ML20134E909
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o NUCLE AR REGULATORY CoMMIS$1 O'
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- e REGION il j
101 MARIETTA STREET.ND.
ATLANT A. 0EORGI A 30323 i
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45 27 1992
Dear Mr. Mosbaugh:
SUBJECT:
RII-90-A-0124 - MULTIPLE CONCERNS REGARDING_ FAILURE TO _
CONTROL AND REPORT DISCOVERY OF UNSECURED SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION I
RII A-0109 - ALLEGED INACCURATE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO NRC This refers to your written concerns submitted to the Region II Field Of fice, NRC Office of Investigations on July 30, 1990, and your subsequent discussions and communications with the Office of i
Investigations regarding the protection and control of safeguards information at Georgia Power Company's Vogtle project offices, Southern company Services offices in Birmingham, Alabama, and Bechtel vendor offices in Gaithersberg, Maryland, Los Angeles, California, and Atlanta, Georgia.
our inspection and investigation of this matter have been completed, and our findings are documented in the enclosed
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allegation summary.
Based on our investigation and inspection findings, the allegation concerning failures to properly secure safeguards information and to report the discovery of unprotected safeguards material in a timely manner was substantiated.
Our i
investigation and inspection did not substantiate the allegation that Georgia Power Company officials withheld pertinent informa-tion from NRC during the enforcement conference of May 22, 1990 or that they impeded the reporting of safeguards events.
Certified Mail No.
P 258 014 582 i
t Information in this record was deleted j
in accordance with the reedom of Information a
Act, exemptions l
FolA-9 >'- 2 #
9611040171 960827 PDR FOIA KOHN95-211 PDR
Mr. Allen L. Mosbaugh 2
Al$ 2 7 Jg t
This concludes the staff's activities regarding this matter.
We appreciate your cooperation and assistance.
Sincerely,
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eats R. C'e ts, director Enfo cemen nd Investigation Coordin on Staff
Enclosure:
Allegation Summary l
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ENCLOSURE ALLEGATION
SUMMARY
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Nultiple concerns regarding failure to RII-90-A-0124 control and report discovery of unsecured safeguards infornation.
Alleged inaccurate information provided to RII-91-A-0109 NRC.
30, 1990, the Region II NRC Of fice of InvestigatiLn (OI)
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On July received in written form via U.S. mail, allegations relating to uncontrolled safeguards documents in the Georgia Power Company's Vogtle Project Offices and Southern Company Services (ECS)
Of fices in Birmingham, Alabama, and in the Bechtel vendor offices in Gaithersburg, Maryland, Los Angeles, California and Atlanta, It was further alleged that licensee stnior management Georgia.
of ficials had prevented or. impeded reporting of events relating to unsecured safeguards materials to the NRC within the required time period, and had provided inaccurate and incomplete information to the NRC at an Enforcement Conference on May 22, 1990, with regard to the existence of a programmatic breakdown in the control and protection of Safeguards Inforaktion in the SCS and Bechtel Design Engineering areas in Birmingham.
The referenced allegati ons were presented by a member of the i
licensee's site management at Vogtle Nuclear Plant, who has since been terminated, and were discussed via telephone wu.r. a member of the NRC Office of Investigation prior to sulatission in written form.
Subsequently, the alleger joined with another former licensee Toyee in filing a 10 CFR 2.206 petition with the NRC that inci 4. ! the aforementioned safeguards issues in addition to several oL.J safety related and licensing issues.
With regard to the safeguards issues it was alleged that a Georgia Power Company (GPC) Vice President made false statements to the NRC during an Enforcement Conference on May 22, 1990, about the status of sateguardo materials in Birmingham.
It was further alleged that GPC personnel (including a Vice President and General Manager, and a SCS Manager) knowingly and repeatedly hid safeguards problems from the NRC and willfully refused to comply with mandatory reporting requirements.
It was specifically alleged that the Vice President stated at the Enforcement Conference that controls in Birmingham had been i
reviewed and safeguards documents were all well controlled there i
by Document Control under a sound program, when in fact, 3
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programmatic breakdown existed in the design engineering area.
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The specific issues identified in the allegations are addressed individually with conclusions based on inspection and investigative findings as followr.:
Allegation No. RII A-0124, an11tiple concerns regarding j
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f ailure to control and report discovery of unsecured safeguards information.
Allegation:
A safeguards container was found left open - -
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November 1989.
Discussion:
Review of a licensee submitted Safeguards Event Report (SER) No.90-03S, dated August 22, 1990, i
and related documentation presented by the 2icensee l
during an Enforcement Conference held in the Region II office on November 13, 1990, confirmed the occurrence J
and failure to report the event as alleged.
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occurrence and failure to report the discovery of the i
unsecured safeguards container was identified during an annual audit conducted by the licensee's Safety Audit and Engineering Review (SAIR) Department during the 16-20, 1990.
The SAER team had been 2
period of July j
instructed by licensee management to place special l
emphasis on safeguards information control as part of j
the corrective action for a violation with civil l
penalty for an unsecured safeguards container cited in 4
l June 1990.
Upon discovery of the event occurrence by the SABR audit July 16-20, 1990, it was reported to the NRC by telephone on July 23, 1990, and subsequently described in the revised SER No.90-038, dated i
i August 22, 1990.
S conclusion:
The discovery and failure to report an unsecured safeguards container as alleged, was substantiated.
However, a violation was not cited because it was identified by the licensee's corrective action for a similar violation prior to the commitment l
date for completion of all corrective action.
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Allegation:
SCS and Eachtel design agencies had inadequate program control and procedures in Atlanta, Birmingham, Gaithersburg, and Los Angles.
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Discussion:
In response to the violation with civil j
penalty cited in Inspection Report Nos. 50-424/90-11 and 50-425/90-11, dated June 27, 1990, the licensee j
initiated corrective actions that included the following enhancements to preclude recurrence of violations relating to the protection of safeguards j
information:
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Enclecure 3
4 Established a requirement that offsite l*
organizations add procedural guidelines to report l
any suspected compromise of safeguards information for determination of reportability, to be completed by September 1, 1990.
1 Provided guidance to offsite organizations to j
limit access to safeguards information containers, j
to be completed by September 1, 1990.
j Established requirement that of fsite organizationt
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inventory the contents of safeguards information containers and maintain logs of access in the 1
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future, to be completed by September 1,1990.
a Established requirement that offsite organizations assign a Security / Safeguards Information coordinator to be responsible for safeguards 4
Information container logs, to be completed by j
September 1, 1990.
Provided direction to offsite organizations to develop and implement guidelines to assure that j
'in-process' security design change requests working packages are properly controlled,' to be completed September 1, 1990.
Conducted a review of achieved security records to l
verify that historical security documents have been properly dispostioned, to be completed by October 1, 1990.
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Response actions by the licensee to include implementation of the corrective actions and program l
enhancement during the period of June - September 1990, resulted in the identification of several improperly i
secured documents, charts, drawings and etc.
Se licensee determined these were either inappropriately marked as safeguards information, when in fact they did l
not contain safeguards information, or contained safeguards information and were not properly marked.
l One of a total of 14 inappropriately secured documents, believed to contain safeguards information, was determined by the licensee to contain significant t
i safeguards information.
Interviews conducted by the NRC OI relating to the protection of Safeguards l
Information in the Bechtel vendor offices, revealed that licensee conducted reviews of the Bechtel files in l
1,os Angeles, a'ad Gaithersburg, and did not identify any compromise or lack of control of safeguards documents at these locations.
The discoveries of unprotected or inadequately secured safeguards information by the i
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le licensee during the implementation of corrective i
actions were reported to the P,C by telephone, or i
documented in the Quarterly Safeguards Event Logs and j
subsequently included in SER No.30-03S.
During an 1
Enforcement Conference held in the Region II office on i
November 13, 1990, relating to the continuing recurrence of events concerning the failure t.o protect i
safeguards information, the licensee provided additional information regarding the discovery and 1
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reportability of safeguards information found to be inadequately protected during implementation of i
corrective actions following the Enforcement Conference i
of May 22, 1990.
conclusion:
Based on information provided by the j
licensee during the Enforcement Conference of November 13, 1990, telephone reports, SER No.90-03S, and investigative findings by the NRC Office of j
i Investigation, the alleged inadequacy of the licensee program control and procedures for the protection of i
safeguards information in the Southern Company Services i
and the licensee's design agencies in Birmingham was J
substantiated.
However, no specific information was
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developed to confirm or substantiate the control of
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safeguards information in the Bechtel offices in Atlanta, Los Angeles, or Gaithersburg was inadequate.
q The files and records maintained in the licensees
- 1 Atlanta of fices were transferred to Birmingham, and are i
further addressed in item 3 below. The licensee's discovery and subsequent report of the failure to adequately protect safeguards information was not cited l
l because it was identified by the licensee's corrective action for a previous cited violation prior to the j
casmitment date for completion of all corrective action.
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Allegation:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SONOPCO) personnel knew of 150 baass of safeguards documents that were allegedly uncontrolled in Atlanta, Georgia; Birmingham, Alabama; Gaithersburg, Maryland; j
and Los Angeles, California.
Discussion:
During the course of implementing corrective actions for the violation with civil penalty i
cited in June 1990, and subsequent to the discovery of 1
unsecured safeguards information reported to the NRC on l
July 23, 1990, the licensee initiated a review of l.
archived security files and records to determine the
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existence of unprotected safeguards information.
Of the estimated 100 to 150 boxes of records, 12 boxes were identified by the licensee as potentially containing safeguards materials.
Review of the h
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contents of the 12 boxes identified 10 documents that initially were believed to contain safeguards l
information.
However, further review determined that only one of the documents actually contained safeguards information.
The licensee reported, and investigation j
by the NRC OI further documented, that their review of archived security files and records included the l
Bechtel vendor files in Los Angeles and Gaithersburg in i
addition to the security files in Southern company j
~ Services and design agencies in.Biratingham.
The review l
included all stored archived security files from 1978 j
No additional safeguards documents were to 1990.
identified.
The discovery of the unsecured safeguards l
document in the archived files was logged in the I
licensee's Safeguards Event Log and was documented in the licensee's revised SER No.90-038.
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Conclusion:==
Information provided by the licensee in revised SEk No.90-03S, and during the Buforcement 3
Conference of November 13, 1990, and investigative findings by the NRC OI did not substantiate that 150 boxes of safeguards documents were uncontrolled in i
j Atlanta, Birmingham, Gaithersburg, and I,os Angeles.
1 However, the existence of one docmnant containing i
l safeguards information in' 12 boxes of security-related files and documents was acknowledged by the licensee l
and documented in the Report of Investigation by the NRC OI.
The discovery by the licensee of an unsecured safeguards document in archived security files was not cited because it was identified by the licensee's i
corrective action for a previous cited violation prior to the connitment date for completion of all corrective i
action.
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Allegation:
Fourteen (14) safeguards documents were found uncontrolled in the SONOPCO Biratingham offices on i
I June 15, 1990.
f Discussion:
Information provided by the licensee in revised SER No.90-038, and during the Enforcement Conference of November 13, 1990, and documented in the l
NRC OI Report of Investigation confirmed the discovery l
and subsequent reporting of the 14 saf eguards. documents by licensee employees in Birmingham, Alabama.
The documents were discovered by the employees during a search of their work areas for any uncontrolled or j
unsecured safeguards information which was conducted as part of the corrective action directed by licensee j
management for the acknowledged programmatic problem in i
the protection of safeguards information.
l Investigative findings by the NRC Of fice of Investigation further documented the delay in reporting f
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f the discovery of the safeguards documents from June 15, 1990, the date of discovery, until July 23, 1990, following receipt and review of the documents at the Vogtle site.
The NRC was notified of the discovery of j
the uncontrolled safeguards documents via telephone on l
July 23, 1990, and the event was documented in the
,i licensee revised SER No.90-038.-
j conclusion:
Based on information provided by the i
licensee via telephone notification, SER No.90-03S,
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during the Enforcement Conference of November 13, 1990, and findings by the NRC OI, the allegation of 14
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uncontrolled safeguards documents in the licensee's j
offices in Birmingham was substantiated.
The available j
and developed inforination also substantiated the delay in reporting the event to the NRC. The discovery of the uncontrolled safeguards documents and the delay in reporting of the event were not cited because the j
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uncontrolled documents were identified by the licensee's corrective action for a previous cited violation prior to the commitment date for completion j
4 of all corrective action.
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A11ecation:
On July 23, 1990, the Vogtle Security Manager expressed a belief that the events discovered in Novesber 1989, and on June 15, 1990, should be The reported to the NRC as 1-hour reportable events.
i events were reported 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> af ter the Vogtle Security j
Manager ande this determination.
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Discussion:
Review of licensee provided information I
and investigative findings by the NRC OI determined that the allegation relating to the delay in reporting i
the safeguards events discovered in Novesbar 1989 and' June 15, 1990, referred to the events addressed in itess one (1) and four (4) above.
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Conclusion:==
As noted in items one(1) and four(4) above, available and developed information l
substantiated the unsecured safeguards container in f
November 1989, and the uncontrolled safeguards i
i documents on June 15, 1990, as alleged.
Investigation j
by the NRC OI concluded that, although the reporting of Safeguards Events to the NRC was slow in some instances, licensee management did not actively impede j
the reporting process.
The delay in reporting the discovery of the unsecured safeguards container and the i
l uncontrolled safeguards documents were not cited because the discovery was made during the process of
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cespleting corrective action for a previous cited violation prior to the conunitment date for completion l
of all corrective action.
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Allegation:
On July 25, 1990, it was revealed to the Vogtle Security Manager that there was a breakdown in j
control of safeguards information in SCS and Bechtel j
design agencies.
The Security Manager concluded that a 1-hour. report was required.
No call was made, but the event was later addressed in the response to the civil 1
j penalty issued in June 1990, f
f Discussion:
Review of information provided by the licensee's revised SER No.90-038, and during the i
Bnforcement Conference of November 13, 1990, and investigative findings by the NRC OI determined that 1
the allegation relating to a breakdown of control of safeguards information in the SCS and Bechtel design agencies, and the failure to report the events as 4
1-hour reportable safeguards events referred to the j
events addressed in items two(2) and three(3) above.
The discovery of uncontrolled and unsecured safeguards 4
l information by the licensee during the implementation i
of corrective action for the violation with civil I
penalty cited in June 1990, was reported to the NRC by telephone, or in the Licensee's Quarterly Safeguards Rvent Log, and was subsequently reported in revised SIR l
l No.90-03S, and addressed by the licensee during the Enforcement Conference of November 13, 1990.
The issues were further documented in the investigative report of the NRC OI.
As noted in items two(2) and j
three (3) above, available information and investigative j
findings confirmed the inadequacy of the licensee's program control and procedures for the protection of i
safeguards information in the SCS and licensee's design agencies' offices in Birmingham, and the occurrence of i
l delays in timely reporting of safeguards events regarding the protection of safeguards information.
i However, as further noted, a breakdown in the i
protection of safeguards information in the Bechtel i
Vendor Offices in Gaithersburg, and Los Angeles, and i
the existence of 150 boxes of uncontrolled safeguards information could not be confirmed.
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Conclusion:==
Inspection and investigativa findings substantiated the alleged occurrences of unsecured and unprotected saferiudh information and delays in the j
reporting of events zeLating to unprotected safeguards 4
information.
However, inspection and investigation did j
not substantiate that licensee management actively j
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Allegation:
In August 1990, two boxes of safeguards documents improperly marked and bound were received at i
the Vogtle plant from a vault in Birmingham.
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Discussinn:
During an interview by a safeguards 3
inspector on November 6, 1990, in the presence of two r
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investigators from the NRC OI, the alleger was i
questioned about the receipt of the two boxes of i
l improperly marked safeguards documents from Birmingham.
The alleger noted that the two boxes of documents were received by the Vogtle Document Control from an unknown l
source, although it was eventually determined that the i
documents came frca a storage vault in Birmingham with l
l instructions to destroy.
The alleger was unable to demonstrate or provide any information to substantiate j
that the two boxes of safeguards materials had not been adequately controlled or protected.
Investigative findings by the NRC OI documented that the two boxes of documents were transferred through proper procedures l
and secured.
Investigation further documented that investigation by the licensee of the transfer of the documents from Atlanta to Birmingham Corporate Offices, and subsequently to Plant Vogtle and then back to the Birmingham office, substantiated that the safeguards i
i material had remained under proper control during the j
i transfer process.
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conclusian:
Based on available information and j
investigative findings, a violation of regulatory requirements relative to the transfer of safeguards j
documents as alleged, was not substantiated.
B.
Allegation No. RII-91-A-0190, Inaccurate information in j
licensee response to 2.206 Petition, i
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Allegation:
1 SONOPCO knowingly and repeatedly hid safeguards problems from the NRC and willfully refused to cesply with vaandatory reporting requirements.
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Discussian:
Information provided by the licensee's SER No. 90+038, and during the Enforcement Conference of 1
November 13, 1990, identified several events relating to the discovery of unprotected or unsecured safeguards information, some of which were not reported in a The circumstances of the discovery and j
timely manner.
reporting of these events were confirmed by onsite i
inspection and investigative findings.
However, on-site inspection on October 16-l'1, 1990, and i
investigation by the NRC OI concluded that, although the reporting of safeguards events to the NRC was slow, l
licensee management did not actively impede such
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reporting.
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l conclusion:
Based on available information and evidence obtained during the investigation by the NRC l
OI, the allegation that SONOPCO knowingly and repeatedly hid safeguards problems from the NRC and willfully refused to comply with mandatory reporting l
requirements was not substantiated.
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Allegation:
SONOPCO Vice President made false i
to the NRC during an Enforcement Conference statement i
about the status of safeguards materials in Birmingham. -
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Discussion:
Review of the Enforcement Conference Summary for the Enforcement Conference held in the l
Region II office on May 22, 1990, revealed that the i
licensee's continuing problems with protection of i
safeguards information was discussed and licensee j
officials acknowledged the recurrence of violations relating to the protection of safeguards materials and j
the necessity for more positive actions to correct the i
i root cause of the violations.
The licensee further provided detailed corrective actions to be implemented The discussion and corrective to preclude recurrence.
l actions to be implemented centered on the safeguards i
information program at Plant Vogtle.
The conference i
susmary did not contain any reference to the status of the safeguards program at the license's offices in Birmingham.
Investigation by the NRC OI did not confirm that the licensee Vice President made false statements to the NRC during the Enforcement l
Conference, and on the basis of the evidence obtained during the investigation, concluded that the licensee 2
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did not withhold pertinent information from the NRC at the time of the Enforcement Conference of May 22, 1990.
conclusion:
Based on investigative findings by the NRC OI, the allegation that the SONOPCO Vice President made l
false statements to the NRC during the Enforcement i
Conference of May 22, 1990, about the status of l
safeguards materials in Birmingham was not i
substantiated.
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Allegation:
SONOPCO Senior Management prevented Site Security Manager frc: making a red phone notification within one hour as required by 10 CFR 73.71.
Discussion:
Information provided by the licensee SBR No.90-03S, and during the Enforcement Conference of 1990, addressed instances in which timely November 13, reporting of events relating to the discovery of i
unprotected or unsecured safeguards information during the implementation of corrective action for a previous violation was not accomplished.
The validity of the 4
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acknowledged delays in reporting was confirmed by
- However, inspection and investigative findings.
inquiry during a Safeguards Inspection at Plant Vogtle 1990, and investigation by the NRC OI on October 16 17, found no evidence to substantiate that the Vogtle Site Security Manager was prevented from making a one hour report of a safeguards event by licensee senior The investigation concluded that although management.
the reporting of safeguards events to the NRC was slow, licensee management did not actively impede such reporting.
Conplusion:
Based on available information and evidence obtained.during the investigation by the NRC the allegation that SONOPCO senior management OI, l
prevented the Site Security Manager from making a rad phone notification as required by 10 CFi. 73.71 was not substantiated.
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