also based on the primary containment pressure response and the fact that the drywell and suppression chamber function as a unit, the primary containment will be tested as a unit rather than the individual components separately.
The calculated radiological doses given in Section 14.9 of the FSAR were based on an assumed leakage rate of 0.635-percent at the maximum calculated pressure of 49.6 psig. The doses calculated by the NRC using this bases are 0.14 ram, whole body passing cloud, gamma do,se, and 15.0 rom, thyroid dose, which are respectively only 5 x 10 and 10 times the 10 CFR 100 reference doses.
Increasihg the assumed leakage rate at 49.6 psig to 2.0 percent as indicated in the specifications would increase these doses approximately a factor of three, still leaving a margin between the calculated dose and the 10 CFR 100 reference values.
AMENDMENT NO.18 9 BFN 3.7/4.7-30 j
Unit 1 1
m
_ _ _ _.. ~
i Technical Specification 388 Unit 2 j
r Remove Insert 3.7/4.7-29 3.7/4.7-29 3.7/4.7-30 3.7/4.7-30*
1 1
1 1
l
- Denotes overleaf Page 9
,4 i
O O
~
1
, 3.7/4 7 R&&EA (cont'd) confirmation that the valve will at least "nearly close" (within 3* of full i
closure). The green light circuit confirms the valve will fully open.
If none of the lights change indication during the cycle, the air operator must i
be inoperable or the valve disc is stuck. For this case, a check light on and red light off confirms the disc is in a nearly closed position even if one of the indications is in error. Although the valve may be inoperable for full closure, it does not constitute a safety threat.
If the red light circuit alone is inoperable, the valve shall still be considered fully OPERABLE.
If th,e green and red or the green light circuit j
alone is inoperable the valve shall be considered inoperable for opening.
If J
the check and green or check light circuit alone is inoperable, the valve I
shall be considered inoperable for full closure unless all vacuum breakers can i
be demonstrated to be fully closed by alternate means such as monitoring the decay rate of drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure.
If the I
red and check light circuits are inoperable the valve shall be considered inoperable and open greater than 3'.
For a light circuit to be cor.sidered
{
OPERABLE the light must go on and off in proper sequence during the opening-i closing cycle.
If none of the lights change indication during the cycle, the valve shall be considered inoperable and open unless the check light stays on and the red light stays off in which case the valve shall be considered inoperable for opening.
The 12 drywell vacuum breaker valves uhich connect the suppression chamber and drywell are sized on the basis of the Bodega pressure suppression system tests. Ten OPERABLE to open vacuum breaker valves (18-inch) selected on this test basis and confirmed by the green lights are adequate to limit the pressure differential between the suppression chamber and drywell during postaccident drywell cooling operations to a value which is within suppression system design values.
The containment design has been examined to determine that a leakage equivalent te ene dr
- 11 vacuum breaker opened to no more than a nominal 3*
as confirmed c, th ed light is acceptable.
On this basis an indefinite allowable repair time for an inoperable red light circuit on any valve or an inoperable check and green or check light circuit alone or a malfunction of the operator or disc (if nearly closed) on one valve, or an inoperable green and red or green light circuit alone on two valves is justified.
During each operating cycle, a leak rate test shall be performed to verify that significant leakage flow paths do not exist between the drywell and suppression chamber. The drywell pressure will be increased by at least one poi with respect to the suppression chamber pressure. The two psig d
setpoint will not be exceeded. The subsequent sappression chamber pressure transient (if any) will be monitored with a sensitive pressure gauge.
If the drywell pressure cannot be increased by one psi over the suppression chamber pressure it would be because a significant leakage path exists; in this event the leaksgo source will be identified and eliminated before power operation.is resumed.
BFN 3.7/4.7-29 Unit 2
-. _. _ ~.. _ _ _
I 3.7/4.7 BARES (Cont'd) 3 l
With a differential pressure of greater than one poig, the rate of change of the suppression chamber pressure must not exceed 0.25 inches of water per j
minute as measured over a 10-minute period, which corresponds to about i
0.09 lb/sec of containment air.
In the event the rate of change exceeds this j
value then the source of leakage will be identified and eliminated before i
power operation is resumed.
The water in the suppression chamber is used for cooling in the event of an accident; i.e.,
it is not used for normal operation; therefore, a daily check of the temperature and volume is adequate to assure that adequate heat removal capability is present.
1 i
The interior surfaces of the drywell and suppression chamber are coated as necessary to provide corrosion protection and to provide a more easily decontaminable surface. The surveillance inspection of the internal surfaces each operating cycle assures timely detection of corrosion. Dropping the torus water level to one foot below the normal operating level enables an inspection of the suppression chamber where problems would first begin to show.
The primary containment preoperational test pressures are based upon the
~
calculated primary containment pressure response in the event of a LOCA.
The peak drywell pressure would be about 49 peig which would rapidly reduce to less than 30 peig within 20 seconds following the pipe break. Following the pipe break, the suppression chamber pressure rises to 27 poig within 25 seconds, equalises with drywell pressure, and decays with the drywell pressure decay.
The design pressure of the drywell and suppression chamber is 56 peig. The design leak rate is 0.5-percent per day at the pressure of 56 psig. As pointed out above, the pressure response of the drywell and suppression chamber following an accident would be the same after about 25 seconds.
Based on the calculated containment pressure response discussed above, the primary containment preoperational test pressures were chosen. Also based on the primary containment pressure response and the fact that the drywell and suppression chamber function as a unit, the primary containment will be tested as a unit rather than the individual components separately.
The calculated radiological doses given in Section 14.9 of the FSAR were based on an assumed leakage rate of 0.635-percent at the maximum calculated pressure of 49.6 peig. The doses calculated by the NRC using this bases are 0.14 rom, whole body passing cloud gamma dose, and 15.0 rom, thyroid dose, which are respectively only 5 x 10 and 10'* times the 10 CFR 100 refsrence
~
doses.
Increasing the assumed leakage rate at 49.6 psig to 2.0 percent as indicated in the specifications would increase these doses approximately a factor of three, still leaving a margin between the calculated dose and the 10 CFR 100 reference values.
3.7/4.7-30l AMENDMENT NO. 2 01 BFN Unit 2
.n
f I
i Technical Specification 388 Unit 3 i
Remove Insert i
3.7/4.7-28 3.7/4.7-28 3.7/4.7-29 3.7/4.7-29*
- Denotes Overleaf Page d
4 1
J l
i
- i 1
4
~.-
i O
O
~
- e. -
j 3.7/4.7 R& Egg (cont'd) j
}
confirmation that the valve will at least "nearly close" (within 3* of full l
j closure). The green light circuit confirms the valve will fully open.
If j
none of the lights change indication during the cycle, the air operator must j
be inoperable or the valve disc is stuck. For this case, a check light on and red light off confirms the disc is in a neerly closed position even if one of the indications is in error. Although the valve may be inoperable for full
}
closure, it does not constitute a safety threat.
I I
If the red light circuit alone is (noperable, the valve shall still be l
considered fully OPERhBLE. If the green and red or the green light circuit alone is inoperable the valve shall be considered inoperable for opening.
If 1
the check and green or check light circuit alone is inoperable, the valve shall be considered inoperable for full closure unless all vacuum breakers can 1
be demonstrated to be fully closed by alternate means such as monitoring the decay rate of drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure.
If the red and check light circuits are inoperable the valve shall be considered inoperable and open greater than 3'.
For a light circuit to be considered 2
OPERABI.E the light must go on and of f in proper sequence during the opening-l closing cycle.
If none of the lights change indication during the cycle, the valve shall be considered inoperable and open unless the check light stayo on and the red light stays off in which case the valve shall be considered l
inoperable for opening.
The 12 drywell vacuum breaker valves which connect the suppression chamber and drywell are sized on the basis of the Bodega pressure suppression system tests. Ten OPERABLE to open vacuum breaker valves (18-inch) selected on this test basis and confirmed by the green lights are adequate to limit ths l
pressure difforential between the suppression chamber and drywell during j
postaccident drywell cooling operations to a value which is within suppression 4
system design values.
i 1
The containment design has been examined to determine that a leakage equivalent to one drywell vacuum breaker opened to no more than a nominal 3' I
as confirmed by the red light is acceptable.
1 I
on this bevis an indefinite allowable repair time for an inoperable red light circuit on any valve or an inoperable check and green or check light circuit j
alone or a malfunction of the operator or disc (if noarly closed) on one valve, or an inoperable green and red or green light circuit alone on two valves is justified.
During each operating cycle, a leak rate test shall be performed to verify that significant, leakage flow paths do not exist between the drywell and suppression chamber. The drywell pressure will be increased by at least one poi with respect to the suppression chamber pressure. The two pria d
setpoint will not be exceeded. The subsequent suppression chamber pressure transient (if any) will be monitored with a sensitive pressure gauge.
If the drywell pressure cannot be increased by one poi over the suppression chamber pressurs it would be because a significant leakage path existsy in this event the leakage source will be identified and eliminated before power operation is resumed.
BFN 3.7/4.7-28 Unit 3
______-___.___.._______.__._.______.-__._____.-m O
O l.
)
3.7/4.7 AMM (Cant'd) i i
i With a differential pressure of greater than one psig, the rate of change of the suppression chamber pressure must not exceed 0.25 inches of water per j
minute as measured over a 10-minute period, which ccrresponds to about 0.09 lb/sec of containment air.
In the event the rate of change exceeds this value then the source of leakage will be identified and eliminated before j
power operation is resumed.
The water in the suppression chamber is used for cooling in the event of an accident; i.e.,
it is not used for normal operation; therefore, a daily check of the temperature and volume is adequate to assure that adequate heat 1
l removal capability is present.
j j
The interior surfaces of the drywell and suppression chamber are coated as j
necessary to provide corrosion protection and to provide a more easily
)
i decontaminable surface. The surveillance inspection of the internal surfaces each operating cycle assures timely detection of corrosion. Dropping the i
torus water level to one foot below the normal operating level enables an 3
inspection of the suppression chamber where problems would first begin to show.
l The primary containment preoperational test pressures are based upon the 1
calculated primary containment pressure response in the event of a I.OCA.
The l
peak drywell pressure would be about; 49 psig which would rapidly reduce to less than 30 poig within 20 seconds following the pipe break. Following the j
pipe break, the suppression chamber pressure rises to 27 psig within i
25 seconds, equalizes with drywell pressure, and decays with the drywell pressure decay.
1 1
l The design pressure of the drywell and suppression chamber is 56 psig. The i
design leak rate is 0.5-percent per day at the pressure of 56 psig. As pointed out above, the pressure response of the frywell and suppression
]
chamber following an accident would be the same aft 1r about 25 seconds.
Based on the calculated containment pressure response discussed above, the j
primary containment preoperational test pressures were chosen. Also based on this primary containment pressure response and the fact that the drywell and j
suppression chamber function as a unit, the primary containment will be tested as a unit rather than the individual components separately.
j The calculated radiological doses given in Section 14.9 of the FSAR were based on an assumed leakage rate of 0.635-percent at the maximum calculated pressure of M 6 poig. The doses calculated by the NRC using this Bases are 0.14 rom, whols body passing cloudg amma do,se, and 15.0 rom, thyroid dose, which are respectively only 5 x 10 and 10 times the 10 CFR 100 reference s
doses.
Increasing the assumed leakage rate at 49.6 peig to 2.0 percent as indicated in the specifications would increase these doses approximately a factor of three, still leaving a margin between the calculated dose and the 10 CFR 100 reference values.
BFN 3.7/4.7-29 l AMENDMENT N0.101 Unit 3 i