ML20148S965
| ML20148S965 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1988 |
| From: | Barton A, Cole S, Turner R CALIFORNIA, UNIV. OF, LOS ANGELES, CA, COLUMBIA UNIV., NEW YORK, NY, NEW YORK, STATE UNIV. OF, STONY BROOK, NY, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
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| OL-3, NUDOCS 8804200101 | |
| Download: ML20148S965 (134) | |
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{{#Wiki_filter:e April 13, 1988 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino Board
)
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Unit 1) )
)
TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN COLE, RALPH H. TURNER, AND ALLEN H. BARTON ON THE REMAND OF CONTENTION 25.C. -- ROLE CONFLICT OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS Introduction l l Q. Please state your names and summarize your professional backgrounds. A. (Cole) My name is Stephen Cole. I am a professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. I l am also President of Social Data Analysts, Inc., a consulting firm engaged in conducting applied sociological studies, includ-i ing surveys. T $$ $0a?lB00A13 050000 y' PD L
00LKEIE0 ustlRC 88 ER 15 N1 @ UNITFD STATES OF AMERICA , NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION crFicE :s P-V)), r; 00CKElffij'C - Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino Board ( l I ) ) l In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Unit 1) )
)
TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN COLE, RALPH H. TURNER, AND ALLEN H. BARTON ON BEHALF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY ON THE REMAND OF CONTENTION 25.C. -- ROLE CONFLICT OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS April 13, 1988
, I graduated from Columbia College with majors in both socio-logy and history in 1962 and received a Ph.D. in sociology from Columbia University in 1967. Since 1962 I have been profes-sionally involved in conducting social surveys. For the last 15 years, first under the name of Opinion Research Associates and starting in 1977 as Social Data Analysts, Inc., I have conducted more than 150 social surveys for various clients, including Newsday, The Boston Globe, The Baltimore Sun, Columbia Univer-sity, the University of California at Irvine, the National Bureau of Economic Research, Brookhaven National Laboratories, the State of California, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Suffolk County, and the Long Island Lighting Company, among others. Since 1979 I have conducted more than 10 surveys on public attitudes toward nuclear power. I have also conducted three surveys on the anti-cipated response of potential emergency workers to a radiological emergency at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
I am the author of more than 30 articles appearing in such Journals as Scientific American, Science, Public Ooinion Ouarterly, American Sociolocical Review, and the American Journal of Socioloov. In addition, I am the author of seven books, in-cluding a textbook on research methods, The Sociolooical Method, third edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1980). My work in sociology h r. , been recognized by the receipt of a Guggenheim Foundation Fellowship, appointment as Fellow to the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Science, and receipt of a Ford l l l l i [ l
Foundation Faculty Research Fellowship. For a more complete description of qualifications and publications, see my Vita, which is Attachment 1 to this testimony. A. (Turner) My name is Ralph H. Turner. I am a professor of sociology and former chairman of the department of sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles. h After receiving a B.A. and M.A. in sociology from the Uni-versity of Southern California, I received a Ph. D. in sociology, with a speciality in social psychology, from the University of Chicago in 1948. I joined the faculty of UCLA that same fall and have been there since. Visiting appointments at other institu-tions have included the University of Washington, University of Hawaii, University of Georgia, University of London and Oxford University in England, Australian National University, Hebrew University and Ben Gurion University in Israel, American Univer-sity of Cairo in Egypt, and the China Aca07my of Social Sciences in China. I have served as President of the American Socio-logical Association, Chairman of the American Sociological Association Theory Section, Social Psychology Section, and Col-lective Behavior Section, and as Vice president of the Interna-tional Sociological Association.
, For seven years, I was Editor of the Annual Review of Socioloav, which is sponsored by the American Sociological Association, and for three years I was Editor of Sociometry (now Social Psycholoov Ouarterly) which is the official social psycho-logy journal of the American Sociological Association. I am the author or coauthor of four books and the editor or coeditor of two others, the author af ovar inn articles in scholarly journals anc books, and the author of approximately the same number of bcok reviews in scholarly journals.
My areas of professional expertise that are most relevant to the topic of this hearing are (1) the theory of social roles, l (2) collective behavior, and (3) human behavior in response to disasters and warnings of disasters. With respect to the theory of social roles, I have authored 15 scholarly articles on the subject, including a definitive essay on role theory in the international EncycloDedia of the Social Sciences. I have also taught the graduate course on "role theory" in the UCLA Depart-l ment of Sociology for approximately 25 years. l I am coauthor (with Lewis Killian) of a textbook on collec-tive behavior, first published in 1957, revised in 1972, and pub-l lished in a third edition in 1987 by Prentice-Hall, Inc. In l addition, I have published numerous scholarly articles on col-
, lective behavior, including in the Encyclopedia Britanica, and have taught an undergraduate course on the subject for 39 years and a graduate seminar on the subject for over 30 years.
In connection with disaster research, I chaired the National, Research Council Panel on Public Policy Implications of Earth-quake Prediction (1975), Nas a member of a National Academy of Sciences delegation to China to study the Chinese earthquake pre-diction effort (1976), served as one of two American representa-tives on the planning committee for a UNESCO International Con-ference on Earthquake Prediction (1979), served on the Advisory Committee on Earthquake Research for the U.S. G'eological Survey, and am currently on the National Research Council Advisory Com-mittee on the International Decade of Natucal Hazard Reduction and the Advisory Committee for the Southern California Earthquake Preparedness Program. I am senior author of the book, Waitino for Disaster: Earthauake Watch in California, and author of numerous scholarly articles on response to disaster warnings. A copy of my resume is attached hereto as Attachment 2. A. (Barton) My name is Allen H. Barton. I am a professor of sociology at Columbia University. l l l l _
, I graduated from Harvard College in 1947, majoring in social relations, and received a Ph.D. in sociology from Columbia Uni-versity in 1957. I have directed several large-scale survey re-search studies, includina studies of populations such as school teachers, educational researchers, students and faculty in a university crisis, community leaders and local residents in New York City community planning districts, and samples of national leaders in Yugoslavia and the United States. My publications in-clude approximately 40 papers, chapters, and monographs, and several books, individually or jointly with research colleagues.
As Director of Columbia's Bureau of Applied Social Research from 1962 to 1976, I have been involved with a large number of research proposals and projects by staff members, faculty members, and students. I have taught graduate courses on survey methods and the logic of social research at Columbia since 1957, as well as substantive courses on formal organizctions, social l l problems, political behavior, and the attitudes and behavior of national elites. In 1959, I was requested by the Disaster Research Group of the National Academy of Sciences' National Research Council to conduct a sociological review of the available social research on community response to disasters. I analyzed the then-existing studies by social scientists covering well over 100 disaster situations, as well as dozens of historical accounts of disasters y and other incidences of collective stress such as wars, depres-sions, concentration camps, and racial persecution. I also re-viewed the summary monographs on particular ' aspects of disaster behavior (e.o., panic, convergence, response to warnings) pro-duced by the Disaster Research Gro.ap, and other efforts to sum- . marize and theorize about behavior in collective stress situa-tions by sociologists and psychologists. My report, Social l Orcanization Under Stress, with an introduction by Prof. Robert ' K. Merton, was published by the National Academy of Sciences in 1963. I subsequently amplified and updated the review of the re-search in a book, Communities in Disaster, published by Doubleday in 1969, and republished in both Britain in 1970 and Japan in 1974. I have since kept up with the disaster literature, re- , viewing the specialized journals in the field, attending various government-supported conferences on disaster research and ap-pearing on panels at professional associations on disaster re-search. For a more complete description of qualifications and pub-lications, see my Vita, which is Attachment 3 to the testimony. Q. What is the purpose of this testimony? i a A. (Cole, Turner, Barton)l/ The purpose of this testimony is to address Emergency Planning Contention 25, subpart C, as re-1/ Unless otherwise indicated, the answers are sponsored by all ! three witnesses.
; manded by the Appeal Board in its March 26, 1986, decision (ALAB-832). The Contention states as follows:
Intervenors contend that the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1) and 50.47(b)(3) because the Plan fails to address the problem of emergency worker role conflict. Intervenors contend that a substantial number of the emergency workers relied upon under the LILCO Plan will resolve such conflicts by attending to their other obligations prior to, or in lieu of, performing the emergency functions assigned to them by LILCO. In the absence of such workers, the LILCO Plan cannot and will not be implemented, and there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b), and NUREG 0654 Section II. The emergency workers -likely to experience role conflict, the type of conflict, and the effect of such conflict upon the implementability of the LILCO Plan are set forth in paragraphs A-F below. C. The LILCO Plan fails to take into account the role conflict that will be experi-enced by school bus drivers. In fact, a sub-stantial number of school bus drivers are likely to attend to the safety of their own families before they report (if they report at all) to perform the bus driving duties which LILCO assumes will be performed. Role con-flict of school bus drivers will mean that neither school buses nor school bus drivers will be available to implement the LILCO Plan. Without an adequate number of buses or bus drivers, LILCO will be incapable of imple-menting the following protective actions:
- 1. early dismissal of schools (necessary under the LILCO Plan to permit school children to be sheltered or to evacuate with their parents);
- 2. evacuation of schools;
- 3. evacuation of persons without access to cars; and
{
. 4. evacuation of persons in special facili-ties.
Q. Please summarize the matters you will discuss in this testimony. A. Under the LILCO Plan, the school bus drivers who regularly take children to and from schools in the school dis-tricts within the EPZ are expected to do one of two things in a Shoreham accident: either take the children home for unification with their families or evacuate the children to reception centers outside the EPZ, depending on the severity and timing of the accident. Egg OPIP 3.6.5. This testimony will ciscuss the potential for role conflict among those school bus drivers and whether, in light of that potential, a sufficient number of school bus drivers can be relied upon to perform emergency duties in driving school children home or to relocation centers during a Shoreham accident. Specifically, we will discuss: (1) why the school bus drivers would experience severe role conflict in the event of a Shoreham accident; (2) why large numbers of them would be likely l l to resolve that conflict by attending to the needs of their l families, or assuring themselves that those needs had been attended to, prior to or in lieu of performing early dismissal or evacuation bus driving functions; and (3) why LILCO's arguments i
~ . that role conflict would not result in large numbers of school bus drivers failing to perform the driving duties assigned by the LILCO Plan, are without merit.
The Bases for Role Conflict and How It Is Resolved Q. For background purposes, please explain what is meant by the term "role conflict." A. In all complex societies, individuals simultaneously occupy many social positions (usually called "statuses" in sociology). As a result of occupying these multiple positions, individuals have role relationships with many other people. Thus, most people have work roles, family roles, and other roles (for instance, roles in religious or other voluntary organiza-tions). Society has certain expectations of how an individual is supposed to perform each of these roles. The people with whom we interact also have expectations for how we should behave in our roles. Since we often simultaneously must fulfill many roles, it is not unusual for the obligations or expectations connected with one role to come into conflict with the obligations or expecta-tions connected with another role. Sociologists have used many different terms, including "role conflict," "status conflict,"
"role-set conflict," and "role strain," to describe variations of l
i L
. this familiar situation. It is not necessary, for our purposes, to review or analyze all of the different versions of this con-cept. Here we shall simply define role conflict as the experi-ence of incompatible obligations from two or more of a person's societal roles.1/
Role conflict can be a moderate or intense experience, depending upon how deeply committed the individual is to the roles involved and what the consequences of a particular role decision may be. For instance, conflict between a business trip and a meeting of one's monthly bridge group is usually resolved with a minimum of stress by opting for the business trip because the commitment to the occupational role is much stronger than commitment to the bridge group, and because consequences of missing the bridge group occasionally are not serious or irrevoc-able. By contrast, commitment to family roles such as parent, husband or wife, son or daughter, and brother or sister, is usually high. In daily life, role conflicts are often resolved l l 1/ Consider the following examples: a minister of a church who in his role as minister accepts it as his religious responsi-bility to accept gratefully a modest salary, but who in his role as a father feels obligated to secure the best education that l money can buy for his children; a labor union official who in his I role as union official is expected to support the union's t endorsed candidate for public office, but in his role as brother i feels obligated to support his brother's candidacy for the same position; the businessman who in his work role feels obligated to bring work home and in his family role obligated to spend time with his wife and children; or the man who in his role as employee perceives a responsibility to perform emergency responsibilities, but in his role as husband or father feels obligated to help ensure the safety and well-being of family members and other dependents. without great stress by temporarily setting aside family com-mitments because the consequences are minor and temporary. But when the life, safety, or health of a family member is at stake, and the consequences of failing to carry out one's responsi-bilities are therefore perceived to be severe and irrevocable, the experience of role conflict will be intense unless the con-flicting role is easily set aside. The potential role conflict that concerns us here is between the school bus drivers' responsibilities toward family or other dependents, and the perceived job responsibilities of such drivers during a radiological emergency. In our opinion, those school bus drivers with responsibilities to spouses, children or other dependents will experience role conflict -- i.e., their roles as family protectors will be perceived to conflict with their roles as school bus drivers. For the reasons discussed below, large numbers will resolve such conflicts in favor of their family responsibilities. Q. In general, how do people resolve role conflict? l A. One way to deal with role conflict is to carry out the responsibilities of one role and to neglect the responsibilities of the other. This solution is sometimes called "role abandon-ment." The abandonment can be permanent or temporary.
- When commitment to both roles is high, people may also try to resolve role conflict either by attempting to perfcrm both roles in some way, or by performing only part of their responsi-bilities to each role. This approach is often counter-pro-ductive, with the result that both roles are performed poorly, if at all.
It is also important to note that the stress of severe role conflict affects concentration, motivation, and attitude on the job. A lessened ability to concentrate, resentment over the choice that had to be made, and continuing worry about the safety of loved ones all increase the likelihood cf mistakes in per-formance. Thus, regardless of the ultimate resolution of the role conflict dilemma, the quality of role performance is likely to be damaged by strong role conflict.)_/ 1 Q. What factors affect how people resolve role conflict? A. There are many factors affecting the resolution of role conflict.A/ The two most important factors, however, are the l 3/ For a more general introduction to the theory of social roles, ag_e. J. Heiss, "Social Roles," Social Psycholoov: Sociolooical Persoective, M. Rosenberg and R. H. Turner, eds. (1981); R. H. Turner, "Role: Sociological Aspects," 13 International Encyclooedia of the Social Sciences, (1968) at 552-57. 1/ For a general discussion of mechanisms utilized to cope with role conflict ag.g Stephen Cole, The Sociolooical Orientation, 2nd Edition (1979), pp. 61-65. Robert K. Merton discusses similar mechanisms in an article on "role-set" conflict. Merton, "The (footnote continued) h
relative importance, or "dominance," of the roles at issue and the consequences of the role choice. With respect to the relative dominance of the roles at issue, it must be recognized that not all roles that individuals occupy are equally important to them. When an individual faces a i role conflict situation in which it i.= necessary to make a choice as to which role will take priority, the individual will be heavily influenced by the expectations and demands of the dominant role. Which roles are dominant are not always readily apparent, but the sociological literature demonstraces that in our society, family roles tend to be the most important. People are taught from childhood that their roles as parents, and other family roles, are the most important. Thus, family roles are likely to be dominant over virtually all others. This does not mean, however, that in all situations the individual will always opt to fulfill family obligations rather than obligations of another role. Other factors will apply as well. This brings us to the second important facter determining j how individuals will resolve role conflicts -- that is, the con-sequences of the role decision. When an individual is in a situation in which failing to meet the obligations of a dominant role, such as a family role, will result in potentially irrevoc-t l (footnote continued from previous page) ! Role-Set: Problem in Sociological Theory," 8 British Journal of Socioloov, (1957) at 108-20. l
l
. able and serious consequences, they will generally choose to meet the obligations of the dominant role. There are strong social norms or expectations which define it as essential for family members to give precedence to their family roles when other members of the family are in a situation where their health, safety, or lives are threatened. For instance, parents who fail to perform family obligations in such a situation are generally looked upon with great disapproval. Thus, in a situation where the individual is faced with either performing an obligation connected with work or acting to protect the life of a family member, almost all will chose the latter alternative.
Another related factor pertinent o the resolution of role conflict is "degree of involvement." The people with whom we interact in our various roles place different degrees of impor-tance on their relationships with us. The bus driver with children is likely to have an intense personal involvement with them and a less intense personal involvement vith those with whom they interact in their role as bus driver. The fact that different people will react differently to our failure to live up to their expectations helps us establish priorities in cases of l conflict.1/ 1 l 1/ This mechanism is really the inverse of the dominant role. ' When we consider which role is dominant, we consider which one l has the most importance to us. When we consider the degree of l involvement with others with whom we interact in our roles, we consider the importance of our behavior to others. Ultimately, l l in deciding what to do in socially induced conflict situations, l we consider both our own feelings and the reactions of others. (footnote continued) l l
,- Role conflict may also be affected by concerns with the differing degrees of power of those with whom we interact in our roles. The employer of the bus driver would have the power to dismiss the bus driver if he or she did not report to drive the bus in an emergency. The bus driver's family members would not have any direct coercive power to force the bus driver to meet their needs. The consequences, however, of violating family expectations could and probably would be permanent damage to the family relationship. In some situations, an employer with the ability to fire an employee might coerce the employee to give priority to the demands of job over demands of family. For reasons discussed further below, in the event of a nuclear accident at Shoreham, this is highly improbable. Another factor relevant to role conflict is societal exoectations, which may be manifested as either positive social approval or negative social sanctions. Because role conflict is generated by location in society, it is usually the case that individuals do not face or experience role conflict in isolation; rather, they face it along with other people in similar social situations. Family membars expect each other to rally in solidarity in an emergency. Society expects such behavior as well. The pointedness of the disapproval from dependent family members for failing to carry out a family role would be much (footnote continued from previous page) And both of these sets of feelings are socially conditioned by societal values.
- greater and more inescapable than disapproval from the community for failing to attend to an emergency role. There is no more poignant criticism than the question, "Where were you when I needed you most?" from a child, a spouse, or a dependent parent.
With respect to emergency-specific factors, role conflict is also influenced by the extent to which the emergency worker nor-mally performs emergency work as part of their regular. job, the amount of training and experience he or she has had in performing l l such tasks. ' Workers with no clear commitment to, or expectation of performing emergency work, who do not do so regularly in their jobs, and who have not been trained to do so, are less likely to perform emergency roles. l Q. In a Shoreham emergency, would the school bus drivers LILCO l relies upon under its Plan experience role conflict and, if so, how would they resolve it? i 1 i l A. It is our opinion that in a radiological emergency at l Shoreham, almost all emergency workers with families or other i dependents will experience role conflict to some degree, in-cluding the school bus drivers LILCO intends to rely upon to evacuate the schools. It is also our opinion that a very large number of them would choose to attend first to the safety and needs of their families. Only after they had fully satisfied themselves that their families were safe -- which in this case l l ca .o out of the area at risk -- would they be -'illing to perform
- t. sir bus driving functions, if they ever uld t all. This will have negative consequences for the rapid ,vacuation or early dismissal of school children from the schools.
Our opinion is based on the factors which we have described above, which are well documented in sociological literature, as applied to the school bus drivers. As noted above, family obligations are dominant to virtually all other roles in our society. It is our understanding that a large majority of the school bus drivers LILCO intends to rely upon reside in or near the EPZ.5/ Thus, in a radiological emergency at Shoreham, these school bus drivers are likely to believe that their families are at risk and will seek to take steps to fulfill their obligations to their families. This is particularly so given the likely perceived con-sequencea of not performing that role. Because of the high level of fear that Long Islanders (consistent with people in the rest of the country) have of radiation,F the potential danger which the school bus drivers will perceive their families to be exposed f/ Sag Direct Testimony of Bruce G. Brodsky, Edward J. Doherty, Howard M. Koenig, Nick F. Muto, Robert W. Petrilak, Anthony R. Rossi, J. ThomTs Smith, and Richard N. Suprina on Behalf of Suffolk County on Contention 25. C (the "School Administrators' Testimony"). F The high degree of concern about radiation has been documented by Professor Cole in previous testimony. Egg, e.a., Cole et al., SC Ex. 33 to the Reception Center hearing, at 26-47.
. to, and the negative consequences of not taking effective action to mitigate that danger, most school bus drivers will choose to abandon, or at least to delay, the fulfillment of their bus driving duties. Thus, the two most important factors affecting how people deal with role conflict weigh het.vily against ful-fillment of the role LILCO expects them to play in an evacuation.
The other factors noted above also support the likelihood that school bus drivers will resolve their role conflict in favor of their families. Societal expectations, at least on Long Island, are that the primacy of the school bus drivers' family obligations are understandable and acceptable. School officials, government officials, and other bus drivers have all acknowledged that school bus drivers would attend first and foremost to the needs of their own families rather than perform school evacua-tions. Eg.g School Administrators' Testimony. Indeed, 255 school bus drivers have already publicly stated their intention not to report to their jobs in an evacuation in a radiological emor-gency. A sample of the signed statements is attached to the School Administrators' Testimony. . I In light of these facts, and because this issue has already been a subject of discussion among bus drivers, the school authorities, and the community in general, it is evident that there is not a clear societal consensus that bus driving duties
must be performed to the detriment of family obligations.$/ Nor does it appear that bus drivers would have much to fear from their employers if they attended first to the safety of their families instead of driving school buses. This removes a potentially potent source of social pressure on the school bus drivers not to abandon their emergency roles.1/ School bus drivers are also more likely to resolve their role conflict in favor of their family obligations because they are not trained emergency workers and do not, in the normal
- course of their duties, perform emergency functions. Policemen, firemen, ambulance drivers, emergency medical technicians, etc.
cope with emergencies frequently as part of their normal jobs and most have had significant experience and training in handling emergencies. These types of emergency workers would also experience role conflict in case of an accident at Shoreham, as P R/ Even though one could postulate the possibility of some community criticism of a bus driver who did not show up to participate in school evacuation, the driver's justified concern and decisive action to protect his or her own f amily members vould mitigate much of that criticism. 1/ Furthermore, even if we assume that the bus drivers thought that they would be fired if they did not drive a bus at Shoreham, the great majority would attend to the needs of their family any-way. This is because in a 3horeham radiological emergency, the bus drivers would perceive that the very health and lives of their family members were threatened and would not be willing to risk jeopardizing their family members lives in order to retain l their jobs as bus drivers. There are very few people in our society who would leave their family members to fend for themselves if they perceived that their family members' lives l were in danger. f
; revealed by the volunteer firemen surveys we discuss below; but, they would probably be less likely to abandon their emergency roles than would school bus drivers.
School bus drivers, on the other hand, very infrequently deal with serious community-wide emergencies as part of their normal jobs. The most serious type of "emergency" that most school bus drivers have encountered would be driving a school bus for an early dismissal during a snow storm. Since snow fre-quently f alls on Long Island during the winter, and since most people have often driven during snow storms, this is not likely to be perceived as a major "emergency" by most school bus drivers. Furthermors, most people do not perceive a snow storm as placing their families at serious risk; most people would per-ceive a radiological emergency as placing their families at risk. We can safely assume that most school bus drivers have never per-formed their duties in a situation similar to that which would exist if a radiological accident occurred at the Shoreham plant.M/ M/ Indeed, LILCO witness Dennis Mileti, has testified in the past that it is important to distinguish between regular emergency workers and people who might be expected to play some supportive role in an emergency without having, orior to the emergency, accepted the emergency role. Thus, policemen and full time firemen know that they have emergency roles and know that they are exoected by their employers and the community to serve in these emergency roles in case of an emergency. School bus drivers, however, are not in the same category. LILCO might argue, however, that even though the bus drivers have said that they will not drive the buses in a Shoreham emergency and school officials have expressed their views that they do not expect nor want bus drivers to drive school buses during a Shoreham (footnote continued)
7... Nor have the school bus drivers made a commitment to fulfill the emergency role LILCO has assigned to them. The policeman and other trained full-time emergency workers have made a special commitment to emergency work, and their families have had to work out their own patterns for adapting to this role. Unless these emergency workers have learned to give top priority to the emergency role, however, and unless they have worked out a satisfactory modus vivendi with their family members, they do not remain in these occupations. School bus driving, on the other hand, is not an emergency role; the drivers have not volunteered for emergency service, or for the potentially dangerous activity involved in driving through a potentially contaminated area. They also have not agreed to leave their families to fend for themselves in the event of a radiological emergency. Indeed, many have said publicly that they would not do so. Thus, their level of commitment to driving a bus during an emergency is low compared to their commitments to protect their families. There is at least one other very important point which weighs against school bus drivers performing their LILCO-assigned emergency roles. In natural disasters, there is no "enemy." The disasters are acts of God or nature, and institutions or organi-zations cannot be blamed for their occurrence. In such cases, communities have been observed to band together for the common (footnote continued from previous page) emergency, that they will do so anyway. This is simply wishful thinking and not based on data or valid sociological theory. I
good (the so-called "therapeutic community"). This would not be the case in the Shoreham emergency. Such an emergency would not be an act of God or nature; it would be perceived by the public as a result of incompetence on the part of Snoreham's operator, LILCO. As has been demonstrated to this Board previously, LILCO has a low degree of credibility on Long Island and the people feel a great deal of anger toward LILCO.ll./ If Shoreham were to be licensed and a serious accident requiring the evacuation of all residents of the EPZ were to occur, not only would LILCO's already low credibility decline, but the residents of Long Island would blame LILCO for the accident. These facts will also affect what school bus drivers will do in an emergency. Man-made disasters provide the opportunity for placing blame, and placing blame can often serve as a device for shifting responsibility. It is possible that many drivers will feel their own emergency responsibilities lessened because the accident is plainly the fault of the power company that built and r;ns the nuclear plant. In an emergency, the only organization which would expect school bus drivers to drive the school buses is LILCO. In contrast, their families would expect them to come home and school officials would not expect them to drive the 1 buses. The concept of "therapeutic community" is only relevant when there is a clear community need and a clear course of action for an individual to follow. This would not be the case for l 11/ Sfdt, e.a., Cole et al., SC Ex. 13 to Reception Center hearing, at 44-47. i l
school bus drivers responding to a Shoreham emergency. Given the low credibility of LILCO and the anger which would be directed at LILCO if a serious accident was to occur, it is highly unlikely that the bus drivers would accept LILCO's unilateral assignment of bus driving responsibilities. Q. LILCO has argued that school bus drivers who are wor-ried about their families can deal with that concern by making a phone call that would not substantially interfere with their ability or willingness to perform their school evacuation driving duties. Do you agree? A. No. Many of the school bus drivers have children who would be in school. It would be virtually impossible for a bus driver to check on the safety of his or her child by telephone. Furthermore, many bus drivers, unless they were at home, would not have easy access to telephones. Also, it might be difficult to use the telephone at all, as the phone system would probably l be tied up during the course of a major accident at Shoreham. ! Even if a dial tone could be obtained it would be dif ficult to get through to an individual school (which would be likely to have its switch boards flooded) and even harder to be able to find out about an individual child. l l l l 1 ; L
In addition, even if a school bus driver could get through to a child, it is unlikely that this would be enough to ensure him or her that the f amily members were safe. There is over-whelming evidence that under conditions which would trigger an early dismissal or evacuation of the schools because of a Shoreham accident, most Long aland residents would not consider themselves or their families to be safe until they had left the EPZ and travelled a significant distance from Shoreham.M./ Most school bus drivers, like most other citizens who live in and around the EPZ, will gather up their family members and leave.:the area by car. Q. LILCO has also stated that it has offered to provide "training" to the school bus drivers and that such training would reduce role conflict or would reduce the likelihood of role l abandonment by school bus drivers. Do you agree? A. No. In this case we think that any training LILCO l might provide would be of little value. l First, we understand that the Exercise (OL-5) Board, which reviewed LILCO's February 13, 1986 exercise performance, has found that LILCO's training program is "fundamentally flawed" and l l l_2_/ Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 3, 12-14; Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 17-18 and Figs. 3, 4; Evans et al, ff. OL-5 Tr. 3786, at 159-65.
. is, in essence, inadequate.M/ In light of this finding, LILCO is hard pressed to say.it will be able to resolve role conflict through training.
Second, we understand that the school bus drivers in question have not received any LILCO training and that none of the bus drivers have agreed to participate in a training program preparing them to drive during a radiological' emergency.li/ An offer to provide training is not the same thing as effective
- training.
Third, we believe that the kind of training envisioned by LILCO, which we understand would consist of a few hours of general infor; nation about radiation and the LILCO Plan, would have no influence on the bus drivers. LILCO has very low credi- , bility among the general public and apparently among bus drivers. It is unlikely that bus drivers would believe anything that LILCO said about the dangers of radiation released during a radio-logical emergency at Shoreham. Training can only be ef fective when the trainees want to be trained, the trainees accept it as their responsibility to learn, and the trainer has high credi-bility. None of these conditions exist in this case. M/ LBP-88-2, 27 NRC , slip op. at 172-252 (February 1, 1988). 1.3/ Sgt Deposition of Douglas M. Crocker, February 2, 1988, at 60-62.
,- Finally, even in the unlikely event that the bus drivers were to participate in a training session, the training proposed by LILCO would be ineffective in dealing with the most serious problem faced by the bus drivers: role conflict. To our knowledge, the proposed training does nothing to protect the dependent f amily members, who would be in just as much danger whether the bus drivers are trained or not.
The Sociological Literature And An Assessment Of LILCO's Misinteroretation of It Q. Has there been any analysis in the sociolugical literature of role conflict experienced by emergency workers during disasters? Killian and Subsecuent Studies on Role Conflict I A. Yes. As in many other areas of science, there are some confifeting views of the significance of role conflict experienced by emergency workers during disasters. Virtually all researchers agree that emergency workers will experience varying degrees of role conflict. They disagree about the likelihood of this conflict resulting in the abandoning of the emergency role. We will briefly review this literature and discuss why we believe that this literature supports our conclusion that a large number of bus drivers are likely not to drive school buses during a i Shoreham radiological emergency. In 1952, Lewis Killian introduced the concept of role con-flict and utilized evidence from studies of disasters to illustrate the concept .M/ In his article, Killian presented evidence from a study of the reactions of people in four South-western communities to physical disasters. The study, which was carried out by the Disaster Studies Project at the University of Oklahoma, of which Killian was then the chief analyst, covered three tornado-struck communities and the Texas City ship explo-sion disaster. Killian quoted the report of a volunteer fireman who "fought the fire by myself until the army got there to help i me," and that "all the rest of the firemen had relatives that were hurt, and they stayed with them. Naturally, they looked after them. If it hadn't been that my wife was all right, this ! town probably would have burned up." Killian concludes: The great majority of persons interviewed who , were involved in such dilemmas resolved them in favor of the family, or, in some cases, to friendship groups. Much of the initial con-fusion, disorder and seemingly complete isorganization reported in disaster communities was the result of the risk of individuals to find and rejoin their families.M/ I Besides Killian's classic study, other studies have provided examples of role conflict experienced during emergencies and reached the conclusion that family roles would take priority in M/ L. W. Killian, "The Significance of Multiple Group Membership in Disaster," American Journal of Socioloav, (January 1952), 309-14. M/ gillian, at 311. 1
- e case of conflict. These include a study of the 1953 Holland flood disaster,M/ a 1958 study by Harry C. Moore of tornadoes in Texas,18_/ a 1958 doctoral dissertation by Charles W. Fogelman,19_/
and a 1958 study by William H. Form and Sigmund Nosow.2_0_/ Most of these studies were summarized in a text on disasters by Professor Barton, communities in conflict (1969). Typical of the findings summarized by Professor Barton is the report by Form and Nosow of the reactions of volunteer firemen: Intarviews indicated that in only one case was there immediate attendance to duty. The chief, who was not in the area at the time, went directly to the firehouse. For all others, two paths of action were followed: if their families were in danger, they saw to them first; or if their families were free of danger, they then proceeded to take some sort of action that they defined as appropriate. Form and Nosow at 152. They conclude, "Help for family members, close friends, and neighbors comes first; then, but apparently only then, other victims can be looked after." M. at 66. The other studies provide similar evidence. M/ Institunt voor Sociaal Orderzoek van het Nederlandse Volk, Studies in Holland Flood Disaster, Vol. III at 103-108, Vol. IV at 22 (1955).
.l 8/ H. Moore, Tornadoes over Texas (1958).
19_/ Fogelman, Family and Community in Disaster (unpublished doctoral dissertation) Louisiana State University (1958). 0 2,0_/ W. H. Form and S. Nosow, Community in Disaster (1958). _ _ ____ _ ___ )
. LILCO's Arauments and Selective Use of Data Q. In light of all of this evidence, that role conflict can create a problem for emergency workers during a disaster, why do you say that there is no consensus on this question?
A. There are other researchers on disasters, including LILCO's witnesses, who have argued that it is unusual for emergency workers to abandon their roles during disasters. We will briefly summarize their position, explain why we believe them to be in error, and, more importantly, explain why we do not believe that their conclusions are applicable to the issue pre-sented here. In order to bolster their argument that the conflict will be unlikely to result in the abandonment of emergency roles by emergency workers -- including school bus drivers -- it has been necessary for LILCO's witnesses to dismiss the work and conclu-sions of Killian and the other sociologists cited above who found evidence of role conflict and role abandonment among emergency workers during disasters. Thus, they have inaccurately described Killian's article as "theoretical." The bulk of Killian's l l article, however, was devoted to reporting the results of a study of four disasters. Thus, it is simply wrong to characterize his work as mere theory. Furthermore, they have argued that those who abandoned roles "had no definite responsibilities in the l l l I
- emetgency social system." It is difficult to understand how such an argument would apply to the volunteer fireman quoted by Killian, or the firemen referenced above by Form and Nosow.
Certainly, volunteer firemen are regular emergency workers who are award n',gt they have a responsibility to put out fires and eved to help in other types of emergencies. LILCO's nitnesses have also attempted to dismiss all of the above-referenced stu6tes which give examples of people who were toported to ha"e abandoned an emergency role by suggesting that tne spbjents of the studies weis either people who did not "know" that they were supposei to p3ay some emergency role, or that they i had evidence that the emergency role could be performed ade-quately without them. LILCO s witnesses, however, provide no ev idord.t. that is true. Again, it is also unlikely that emergency wot:kert like the firemen referenced above did not "know" about
- their <imergency duties. In any event, this factor is unlikely to i
be App 21ccble 19 these circumstances since so many bus drivers have put,licl y rejected the role which LILCO has unilaterally assigned to them. In general, LILCO's aitnesses have been highly selective in their discussion of the research on disasters and have failed to adequately censider how differences in the type af ditaster could af f ect the 'way ere:.gency werkora rnspond to tne conflict. There are tv6 basic s*udier, which these tesrtauchers (priarally used tc l l \ l 1 l
O bolster this position. The first is an unpublished 1962 masters thesis by Meda White. White interviewed various emergency workers about what they had done during and after tornadoes. Of
- the 117 people she interviewed, 82 percent contributed to disaster activity first, before attending to their families.
LI' CO's witnesses have attributed the difference between the earlier reports of role abandonment and the results of White's study to the "fact" that White was supposed to have studied workers who were "certain" of their emergency roles whereas the others (e a., Form and Nosow) studied people who were not certain of their emergency roles. This conclusion is insupportable and distorts White's work. First, we have already pointed out that many of the emergency workers previously reported to have abandoned their roles were in fact experienced emergency workers, such as volunteer firemen who were aware of their emergency roles. Second, the basic problem in applying the results of White's study to bus drivers facing a Shoreham emergency concerns the nature of the disaster agent. Disasters vary in the duratiqn of the threat or impact, f rom brief in the case of tornadoes and e rthquakes to prolonged in the case of floods and radiation Jaergencies. The duration of threat from a hurricane will i generally be longer than a tornado, but substantially shorter t than a serious radiological accident at a nuclear power plant.
, Disasters also vary in their imoact area, from very narrow in the i
_ ___-~._ __ ___ .. _ l
' o ,' case of tornadoes to very broad in hurricanes, floods, earth-quakes, and radiation emergencies. They also vary in the extent to which the threat is visible. Most natural disasters present visible threats while radiation danger is invisible without the aid of special equipment. All of these attributes of the disaster agent contribute to how emergency workers might react to potential role conflict. Because tornadoes, the disaster which White studied, pass quickly and then are gone, by the time an emergency worker had to perform his or her emergency role the threat would have passed. Thus, it would be possible for emergency workers to find out quickly if their family members had been affected by the tornado. If not, then their family members would not be in danger and they would agt experience role con-flict.2,1/
i White concluded that people usually opt for the role where the need is more certain and that "the family d.id win the majority of role conflicts, when the two needs were equally 21/ Thus, it is not surprising that few of the 117 respondents in White's study were in a situation of "certainty" of need in both family and emergency job role. Only four felt equally l needed in both the family and emergency roles. Of these few, ( half chose family role and half chose the job role. Another four l people were "undecided" about both roles and, of these, only one l carried out his job. Thus, most emergency workers were in situa-l tions where the organization's need was more certain than the i family's. However, "(w]henever the family need was more certain, 0% put the organization first. There were only seven such cases, remarkably few." White, at 27. This distribution of situational perception on the part of the emergency workers was clearly a function of the nature of the disaster agent -- namely, a tornado -- which strikes a narrow swath across a community and is over within minutes. ,
i Q, D. l certain." White, herself, was concerned with why her study : seemed to yield results differing from those reported by Killian and stated: Why, then, did Killian get the findings that he did? A look at the map of the Texas City i disaster (one of the disasters studied by l Killian) area revealed what was so unusual about : Texas City and so important in causing job-defec- l tions the workmen's homes lay next to the dock area. When the first ship expleded, these little i homes caught fire. Workmen were in the awful position of seeing that both the place they. , worked.and their homes were going up in flames. ! This is the intense Family 1-Organization 1 con- ! flict thpt is completely missing from our i sample .M/ Thus, the circumstances studied by Killian presented a role con- I
, flict situation which resulted in the family role taking pre-cedence, while the White study simply did not present that situa- i tion. LILCO's witnesses have completely ignored this distinction ,
r between the two studies. . i Professor Barton's 1969 book, Communities in Disaster, de-voted seven pages to a discussion of the White study. He con- . I cluded: ; l i It must be emphasized that the finding of White's study is not that 'the great majority of people r choose their organizational role over their family role' but that they will do so under certaln conditions, which prevailed in the three tornado disasters she studied. In other types of disasters -- exemplified by the Texas City M/ Id. at 31. 1 i
. explosion -- the distribution of knowledae about ' the needs of the family may be quite different.
In the case of an atomic attack, the visible ex-tent of fires or the undetectable extent of radiation might create a certainty of family danger over a wi5le area, similar to the Texas City situation.M/ If we compare a potential Shoreham radiological emergency with the tornadoes studied by White and the Texas City ship disaster which was discussed by Killian, we believe the situation at Shoreham would be much closer to the latter. To understand this conclusion, it is important to understand the situation to be faced by the school bus drivers. According to LILCO, they would be expected to serve as evacuation drivers while the radiological threat is imminent or actually present in the EPZ where the schools in question are located. They would not just be called upon to perform rescue or other community activities after the danger has passed. Thus, the drivers (most of whom, live in the school districts in or near the EPZ) would have reason to be concerned that their families would be in danger. LILCO would be advising some or all EPZ residents to evacuate as soon as possible. LILCO would also be requesting that the bus drivers drive school children in the EPZ to safety. In an on-going radiological emergency requiring evacuation, the danger would be perceived as persisting, unline in White's tornado studies. It is therefore highly likely that those bus drivers with families would feel certain that their family members needed M/ Barton, at 120. their help, experience intense role conflict, and resolve that conflict in che socially expected way of giving priority to the family role in a situation in which the consequences of not doing so might be severe and irrevocable. LILCO's witnesses, however, have completely misinterpreted the conclusion of the White study. They have argued that White's study shows that where emergency roles are clear and certain, people will do their emergency jobs, and that good training establishes "role certainty." This distorts White's findings for three reasons. First, White's concept of "certainty" had nothing to do with training or past experience, but with the emergency worker's knowledge of whether he or she was aggded in the family role and in the emergency role. Egg White, at 26. Second, White studied emergency workers whom she described either as pro-fessionals (full-time firemen, policemen, city officials, etc.) who work with emergency situations regularly as part of their normal jobs, or trained volunteers who frequently perform emer-gency functions (such as volunteer firemen or Red Cross workers). The Shoreham school bus drivers fit into neither of these cate-gories. Third, and perhaps most importantly, as we have already pointed out, the disaster agent in White's study was a tornado. White herself (as demonstrated in the quote above) was very aware that it would be wrong to generalize from the behavior of emer-
;' gency workers in one type of disaster to disasters which -would pose substantially dif ferent circumstances. Whereas the emer-gency workers which White studied were able to ascertain that the tornado, which had passed and left, had not harmed their family members, this would be difficult for -school bus drivers to do during an ongoing radiological emergency at Shoreham.
Finally, there is one other piece of research which is re-ferred to by those, such as LILCO's witnesses, who argue that the role abandonment by emergency workers in disasters is not a i serious problem. This is the research carried out by Quarantelli and Dynes at the Disaster Research Center in Ohio and recently published by Dynes.M/ Dynes draws the following conclusions from the re-analysis of the Disaster Research Center data: However, in examining over 150 different disaster events and in the course of interviewing over 7000 different organizational officials, role conflict did not emerge as a problem. l Dynes at 81. He then concludes: I In sum, in examining a sample of 443 persons who held positions in emergency-relevant organiza-tions, not one abandoned his/her emergency role obligations to opt for familiar-role obligations. I Dynes at 84. M/ R.R. Dynes, "The Concept of Role in Disaster Research," in R.R. Dynes, B. deMarchi and C. Pelanda, Socioloov of Disasters (1987) at 71-102 ("Dynes"). The Disaster Research Center data are not reliable and are : not relevant to the issue before this Board for the following ! i reasons. First, the Quarantel,'i and Dynes study is based upon a re-analysis of data which were originally collected for other l reasons. In the original interviews, an questions were asked ! about role conflict. The respondents were asked where they were , at the time of the disaster and to describe their actions in chronological sequence, without any specific questions about role r conflict or their family's situation. Since the interviews were , clearly about disasters and the performance of the respondent's , i role during a disaster, there may have been little reason for the , t respondent to talk about role conflict. F i )
- Second, it is also possible that the responses could have been influenced by normative responding. Emergency workers and l officials were being interviewed by a government-funded research organization which was examining their performance during an i emergency. There probably was incentive for the respondents to j
, paint their own performance as emergency workers in as favorable 1 I l a light as possible. l
?
e I Third, most of the people interviewed were highly pro-fessional disaster workers. To our knowledge, none was a school ! i bus driver. l
Fourth, although many emergency workers were interviewed, this was not a systematic quantitative study. No information is presented about questions asked, the order in which they were asked, or about who did the interviewing. In short, it is impossible to draw any definite causal conclusions from the type of analysis done by Quarantelli and Dynes. Qualitative research can be used to gain a greater understanding into a social situa-tion, but nga to test hypotheses. And given the fact that the research was not aimed at finding out anything about role con-flict, it is of dubious value for gaining any insight into this problem. Fifth, the disasters studied by Quarantelli and Dynes did not include any radiological emergencies. We have already pointed out why it is dangerous to generalize from the behavior of people in one type of disaster to their probable behavior in a radiological emergency, l i Sixth, even the data presented by the Disaster Research ! Center suggest that the role conflict can be a serious problem in j some types of disaster. For instance, for emergency workers called from their homes in floods or hurricanes, only 33 percent reported responding immediately to emergency jobs. I { o In short, it is evident from reviewing the sociological literature that role conflict has been found to occur and that it would occur more often under the circumstances that would prevail in a radiological emergency for Shoreham -- particularly for non-emergency workers like school bus drivers. In attempting to rebut this evidence, LILCO has distorted or ignored the appli-cable studies and data. t Survey Data S,uocortina the 2xistence of Role Conflict I Q. Have you conducted any research on Long Island to support your position that many bus drivers will not perform the emergency roles that LILCO expects under its Plan? A. (Cole) Yes. I have conducted three surveys that are directly relevant to the issue of how school bus drivers would resolve role conflicts (1) a 1982 survey of school bus drivers; i (2) a 1982 survey of volunteer firemen; and (3) a 1988 survey of volunteer firemen. The results of all three surveys suggest that large numbers of school bus drivers would resolve their role con-l flict by not performing school bus driving roles, and instead by attending to the safety of themselves and their families. i l Q. For background purposes briefly summarize the results of your 1982 curvey of school bus drivers. l l I i 1
A. (Cole) The results of that survey are described in detail in my testimony which was submitted on the role conflict issue in 1984.25/ Briefly, that survey was conducted of virtually all (246) of the school bus drivers who at the time (September 1982) drove for the Riverhead Central School District, the Eastport Union Free School District, the Middle Island Central School District (now Longwood), the Shoreham-Wading River School District, and the South Manor Union Free School District. The results of the survey indicated that in the eve'nt of a radiological emergency at the Shoreham plant, a substantial majority of school bus drivers would first look after the health and safety of their families rather than report to drive a school . bus. Specifically, 69 percent of those interviewed said that if there were an accident requiring the evacuation of people within a ten mile zone of the plant, they would first make sure that their families were safely out of the evacuation zone; an addi-tional four percent stated that they would first check on their . families and then go to drive the school bust 24 percent said , that they would report to work so that they could pick up school children in the evacuation zone and drive them to a shelter; three percent said that they would immediately leave the evacua-i tion zone. ., 2_5/ Sig Cole et al., ff. Tr. 2792 (January 20, 1984). i
t Q. Do you believe that the 1982 survey of school bus . C drivers is still valid? l A. (Cole) Yes. If there have been any significant { changes in eonditions since the time of the 1982 survey they have been such as to increase the level of role conflict school bus ; drivers would experience and to increase the probability that they would abandon their roles as emergency workers during a Shoreham radiological emergency. i Q. Please explain. : i ! A. (Cole) Since the first survey was done in 1982 there ( i has been a significant change in the attitudes of Long Island i j residents towards the Shoreham nuclear plant. Such changes have been documented both in surveys conducted by Newsday and in , i
- surveys conducted for Suffolk County. As these surveys demon-i strate, there has been a substantial increase in apprehension ;
about the dangers of a potential nuclear accident at the Shoreham l plant. This is in part due to the great interese in Shoreham and ! l the widespread discussion of the plant, the political opposition to the plant of the County, State, and other local governments, and the accident at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union.26,/ The in- l 1 : j crease in concern about Shoreham means that in the event of an ( i ! accident, bus drivers are more likely today than they were in
- a i 2_6/ 131, n , Cole et al., SC. Ex. 13 to Reception Center i hearing at 37-40. !
i i j ,
.l 1982 to perceive that their families would be seriously endangered by a Shoreham accident and in need of their assistance to escape or minimize the danger.
With respect to the school bus drivers, the statements signed in 1986 by 255 drivers from several school districts in or near the EPZ, including some of those surveyed in 1982, demon-strates this increased concern. Q. Please describe any other data you have obtained re-garding role conflict among emergency workers on Long Island. A. (Cole) In 1982 I conducted a survey of firemen from , 1 the following volunteer fire departments which serve areas within approximately 10 miles of Shoreham: Ridge Volunteer Fire Depart-ment, Miller Place Volunteer Fire Department, Sound Beach Volunteer Fire Department, Rocky Point Fire Department and Riverhead Fire Department.
- The questionnaire used in the survey was prepared by me in consultation with Drs. Kai Erikson and James Johnson, whom the '
l' Board will remember as sociological experts whose testimony on role conflict was admitted by the Board in 1984. A copy of the questionnaire is Attachment 4 hereto. The interviewing for this survey was conducted on the tele-phone.2.2/ It was not possible to reach all of the 467 members of the five fire departments, although an attempt was made. However, we were able to complete interviews with 291 firemen, or 62 percent of all the firemen in the five departments.M/ Since the procedure used in this survey was not based upon sampling, but represented an attempt to interview an entire population, sampling statistics estimating the sampling error would not be appropriate. It is possible, although there is no evident reason why it should be so, that those firemen whom we were not able to contact on the telephone may have somewhat different attitudes than those firemen whom we were able to contact.2,9,/ Q. Please describe the results of the 1982 volunteer firemen survey. 2,l/ All the interviewing was conducted from a rented telephone facility in Melville, New York. Interviewing was done on the evening of September 28, September 3v, and during the day on Saturday, October 2, 1982. Evening calls were made between the hours of 6:00 and 10:00 p.m., and Saturday calls were made between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. All the inter-viewers were experienced and trained people who had previously performed surveys for Social Data Analysts, Inc. M/ There were 83 members of the Ridge Department surveyed, 144 members of the Rivarhead Department, 60 members of the Sound Beach Department, 110 member of the Rocky Point Department, and 70 members of the Miller Place Department. 2_9,/ Of the 323 firemen we were able to contact on the telephone, 32 or 10 percent, refused to participate in the survey. For the majority of the remaining firemen with whom we did not complete the interviews (;',e., the 144 firemen other than the 323 who were actually contacted), we were unable to reach them, either receiving no answer or busy signals on the four or more attempts we made. l l
- A. (Cole) The questionnaire asked, among other things, the following question:
Assuming that the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant is licensed and begins to operate, we are interested in knowing what you think you would do if there was an accident at the plant. , Suppose that you were at work on a weekday morning and there was an accident at Shoreham. Everyone living within ten miles of the plant , was advised to evacuate. Volunteer firemen were expected to help with the evacuation. What do you think you would do first? First, you would report to the fire sta-tion so that you could help with fire fighting and evacuation in the evacuation zone, or first, you would make sure that your f amily was safely out of the evacuation zone, or first, you would do something else (Specify) Don't know The survey results indicate that a significant percentage of firemen would first ensure the safety of their families before attempting to report for duty. In response to the above ques-tion, 68 cercent of the firemen said that they would first make sure that their families were safely out of the evacuation zone, whereas oniv 21 cercent said that they would first report to the fire station to help with evacuation or fire fighting. One percent said that they would leave the evacuation zone, seven 4
percent said that they would do something else (generally in-volving an retivity which would delay their reporting to duty), and four percent said that they did not know what they would do. } For those firemen who said that they would first make sure that their family was safely out of the evacuation zone (68 percent), we asked the following question: How would you make sure that your family was safely out of the evacuation zone? go home and drive your family to a safe place j out of the evacuation zone call home and tell your family to leave without you i some other way l (Specify) Don't know Fif ty-one percent said that they would call home and tell j their family to leave without them; 32 percent said that they would drive their family to a safe place outside the evacuation zone; 12 percent said that they would seek to protect their family some other way (generally involving an activity such as i ! taking a boat to Connecticut which would delay their reporting to ! work); and five percent said that they did not know what they
*:sula do.
. These results are shown in Attachment 5 hereto.
I 1 I
t Combining the answers to these two quescions, we constructed , an index which suggests that 36 percent would look after the i 4 r safety of themselves and their family in a way which would pre-vent them from reporting quickly to duty, 53 percent would j attempt to report to work relatively quickly, and eight percent did not know what they would do.3_F
- This conclusion was supported by answers given to certain "agree / disagree" y$stions which were included in the survey.
For example, 92 percent of the firemen agreed that: "In the event of a nuclear emergency at Shoreham, it would be the obliga-tion of everyone to first look after the health and safety of their family." Only five percent disagreed with this and three ! percent had no opinion. Or the other hand, only 17 percent , agreed with the statement that: "In the event of a nuclear i l' 3_U In constructing this index, we defined those who would ! "report to work quickly" as those ' ho said they would first l report to the fire station (response 1 to question 18), or those ! who said they would first make sure that their family was safely : out of the svacuation zone by calling home and telling the family i to leave without them (response 2 to question 19, following
, response 2 to question 18). We defined those "who wou1.d not l report quickly for duty" as those who said they would leave the i evacuacion zone to make sure they were in a safe place (response i i
3 to question 18); those who said they would go home and drive ! i their families to a nafe place out of the evacuation zone ! (response 1 to question 19, following response to question 8), i those who said they would do something else first (response 4 to question 18), or those who would make sure their families were safe some other way response 3 to question 19, after response 2 l i to question 18). An examination of the specific responses given by firemen who responded to the "something else" option in , l questions 18 or 19, indicated that they would deal with the role l conflict in some way which would make it difficult for them to 7 report to work quickly. For example, several of them said they 9 j would try to evacuate by boat, j l t i i [ l l
4
- emergency at Shoreham, a volunteer fireman must place duty to the fire department over dut'y to family." Seventy-seven percent dis-agreed with this and six percent had no opinion.
Q. Please describe how the 19d8 survey of volunteer fire-men was conducted. i A. (Cole) In March 1988, the following volunteer fire departments, which serve areas of the Shoreham EPZ, provided us with up-to-date lists of their members: Ridge Volunteer Fire Department, Sound Beach Volunteer Fire Department, Rocky Point Fire Department, and Riverhead Fire Department.31/ 1 l
- The interviewing for this survey was conducted on the tele-l phone from my offices at the State University of New York at i Stony Brook by trained interviewers who had previously worked for Social Data Analysts, Inc. It was not possible to reach all of the 407 members of the four fire departments, although at least l
l l four call back attempts were made to reach each member. We were able, however, to complete interviews with a total of 266 l vo.1unteer firemen, or 65 percent of all the firemen in the four depa r tcent s . 3_2/ l l 3_1/ An additional attempt was made to obtain a list from the l Miller Place Volunteer Fire Department. The commissioners of this fire department decided that they did not want to l I participate in the survey but did send a letter saying that their fire department had voted not to participate in a Shoreham qv d24cuation.The
/ survey included 102 members of the Ridge Volunteer Fire Department, 54 members of the Sound Beach Volunteer Fire Depart-i (footnote continued) t l .a. ,--
The questionnaire utilized in tne 1988 survey was prepared by me and was reviewed by Profesnors Barton and Turner prior to finalization. A copy of the questionnaire is attached hereto as Attachment 6.33,/ Q. Please describe the results of the current survey of volunteer firemen. (footnote continued from previous page) ment, 79 members of the Rocky Point Fire Department, and 172 members of the Riverhead Fire Department. Of the 335 firemen we were able to contact on the telephone, 69, or 17 percent, refused to participate in the survey. We were unable to reach the remaining firemen with whom we did not l complete interviews (i.e., the 72 firemen other than the 335 we actually contacted), either because we were unable to get through on the telephone or the fireman was not at home and a convenient time for a call back interview could not be arranged. l Since the procedure used in this survey is not based upon l sampling, but represents an attempt to interview an entire l population, sampling statistics estimating the sampling error would not be appropriate. It is possible for this survey as in the previous survey of volunteer firemen that those firemen whom l we were not able to contact on the telephone may have somewhat different attitudes than those firemen whom we were able to contact. l 33_/ A telephone pretest was conducted with ten members of the ! Sound Beach volunteer fire department. The purpose of the pretest was to make sure that the questionnaire was intelligible and that it was possible to administer it easily. Since no significant changes were made on the basis of the pretest it was possible to include the ten pretest interviews with the others. (They have indeed been included with the other interviews with l volunteer firemen from Sound Beach.) l l
A. (Cole) Let me begin by describing the general struc-ture of this survey. After ascertaining whether the individual was indeed a member of the relevant fire department and deter-mining how long he or she had been a member, the following question was read: Assuming that the Shoreham nuclear power plant is licensed and begins to operate, we are interested in knowing what you would do if there was an accident at the plant. Suppose that you were at work on a weekday morning and there was an accident at the plant. Everyone living within ten miles of the plant was advised to evacuate as soon as possible. Volunteer firemen were asked to report to the fire house to help with the evacuation. What do you think you would do first? first, you would report to the fire station so that you could help with fire fighting and evacuation in the evacuation zone, or first, you would make sure that your family was safe, or first, you would leave the evacuation zone to l make sure that you were in a safe place, or first you would do something else (specify) Don't Know or Refuse When asked this question, 14 percent of the firemen said that they would first report to the fire station, 77 pe cent said that they would first make sure that their families were safe, two percent said that they would first leave the evacuation zone I l 1
l to assure their own safety, five percent said that they would do something else, and two percent said that they did not know what they would do. Based upon the answer the respondent gave to this first question, an additional series of questions was asked which were aimed at finding out the order in which the fireman would perform various activities and whether the fireman would report for duty-at the fire house in a timely manner. A total of 18 questions were utilized in order to make this determination. These are questions 6 through 23 on the attached questionnaire and are mostly open-ended, which allowed the respondent to tell us most accurately what he intended to do. Given the fact that each fireman respondent could have had a unique set of responses to these open-ended questions, it was decided to develop a code to categorize the questionnaires.34/ l 3_4_/ The code consisted of the following seven categories: Category 1: would report promptly for work at the fire house; Category 2: would check on family and report relatively promptly for work at the fire house; Category 3: would check on family and then report relatively promptly for work at the fire house unless spouse asked to be taken out of the evacuation zone; Category 4: would stay at home with family members and be unable to report relatively promptly or at all for duty; Category 5: would leave the evacuation zone with fami1.y members preventing them from reporting promptly or at all for duty. Given what we know of the general attitudes of EPZ residents from prior surveys, it is quite probable that many (footnote continued)
The coding procedure yielded the following results: 16.5 percent (44 people) said that they would first report to the fire house; 9.4 percent (25 people) said that they would check on their families and report without delay to the fire house; 4.5 percent (12 people) said that they would check on their (footnote continued from previous page) firemen would be in such a situation. However, since we did not want to assume that a spouse would be asked to be tak^n out of the evacuation zone, we considered that these people would report relatively promptly for work at the fire station as long as they answered question 23 (see attached questionnaire) that after they had checked on the safety of their family they would report, or l would try to report, for duty at the fire house; Category 6: would do something else which would make it difficult or impossible for the fireman to report promptly or at all; Category 7: does not know what he or she would do in a Shoreham emergency. The following rules were utilized in coding:
- 1. Firemen who said that they would report first to the fire house were coded Category 1; i 2. Firemen who said that they would leave the area to l assure their own safety were coded Category 6; l 3. Firemen who said that they would first check on the safety of their family members and then responded on question 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, or 20 that they would take their family l
l members out of the evacuation zone were coded as Category 5. It l was assumed that for a fireman to go from work to pick up family l members and then drive them out of the evacuation zone in the congested conditions which would exist in a General Emergency, it would take at least several hours; thus making it impossible, even if the fireman was so inclined, to report for duty in a timely fashion. Another assumption used here was that it would probably be difficult or impossible for a fireman to assure the safety of family members by telephone. This is because during an emergency at Shoreham the telephone system will be overloaded making it difficult to get a dial tone and difficult to get through to specific people. It was assumed that an emergency in which aR residents of the EPZ were advised to evacuate would last for at least several hours and that as long as LILCO was (footnote continued) 1 l
\
l families and unless their spouse anked them to leave the evacua- l l tion zone would report relatively promptly to the fire house; j nine percent (24 people) said that they would stay at home with their families; 50.8 percent (135 people) said that they would leave the evacuation zone with their families; three percent (8 people) would do something else which would make it difficult 1 or impossible to promptly report to the fire house; and l 6.8 percent (30 people) said that they did not know what they l l would do in a Shoreham emergency. If we combine Categories 4, 5 and 6 we may conclude that 64 oercent of the firemen would either j l l leave the evacuation zone or encace in other behavior makino it ; difficult or imoossible to reoort oromotiv for duty. If we l combine the first three categories, we may conclude that 30 percent of the firemen would report relatively quickly for duty. Seven percent of the firemen could not decide what they would do in a Shoreham emergency. (footnote continued from previous page) advising all residents of the EPZ to evacuate, firemen and their families would perceive that they were in some danger. Many of the firemen who said that they would go home and stay with their families told the interviewers that they would want to evacuate (as advised by LILCO), but that they thought that it would be impossible due to traffic congestion and that therefore the best course of action would be to remain at home. I 4. Firemen who said that they would first check up on i their families and then responded to question 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, l 16, 19, or 20 that they would stay at home with their families l were coded as Category 4; 1 l
- 5. Firemen who said that they would first check on their families and then in response to either question 13 or 17 said that they would leave the evacuation zone, were coded Category 3;
- 6. Firemen who replied "something else" or "don't know" were coded on a case by case basis.
1 1
To understand further how the respondent firemen would resolve role conflict in the event of a Shoreham accident, the survey also contained several questions on how dangerous the respondent believed it would be both for family members and the firemen to be in the EPZ. Seventy-nine percent of the firemen said that if an accident occurred at Shoreham which required the evacuation of everyone in the EPZ, it would be dangerous for a member of their family to remain in the evacuation zone for several hours. Of this group, 64 oercent said it would be "very dancerous." Ten percent did not know how dangerous it would be. These results confirm the large body of existing evidence that Long-Island residents have a high level of fear of radiation which could be released during an accident at Shoreham. The fact that the firemen themselves and their family members (we have no direct data on the beliefs of their family members but there is no reason to believe they are dissimilar to other residents of the EPZ) believe that a shoreham accident poses a high level of danger to them, places the firemen in a position of heavy role conflict. In short, the survey we have conducted provides evidence that a majority of firemen will resolve their role conflict by giving priority to their roles as family members and by looking first after the needs of their family. Some firemen would try to do what LILCO hopes all, or most, emergency workers will do -- perform their emergency roles. However, the conditions which are likely to exist in a St. eham emergency make it extremely diffi-cult, if not impossible to look after the needs of one's family and to report promptly for emergency duty. We concluded that less than one third of volunceer firemen can be counted on to help out during an emergency at the Shoreham plant.E/ E/ Q. Dr. Cole, in the 1982 survey of volunteer firemen you concluded that slightly more than half of the firemen would attempt to report for work relatively promptly. The current survey suggests that only about one third of the firemen can be l counted upon to report to the fire house relatively promptly. How can you explain the apparent change in results? A. (Cole) In my opinion there are two primary reasons for the change. First, the current questionnaire is a better questionnaire for assessing what firemen would do in a Shoreham emergency than the one employed in the 1982 research. In the 1982 survey we asked the firemen what they would do "first." If the respondent said that he or she would first make sure that "your family was safely out of the evacuation zone," we asked them how they would do this. We utilized a closed ended question. This question has two problems: first it assumes that the fireman would be able to get through on the telephone and actually talk with their family members, second it does not allow the fireman a chance to express in their own words what they would do. The current survey asked each fireman who said that he or she would first make sure that their family was safe (note that we did not say here "safely out of the evacuation zone" as we did in the first survey), how they would make sure that various members of their family were safe. We also asked the firemen what they would do if they could not reach their family members on the telephone. Whereas the first survey used two questions to assess what the fireman would do, the current survey used a series of seventeen primarily open ended questions to make the same assessment. It is probable that the first survey underestimated the proportion of firemen who would engage in behaviors making it difficult or impossible to report promptly to the fire station. The second likely reason for the change is the greater concern over Shoreham in the Long Island community. As we pointed out above, concern with and opposition to Shoreham has significantly increased between 1982 and the time the current (footnote continued)
Q. Please explain why the results of the firemen surveya are relevant to the issue of how school bus drivers would respond during Shoreham emergency. A. In ALAB-832, the Appeal Board recognized the relevance of the fireman surveys conducted by Professor Cole, stating: Stated in its simplest form, if a trained professional emergency worker such as a fireman would put family obligations ahead of the discharge of any Shoreham emergency duties that might be assigned to him or her, it is a fair inference that an individual not in such a line of endeavor would encounter at least as great role conflict. It is thus unsurprising that, in the consideration of emergency planning in Zimmer, we found that surveys of volunteer life squadsmen and firemen concerning the role conflict they would encounter raised "a serious question as to whether bus drivers could be depended upon to carry out their responsibilities" in the event of an accident at that plant. We further determined there that those surveys precluded, on the evidence of record, a finding that the school bus drivers would respond promptly. . i l ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135, 153-154 (1986). 1 l (footnote continued from previous page) survey was conducted in March of 1988. This change has resulted from extended public debates about the Shoreham plant (Shoreham I has been a major issue in most Long Island elections over the last several years), the continued opposition to the opening of Shoreham by Suffolk County, New York State, and other local governments, and probably most importantly, the accident at l Chernobyl in the Soviet Union. It must be remembered that role conflict is created because emergency workers believe that a serious accident at Shoreham endangers the health and even perhaps the lives of themselves and their family members. The more emergency workers and their families who believe that an accident at Shoreham would expose them to life threatening and health threatening risks, the more the workers will experience role conflict.
. Volunteer firemen are trained and experienced emergency workers who have volunteered to deal with life threatening emergencies (fires). They have also received substantial training in how to deal with fires. Nevertheless, 60 percent of the volunteer firemen responding to the most recent survey con-ducted by Professor Cole have indicated that they would not report for duty in a timely manner.
School bus drivers do not have the experience, training, or commitment of firemen in dealing with life-threatening i ! emergencies. Thus, it is likely that, consistent with the results of the 1982 school bus driver survey, substantially more than 60 percent of the school bus drivers would look first to the needs of their family and that only a small fraction could be counted upon to report on time to drive school buses as con-templated under the LILCO Plan. Q. Are the survey data obtained by Professor Cole useful in predicting the actual behavior of school bus drivers in an emergency at Shoreham? A. In general, surveys provide useful information on how people will behave in an emergency. The actual behavior of any particular individual in an actual emergency would, of course, be influenced by the specific conditions existing at the time of the
e emergency and his or her perceptions of those conditions. For this reason, we use these surveys not to predict what particular i i school bus drivers will do or the exact proportion of drivers who l will resolve role conflict by looking after the needs of their families, but rather to estimate the approximate extent to which role conflict will present a problem in implementing the LILCO Plan.M/ l 0 LILCO has also conducted a survey which purports to investigate how bus drivers have responded in past disasters. Can you comment on the validity of that survey? ! M/ (Cole) In addition, in evaluating the extent to which the l school bus driver survey we conducted accurately predicts the behavior of school bus drivers in a real emergency, we must consider that, although anonymous, the 1982 school bus driver questionnaires were filled out in a work setting at which the bus drivers' supervisors were present. Interviews with some bus drivers after completion of the questionnaire indicated that they were apprehensive about saying that they would not report to drive the bus. Several expressed fear that if it became known that they would not report to work during an emergency, they would lose their jobs. (All) Given this setting, which emphasized the importance of work and the fear that some drivers may have felt about saying that they would not report for work during a radiological emer-gency, it is possible that the results obtained from this survey underestimate the proportion of bus drivers who would look after i the needs of their family rather than report to drivs a school bus during a radiological emergency. At any rate, we feel confi-dent that the survey did not overestimate the potential for role conflict. Moreover, as noted, we believe these 1982 data are still valid, as evidenced by the more recent surveys and by the bus driver statements mentioned above. l I
- A. (Cole) Yes, although LILCO only provided the final comi-pleted questionnaires of its survey to us a few day before
- n .t c . .
testimony was due. Based on my preliminary review of the com-pleted survey instruments, and a report pr epared by LIL90's wit.- ness, Mr. Kelly, I believe that this research is completely irrelevant for understanding how Shoreham school bus driverc wiP. behave in a radiological emergency. This is because in none of the 16 emergencies studied by LILCO did a significant number of bus drivers face any type of l l role conflict. First, in almost all of the emergencies analyzed by LILCO, the families of the bus drivers utilized were not located within the area of danger.E/ Accordingly, the question-naires reveal that in most of the cases, the bus drivers did not perceive that their families were in any danger. Likewise, in some of the emergencies the danger had passed prior to tne time when the bus drivers were asked to participate and there was no danger at all to their family members._3_8/ j These facts demonstrate a basic misunderstanding of role conflict on the part of LILCO. The question is not simply whether bus drivers will drive buses, but whether they will do so E/ Indeed, in some of the questionnaires, the respondents suggested that bus drivers were not called to duty whose families l were in the impact zone. 38/ In addition, in many of the emergencies studied, the disaster agent (e.g., flood or hurricane) was familiar to the bus drivers, visible, and unlikely to create the kind of anxiety that ! would be created by invisible radiation. l i :
, when they perceive that their families or other dependents are threatened by the disaster agent. It would not be surprising if LILCO draws the conclusion from its survey that some bus drivers drove buses in past emergencies. It would be very surprising, however, if LILCO's witnesses concluded that the survey sheds any light on the issue at hand --
role conflict in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham.3_9/ 3U It is possible to show for each of the 16 emergencies why the information collected has little or no relevance to determin-ing how Shoreham school bus drivers will behave in a radiological emergency. For the sake of brevity, we will analyze only one. The questionnaire on the top of the pile sent to us by.LILCO concerned the Springfield, Massachusetts gas leak. First, it is important to note that the area that had to be evacuated was identified by the respondent as being "over one-half mile." Presumably, this means less than one square mile. Given the relatively small area of evacuation, it is probable that few, if any, of the 33 bus drivers had family members within the evacuation zone. Indeed, in Question 37, the respondent said that he did not know if any bus drivers had families in the area at risk during the emergency. Thus, there is no evidence that I any of the bus drivers experienced role conflict. A question on how many drivers volunteered drive the buses also to is completely irrelevant because it does not tell us if any of these people had family members in the evacuation zone or if they perceived that they, themselves, would be in danger by participa-ting in the evacuation. According to Question 33, the bus l drivers did not think that they were in danger during the time I when they were driving buses in the evacuation zone. This is l totally the opposite of the situation which Shoreham school bus drivers would experience. If the bus drivers did not think that L they would be in danger by driving into the evacuation zone, they L certainly would not have perceived their family members, who were outside of the evacuation zone, as being in danger. ( It is particularly interesting to note the response to Quection 35 in which we are told that the bus drivers did not go into the "hot spot" which was "cordoned" off. Thus, the drivers themselves were never exposed to any hazard. And we are told that school children who were at risk in the "hot soot" were told I to walk about one-cuarter of a mile throuch the hazardous zone to the busses. which were outside of the hazardous zone. This is a l situation which is unlike that contemplated by LILCO and which ! (footnote continued) l l
. Q. Does this conclude your testimony?
A. Yes. l l l i I (footnote continued from previous page) would be totally intolerable at Shoreham. It raises the question of: Why weren't the bus drivers asked to drive directly to the school to pick up the children, thus substantially shortening their exposure to the hazard? I
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PRIVILEGED - PREPARED AT THE DIRECTION OF COUNSEL IN ANTICIPATION OF LITIGATION. ENGINEERING STATEMENT REGARDING FIELD STRENGTH MEASUREMENTS OF RADIO STATIO!S l l l WICC (AM) BRIDGEPORT, CONNECTICUT ! WELI (AM) NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT l WGLI (AM) BABYLON, NEW YORK l WLIM (AM) PATCHOGUE, NEW YORK l WRHD (AM) E'VERHEAD, NEW YORK WRIV (AM) - LIVERHfAD, NEW YORK WLNG (AM) SAG HARBOR, NEW YORK I April, 1988 l i l
, i ENGINEERING REPORT MOFFET, LARSON & JOHNSON, INC.
Caca Lttscuro past CONSULTING TEL ECOMML'NICATION5 ENGl%EE RS F ALLS CMurcw va 2aosi AFFIDAVIT COUNTY OF FAIRFAX )
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COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA) CHARLES G. PERRY, III, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says: That he has Bachelor's degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of Tennessee and that he is a registered professional engineer in the Commonwealth of Virginia; That he. is corporate treasurer of Moffet, Larson & Johnsen, Inc., consulting telecommunications engineers; That this firm has been retained by Suffolk County, New York to prepare this engineering statement; That he has either prepared or directly supervised tile preparation of all technical information contained herein, and that the facts stated in this en8 1neering statement are true to the best of his knowledge, except as to such statements 'as are herein stated to be on information and pgg belief, and as to such statements he believes them to be true. l \
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f (( CMRLES C. PERRY, fli DarTes*G. ' Perry, Ill No. 15347 I l Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of April, 1988. . DN^t,Ejed .c
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5203 Lttssuno Pmt CON 5L LTING TELTCOMML'NIC ATIONS E NGINEE RS F ALLS CMwacM va 22045 ENGINEERING STATEMENT REGARDING FIELD STRENGTH MEASUREMENTS OF RADIO STATIONS WICC (AM) BRIDGEPORT, CONNECTICUT WELI (AM) NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT WGLI (AM) BABYLON, NEW YORK WLIM (AM) PATCHOGUE, NEW YORK WRHD (AM) RIVERHEAD, NEW YORK WRIV (AM) RIVERHEAD, NEW YORK . WLNG (AM) SAG HARBOR, NEW YORK INTRODUCTION This engineering report has been prepared on behalf of Suffolk County, New York, to provide the results of field tests conducted within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone ("EPZ") around the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station on Long Island, New York. The purpose of the field tests was to verify the signal level of the AM radio stations participating in I an Emergency Broadcast System ("EBS") network proposed by the Long Island
- Lighting Company ("LILC0"), as owner of the Shoreham plant, in the event t of a radiological energency at Shoreham. Th'e stations surveyed were the following
[ WICC Bridgeport, Connecticut 600 kHz 1.0/0.5 kW DA-2-U WELI New Haven, Connecticut 960 kHz 5.0 kW DA-N-U WGLI Babylon, New York 1290 kHz 5.0/1.0 kW DA--U WLIM Patchogue, New York 1580 kHz 10.0 kW ND-D WRHD Riverhead, New York 1570 kHz 1.0 kW DA-D WRIV Riverhead. New York 1390 kHz 1.0 kW ND-D WLNG Sag Harbor, New York 1600 kHz 0.5 kW h>D l
ENGINEERING REPORT MOFFET. LARSON & JOHNSON. INC. 5203 Le ttsuno *.a t CON 5t LTING TE LECO%t 4tL%1(41 TON 5 f %Gl%EE R$ ra6LS cwunca va 2204i r i The measurements were made by Charles G. Perry, III and Jeffrey M. Bixby of Moffet, Larson & Johnson, Inc. during the week of March 14, 1988. Analysis of all the daytime field strength measurement data indicates that none of the stations surveyed provides any meaningful or reliable nighttime service within the EPZ, even if operated at their licensed daytime power levels. Indeed, in some cases the radio stations l q relied upon .by LILCO fail to provide even meaningful or reliable daytime coverage to the EPZ.1 DISCUSSION l This report provides the results of field strength measurement tests conducted on the AM stations participating in LILCO's proposed EBS network for the Shoreham EPZ, and sets forth the conclusions that can be drawn based upon these test results regarding coverage of such stations with respect to the Shoreham EPZ. The points were initially l selected by use of a 2 mile x 2 mile grid in the manner provided in I ; 1 Due to the limited time made available for Hoffet, Larson & Johnson to conduct field strength measurement tests of the radio stations participating in LILCO's proposed EBS, it was decided to focus upon the AM stations relied upon by LILC0; in particular, the extent to which these stations could be said to provide meaningful or reliable service to the Shoreham EPZ, especially at night. Measurements were also taken of WPLR(FM) at selected points. However, the data gathered concerning WPLR(FM) was insufficient to permit any conclusions regarding its coverage of the EPZ. M M
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. i MOFFET. LARSON & JOHNSON INC.
j .nos us..v.o.me cossetTno it t r eou u r sicanos s i son t r as ,.u c-v.c- v. a non l Section 73.314(c) of the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") I
! Rules. In addition, radials were established through the EPZ with I
! respect to WICC, WELI and WLIM. All measurements were taken during I
} daytime hours (specifically within the period from two hours after local If
! sunrise to two hours before local sunset). This is in accordance with 0 generally accepted or standard procedures, and serves to minimize the p
n effects of skywave interference on the measurements. The measurements D
!! vere made with a Potomac Instruments field intensity meter, type FIM-71 il .
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designed specifically for the purpose of such measurements. The meter, serial number 189, had a current calibration certiP_cate at the time the i data were taken. As a double check, imnediately following the 1 ' measurements, the instrument was returned to the manufacturer for an i 9 "incoming" calibration of three frequencies (600, 1290, 1600) over the
.I range of the stations measured. The instrument was found to be well d
within the manufacturer's specification. As noted above, the measurements were taken during daytime hours in 4 (' accordance with FCC accepted practices and with generally accepted l$ procedures. Although some of the measured stations do not operate at i night, and others reduce their broadcast signal strength at night, the i.
; stations were presumed to be operating with their normal daytime facilities, since it is our understanding that LILCO has indicated that i.
O in the event of an emergency at Shorcham, these stations could operate
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with their daytime facilities, in order to maximize coverage of the EPZ. Figures 1 through 7 are, for each station, reproductions of a map of the Long Island area showing the approximate boundaries of the EPZ, the theoretical nighttime coverage with respect to the EPZ (assuming the station was operating with daytime facilities), the station location _ (where possible), and the results of measurements taken in the area. b*hile a complete discussion of the factr,rs which determine the coverage of a radio station is beyond the scope of this report, a brief description of some of these factors follows. l RADIO STATION COVERAGE IN GENERAL In very general terms, the coverage of any AM station is determined by three major factors: (1) the strength of the signal leaving the transmitter plant; (2) the propagation losses along the paths to prospective listeners; and (3) for each receiving location, the ability to override interference which tight be present and the signal level I needed to override it.
- 1. Strength of Signal The strength of the signal leaving a transmitter is a functien of the station's power, the efficiency of its antenna system, and, in the case
! of "directional" stations, the antenna's radiation pattern. Directional j antenna system patterns are designed to comply with FCC rules regarding 1 ( interference to other stations and coverage of the community of license. I l l t
ENGINEERING REPORT e MOFFET. LARSON & JOHNSON. INC. I sees 6res.v.o -r cossettisc titreouut sicatioss isciserns ,466. c v.c v. ,,o., l In nearly all cases, a directiona3 station's coverage will be greater in certain directions than in others. Typical of this is radio station WRHD in Riverhead, New York. WRHD is located on the. southeast side of Riverhead near the Peconic River and operates with 1000 watts of power. The station's radiation pattern is such that its equivalent power toward the southeast (125') is 2400 watts, while toward the west (265*)--the direction of the EPZ--it operates with the equivalent of only approximately 80 watts.
- 2. Prepagation Losses Losses along the path to potentia 3 listrners are affected primarily by distance,- frequency, and the ability of the earth to "conduct" the signal, a factor called "conductivity." Under conditions of "perfect" conductivity, signal strength varies inversely with distance, that is, each time the distance is doubled, the signal strength (measured in terms of voltage) is reduced by half. However, conditions approaching "perfect" conductivity are generally seen only over sea water paths, and even there only for distances less than about 100 miles. Sea water has an estimated conductivity of 5000 mS/m, while the land areas of Long Island have an FCC estimated conductivity of 0.5 mS/m. The effect of this is to rapidly attenuate the signal over such land areas. If one considers a radio station operating with a power of approximately 250 watts on a frequency of 1000 kHz, a listener located 10 miles away O
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. MOFFET. LARSON & JOHNSON. INC.
sacs Latssues ..it CON 5t'Lil%G 1E L ECOMMt'%IC ATION5 f %GINEE R5 raLLs cavaca va a:04+ might receive a signal g*rength of 10 mV/m if the intervening path were sea water, and only 0.55 mV/m if the path were over a land mass like Long Island, a ratio of 18:1. As a result, while radio stations WICC and WELI (both located in Connecticut) can be heard on the north shore of Long Island, their received signal levels diminish rapidly as one moves away from the north shore. It should be noted that estimated conductivity is taken from an FCC map called Figure M-3, which shows estimated conductivities for the United States. It is our erperience that these values generally overstate the conductivity, that is, the actual value is generally somewhat lower than showr. There are also variations in conductivity which tend to reduce coverage in warmer weather. l Finally, losses along the propagation path are less for the lower AM frequencies than for the higher ones. For this reason, a 250 watt radio ! station operating on 550 kHz in an area like Long Island (conductivity 0.5 mS/c) might have a signal strength of 1.4 mV/m at a distance of 10 miles, while one operating at 1600 kHz under otherwise similar conditions might only have 0.31 mV/m, a ratio of 4.5:1.
- 3. Interference The third factor in the ability of a radio station to serve an area l
is the interference it must overcome at any prospective listener's location. Sources of such interference include man-made noise (power
-- ~ .. - n ,
ENGINEERING REPORT
.. MOFFET. LARSON & JOHNSON. INC.
s203 Lessesec pist CON $L'LTING TEL ECOMut'NIC ATIONS t %GINEE R$ rALLs cmusca va aros' lines, electric applicnces, automotive ignition systems), atmospheric noise (static), and interfering signals from other radio stations. During the day, man-made noise and, in some cases, signals from nearby radio stations are the primary interference sources. Pursuant to 47 CFR 73.182(e), under daytime conditions, a signal level of 0.5 mV/m is generally sufficient to provide service. However, in more densely populated areas it may require considerably more signal to overco=e man-made noise. Again, as a guideline, the FCC assumes that a signal of 2 mV/m or greater is required to serve a community with a population of l 2,500 or more. l At night, however, signals from radio stations at great distances often create very high levels of interference. To account for these levels, the term "night interference-free limit" or "night limit" is l generally used to refer to the received signal strength required to I . l overcome all the distant interfering signals and provide a "listenable" l signal. This night limit is generally much higher than the levels required for daytime service. For example, radio station WRHD in I
- Riverhead has a night limit of 50 mV/m, meaning that its useful coverage l
is limited to areas which receive 50 mV/m or more from the station. By contrast, during the day, the station provides service consistent with the FCC Rules to those receiving 0.5 mV/m. i l l - l
ENGINEERING REPORT .. hiOFFET. LARSON & JOHNSON INC. 5203 LEttevnG peat CON %t'LTING TELECOM ML'NIC AT10%5 E ngl %f t R5 ra6Ls cwunch va 2:04: RADIO STATIONS WICC AND WELI WICC is located in Bridgeport, Connecticut. It operates with a daytime power of 1000 watts on 600 kHz and uses a directional antenna both day and night. WICC's night limit, calculated in accordance with FCC procedures, is 4.6 mV/m. WELI is located in New Haven, Connecticut. It operates with a power of 5000 watts day and night on 960 kHz. WELI uses a non-directional antenna for its daytime operation and a directional antenna at night. WELI's night limit, calculated as above, is 3.7 mV/m. The results of daytime measurements and projections of the niF ht limit contour of WICC are shown on Figure 1 of this report, and those of WELI on Figure 2. As a result of the sea water path over the Long Island Sound, the stations can be heard on the north shore of the EP2, but "fade" rapidly going inland. Thus, the signal from VICC's daytime operation exceeded the night limit at three points, all along the north shore of the island. The signal from WELI exceeded its night limit at only two points, also along the north shore. 2 Taking into account WELI's increased radiation toward the EPZ from its nighttime operation, however, we would expect that point 11 would also receive service. Thus, of 33 points measured, 3 might exceed the night limit for WELI.
[ ENGINEERING REPORT
. l MOFFET. LARSON & JOHNSON INC.
.e. rosstuisc trt scouvesic=Tioss scistins r.66. c o.c- v. ano .
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! RADIO STATIONS WRHD AND WRIV i
l i These stations are located in Riverhead, New York, at the extreme eastern edge,of the EPZ. WRIV operates on 1390 kHz daytime with I 1000 watts, and a non-directional antenna. WRHD operates on 1570 kHz, i with 1000 watts daytime, and a directional antenna. The WRHD night limit i is 50 mV/m, while the WRIV limit is 35 mV/m. WRHD's coverage of the EPZ is further hampered by its directional nattern, which concentrates its energy toward the southeast (away from the EPZ), and by its high frequency. Figures 4 and 5 show the results of the measurements taken on these two stations and projections of the night limit contour. Based upon-these measurements, we do not believe WRHD covers the EPZ at all, and believe that WRIV provides only extremely limited coverage. t RADIO STATION WLNG l WLNG is located in Sag Harbor, New York, and operates on 1600 kHz, with 500 watus daytime, and a non-directional antenna. The WLNG night limit is 15.2 mV/m. Figure 7 depicts the measurements taken on k1NG and
, projections of the night limit contour. .
As can be seen from Figure 7, at no point did the k1NG signal even approach the levels reqetred for nighttime service. In fact, it was only at point 43 that the signal level reached 0.5 mV/m (the level required for daytime service), and even at that point, there was interference. It therefore can be concluded that WLNG fails to provide meaningful or reliable coverage of the EPZ either day or night.
ENGINEERING REPORT j MOFFET. LARSON & JOHNSON. INC.
..o . s e r . . u.o ... cosst tmc titicouunic4Tross eso.str as ,.66.c o.e- v. ,,o.-
i i RADIO STATION WGLI l Radio station WGLI is located in Babylon, New York, and operates on i i 1290 kHz, with 3000 watts and a directional antenna during daytime hours. The station's night limit is 8.3 mV/m. Figure 3 shows the results of the WGLI measurements with respect to the station's night limit. In fact, none of the measurements taken on i
! WGLI even approached the 0.5 mV/m level required to provide daytime i
! service. Based upon these measurements, we do not believe that Wrf.I provides meaningful or reliable day or night service to the EPZ.
RADIO STATION WLIM-Radio station WLIM, Patchogne operates on 1580 kHz with 10,000 watts daytime, using a non-directional antenna. The statior has a night limit of 12.1 mV/m. For the purpose of this report, we have calculated the l night limit based on the station's non-directional operation, since its coverage of the EPZ is most favorable to the LILCO when viewed in that I light. At points 9 and 10, the measured signal from WLIM exceeded the night limit; however, only point 9 is within the EPZ. At all other points, the I signal was below the station's night limit. WLIM's coverage of the EPZ l is hampered by a number of factors, primarily its high frequency. l However, toward the eastern portion of the zone, it also experiences adjacent channel interference from WRHD in Riverhead. 1
*f ENGINEERING REPORT i
MOFFET. LARSON & JOHNSON. INC. saos tetsoveo .at CON 5t'LTING Tit troq ui %BC ATIO%5 t %Gl%E E RS raLLs cuvecw va asoas i i While WLIM provides daytime service to significant portions of the I i EPZ, this firm concludes that it does not provide meaningful or reliable i service to the EFZ at night. CONCLUSIM i l Figure 8 of this report is a composite map showing the areas of the 1
! EPZ which receive even limited predicted nighttime service from one or i
l more of the AM stations participating in LILCO'a proposed EBS network. . I' The shaded area of the EPZ represents the area which does not rece'.ve meaningful or reliable nighttime service from any of the AM stations. As l! can be seen from Figurc 8, and the attached tables which reflect measurement point data, stations WICC and WELI, and, to a limitad extent, WLIM and WRIV, provide minimal nighttime coverage of the E.PZ. The other three stations--WRHD, WLNG and WGLI--f ail to provide any meaningful cr q reliable nighttime service within the EPZ. I 1 I I l
't i
l l l I i l t I i
ENEINEERING REPORT
, MOFFET. LARSON '& JOHNSON. INC.
^
. s303 ka t SpueG min t CON 5t'LTING Tit FCOu ut Nir 41;w g t%Gl%I[R5 . palls CMuncM va Saca' '
s TABLE 1 - COMPARISON OF MEASWLED FIELD INTENSITY TO NIGHT LIsII FOR WJCC (600 kHz) Night Night Point Limit Measured Field Ratio of Measured Field Limit Number (mV/m) Intensity (mV/m) Intensity to Night Limit Het 2 4.6- 3.65 0.79 No 3 4.6 10.00 2.17 Yes 4 4.6 2.05 0.45 No l 5 4.6 0.95 0.21 No 6 4.6 2.81 0.61 No 8 4.6 2.45 0.53 No 9 4.6 1.38 0.30 No 10 4.6 1.85 0.40 No 11 4.6 5.20 1.13 Yes 4.6 1.25
. 12 0.27 No l 13 4.6 1.25 0.27 .No 14 4.6 1.16 0.25 No -
15 4.6 7.50 1.63
- Yes 16 4.6 2.20 0.48 No 17 4.6 2.10 0.46 No 19 4.6 1.85 0.40 No 20 4.6 1.50 0.33 No 21 4.6 1.78 0.39 w
.i 22 4.6 1.31 0.28 No 23 4.6 0.50 0.11 No 24 4.6 1.20 0.26 No 26 4.6 3.00 0.65 No 27 4.6 1.79 0.39 No 28 4.6 2.00 0.43 No 29 4.6 1.05 0.23 No 30 4.6 2.00 0.43 No l 31 4.6 1.60 0.35 No 32 4.6 1.40 0.30 No 32 4.6 2.00 0.43 No 33 4.6 1.60 0.35 No 34 4.6 1.40 0.30 No 35 4.6 1.00 0.22 No 36 4.6 1.00 0.22 No 38 4.6 2.70 0.59 No 40 4.6 1.40 0.30 No 43 4.6 1.75 0.38 No 44 4.6 1.55 0.34 No 4
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, MOFFET. LARSON & JOHNSON INC.
,,,, 6 . ..s.o . . e rosst ttisc tettrouwt sic atioss escistr as rau. cavace va a sce TABLE 2 - COMPARISON OF MEASURED FIELD Ih"IENSITY TO NIGHT LIMIT FOR WELI (960 kHz) ,
Night Night Point Limit Measured Field Ratio of Measured Field- Limit Number (mV/m) Intensity (mV/m) Intensity to Night Limit Met 2 3.7 1.05 0.28 No 3 3.7 4.50 1.22 Yes 4 3.7 0.88 0.24 No 5 3.7 0.35 0.10 No 6 3.7 1.00 0.27 No 8 3.7 0.52 0.14 No 9 3.7 0.55 0.15 No 10 3.7 0.60 0.16 No 11 3.7 2.33 0.63 No 12 3.7 0.60 0.16' No 13 3.7 0.60 0.16 No 14 3.7 0.78 0.21 No 15 3.7 4.20 1.14 Yes 16 3.7 1.09 0.29 No 17 3.7 1.30 0.35 No 19 3.7 1.30 0.35 Nc 20 3.7 1.00 0.27 No 21 3.7 0.67 0.18 No 22 3.7 0.72 0.19 No 23 3.7 0.56 0.15 No 24 3.7 0.96 0.26 No 26 3.7 1.68 0.45 No 27 3.7 1.05 0.28 No 28 3.7 1.30 0.35 No 29 3.7 0.80 0.22 No 32 3.7 1.15 0.31 No 33 3.7 1.00 0.27 No ( 34 3.7 0.72 0.19 No r 35 3.7 0.55 0.15 No 36 3.7 0.70 0.19 No 40 3.7 1.25 0.34 No 43 3.7 1.30 0.35 No 44 3.7 1.00 0.27 No l l l l
ENGINEERIN3 REPORT , MOFFET. LARSON & JOHNSON. INC. 9303 Le t tsons e.a t CON 5L'LTING T E LE COM W L'NIC 4710%51 %Gl%E E R5 F ALLS Cwwer= va 2 304 ' t, TABLE 3 - COMPARISON OF MEASURED FIELD Ih7ENSITY TO NIGHT LIMIT FOR WGLI (1290 kHz) l Night Night Point Limit Measured Field Ratio of Measured Field Limit Number ( _mV/m) Intensity (mV/m) Intensity to Night Limit Met
~
1 8.3 0.1 0.00 No 4 8.3 0.12 0.01 No 9 8.3 0.13 0.02 No 16 8.3 inaud 0.00 No 17 8.3 0.1 0.00 No 19 8.. inaud 0.00 No 20 8.3 0.1 0.00 No i 21 8.3 0.1 0.00 No
! 28 8.3 inaud 0.00 No I
32 8.3 inaud 0.00 No 38 8.3 inaud 0.00 No 40 8.3 inaud 0.00 No 43 8.3 inaud 0.00 No i 5 9
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; MOFFET. LARSON & JOHNSON INC.
s ac , te r nes=o ... cost tTno ittreouut sicatioss isontrat raa c one .. aae.- { TABLE 4 - COMPARISON OF MEASURED FIELD INTENSITY i TO NIGHT LIMIT FOR WRIV (1390 kHz) I Night Night Point Limit Heasured Field Ratio of Measured Field Limit
, N_umbe r (mV/c) Intensity (mV/c) Intensity to Night Limit Het lj 10 35 0.25 0.01 No 15 35 0.43 0.01 No dll 16 35 0.21 0.01 No
,i 17 35 0.43 0.01 No
,! 19 35 0.35 0.01 No ll 20 35 0.36 0.01 No lI 21 35 0.25 0.01 No
! 25 35 0.60 0.02 No
!l! 28 35 1.38 0.04 No
!"' 30 35 0.85 0.02 No i 31 35 1.10 0.03 No h 32 35 1.80 0.05 No 37 35 4.00 0.11 No 38 35 7.20 0.21 No 39 35 13.00 0.37 No l 40 35 10.00 0.29 No j 41 35 49.50 1.41 Yes
;j 43 35 35.00 1.00 Yes I 45 35 110.00 3.14 Yes
,! 46 35 190.00 5.43 Yes li I
n I l 1 l j! I I t li 1 i I I I i
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. MOFFET. LARSON & JOHNSON. INC.
j .a o s 6 ..s.e. - . a cosst ttiso taticoquesic atioss tsoista ns ea66. e ,s.c- va ano., I i i TABLE 5 - COMPARISON OF MEASURED FIELD INTENSITY TO NIGHT LIMIT FOR WRHD (1570 kHz) Night Night Point ' Limit Measured Field Ratio of Measured Field Limit Number (mV/m) Intensity (mV/m) Intensity to Night Limit Met 15 50.8 0.10 0.00 No 16 50.8 inaud 0.00 No 17 50.8 - 0.10 0.00 No 19 50.8 inaud 0.00 No l 20 50.8 inaud 0.00 No 21 50.8 0.10 0.00 No 25 50.8 0.17 0.00 No 28 50.8 0.22 0.00 No 30 50.8 0.20 0.00 No 31 50.8 0.27 0.01 No
'32 50.8 0.26 0.01 No 37 50.8 0.80 0.02 No 38 50.8 1.00 0.02 No 39 50.8 3.20 0.06 No 40 50.8 1.60 0.03 No 41 50.8 10.00 0.20 No 43 50.8 7.50 0.15 No
- 45 50.8 23.00 0.45 No 46 50.8 40.00 0.79 No b
', ENGINEERING REPORT . MOFFET, LARSON & JOHNSON INC.
saos Letsewoo
- at CONSUL TING Tilf COMML'NIC4740%51%Gl%tf R5 raLLs cawaca sa asoat TABLE 6 - COMPARISON OF MEASURED FIELD INTENSITY TO NIGHT LIMIT FdR WLIM (1580 kHz)
Night Night Point Limit Measured Field Ratio of Mensured Field Limit Number (mV/m) Intensity (mV/m) Intensity to Night Limit Het 2 12.1 4.70 0.39 No 3 12.1 1.05 0.09 No 4 12.1 7.00 0.58 No 5 12.1 10.50 0.87 No 6 12.1 1.71 0.14 No 7 12.1 2.20 0.18 No 8 12.1 4.35 0.36 No 9 12.1 13.00 1.07 Yes 10 12.1 48.00 3.97 Yes 11 12.1 1.10 0.09 No 12 12.1 5.30 0.44 No 13 12.1 5.30 0.44 No 14 12.1 8.50 0.70 No 15 12.1 0.90 0.07 No 16 12.1 0.45 0 04 No
. 17 12.1 1.00 0.08 No 18 12.1 1.70 0.14 No 19 12.1 1.80 0.11 No 20 12.1 1.60 0.13 No 21 12.1 1.58 0.13 No 22 12.1 5.40 0.45 No 23 12.1 0.62 0.51 No 24 12.1 1.22 0.10 No 25 12.1 0.45 0.04 No 26 12.1 2.20 0.02 No 27 12.1 0.56 0.05 No 28 12.1 1.00 0.08 No 29 12.1 0.80 0.07 Ne i
30 12.1 0.30 d.02 too 32 12.1 1.00 0.08 No 33 12.1 1.00 0.08 No 34 12.1 0.65 0.05 No 35 12.1 0.80 0.07 No 36 12.1 1.50 0.12 No 38 12.1 0.30 0.02 No 40 12.1 0.37 0.03 No 43 12.1 0.30 0.02 No I
EN21NEERING REPORT MOFFET. LARSON & JOHNSON. INC. S 2 03 LE E SSWm3 p.a g CON 5t*LTi%G T ELECottL9L'%IC ATIONS ENGINE! R5 eacLS ca.unca va atosi l TABLE 7 - COMPARISON OF MEASURED FIELD IhTENSITY TO NIGHT LIMIT FOR WLNG (1600 kHz) Night Night Point Limit Measured Field Ratio of ' Measured Field Limit Number (mV/m) Intensity (mV/m) Intensity to Night Limit Mt . _ _ _ 15 15.2 0.15 0.01 No 16 15.2 0.10 0.00 No 17 15.2 0.10 0.00 No 19 15.2 inaud 0.00 No 20 15.2 0.10 0.00 No 21 15.2 0.10 0.00 No 25 15.2 0.17 0.01 No 28 15.2 0.10 0.00 No 30 15.2 0.11 0.01 No 31 15.2 0.11 0.01 No 32 15.2 0.13 0.01 No 37 15.2 0.10 0.01 No 38 15.2 0.25 0.02 No 39 15.2 0.17 0.01 No 40 15.2 0.30 0.02 No 41 15.2 0.34 0.02 No 43 15.2 0.50 0.03 No 45 15.2 0.45 0.03 No l i e
ENSINEERING REPORT
.. MOFFET. LARSON & JOHNSON INC.
saos Lassesso e.at CONSULTi%O TE LECOMMl'NIC ATION$ t%CINf f RS F ALLS cmunca va saca-TABLE 8 - COMPARISON OF MEASURED FIELD IhTENSITY TO NIGHT LIMIT FOR ALL AM STATIONS (AM) (AM) (AM) (AM) (AM) (AM) (AM) WICC WELI WGLI WRIV WRHD WLIM WLNG 600 960 1290 1390 1570 1580 1600 (Night ' Point Limit)
. Number 4.60 3.70 8.30 35.00 50.80 12.10 15.20 1 0.1 2 3.65 1.05 4.70 3 10.0+ 4.50+ 1.05 a 2.05 0.88 0.12 7.00 5 0.95 0.35 10.50 6 2.81 1.00 1.71
- 7. 2.20 8 2.45 0.52 4.35 9 1.38 0.55 0.13 13.00+
10 1.85 0.60 0.25* 48.00+ 11 5.20+ 2.33 1.10 12 1.25 0.60 5.30 13 1.25 0.60 5.30 14 1.16 0.78 8.50 15 7.50+ 4.20+ 0.43* 0.10 0.90 0.15* 16 2.20 1.09 inaud 0. .^ 1 inaud 0.45 0.1 17 2.10 1.30 0.1 0.43 0.1 1.00 0.1 18 1.70 19 1.85 1.30 inaud 0.35* inaud 1.80 inaud 20 1.50 1.00 0.1 0.36 inaud 1.60 0.1 21 1.78 0.67 0.1 0.25 0.1 1.58 0.1 22 1.31 0.72 5.40 23 0.50 0.56 0.62
- 24 1.20 0.96
' 1.22 25 0.60* 0.17 0.45 0.17 26 3.00 1.68 2.20 27 1.79 1.05 0.56 28 2.00 1.30 inaud ' . 38 0.22* 1.00 0.1* 29 1.05 0.80 0.80 30 0.85 0.20 0.30 0.11* 31 1.10 0.27 0.11 32 2.00 1.15 inaud 1.80 0.26,* 1.00 0.13* 33 1.60 1.00 1.00 34 1.40 0.72 0.65 35 1.00 0.55 0.80 36 1.00 0.70 1.50
~*
ENGINEERING REPORT
. MOFFET. LARSON & JOHNSON. INC.
l nos 6:s ses=o ..: cossettiso itticouwesicmoss t sciss e ns ..dec-wac- . e,o.s l TABLE 8 - COMPARISON OF MEASURED FIELD Ih7ENSITY TO NIGHT LIMIT FOR ALL AM STATIONS (Continued) (AM) (AM) (AM) (AM) (AM) (AM) (AM) k'ICC kT.LI ktLI k'RIV k'RHD k' LIM k' LNG 600 960 1290 1390 1570 1580 1600 37 4.00 0.80 0.10-38 2.70 inaud 7.20 1.00 0.30* 0.25* 39 13.00 3.20 0.17* 40 1.40 1.25 inaud 10.00 1.60 0.37* 0.30* 4 41 49.50+ 10.00 0.34* 42 43 1.75 1.30 inaud 35.00+ 7.50 0.30 0.50* 44 1.55 1.00 NA NA NA NA
;l 45 110.00+ 23.00 0.45
'l 46 190.00+ 40.00' l
+ - Exceeds night limit
* - Interference present t
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{ r a P 1 P ATTACHMENT 1 l l i I l r P h P t
VITA Stophen Cole _B_trth Date: _ June 1, 1941 Home Address: 23 Mt. Crey Road Stony Brook, New York !!?90 Phone 516-751-6588 Office Address: State University of New York at Stony Brook Department of Sociology Stony Brook, New York 11794 Phone 516-632-??32 Education B.A., Columbia College, 1962 Ph.D., Columbia University, 1967 Academic Appointmentst 1964 1965 Lecturer, Ba rna rd College 1966-67 Lecturer, Columbia University 1966-76 Instructor of Sociology, Columbia University Research Associate, Bureau of Applied Social 1967-68 Research, Columbia University Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, 1968-70 Columbia University Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, 1970-73 State University of New York at Stony Brook Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, 1973-Present State University of New York at Stony Brook Professor, Department of Sociology, State 1977-Present University of New York at Stony Brook Resea rch As sociat e, Ce nter f or the Social 1987 Sciences, Columbia University Visiting Profesor, Institute of Sociology, University of Wa rsaw, Poland Honorary Societies and Awardst 1962 1962 Phi Beta Kappa, Magna Cum Laude, Columbia College Honorary Woodrow Wilson Fellow 1962-63 1963-66 National Science Foundation Fellow National Institutes of Health, Public Health Service Tellow 1963 1965-66 Bobbs-Me rrill Award John W. Burgess Honorary Fellow of the Faculty of 1971-72 Political Science, Columbia University Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellow 1976-Present Sociological Res ea rch /.s socia tion sd 101749
,' Page 2 Honorary Societies and Awa rd s (continued...) 1978-79 1978-79 Cuggenheim Toundation Tellowship Fellow, Cente r f or Advanced Study in the 1980 Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California Presen:ed annual paper at Sociological Research 1984-Present Association Dinner SUNY Faculty Exchange Scholar P rof essional Activities: _ From 1966 to the present f ollowing organizat ions I have served as a consultant to the projects. on various applied sociological research 1966-68 Social Welf are Research Council, CUNY 1970-71 Center for University of PennsylvaniaResearch on the Acts of Han, 1973-1987 Newsday 1973-79 Committee on Science and National Academy of SciencesPublic Policy (COSPUP), 1977 Brookhaven National Laboratories 1978 The Baltimore Sun 1979 National Bureau of Economic Research 1981 Long Island Lighting Company 1982 The Boston Globe 1982-83 University of California at Irvine 1984 State of California 1982 present Suf f olk County (New York) 1997 Commonwealth of Massachuset ts I have also served on journals: Sociology the editorial boards of the following American Journal of Education,_S_ociological Quarterly, of Sociology, _T_he American Sociologist. _ I have served as a referee for more than a dozen other journalt, Institutesforofthe National Health, the Science Foundation, the National well as other public and privateNational Ins titute granting of Education, a ge ncie s. as Over invited the last fifteen lectures at years I have presented more than 40 institutions all overprof es sional conf e rences and educational North America and in Europe. p/101750
O
. Page 3 Publications: __
_8_0 0 K S 1969 The Unionization of Teachers: A Case Study of the UFT. New York: Praeger Press. (Reprinted by Arno P r e's s , 1980). 1972 The Sociological Me thod , 1980, 3rd enlarged edition. New York: Harper and Row 1973 Social Stratification Jonathan in Science (with R. Cole). Chicago: Chicago Press. (Paperback edition The University of in 1981). published Translated into Chinese by Gu Xin Light Daily Press 1988 (with a new introduction). 19i) _The Sociological orientation. 1979 2nd enlarged edition. New York: Harper and Row 1978 _PPhase e e rI R e v iJonathan (with e w in the R. National Science Foundation: Washington, D.C.: National Academy Cole and Leonard of Sciences. Rubin). 1981 Peer Review Phase II (withinJonathan the National R. Science Foundation: Cole). Washington,' D.C.: National Academy of Scisnees. 1988 Social Influences on the Crowth of Scientific Knowledge (with Jonathan R. Cole). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (forthcoming) PAPER 5; (an asterisk indicates a refereed journal) 1961 "The Charitable Impulse in Victorian England," King's Crown Essays 9, 3-28. 1964 "Inventory of Empirical and Theoretical Studies of Anomie" (with Harriet A. Zuckerman). In Marshall Clinard (Ed.), Anomie and Deviant Behavior. New York: Free Press, pp. 243-313. ~
- 1967 "Scientific output and Recognition: A Study in the Operation of the Reward System 1.n Science" (with Jonathan R. Cole), American Sociological Review 32, 377-390. Reprinted as a Bobbs-Merrill Reprint and as an XIP Publication.
p/101751
. )
Page 4 i _P_ A P E R S Continued.... . 1968 "Visibility and t he St ructural Ba ses of Awareness in Scientific Research" (with Jonathan R. , American Sociological Review 33, 397-413. Cole),
- 1968 "The Uniontration of Teachers: Determinants of.
Ra nk-a nd-File Su ppo r t ," $_ o c i o l o g y of Education 41 66-87 Reprinted in Donald A. Erickson (Ed.),_ _ Educational Organisation and Administration. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1977
- 1969 "Teacher's Striket A Study of the Conversion of Predisposition into Ac tion," American Jou rnal of Sociology ~ 74, 506-520. Reprinted as Warne r '
Modula r Pu b11 ta t ion R809. Reprinted in Donald l C e r w i n ( E d . ) , _T_h e Employment of Teachers. Some i- Analytical Views. Corporation, 1974 Berkeleyt McCutchan Publishing
- 1969 "Determinants of Faculty Support of Student Demonstrations" (with Hannelore Adamsons),
_S_o e t o l o gy of Education 42, 315-329.
- 1970 "Professional Status and Faculty Support of Student Demonst Public Opinion rations" (with Hannelore Adamsons),
Quarterly 34, 389-394
- 1970 "Professional Standing and the Reception of Scientific 76, 206-306.Pape rs," Ame rican Jou rnal of Sociology S-678. Re p rint Reprinted as Bobbs-Merrill Reprint _
e d in 8.T. Eiduson and L. (Eds.), Science as a Ca ree r Choice. New Beckman York: Russell Sage Foundation, Reprinted in P. Weingart (Ed.), 1973, pp7 499-512. Wissenschaf tssoziologie 1 Athenaeue Verlag, 1973.
- 1971 "Me a s u r i ng the Quality of Sociological Papers" l (with Jonathan R. Cole), Ame rican Sociologis t 6, i
23-29 1972 "Continuity Case Study and of Fa I ns ilu tre." itu tional1:a t ion in Sciencet A In Anthony Obserschal? (Ed.),_The Establishment of Empirical Sociology. New York: Harper and Row, pp. 73-129. R e p r i n t e'd in Wolf Lepennies ( E d. ) , Ce s chic h t e_ d e r Soziologie Suhrkamp Verlag ( F r a nk f u r t as Ma in), vol. 4, 31-110, 1981. y/101752
e Page 5 PAPER $ Continued....
- 1972 "Illness and the Legitimation of Failure" (with Robert Lejeune), American Sociological Review 37, 347-356. Reprinted in Leo C. Reeder (Ed.), Hand-book of Scales and Indices of Health Behavior, f977 Reprinted in Cary S. Kart (Ed.), Dominant issues in Medical Sociology. (Tirst edition) Reading, Mass.
Addison Wesley Pubitshing Co. , 1977 (Second Editiot 1986. Reprinted in Howard Robboy and Candice Clark New York,Social (Eds. ), _ 1986 Int e rac t ion, St. Ma rtin's P res s ,
- 1972 "The Ortega Hypothesis" (with Jonathan R. Cole),
Science 178 (October), 368-375. Reprinted in Eire Gebhardt, Sociology of Science. New York Seabury Press, 1980 1975 "The Crowth of Scientific Knowledge: Theories of Deviance as a Ca se S t udy." In Lewis Coser (Ed. ), The Idea of Social S_tructure Papers in Honor of Robert K. Merton. New York: J o~v a n o v i c h , pp. 175-220. Marcourt, Brace, 1976 "The Reward System of the Social Sciences" (with Jonathan R. Cole). In Charles Trankel (Ed.), Controverstes and Public Policy. and Decisions: The Social Sciences New York: Russell Sage, pp. 55-88. 1977 "Peer Review (with Jonathan R.in the American Scientific Consunity" Cole and Leonard Rubin), Scientific American 237, No. 4 (October), 34-41. 1978 "Measuring the Cognitive State of Scientific Disciplines" (with Jonathan R. Cole and Lorraine Dietrich). In Yehuda Elk ana, Robert R. Merton, Arnold Thackray, and Harriet A. Zuckerman (Eds.), Toward Indicators. a Metric of Science: The Advent of Science New York: John Wiley. 1978 "Scientific Reward Systems: A Comparative Analysis." In Robert Alun Jones (Ed.),_Research _i n the Sociology of Knowledge. Science, and Art. Greenwich, Conn.: Johnson Associates, Inc. pp. 167-190. c'101753
'O Page 6
, PAPERS Continued....
1979 J."Which Re sea rche r Will Cet the Grant?" (with R. Cole),_ Nature _ 279, 575-576 1979 "Comment on a paper A me r i c a n S o cj_o l o g i s t by Michael Overington," _The 14 (Fe brua ry), 17-19. 1979 _
"Age of and Scientific Perf ormance, " A Sociology 84, 958-977 merican Journa1_
1980 "Comments on Scientometries,' Indicators Vol. 2, No.of Setentific Manpower' " Translated into Russian, 1987 5-6, pp. 405-409. , 1981 "The Functions Sociological Research" F. (with K.of Classical Theory in C Kuklick (Ed.), Adatto). In Knowledge. Science,Research in the Sociology of Conn.: and Art 111. Creenwich, _ 1981 Johnson Associates. Inc.
"Chance J. R.
and Consensus in Pee r Review," (with Cole and C. (20 November 1981),Simon),_ 881-886. Science 214, 1982 "NSF Pee r Re view Gary Simon) Science, (con t inued)" (wit h J. R. Cole and
- 215 (22 January, 1982) 344-8.
1983 "The Hierarchy of of Soetology 89, 111-139. the Sciencest", Ame rican Journal J. poz Niznika, Translated into Polish in nania Va rsawed. Rotwoj nauki a spoleczny Panstovove Wydawnictwo konteks,t, Naukove, 1987
- 1984 "Little Science
_S c i e n t o me t r i e s_ ( w i t h C . S . Big Science Revisited," 1984 Meyer) 7, 443-458 "Experts' Consensus National Science and Decision Making at the i n K e n n e t h Wa r r e n _ R. Cole)(with J.
, S_e l e c t iv i t yFoundation,"
_Sy s t s a s t Praeger Science Survival of the F i t t e sand Information t_ , (New York _
- 1986 Publishers) i "Sex School Discrimination 1929-1964,"and Admission to Medical American Journal of Sociology, 92 (545-567).
1 5 J101754
e Page 7 e P_A P E R S Continued.... 1987 "Testing the Ortega Hypochesist Milestone or Millstone?" Scientometrics (wit h J. R. Cole)
~
12, 327-335 (Entire issue devoted to examination of 1972 paper "The Ortega Hypothesis.") 1988 "Formation of Public Opinion on Complex Issuest The Case H. O'Corman,of Nuclear ed. Power" (with R. Fiorentine) in Surveying Social _ Lifer Essays in Honor of He rbert
- 3. Hyman (Middletown, Conn. Wesleyan University
~
Press)in press.
- 1988 "Do Journal Rejection Rates Index Consensus? A Reply to Hargens." American Sociological Review (with C. Simon and J.R. ~
Cole) forth-coming in February issue. 1988 "Discrimination Against Women In Science The (withConfusion of Outcome with Process," R. Fiorentine), Harriet Zuckerman, Jonathan R. Cole, and John Bruer, eds. Women _and the Pursuit of Science (New York Norton), in press. 1988 "Confusing outcome with Process in the Analysis of R. Sex Discrimination" reply to Crosst (with forthcoming. American Journal of Sociology, Fiorentine) _ I l t { l g j101755 I r l .
e S e 4 e i i ATTACHMENT 2 I i i l I I i t l l L
ATTACHMENT 2 C RALPH H. TURNER, Professor of Sociology
. University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90024 . August 1986 BRIEF RESUME I Education:
Ph.D. in Sociology at University of Chicago, 1948; Graduate study at University of Southern California and i University of Wisconsin, 1941-43. Major Professional Office: Editor, Annual Review of Sociolocy, 1980-86 President, Society for the Study of Symbolic Interactiin, 1982-83 Vice President, International Sociological Association, 1978-82 : President, American Sociological Association, 1968-69 Editor, Sociometry, 1962-64 President, Pacific Sociological Association, 1956-57 Fellowships, Honors, and Special Responsibilities:
, %w . k i t % . M M A5n4/9 Annual Faculty Research Lectu r, Univers%b dwe., /4 81) ity of California.
Los Angeles, 1986-87; College of Letters and Science, Faculty Award,1:niversity of California, Los Angeles, 1985; Annual Katz-Newcomb Lecturer, University of Michigan,1985; Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1984; Chairman, Academic Senate, University of California-statewide, 1984; Visiting Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford, 1980; charles Horton Cooley Award from the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction, 1978; Guggenheim Fellowship, United Kingdom, 1964-65; Fulbright Research Fallowship, United Kingdom, 1956-57; Social Science Research Council Faculty Research Fellowship, 1953-56; Books Published: Collective Behavior (with L. Killian), Third Edition, 1987 (Prentice Hall), Second Edition, 1972, First Edition, 1957; (--- Waitino for Disaster: Earthauake Watch in California (with J. Nigg & D. Paz), 1986 (University of California Jress); Social Psycholoov Sociolocical Persoectives. (M. Rosenberg and R. H. Turner, eds.), 1981 (Basic Booits) . Earthauake Thr s al: The Human Response in Southern California (with J. Nigg, D. Paz, and B. Young), 1979 (UCLA Institute for Social Science Research); Earthauake Prediction and Public Policy (By the Panel on Public W 101818
Policy Implications of Earthquake Prediction, National
. Research Council, Ralph H. Turner, Chairman), 1975 (National . Academy of Sciences);
Family Interaction, 1970 (John Wiley & Sons); Robert Park: On Social Control and Collective Behavior (edited and with an introduction by R. H. Turner), 1967 (University of Chicago Press); 4h---The Social context c! Ambition, 1964 (Chandler Press); over 150 articles, book chapters, and reviews on collective behavior, social aspects of disaster, theory of social roles, the self concaption, social aspects of ambition and upward mobility, racial inequality in the United States, and sociological theory and methods. List of Publications (excluding book reviews):
- 1. "Propaganda and the Social Situation," Socioloov and Social Research, 27 (May, 1943), 363-72.
- 2. "The Navy Disbursing Officer as a Bureaucrat," American Sociolocical Revieg, 12 (June , 1947), 342-48.
- 3. "Is Culture Change Cyclical?" in Theories of Social Chance
; (Department of Sociology, University of Chicago,1947), 170-200 (mimeographed).
i 4. "Statistical Logic and Social Research," Socioloov and Social Research, 32 (January, 1948), 697-704.
- 5. A Preliminary Survey of Intearation of Nearoes into Enolovment in Indianaoolis. Chicago American Council on j Race Relations, 1948, p. 136 (mimeographed).
- 6. "The Nonwhite Male in the Labor Force," American Journal of Socioloav, 54 (January, 1949), 356-62.
- 7. "Tc3 Evnected Cases Method Applied to the Nonwhite Male Lai " Jrce," American Journal of Socioloov, 55 (September, 1944), 146-56.
- 8. "The Nonwhite Female in the Labor Force," American Journal of Socioloov, 56 (March, 1951), 438-47.
( ! 9. "The Experience of Vertical Mobility and Personal Values," Proceedinos of Pacific Sociolecical Society, published as Research Studies of the State Collece of Washincton, 19, No.
- 2 (June, 1951), 89-92.
- 10. "The Relative Position of the Negro Male in the Labor Force i
of Large American Cities," American Socioloaical Review, 16 (August, 1951), 524-29. g 101819 l l I [
Ralph H. Turner
- 11. "Moral Judgment: A Study in Roles," American Sociolocical Review, 17 (January, 1952), 70-77.
- 12. "The Quest for Universals in Sociological Research,"
American Sociolocical Review, 18 (December, 1953), 604-11.
- 13. "Children and Women's Work," Socioloov and Social Research, 36 (July, 1952), 377-81.
- 14. "Foci of Discrimination in the Employment of Honwhites,"
American Journal of Socioloov, 58 (November, 1952), 247-56.
- 15. "Negro Job Status and Education," Social Forces, 32
- (October, 1953), 45-52.
- 16. "Occupational Patterns of Inequality," American Journal of Sociolcoy, 59 (March, 19S4), 437-47.
- 17. "Value Conflict in Social Disorganization," Socioloov and Social Research, 38 (May, 1954), 301-308.
- 18. "Self and other in Moral Judgment," American Sociological Beview, 19 (June, 1954), 249-59.
- 19. "Reply to Angell," American Sociolooical Review, 19 (August, 1954), 477-78.
- 20. "The Family," Chapter 10 in Leonard Broom and Philip Selznick (eds.), Sociology. New York: Row Peterson, 1955.
- 21. "Reference Groups of Future-Oriented Men," Es.cial Forces, 34 j (December, 19 55) , 130-36.
22 dInternational Understanding: An Exercise in Reading National Perspective," Claremont Collece Readina Conference: Twentieth Year _ Book, 1955, 13-32.
- 23. "Role-taking, Role Standpoint, and Reference Group I
Behavior," American Journal of Socioloov, 61 (January, 1956), 316-28.
- 24. "Zoot-suiters and Mexicans: Symbols in Crowd Behavior,"
(with Samuel J. Surace), American Journal of Socioloov, 62 (July, 1956), 14-20.
- 25. "The Changing Ideology of Success: A Study of the Aspirations of High School Men in Los Angeles," Transactions of the Third World Conoress of Socioloov, 1956, V, 35-44.
- 26. Collective Behe.vior (text and readings), with Lewis M.
Killian, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1957, 547 y101820
Ralph H. Turner 4 pp. , 4
- 27. "The Normative Coherence of Folk concepts," Proceedinas_of the Pacific Sociolecical Society, published as Research Studies of the State Collece of Washinoton, 25 (June, 1957),
127-36. '
- 28. "Needed Research in Collective Behavior," Socioloov and Social Research, 42 (July, 1958), 461-65.
I j 29. "Life Situation and Subculture: A Comparison of Merited l Prestige Judgments by Three occupational Classes in Britain," British _ Journal of Sociolqqy, 9 (December, 1958), 299-320.
- 30. "An Experiment in the Modification of Role Conceptions,"
i Yearbook of the American Philosoohical Society, 1959, 329-32.
- 31. "Preoccupation with Competitiveness and Social Acceptance among American and English College Students," Sociometry, 23 L (September, 1960), 307-25.
- 32. "Sponsored and contest Mobility and the School System," !
American Sociolooical Review, 25 (December, 1960), 855-67.
- 33. "Reply to Halsey," American Sociolocical Revie'w, 26 (June, 1961), 455-56.
- 34. "The Problem of Social Dimensions in Personality," Pacific l Socioloolcal Review, 4 (Fall, 1961), 57-62.
i { 35. "Role-taking: Process Versus Conformity," in Arnold Rose ! (ed.), Fuman Behavior and Social Processes, Boston: Ecughton-Mifflin Co., 1962.
- 36. "Some Family Determinants of Ambition," Socioloov and Social Research, 46 (July, 1962), 397-411.
l
- 37. "Primary and Secondary Group Moral Responsibility Roles,"
Mens en Maatschaeoli, 37 (September, 1962), 335-46.
- 38. Race and Intellicence, Melvin Tumin, Henry C. Dyer, Silvan S. Tomkins, Ralph H. Turner, and Sherwood L. Washburn, New i
York: Anti-Defamation League, 1963.
- 39. The Social Context of Anbition, San Francisco: Chandler i Press, 1964, 269 pp.
- 40. "Collective Behavior," Charter 12 in R. E. L. Faris (ed.),
dandbook of Socioloov, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964, pp. 382-425. y) 101821
Ralph H. Turner
. 41. "Upward Mobility and Class' Values," Social Problems, 11 '
l (Spring, 1964), 359-71. ;
- 42. "Collective Behavior and Conflict: New Theoretical !
Frameworks," _Sociolecical Ouarterly, 5 (Spr.ing, 1964), 122-132. t
- 43. "Some Aspects of Women's Ambi. ion," American Journal of Sociolooy, 70 (November, 1964), 271-85.
- 44. "On Neighborhood Context and College Plans," American Sociolecical Review, 31 (October, 1966), 698-702.
- 45. "Acceptance of Irregular Mobility in Britain and the United States," Sociometry, 29 (December, 1966), 334-352.
- 44. Robert Park on Social Control and Collective Behavior, i edited and with an introduction by Ralph H. Turner, Chicago:
i University of Chicago, 1967.
- 47. "Types of Solidarity in the Re-Forming of Groups," Encific Sociolecical Revicw, 10 (Fall, 1967), 60-68. ;
- 48. "Is It Vive la Difference?" in ExDlodino the Myths: A Reoort
) of a Conference on Evoandino Emoloyment Occortunities for Career Women, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 1967, 13-18.
- 49. "Role: II. Sociological Aspects," in International
- Encyclooedia of the Social Sciences, New York
- Macmillan and Free Press, 1968, Volume 13, pp. 552-557.
l 50. "The Self-Conception in Social Interaction," in Chad Gordon I and Kenneth Gergen (eds.), The Self in Social Interaction, . I New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968, Vol. I, pp. 93-106.
- 51. "Sozickulturelle Persenlichkeit," in Werterbuch der Soziolooie, second edition, Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1969, t pp. 1032-1036.
- 52. "The Social context of Ambition," in Muzafer Sherif and i Caroline Sherif (eds.), Social Psychol 2Hy., New York: Harper and Row, 1969, pp. 444-447.
l
- 53. "The Public Perception of Protest," American Sociolooical i Review, 34 (December, 1969), 815-831.
t
- 54. "The Theme of contemporary Social Movements," British Journal of Socioloav, 20 (December, 1969), 390-405.
l l
- 55. "Determiaants of Social Movement Strategies," in Tamotsu l Shibutani (ed.), Human Nature and Collective Behavior; l
y/101822 l
Ralph H. Turner Eppers in Honor of Herbert Blumer, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970, pp. 145-165.
- 56. Family Interaction, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1970, 505 PP.
- 57. "The Public Perception of the Watts Riot as Social Protest,"
by Vincent Jeffries, Ralph H. Turner, and Richard T. Morris,, American Sociolocical Review, 36 (June, 1971), 442 151.
- 58. "Introduction." The Nature of Humar. Nature, by Ellswortn Faris, Dubuque , Iowa: Brown Reprints, 1971, pp. v-xiii.
- 59. "Deviance Avowal as Neutralization of Commitment," Social Problems, 19 (Winter, 1972), 308-321.
I
- 60. Collective Behavior, Revised Edition. (with Lewis M.
Killian), Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972. ~435 PP.
- 61. "Integrative Beliefs in Group Crises," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16 (March, 1972), 26-40.
- 62. "Campus Peace: Harmony or Uneasy Truce?" (Eopioloov and Social Research, 57 (October, 1972), 5-21.
- 63. "Unresponsiveness as a Social Sanction," Sociometry, 36 (March, 1973), 1-19.
l 64. "Collective Behavior," Encyclopedia Brittanica, Fifteenth Edition, 1974, Volume 4, 842-853. l l 65. "Rule Learning as Role Learning: What an Interactive Theory of Roles Adds to the Theory of Social Norms," International Journal of Critical Sociolouv, 1 (September, 1974), 52-73. l 66. "The Pattern of Upward Mobility in Australia," International Journal of Comparative Socioloav, 16 (March-June, 1975), 81-99. l
- 67. "Is There a Quest for Identity?" Sociolocical Ouarterly, 16 (Spring, 1975), 148-161.
- 68. "Feeling Unfree on a University Campus," Xouth and Society, l
6 (June, 1975), 423-448. 1
- 69. Earthouake Prediction and Public Policy. by the Panel on the Public Policy Implications of Earthquake Prediction of l
the Advisory Committee on Emergency Planning, National Academy of Sciences (Ralph H. Turner, Panel Chairman). Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1975. 142 PP. l y/101823
Ralph H. Turner
- 70. "The Real Self: From Institution to Impulse," American Journal of Socioloav, 81 (March, 1976), 989-1016.
- 71. "Earthquake Prediction and Public Policy: Distillations from a National Academy of Sciences Report," Mass Emercencies, 1 (7uly, 1976), 179-202.
- 72. "Ambiguity and Interchangeability in Role Attribution: The Effect of Alter's Response," American Sociolocical Review, 41 (December, 1976), 993-1006. By Ralph H. Turner and Norma Shosid.
- 73. "Mobilizing the Masses," pp. 260-267 in "Prediction of the Haicheng Earthquake," Prepared by the Haicheng Earthquake Study Delegation, EOS, 58 (May 1977), pp. 236-272.
- 74. "The Role and the Person," American Journal of Socioloav, 84 (July, 1978), 1-23.
- 75. "Earthquake Prediction Volunteers: What Can the United j States Learn from China?" Mass Emercencies, 3 (September, j 1978), 143-160.
l
- 76. Earthauake Threat: The Human Resoonse in Southern California, by Ralph Turner, Joanne H. N igg., Denise Heller Paz, and Barbara Shaw Young. Los Angel ~es Institute for Social Science Research, University of California, 1979. 152 PP.
- 77. "Earthquake Threat: The Human Response in Southern California," in The Human Settlements on the San Andreas Fault. Tijuana, Baja California, and Sacramento, California: Estado de Baja California and California State Seismic Safety Commission, 1979; pp. 299-307.
- 78. "Strategy for Developing an Integrated Role Theory,"
Humboldt Journal of Social Relatons, 7 (Tall / Winter 1979/80), 123-139.
- 79. "The Mass Media and Preparation for Natural Disaster," in Committee on Disasters and the Mass Media, Commission on Sociotechnical Systems, National Research Council, Disasters and the Mass Media. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1980, 281-292.
80t Community Response to Earthauake Threat, by Ralph H. Turner, Joanne M. Nigg, Denise Heller Paz, and Barbara Shaw Young. Los Angeles: Institute for Social Science Research, University of California, 1980. Ten volumes plus Appendix, Technical Report to N.S.F.
- 81. "Earthquake Prediction and Economic Recession: A Red
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Ralph H. Turner Herring?" Hazard Monthly, 1 (July, 1980), pp. 1, 5, 15.
- 82. "The True Self Method for Studying the Self Conception," by Ralph H. Turner and Jerald Schutte, Symbolic Interaction, 4 (Spring, 1981), 1-20.
- 83. "The Boundaries of the Self: The Relationship of Authenticity to Inauthenticity in the Self-conception,"
Chapter 4 in Mervin D. Lynch, Ardy th A. Norem-Hebeisen, and Kenneth Gergen (eds.), The Self Concent: Advances in Theory and Research. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Press, 1981, pp. 39-57. By Ralph H. Turner and Steven Gordon.
- 84. "Collective Behavior and Resource Mobilization as Approaches to the Study of Social Movements," in Louis Kriesberg (ed.),
Research in Social Movements. Conflict and Chance, Vol. 4, 1981. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press. Pp. 1-23. , 85. Social PsychoLoav: Sociolocical Perspectives. Morris l Rosenberg and Ralph H. Turner (eds.). New York: Basic Books, 1981.
- 86. Annual Review of Socioloav, Volume 7, Ralph H. Turner, editor, 1981.
- 87. "Disaster Subcultures in Earthquake Country," pp. 207-18 in Barclay G. Jones and Miha Tomavevic (eds.), Social and Economic Ascects of Earthauakes: Procee ignas of the Third International Conference: The Social ano' Economic Aspects of Earthcuakes and Plannina to Miticate their Impacts.
Llubjlana & lthaca: Institute for Testing and Research in Materials and Structures and Cornell University Program in Urban and Regional Studies, 1982.
- 88. "Media in Crisis: Blowing Hot and Cold," Bulletin of the Seisinolocical Society of America, 72 (December, 1982), S19-S28.
- 89. Annual Review of Socioloav, Volume 8, Ralph H. Turner, editor, 1982.
l 90. "Social and Economic Aspects," Chapter 9 in Committee on Earthquake Engineering Research, NRC, Earthauake Encineerina--1982. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1982 (Chapter by R. Turner, Harold Chochrane, Linda Nilson, and Alan J. Wyner).
- 91. "Waiting for Disaster: Changing Reactions to Earthquake Forecasts in Southern California," International Journal of Disasters and Mass Emercencies, 1 (August, 1983), 307-334.
W 101825 _ _ )
r Ralph H. Turner
- 92. "Figure and Ground in the Analysis of Social Movements,"
Symbolic Interaction, 6 (Fall, 1983), 175-182.
- 93. Annual Review of Socioloav, Volume 9, Ralph H. Turner, editor, 1983.
- 94. "Responses to Uncertainty and Risk: Mexican American, Black and Anglo Beliefs about the Manageability of the Future,"
Social Science Ouarterly, 65 (June, 1984), 665-79. By Ralph H. Turner and K. Jill Kiecolt. t l 95. "Individual and Group Response to Earthquake Prediction," l pp. 599-614 in Earthauake Prediction: Proceedinas of The International Symoosium on Earthauake Prediction. Paris: UNESCO; and Tokyo: Terra Scientific Publishing Co., 1984.
- 96. Annual Review of Socioloav, Volume 10, Ralph H. Turner, editor, 1984.
l
- 97. "Unanswered Questions in the Convergence between Structuralist and Interactionist Role Theories," pp. 22-36 in Horst J. Helle (ed.), Perspectives on Micro-sociolocical Theory. London & Beverly Hills: Sage Pu...ications, 1985.
1 ( 98. Annual Review of Socioloav, Volume 11, Ralph H. Turner, l editor, 1985.
- 99. "Articulating Self and Social Structure," pp. 119-132 in
! Terry Honess and Krysia Yardley, eds., Self and Identity 1 ) Psychosocial Perspectives. Chichester, England: John Wiley l
& Sons, Ltd., 1986.
l 100. Waitina for Disaster: Earthauake Watch in California. By l R.H. Turner, Joanne Nigg and Denise H. Paz. University of California Press, 1986. 446 pp. l l 101. "The Mass Media in Earthquake Warning " by R.H. Turner and l Denise H. Paz, pp.99- //f in S.J. Ball-Rokeach and Muriel Cantor, eds., ?Me Media and th e s nci a l re t ri- -4hnt l Enc 4 ^10c ic al- T : r s pec t ives . Beverly Hills: Sage publications, 1986. gg nm Jm. QQ , l 102. Annual Review of Socioloav, Volume 12, Ralph H. Turner, editor, 1986. I 103. Collective Behavior, Third Edition. By Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1987. l [101826 I
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h e O O ATTACHMENT 3 mium-u muimmun s
l ATTACHMENT 3
. Februcey 14, 1988 VITA
. ALLEN H. BARTON Born October 7, 1924, Greenuich, Conrecticut. Married, 4 children,
, Current posttion: Professor of Sociology, Columbia University i
Office address: Department of Sociology, 514 Fayeruoather Hall, Columbia University, Neu York NY 10027 t ( Telephone: 212-280-4022) Home address: 327 Valley Road, Cos Cob, CT 06S07 Educat ion: Attended Brunsuick School and Greenuich public schools, graduated from Edgeucod School, Greenutch, CT June 1941. Harvard College , 1941-43, 1946-47: A.B. 1947. Cornell University, Army Specialtzed Training Program, Chinese Area and L a ngu ag e , 1943-44. Columbia University, graduate study in sociology, 1947-53: Ph.D 1957. Employment: U.S. Army, 1943-46. Highest rank : Tech Sergeant Signal Corps. Lecturer in Sociology, University of Oslo, 1948-49 Social Science Research Council Research Training Fellevship, 1949-50 Bureau of Applied Social Research ( BASR), Columbia University: Research Assistant , 1947-48, 1950-54 Research Associate, 1957-62 01 rector, 1962-77 Department of Sociology, Columbia University: Teaching Assistant 1950-51 Instructor 1953-54 Assistant Professor 1958-62 Associate Professor 1962-71 Professoc 1971 present University of Chicago Lau School ! Assistant Prof essor of Sociology, 1954-57 Research proj ects: Econoato Planning Study, Noruey, 1948-50s directed by Paul F. Lazarsf eld, ( Socisi Science Research Council and Noruegian f oundations). I Propositional Inventory on Political Behavior, Columbia University, 1952-l 531 directed by Peul F. Lazarsf eld (Ford Foundation). l Jury Project, University of Chicago Lau School', 1954-57: directed by l Eduard Levi and Harry Kalven (Ford Foundation) Methodological Documentation Proj ect, Columbia University,1957-64: directed by Paul F. Lazarsf eld (Ford Foundation) Reviou of 01saster Research, 1959-6!i project director (National Academy of Sciences)
s Sociology of Reading Research, 1960-63: proj ect director (Carnegie I Corporation)
. Yugoslav Elite Survey, 1967-70s proj ect co-director (Carnegie Corporatton)
Columbia Student Demonstrations Survey, 1968: proj ect director (Russell Sage Foundation) American Leadership Survey, 1970-74: proj ect co-director ( N!MH, Ford Foundet t on) Neu York Neighborhood Government Study, 1972-75: project director (National Science Foundation) Member: American Soctological Aesociation Amertcen Association for the Advancement of Science (Fellou) American Association f or Public Opinion Research American Association of University Professors International Sociological Association: Research Committee on Otsasters Interuniversity Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Policy Studies Association Social Research Association Social Science History Association Society for the Study of Soctal Problems , World Association f or Public Upinton Research l
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I Publications "Qualitative measurement in the social sciences," by Paul F. Lazarsf eld and Allen H, Barton, in The,Poliev Scienssa, edited by Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell. Stanford Universtty Press, 1951, pp. 155-192.
"The psychology of voting: an analysts of political behavtor," by S.M.Lipset, P.F.Lazarsfeld, A.H. Barton and J.J.Linz, in Handbook of Social Psychos loQY (2nd edition), edited by Gardner Lindzey. Cambetdge, MA: Addtson-Wesley, 1954, pp. 1124-1175.
"Some functions of qualitative analysts in social research," by Allen H.
Barton and Paul F. Lazarsf eld, Frank furter Beitrace zur Sozioloote 1 (1955) 321-361.
"The concept of property space in social research," in The Lanounce of Social Research, edited by Paul F. Laz arsf eld and Morris Rosenberg, Glencoe, IL' The Free Press, 1955, pp. 40-55.
Sociolooical and Psycholeoical Problems of Economic Plannino in Noruav. Doctoral dissertation, Department of Sociology, Columbia University. Ann Arbor: University Microftims International, 1957. STUDYING THE EFFECTS OF COLLEGE EDUCATION: A methodolooical critious of "Chancino Values in Coll ece". New Haven: The Hazen Foundation, 1959.
"The experience of injustice as a research problem," by Alle, H. Berton and l Saul Mendlovitz, Journal of Leoal Education 13(1) (1950'.
l l "Change in an organizational system: formalization of a qualitative study," by Allen H. Barton and Bo Anderson, in Corolex Oroantrations: A Socioloolcal Reader, edited by Amital Etzion1. New York: Hol t , Rinehart & Winston, 1961, pp. 400-418. ORGANIZATIONAL MEASUREMENT. New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1961. 82 pages. , "Methodology of quant s tative social research," by Allen H. Barton and Paul F. l L az ars f eld, in A New Survey of the Social Sciences, edited by B.N. l Varna, New York : Asia Publishing House, 1962, pp. 151-169, SOCI AL ORGANIZATION UNDER STRESS: A Socioloolcal Review of Disaster Research< 01sastec Study Series, National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council Weshington, DC, 1963. 208 pages.
"Measuring the values of individuals," Relicious Education 57 (4) Res e ar ch Supplement (July-August 1962), 62-97.
"Organization and mass behavior in the emergency social system," in Man and
! Society in Disaster, edited by George W. Baker and Dwight Chapman. New York: Basic Books, 1962, 222-267.
s I, . o 4 "The col'ege as a social organization," Colleos Admissions 10: The Behavioral Sciences and Education. Pctnceton, NJ: College Entrance Examination Boar d.
"Decis ion-mak i ng in a planning agency ," Social Science Inf ormation 2 ( 1962 )
S7-76.
"Research and practice in the teaching of reading," by Allen H. Barton and David Wilder, in Innovation in Educat ion, ecited by Matthew 8. Miles. New York : Teachers College Bureau of Publice,ttons, 1964, pp. 361-398.
"University resources for survey research on urban problems," by Allen H.
Barton and Davtd Sills, in The Universities in Reatonal Af f airs, v. 2 of Urban Research and Education in the New York Metrocolit an Recion, edited by Harvey S. Perloff and Henry Cohen. New York: Regional Plan Assocta-tion, 1965.
"Bringing society back in," American Behavioral Scientists 12 (1968) 1-9.
"The Columbia crists: campus, Vietnam and the ghetto," Public Opinion l
Qu ar t er l y 37 (1968) 333-351.
"Organizations: methods of research," -International Enevelocedia of the Social Sciences, v. 11, pp. 334-343. New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968.
"Personal influence revisited," in Current Controversies in Mark etino Re s e ar ch , edited by Leo Bogart. Chicago: M ar k ham , 1968, pp. 113-126.
COMMUNITIES IN DISASTER: A Sociolocical Analvsis of Collective Stress Situations. New York: Doubleday, 1969. Also published by Ward Lock Educational, London, 1970: Japanese edit ion, Tokyo, 1974 "The organization as a social entity," New Dimensions in Oroanization. New York: Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc. 1969, pp. 21- 34.
"Reception et diffusion des informations dans un groupe de formateurs de l'opinton publique dans une societe' socialiste " by Allen H. Barton, l Lj 11j ana Bacevic and Dragomir Pantic, L'Homme et la Soeiste', no. 14 i (1969) 228-239.
l "Empirical nothods and elite theories," Revista di Socioloota ( Roma) 9 (1971) 57-82.
"Empirical methods and radical sociology: a liberal critique," in Radleal Socioloov, edited by J. David Colfax and Jack L. Roach. Neu York: Basic Books, 1971. 90, 460-477.
"Selected problems in the study of religious development," in Research on Relicious Develocment, edited by Merton P. Strommen. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1971, pp. 836-855.
i
* ! S "The use of surveys in the study of social problems," in Handbook on the Study of Social pp. Problems, 85-148. edited by Erutn O. Smtgel. Chicago: Rand McNally,
, 1971, OPINION-MAKING ELITES IN YUGOSL AVI A, edited by Allen H. Barton, Bogdan Centtch and Charles Kadushin. Neu York: Praeger. 1973.
"Determinants of leadership attitudes in a socialtst society," in Bar ton.
I Dent tch and Kadushin, Con nion-Mak ino El i tes in Yucoslavia, pp. 220-262.
"Consensus and conflict among American leaders, ' Public Ooinion Quarterly 38 (unnter 1974-75) 85-148.
"The impact of pretrial pubinetty on jurors' verdicts," by Alice Padauer-S anger and Allen H.
Barton, in The Jurv System in America, edited by Rita James Simon. 8everly Hills, CA: 3 age Publications, 1975, pp. 123-139.
"The limits of evaluation: problems of evaluation of techniques, programmes, institutions, and social sys tems. ' in Societ echnies , edited by Albert Cherns. London: Malaby Press, 1976, pp. 229-238. German translation in Joachim K.H.W. Schmidt, Planvolle Steurono des Gessellschaf tlichen Handelns, We stdeut scher Verl ag, 1975.
DECENTRALIZING CITY GOVERNMENT: An Evaluation of the Neu York City District Manacer Excertment. by A.H. Bar t on, N. I . Fains t ein, S. S. Fat nst ein, ( N.S. Friedman, S.J.Hagtnbotham, J.D.Koblentz, T.F. Rogers, J.M.Boyle and R. Brumback. Lextngton, MA: Lex ingtor. 3ook s , 1977.
"Applied research in the poliitcol process, ' Current Socioloov 23 (1) (1975) 49-65.
"Measurtno belief system structure," by Allen H. Barton and R. Wayne Parsons.
Publie Ooinion Quarterly 41 (Summer 1977) 159-180.
" A diagnosis of bureaucratic maladies,
- American Behavioral Scientist 22 (May-June 1979) 483-492.
"Paul Lazarsf eld and applied social research." Social Science Historv 3 (October 1979) 4-44 MAKING BURE AUCRACIES WORM , edited by Carol H. Weiss and Allen H. Barton.
Beverly Hille, CA: Sage Publications, 1980.
"Fault linee in American elite consensus," Daedalus 109 (Summer 1980) 1-45.
! Revleu of Contextual Analvais: Concects and Statistical Technicuen by L.H.Boyd and G.R.!versen, in Conterocracy Socioloov 10 (1981) 318.
"Paul F. Lazarsf eld ard the invention of the university institute for applied social research," in Oceanizino f or Social Research, edited by Burkhardt Holtzner and Jirl Nehnevaj aa. Cambridge, MA: Schenckman, 1982, pp, 17-83.
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"The American Leadership Survey: 1ssues, methods, and ethtes," in AA Intro-duction to Social Research, v. I of A Handbook of Sectal Science Methods.
edited by Robert 8. Smith. Cambendge, MA: Bal l i ng e r , 1983, pp. 253-324 Review of Liites in Australia by John Higley et al. , in Social Forces 61 (1983) 963. Foreuerd to Guide to the Bureau of Acolied Social Research, edited by Judith S. Darton. New York: Clearuater Press, 1984 "Determinants of elite policy attttudes," in Elite Studies and Cemmuntst_ Politics, edited by Ronald H. Linden and Bert A. Rockman. Pittsburch: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984, pp. 191-235.
"Background, attitudes, and activities of American elites," in Studies of the Structure of National Elite Grouos, edited by Guen Moore, v.! of Research in Politics and Society. Greenwich. CT: JAI Press, 1985, pp. 173-218.
( , "Deterntnants of economic attitudes an the Amertcan business elite," American Journal of Socioloav 91 (July 1985) 54-87. l Review of The Life of the Parties: Activists in Presidential Politics, by Ronald B. Rapoport , Alan J. Abramovitz and John NcGlennon, in t Contemocracy Socioloov 16 (1987) 819-20. 8 l i I e
1 l 1 I 1 l l , l l l l l ATTACHMENT 4 , 1 1 I i l l l l l 1 l l l l
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SUFFOLX COUNTY SURVEY Volunteer Firemen September, 1982 i Hello, my name is Suffolk County. and I am calling for We are doing a survey of volunteer firemen to 1 obtain information that will be useful to the County in making plans nucleartopower deal with a possible nuclear emergency at the Shoreham plant. The l , ment is cooperating with this research. fire depart- 2 list of members. Do you still work with the' They have given us a - fire department? 3 i 4. For how many years have you worked with this fire district? " 0=less than one 4=six to ten 1=one 2=two to three 5-more Onan ten l 3=four to five DON'T READ [9= Refuse 1 4 { 5-9 What is the zip code of your home address? l 5 6 7 8- 9 I l I i l
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. In general, near each ofhow the dangerous following do you think it would be to live, (categories for Q. 10 to 0 13) 1=very dangerous .
2= dangerous 3=not too dangerous DON'T READ [4= Don't Knov [9= Refuse
- 10. an airport 10
- 11. a mental hospital 11
- 12. a coal fired power plant 12
- 13. a nuclear power plant 13
- 14. Would you describe yourself as:
1=a supporter of nuclear power plants as
,- a means of providing electricity. -
.f.
\,
, 2=an opponent of nuclear power plants, or i
l 3=you haven't made up your mind yet on this issue? l DON ' T READ [9= Refuse 14
- 15. Do you think that LILCO should complete and operate the Ehoreham nuclear power plant?
1=yas DON'T READ [3= Don't Know 2=no [9= Refuse 15
- 16. During normal operation, which type of electricity plant pollutes the air the least:
l=an oil-fired plant 2=a coal-fired plant 3=a nuclear-fired plant 4-you're not sure DON ' T READ [5=all about the sama l [9= Refuse - 16 i( SOCIAL DATA ANALYSTS, INC.
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- 17. During normal operation does a nuclear power plant give off a dangerous level of radiation?
\ .
l=yes 2=no DON 'T READ [3= Don't Know [9= Refuse 17
- 18. Assuming that the Shoreham nuclear power plant is licensed and begins to operate, we are interested in knowing what you think you would do if there was an accident at the plant. Suppose that you were at work on a weekday morning and there was an accident at Shor eham. Everyone living within ten miles of the plant was advised to evacuate. Volunteer firemen were expected to help with the evacuation. What do ,
you think you would do first? 1=first, you would report to the fire station so that you could help with fire fighting and evacuation in the evacuation zone, or [ SKIP to Q. 233 - i 2=first, you would rake sure that your family was safely out of the evacuation zone, or CASK Q. 19 to 223 I 3=first, you would leave the evacuation zone to make sure that you were in a safe place, or (SKIP to Q. 233
?
4=first, you would do something else
. [ SKIP to Q. 23] Specify 1
DON 'T READ [5= Don't Know [ SKIP to Q. 23 [9= Refuse [ SKIP to Q. 233 18
- 19. How would you make sure that your family was safely out of the evacuation zone?
1=go home and drive your family to a safe place out of the evacuation zone 2= call home and tell your family to leave without you 1 3=some other way (Specify) DON'T READ [4= Don't Know [9= Refuse 19
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SOCIAL DATA ANALYSTS, INC.
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- 20. Where would you go?
l= someplace in Suf folk County 2= someplace in Nassau County 3= someplace In New York City 4=some other place i 5=you don't know (Specify) ' * [ SKIP to O. 22] DON'T READ [9= Refuse [ SKIP to Q. 22] 20 21. In terms your home?of miles, about how far away is this place from l t 1=10 miles or less
- 2=11 to 20 miles 3=21 to 30 miles 4=31 to 40 miles
! 5=41 to 50 miles 6=more than 50 miles DON'T READ [7= Don't Know [9= Refuse 21 22. After your family was in a safe place would you return to the fire house to help with evacuation? , 1=yes 2=no DON'T [3=I would try l [4= Don't Know READ [9= Refuse 22 23. If there was a nuclear accident at Shoreham requiring the evacuation of people within a ten mils zone, how dangerous do you think it would be for you to spend a day working within the evacuation zone? 1=much more dangerous than normal fire fighting work 2=somewhat more dangerous 3=about equally dangerous than normal fire fighting work l 4=less dangerous i 5=not da'ngerous at all DON'T READ [5= Don't Know [9= Refuse 23' I i \ SOCIAL DATA ANALYSTS, INC. l . . - . -
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Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. I (Categories for Q. 24 to O. 27) 1= agree 2= disagree DON ' T READ [ 3 = Don ' t Know [9= Refuse 24. Helping with the evacuation of people from the amergency zone during a nuclear emergency should be the job of specially trained personnel rather than the job of volunteer firemen. 24
- 25. In the event of a nuclear emergency at shoreham it would
- be the obligation of everyone to first look after the '
health and safety of their family. 25
- 26. Only firemen who have specifically volunteered should be expected to help with off site evacuation during a nuclear emergency.
26 27. In the ovent of a nuclear emergency at Shoreham, a voluntee ~ . fireman must place duty to the fire department over duty to family.
,, 27 'k, 28.
Do you eu rently have any children living at home with you? l-yes 2=no (SKIP to O. 323 DON'T READ [9= Refuse 28 29. How old is the youngest child living at home with you? 1=under 5 2=5 to 12 3=13 to 18 4=over 18 DON'T READ [9= Refuse l l 29 30-31 In what district do your children attend school? 30' 1 school district (99=no children. attending school] 31 1 I s . SOCIAL DATA ANALYSTS, INC. .
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- 32. What is your current marital status?
-o \, l= married 9 2= single (SKIP to Q. 34]
3= widowed [ SKIP to Q. 34] 4= divorced or separated (SKIP to O. 34] DON'T READ (9= Refuse .
- 33. 32 Does your spouse currently work full time (30 hours a week or more)?
l=yes 2=no DON'T READ (9= Refuse
- 34. 33 What is the last grade of school that you completed?
1=some high school or less 2=high school graduate 3=some college 4= college graduate DON
- T READ (9= Refuse i
35. f.'" What is your age category? .
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l=under 25 2=25-35 3=36-50 4=51-65 5=over 65 DON'T READ [9= Refuse 35 \ -
- 36. What is your sex?
l= male 2= female 36 ~ THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION l/ i l SOCI % DATA ANALYSTS, INC.
h ' & 9 4 9 e ATTACHMENT 5
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1982 FIREMEN SURVEY
,' Responses Given by Volunteer Firemen to Role Conflict Questions Assuming that the Shoreham nuclear power plant is licensed and begins to operate, we are interested in knowing what you think you would do if there was an acc.4 dent at 'he plant.
Suppose that you were at work c. a weekday morning and there was an accident at Shoreham. Everyone living within ten miles of the plant was advised to evacuate. Volunteer firemen were expected to help with the evacuation. What do you think you would do first? first, you would report to the fire station so that you could help with fire fighting and evacuation in the evacuation zone, or 21% first, you would make sure that your family was safely out of the evacuation zone, or 68 first, you wculd leave the evacuation zone to make sure that you were in a safe place, or 1 first, you would do something else 7 , Don't know 4 Total 100% (291) How would you make sure that your family was safely out of the evacuation zone? go home and drive your family to a safe place out of the evacuation zone 32% call home and tell your family to leave without you S1 some )ther way 12 Don't know 5 Total 100% (291) , l
TABLE 2 Continued.... Do you agree or disagree that in the event of a nuclear emergency at be the obligation of everyone to firstShorehamlookit would after the health and safety of their family. agree disagree 92% Don't know 5 Total . _ 3 , 1004-(291) Do you agree or disagree that . a nuclear emergency at Shoreham, in the event of a volunteer fireman must place over duty to family, duty to the fire department agree disagree 17g Don't know 77 __ 6 Total 1004 (291) l I l l 1 9 i_
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i e 1 i i l 1 l 1 l 1 I i ATTACHMENT 6 l l l i l l l l
. _ __ _, 1 ATTACHMENT b SUFFOLK COUNTY SURVEY Volunteer Firemen March, 1988 Hello, my name is and I am calling I for Social Data Analysts. Suffolk County has retained us to do some reseach on what might happen if there were an emergency at'the Shoreham nuclear power plant. The 2 fire department is cooperating with this research. They have given us a list of members. Do you still work with the fire department? 3 Yes [ASK Q. 5] 4 No [ TERMINATE]
- 5. For how many years have you worked with this fire district?
l 0 = less than one 4 = six to ten I = one 5 = more than ten f 2 = two to three l 3 = four to five DON'T READ [9 = Refuse] 5
- 6. Assuming that the Shoreham nuclear powe r plant is licensed a nd begins to operate, we are interested in knowing what you would do if there was an accident at the plant. Suppose that you were at work on a weekday morning and there was an accident at the plant. Everyone living within ten miles of the plant was advised to evacuate as soon as possible. Volunteer firemen were asked to report to the firehouse to help with the evacuation. What do you think you would do first?
1 = first, you would report co the fire station so that you could help with fire fighting and evacuation in the evacuation zone, or [ SKIP to Q. 24] 2 = first, you would make sure that your family was safe, or [ASK Q. 7] 3 = first, you would leave the evacuation zone to make sure that you were in a safe place, or [ SKIP to Q. 21] 4 = first, you would do something else (specify) (SKIP to Q. 24] DON'T READ [5= Don't know [ASK Q. 7] [9= Refuse [ASK Q. 7] 6
- 7. Do you currently have any children living at home with you who are attending school?
I = yes (ASK Q. 8] 2 = no (SKIP to Q. 10] DON'T READ () = Refeme (SKIP to Q. 10] 7
- 8. How would you make sure that your children who go to school were safe?
D (1 = go home or r. o school and take them out of 0 t'a evacuation zone (SKIP to Q. 21] N [2 = .ay at home with them (SKIP to Q. 23] T (3 = call on the telephone to make sure they were safe (ASK Q. 9] , [4 = sonsthing else R E A (specify) [ SKIP to Q. 10] D (5 = Don't Know (SKIP to Q. 10) (9 = Refuse (SKIP to Q. 10] 8
- 9. What would you do if you could not get through on the l
telephone or you could not find out on the telephone ! whether your child ren we re safe? D (1 = go to get them and take them out of the 0 evacuation zone (SKIP to Q. 21] N
' (2 = stay at home with them (SKIP TO Q. 23]
T (3 - something else R (specify) [ASK Q. 10] E A [4 = Don't Know (ASK Q. 10] D [9 = Refuse (ASK Q. 10] 9 l l
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- 10. Do you currently have any young pre-school aged children
' l ivi ng at home with you?
I = yes (ASK Q. 11] 2 = no (SKIP to Q. 14] DON'T READ [3 = Don't Know (9 = Refuse (SKIP to Q. 14] 10
- 11. How would you make'sure that these children were safe?
D (1 = go home and take them out of the evacuation 0 zone (SKIP to Q. 21] N (2 = stay home with them (SKIP to Q. 23] T (3 = call home and ask wife or other care take r to take them out of the evacuation zone (ASK Q. 12] (4 = something else . R E A (specify) [ SKIP to Q. 14] D (5 = Don't know (ASK Q. 13] (9 = Refuse (ASK Q. 13] 11
.2. What would you do if you could not get through on the telephone?
D (1 = go to get them and take them out of the 0 evacuation zone (SKIP to Q. 21] l l N (2 = stay at hcse with them (SKIP TO Q. 23] l T (3 = something else R (specify) (ASK Q. 13] E A (4 = Don't Know (ASK Q. 13] D (9 = Refuse (ASK Q. 13] 12
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- 13. What would you do if your spouse (or other care taker]
asked you to come home and go with them out of the evacuation zone? D [1 = go home and take them out of the evacuation 0 zone [ SKIP to Q. 21] N
' stay at home with them. [ SKIP T0-Q. 23]
[2 = T [3 = insist that they go by themselves or try to get someone else to take them [ SKIP to Q. 24] [4 = something else R E A (specify) [ SKIP to Q. 24] D [5 = Don't know [ASK Q. 14] [9 = Refuse [ASK Q. 14] 13 S
- 14. Are you cur rently ma rried?
I = yes [ASK Q. 15] 2 = no [ SKIP to Q. 18] DON'T READ [9 = Refuse (SKIP to Q. 18] 14
- 15. How would you make sure that your spouse was safe?
D [1 = go home and take spouse out of evacuation 0 zone [ SKIP to Q. 21] N
' [2 = stay at home with he r/him (SKIP TO Q. 23J
[3 = call home [ASK Q. 16] l [4 = something else l R E l
- A (specify) [ SKIP to Q. 17]
D [5 = Don't Know [ SKIP to Q. 17] [9 = Refuse [ SKIP to Q. 17] 15 l I l
- 16. What would you do if you could not get through on the telephone?
[1 = go to get her/him and take her/him out of tne D evacuation zone [ SKIP to Q. 21] O N- [2 = stay at home with her/him [ SKIP TO Q. 23] T [3 = something else (specify) [ASK Q. 17] R E [4 = Don't know [ASK Q. 17] A D [9 = Refuse [ASK Q. 17] l 16 L l 17. What would you do if your spouse asked you to come home and , take her [him] out of the evacuation zone? [1 = go home and take her/him out of the evacuation D zone (SKIP to Q. 21] O N [2 = stay at home with her/him [ SKIP TO Q. 23] T [3 = insist that she go by herself or try to get someone else to take them [ SKIP to Q. 24] [4 = something else R E i A (specify) [ SKIP to Q. 24] D [5 = Don't Knoe [ASK Q. 18) 19 = Refuse [ASK Q. 18] 17 l 18. Do you currently have parents or anyone else living at home with you? l 1 = yes [ASK Q. 19] l 2 = no (SKIP To Q. 24] l DON'T READ [9 = Refuse [ SKIP to Q. 24] 18 1
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c . [ 19. How would you make sure that these people were safe? (1 = go home and take them out of the evacuation zone (SKIP to Q. 21] D 0 (2 = stay at home with them (SKIP TO Q. 23] N
' call on the telephone to make sure they
[3 = T were safe (ASK Q. 20]
'4 = something else R
E A (specify) (SKIP to Q. 24] D [5 = Don't know [ SKIP to Q. 24] l [9 = Refuse (SKIP to Q. 24] 19
- 20. What would you do if you could not get through on the telephone or you could not find out on the telephone whether these people were safe?
D (1 = go to get them and take them out of the 0 evacuation zone ( ASK Q. 21] N ' ' (2 = stay at home with them (SKIP TO Q. 23] l T (3 = something else l R (specify) [ SKIP to Q. 24] E A (4 = Don't Know [ SKIP to Q. 24] l D i (9 = Refuse (SKIP to Q. 24] 20
- 21. Where would you go?
1 = someplace in Suffolk County 2 = someplace in Nassau County 3 = someplace in New York City 4 = some other place _ (specify) 5 = you don't know (SKIP to Q. 23] DON'T READ (9 = Refuse (SKIP to Q. 23] 21 t }
- a. 7 6
, 22. In terms of miles, about how far away is this piece from g your home? %
1= 10 miles or less
-2 = 11 to 20 miles 3 = 21 to 30 miles 4 = 31 to 40 miles 5 - 41 to 50 miles 6 = more than 50 miles DON'T READ [7 = Don't know
[9 = Refuse 22
- 23. After you made sure your family was safe, would you return to the fire house to help with the evacuation?
I = yes 2 = nc DON'T READ (3 = I wot.d try (4 = Don't know , (9 = Refuse 23
- 24. If there was an accident at Shoreham and everyone living within ten miles of the plant was asked to evacuate, do you think it would be dangerous for a member of ,our family to remain in the evacuation zone for several hours?
I = yes (ASK Q. 25] 2 = no (SKIP to Q. 26] DON'T READ [3 = Don't Know (9 = Refuse (SKIP to Q. 26] 24
- 25. How dangerous do you think it would be?
! 1 = very dangerous 2 = somewhat dangerous 3 = not too dangerous DON'T READ (4 = Don't Know (9 - Refuse 25
- 26. If there was an accident at Shoreham requiring the evacuation of peorie within a ten mile zone of the plant, do you think that it would be dangerous for you to spend a day working l within the evacuation zone?
j i j 1 = yes (ASK Q. 27] 2 = no (SKIP to Q. 28] DON'T READ (3 = Don't know (9 = Refuse (SKIP TO Q. 28] 26
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.o e 27. How dangerous do you think it would be?
e 1 = much more dangerous than normal fire fighting work 2 = somewhat more dangerous than normal fire fighting work 3 = just as dangerous as normal fire fighting work 4 = less dangerous than normal fire fighting work DON'T READ [5 = Don't Know [9 = Refuse 27
- 28. About how many miles is your home from the Shoreham nuclear power plant?
l 1 = less than 5 2 = between 5 and 10 l 3 = between 11 and 15 4 = more than 15 DON'T READ [5 = Don't know [9 = Refuse 28
- 29. What is your age category?
l I = under 25-2 = 25 - 35 3 = 36 - 45 4 65 , ! 5 = over 65 l DON'T READ [9 = Refuse 29
- 30. What is your sex?
I = male 2 = female 30 i THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION [ Interviewer: Please verify and record respondent's telephone number] 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 e
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