IR 05000321/1985011
| ML20127E228 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 04/22/1985 |
| From: | Blake J, Crowley B, Newsome R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127E213 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-85-11, 50-366-85-11, NUDOCS 8505200008 | |
| Download: ML20127E228 (13) | |
Text
pn nf req'6 UNITE 3 STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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g REGION 11 g
j 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
- t ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-321/85-11 and 50-366/85-11 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545-Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.:
50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.:
DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility.Name: Hatch Inspection Conducted: April 9 - 12, 1985 Inspectors:
M, [. M dk&I B. R. Crowley
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Date Signed-dd
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4-se -er W.
wt e Date Signed
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Approved by:
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'Y J.
Take, Section Chief Dat'e Sfgned
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En n ring Branch D is on of Reactor. Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 58 inspector-hours on site in the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters (Unit 1),
inservice inspection (ISI) (Unit 2), IE Bulletins (Units 1 and 2), and Inspector Followup Items (Units 1 and 2).
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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8505200008 880424 gDR ADOCK 05000322 PDR
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- H. Nix, Site General Manager T. Green, Deputy General Manager D. McCusker, Superintendent of Quality Control (QC)
P. Norris, Senior Plant Engineer
- E. Aldridge, Superintendent of Materials-C.' Goodman, Senior Plant Engineer, Regulatory Compliance J. Ponder, Plant Engineer, Regulatory Compliance C._Stancil, Regulatory Compliance Engineer R. Godby, Plant Engineer D. Vaughn, Senior Quality Assurance (QA) Field Representative
- C. Garner, QA Field Representative Other. licensee employees contacted included QC inspectors, engineers, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organizations
- D. Barnes, ISI Site Coordinator, Southern Company Services (SCS)
J. Agold, Supervisor of Coordination and Documentation (SCS)
M. Belford, Supervisor, Inspection Engineering, (SCS)
- G. Loftus, Lead Inspector - Level III, (SCS)
- R. Kellerhall, Lead Inspector, Lambert, McGill and Thomas (LMT)
NRC Resident Inspector P. Holme-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 12, 1985, with those persons indicated in the paragraph above. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (IFI), 366/85-11-01, Identification of the Lower Supports on A and B RHR-HX, paragraph 6.b.(6).
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio. _ - -
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Licensee Action on. Previous' Enforcement Matters (0 pen) -Violation 1321/84-49-02, Failure to Follow Weld Material Control l Procedure. Georgia Power. Company's letter of response (NED-85-074) dated February-6,1985, has. been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region'II (RII). The inspectors examined corrective actions as stated in the letter of response and discussed the corrective. actions with responsible licensee. personnel.
Examination.of 'the corrective action included
- inspection of ' the tool _ room and warehouse for welding material storage
. conditions. This ' inspection revealed that welding materials stored in the warehouse do not appear to be adequately segregated by material type.
Although all materials are identified and the material type and size is identified by tape on the storage shelf directly adjacent,to the material, materials of different. types are stored in the same area in-some cases. The licensee agreed to segregate the material by type in a more orderly manner.
Warehouse storage will be examined during future inspections.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.
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Inservice Inspection - Review of Program (73051)(Unit 2)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's inservice -inspection (ISI) program for the current outage.in the areas indicated below. -In accordance with the updated program (submitted.to NRC on August 12, 1983), the applicable-Code is the ASME Boiler' and Pressure Vessel Code,'Section XI,1980 Edition with Addenda thru W80.. Southern Company Services (SCS) has the responsibility as the ISI contractor. Lambert, McGill and Thomas (LMT) 'is a subcontractor for
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-Nondestructive Examination'(NDE) inspections.
a.
.The inspectors reviewed the -inspection plans listed in b. below to determine whether the plans had been approved.by the Itcensee.
b.
The inspectors reviewed the following Georiga Power Company (GPC) and SCS documents relative to the ISI program. Except for the Examination Outage Plan, GPC administrative control procedures 10AA-MGR02-0 and 40AC-ENG01-0, GPC " Quality Assurance Audit Program (By Auditor) -1984",
and GPC " Audit Plan" QA-80-294, these documents have been reviewed during previous inspections-(See RII Report 50-321,366/84-42). During
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the current inspection, only changes to previously reviewed documents were reviewed.
(1) SCS " Nondestructive Examination Outage Plan - Edwin I. Hatch
Nuclear Plant Unit-2 - 1985 Spring Outage"
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(2) HNP QA-03-02, Revision 11, " Training and Personnel Qualifications" j
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(3) HNP QA-05-01, Revision 10, " Field Audits"
(4) HNP-9, Revision 26, " Procedure Writing Use and Control" i
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(5) HNP-10, Revision 14, " Document Distribution and Control" (6) HNP-820, Revision 14, " Plant Records Management" (7) Hatch Quality Control Procedure, " Inservice Inspection Visual Examination Surveillance Procedure for Classes 1, 2, and 3 Pipe Supports" (8) Hatch Administrative Control Procedure 10AC-MGR02-0, Revision 0,
" Plant Review Board Administrative Procedure" (9) Hatch Administrative Control Procedure 40AC-ENGR 01-0, Revision 0,
" Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program" (10) HNP-823, Revision 9, " Qualification of Inspection Personnel" (11) " Plant Hatch QA Department Annual Audit Schedule and Status -
1985", 3/22/85 (12) " Inservice Inspection Program Audit Matrix" (13) SCS GEN-H/F/V-100, Revision 2, " Procedure Numbering System" (14) SCS GEN-H/F/V-101, Revision 2, " Filing System" (15) SCS GEN-H/F/V-102, Revision 4,
" Procedure Development and Revision" (16) SCS ADM-H/F-200, Revision 1, " Inservice Inspection and Inservice Testing Plan and Revisions" (17) SCS ADM-H/F-201, Revision 1, " Inservice Inspection and Inservice Testing Program and Revisions" (18) SCS ADM-H/F-203, Revision 1, " Design Change Incorporation" (19) SCS ADM-H/F-204, Revision 2, " Nondestructive Examination Outage Plan" (20) SCS ADM-H/F/V-205, Revision 2, " Indication Notification" (21) SCS ADM-H/F-206, Revision 2,
" Deviations to SCS Preservice/
Inservice' Inspection Procedures and Examination Plans" (22) SCS ADM-H/F-207, Revision 1, " Final Report Preparation" (23) SCS ADM-H/F/V-208, Revision 1, " Data Control" (24) SCS ADM-H-211, Revision 0, "The Georgia Power / Southern Company Services ISI/NDE Program Responsibilities for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2"
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(25) SCS ADM-H/F/V-212, Revision 1, "Nonconformance Items" (26) SCS AUX-H/F/V-300, Revision 2, " Procedure (written practice) for Qualification of Nondestructive Personnel" (27) SCS AUX-H-301, Revision 0, " Measuring and -Recording Search Unit Location During Manual Ultrasonic Examinations" (28) SCS AUX-H-302, Revision 0, "Preservice and Inservice Inspection Documentation" (29) SCS UT-H-450, Revision 0,
" Qualification of Manual Ultrasonic Equipment" These ~ Jocuments were reviewed to assure that procedures and plans had been (;tablished (written, reviewed, approved and issued) to control and accomplish the following activities:
Vrganizational structure including qualifications, training,
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responsibilities, and duties of personnel responsible for.ISI Audits including procedures, frequency, and qualification of
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personnel General QA requirements including examination report, deviations
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from previously established program, material certifications and identification of components to be covered Work and inspection procedures
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Control of processes including suitably controlled work
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conditions, special methods, and use of qualified personnel Corrective action
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Document control
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Control of examination equipment
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Quality records including documentation of indications and NDE
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findings, review of documentation, provisions to assure legibility and retrievability, and corrective action Scope of the inspection including description of areas to be
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examined, examination category, method of inspection, extent of examinations, and justification for any exception
' Definition of inspection interval and extent of examination
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Qualification of NDE personnel
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Controls of generation, approval, custody, storage and maintenance
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of NDE records-Within the areas inspected, no_ violations or deviations were identified.
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NDE Inservice Inspection'(ISI) Unit 2 During ' this inspection period, ISI examinations were being performed in 1 Unit 2 by LMT utilizing LMT personnel and -some SCS examiners.. The'
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examinations were being' accomplished in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel - Code,.Section XI,1980 edition, Winter 1980 addenda. The inspectors observed a limited amount of work activities due to the limited'
availability' of examination items ready for ISI during - this ~ inspection
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The inspectors reviewed procedures, certification records of
' equipment, materials, and NDE personnel which will subsequently be utilized
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during~ the required ISI examinations during this outage. The observations-and/or reviews conducted by the inspectors are documented in the following
' subparagraphs.
a.
Review of Procedures (73052)
(1) The inspectors reviewed the procedures indicated below to deter-nine whether the procedures were consistent with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments.
The procedures were also reviewed in the areas of procedure approval, requirements - for '
qualification of - NDE personnel, and compilation of required records.
Procedure No.
Title LMT PT-3 (R4)
" Liquid Penetrant Examination" (With Field Change No. 2)
LMT UT-3-(R9)
" Ultrasonic Examination-of Reactor Vessel Nozzle Forging Inner Radii"'
LMT UT-11 (R6)
" Nuclear Preservice and Inservice Examination of Threads In Pressure Vessel Flange Stud Holes" LMT UT-12 (R3)
" Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Vessel Nozzle Bore" LMT QA-6 (R13)
" Qualification and Certification of NDE Personnel" SCS UT-H-410 (R2)
" Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Pressure Vessel Welds"
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(2) Procedure LMT PT-3 (R4) was reviewed for procedure technical content relative to: method consistent with ASME code, specifica-tion of brand names of penetrant materials, specification of limits of sulfur and total halogens for materials, pre-examination surface preparation, minimum drying time following surface cleaning, penetrant application and penetration time, temperature requirements, solvent removal, method of surface drying, type of developer and method of application, examination technique, technique ' for evaluation, acceptance standards, and requalifica-tion requirements.
(3) Procedures LMT UT-3 (R9), LMT UT-11 (R6), LMT UT-12 (R3), and SCS UT-H-410 (R2) were reviewed for procedure technical content relative to: type of apparatus, extent of coverage including beam angles and scanning techniques, calibration requirements, search units, DAC curves, transfer requirements, reference level for monitoring discontinuities, method of demonstrating penetration, levels of evaluation and recording indications, and acceptance standards.
b.
Observation of Work and Work Activities (737538)
The inspectors observed the ISI activities described below to determine whether these activities were being performed in accordance with regulatory requirements and licensee procedures.
(1) The below listed personnel qualification records for NDE Examiners were reviewed:
Method Level I Level II Level III Liquid Penetrant
2 Magnetic Particle
2 Ultrasonic
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Eddy Current
1 Visual Examination VT-1 VT-2 VT-3 VT-4 Level Level Level Level 2-II 1-III 1-II 1-III 2-II 1-III 1-II 1-III (2) The above personnel qualification records were reviewed to ascertain whether the records properly reflect the following:
Employer's name
Person certified
Activity qualified to perform
Level of certification
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- Effective period of certification
Signature of individual certifying title and level
Basis used for certification, such as the required number of training hours, etc., for the respective NDE method.
- Annual visual acuity and color vision examination and periodic recertification.
(3). A portion of the in process ultrasonic inspection was observed for the following welds:
Item No.
Area-83.90 2N2C - B Loop Recirculation Inlet Nozzle at 90 Degrees B3.90 2N2J - A Loop Recirculation Inlet Nozzle at 300 Degrees C1.10 2HX-A-2 Upper Shell Ring to Lower Shell Ring The inspections were compared with applicable procedures in the following areas:
(a) Availability of and compliance with approved NDE procedure (b) Use of knowledgeable NDE personnel (c) Use of NDE personnel qualified to the proper level (d) Type of apparatus used (e) Extent of coverage of weldment (f) Calibration requirements (g) Search units (h) Beam angles (i) DAC curves (j) Reference level for monitoring discontinuities (1) Method of demonstrating penetration (m) Limits of evaluating and recording indications (n) Recording significant indications (4) The following listed ultrasonic equipment and materials certifica-tion records were reviewed:
Ultrasonic Instruments Nortec Serial No. 126 Nortec Serial No. 167 Nortec Serial No. 269 Nortec Serial No. 273
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V Ultrasonic Transducers Size Frequency Serial No.
1" Diameter 2.25 MHZ NSC0022 1" Diameter 2.25 MHZ 016575
.5 x 1" 60'
2.25 MHZ C85196
.5 x 1" 60*
2.25 MHZ C85195
.5 x 1" 45'
2.25 MHZ C85199
.5 x 1".45'
2.25 MHZ C85197 1/2" x 1/2" 45*
2.25 MHZ A1300 1/4" x 1/4" 2.25 MHZ V3380 3/8" diameter 2.25 MHZ T6156 1/2" x 1/2" 45'
2.25 MHZ C84215 3/8" x 3/8".45*
2.25 MHZ C85202 Ultrasonic Couplant LMT Batch No. 61384 SCS Batch No. 8440 Ultrasonic Rompas Blocks LMT 058 LMT 064 LMT 069 (5) In process magnetic particle (MT) inspection was observed for portions of the following welds:
Item No.
Area C3.10 2HX-B-3S-3 RHR-HX Lower support C5.11 2E51-2RCIC-10-TD-5 10" Pipe to E11 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System The inspections were compared with applicable procedures in the following areas:
(a) Availability of and compliance with approved NDE procedures (b) Use of knowledgeable NDE personnel (c) Use of NDE personnel qualified to the proper level (d) Recording of inspection results (e) Examination method
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(f) Contrast of dry powder particle color with background and surface temperature (g) Examination overlap and directions (h) Pole spacing and lifting power for yoke method (1) Acceptance criteria (6).While observing the examination of weld 2HX-B-3S-3 the inspectors noted that of the four lower Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger (RHR-HX) supports only one support required examination,. that being support designated as support number 3.
The support being inspected did not appear to have any permanent identification number attached and review of the ISI RHR-HX sketch of both A and B heat exchangers did not indicate how the individual support
identification numbers were to be established, i.e.,
1 thru 4 counting clockwise from some permanent starting point.
Discussions with SCS personnel indicated,that the lower RHR-HX supports-did not have permanent identifying numbers on or attached to each individual support. Further, the one support of the four
that was selected for each examination was established by.the
" rule of thumb" method, without documentation as to what was meant s
by " rule of thumb". This method of support selection could in the i
future, or may have already resulted in the same support being examined repeatedly instead of each of the four supports being selected and examined on a rotational basis.
During further discussion with the licensee, management agreed to establish a positive support identification method.
The support identifica-tion method for the A and B RHR-HX lower supports will be reviewed during a future inspection.
This matter is identified as IFI 366/85-11-01,' Identification of the Lower Supports on A and B RHR-HX.
(7) The above listed welds were MT inspected using AC yokes identified as LMT-002 and (SCS) 443. Review of documentation for.the AC yoke lift tests, which requires a lifting power of at least ten pounds, indicated that the lift tests had been accomplished using International Institute of Welding (IIW) calibration blocks which were identified as No. 01 and No. 020.
The documentation presented for each of the IIW blocks did not include the weight of the blocks and documentation as to the weight of the IIW blocks
was not available when requested by the inspectors.
The inspectors requested that the weight of each block be determined and documented. ' The licensee transported the IIW blocks to a certified weight scale, off site, and the weight of each block was documented and notarized.
Each IIW block weighed in excess of eleven pounds, which is acceptable by the aforementioned require-
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ment.
The inspectors - have no further questions regarding this matter.
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(8) The inspectors reviewed the " certification of contaminant content" for the below listed liquid penetrant materials to determine whether the analysis for halogen and sulfur was consistent with applicable requirements.
Batch No.
Penetrant Cleaner / Remover Developer 828097 84E051 840005 84E019 84G040 81H114 84M057
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Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
IE Bulletins (92703)(Units 1 and 2)
(0 pen) IEB 321, 366/80-BU-08, Examination of Containment Liner Penetration Welds (see RII Report 50-321, 366/82-08 for a previous inspection of this Bulletin).
NUREG CR-3053 was issued in July 1984 documenting, on a plant specific basis, evaluation of licensees' responses to Bulletin 80-08.
In addition, the NUREG recommends necessary action to disposition the Bulletin for each plant. The licensee agreed to evaluate the need to take action on the NUREG recommendations for Units 1 and 2.
8.
Inspector Followup Items (92701)(Units 1 and 2)
a.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 321/84-49-01, Clarification of Weld Material Control Procedure.
This item concerned the fact that procedure HNP-6916 did not clearly cover storage of coated electrodes other than low hydrogen and was not clear relative to issue of bare wire on spools. Revision 16 to HNP-6916 clarifying the above areas has been issued.
b.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 366/84-23-01, Resolution of Indica-tions in Jet Pump Instrument Nozzle Safe Ends.
UT inspection of the jet pump instrument nozzle safe ends revealed several axial indications in both "A" and "B" safe-ends.
The licensee and their contractor determined that the indications were not caused by cracks.
Licensee letter NED-84-401. dated July 27, 1984, and NED-84-620 dated December 18, 1984, justifies their disposition of the indications.
Based on review of the letters, there are no further questions on this item.
c.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 366/84-04-02, UT Indication in Feedwater Weld 2B21-1FW-12AA-12.
During a previous outage (See RII Report 50-366/84-04) a circumferential UT indication approximately seven inches long was found.
After extensive investigations, the licensee determined that the indication was caused by a fabrication type defect and was considered to be acceptable for continued
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operation.
Justification for this position was presented to RII on May 18, 1984 (See GPC letter NED-84-259).
During the May 18, 1984 meeting, the licensee made four. commitments to the NRC relative to the indication. These four commitments were as follows:
(1) Perform a detailed " baseline" examination of the N4A nozzle
~ following flood-up of the reactor pressure vessel after completion of recirculation piping replacement as referenced for future examinations to assure the indication has not increased in size.
Per NRC staff request, GPC will notify NRC Region II reasonably in advance when the " baseline" examination will be performed so that NRC inspection personnel may witness the performance of that examination, (2) Review preservice inspection data from the mechanized ultrasonic examination of the N4A nozzle to determine the location (s) of the
" geometric" indications observed during that examination, (3) Review examination data from the last Hatch Unit 1 examination of the feedwater nozzles to see if similar methodology was used as that for Hatch Unit 2 and the results thereof, and (4) Reinspect the Hatch. Unit 2 N4A nozzle during the next two refueling outages.
Should the ultrasonic data essentially be the
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same after the two successive inspections, the examination frequency would revert to every other refueling outage as required by NUREG-0619, "BWR Feedwater Nozzle and Control Rod Drive Return Line Nozzle Cracking."
Licensee letter NED-84-329 documented licensee response ~ to the four commitments. During an inspection documented by RII Report 50-366/
84-23, RII inspectors witnessed inspection of the indication for baseline purposes.
During the current outage, the licensee performed the first inspection required by commitment No. 4 and concluded that the indication had not changed significantly since the last inspection.
During the current inspection, the inspectors reviewed the current outage data and verified that inspection of the indication during the next refueling outage is included in the "First Ten-Year Inservice
- Examination Plan for Class 1 components - Edwin I. Hatch Unit 2."
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d.
(Closed) Inspector Follow ~up Item 321, 366/82-08-05, Implementation of NUREG 0619 - Generic Letter 81-11. During the current inspection, the inspectors verified that, in general, the inspection requirements of NUREG 0619 have been included in licensee ISI plans. The following plans were reviewed for NUREG 0619 inspection:
SCS " Modified first Ten-Year Inservice Examination Plan for
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Class 1 Components - Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1"
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SCS " Modified Forty-Year Inservice Examination Plan for Classes 2 and 3 Components - Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1"
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SCS "First Ten-Year Inservice Examination Plan for Class 1
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Components - Edwin I. Hatch Unit 2" SCS " Forty-Year Inservice Inspection Plan for Classes 2 and 3
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Components - Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 2" Further inspection of implementation of NUREG 0619 will be performed during routine ISI inspections.
e.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 321/84-49-03, Clarification of Requirements for Overlay Weld Tapers. This item concerned the fact that some of the weld overlays made during the last outage had excessive tapers at the weld toes. The design paper work did not specify an angle requirement. Since the last inspection, the licensee had their contractor, Structural Integrity Associates, perform stress calculations to justify the excessive angles.
Structural Integrity Associates' calculations are documented in their letter PCR-84-098 dated December 17, 1984, and show that angles up to 85' present no problems for " worst case" conditions. There are no further questions on this item.
e.
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 321, 366/82-08-03, Implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.150.
The licensee's contractor, SCS, is of the opinion that this regulatory guide does not apply to BWR reactor vessels.
However, SCS will evaluate the guide to determine if there are aspects of the guide that will enhance their program for reactor vessel inspections and can be incorporated.
f.
(Closed) Inspector Followup item 321/84-27-01, Discrepancy Between Long Term ISI Plans and NDE Data. This item concerned the fact that several areas required inspection in the second ISI period and records were not available to cover the inspections. The licensee's contractor, SCS, has reviewed each case in question (see SCS letter dated August 15,
~1984) and determined that Code requirements have been met. It appears
.that in the past, the method for keeping track of changes involving substitutions because of accessibility or high radiation, that affected the long term plan, was not adequate. However, the deviation system and the system for updating the long term plan have been upgraded.
Their new system should solve this problem.
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