IR 05000321/1985035
| ML20140E693 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 01/22/1986 |
| From: | Blake J, Crowley B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140E684 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-85-35, 50-366-85-35, NUDOCS 8602040055 | |
| Download: ML20140E693 (13) | |
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pDQteo UNITED STATES o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11 p
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 O
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Report Nos.: 50-321/85-35 and 50-366/85-35 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.:
50-321 and 50-366 License Nos..
DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name:
Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection d-ecember 9-13, 1985
/ 22-64 j
Inspecto -
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owley fateSigned
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Approved by:
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.E)4ake'.SectionChief D' ate Signed
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En n9ering Branch D' ision of Reactor Safety
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SUMMARY i
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection involved 43 inspector-hours in the
areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters (Units I and 2) and
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inservice inspection (ISI) (Unit 1).
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- H. C. Nix, Site General Manager T. V. Green, Deputy General Manager
- C. T. Jones, Manager of Engineering P. E. Fornel, Manager of Quality Assurance (QA)
- J. L. Wilkes, Manager of Special Projects
- D. A. McCusker, Superintendent of Quality Control (QC)
J. L. Large, Superintendent of Maintenance 0. M. Fraser, QA Audit Supervisor P. Norris, Senior Plant Engineer D. J. Vaughn, Senior QA Representative G. R. Brinson, Senior QC Specialist R. K. Godby, Plant Engineer T. S. Huckaby, ISI Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included QC personnel, engineers, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organization T. N. Epps, Manager Inspection, Testing and Engineering, Southern Company Services (SCS)
A. G. Maze, Supervisor of NDE, SCS
- J. M. Agold, Supervisor of Coordination and Documentation, SCS
- D. R. Barnes, ISI Site Coordinator, SCS
- G. A. Loftus, Lead Inspector - Level III, SCS NRC Resident Inspectors
- P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector G. M. Nejfelt, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 13, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dis-senting comments were received from the licensee.
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 321/85-35-01, Revision of Procedures UT-H-400 i
and UT-H-470 to Specify Qualification to EPRI Program paragraph 7.b(1).
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(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 321/85-35-02, Revision of Procedure UT-H-408 for UT of Overlay Welds paragraph 7.b(2).
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 321/85-35-03, Revision of MT Procedure MT-H-501 to Cover Measurement of Black Light Intensity paragraph 7.c.
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 321/S5-35-04, Review of ISI Inspection Plans to Insure that 10 year Requirements are Met paragraph 8.a.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Violation 321/85-26-03, Failure to Follow Inspection Program for Class 2 Tubing Welds. Georgia Power Company's letter of response (NED-85-
-818) dated November 4, 1985, has been reviewed and determined to be accep-table by Region II (RII).
The inspector examined corrective actions as stated in the letter of response and discussed the corrective actions with responsible licensee personnel.
Review of documentation associated with corrective action revealed that the nondestructive (NDE) examiner who performed the PT inspections in question was not properly certified at the time of the NRC finding due to a mixup in termination /re-employment dates.
This fact was identified by a OA audit (see finding LR-QAM-001-1085) af ter the NRC finding. This was not apparent during the NRC inspection due to the mixup in termination /re-employment dates.
Based on the QA audit finding, all affected welds were re-inspected and the examiner in question re-tested and re-certified.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item 321, 366/85-14-02, Resolution of Requirements for Incre se in Inspection Scope When Corrective Actions are Required for Pipe Supports.
This item was opened to resolve questions relative to the licensee's program for re-examination of problem supports and expansion of inspection scope when results of pipe support examinations require correc-tive actions.
The licensee has revised procedure 450C-INS-001-05 to cover scope expansion when problems are found.
In addition, the licensee has reviewed past practices and found that Section XI has not been violated in the area of scope expansion. The licensee has not resolved the question relative to re-examination.
This item is still being reviewed.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.
5.
Independent Inspection Effort (Unit 1)
a.
General Inspection (54834B) (42902B) (429408)
The inspector conducted a general inspection of portions of the reactor and auxiliary buildings to observe activities such as housekeeping, material identification and control, and material storag '
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b.
Main Steam Isolation Valve Stem Failure When the main steam isolation valves were disassembled, the stem in the
"A" inboard valve was found to be broken at the relief groove above the back seat.
Also, the stem in the
"B" inboard valve was visually cracked 3/4 around the circumference at the relief groove.
The " A" inboard valve stem was previously found broken and replaced in July of 1985. The breaks appear to be fatigue related.
In July 1985, it was thought that the failure occurred due to the disc not being fully back seated allowing the disc to vibrate.
In July 1985, steps were taken to assure that the discs were fully back seated. The valve manufacturer has redesigned the stem changing the diameter from 1 3/4" to 2" and changing the relief groove design.
The licensee is still evaluating this problem.
The inspector observed:
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"A" inboard broken stems - current and July 1985
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"B" inboard cracked stem
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"B" outboard - PT of relief area okay
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"D" outboard - some PT indication of crack relief area Within the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Inservice Inspection - Review of Program (73051) (Unit 1)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's inservice inspection (ISI) program for the current outage in the areas indicated below. The first 10 year inspec-tion interval for Unit I will conclude on December 31, 1985. Therefore, all inspections required for the first interval are to be completed during the current outage. In accordance with Georgia Power Company letters NED-85-483
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dated June 25, 1985, and NED-85-508 dated July 18, 1985, the first 10 year interval inspections are to be completed in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, 1980 Edition, W80 Addenda.
The letters provided the ISI program updates to the 1980 code and applicable relief requests.
NRC letter, Harold R. Denton to J. T. Beckham, Jr., dated November 7, 1985, provided a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the updated program.
The SER granted some relief requests, conditionally granted others, and denied some. Based on a meeting November 19, 1985, between Georgia Power Company and the NRC, Georgia Power Company submitted additional information by letter SL-85-49 dated November 27, 1985.
The ietter requested NRC's approval of the information provided.
In addition to the inspections required to meet the first 10 year interval requirements and various other augmented inspections, the outage plan
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includes inspections of stainless steel pipe welds relative to Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) problems. The proposed inspection program l
for these welds is specified in Georgia Power Company's Letter NED-85-477
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dated July 1, 1985. In general, the proposal specifies 100 percent inspec-tion of the 130 stainless steel welds in the Reactor Recirculation (RECIRC),
Residual Heat Removal (RHR), and Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) systems.
In addition, the proposal provides for IGSCC mitigation techniques using weld overlays or Induction Heat Stress Improvement (IHSI).
By letter dated August 1, 1985, the NRC approved Georgia Power Company's proposal with comments.
In summary, the comments relate to:
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Requalification at EPRI NDE Center of all UT personnel performing detection and evaluation
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Training and qualification at EPRI NDE Center of personnel performing inspections of overlays
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Overlay of axial cracks to provide a leak barrier
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Interim guidelines for allowable flaw sizes for flux welds UT inspection after IHSI treatment
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In addition to post IHSI UT, the inspection plan specified UT of a sample consisting or 22 welds prior to IHSI. However, during this inspection the sample was increased to include all of the 6" RWCU welds due to crack-like indications found in two RWCU welds.
Southern Company Services (SCS) has the responsibility as the ISI contrac-tor. Lambert, McGill and Thomas (LMT) is the primary subcontractor for NDE inspections.
In addition, Combustion Engineering, Inc. (CE) and Nuclear Energy Services (NES) have subcontracts to assist in NDE inspections.
a.
The inspector reviewed the inspection plan listed in b. below to determine whether the plan had been approved by the licensee, b.
The inspector reviewed the following Georgia Power Company (GPC) and SCS documents relative to the ISI program. Many of the documents have been reviewed during previous inspections (see RII Reports 50-321, 366/84-42 and 50-321, 366/85-11). During the current inspection, only changes to previously reviewed documents were reviewed.
(1) SCS " Nondestructive Examination Outage Plan - Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1 - 1985 Fall Outage" (2) HNP QA-03-02, Revision 11, " Training and Personnel Qualifications" (3) HNP QA-05-01, Revision 13, " Field Audits" (4) Hatch Administrative Control (AC) Procedure 10 AC-MGR-003-05, Revision 2, " Preparation and Control or Procedures" (5) Hatch Administrative Procedure AG-ADM-14-1184, Revision 0,
" Administration of Procedure Reviews"
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(6) Hatch AC Procedure 20AC-ADM-01-0, Revision 0, " Document Distri-bution and Control" (7) Hatch AC Procedure 20AC-ADM-002-05, Revision 1,
" Plant Records Management" (8) Hatch AC Procedure 10AC-MGR-007-05, Revision 0, " Personnel Quali-fication Requirements" (9) Hatch QC Procedure 450C-INS-001-05, Revision 1, "ISI Visual Exam Surveillance Procedure for Class 1, 2, and 3 Pipe Supports" (10) Hatch AC Procedure 10AC-MGR-02-0, Revision 0, " Plant Review Board Administrative Procedure" (11) Hatch AC Procedure 40AC-ENGR-01-0, Revision 0, " Inservice Inspec-tion (ISI) Program" (12)
" Plant Hatch QA Department Annual Audit Planning Matrix, Schedule and Status Report-1985," 11/21/85 (13)
" Inservice Inspection Program Audit Matrix," R0, 12/4/85 (14)
SCS GEN-H/F/V-100, Revision 3, " Procedure Numbering System" (15)
SCS GEN-H/F/V-101, Revision 3, " Filing System" (16) SCS GEN-H/F/V-102, Revision 5,
" Procedure Development and Revision" (17) SCS ADM-H/F-200, Revision 2, " Inservice Inspection and Inservice Testing Plan and Revisions" (18) SCS ADM-H/F-201, Revision 2, " Inservice Inspection and Inservice Testing Program and Revisions" (19) SCS ADM-H/F-203, Revision 2, " Design Change Incorporation" (20)
SCS ADM-H/F-204, Revision 3, "" Nondestructive Examination Outage Plan" (21)
SCS ADM-H/F/V-205, Revision 3, " Indication Notification" (22) SCS ADM-H/F-206, Revision 3,
" Deviations to SCS Preservice/
Inservice Inspection Procedures and Examination Plans" (23)
SCS ADM-H/F-207, Revision 2, " Final Report Preparation" (24)
SCS ADM-H/F-208, Revision 2, " Data Control" i
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(25) SCS ADM-H-211, Revision 1, "The Georgia Power / Southern Company Services ISI/NDE Program Responsibilities for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2" (26) SCS ADM-H/F/V-212, Revision 2, "Nonconformance items" (27) SCS AUX-H/F/V-300, Revision 2, " Procedure (written practice) for Qualification of Nondestructive Personnel" (28) SCS AUX-H-301, Revision 0, " Measuring and Recording Search Unit Location During Manual Ultrasonic Examinations" (29) SCS AUX-H-302, Revision 1, "Preservice and Inservice Inspection Documentation" (30) SCS UT-H-450, Revision 1, " Qualification of Manual Ultrasonic Equipment" These documents were reviewed to assure that procedures and plans had been established (written, reviewed, approved and issued) to control and accomplish the following activities:
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Organizational structure including qualifications, training, responsibilities, and duties of personnel responsible for ISI Audit including procedures, frecuency, and qualification of
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personnel
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General QA requirements including examination report, deviations from previously established program, material certifications and identification of components to be covered
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Work and inspection procedures
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Control of processes including suitably controlled work condi-tions, special methods, and use of qualified personnel
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Corrective action Document control
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Control of examination equipment
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Quality records including documentation of indications and NDE
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findings, review of documentation, provisions to assure legibility and retrievability, and corrective action Scope of the inspection including description of areas to be
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examined, examination category, method of inspection, extent of examinations, and justification for any exception
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Definition of inspection interval and extent of examination
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Qualification of NDE personnel
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Controls of generation, approval, custody, storage and maintenance of NDE records Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Inservice Inspection - Review of Procedures (730528) (Unit 1)
The inspector reviewed the ISI procedures indicated below to determine whether the procedures were consistent with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments.
See paragraph 6 above for the applicable code.
a.
The following procedures were reviewed in the areas of procedure approval, requirements for qualification of NDE personnel, and compi-lation of required records:
(1) SCS-UT-H-400, Revision 5, " Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Full Penetration Piping Welds (Greater than 0.400 inch)"
(2) SCS-UT-H-408, Revision 0,
" Ultrasonic Examination of Weld Overlays" (3) SCS-UT-H-410, Revision 3,
" Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Pressure Vessel Welds" (4) SCS-UT-H-470, Revision 0, " Plan Flaw Sizing Procedure" (5) SCS-MT-H-500, Revision 1, " Dry Power Magnetic Particle Examination Yoke Method" (6) SCS-MT-H-501, Revision 1,
" Wet Florescent Magnetic Particle Examination Procedure" (7) SCS-PT-H-600, Revision 1,
" Visible, Solvent-Removable. Liquid Penetrant Examination Procedure" (8) SCS-VT-H-710, Revision 0, " Visual Examination (VT-1)"
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LMT-UT-3, Revision 9, " Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Vessel Nozzle Forging Inner Radii" (10) LMT-VT-11, Revision 6, " Nuclear Preservice and Inservice Exami-nation of Threads In Pressure Vessel Flange Stud Holes" b.
UT Procedures SCS-UT-H-400, SCS-UT-H-408, SCS-UT-H-410, SCS-UT-H-470, LMT-UT-3 and LMT-UT-11 were reviewed for procedure technical content relative to:
type of apparatus, extent of coverage including beam angles and scann;ng techniques, calibration requirements, search units,
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DAC curves, transfer requirements, reference level for monitoring discontinuities, method of demonstrating penetration, levels of evaluation and recording indications, and acceptance standards.
In addition, the procedures used for inspection of stainless pipe welds were reviewed to determine whether the latest guidelines necessary for detecting and evaluation of IGSCC (i.e., equipment, recording levels, evaluation techniques, etc.) had been incorporated.
Witn exception - of Procedures SCS-UT-H-408 and SCS-UT-H-470, the UT procedures listed were reviewed during previous inspections (see RII Reports 50-321, 366/84-42 and 50-321, 366/85-11).
During the current inspection only changes to previously reviewed procedures were reviewed.
The following problems with the above procedures were identified:
(1) SCS-VT-H-400 and SCS-UT-H-470 - These procedures do not speci fy qualification of NDE personnel to the EPRI NDE Center Program.
The licensee and SCS agreed to revise the procedures to require qualification to the EPRI NDE Center Program.
Pending review of the revised procedures, this matter is identified as Inspector Followup Item 321/85-35-01, Revision of Procedures UT-H-400 and UT-H-470 to Specify Qualification to the EPRI Program.
It should be noted that personnel are being qualified to the EPRI Program even in the absence of procedure requirements.
(2) SCS-UT-H-408 - The following areas of this procedure were identi-fied that need changing / evaluating:
The procedure needs to specify qualification of NDE personnel
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to the EPRI NDE Center Program.
Paragraph 7.2.1 allows angle beam search units to produce a
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sound beam within
of the nominal angle.
This was written for the creeping wave and appears to be too wide a variation for the 60 and 70 angle beam transducers.
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Paragraph 10 does not fully describe the required surface finish for UT inspection of overlays. The licensee plans to use workmanship samples for acceptance of the surface finish.
The use of the workmanship samples needs to be described in the procedure.
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Paragraph 11.4 specifies that for scanning the gain be adjusted to obtain noise levels of 10 to 15% full screen height (FSH).
This might require reducing the sensitivity below the reference level. The licensee was in the process of manufacturing a new calibration block and agreed to evaluate this question on the new calibration bloc __
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4 The licensee and SCS agreed to evaluate the above problems and make necessary procedure changes.
Pending review of the revised procedure, this matter is identified as inspector Followup Item 321/85-35-02, Revision of Procedure UT-H-408 for UT of Overlay Welding.
c.
Procedures SCS-MT-H-500 and SCS-MT-H-501 were reviewed in the area of procedure technical content relative to:
examination method, surface preparation, use of color contrast particles, viewing conditions for fluorescent particles, examination directions and overlap, prod or pole spacing, magnetizing current or lifting power and acceptance, criteria.
During review of Procedure SCS-MT-H-501, the inspector noted that the procedure does not clearly cover the ASME Code,Section V requirement to verify the intensity of the black light every eight hours.
The licensee and SCS agreed to revise the procedure to clearly define this requirement. Pending review of the revised procedure, this matter is identified as Inspector Followup Item 321/85-35-03, Revision of MT Procedure MT-H-501 to cover Measurement of Black Light Intensity.
d.
Procedure PT-H-600 was reviewed in the area of procedure technical content relative to: method consistent with ASME Code, specification of brand names of penetrant materials, specification of limits of sulfur and total halogens for materials, pre-examination surface preparation, minimum drying time following surface cleaning, penetrant application and penetration time, temperature requirements, solvent
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removal, method of surface drying, type of developer and method of
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application, examination technique, technique for evaluation, accep-tance standards, and requalification requirements.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Inservice Inspection - Observation of Work and Work Activities (737538)
(Unit 1)
The inspector observed the ISI activities described below to determine whether these activities were being performed in accordance with regulatory
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requirements and licensee procedures. See paragraph 6 above for the appli-
cable code.
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a.
As noted in paragraph 6 above, the first ISI 10 year interval will conclude on December 31, 1985.
The inspector compared the current outage plan for Class I components and piping with the " Modified First 10 year Inservice Examination Plan for Class 1 Components - Edwin I.
l Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 1" to determine whether the 10-year require-ments of the Technical Specifications, ASME Section XI, and the ISI
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Program accepted by the NRC will be met during the current outage in the areas of:
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Methods of examination
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Extent of examination See paragraph 6 for a discussion of the status of NRC acceptance of the updated ISI Program and relief requests.
During the review, the inspector identified the following problems:
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On sketch A-1 in the outage plan and the 10 year plan, the bottom RV head torus meridional welds were identified as C-5-A through C-5-H.
In the outage plan examination table, the welds are identified as BHT-A through BHT-H.
i For the support skirt to RV bottom head weld, the outage plan
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specifies examination of 5% of the circumference of the weld. The 1974 ASME Code,Section XI, which is being used for weld selection requires that 10% of the circumference of the weld be examined.
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RV instrument nozzle welds N10, N11A, N118, N12A, N128, N16A and N168 are not listed in the 10 year plan examination tables. They are shown on sketch A-1.
A5ME,Section XI, requires a VT-2
inspection of these welds.
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CRD housing welds are listed in the outage plan, but not in the 10 year plan.
For RV closure head studs, the outage plan specifies UT only. By
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ASME,Section XI, studs that are removed require UT and surface examination.
Some studs are removed at plant Hatch.
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For pipe weld 1821-1MS-24D-2, the 10 year plan indicates that inspection has not been performed and is required during the third period. However, the outage plan does not include this weld. The ISI contractor, SCS, stated that the 10 year plan is in error in that the weld was actually examined 10/84.
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The 10 year plan requires that pipe welds 1E11-1RHR-24A-R-2, 248-R-2 and 24B-R-3 be RT inspected. However, these welds are not in the outage plan.
SCS indicated that this was an oversite in preparation of the outage plan. The welds required RT and surface examination and the surface examination had been performed during a previous outage.
The individual preparing the outage plan failed to notice that the RT had not been performed.
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Containment penetration welds have been added to the outage plan due to concerns expressed by NRC.
However, the welds are not in the 10 year pla At the time of the inspector's review, SCS was in the process of reviewing the 10-year plan and outage reports for the previous outages to insure that all 10 year requirements are being met. This review was not complete at the time of the inspector's review. Some of the items identified by the inspector had been noted by SCS. It appears that the type problems identified by the inspector will be identified by the SCS review. Pending completion of the SCS review and further review of the problems by the inspector, this matter is identified as Inspector Followup Item 321/85-35-04, Review of ISI Inspection Plans to Insure that 10 year Requirements are Met.
b.
Personnel qualification / certification records for one Level I, one Level I-trainee, two Level II, and two Level III examiners associated with the inspections of paragraphs c. and d. below were reviewed.
In addition, the inspector discussed with the licensee and SCS their qualification program for NDE examiners inspecting stainless steel pipe welds. All Level II and III examiners performing final UT inspections (after IHSI) are required to have passed the current EPRI NDE Center detection course.
Examiners sizing cracks will have passed the EPRI sizing course. All examiners inspecting overlay welds are required to successfully complete the EPRI NDE Center Weld Overlay Workshop.
In addition to meeting SNT-TC-1A requirements, all Level I and II examiners are required to take a written test on applicable SCS pro-cedures.
Also, Level I examiners are required to demonstrate this ability on an IGSCC block prior to scanning for IGSCC.
c.
A portion of the in process UT inspection, including calibration activities, was observed for the following welds:
Weld Sketch Examination N2C A-1 0 and 60 N2F A-1 0 and 60 IB31-1RC-12AR-G-2 A-18 45 (Pre-IHSI)
IB31-1RC-12AR-G-3 A-18 45 (pre-IHSI)
The inspections were compared with applicable procedures in the following areas:
(1) Availability of and compliance with approved NDE procedure (2) Use of knowledgeable NDE personnel (3) Use of NDE personnel qualified to the proper level (4) Recording of inspection results (5) Type of apparatus used (6) Extent of coverage of weldment (7) Calibration requirements (8) Search units (9) Beam angles (10) DAC curves L
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(11) Reference level for monitoring discontinuities (12) Method of demonstrating penetration (13) Limits of evaluating and recording indications (14) Recording significant indications (15) Acceptance limits d.
The inspector observed a UT "re-look" at indications in weld 1G31-1R2CV-6-D-5 (pre-IHSI).
e.
The inspector observed a demonstration of the UT technique to be used for inspection of the RECIRC system nozzle to safe-end welds.
The demonstration was on a mockup of the nozzles to safe-end weld con-taining an axial crack. A 60 1MHZ refracted longitudinal wave trans-ducer was used.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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