ML20136G380

NRC Tenth Annual Rept on Domestic Safeguards (U) During Period from Oct 1983 - Sept 1984

ML20136G380
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Issue date:	09/30/1984
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ML20136G373	List: ML20136G370 ML20136G380
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NUDOCS 8508190384
Download: ML20136G380 (6)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON DOMESTIC SAFEGUARDS (U)

DURING THE PERIOD FROM OCTOBER 1, 1983 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1984 8508190384 850802 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR

c l TENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON DOMESTIC SAFEGUARDS Introduction This report advises the President, pursuant to requirements of National Secur-ity Decision Memorandum 254, on the effectiveness of domestic nuclear safe-guards in the commercial licensed sector under the jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in FY-1984.

Background

Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, NRC regulates safeguards in licensed nuclear facilities and activities to assure protection of the public health and safety and the national defense and i security. To accomplish this, NRC ensures that appropriate measures are taken to deter, prevent, or respond to the unauthorized possession or use of signifi-cant quantities of special nuclear material through theft or diversion, and to protect against radiological sabotage. In general, safeguards for nuclear fuel i

fabrication facilities and nonpower reactors emphasize protection against theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM), while those for power reactors stress protection against radiological sabotage.

During FY-1984, NRC safeguards measures were applied to 87 power reactors, 67 nonpower reactors, and 28 fuel cycle facilities. They were also applied to 294 shipments of spent fuel,19 shipments of SNM involving more than one but less than five kilograms of high-enriched uranium, and three shipments of SNM involving five or more kilograms of high enriched uranium.

The following information summarizes the status of domestic safeguards for i licensed nuclear reactors, fuel facilities, and transportation. The status of safeguards contingency planning and threat assessment is also discussed.

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e Reactor Safeguards Status Power Reactors. Power reactor licensee security plans contain commitments to implement a number of protective measures designed to provide protection against a specified. design basis threat. These include access controls, personnel searches, multiple barriers, intrusion alarms, armed response forces on-site, redundant communications to local police units, security personnel training, development of plans for security contingencies, and pre-employment screening of plant workers based on industry standards.

I During FY-1984, the NRC staff continued its program of safeguards effectiveness reviews to validate the proper identification and protective measures for vital equipment at power reactors, to examine the interface between safety and safe-guards to identify any safety problems that may result from implementing secur-ity requirements, to assure the overall effectiveness of safeguards systems and regulations at licensed nuclear facilities, to evaluate contingency response capabilities and coordination with local law enforcement, and to identify any generic issues and validate the regulatory base. These safeguards reviews are i conducted independently of NRC's regular inspection and enforcement activities and are intended to assure that safeguards programs, as implemented by the licensees, are effective against NRC's design basis threats defined in 10 CFR 73.1.

The inspection program, on the other hand, is designed to assure that licensees

are in compliance with regulatory requirements, to evaluate overall adequacy of i measures and programs, and to provide appropriate feedback so that corrective actions can be considered. During FY-1984, 85 violations of safeguards require-l ments were identified during 185 safeguards inspections of 79 operating power l reactors.

Safeguards effectiveness reviews were conducted at five power reactors in

FY-1984. These reviews identified some problems involving perimeter barriers, i intrusion detection systems and protection of vital equipment. The reviews

! also identified equipment that licensees were unnece<3arily protecting as vital I

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6 and access control systems that could adversely affect safety by impeding operator access to vital areas. The NRC staff is working to resolve any I

generic regulatory concerns and to assure timely correction of any licensee program weaknesses identified in these safeguards reviews.

A number of rulemaking activities were pursued during the year. In August 1984 the Commission proposed amendments to its regulations which would require an access authorization program for individuals seeking unescorted access to sensitive areas in nuclear power plants. The proposed amendments, which will affect all nuclear power plant licensees, are intended to result in increased assurance of the trustworthiness of personnel at nuclear power plant sites. In support of these amendments the Commission provided support for legislation to provide licensee access to Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal data for the purpose of employee screening. Other amendments proposed during the year addressed the designation and protection of vital locations containing safety-related equipment and the clarification of certain access control requirements.

The staff also continued to develop amendments that would clarify and simplify reporting requirements for safeguards events and would reduce the regulatory burden on NRC licensees.

Nonpower Reactors. Based on intelligence information currently available to the NRC, the staff has not identified a credible threat directed at domestic licensed nuclear facilities. However, as a matter. of prudence, the NRC is considering increased security measures at nonpower reactors possessing high-enriched uranium (HEU), such as, requiring the removal of all excess unirradiated HEU fuel from those few sites which still have it stored on-site, and providing additional physical impediments to the unauthorized removal of fuel. Also, on June 29, 1984, the Commission issued a proposed rule regarding the conversion from HEU to LEU fuel in nonpower reactors. This proposed rule is under final consideration within NRC as of July 1985. During FY-1984, nine violations of safeguards requirements were identified during 41 NRC safeguards inspections of 36 nonpower reactors.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Safeguards Status In FY-1984, NRC safeguards requirements were in force at 28 licensed fuel cycle facilities. Four of these facilities possessed significant quantities of strategic SNM, requiring implementation of the most extensive physical security and accountability measures. Somewhat less extensive physical security and accountability measures were required at another 16 facilities commensurate with the quantities and types of SNM in their possession. The remaining eight facilities were required to implement some physical security measures but were not required to have detailed material control and accounting systems.

The activities associated with SNM at these 28 fuel facilities included full scale production, pilot plant operations, decommissioning efforts, and the storage of sealed items. NRC licensing activity associated with these 28 facilities consisted of review and approval of changes to the in place physical security and material control and accounting systems. The NRC reviewed and completed action on approximately 160 licensing matters associated with these facilities during 1984.

The regulations that prescribe material control and accounting measures for special nuclear material were revised to provide regulatory relief for licens-ees who process low-enriched uranium. Reform amendments were developed that were performance oriented- giving licensees an opportunity to choose their own method of meeting a stated objective rather than following prescriptive requirements. The new rules provide a significant gradation between the requirements for material of high strategic significance and those for material of low strategic significance.

With regard to the Nuclear Fuel Services' high-enriched uranium facility at Erwin, Tennessee, the Commission, in May 1983, specified performance criteria for the facility's inventory difference over a two year period. The licensee met the perfornance criteria for the first year of operation and is now follow-ing more restrictive performance criteria for the second year. Because of the 4

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complexity of the operations, a resident inspector has been assigned to this facility.

During FY-1984, 38 violations of safeguards requirements were identified during 119 NRC safeguards inspections of 21 fuel cycle facilities. The ,RC staff also conducted safeguards effectiveness reviews at two licensed facilities possess-ing significant quantities of strategic SNM. At one facility, deficiencies were found requiring immediate compensatory measures. NRC is presently working with both licensees to implement permanent corrections for all identified deficiencies.

Transportation Status During FY-1984, NRC approved 45 transport routes for spent fuel shipments from the perspective of protection against sabotage. Two hundred ninety-four ship-ments were made over these routes. In conjunction with these route approvals, to facilitate the disclosure of spent fuel shipment information, NRC periodi-cally publishes a document entitled "Public Information Circular for Shipments of Irradiated Reactor Fuel," which contains all approved routes. The latest revision of this circular was published in June 1984.

During FY-1984, no violations of safeguards requirements were identified during inspections of 86 shipments. These included two inspections of shipments of strategic special nuclear material, 81 inspections of shipments of irradiated fuel, and 3 other sh pments. Inspections took place primarily at points of origin and at destinations, but also included transfer points and enroute as deemed desirable.

In June 1984, the Commission issued for public comment a proposed rule for physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel shipments to replace the interim requirements issued in 1979 and amended in 1980. Research projects completed in 1981 and 1982 show that the quantity of radioactive material likely to be released as a result of sabotage is much less than was estimated when the 5

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interim rule was issued. Public comments are being analyzed and a proposed revised rule is being developed by the staff.

Contingency Planning and Threat Assessment Safeguards contingency plans deal with threats, thefts, and sabotage relating to licensed SNM and nuclear facilities. In August 1984, the NRC staff com-pleted a review and revision of its headquarters contingency plan in accordance with " Agency Procedures for the NRC Incident Response Plan."

During FY 1984, the staff continued its review of domestic and foreign threat-related information received from a variety of sources to assess the threat environment. The results of the continuing review were formally documented in January and July 1984. No significant change in the domestic threat environ-ment was noted. However, in light of terrorist activity abroad, in February 1984 the NRC notified licensees of its concerns regarding the potential use of vehicle bombs by terrorists against nuclear activities or facilities. NRC's notice stated that licensees were not required to protect against vehicle bombs, but it would appear appropriate for them to review their vehicular access control equipment and procedures and examine contingency plans and the tactical measures to be employed by members of their security organizations to impede penetration of protected areas by unauthorized vehicles. Moreover, as a matter of prudence, NRC initiated a research effort to obtain a clear and comprehensive understanding of the technical aspec.ts of the issue for use if future changes in the domestic threat environment were to indicate a need for protection against vehicular explosive threats.

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