Text

Proposed Tech Specs,Converting to Improved Std Ts,Per NUREG- 1433,rev 1, Std TS for GE BWRs (BWR/4)
	ML18039A267
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Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	03/13/1998
From:	; TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	;
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ML18039A266	List: ML18039A265; ML18039A267;
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	RTR-NUREG-1433 NUDOCS 9803230298
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ENCLOSURE 3

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (TVA)

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)

UNITS 1, 2, and 3 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TS)

CHANGE TS-353S1 SUPPLEMENTAL CHANGE MARKED PAGES I. AFFECTED PAGE LIST Unit 1

Unit 2 Unit 3 3.3-5 3.3-6 3.3-19 3.3-20 3.3-5 3.3-6 3.3-19 3.3-20 3.3-5 3.3-6 3.3-19 3.3-20 B 3.3-7 B 3.3-8 B 3.3-10 B 3.3-30 B 3.3-34*

B 3.3-44 B 3.3-7 B 3.3-8 B 3.3-10 B 3.3-31 B 3.3-34*

B 3.3-44

new page not in original submittal.

All other pages should be substituted II. MARKED PAGES See attached.

98032302'PS 980313 PDR PDR ADQCK 05000259

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REgUIREHENTS continued SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.10 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

184 days SR 3.3.1.1.11

'(Del eted)

SR 3.3.1.1.12 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

18 months SR 3.3.1.1.13

-NOTIS- ---

Neutron detectors are excluded.

or unc on 2.a, o

req re e

p formed when tering HO from DE 1 unti 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months a

r entering DE Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

18 months SR 3.3.1.1.14 Perform LOGIC SYSTEH FUNCTIONAL TEST.

18 months SR 3.3. 1. 1. 15 Verify Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure Low Functions are not bypassed when THERHAL POWER is a 3K RTP.

18 months SR 3.3.1.1.16

-NOTE For Function 2.a, not required to be performed when entering HODE 2 from HODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering HODE 2.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 184 days BFN-UNIT 1 3.3-5 Amendment

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.l.l Tabte 3.3.1 1.1 (page 1 of 3)

Reactor Protectfon Syatm Instrcmentatfon

, FWCTIOI APPL ICARLE COOITI(NS NINES OL RENIIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROI SPECIFIED PER TRIP REOIIRED COOlTION SYSTBI ACTIDN D 1

SLNVEILLANCE REINI RECANTS ALLQIASLE VALSE%

1 ~

Inteneodfate Range Honftora a.

Neutron Ftux -Hfgh SR 3 3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1 1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1i9 SR 3.3.1.1;14 S 120/125 dfvfsfons of futt scale b.

Inop 2.

Average Poser Range

)conf tora 5(a) 5( ~)

SR 3.3.1.1.1 S 120/125 SR 3.3.1.1.4 dfv)alone of SR 3.3.1.1.9 fuLL scat ~

SR 3.3.1.1.14, SR 3.3.1 ~1.3 NA SR 3 3.1 1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.4 NA SR 3.3.1.1 14

~.

Neutron Flux -Hfyh, gSerdaan )

~

f.'

b.

Flew Bfased Sfatated Therml Paar -Hfgh

. c.

Neutron Flux -Hfgh 3(b) 3(b) 3(b)

SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1 1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.16 SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.16 SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.16 S 15X RTP t

S 0.66 M

+ 71X RTP and 5 120X RTP S 120X RTP I

(cont Inued)

(a)

Mfth eny control rod ufthdraeI free ~ core cell containfng one or aore fuel assecsbtfes.

(b)

Each APNI channel provfdea frputs to both trfp system.

BFN-UNIT 1 3.3-6 Amendment

S

Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS continued SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.1.7 Verify control rod sequences input to the RNH are in conformance with BPWS.

Prior to declaring RN OPERABLE following loading of sequence into RMH SR 3.3.2.1.8 NOTE Neutron detectors are excluded.

Verify the RN:

a.

Low Power Range -- Upsca e Function is ot bypass when THERNAL POWER is and s RTP.

In ermediate ower Range -- Upscale Function is ot bypassed when THEfNAL

.POWER is >

and a RTP.

c.

High Power Ra e -- Up ale Function is~ot bypasse when TH RMAL POWER is

>INES RTP.

18 months BFN-UNIT 1 3.3-19 Amendment

Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2.1-1 (page 1 of 1)

Control Rod Block Inst~tation FUNCTION APPL ICABLE NCOES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CCse IT ICNS REQUIREO CHANNELS SURVEILLANCE REQJIRENENTS ALL(slABLE VALUE 1.

Rod Block Nonitor a.

Lou Pouer Range -- Upscale (a)

SR 3.3.2.1.1 (e)

SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.8 b.

Intersediate Poser Range.-

Upscale (b)

SR 3.3.2. 1.1 (e)

SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.8 c.

High Pouer Range -- Upscale (f),(g)

SR 3.3.2.1.1 (e)

SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.8 d.

Inop e.

Oeaaca I~

(g),(h)

SR 3.3.2. 1. 1 NA SR 3.3.2.1.1

( I )

SR 3.3.2.1.4 2.

Rod @orth Ninieiter 1(c) 2(c)

SR 3.3.2. 1.2 NA SR 3.3.2.1.3 SR 3.3.2.1.5 SR 3.3.2.1.7 3.

Reactor Node Seitch -Shutdown Position (d)

SR 3.3.2,1.6 NA (a)

THERKIL POVER Qg and( gk RTP and HCPR~

(b)

THERKAL PQJER and S

RTP and NCPR~

(c)

Qith THER)(AL POlKR S 10X RTP.

(d)

Reactor sade suitch in the shutdown position.

(e)

Less then or equal to the Ailmabie Value specified in the COLR.

)

THERNAL,PQKR >

and

< 90K RTP and HCPR (g)

THERHAL POUER 8 90X RTP and HCPR (h)

THERHAL POMER and

< 90X RTP and NCPR (i)

Greater than or equal to the Aliouabie Value specified in the COLR.

3.ess 4h~

+~ ~

s~<

(. Oi 9.

BFN-UNIT I 3.3-20 qg.o ~

,g-gS4

. Amendment

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSE LCO, and APPLICABILITY S,

Avera e Power Ran e Honitor (continued)

The APRH System is divided into four APRH channels and four 2-out-of-4 voter channels.

Each APRH channel provides inputs to each of the four voter channels.

The four voter channels are divided into two groups of two each, with each group of two providing inputs to one RPS trip system.

The system is designed to allow one APRH channel, but no voter

channels, to be bypassed.

A trip from any one unbypassed APRH will result in a "half-trip" in all four of the voter

channels, but no trip inputs to either RPS trip system.

A trip from any two unbypassed APRH channels will result in a full trip in each of the four voter channels, which in turn results in two trip inputs to each RPS trip system logic channel (Al, A2, Bl, or B2).

Three of the four APRH channels and all four of the voter channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single failure will preclude a

scram on a valid signal.

In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core, consistent with the design bases for the APRH functions, at least twenty (20)

LPRH inputs, with at least three (3)

LPRH inputs from each of the four axial levels at which the LPRHs are located, must be operable for each APRH channel.

2.a.

Avera e Power Ran e Monitor Neutron Flux-Hi h tSetdown)

For operation at low power (i.e.,

MODE 2), the Average Power

{

I Range Monitor Neutron Flux High,(Setdown)Function is capable of generating a trip signal that prevents fuel damage resulting from abnormal operating transients in this power range.

For most operation at low power levels, the

~ Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High,(Setdown)

Function will provide a secondary scram to the Intermediate Range Monitor Neutron Flux High Function because of the relative setpoints.

With the IRHs at Range 9 or 10, it is possible that the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron

( Flux-High, (Setdown)Function will provide the primary trip signal for a corewide increase in power.

'o specific safety analyses take direct credit for the (L 4 I Average Power Range Honitor Neutron Flux-High, (Setdown )

Function.

However, this Function indirectly ensures that before the reactor mode switch is placed in the run (continued)

BFN-UNIT I B 3.3-7 Amendment

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.a.

Avera e Power Ran e

Mo itor Neutron Flux-Hi h

SAFETY ANALYSES, [Setdown') (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY position, reactor power does not exceed 25% RTP (SL 2.1.1.1) when operating at low reactor pressure and low core flow.

Therefore, it indirectly prevents fuel damage during significant reactivity increases with THERMAL POMER

< 25K RTP.

The Allow'able Value is based on preventing significant increases in power when THERMAL PNER is

< 25% RTP.

The Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux -High, (Setdown )t k 4 Function must be OPERABLE during MODE 2 when controT rods may be withdrawn since the potential for criticality exists.

In MODE 1, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High Function provides protection against reactivity transients and the RMH and rod block monitor protect against control rod withdrawal error events.

2.b.

Avera e Power Ran e Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power-Hi h

The Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High Function monitors neutron flux to approximate the THERMAL POWER being transferred to the reactor coolant.

The APRM neutron flux is electronically filtered with a time constant representative of the fuel heat.transfer dynamics to generate a signal proportional'to the THERMAL POWER in the reactor.

The trip level is varied as a function of recirculation drive flow (i.e., at lower core flows, the setpoint is reduced proportional to the reduction in power experienced as core flow is reduced with a fixed control rod pattern) but is clamped at an upper limit that is always lower than or equal to the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux -High Function Allowable Value.

The Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power-High Function provides protection against transients where THERMAL POMER increases slowly (such as the loss of feedwater heating event) and protects the fuel cladding integrity by ensuring that the MCPR SL is not exceeded.

During these events, the THERMAL PNER increase does not significantly lag the neutron flux response

and, because of a lower trip setpoint, will initiate a scram before the high neutron flux scram.

For (continued)

BFN-UNIT 1 B 3.3-8 Amendment,

n

RPS Instrumental i",t B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO and APPLICABILITY 2.c.

Avera e Power Ran e Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux-Hi h (continued) valves (S/RVs), limits the peak reactor pressure vessel (RPV) pressure to less than the ASHE Code limits.

The control rod drop accident (CRDA) analysis (Ref. 5) takes credit for the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function to terminate the CRDA.

The Allowable Value is based on the Analytical Limit assumed in the CRDA analyses.

The Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 where the potential consequences of the analyzed transients could result in the SLs (e.g.,

HCPR and RCS pressure) being exceeded.

Although the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function is assumed in the CRDA analysis, which is applicable in HODE 2, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High,(Setdown)Function conservatively

( P- ~

bounds the assumed trip and, together with the assumed IRH trips, provides adequate protection.

Therefore, the Average Power Range Honitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function is rfot required in HODE 2.

2.d.

Avera e Power Ran e Nonttor-Ino

( p Three of the four APRM channels required to be OPERABLE for each of the APRH Functi This Function (Inop) provides assurance that minimum number of APRHs are OPERABLE.

For any APRH c annel, any time its mode switch is in any position other than "Operate,"

an APRH module is unplugged, or the automatic self-test system detects a

critical fault with the APRH channel, an Inop trip is sent to all four voter channels.

Inop trips from two or more

'non-bypassed APRH channels result in a trip output from all four voter channels to their associated trip system.

This Function was not specifically credited in the accident

analysis, but it is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function.

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 1 8 3.3-10 Amendment

RPS Instrumentation 8 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE RE(UIREHENTS SR 3.3. 1. 1.9 SR 3.3.1. 1. 10 and SR 3.3. 1. 1.13 (continued) plate 9'to SR 3.3. 1. 1.9 and SR 3.3.1. 1. 13 states that neutron

[

detectors are excluded froa CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive

devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal.

Changes in neutron detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the 7 day calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1. 1.2) and the 1000 effective full power hours LPRH calibration against the TIPs SR 3.3.

. 1.7).

A second Note for SR 3

1.9 is provided that requires the IRH SRs to be performed within 12 h

s entering from HODE 1.

Testing of the HODE 2 IRH Functions cannot be performed in HODE 1 witho lizing jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links.

This Note allows entry into HODE 2 from HODE l.if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.

Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.

The Frequency of SR 3.3. 1. 1.9 is based upon the assumption of a 92 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

The Frequency of SR 3.3. 1. 1.10 is based upon the assumption of a 184 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

The Frequency of SR 3.3. 1.1. 13 is based upon the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

SR 3.3.1.1.11 (Deleted)

SR 3.3.1.1.14 The LOGIC SYSTEH FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel.

The functional testing of control rods (LCO 3. 1.3),

and SDV vent and drain valves (LCO 3. 1.8),

overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 1 B 3.3-30 Amendment

SRH Instrumentation 8 3.3.1.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

"SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)";

LCO 3.3.1. 1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation";

IRH Neutron Flux High and Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Neutron Flux High,

<Setdown) Functions; and LCO 3.3.2. 1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation."

The SRMs have no safety function and are not assumed to function during any FSAR design basis accident or transient analysis.

However, the SRHs provide the only on scale monitoring of neutron flux levels during startup and refueling.

Therefore, they are being retained in Technical Specifications.

LCO During startup in MODE 2, three of the four SRH channels are required to be OPERABLE to monitor the reactor flux level prior to and during control rod withdrawal, subcritical multiplication and reactor criticality, and neutron flux level and reactor period until the flux'evel is sufficient.

to maintain the IRMs on Range 3 or above.

All but one of the channels are required in order to provide a

representation of the overall core response during those periods when reactivity changes are occurring throughout the core.

In MODES 3 and 4, with the reactor shut down, two SRH channels provide redundant monitoring of flux levels in the core.

In MODE 5, during a spiral offload or reload, an SRM outside the fueled region will no longer be required to be

OPERABLE, since it is not capable of monitoring neutron flux in the fueled region of the core.

Thus, CORE ALTERATIONS are allowed in a quadrant with no OPERABLE SRH in an adjacent quadrant provided the Table 3.3. 1.2-1, footnote (b),

requirement that the bundles being spiral reloaded or spiral offloaded are all in a single fueled region containing at least one OPERABLE SRM is met.

Spiral reloading and offloading encompass reloading or offloading a cell on the edge of a continuous fueled region (the cell can be reloaded or offloaded in any sequence).

In nonspiral routine operations, two SRHs are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundant monitoring of reactivity (continued)

BFN-UNIT 1 B 3 '-34 Amendment

~ v

Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.

1 0

BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES,

LCO, and APPLICABILITY 1.

Rod Block Monitor (continued)

The RBM Function satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 10).

Two channels of the RBM are required to be OPERABLE, with their setpoints within the appropriate Allowable Value for the associated power range to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude a rod block from this Function.

The setpoints are calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology (nominal trip setpoint).

Analyses (Re f. -3) have shown that for specified initial MCPR values, the RBM is not required to be OPERABLE.. These MCPR values are provided in the COLR ~~

for operations

~

908

RTP, and for operations )

27%

and 90%

RTP.

For these power ranges with the initial MCPR h the COLR

value, Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations.

The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Values between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.

Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip

setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable.

Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place.

The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor power),

and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g.,

trip unit) changes state.

The analytic limits are derived'rom the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis.

The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration,

process, and some of the instrument errors:

The trip setpoints are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift).

The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environmental effects (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

za The RBH is assumed to mit'e the consequences of an RWE event when operating a RTP.

Below this power level, the consequences of an RWE event will not exceed the MCPR SL and, therefore, the RBM is not required to be OPERABLE (Ref. 3).

na yses e

) have

~

s n

a ith an 'tia CPR a

. 5, n

E e t wi esult i excee th CPR SL Also he an yse demon ate th when o erati at a K RTP ith CP z 1.44, no RW event will resu t 1n excee sng e

MCPR (continued)

BFN-UNIT 1

B 3.3-44 Amendment

~

I

~

I I

~

I ~

~

I

~

I '

I I

I

~

I

~

I I

~

~ I

~

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II I

II

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II

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RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3)

Reactor Protection Syatm Inst~tat ion FUNCTION APPLICABLE NMES OR OTHER SPECIFIED COO IT I ONS REOUI RED CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEN COQ IT IONS REFERENCED FROI REDUIRED ACTIOI D.1 SOLVEILLANCE REQUIREIKNTS ALLOUABLE VALUE 1.

Inteneediate Range Honi tora

~.

Neutron Flux -High b.

Inop 2.

Average Pouer Range Honi tora a.

Neutron FLux -High, b,

FLOM BIased SIMJLated Thermal Paar -High c.

Neutron Flux -High 5(a) 5( ~)

3(b) 3(b) 3(b)

SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.16 SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.16 SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3 ~ 1.1. 16 S 120/125-divisions of fulL scale S 120/125 divisions of full scale d 15X RTP S 0.66 ll

+ 71X RTP and S 120X RTP d 120X RTP (cont inued)

(a)

Mith any control rod Nithdran frca a core cell containing one or sore fuel asseabl ies.

(b)

Each APml charnel provides inputs to both trip systeas.

BFN-UNIT 2 3.3-6 Amendment

Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS continued SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2. 1.7 Verify control rod sequences input to the RWH are in conformance with BPWS.

Prior to declaring R'i'PERABLE following loading of sequence into RMH SR 3.3.2.1.8 NOTE-Neutron detectors are excluded.

Verify the RN:

a.

Low Power Range

- Upscale Function is n t bypasse when THERMAL POWER is and s

% RTP.

b.

Intermediate Power Range -- Upscale Function is ot bypas d when,THERNL POWER is and s RTP.

c.

High Power R

ge -- Ups le Function is bypass d when THE L POWER is RTP.

18 months BFN-UNIT 2 3.3-19 Amendment

Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2.1-1 (page 1 of I)

Control Rod Slock fnatnmntatfon APPL 1 CASLE NCOES OR OTHER SPECl f1 EO CONfTl(HIS REINlREO CHAINELS SQIVElLLANCE REINIIRODENTS ALLOIASLE VALUE a

Rod Stock Nonftor

~.

Lou Powr Range -- Upscale (a)

SR 3.3.2.1.1 (e)

SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.b b.

Interaedfate Powr Range--

Upscale (b)

SR 3.3.2.1.1 (e)

SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.b c.

High Powr Range -- Upscale (f),(g)

SR 3.3.2.1.1 (e)

SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.d d.

1nop e.

Oeelcale (g),(h)

(g),(h)

SR 3.3.2,1.1 NA SR 3.3.2.1.1 (f)

SR 3.3.2.1.4 2.

Rod Vorth Nfnfaizer 1lal 2W SR 3.3.2.1.2 NA SR 3.3.2.1.3 N.

SR 3.3.2.1.5 SR 3.3.2.1.7 3.

Reactor Node Svftch -Shutdown Position (d)

SR 3.3.2.1P6 NA 6x

(~ T Tl(ERlSL PSSR a (S(\\ and E RTP and NCP((

(b).

THERNAL POIER i and 5 RTP and NCPR~

(c)

Vfth THERNAL PAAR S fOX RTP.

(d)

Reactor aode siftch fn the shutdown position.

(e)

Less than or equal to the Allowble Value specified in the COLR.

(f)

THERNAL POKR x and c %C RTP and NCPR (RT TNERNRL PSSR I ECI RTP and NCPR ~~C

(

RNRL Essa a

and <<CRI R'Tp and NcpR ~~

(I)

Greater than or equal to the Allowble Value specified fn the COLR.

SCIL 4i n-d" g

<<L 5 n I-(D( i4 I

BFN-UNIT 2 3.3-20 Amendment

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.l.l BASES APPLICABLE "

SAFETY ANALYSES,

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Avera e Power Ran e Monitor (continued) indication of average reactor power from a few percent to greater than RTP.

The APRH System is divided into four APRM channels and four 2-out-of-4 voter channels.

Each APRH channel provides inputs to each of the four voter channels.

The four voter channels are divided into two groups of two each, with each group of two providing inputs to one RPS trip system.

The system is designed to allow one APRM channel, but no voter

channels, to be bypassed.

A trip from any one unbypassed APRH will result in a "half'-trip" in all four of the voter

channels, but no trip inputs to either RPS trip system.

A trip from any two unbypassed APRM channels will result in a full trip in each of the four voter channels, which in turn results in two trip inputs to each RPS trip system logic channel (Al, A2, Bl, or 82).

Three of the four APRM channels and all four of the voter channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single failure will preclude a

scram on a valid signal.

In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core, consistent with the design bases for the APRH functions, at least twenty (20)

LPRH inputs, with at least three (3)

LPRM inputs from each of the four axial levels at which the LPRHs are located, must be operable for each APRM channel.

2.a.

Avera e Power Ran e Monitor Neutron Flux-Hi h

/Setdown'1 For operation at low power (i.e.,

MODE 2), the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux High, (Setdown) Function is capable of generating a trip signal that prevents fuel damage resulting from abnormal operating transients in this power range.

For most operation at low power levels, the i Average Power Range Honitor Neutron Flux High,(Setdown)

, Function will provide a secondary scram to the Intermediate Range Honitor Neutron Flux High Function because of the relative setpoints.

Mith the IRHs at Range 9 or 10, it is possible that the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron i Flux-High,(Setdown) Function will provide the primary trip signal for

5. corewide increase in power.

No specific safety analyses take direct credit for the i Average Power Range Honitor Neutron Flux-High, (Setdown)

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 2 8 3.3-7 Amendment

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.a.

Avera e

Power Ran e Monitor Neutron Flux&~i h SAFETY ANALYSES, (Setdown) (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Function.

However, this Function indirectly ensures that before the reactor mode switch is placed in the run position, reactor power does not exceed 25%

RTP (SL 2.1.1. 1)

Function.

However, this Function indirectly ensures that before the reactor mode switch is placed in the run position, reactor power does not exceed 25%

RTP (SL 2. 1. 1. 1) when operating at low reactor pressure and low core flow.

Therefore, it indirectly prevents fuel damage during significant reactivity increases with THERMAL POWER

< 25K RTP.

The Allowable Value is based on preventing significant increases in power when THERMAL POWER is < 25K RTP.

The Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux High, (Setdown )) ~ <

Function must be OPERABLE during MODE 2 when control rods may be withdrawn since the potential for criticality exists.

In MODE 1, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux High Function provides protection against reactivity transients and the RWM and rod block monitor protect again5t control rod withdrawal error events.

2.b.

Avera e Power Ran e Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power-Hi h

The Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power-High Function monitors neutron flux to approximate the THERMAL POWER being transferred to the reactor coolant.

The APRM neutron flux is electronically filtered with a time constant representative of the fuel heat transfer dynamics to generate a signal proportional to the THERMAL POWER in the reactor.

The trip level is varied as a function of recirculation drive flow (i.e., at lower core flows, the setpoint is reduced proportional to the reduction in power experienced as core flow is reduced with a fixed control rod pattern) but is clamped at an upper limit that is always lower than or equal'to the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux -High Function Allowable Value.

The Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power-High Function provides protection against transients where THERMAL POWER increases slowly (such as the loss of feedwater heating event) and (continued)

BFN-UNIT 2 B 3.3-8 Amendment

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE'AFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

.c.

Avera e Power Ra e Honitor Fixed Neutron Flux-Ki h The Average Power Range Honitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function is capable of generating a trip signal to prevent fuel damage or excessive RCS pressure.

For the overpressurization protection analysis of Reference 4, the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function is assumed to terminate the main steam isolation valve (HSIV) closure event and,'along with the safety/relief valves (S/RVs), limits the peak reactor pressure vessel-(RPV) pressure to less than the ASHE Code limits.

The control rod drop accident (CRDA) analysts (Ref. 5) takes credit for the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function to terminate the CRDA.

The Allowable Value is based on the Analytical Limit assumed in the CRDA analyses.

The Average Power Range Honitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function is required to be OPERABLE in HOOE I where the potential consequences of the analyzed transients could result in the SLs (e.g.,

HCPR and. RCS pressure) being exceeded.

Although the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed'eutron Flux -High Function is assumed in the CROA analysis, which is applicable in HODE 2, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High,(Setdown+unction conservatively bounds the assumed trip and, together with the assumed IRM trips, provides adequate protection.

Therefore, the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function is not required in MODE 2.

2.d.

Avera e Power Ran e MonitorIno Three of the four APRH charm are required to be OPERABLE for each of the APRH Funct ns.

This Function (Inop) provides assurance that minimum number of APRMs are OPERABLE.

For any APRH c annel, any time its mode switch is in any position other than "Operate,"

an APRH module is unplugged, or the automatic self-test system detects a

critical fault with the APRH channel, an Inop trip is sent to all four voter channels.

Inop trips from two or more non-bypassed APRH channels result in a trip output from all four voter channels to their associated trip system.

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 2 B 3.3-10 Amendment

0

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.10 and SR 3.3.1.1.13 (continued) range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

For the APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High

Function, SR 3.3. 1. 1. 13 also includes calibrating the associated recirculation loop flow channel.

For MSIV-

Closure, SDV Hater Level-High (Float Switch),

and TSV-Closure Functions, SR 3.3. 1.1. 13 also includes physical inspection and actuation of the switches.

Jhfteg)to SR 3.3.1. 1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1.13 states that neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive

devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal.

Changes in neutron detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the 7 day calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.1.2) and the 1000 effective full power hours LPRM calibration against the TIPs SR 3.3. 1. 1.7).

A second Note for SR

.1.1.9 is provided that requires the

)

IRM SRs to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of enteri,ng 2 from MODE 1.

Testing of the MODE 2 IRM Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1 withou utilizing jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links.

This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.

Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.

The Frequency of SR 3.3. 1. 1.9 is based upon the assumption of a 92 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

The Frequency of SR 3.3. 1. 1. 10 is based, upon the assumption of a 184 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

The Frequency of SR 3.3. 1. 1. 13 is based upon the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

SR 3.3.1.1.11 (Deleted)

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 2 B 3.3-31 Amendment

SRH Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

"SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)";

LCO 3.3. 1. 1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation";

IRM Neutron Flux-High and Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Neutron Flux-High, (Setdown) Functions; and LCO 3.3.2. 1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation."

The SRMs have no safety function and are not assumed to function during any FSAR design basis accident or transient analysis.

However, the SRMs provide the only on scale monitoring of neutron flux levels during startup and refueling.

Therefore, they are being retained in Technical Specifications.

LCO During startup in MODE 2, three of the four SRH channels are required to be OPERABLE to monitor the reactor flux level prior to and during control rod withdrawal, subcritical multiplication and reactor criticality, and neutron flux level and reactor period until the flux level is sufficient to maintain the IRMs on Range 3 or above.

All but one of the channels are required in order to provide a

representation of the overall core response during those periods when reactivity changes are occurring throughout the core.

In HODES 3 and 4, with the reactor shut down, two SRM

- channels provide redundant monitoring of flux levels in the core.

In MODE 5, during a spiral offload or reload, an SRH outside the fueled region will no longer be required to be

OPERABLE, since it is not capable of monitoring neutron flux in the fueled region of the core.

Thus, CORE ALTERATIONS are allowed in a quadrant with no OPERABLE SRM in an adjacent quadrant provided the Table 3.3.1.2-1, footnote (b),

requirement that the bundles being spiral reloaded or spiral offloaded are all in a single fueled region containing at least one OPERABLE SRH is met.

Spiral reloading and offloading encompass reloading or offloading a cell on the edge of a continuous fueled region (the cell can be reloaded or offloaded in any sequence).

In nonspiral routine operations, two SRHs are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundant monitoring of reactivity (continued)

BFN-UNIT 2 B 3.3-34 Amendment

Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES,

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Rod Block Monitor (continued)

The RBH Function satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 10).

Two channels of the RN are required to be OPERABLE, with their setpoints within the appropriate Allowable Value for the associated power range to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude a rod block from this Function.

The setpoints are calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology (nominal trip setpoint).

Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations.

The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Values between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.

Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip

setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable.

Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place.

The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor power),

and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g.,

trip unit) changes state.

The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis.

The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration,

process, and some of the instrument errors.

The trip setpoints are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift).

The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument dri'ft, and sever e environmental effects (for channels that must function in harsh Analyses (Ref.

3) have environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

~'7 PA The RN is assumed to mitigate the consequences of an RWE

'i event when operating aQf5 RTP.

Below this power level, the consequences of an RQE event will not exceed the NCPR SL and, therefore the RN is not re uired to ERABLE Ref.

3 When o era ng RTP, analyses (Re ave shown that for specified initial MCPR values, the RBM is not required to be OPERABLE.

These MCPR values are arovided in the COLR for operations )

90%

RTP,

(

P and for operations

~ 27>

own that with

' 'CPR, E event will and 90%

RTP.

For these result i ceding th L.

Also, t~rtITyses power ranges with the emo s rate that when operating at 90K RTP with initial McPR ) the coLR PR e 1.44 no even ws result n e the HCPR

value, (continued)

BFN-UNIT 2 B 3.3-44 Amendment

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1el SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS continued SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.10 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

184 days SR 3.3.1.1.11 (Del eted)

SR 3.3.1.1.12 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

18 months SR 3.3.1.1.13

~OTSP---- -----

Neot o detectors are e

2.

For ction

.a, n

equired to b p

ormed when'ring HODE om E

1 unt 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months aft entering E 2.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

18 months SR 3.3.1.1.14 Perform LOGIC SYSTEH FUNCTIONAL TEST.

18 months SR 3.3.1. 1. 15 Verify Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure Low Functions are not bypassed when THERHAL POWER is a 3K RTP.

18 months SR 3.3.1.1.16 NOTE-For Function 2.a, not required to be performed when entering HODE 2 from HODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering HODE 2.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 184 days BFN-UNIT 3 3.3-5 Amendment

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.l.l Table 3.3.1 ~ 1 1 (page 1 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Inatrtmontat ion FUNCTIOI APPL ICABLE HLXIES OR OTHER SPECI F IED COO IT IONS REINJIRED CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEN COOITIONS REFERENCED FROI REQUIRED ACTION D ~ 1 SLNLVEI L LANCE RECNJ IREl%NTS 'LLONASLE VALUE 1.

Inteneedfate Range Honitors a.

Neutron Flux -High SR 3.3.1.1.

1 SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1 1 9 SR 3.3.1.1.14 s 120/125 divisfons of full scale b.

Inop 2.

Average Power Range Honitors 5(a) 5(a)

SR 3.3.1.1.1 s 120/125 SR 3.3.1.1.4 divisions of SR 3.3.1.1.9 fuLL scale SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.3 NA SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.4 NA SR 3.3.1.1.14 a.

Neutron Flux -Hfgh, QS et dONfl )

b.

Flaw Bfased Sfmfated Thersaf Pouer -High c.

Neutron Flux -High 3(b) 3(b) 3(b)

SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3 3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.16 SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.'1.16 SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1 1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.16 s 15x RTP t

s 0.66 M

+ 71X RTP and S 120X RTP s 120X RTP (cont inued)

(a)

Mith any control rod Nithdralel free a core cell containing one or Nore fuel asscwblies.

(b)

Each APRH charnel provides fnputs to both trip system.

BFN-UNIT 3 3.3-6 Amendment,

Control Rod Block Instrusentation 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE RE UIRENENTS continued SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2. 1.7 Verify control rod sequences input to the RIM are in conformance with BPWS.

Prior to declaring RN OPERABLE following loading of sequence into RMH SR 3.3 2

1 8 Neutron d

NOTE tectors are excluded.

yp s

and w

RTP.

Intermediate Power Range -- Upscale Function is not bypass d when THERNL POWER is )

and w RTP.

High Power Ra ge -- Up cale Function is ot bypass when T ERNL POWER is 3

RTP.

C ~

Verify th RN:

a.

Low ower Range

- Upscale Function is t b ass when THERNL POWER i 1S months BFN-UNIT 3 3.3-19 Amendment

Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 Tabl ~ 3.3.2.1 1 (page 1 of 1)

Control Rod Block Inst~tati on APPLICABLE N(DES OR OTHER SPECTP IED CCNNJ IT lCNIS RE(NJJ RED CHANNELS QNIVEILLANCE REOUJRBKNTS ALLQJABLE VALUE 1.

Rod BLock Nonltor

~.

Locc Pacer Range -- Upscale SR 3.3.2.1.1 (e)

SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.8 b.

Intecscedl ate Pacer Range--

Upscale (b)

SR 3.3.2.1.1 (e)

SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.8

, c.

High Pcwer Range.- Upscale (f),(g)

SR 3.3.2.1.1 (e)

SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.8

~.

Danecale (g),(h)

(g),(h)

SR 3.3.2.1.1 NA SR 3.3.2.1.1

( I )

SR 3.3.2.1.4 2.

Rod 1Jorth NInlalter 1(c) 2(c)

SR 3.3.2.1.2 NA SR 3.3.2.1.3 SR 3.3.2.1.5 SR 3.3.2.1.7 3.

Reactor Node Switch -Shutdcen Position (d)

SR 3.3.2.1.6 NA 2'7 (a)

THERNAL P(NJER R

and S @ RTP and NCPR

<~

(b)

THERNAL POUER ~

and S

RTP and NCPR (c)

With THERNAL POKR S

1DX RTP.

52-(d)

Reactor aode sultch In the shutdoccn position.

(e)

Less than or equal to tha Allowable Value specified ln the COLR.

( )

THE and c 90X RTP and NCPR (g)

THERNAL POKR k 90X RTP and NCPR~

(h)

THERNAL POKR k and c 90X RTP and NCPR (I) greater than or equal to the Alioccabie Value specified ln the COLR.

vl' dg, BFN-UNIT 3 3.3-20 Amendment

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES,

LCO, and APPLICABILITY ver e Power Ran e Honito (continued) indication of average reacto'r power from a few percent to greater than RTP.

The APRH System is divided into four APRH channels and four 2-out-of-4 voter channels.

Each APRH channel provides inputs to each of the four voter channels.

The four voter channels are divided into two groups of two each, with each group of two providing inputs to one RPS trip system.

The system is designed to allow one APRH channel, but no voter

channels, to be bypassed.

A trip from any one unbypassed APRH will result in a "half-trip'n all four of the voter

channels, but no trip inputs to either RPS trip system.

A trip from any two unbypassed APRH channels will result in a full trip in each of the four voter channels, which in turn results in two trip inputs to each RPS trip system logic channel (Al, A2, Bl, or 82).

Three of the four APRH channels and all four of the voter channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single failure will preclude a

scram on a valid signal.

In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core, consistent with the design bases for the APRH functions, at least twenty (20)

LPRH inputs, with at least three (3)

LPRH inputs from each of the four axial levels at which the LPRHs are located, must be operable for each APRH channel.

2.a.

Avera e Power Ran e Honitor Neutron Flux-Hi h g h.

1 ( Setdown )

For operatloh at low power (t.e.,

NODE 2), the Average Power

g. 5

~

Range Honitor Neutron Flux-High, (Setdown) Function is capable of generating a trip signal that prevents fuel damage resulting from abnormal operating transients in this power range.

For most operation at low power levels, the

) Average Power Range Honitor Neutron Flux-High,'letdown)

Function will provide a secondary scram to the Intermediate Range Honitor Neutron Flux-High Function because of the relative setpoints.

With the IRHs at Range 9 or l0, it is possible that the Average Power Range Honitor Neutron

< Flux-High, (Setdown)Function will provide the primary trip signal for a corewide increase in power.

No specific safety analyses take direct credit for the

(

Average Power Range Honitor Neutron Flux-High,/Setdown)

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 B 3.3-7 Amendment

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES,

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Avera e Power Ran e Monitor Neutron Flux-Hi h

(~Setdo

) (continued)

~ P-Function.

However, this Functfon indfrectly ensures that before the reactor mode switch is placed in the run position, reactor power does not exceed 25% RTP (SL 2. 1.1.1) when operating at low reactor pressure and low core flow.

'herefore, it indirectly prevents fuel damage during significant reactivity increases with THERMAL POWER

( 25% RTP.

The Allowable Value is based on preventing significant increases in power when THERMAL POWER fs ( 25% RTP.

The Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux -High, (Setdown )) ~ ~

Function must be OPERABLE during MOOE 2 when control rods lway be withdrawn since the potential for criticality exists.

In MOOE 1, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High Function provides protection against reactivity transients and the RWM and rod block monitor protect against control rod withdrawal error events.

2.b.

Avera e Power Ran e Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power-Hi h

The Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power -High Function monitors neutron flux to approximate the THERMAL POWER being transferred to the reactor coolant.

The APRM neutron flux is electronically filtered with a time constant representative of the fuel heat transfer dynamics to generate a signal proportional to the THERMAL POWER in the reactor.

The trip level is varied as a function of recirculation drive flow (i.e., at lower core flows, the setpoint is reduced proportional to the reduction in power experienced as core flow is reduced with a fixed control rod pattern) but is clamped at an upper ifllit that is always lower than or equal to the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function Allowable Value.

The Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power-High Function provides protection against transients where THERMAL POWER increases slowly (such as the loss of feedwater heating event) and (continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 B 3.3-8 Amendment

0

RPS Instrumentation 8 3.3.1.I BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY

{continued) c.

Avera e Power Ran e Ho itor Fixed Neutron Flux-Hi h The Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function is capable of generating a trip signal to prevent fuel damage or excessive RCS pressure.

For the overpressurization protection analysis of Reference 4, the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function is assumed to terminate the main steam isolation valve (HSIV) closure event and, along with the safety/relief valves (S/RVs), limits the peak reactor pressure vessel (RPV) pressure to less than the ASHE Code limits.

The control rod drop accident

{CRDA) analysis (Ref. 5) takes credit for the Average Power Range Honitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function to terminate the CRDA.

The Allowable Value is based on the Analytical Limit assumed in the CRDA analyses.

The Average Power Range Honitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function is required to be OPERABLE in HODE I where the potential consequences of the analyzed transients could result in the SLs (e.g.,

HCPR and RCS pressure) being exceeded.

Although the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function is assumed in the CRDA analysis, which is applicable in HODE 2, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High, (Setdown)Function conservatively bounds the assumed trip and, together with the assumed IRH trips, provides adequate protection.

Therefore, the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function is not required in MODE 2.

2.'d.

Avera e Power Ran e Honitor-Ino Qk4 Three of the four APRH channel re required to be OPERABLE for each of the APRH Funct s.

This Function (Inop) provides assurance that minimum number of APRHs are OPERABLE.

For any APRH channel, any time its mode switch is in any position other than "Operate,"

an APRH module is unplugged, or the automatic self-test system detects a

critical fault with the APRH channel, an Inop trip is sent to all four voter channels.

Inop trips from two or more non-bypassed APRH channels result in a trip output from all four voter channels to their associated trip system.

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 B 3.3-10 Amendment

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE RE(UIREHENTS 9

S 3.

.3 (continued) range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

For the APRH Simulated Thermal Power-High

Function, SR 3.3.1.1.13 also includes calibrating the associated recirculation loop flow channel.

For HSIV-

Closure, SDV i/ater Level-High (Float Switch),

and TSV-Closure Functions, SR 3.3.1.1.13 also includes physical inspection and actuation of the switches.

P6te+to SR 3.3.1.1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1.13 states that neutron f

detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal.

Changes in neutron detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the 7 day calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.1.2) and the 1000 effective full power hours LPRH calibration against the TIPs SR 3.3.1.1.7).

A second Note for SR

3..1.1.9 is provided that requires the I

SRs to be performed within 12 ho s of entering from HODE 1.

Testing of the HODE 2 IRH Functions cannot be performed in HODE 1 withou utilizing jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links.

This Note allows entry into HODE 2 from HODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.

Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.9 is based upon the assumption of a 92 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.10 is based upon the assumption of a 184 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.13 is based upon the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

(Deleted)

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 B 3.3-31 Amendment

SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)wx!

"SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)"; LCO 3.3. 1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation";

IRM Neutron Flux-High and Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Neutron Flux-High, (Setdown) Functions; and LCO 3.3.2. 1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation."

The SRMs have no safety function and are not assumed to function during any FSAR design basis accident or transient analysis.

However, the SRMs provide the only on scale monitoring of neutron flux levels during startup and refueling.

Therefore, they are being retained in Technical Specifications.

LCO During startup in MODE 2, three of the four SRM channels are required to be OPERABLE to monitor the reactor flux level prior to and during control rod withdrawal, subcritical multiplication and reactor criticality, and neutron flux level and reactor period until the flux level is sufficient to maintain the IRMs on Range 3 or above.

All but one of the channels are required in order to provide a

representation of the overall core response during those periods when reactivity changes are occurring throughout the core.

In MODES 3 and 4, with the reactor shut down, two SRM channels provide redundant monitoring of flux levels in the core.

In MODE 5, during a spiral offload or reload, an SRM outside the fueled region will no longer be required to be

OPERABLE, since it is not capable of monitoring.neutron flux in the fueled region of the core.

Thus, CORE ALTERATIONS are allowed in a quadrant with no OPERABLE SRM in an adjacent quadrant provided the Table 3.3. 1.2-1, footnote (b),

requirement that the bundles being spiral reloaded or spiral offloaded are all in a single fueled region containing at least one OPERABLE-SRM is met.

Spiral reloading and offloading encompass reloading or offloading a cell on the edge of a continuous fueled region (the cell can be reloaded or offloaded in any sequence).

In nonspiral routine operations, two SRMs are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundant monitoring of reactivity (continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 B 3.3-34 Amendment

Control Rod Block Instruaentatfon B 3.3.2.1 APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO, and APPLICABILITY

/analyses (Ref.

3) have shown that for specifiea initial MCPR values, the RBM is not required to be OPERABLE.

These MCPR values are nrovided in the COLR for operations )

90%

RTP, and for operations ) 278 and (

90%

RTP.

For these power ranges with the initial MCPR 8 the COLR

value, it (continued)

The RN Function satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 10).

Two channels of the RN are required to be OPERABLE, with their setpoints within the appropriate Allowable Value for the associated power range to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude a rod block from this Function.

The setpofnts are calibrated consistent with applicable setpofnt methodology (nominal trip setpoint).

Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations.

The nominal setpofnts are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Values between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.

Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip

setpoint, but wfthfn its Allowable Value, fs acceptable.

Trip setpof'nts are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place.

The setpofnts are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor power),

and when the measured output value'of the process.

parameter exceeds the setpofnt, the associated devfce (e.g.,

trip unit) changes state.

The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysi.s.

The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration,

process, and some of the instrument errors.

The trip setpoints are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift).

The trip setpofnts derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentatfon uncertainties,.process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environmental effects (for channels that must function fn harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

) The RN is assumed to mi ate the consequences of an RME event when operating a RTP.

Below this power level, the consequences of an RME event will not exceed the HCPR SL and, therefore the RN is not re uired to be OPERABL (Ref.

3.

en opera ana yses e

ve own t a wi initial HCP

, no RME ev result i ceeding the Also, the a

ses demon ate t 0

HC a 1.44, no RME event will result in exceeding the HCPR (continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 B 3.3-44 Amendment

ENCLOSURE 4

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (TVA)

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)

UNITS 1 I 2I and 3

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TS)

CHANGE TS-353S1 SUPPLEMENTAL CHANGE REVISED PAGES I.

AFFECTED PAGE LIST Unit 1

3.3-5 3.3-6 3.3-19 3.3-20 B 3.3-7 B 3.3-8 B 3.3-10 B 3.3-30 B 3.3-34*

B 3.3-44 B 3.3-45 Unit 2 3.3-5 3.3-6 3.3-19 3.3-20 B 3.3-7 B 3.3-8 B 3.3-10 B 3.3-31 B 3.3-34*

B 3.3-44 B 3.3-45 Unit 3 3.3-5 3.3-6 3.3-19 3.3-20 B 3.3-7 B 3.3-8 B 3.3-10 B 3.3-31 B 3.3-34*

B 3.3-44 B 3.3-45

new page not in original submittal.

All other pages should be substituted II.

REVISED PAGES See attached.

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS continued SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.10 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

184 days SR 3.3.1.1.11 (Del eted)

SR 3.3.1.1.12 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

18 months SR 3.3.1.1.13

-NOTE Neutron detectors are excluded.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

18 months SR 3.3. 1. 1. 14 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.

18 months SR 3.3. 1. 1. 15 Verify Turbine Stop Valve Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is > 30'X RTP.

18 months SR 3.3.1.1.16

-NOTE-For Function 2.a, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

I I

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 184 days 0

BFN-UNIT 1 3.3-5 Amendment

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3)

Reactor Protection Syatce Inst~tation FUNCTION APPLICABLE NODES OR REQUIRED OTHER CHANNELS SPEC IFIED PER TRIP CONDITIONS SYSTEN COND IT IONS

'EFERENCED FR(sl REQUIRED ACTION D.1 SURVEI L LANCE REQUIREHENTS ALLOMASLE VALUE

~

Interaedi ate Range Nonitors a.

Neutron Flux -High b.

Inop 2.

Average Pouer Range Honitora a.

Neutron Flux -High, (Setdoun) b.

FLou siaaed sibilated Therael Power -High 5(a) 5( ~)

3(b)

V 3(b)

SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.9

'R 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.16 SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.16 5 120/125 divisions of full scale S 120/125 divisions of full scale S 15X RTP

$ 0.66 M

+ 71X RTP and 5 120X RTP c.

Neutron Flux -High 3(b)

SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.16 S 120X R'IP (continued)

(a)

Mith any control rod uithdram free a core ceLL containing one or sore fueL aaaeablies.

(b)

Each APRN charnel provides inputs to both trip system.

BFN-UNIT I 3.3-6 Amendment

Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS continued SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2. 1.7 Verify control rod sequences input to the RWM are in conformance with BPWS.

Prior to declaring RWM OPERABLE following loading of sequence into RWM SR 3.3.2.1.8 NOTE Neutron detectors are excluded.

Verify the RBM:

a.

Low Power Range -- Upscale Function is not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is a 27K and a 62K RTP.

b.

Intermediate Power Range -- Upscale Function is not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is > 621. and a 82% RTP.

c.

High Power Range -- Upscale Function is not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 82%%d RTP.

18 months BFN-UNIT 1 3.3-19 Amendment

Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2.1-1 (page 1 of 1)

Control Rod Block Instrusentatfon FUNCTION APPLICABLE NCOES OR OTHER SPECIFIED COHO ITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS SURVEILLANCE REQUI RENENTS ALLOMABLE VALUE 1.

Rod Block Konitor a.

Ltw Pouer Range -- Upscale (a)

SR 3.3.2.1.1 (e)

SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.8 b.

Intermediate Powr Range -.

Upscale (b)

SR 3.3.2.1.1 (e)

SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1 '

c.

High Peer Range -- Upscale (f),(g)

SR 3.3.2.1.1 (e)

SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.8 d.

Inop e.

Oanscale (g),(h)

(g),(h)

SR 3.3.2.1.1 NA SR 3.3.2.1.1 (I)

SR 3.3.2.1.4 1(c) 2(c)

SR 3.3.2.1.2 NA SR 3.3.2.1.3 SR 3.3.2.1.5 SR 3.3.2.1.7 3.

Reactor Node Switch -Shutdan Posf tfon (d)

SR 3.3.2.1.6 NA (a)

THERNAL POMER 8 27X and 5 62X RTP and NCPR less than the value specified fn the COLR.

(b)

THERNAL POUER > 62X and S 82X RTP and NCPR less than the value specf fied fn the COLR.

(c) llfth THERNAL POKR 1 10X RTP, (d)

Reactor soda siitch fn the shutdcaa positfon.

(e)

Less than or equal to the Alfouable Value specified fn the COLR.

(f)

THERNAL PAAR i 82X and < 90X RTP and NCPR less than the value speci ffed in the COLR.

(g)

THERNAL POKER R 90X RTP and NCPR less than the value specff fed fn the COLR.

(h)

THERNAL POMER? 27X and < 90X RTP and NCPR less than the value specfffed in the COLR.

(i)

Greater than or equal to the Alienable Value specified fn the COLR.

BFN-UNIT I 3.3-20 Amendment

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, i'CO, and APPLICABILITY 0,

Avera e Power Ran e Monitor (continued)

The APRH System is divided into four APRM channels and four 2-out-of-4 voter channels.

Each APRM channel provides inputs to each of the four voter channels.

The four voter channels are divided into two groups of two each, with each group of two providing inputs to one RPS trip system.

The system is designed to allow one APRM channel, but no voter

channels, to be bypassed.

A trip from any one unbypassed APRM will result in a "half-trip" in all four of the voter

channels, but no trip inputs to either RPS trip system.

A trip from any two unbypassed APRM channels will result in a full trip in each of the four voter channels, which in turn results in two trip inputs to each RPS trip system logic channel (Al, A2, Bl, or B2).

Three of the four APRM channels and all four of the voter channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single failure will preclude a

scram on a valid signal.

In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core, consistent with the design bases for the APRM functions, at least twenty (20)

LPRH inputs, with at least three (3)

LPRH inputs from each of the four axial levels at which the LPRHs are located, must be operable for each APRM channel.

2.a.

Avera e Power Ran e Monitor Neutron Flux-Hi h Setdown For operation at low power (i.e.,

MODE 2), the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux High, (Setdown)

Function is capable of generating a trip signal that prevents fuel damage resulting from abnormal operating transients in this power range.

For most operation at low power levels, the Average Power Range Honitor Neutron Flux-High, (Setdown)

Function will provide a secondary scram to the Intermediate Range Monitor Neutron Flux High Function because of the relative setpoints.

With the IRHs at Range 9 or 10, it is possible that the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux High, (Setdown)

Function will provide the primary trip signal for a corewide increase in power.

No specific safety analyses take direct credit for the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High, (Setdown)

Function.

However, this Function indirectly ensures that before the reactor mode switch is placed in the run BFN-UNIT I B 3.3-7 (continued)

Amendment

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 APPLICABLE

)

SAFETY ANALYSES

LCO, and APPLICABILITY 2.a.

Avera e Power Ran e Monitor Neutron FluxHi h

~Setdown)

(continued) position, reactor power does not exceed 25K RTP (SL 2. 1. 1. 1) when operating at low reactor pressure and low core flow.

Therefore, it indirectly prevents fuel damage during significant reactivity increases with THERMAL POWER

< 25K RTP.

The Allowable Value is based on preventing significant increases in power when THERMAL POWER is <

25%

RTP.

The Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux High, (Setdown)

Function must be OPERABLE during MODE 2 when control rods may be withdrawn since the potential for criticality exists.

In MODE 1, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux -High Function provides protection against reactivity transients and the RWM and rod block monitor protect against control rod withdrawal error events.

2.b.

Avera e Power Ran e Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power-Hi h

The Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power-High Function monitors neutron flux to approximate the THERMAL POWER being transferred to the reactor coolant.

The APRM neutron flux is electronically filtered with a time constant representative of the fuel heat transfer dynamics to generate a signal proportional to the THERMAL POWER in the reactor.

The trip level is varied as a function of recirculation drive flow (i.e., at lower core flows, the setpoint is reduced proportional to the reduction in power experienced as core flow is reduced with a fixed control rod pattern) but is clamped at an upper limit that is always lower than or equal to the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux High Function Allowable Value.

The Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal-Power-High Function provides protection against transients where THERMAL POWER increases slowly (such as the loss of feedwater heating event) and protects the fuel cladding integrity by ensuring that the MCPR SL is not exceeded.

During these

events, the THERMAL POWER increase does not significantly lag the neutron flux response

and, because of a lower trip setpoint, will initiate a scram before the high neutron flux scram.

For BFN-UNIT 1 B 3.3-8 (continued)

Amendmenc

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES

~,

APPLICABLE-SAFETY ANALYSES LCO and APPLICABILITY 2.c.

Avera e Power Ran e Monitor.Fixed Neutron Flux-Hi h (continued) valves (S/RVs), limits the peak reactor pressure vessel (RPV) pressure to less than the ASME Code limits.

The control rod drop accident (CRDA) analysis (Ref.

5) takes credit for the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux High Function to terminate the CRDA.

The Allowable Value is based on the Analytical Limit assumed in the CRDA analyses.

The Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 where the potential consequences of the analyzed transients could result in the SLs (e.g.,

MCPR and RCS pressure) being exceeded.

Although the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux-High Function is assumed in the CRDA analysis, which is applicable in MODE 2, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux High, (Setdown)

Function conservatively bounds the assumed trip and, together with the assumed IRM trips, provides adequate protection.

Therefore, the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux High Function is not required in MODE 2.

2.d.

Avera e Power Ran e Monitor-Ino Three of the four APRM channels are required to be OPERABLE for each of the APRM Functions.

This Function (Inop) provides assurance that the minimum number of APRMs are OPERABLE.

For any APRM channel, any time its mode switch is in any position other than "Operate,"

an APRM module is unplugged, or the automatic self-test system detects a

critical fault with the APRM channel, an Inop trip is sent to all four voter channels.

Inop trips from two or more non-bypassed APRM channels result in a trip output from all four voter channels to their associated trip system.

'his Function was not specifically credited in the accident

analysis, but it is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function.

0 BFN-UNIT 1 8 3.3-10 (continued)

Amendment

RPS Instrumentation 8 3.3.1.1 BASES

.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.10 and SR 3.3.1.1.13 (continued)

A note to SR 3.3. 1. 1.9 and SR 3.3. 1. 1. 13 states that neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal.

Changes in neutron detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the 7 day calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3. 1.1.2) and the 1000 effective full power hours LPRH calibration against the TIPs (SR 3.3. 1.1.7).

A second Note for SR 3.3. 1. 1.9 is provided that requires the IRH SRs to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of entering MODE 2 from MODE l.

Testing of the MODE 2 IRH Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links.

This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.

Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.

The Frequency of SR 3.3. 1. 1.9 is based upon the assumption of a 92 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

The Frequency of SR 3.3. 1. 1. 10 is based upon the assumption of a 184 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

The Frequency of SR 3.3. 1. 1.13 is based upon the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

SR 3.3.1.1.11 (Deleted)

SR

3..1.1.14 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel.

The functional testing of control rods (LCO 3. 1.3),

and SDV vent and drain valves (LCO 3. 1.8),

overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 1 B 3.3-30 Amendment

0

SRH Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 APPLICABLE

'AFETY ANALYSES

~ (continued)

I "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)"; LCO 3.3.$.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation";

IRM Neutron Flux-High and Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Neutron Flux-High, (Setdown)

Functions; and LCO 3.3.2. 1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation."