ML20148C300

Insp Repts 50-254/97-07 & 50-265/97-07 on 970421-25. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review of Radiation Protection Performance During Unit 2 Refueling Outage

ML20148C300
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	05/09/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20148C290	List: ML20148C285 ML20148C294 ML20148C300
References
50-254-97-07, 50-254-97-7, 50-265-97-07, 50-265-97-7, NUDOCS 9705150307
Download: ML20148C300 (14)

See also: IR 05000254/1997007

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION lil

Docket Nos: 50-254; 50-265

Licenses No: DPR-29; DPR-30

Reports No: 50-254/97007(DRS): 50-265/97007(DRS) j

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Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

Facility: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station

Units 1 and 2

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Location: 22710 206th Avenue North

Cordova, IL 61242 '

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Dates: April 21-25,1997 ,

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inspectors: N. Shah, Radiation Specialist 1

D. Hart, Radiation Specialist

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Approved By: T. J. Kozak, Chief Plant Support Branch 2 ~

Division of Reactor Safety

9705150307 970509

PDR ADOCK 05000254

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2

} NRC Inspection Reports 50-254/97007; 50-265/97007

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This inspection included a review of radiation protection performance during the Unit 2

{ refueling outage (02R14). Included in the review were as low as reasonably achievable

j' (ALARA) planning and controls, source term reduction, and radworker performance. Also

reviewed were two events

(1) poor control during reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system i

valve work which resulted in one worker receiving an unplanned intake of radioactive  !

i materials and (2) the release of contaminated materials to an offsite salvage yard. The  ;

j report covered a one week inspection concluding on April 25,1997. '

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Overall,'tlw radiological controls implemented during the outage were good. In particular, ,

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the consideration of emergent and contingent work in pra-outage planning resulted in more 1

l conservative ALARA initiatives than were used in the past. The inspectors observed the

implementation of good ALARA controls and source term reduction initiatives and good

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radworker practices. However, recurrent problems were noted with identifying the extent  ;

i of scaffolding needs prior to the outage, with engineering support for lead shielding '

} activities, and with work groups not providing accurate man-hour estimates to RP for

j ALARA planning. Additionally, problems were noted with worker knowledge of

j management expectations and with communication of these expectations in radiation work

i permits (RWPs). Two violations were identified including (1) the failure to provide

i adequate engineering controls during RWCU valve work and (2) the failure to follow

station procedures regarding the unrestricted release of material from the radiologically

l posted area (RPA). The similarity of the RWCU event to other past events indicated that

? the planning and implementation of valve work was still in need of improvement.

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j Report Details

R1 Radological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls

R1.1 Intake of Radioactive Material During Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Valve

, Work

! a. Insoection Scone

! The inspectors reviewed the events surrounding a recent intake of radioactive

i material during RWCU valve work. The inspection consisted of interviewing

j workers involved in the job, a walkdown of the job site and reviewing the ALARA

! plans, radiation work permits (RWPs) and other relevant documentation.

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b. Observations and Findinos

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j On April 15,1997, a contract valve technician received an intake while performing

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work on an RWCU primary isolation valve (No. 2-1201-2) in the drywell. The initial

whole body count (WBC) indicated an intake of 1872 nCi (primarily cobalt-60),

) which cleared (via biological elimination) over the next several days until stabilizing

i at about 142 nCi. Based on the WBC results, the licensee estimated the worker

i received about 190 mrem committed effcctive dose equivalent (CEDE). The

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inspectors independently verified the dcse estimate. The licensee concluded that

the intake resulted from the failure of the workers to ensure that engineering ,

l controls (described below) were used during the job. '

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, The work consisted of measuring the valve components (which had been removed

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during the dayshift) on second shift in preparation for reassembly of the valve.

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Decontamination of the valve internals was required in this process. Three contract

workers, including a contract RP technician (CRPT) who covered the job, were

j involved. Based on an air sample taken during the valve breach (which indicated ,

5.71E-13 uCi/cc), the licensee concluded that respirators were not needed.  !

However, since the valve components were highly contaminated (25,000 to

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600,000 dpm (removable); with contact beta dose rates of 6 rad /hr), it was

j determined that it would be practical to use engineering controls to limit the

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concentration of radioactive materials in air during the decontamination of the valve

internals. Therefore, the RWP required that for decontamination activities, the

internals be placed in a glove bag which had a High Efficency Particulate Air (HEPA)

filter vacuum system attached. Additionally, the workers wore full protective  ;

clothing including faceshields. Average dose rates were 60-80 mrem /hr in the

general area and about 250 mrem /hr near the glove box. The workers received a l

prejob briefing by the CRPT prior to starting work.

During decontamination activities in the glove bag, neither the CRPT nor the valve ,

technician verified that the HEPA vacuum system was operating. After finishing

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the decontamination activities, the valve technician removed the valve disc

assembly from the glove bag and proceeded to verify its fit inside the valve body.

The worker sprayed the valve with glycerol and wiped it down to remove residual

contamination that could interfere with the fitting. However, this activity was not

performed inside the glove bag and was not challenged by the CRPT, who did not

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i recognize that the RWP spscified that decontamination activities be performed

inside the glove bag. I

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The inspectors' independer.t review agreed with the licensee's determination that

. problems with this job included a lack of worker familiarity with the controls '

s specified for the joo and a poor self-check by the workers prior to and during the

L job. The CRPT was assigned this job after he had arrived for work on April 15, was  :

{' not involved in the planning and pre-job evaluation, and had only a cursory

familiarization with the ALARA plan and RWP. During the interviews, the workers  ;

i (including the CRPT) etated that they were uncomfortable with the scope and

I conduct of the pre-job briefing; however, they did not stop and reverify the

j information prior to starting work. During work in the glove bag neither the CRPT

nor the valve technician verified that the HEPA vacuum system on the glove bag

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There were several other contributing causes to this event, including: i

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l e Poor turnover to the CRPT covering the work and during the pre-job briefing.

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The specific engineering controls used during the job (i.e. the HEPA vacuum)

. were not communicated during the pre-job briefing. Additionally, the CRPT

l who covered the valve disassembly had noted on a survey form that the

glove bag needed to be moved to a lower dose area. However, this was not

i communicated to the afternoon shift CRPT and was not done.

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e Poor coverage by the CRPT. Durin0 the job, the valve technician used a rag

and glycerol spray to decontaminate the valvo disc assembly, outside of the

j glove bag. The CRPT observed this, but dia not recognize that the RWP (no.

! 972111, Revision 2), specified that work on the disc assembly be performed

I in the glove bag.

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Additionally, the licensee's oversight of contractor activities during this job was

i weak. The licenses was developing long term corrective actions to address the

} root and contributing causes. Short term actions included placing an administrative

i hold on further valve work until all valve crew personnel were briefed on the event,

l verifying that all RWPs controlling glove bag evolutions listed the appropriate

requirements, suspending the radiologically posted area (RPA) access for the CRPT

and valve technician, and reenforcing the proper use of ventilation units with

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The failure to ensure the operability of the HEPA vacuum unit when the glove bag

was used and to perform the decontamination of the valve disc assembly inside the

glove bag, were two examples of a violation of 10 CFR 20.1701, which requires

that engineering controls (e.g. containment or ventilation) be used, to the extent

practical, to control the concentrations of radioactive materialin air (VIO 50-

254/265-g7007-01). This event was similar to those occurring in past outages

indicating that the overall planning /corere8 c! salve activities was in need of

improvement. This was discussed with the license, who planned to review these

events, in the aggregate, for generic issues.

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$ c. Conclusions

j The licensee's oversight and preparation for work on an RWCU primary isolation

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valve was ineffective. Specifically, a lack of worker familiarity with the controls

specified for the job and a poor self-check by the workers prior to and during the

i }ob, resulted in specified engineering controls not being used and a worker's intake

, of radioactive material. One violation, with two examples, was identified for the

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failure to use the specified engineering controls. The similarity of this event to

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other events in previous outages indicates that improvement was needed in the

planning and control of valve work.

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f R1.2 Contaminated Material Released Offsite

a a. Insoection Scone

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): The inspectors reviewed the recent release of contaminated material to an offsite

l scrap metal processor. The inspection consisted of interviewing workers and

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reviewing the radiological survey results, station procedures and other relevant

documentation.

i b. Observations and Findinas

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On February 21,1997, the lilinois Railway Supply Company (IRSC), a scrap meta'l

i processor, notified the licensee that a shipment of scrap metal had alarmed

' radiation monitors at the North Star Steel incorporated (NSSI) site (another scrap

metal processor). The affected scrap metal came from a railroad boxcar that the

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licenses had shipped to the IRSC on October 9,1996. The boxcar was one of two

, that had been unconditionally released from the site in September 1996, in order to

. reduce the amount of radioactive material stored in satellite RPAs. On February 20,

[ 1997, the IRSC shipped some of the scrap metal to NSSI. After the licensee was

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notified of the alarm at NSSI, RP personnel were dispatched to the NSSI and IRSC

! sites to survey the affected material. Over 70,000 lbs of scrap metal were

l recovered, with the majority having fixed contamination ranging from 400 to

j 40,000 dpm. However, the licensee identified one piece of wood and two metal

plates which had fixed contamination levels ranging from 300,000 to 500,000 dpm

(the plates also had contact radiation levels ranging from 2-3.5 mrom/hr).

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} The inspectors' independent review agreed with the licenc?.e's conclusion that the

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root cause was a non-conservative approach to the release of the material.

- Specifically, the licenses was not aware of the full radiological history of either

boxcar and did not perform a thorough survey prior to their release. For example,

! several of the above contaminated items were internal metal side wall panels

j covered by plywood sheets that had not been removed during the radiological

survey.  !

1 siation Procedure No. OCAP 600-01 (Revision 0, dated December 4,1995),

. " Control of Materials for Unconditional Release from Radiologically Posted Areas,"

l Step B.10, required that items being unconditionally released have no measurable .

activity above background as measured using portable radiation detection I

i instrumentation. The failure to follow this procedure is a violation of Technical

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Specification (TS) 6.11 which required adherence to RP procedures (VIO 50-

254/265-97007-02). In addition to the actions stated above, the licenses

suspended the RPT who performed the survey and was reviewing the unconditional

release process to ensure it was consistent with industry practice and was well

, understood by plant personnel.

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c. Conclusions

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The licensee's oversight and controls over the unconditional release of scrap

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material to an offsite vendor was ineffective. Specifically, a non-conservative

approach to the unconditional release survey resulted in the release of contaminated

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material to the offsite vendor. One violation was identified for the failure to follow I

RP procedures regarding the unconditional release of items from the RPA. I

R1.3 Review of Outage Radiological Performance

a. Insoection Scone

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's radiological performance during Q2R14.

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The inspection consisted of interviewing workers, observing ongoing work, and

j reviewing the ALARA plans, RWPs and other relevant RP documents.

b. Observations and Findinos

As of April 21,1997, with the outage about 80% complete, the station had j

accrued an annual dose of 400 rem, of which 334 rem was attributed to the

outage. The outage activities considered the most radiologically significant included

Inservice inspection (ISI), Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) suction strainer

modification, Control Rod Drive (CRD) removal /replaceinent, Unit 2 "A" recirculation

, (RR) pump motor replacement, turbine component sandblasting, reactor vessel and

vessel head flange repairs, and RR pump suction and discharge valve refurbishment.

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The ECCS suction strainer, reactor vessel and vessel head flange and RR pump

j motor and valve work were among several activities resolving outstanding material

condition deficiencies that adversely affected plant performance. For example, the

RR pump motor and valves have had several past temporary repairs to resolve

recurrent leakage problems. During this outage, the licenses replaced the RR pump

motor and refurbished the RR pump discharge and suction valves to attempt a final

l fix to the problem. Overall, about 320 rem was planned for the above material >

condition improvement initiatives. However, as explained below, the actual l

. exposure for this work was significantly less than estimated. l

The licensee's goal for 1997 was 1260 rem, including an estimated 980 rem for

Q2R14 work. Unlike previous years, these goals included estimated contributions

from contingent and projected emergent work, based on historical trends, resulting

in more contarvative ALARA planning. For 02R14, about 250 rem was estimated

from contingent and emergent work. The expected contingent work was also

included in each specific outage job dose estimate. For example, about 63 rem

contingent dose was included in the ISI work for anticipated scope expansion

and/nr the need to perform weld overlays. This estimate was consistent with the

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l additional 54 rem accrued during ISI work in the last unit 1 outage (which had a ,

similar original scope). The licensee's control of O2R14 scope and an absence of

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significant emergent work (12 rem as of April 25) has resulted in actual outage  ;

dose being significantly below the expected goal.

- Good use of ALARA controls and source term reduction efforts also contributed to l

the low dose total. Some examples of ALARA controls observed by the inspectors

included the use of

mockups for scaffold / shielding activities, RR motor pump

work, and CRD work; cameras and teledosimetry during installation of the RR pump

i motor and undervessel work; a robotic cleaning system for the reactor vessel and l

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vessel head flange work; and special tooling (based on Unit 1 outage lessons

l loamed) during CRD and RR valve work. In particular, the CRD work (comprising

, 29 drives and 2 thermal sleeves) was completed for about 1 rem compared to the

goal of 3.5 rem, even though working area dose rates were comparable to historical l

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averages. The difference was primarily attributed to tools the station developed

i which significantly decreased the disassembly time for the drives.

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I Regarding source term reduction, the licensee performed a chemical

decontamination of the RR suction and discharge piping and continued to hydrolaze l

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high dose rate piping. Although the chemical decontamination results were still  ;

i being evaluated by the licensee, an average dose rate reduction factor between 3-6

j was seen in the hydrolazed piping. The licenses focused hydrolazing on those

areas that significantly contributed to worker dose such as the CRD scram  !

discharge and sink drain lines, the south vertical floor drain, reactor building and

drywsil equipment drain headers, and the RHR heat exchanger piping. Other

3 significant actions included the installation of 29 low cobalt containing CRDs and a

l depleted zinc injection system in Unit 2. These activities were part of an ongoing

i licensee initiative to replace all the CRDs with low cobalt components and install a

depleted zinc injection system in both units.

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l The inspectors also ')ted several efforts by the licensee to address historical ,

l outage problems. For example, poor control and guidance for RWCU operation

during reactor cavity floodup resulted in water clarity issues and higher dose rates ,

3 on the refuel floor in past outages. For 02R14, a requirement was placed in the

! outage water movement plan to continue running the RWCU until good water

j clarity was achieved and chemistry personnel verified that the radioactivity

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concentration was below 0.05 uCi/ml. The inspectors verified that both criteria had

been met and observed no problems with either water clarity or refuel floor dose

i rates during 02R14. Another long standing issue was high dose rates observed on

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the RHR shutdown cooling system from entrained corrosion materialin the piping

and in the bottom of the reactor vessel. Previous attempts tc remove this material

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(via chemical decontamination and hydrolazing) were unsuce,essful owing to the

inability to reach the lower sections of the vessel and the RHR piping. In 02R14

l using a different hydrolazing configuration, the licensee removed most of the

i corrosion materialin the reactor vessel bottom. Although this did not significantly

affect dose rates, the licensee believed that flow through the vessel bottom would

improve thereby reducing the accumulation of corrosion products. The licensee

was evaluating methods to remove the remaining corrosion products in the RHR

lines.

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.The inspectors noted that the licensee continued to have problems with identifying

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scaffold needs prior to the outage, with engineering support for lead shielding

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activities and with work groups not providing accurate man-hour estimates to RP

for ALARA planning. For example, in both O2R14 and the last Unit 1 outage,

between 200-250 unplanned scaffolding requests were added to the scope. j

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Additionally, the increased demand for engineering resources to address material

condition issues have resulted in RP shielding requests not being processed in a

timely manner. These problems have not sit f.ficantly impacted outage

performance, as workers have developed informal mechanisms to resolve them.

For example, the RP staff developed an informal rule of dividing provided man-hour

l estimates by a factor of 3 to obtain a more accurate estimation of total time needed

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to be spent in radiological areas. The licensee was aware of these issues and

planned to develop corrective actions.

c. Conclusions

Overall, the radiological controls for the outage were good. Of particular note was

the licensee's effort to incorporate contingent and emergent work estimates, based

on historical performance, into the ALARA planning process. Additiorally, the

licensee continued to implement good ALARA controls and source term reduction

initiatives and made progress in resolving ongoing issues from previous outages.

However, recurrent problems were noted with identifying scaffold needs prior to

the outage, with engineering support for lead shielding activities and with work

groups not providing accurate man-hour estimates to RP for ALARA planning.

R1.4 Review of Radiological Performance For Routine Activities (Outage and Non-Outage)

a. Insoection Scone

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's radiological performance for selected routine

activities during both non-outage and outage time periods. The inspection

consisted of reviewing historical dose data, interviewing workers and observing

ongoing work. The specific activities reviewed included routine operator and

firewatch rounds, station laborer decontamination activities in high radiation areas

(HRAs) and minor instrument maintenance (IM) work in HRAs.

b. .Qbservations and Findinas

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With the exception of the station laborer activities, a general decrease was seen in '

the work exposure totals since 1994. A specific breakdown of the dese (in rem)

for each activity (non-outage and outage combined) per year is docum9nted in the

following table (for 1997, the dose was as of April 21):

Activity 1994 1995 1996 1997

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Operator rounds 37.1 27.1 26.6 7.9

Firewatch rounds 14.8 14.7 12.7 4.0

IM work 15.3 10.1 8.7 1.9

Station Laborers 21.0 26.6 32.4 7.5 '

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The station laborer dose trend reflected an increased station effort to reduce the

amount of contaminated area in order to facilitate work (such as operator rounds).

Discussions with RP personnel identified several improvement efforts taken by the

work groups to decrease station dose. For example, the inspectors observed

operators using cameras to verify the operability of equipment located in high dose

areas and both operations ac.d firewatch personnel using good ALARA techniques

(i.e. minimizing time, maximizing available shielding, etc). Additionally, the workers '

described severalinitiatives being taken to further dose reduction efforts. For

example, both the operations and firewatch departments were working with RP

personnel to develop low dose plant walkdown routes, and the station laborer

group was evaluating the recontamination rate for certain plant areas and

developing a more realistic goal for plant contaminated arca in order to reduce time

spent in HRAs.

c. Conclusions

Total exposure for routine operator and firewatch rounds and for IM work

decreased owing to station ALARA efforts. However, station laborer dose

increased owing to station decontamination efforts.

R1.5 Contaminated Oil Found in Waste Water Treatment Plant (WWTP)

On March 25,1997, during a routine walkdown, a station operator and chemistry

technician observed oil in the WWTP flocculation / clarifier tank. After identification,

the oil was concentrated and removed by a belt skimmer to the WWTP oil skimmer

holding tank. Samples were collected of the oilin the holding tank and of the

waste water at the WWTP effluent point. A gamma isotopic of both samples

identified about 4.2E-7 uCi/mi of cobalt-60 in the holding tank oil (above the

environmental lower limit of detection (LLD) value of 1.5e-8 uCi/ml) and no activity

above the environmental LLD in the effluent. A second sampling (both locations)

was performed on March 26; neither sample had activity above the environmental

LLD.

The contamination resulted from an oil sealleak on the centrifuge used to clean

turbine lube oil sent to the Dirty Oil Tank. Historically, contamination has been

observed in the turbine lube oil owing to past cross contamination events invoiving

the Units 1 and 2 oil separator. After discovery, the oil seal was immediately

repaired by the licensee.

The WWTP effluent release point was sampled monthly by the licensee and has

never seen activity via this pathway. Additionally, the WWTP discharged into the

normalliquid radwaste discharge point which was continuously monitored and ,

sampled. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's handling of this event and j

identified no problems. This event will be documented in the next annual effluent

report.

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i R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in RP&C  !

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l R4.1 Review of Outage Radworker Performance and Work Controls

I a. Insoection Scone

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i The inspectors reviewed outage radworker performance and work controls by  !

i reviewing work packages and similar relevant documentation, interviewing workers,

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attending job planning meetings and observing work activities. During the I

walkdowns, the inspectors questioned workers and RPTs regarding those

expectations stated in the licensee's " Radiation Worker Handbook" (issued August

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l 1996) and "RP, Chemistry and Station Labor " Expectations and Standards

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Handbook" (dated 1996), respectively.

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b. Observations and Findinos

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l During walkdowns of the Units 1 and 2 reactor (including ECCS rooms) and turbine

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buildings, the inspectors observed good radworker practices including use of low

dose areas, frequent checking of electronic dosimetry (EDs), proper use of personal

contamination monitoring (PCM) equipment, and proper wearing of protective

l clothing. Workers were familiar with tha " Radiation Worker Handbook"

requirements, but were confused regarding how to correctly move materialin or out

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of a contaminated area and who (RP or the workers) was responsible for ensuring

the operability of engineering controls. This was discussed with licensee

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management who planned to develop corrective actions. 1

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While observing work in the Unit 2 hip pressure coolant injection (HPCI) room (a

posted contaminated area), the inspectors noted that a worker, in full PCs, was not l'

wearing a protective hood or hard-hat. Since other workers in the area were  ;

wearing these items, the inspector questioned this worker on the RWP (No. l

973042, Revision 1) requirements for PCs. The worker stated that he did not

know the exact requirements, but believed that the use of a hood or hard hat was

optional. The inspectors verified that the worker was correct and identified several

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other RWPs which contained requirements that were optional on the part of the l

worker. The inspectors were concerned that the use of optional requirements '

would result in workers making non-conservative decisions in order to increase

productivity. Licensee management agreed with the inspectors and planned to j

review the RWP process.

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The inspectors observed good performance and controls by RPTs. For example, at

the drywell and refueling floor control points, the inspectors observed the RPTs i

removing unnecessary personnel and providing good coordination between work l

groups. Additionally, following the resumption of RWCU valve work (see Section i

R1.1), the inspectors observed an RPT provide an effective prejob briefing for  !

ongoing valve work. Based on the interview results, the inspectors concluded that

the RPTs were familiar with the "RP, Chemistry and Station Labor Expectations and

Standards Handbook" requirements.

The inspectors attended several daily planning meetings, including shift,

maintenance and operations departmant turnover briefings, station outage

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meetings, and a monthly ALARA committee meeting. Radiological concerns were

appropriately addressed and good communication between work groups was

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. c. Conclusigna

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Workers were generally familiar with management expectations and RPTs were

observed using good controls during work activities. However, some problems

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were identified regarding the understanding of requirements for control of

contaminated areas and use of engineering controls and one weakness was

identified with the use of optional controls in RWPs.

. R8 Miscellaneous RP&C lasues

The follorfing items identified in previous inspection reports were reviewed by the

inspectors:

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(Closed) Violation 50-254/265-93030-05: Failure to survey a vehicle before

j releasing. The licensee discussed the event with the appropriate station personnel

i and revised station Procedure No. OCAP 650-04, " Disposition of Radioactive

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Material Shipment Vehicles" to contain more explicit guidance for performing i

vehicle surveys. The inspectors reviewed the revised procedure and noted that

since this event, the licensee's performance in this area has been good. This item

is closed.

(Closed) IFl 50-254/265-96004-10: Station task force efforts to address poor

radiation worker practices. Since corrective actions were initiated in 1995, the

licenses has observed a decrease in the number of radworker performance events.

This was consistent with observations made during routine NRC inspections. Based

on the performance trend, this item is considered closed.

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the

conclusion of the inspection on April 25,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings

presented and did not identify any of the documents listed as proprietary.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

D. Cook, Operations Manager

W. Lipscomb, Work Control Superirtendent '

L. W. Pierce, Station Manager

G. Powell, Radiation Protection Manager

W. Schmidt, ALARA Supervisor i

R. G. Svaleson, RP/ Chemistry Superintendent

M. B. Wayland, Maintenance Manager

INSPECTION PROCEDURE USED

IP 83750 OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE

IP 84750 REACTOR WATER CHEMISTRY AND GASEOUS AND LIQUID EFFLUENT

RELEASE PROGRAM

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED  :

OPEN

50-254/265-97007-01 VIO Failure to use engineering controls (Section R1.1) ;

50-254/265-97007-02 VIO Failure to follow RP procedures (Section R1.2)

CLOSED

50-254/265-93030-05 VIO Failure to survey a vehicle (Section R8)

50-254/265 96004-10 IFl Radiation worker performance task force results

(Section R8)

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LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

NRC Information Notice No. 88-63 (dated 8/15/88) including Supplement Nos.1-3

Q2R14 Pre-Outage ALARA Report

Unit 2 "A" Recirculation Pump Internals Project ALARA Plan (dated 2/10/97)

Level 2 PIF (No. 97-0490) Investigation Report, " Radioactive Material was Released From

Quad Cities Station Due to unconditional Release Standard Deficiencies and Ineffective Risk

Assessment of the Potential Risks Involved"

Licensee investigation report (dated 4/21/97) for the 4/15/97 radioactive intake that occurred

during RWCU valve work i

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" Comed Radiation Worker Handbook," Revision 0, dated August 1996

" Quad Cities Radiation Protection, Chemistry and Station Labor Expectations and Standards

Handbook," dated 1996

Station Procedure Nos.

QCAP 600-08, Revision 0, "ALARA Program"

QCRP 6020-03, Revision 4, " Radiological Surveys"

QCAP 600-01, Revision 0, " Control of Materials for Unconditional Release for Radiological

Posted Areas"

QCMM 1515-17, Revision 0, " Pressure Seal Gate Valve Maintenance"

QCRP 6200-05, Revision 6, " Writing Radiation Work Permits"

QCAP 640-4, Revision 3, " Installation and Use of Contamination Control Devices"

QCAP 600-06, Revision 6, " Radiation Work Permit Program"

QCRP 6020-02, Revision 7, " Airborne Radioactivity Sampling and Analysis"

QCRP 6210-15, Revision 3, " Issuance & Inspection of Contamination Containment Devices"

PCFHP 400-10, Revision 2, " Replacing or Relocating LPRMs or Dry Tubes"

QCAP 650-04, Revision 2, " Disposition of Radioactive Material Shipment Vehicles"

Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) Nos.

973093, Revision 1, " Unit 2 Main Turbine Overhaul"

973094, Revision 4, " Unit 2 Main Turbine Sandblasting Activities"

973067, Revision 1, " Reactor Head and Reactor Vessel Flange Repairs"

972101, Revision 2, "2-0202-4A/5A: Replace Stem / Repair / Repack / Test Valves"

972102, Revision 2, "2-0202-4B/5B: Replace Stem / Repair / Repack / Test Valves"

972060, Revision 0, " Unit 2 "A" Recirculation Motor Removal"

972061, Revision 0, " Unit 2 "A" Recirculation Pump: Furmanite Clamp & Pump Internals

Work"

972062, Revision 1, " Unit 2 "A" Recirculation Pump: Repair Flange Face"

972111, Revision 2, "2-1201-2 Inboard Isolation: Disassemble / Inspect / Repair"

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972031, Revision 2, "ECCS MOD: Unit 2 DW Asbestos Insulation Abatement" ,

973065, Revision 0, "ECCS: Suction Strainer Replacement Mod (Support Activities"

973066, Revision 1, " Unit 2 Torus Diving Activities"

973064, Revision 0, " Unit 2 ECCS Suction Strainer Mod: RB Basement Support '

Activities"

972011, Revision 0, " Control Rod Drives: Remove / Replace / Transfer"

%1053, Revision 2, " Weld Overlays: Repair listed welds"

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972023, Revision 2, "ISI: Drywell Insulation Support"

972024, Revision 0, "ISI: Drywell Scaffold Support"

972025, Revision 0, "ISI: Drywell Listed Inspections"

973119, Revision 1, "ISI: Insulation Repair /Decon/ Staging on Unit 1 RB 666"

973118, Revision 0, "ISI: Prep / Inspect Urdt 2 Reactor Vessel Head Welds"

972016, Revision 0, " Unit 2 DW Replace Dry Tubes: IRM 11-14 and SRM 21-22"

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