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F,IE E A 9 2-9, e
1 1
U 2
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3
4 Region II 5
6 7
Enforcement Hearing i
8 i
9 In Re: Plant Vogtle 10 11 May 13, 1992 12 13 2:00 p.m.
14 i
i 15 101 Marietta Street 16 Suite 3000 17 Atlanta, Georgia 18 4
19 20 Linda E.
Wood, CCR-A-752 21 22 23
/
BROWN REPORTING, INC.
24 1100 SPRING STREET, SUITE 750
. ATLANTA, GEORGIA '30309 25 (404).876-8979
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SJ 9611040100 960827 PDR FOIA-KOHN95-211 PDR
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1 APPEARANCES 2
3 For NRC:
i 4
5 Stewart D.
Ebneter, NRC,'RII, R'agiona?. Administrator 6
James Lieberman, NRC, Director Office of Enforcement 7
Pierce Skinner, NRC, RII, DRP 8
David B.
Matthews, NRC, NRR, DRPE 9
George R.
Jenkins, NRC, RII, Director, EICS 10 James L.
Milhoan, NRC, RII, DRA 11 Jay McGurren, NRC, OGC 12 Carolyn F.
Evans, NRC, RII, Regional Counsel 13 Luis A.
Reyes, NRC, RII, Director, DRP 14 Alan Herdt, NRC, RII, DRP, Branch Chief 15 Darl Hood, NRC, NRR, PD2-3 Project Manager 16 Bruno Uryc, NRC, RII, Senior Enforcement Specialist 17 William Troskoski, NRC, OE 18 Brian Bonser, NRC, SRI, VEGP 19 Joelle Starepos, NRC, Reactor Engineer Intarn 20 21 22 23 24 25
t 3
1 APPEARANCES 2
3' For Georgia Power Company:
4' 5
Bill Shipman, Plant Manager, Plant Vogtle 6
Marcel Wilkins, I&C Technician, Plant Vogtle 7
J.D.
Davis, I&C Technician, Plant Vogtle 8
Jane C.
Davis 9
R.P.
Mcdonald, GPC, Executive VP 10 W.G.
Hairston, III, GPC, SUP 11 C.K.
McCoy, GPC, VP 12 S.H.
Chestnut, GPC, Manager Technical Support 13 J.A.
Bailey, Southern Nuclear Operating Co.
14-M.L.
Hobbs, I&C Superintent, Plant Vogtle 15 L.A.
Ward, Maintenance Manager', Plant Vogtle 16 Art Domby, Esq., Troutman Sanders 17 J.
Lamberski, Esq., Troutman Sanders 18 19 20 21 22 23.
24 i
. 25-
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l 4
1 MR. EBENETER:
Good afternoon.
As soon i
l 2-as I make an opening statement we'll go around and 1
3 introduce everybody.
4-This is an Enforcement Conference between j
l' 5
Georgia Power Company and the NRC with regard to the 6
event last January, falsification of records.
l 7
We have had two Enforcement Conforences 8
with the other principals involved this morning.
9 And this will be the final one today.
We are i
10 looking at the new Wrong Doen Rule which is a new i
11 rule that took effect last September and so it's a 12 precedent setting type Enforcement Conference.
13 Other than that, let's introduce 14 everybody and after we do that Jim Lieberman, who is 15 the Director of Office of Enforcement who is with 16 us, will be sort of lead on the Enforcement 17 Conference from our side.
18 And other than that the same framework 19 that we always use for Enforcement Conferences.
20 It's really your meeting to tell us any other
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21 information that you have and we will be exploring 22 certain issues that Jim has a list of issues.
23 That's all I want to say really.
24 Oh, we need to Ms. Linda' Wood is our 25 court reporter.
You should speak not only to me,
1 but to her so she can get hopefully all the 2
information down.
But it is important that you 3
speak loud and. clear so that she can hear 4
everything.
If it gets where you can't hear us, 5
just interrupt us.
6 MR. JENKINS:
Anybody who doesn't have a 7
name tag should speak to identify themselves for her 8
benefit.
9 MR. EBENETER:
So let's go around and 10 introduce everyone so we all know who is here.
I'm j
11 Stew Ebeneter, Regional Administrator.
12 MR. LIEBERMAN:
J.
Lieberman, Director of 13 the Office of Enforcement.
d 14 MR. REYES:
Luis Reyes.
I'm the Director j '
15 of Division of Reactor Projects here in Region II.
i 16 MR. JENKINS:
George Jenkins, Director 17 of the Region Enforcement staff.
18 MR. MATTHEWS:
David Matthews from the 19 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
20 MR. HOOD:
Darl Hood, NRC, Project 21 Manager, Headquarters.
22 MR. HERDT:
Alan Herdt, Chief of Projects 23
. Branch.for'the Georgia Power Plant.
.24 MR. SKINNER:
Pierce Skinner, Section 25 Chief Georgia Power plants for NRC.
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6 1
MR. WILKINS:
I'm Marcel Wilkins, I&C 2
Technician.
3-MR. DAVIS:
J.D.
Davis, I&C Technician, 4
Georgia Power.
5 MRS. DAVIS:
Jane Davis.
6 MR. McGURREN:
My name is Jay McGurren, 7
Office of General Counsel, NRC headquarters.
8 MR. STAREPOS:
Joelle Starepos, staff 9
reactor engineering intern.
10 MR. BONSER:
I'm Brian Bonser, Senior 11 Resident at Vogtle.
12-MR. TROSKOSKI:
William Troskoski, 13 Enforcement.
14 MR. URYC:
Bruno Uryc, Senior Enforcement 15 Specialist, Region II.
i 16 MR. MILHOAN:
Jim Milhoan, Deputy 17 Regional Administrator, Region II.
18 MS. EVANS:
Carolyn Evans, Regional 19 Counsel.
20 MR. DOMBY:
Art Domby, I'm with Troutman 21 Sanders, counsel for Georgia Power.
22 MR. MCDONALD:
Pat Mcdonald, Executive 23 LVice-President, Georgia Power Company.
24' MR. HAIRSTON:
George Hairston,
.25 Vice-President, Georgia Power Company.
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MR. McCOY:
Ken McCoy, Vice-President, 2-GeorgiaLPower Company.
3 MR. SHIPMAN:
Bill Shipman, General Plant 4
Manager, Plant Vogtle.
5 MR. CHESTNUT:
Steve Chestnut.
I'm the j
6 Plant Vogtle Manager of Technical-Support.
7 MR. BAILEY:
Jim Bailey, Manager.of 8
Licensing..
i 9
16R. HOBBS:
Mike Hobbs, I'm the 10 Instruments and Control' Superintendent at Plant j
11 Vogtle.
12 MR. WARD:
Lewis Ward, Maintenance L
13 Manager at Plant.Vogtle.
14-MR. LAMBERSKI:
John Lamberski, Troutman 15-Sanders.
16 MR. LIEBERMAN:
The focus of this 17 conference today, as Mr. Ebeneter said, is the i'
18 apparent deliberate violations of falsification of records done by two of your I&C technicians.
19 4
20
.What we want to focus on this afternoon 6
21' though is.the management's response to that i
22 incident.
And I would hope that during your 23 Lpresentation you would address some of the following 2 4'-
issues.
And if-they-are not worked into your 25 4
8 1
presentation, then we can discuss them after your 2
presentation.
How was the matter identified.
What 3
type of investigation did you perform to ascertain 4
the facts.
What are the disciplinary policies of E
the company as to deliberate violations.
6 Your views on whether the QC function was 7
satisfactorily carried out in this case.
Your views 8
as to whether the foreman, I&C foreman properly 9
carried out his activities.
Views on whether this 10 is.an isolated situation or a pervasive situation, 11 that is in not following procedures and your basis 12 for that.
The degree of responsibility, if any, 13 that Georgia Power considers they have in this 14 case.
15 MR. McCOY:
Could you say that again?
16 MR. LIEBERMAN:
The degree of 17 responsibility that Georgia Power believes belongs 18 to them in this case versus responsibility in the 19 individuals, whatever your views are on that 20 subject.
21 And then, I guess finally, why you have 22 confidence in the two individuals that they should 23 be-allowed to be involved in licensee activities in 24 the future.
l 25 MR. MCDONALD:
Mr. McCoy will lead off
9 1
with our position.
2 MR. McCOY:
I think we have covered these
'3
. issues in our. presentation.
But as we go through 4
I'll try and keep. track and you do, too.
And then 5
well get to each of them, if there is any area that 6
you think we-have not adequately addressed that you 7
have questions about, let's address that.
8' MR. EBENETER:
Very good.
Before we' 9
start, get started did you send around a sign-in i
10 sheet?
11 MR. HERDT:
It's on the way.
12-MR. McCOY:
Let me begin by making a 13 clear statement which should narrow the scope of our i
14 discussions here today.
i l'
15 Georgia Power management, after review of
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16' the events, which Bill Shipman will brief you on, j
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17
'has concluded that the two I&C technicians knowingly I
t 18 violated Plant Vogtle procedures and submitted false 19-calibration' data.
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'20 We condemn those acts.
There is no i
o
' ustification for the ignoring of procedural j
21.
1 22 requirements,-even when knowledgeable ~and 23-experienced employees rely upon the low safety J
24-significance of the procedural noncompliance or I
25 believe that their actions are technically correct 1
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10 1
Honesty and integrity of employees are 2
fundamental to our confidence in the condition and i
3 the: status of our plant.
And therefore, are 4-strongly emphasized in our training and management
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l actions.
6-We do not condone any act of. lying, 7
misrepresentation or failure to be forthright and 8
accurate.
Procedures are established in order to 9
control work activities in accordance with well 10 thought out and approved techniques and contain 11 approved criteria for acceptance of that work.
12 And without this control and acceptance 13 criteria you can lose the basis for reasonable 14 assurance for safety.
You can be the best engineer, 15 the best operator or the best IEC technician in the 16 world and know the consequences resulting from the 17 deviation from a procedure.
18 Your actions may be even quote right from 19 a technical standpoint, but you are still wrong when 20 you fail to follow procedures, except in extremely 21 rare cases where plant safety requires immediate i
22-action contrary to the established procedure.
23 This is our policy and it is our 24 consistent practice.
Our response to this event was 1! 5
~ expeditious and rigor,ous.
We kept our resident i
11 1
' inspectors in. formed of the event, of our review 2
status.and.our rationale for our response.
3 The pertinent documentation which we 4
assembled on this matter was provided to our 5
residents.
We see this conference as an opportunity 6
to brief those NRC representatives who were not 7
closely involved and to insure the underlying facts 8
are clearly understood.
9 As we view this matter it's significance 10-centers on two issues:
Falsification of data and
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11 procedural noncompliance.
j
.12 Plant management conducted a careful 13 review including interviews of effected individuals 14 and a review of relevant documentation.
We have 15 concluded that the integrity of these employees, 16-although certainly called into question by their 17 actions, which appropriately were.the subject of l
18 severe disciplinary sanctions, is sufficiently sound 19 to warrant continued employment and continued 20
-involvement in activities subject to 10 CFR Part 4
i:
21 50.
l 22 This was not a judgment lightly made.
23 And as Bill will discuss more thoroughly, involved 24 difficult agonizing judgments with countervailing 25
~ considerations.-
y
12 1-Let's be frank, the quickEreactive and I
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perhaps obvious decisions are not always the ones 3
which pass the test of time.
I believe that the 4
approaches which we use will assure that the message 5
which we want to send, that is that compliance with i
6 procedures and honesty in actions are cardinal 7.
. fundamental' principles essential in our plant, will 8
last longer and be heard louder than if the obvious 9
decision to summarily terminate these two employees 1
10 had been made.
11 We took an approach that increased our 12 assurance that this type of event is atypical and 13 isolated.
Other employees can see that i f they come 14 forward and volunteer information concerning i
15' noncompliances or wrongdoing, due credit for their I.
16 forthrightness will be given.
17 In this way we did not chill 18 self-reporting as would be'the case with an overly f-19-simple termination approach.
We achieved our goal 20 of making this event a clear lesson to our employees 21 that procedural compliance and honesty in their work i
22
.are necessary conditions of continued employment.
23 Bill.will now present one, the details of 24 this. event; two, what we have determined to be the 25-reasons.for this event; three, the corrective
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actions which we have implemented; and four, 2
aggravating and mitigating circumstances which 3
should be factored by the NRC in its review, j
4 including a discussion of the actual direct safety i
5 consequences of this noncompliance.
6 Again, I would like to be absolutely sure 7
that you understand that no one associated trith l
8 Plant Vogtle condones or accepts the action of these
-9 technicians in any way, shape or form.
i 10 We are presenting to you what we are j
l 11 presenting to you are the relevant facts and l
12 circumstances that led us to conclude that the 13 actions that we have taken were proper and 14 sufficient.
Bill.
15 MR. SHIPMAN:
I would like to make a 16 presentation using a series of slides as sort of an 17 outline.
And I'll ask Steve to put those on the 18 view craft and if at all possible, as this thing 19 develops, questions will be answered as I go along.
20 If you could hold your questions till the end, I 21 would appreciate that in order to get through with 22 it.
23' And if that's not possible, I understand 24 it.
But, that was my desire to get through it and 25
.then respond to questions that I might not have
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a 14 1
answered as we go through.
2 Okay.
Steve.
To give us a chronology of 3
this event we need to go back into the fall of 1991 4
when Plant Vogtle implemented a design change to 5
remove the RTD bypass manifold from car plant and 6
installed the resistent temperature detectors for i
7 detecting reactant coolant flow directly into the 8
loops themselves.
9 As a result of that modification and the 10 core design that we have, we discovered that we, as 11 other plants, have an anomaly called T hot 12 oscillations.
13 And what this does to us in the case of 14 OP and OT Delta T is since the reactor coolant 15 temperature is an input to that circuit, those 16 oscillations or essentially noise on riding on 17 top of the steady state signal, those noise spikes 18 were creating for us alarms on OP Delta T and OT 19 Delta T turbine runback signals.
20 These are protective signals that are put 21 in the plant to detect an early potential for an 22 overpower or overtemperature event and run the 23 turbine back, reduce load and prevent the overpower 24 overtemperature event from occurring.
2,5 These set points are normally set three
l l
l' 15 1
percent below the calculated OT or OP Delta T 2
reactor trip set point.
So we get them three l
3 percent below when you would have a reactor trip.
4 To climinate the nuisance spikes we, in 5
conjunction with our AE Westinghouse, developed a 6
design change to lower the margin between the trip i
7 set point and the runback set point from three 8
percent to one percent.
l 9
That design change was implemented in 10 December of 1991 and resulted in what we call 11 temporary procedure changes to the Delta T loop 12 procedures.
13 Those temperature changes those design 14 changes or temporary procedure changes resulted in 15 change in the voltage set points for a number of 16 devices in the Delta T loop, specifically in one 17 case this bistable we are talking about.
18 And also, with that temporary change then 19 was implemented in permanently into the procedures 20 in January of
'92.
December was a temporary 21 procedure change implemented in the plant, the new 22 value set into the loops in the plant.
23 January we implemented the temporary 24 procedure change into the permanent procedures as
'25 Revision 16 to the procedures.
h.
1.
4 L
16 I
l' As we will show as we go through this 2
thing, the permanent change to the procedures was 3
made correctly in three out of four loops and j
4 incorrectly in one place in_one out of four of the i
L 5
loops, specifically loop three.
6 We are required to do a surveillance,
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7 what we' call an ACOT analog calibration or analog
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8 channel operational test once each month on each of I
9 these loops.
So there are a total of eight of these j
10 things done each month.
11 In January -- on January the 28th, 1992, 12 JD Davis and Marcel Wilkins was given the ACOT 13 procedure, surveillance procedure to run on loop 14 three Delta T.
this is on night 15 And they went out 16 shift.
They went out to run this surveillance 17 procedure, set up the equipment.
And.the procedure 18 requires you to go through and take "as found" data i
19 and enter on -- in the ACOT section enter on data 20 sheet one in the procedure.
21-That data sheet has desired values for 22:
voltages,;has a plus and minus tolerance value.
And 23 you go through and record the "as found" data.
.24 If you-find yourself with a condition 25 where the'"as found" data does not meet the desired i
17 1
data requirement plus or minus the tolerance, then 2
you are required to calibrate that particular 3
component.
4 I might add at this point neither of 5
these technicians, of course, knew that there was an 6
error in the procedure that they were running.
They 4
7 assumed quite logically that the procedure was 8
correct.
when running the procedure 9
They found 4
10 they found when they got to.the bistable data for 11.
the OP Delta T turbine runback bistable that the "as 12 found" data was not within the bounds of the
' 13 required value.
14 There is a lot, and I have heard 15 testimony and I have personally interviewed both 16 individuals on this issue, and talking about this 17 story sometime after it occurred, there is some 18 differences in the way the story is told, but there 19 is no difference in the basic facts.
20 When the data was found out of spec, it 21 was agreed we need to call the foreman, make him 22 aware of this, which is required by the procedure.
23 That was in fact done.
A QC inspector 24 was called.
A QC inspector in this situation is 25 only called if you_have an out of tolerance value
l 18 1
and it requires calibration which an out of 2
tolerance value does require.,
4 3
You must have QC come and witness that l
4 you have, in fact, restored the "as found" values to 5
within the tolerance given for the desired value.
6 QC person was called.
The foreman and 7
the QC person came to the control room.
The problem
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8 was shown to the foreman.
It's my understanding the 9
foreman told these gentlemen to tweak it in.
There 10 is some discussion about tweak it in.
11 I believe personally and I'm convinced 4
12 that in this case tweak it in means calibrate the 13 bistable.
Otherwise we have no reason for the QC 14 person there if you are not going to follow
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15 procedure and do the calibration.
16 So, we were told to calibrate the 17 bistable.
In fact, what happened was that the 18 bistable was adjusted under the ACOT section of the 19 procedure as opposed to going out of the procedure 20 into the calibration procedure actually what you 21 do is from the ACOT section you go to a later 22 section in that same procedure.
And that requires 23 you to enter data on a separate data sheet.
And 24 also requires you to go outside the procedure for 25 the actual instructions for adjusting the pot on the
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1 edge of the card.
j 2-That.was not, in fact, done.
It was, in 3
fact, the pot was adjusted with the voltage inputs l
4 and the setup as it's given in the ACOT section of 5
the procedure and was adjusted to the value, desired i
'j; 6
'value in the ACOT, procedure.
7 In and of itself this adjustment at this s
l 8
point in the procedure in reality has no safety 9
significance if you want to look at it from that i
10 aspect, because you get ident'ically the same results j
[
11 as if you go outside into the calibration 12 procedure.
I 13 However, the procedure requires you to do 14 it a different way.
And you move the place where l
1S.
you-insert voltage and you move the place where you 4
J 16 monitor and you get different voltage values that 17 represent the same thing.
4 I
l 18 Without the error in the procedure the I
f 19 bistable would have been set to the exact value that 20-was. required.
However, the procedure was incorrect 21 and it resulted in an inaccurate setting of the 22 bistable and also exposed a violation of procedure.
l 23
.Once this bistable had been reset, the OC 24 person. viewed the "as left" settings, confirmed tha-
'25 :
the "as.left" settings were within the desired i
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i 20 1
'value.
He did that'in the ACOT section of the 4
p 2
procedure, not on the data sheet 37 as it is 3-numbered,-that you would get to in the calibration 4
section.
5 Again, the results would have been i.
6 identical had the procedure not been in error.
Once "7
this was done there was some' discussion among the i
l 8
technicians about what they had done.
i 9
As I understand it, there was a question-l 10 about how should we what should we do.
We have l
1 11 violated procedure.
We have an error.
12 One time there was a discussion about we 13 need to just enter this comment on the work request 4
14 that the bistable was adjusted in the ACOT section i
15 of the procedure as opposed to the calibration 16 section.
4 5
17 That option was not chosen for whatever 18' reason, and data was fabricated to place on data i
19 sheet 37 to indicate that that calibration had been
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20 run when it, in fact, had not.
21.
In fact, had that-calibration been run, 22 it would'have, I think, identified an inconsistency
.23 in.the1 procedure.
And would have and it would 24~
have had.to.have been dispositioned.
l 25.
Once the QC inspector had signed off on b
4
_d 1
i
I 21 1
the procedure hold point, the loop was returned to 2
service.
The foreman came back to the racks, 3
verified that all of_the test equipment had been 4
removed, all of the bistable switches and other 5
switches in the rack had been returned to their j
6 normal operating condition and that the loop was, in 7
fact, properly restored.
8 And the procedure was signed off and the i
9 loop was considered to be back in service properly 10 calibrated.
11 Shortly after the loop was returned to 12
' service we started receiving sporadic alarms again 13 on OP Delta T turbine runback bistable.
On day 14 shift of the 28th I&C people and other people in the 15 shop on day shift in investigating why we have 16 alarms on this channel determined that the procedure 17 was in error and that improper values had been set 18 into the bistable.
And the procedure was revised 19 and the proper set point was reinstated.
20 On the night of the 29th these two 21 gentlemen, JD and Marcel, returned to the plant for
'22 their normal shift and were made aware that we had
'23 had problems with this channel.
And were told that 24 they needed to on the morning of the 29th stay over 25
'and see~their-supervisor Scott Hammond.
22 1-
.And they did so and went in to see Mr.
2 Hammond.
And in the ensuing discussion about what 3
. happened on the night of the 28th and why do we have 4
a channel that's improperly calibrated, as I l
5 understand it, Mr. Davis said that you need ts --
6.
there;is something you need to know and that is that 7
I didn't follow procedure.
That I did not do the i
8 calibration section of the procedure.
I adjusted it 9
in'the ACOT section.
I violated procedure.
And Mr.
i 10 Wilkins said and I also fabricated the data that 1
11 would indicate we calibrated it when we did not.
without a great deal i
12 So, there was a 13 of questioning, the true facts of what happened on 14 the 28th came forward immediately from the two 15 gentlemen.
16 Immediately upon hearing what had l
17 happened on the 28th, the I&C supervisor contacted 18 the superintendent, Mike Hobbs, who contacted Lewis 19 Ward, the maintenance manager, and they also had an 20 interview with Mr. Davis and Mr. Wilkins and who i
21 reconfirmed the same data that they had told to i
22-Scott Hammond.
23 Shortly after this interview, within a 24-
. matter of"an hour or'so, the maintenance manager 25 went:up and informed'the resident inspector Brian
23 J
1 Bonser of the situation we had and the facts that we 2
knew as we knew them at tha.t time, made him aware 3
and also told him that, you know, that we had an 4
ongoing investigation and that these two gentlemen 5
had been sent home on administrative leave.
6 And, in fact, they were on their normal 7
seven day off starting that day.
This occurred on 8
the 29th of January.
9 On the 3rd of February I called both of 10 these gentlemen into back into the plant, into my 11 office to discuss this matter with them.
It's a 12 normal reaction when you find that a trusted 13 employee has willingly violated procedures, 14 fabricated data, to termina that employee.
15 That's an easy at...-er.
You don't have to 16 worry about any complications with that.
However, I I
17 have been a professional for some 33 years now, 20 18 of that in the nuclear industry.
19 And I have learned that in many times my 20 first reaction in a situation like this is not the 21 best reuction.
That I need to consider what I'm 22 going to do and what message I want to send.
23 As I have already said, I personally 24 interviewed these' employees to establish what their 25 motivation was, what their sense of right and wrong a
s I
es i-4 24 1 ~
was about this incident.
Was supervision involved l
2 in this wrongdoing.
Had they done this sort of 3
-thing before.
Did they know of anyone else doing i
4 this kind of-thing.
What was their general attitude 5
about this offense, remorseful, arrogant, denial, 6
all of the things that you normally see.
And
-7 furthermore, what could I have done to prevent this 8
from occurring.-
9.
During those conversaticns I-found both i
10 of these individuals to be very accountable for 11 their actions, very remorseful and anguished about 12 having created a problem for their department, for 13 their plant, for themselves and for their families.
14 Also concluded that supervision and i
15 pressure for a schedule was not a factor in their 16 decision.
Both individuals convinced me that they i-17 had never fabricated data before and was not aware 2
18 of anyone that had.
~ 19 As I~have said before, in determining 20
'what message I wanted to send, what discipline I i
1 21 wanted to recommend to Mr. McCoy that we take, I
' 22 wanted to take a-discipline severe enough to clearly i'
23 establish that this was unacceptable behavior, but 24 recognize the importance of admitting wrongdoing.
25 In other_words, I feel like that it's d
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25 1
important for employees in our industry to know that 2
when they have inadvertently found themselves 3
outside procedural guidance or when they have 4
consciously violated procedures and come to their 5
senses, that they know that the.best thing for them 6
to do is immediately notify their supervision and 7
that this admission will not prevent the appropriate 8
discipline, but at best it can mitigate the severity 9
of the discipline.
10 I was concerned and I am still concerned 11 that the termination of these employees who, when 4
12 questioned about this event, very freely admitted
'13 their guilt, their error in judgment, would send a 14 message to the rest of our employees that if you 15 make a mistake, you are better off to hide and deny 16 it, because the discipline for the mistake is the 17 same.
i 18 As a plant manager responsible for this 19 plant, I need for my employees to be trustful and 20 have high integrity.
I-also need for.them, when 21 they make a mistake, to come forward and admit it 22 and to have the understanding that if I find it and 23.
they have not admitted it, that that is the most 24 severe discipline that they will encur.
25 We have many thousands of procedures.
We
26 1
have many opportunities for people to inadvertently 2
or deliberately v1olate procedures.
I must depend 3
on them-to, first of all, to follow procedures; 4.
second of all, if they find themselves outside 5
procedure, to make it known.
6 These are some~of the considerations that 7
went into my final recommendations to Mr. McCoy.
8 about what we should do with discipline of these 9
individuals.
10 My recommendation was that we administer 11 what we in Georgia Power call decision making in Georgia Power's 12.
leave.
In Georgia Power 13 positive discipline program that is the most severe 14 discipline that can be administered short of 15 termination.
16 That is severe discipline.
And at this 1
17 time I would like to just read to you, since this
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18 has been a question, what the Georgia Power 19 procedures manual on decision making leave says.
20 And this-is under decision making leave 21 A,
application.
A decision making leave is the 22 third.and final level-of formal discipline in the 23 positive discipline program.
24 It is given to an employee when the 25:
employee'does not meet the commitment to improve 4
o
,. 4 27 1
following a written reprimand or when a single 2
infraction is serious enough to warrant this level 3
of discipline.
4 The DML consists of a discussion between 5
the employee and his immediate supervisor during 6
which the supervisor, using the employee discussion 7
guide, makes it clear the extreme seriousness of the 8
employee's problem.and the requirement for total 9
performance commitment.
~
10 The employee is told to make a conscious 11 decision whether to meet Georgia Power's 12 expectations in all areas or to resign from the 13-company.
14-The employee is given the following work 15 day off with pay to think about the matter and is 16 told to report back to the supervisor the next work 17 day with a decision.
18 If possible, avoid giving a DML the day 19 before an off day.
When the employee returns the 20
. supervisor-reinforces the seriousness of the 21' commitment to improve or a notice of resignation.
22 If the employee. elects to keep the job, 23 specific notice should be given that any performance
~ 2 4.
problem requiring disciplinary action is likely to 25
. result-in the employee's dismissal during the time
l 28 j
1 the DML remains actively in the employee's file.
2' And then under the, administrative 3
guidelines in the same procedure:
Because the f
4 decision making leave requires a total performance.
4 j
5 commitment by the employee, there may be only one l
j-6 acilve DML.
7 If the employee is.not terminated after i
8 committing a significant infraction while under an
]
9 active DML,.the decision.not to terminate must be 10 documented and approved by the supervisor who l
11 authorized the original DML or another appropriate l
12 level ~of management.-
e 13 It is a very serious disciplinary action 14 in Georgia Power.
A quick look at our corporate 15 records indicate that there have been approximately
~
16-200 DMLs issued.
Of those 200, 84 of them or about 17 50 percent, the individual has eventually been.
18 terminated because of infiictions of his 19
' probationary period.
So, about 50 percent wind up 20' being dismissed.
21 At.the Vogtle Plant the ratios are about 22 the same.
There have been 32 DMLs issued and 12 23-
-have eventually resulted in dismissal of the
' 24 employee.
So it is a significant discipline.
25 It's in their file for 18 months and any 4
I f
3 a
.o---
~
4 e
29 5
1 infraction -- some of the some of the dismissals 2
that were the DML had to do with performance.
At 3
least one I have read the individual was given a DML 4
for not-performing work properly and he was given a e
5 task to was a utility type person,.to wash a 6
car.
And when he finished with the car he had not l
7 cleaned some. bird droppings off the windshield.
So 8
he was terminated for' inadequate Job performance 9
Because his DML was related to job performance.
10 Another individual in the same area of i
11 job performance was given-a task to carry a document l
12 across town here in Atlanta.
It should have taken I
13 30 minutes and it took him an hour and a half.
And 14 he was terminated for improper performance of his 15 job.
16 So it is a it's a very serious thing 17 and it can result in termination.
We have received 18 on the 20th of March the NRC Inspection Report 92-02 19 which documented this incident and NRC Information 20 Notice 92-30 on the 23rd of April which alr40 21 documents this event as well as other events in the
- 22
. industry.
23 And we are aware of those both of m
24 those documents and our people are now aware of 25-them.
m m
+
s
30 1
I have covered much of this, but I want 2
to go back through and reiterate to you, when we had 3
the initial bistable alarm on the 28th, our I&C 4
Department immediately got involved to determine why 1
5 we were now having an alarm.
6 We discovered very quickly that we had an 7
error in the procedure and consequently an error in 8
the circuit in the voltage settings.
A deficiency 9
card was initiated and an associated route cause 10 review was initiated.
11 That route cause review revealed both the e
12 procedure error and documented the procedural 13 violation and the fabrication of data by JD and 14 Marcel.
15 We reviewed the calibration procedure as 16 a part of this, as I have already said, we 17 determined that we had this error and no other 18 errors as a result of the revision to this 19 procedure.
20 Supervisors and management interviewed 21' the individuals, developed the story you have s
22 heard.
I interviewed the individuals, the 23 technicians and corroborated all the things I had
- 24
- been told.
25 Also had our people go out and do a 4
6
31 1
sample of procedures that had been run that involved 2
personnel to see if we could detect anything from 3
reviewing procedures that would indicate this may 4
have been wider spread than this single incident.
5 We were unable to detect any pattern or 6
falsification of data or willful wrongdoing by 7
reviewing procedures.
8 We have interviewed other people in the 9
I&C Department both about this event, about the 10 I&C Department in general about these two 11 individuals, about other individuals who might be 12 involved in similar activities.
13 We have been able to find no other 14 instances similar to this that we can document.
We I have put out a memo to all personnel in 15 have it's been out recently documenting 16 the plant
.17 what my expeccations are, what Georgia Power's 18 expectations are, also what the Nuclear Regulatory 19 Commission's expectations are-in this issue and in 20 similar events what we expect in the plant.
21 That memo included as an attachment to it 22 both the Information Notice that was sent out and 23 also a copy of the Federal Register that included 24 the new law.
So that all of our people know that 25 not only are we looking very hard at what goes on,
32 1
i 1
but that there are other people looking.
i 2
The corrective actions for this event, as j
i j
3 I have already said, we administered severe j
l 4
discipline.
.The only more severe discipline we l
5' could-have administered would have been 6
termination.
7 They are fully aware, and as I think they 8
have told some of you gentlemen who have interviewed 9
them, that any further violations or infractions on i
10 their part will in very high probability result in i
11 immediate termination.
l 12 I think that message.has gone out to all 13 of our employees.
Also it's corroborated by 14 interviews with these two individuals.
We have had r
15 a series of management and supervisory meetings with 16 the IEC technicians, and this occurred shortly after 17 the event, within two or three days, to strongly 18 emphasize again our expectations for procedure 4
l 19 compliance, the reliance on integrity of the plant 20 staff is a fundamental job requirement and a basis 21 for employment'.
22 If there were any people in our plant who l
23 did not understand what was required, I think we 24
- have made sure that they now understand.
. 25 Again,-as a part o,f.the corrective m.
E-
~
e-r.*-
= -
l 33 1
actions, the memorandum I have sent out again 1
2 reinforces all of the above.
3 We are reviewing other industry events as 4
identified in Information Notice 92-33.
We have in 5
process a review of surveillances performed by our i
6 operators as a result of that Information Notice and 7
problems that have been found in the northeast.
8 At this point in time we have completed j
9 review of 11 PEOs rounds from March of '91 until 10 March of
'92.
That is every shifts rounds utilizing 11 the security computer printouts for when people 12 enter doors and when they exit doors.
13 We have found no indications that, well 14 as you can tell from the fact that they entered an 15 area and exited an area that would indicate that 16 they have not made the rounds, they have not at
.17 least been in the area where they were supposed to 18 have been when they said they were.
19 We have also looked at, I think it's 12 20 red waste operators over that same period with the 21' same finding.
Now, the areas we were looking at 22 were basically the diesel building, the auxillary 23' feed water' pump rooms, the nuclear service water 24 cooling tower and the spent fuel pool.
25 These all happen to be areas, vital areas
l
- n.
34 1
that'have specific card readers or badge readers 2
that you-badge in and out and so it's pretty easy to 3
go get a computer printout of the entrances and j
4' exits of these people from those areas and review 5
that.
And that's the process by which we have been 6
reviewing this.
7 As I said, at this time, we have found no 8
errors.
We had chosen a larger sample of PEOs to 4
9-look at and we are continuing with that review.
And 10 we'll keep Brian informed, o f-cours e, of any events 11 that occur as a result of that.
12 We believe that our review, as well as 13 historically what we know, NRC is doing, has always 14 done and is still doing through Brian and the 15 residents and the inspection teams who come on site, 16 we believe all of that has created a broad awareness 17 of the need to fully comply with our procedural 18 requirements as well as all the other rules and 19 regulations that we live under.
l I
20-We have established a policy of 21 identification of mistakes and conditions adverse to 22 safety.
.And we have tried to do things to encourage 23 people to.come forward-when they know they have made 24 mistakes.
{
25 We have a management policy of openness h
~
~
35 1
in identifying problems to the NRC staff and to the 2
other regulators.
I think in this case and all 3
.other cases Brian will indicate to you that we have 7
4 been very open with him in providing him all the 5
information we had as early as we had it, sometimes 6
incomplete information, sometimes early notification I
7 that there is something developing.
8 We have no desire to hide anything.
We 9
see no benefit to hide anything.
Our positive 10 discipline program encourages reporting of 11.
deficiencies and is designed to achieve proper i
12 performance.
13 It is a measured program designed to 14 modify behavior.
We believe it's quite successful.
15 It's very painful sometimes to follow, as is all L
'16 discipline programs that require you to over a 1
17 period of time develop a problem person and 18 determine that you are not going to be able to 19 change their behavior.
20 But we believe the program is designed to 21 modify behavior.
Of course, there are some 22 behaviors that are unacceptable at any time.
23 We have looked for previous similar
.24
-events in our plant of where we have had people who i
25 violated procedure or' violated regulations that we
+
b,
36 1
are aware of, that you are aware of, because you are 2
aware of the ones we are aware of basically.
3 There was a PEO who did a valve lineup in 4
the fall of '91 and unfortunately again, the 5
individual did not do the valve lineup because the 6
valve he supposedly lined was no longer installed.
i 7
He did not come forward with that nor did he 8
acknowledge his mistake when confronted and that 9
individual was terminated.
10 We had an individual utility person who 11 was doing fire watches who was terminated for 12 failure to do his fire watch properly.
This was 13 determined by his supervisor's oversight deciding to 14 go out and monitor what his people was doing and was 15 in the area where the fire watch should be performed 16 at a certain time and they did not see the 17 individual.
18 And he went and checked the record and i
19 the individual had signed off that he did the fire 20' watch at the time the supervisor was in the area 21 monitoring for proper performance.
That individual 22-was terminated.
23 We have a record of taking as severe 1'
24 disciplinary action available to us when we believe
- 25 it is - called for.
L
4 37 i
1 For our conclusions we believe that the 2
level of discipline that we have administered is 3'
appropriate for the foliowing reasons.
We don't 4
believe that the. technicians' actions in this case 5
was malicious.
6 We don't believe they intended to go out
-7 and put the plant in an unsafe condition and as a 8
matter of fact nor did they.
They believed that the 9
adjustment that was made, while it was not in 10 accordance with procedure,.was not made in 11 accordance with procedure, it was technically j
12 correct.
13 That is,-the results achieved, had the 14 procedure been correct, would have been exactly what 15 would have been achieved had you followed the 16 calibration procedure.
17 We believe that the discipline is 18
. consistent with Georgia Power and Plant Vogtle's 19
' positive discipline program.
We administered the 20 most severe discipline short of termination.
i
- 21.
.Due to the severity of the discipline we 221 believe that the unacceptability of the technicians' 23 behavior is recognized by the plant as unacceptable 24
' conduct.
. 25 These technicians have admitted and
.. ~ _.
. -.. ~..
w t-
,.~
38
+
s t
l' recognized their errors and pledged to me personally i-2 and to Georgia Power in-genera,1 future compliance l
j 3
with all of our rules and regulations.
.Their
]
4 cooperation and their openness was factored into the 4
5 decision.
6 We gave them due consideration for past 7
good performance and reputation.
And we have asked 8
.in our shop about these two gentlemen's reputation 9
with their peers and they have good reputations.
J 10 We have tried to use this noncompliance J
11-as a positive example to encourage self-reporting, 12 open, truthful. communications between our employees 3
j 4
13 and ourselves.
14 It is a well-known event at our plant
(
15 site.
And if there are other' people or were other j'-
16 people who would do this, I believe it has been a 17 significant deterant to those people.
18
-I believe that this discipline is j
19 consistent with your enforcement policy which 20-requires us~to take significant remedial action.
21.
That. removal of the person is not necessarily
.22' required,.but substantial-disciplinary action is 23 required.
n
-24:
And I understand that you recognize that
- 25 judgments will have to be made_on a case'-by-case
~
_ _ __ _ _ _.- _ _ ~.. __ _ _ __ _ _._
W 39 4
1 basis.
Thoses judgments should consider the 2;
attitude of'the wrong doer, the admission of 3
wrongdoing and the acceptance of responsibility.
_4 Furthermore, we believe that enforcement 5
action against a licensee is inappropriate for the 6
following reasons:
The training, experience and 7;
knowledge of consequences.
8' These individuals were trained.
They are i
9 aware of'our expectations as it relates to 10 compliance with procedures.
.And they are 11 experienced in these specific procedures.
i 12 These procedures, as I have already said, 13 are run a total of eight times each and every l
14 month.
These. individuals may not run them eight 15 times but it comes their time periodically.
16 The level of the individuals involved are 17 not management employees.
They are at the level l
18 below foreman.
That the actual safety consequences 19 was negligible.
The "as found" values were, in 20 fact,-more conservative, that is the "as found" l
21 values-after they worked on this loop was more 22
- conservative than what the procedure would actually 23
'have had them set had it been correct _and they had 24 done it properly.
,25 That is'the move from three percent
2 40 i
1 the move from one percent below OP Delta T set point 2
to three percent below OP Delta T set point.
3-There was no benefit to the licensee 4-resulting from this event.
There was no schedule j
j 5-pressure.
There was no financial or production i
6 effect.
}
J 7
We believe the degree of supervision at 8
the time.was appropriate.
As I have said before, 3
9 these procedures are run often.
Our technicians are i
10 familiar with the procedures.
They are normally a
11-given the procedures by their foreman, told to run 12
'this surveillance procedure.
13 The instructions in the procedure say 14 call me if you have a problem and the foreman will 15 then go and address the problem.
That, in fact, i
'16 occurred at this time.
The foreman was called.
The 17 QC. inspector was called signifying let's get the 18 bistable calibrated and get a QC inspector down here 19 to verify the "as left" values.
No apparent need 1
20 for constant supervision.
21 Our response.
The licensee's response to 22 this event has been severe. discipline to these 23 employees.
The technicians involved, as I have c
- 24
.already said, are accountable for their actions, 25=
they-have acknowledged it, they have been l
~
4 41 1
forthcoming, they are very repentant and they have 2
pledged to comply with all of our procedures and 3
regulations.
4 We find no management involvement in any j
5 of the inappropriate actions that occurred here.
We
)
6 identified the procedural and data errors later in 7
the day of the 28th and promptly brought those to 8
the NRC's attention.
9 In summary I'd just like to cover some of 10 the high points of what I have tried to tell you.
f.
11 We know, we believe that the actions by the 12 technicians was incorrect and clearly unacceptable 13 to us.
14 When the problem was identified we 15 immediately conducted a thorough investigation.
We 16 promptly notified the NRC of our concerns and 17 provided complete information throughout the 16 investigation.
19 We took significant corrective action j
20 with the individuals and with the information to the 2i plant'in general.which we believe has insured a 22 deterant effect and an example for others.
23 We conducted a thorough broadness review I
24 of this event, tried to determine if we had a larger 25 problem with personnel or are we dealing with an m
c t
I 42 1
isolated event..
2 We believe that the strong and personnel 3
- actions taken.by management to reinforce our 4
requirement that all personnel carry out activities 4
5 according to procedure and with highest standards of
' ntegrity and trustworthiness have been received by-i 6
7 our people.
8 We have carefully examined the specifics 9
of this case and made judgments that the discipline 10 that was issued was appropriate, sufficiently severe 11 considering the attitudes of the technicians and has 12 the desired deterant effect on the plant at large.
13 Consequently, we believe no enforcement 14 action.is required due to the responsible handling 15 of-these issues by the licensee.
16-That concludes my presentation.
i 17 MR. McCOY:
What I would like to do is 18 step'through these questions you had, Jim, and just 19 give you an opportunity -- let me step through the 20 ones I'think.he may not have completly covered and 21 then you add any. questions or information that's 22 lacking.
I 23.
MR. LIEBERMAN:
How about before we do 24
.that, since there is a' lot of factual information, 25 maybe we can go over some of the points Mr. Shipmar.
- l. z
't, 43 1
made and what the company has done so we can get an 2
understanding of those issues.,
3 And then if we have anything left 4
over 5
MR. McCOY:
That's fine.
my first 6
MR. LIEBERMAN:
I want 7
question is the motivation.
These individuals say 8
they have never done it before.
The attitude of the 9
company is we expect people to follow procedures.
10 We don't have any evidence apparently 11 that procedures haven't been deliberately violated 12 in the past.
There was no pressures, no scheduling 13 pressure.
1 14 Wouldn't have taken that much longer to 1
15 have done it the right way.
There didn't seem to be 16 a lot.of discussion as to consequences of not doing 17 it the right way at-the time it occurred.
i 18 In your view what's the motivation?
Why
-19 did they do'it?
All those things don't seem to hang
.20 together.
21 MR. SHIPMAN:
In my view, this is-12 2 '
' speculation on my part, because I do not know what L2 3 -
- -isEin either one of these gentlemen's minds or
- 24 hearts ~in this respect, but in my view this problem 25-
- was created by one simple fact.
y "f,
1--..
-+.,
1*
44 l
1 That is that JD Davis knew this circuit, j
2 this procedure and he knew that tweaking this 3
bistable at this point produced the identical 4
results as if you.went out into the calibration 5
procedure and did it 6
MR. McCOY:
With much less work.
with much less work.
I 7
MR. SHIPMAN:
3 8
don't know, as I have stated, Mr. Lieberman, I don't 9
know what's in their hearts.
That's my personal 10 conclusion because from reviewing the circuit, from 11 reviewing the procedure, I have concluded and I have j
i 12 had other people review and conclude the same thing,
j 13 that you get identical results and in a sense the 14 procedure forces you to do work that is unnecessary.
15 MR. LIEBERMAN:
So that's just that 16 the ultimate cause, putting trust and integrity to 17 one side, is the lack of appreciation for following 18 procedures.
19 MR. SHIPMAN:
A lack of a hundred percent 20 dedication to following prncedures step-by-step.
21 MR. LIEBERMAN:
So my next question is 22-you have told us that you put out a memorandum, 23 enclosed the information notice emphasizing this
-24 issue.
That occurred last week?
25 MR.' SHIPMAN:
No.
I wrote the memorandum 1
45 1
last week.
It got out to all employees this week.
2 MR. LIEBERMAN:
This event occurred 3.
January 29th?
4 MR. SHIPMAN:
Yes.
5 MR. LIEBERMAN:
Did you do anything 6
between that time and the time the. Enforcement I
7 Conference was arranged to get the word out?
i 8
MR. SHIPMAN:
Yes.
Shortly after this 9
event occurred Mr. Ward and Mr. Hobbs met, and Scott 10 Hammond met with all the personnel in the I&C shop, j
1 11 discussed this event, discussed the necessity of 12 procedural compliance and following procedures
]
13 vertabim.
14 And so.it was covered in the area of the i
15 problem in the plant in general.
Other than in I
16:
general discussions about it in staff meetings there 17 was no written information put out to the plant in 18
- general, 19-MR. McCOY:
Perhaps it-would be helpful 20 to put that slide back up that had all the 1
21
' corrective actions'that were taken and say what 22 dates each of-those-were taken.
23 Is that the thrust of your question?
L2 4 MR. LIEBERMAN:
Well, what I really 2 5l wanted to detsrmine is how much education the staff t.-
4
46 1
has receiveu concerning the importance of or the 2
impact or potential penalties for not complying
-3 for deliberately not complying with requirements?
4
.MR.
McCOY:
There is a couple of things 5
here, Jim, that I think should be pointed out.
The 6
memorandum that we put out is based not only on this 7
event,.but on other events that have occurred in the 8
industry recently which we have just gotten 9
recently.
10 And this information has just been 11 digested.
And as Bill has said, we have been 12_
looking to see if there were any indications of 13 that.
And this memorandum that was put out this 14 week addresses the whole broader scope.
~
15 Now, there were specific actions taken 16 earlier.
And I think if we go back over that, it 17 was clear to me that all of our employees at the 18 plant were aware of this specific event and the 19 actions taken.
And I believe they were taken in a 20 timely manner.
21' MR. LIEBERMAN:
How about prior to the did.the employees 22 event, were employees 23 appreciate that if they were involved-in a 24 deliberate violation, that they would be subject to
'25.
.this decision making leave or worse?
47 1
MR. SHIPMAN:
That is yes, that is a 2
part of our general employee training where 3
employees are trained on our procedures and 4
policies.
5 And I believe it's also a part of our --
6 and I'm not 100 percent positive of this it is 7
part of our training like for the instrument and 8
control technicians as a part of their training.
9 No question in my mind that all of our l
10 employees know what expectations Georgia Power has 11 for procedural compliance.
l 12 MR. LIEBERMAN:
You keep on saying or a 13 number of times 14 MR. McCOY:
Jim, before you leave that 15 question there is one other piece of relevant 16 information there.
t 17 Our past actions, which are well 18 communicated and understood throughout the plant, 19 have clearly reinforced, our management practices 20 have reinforced that training.
21 Specifically, the examples that we have 22 given about the termination for failure to follow i
23 procedure or falsification of data in the past has 24 sent a message, in my mind, clearly to our employees 25 that we are serious about our expectations in this
O 48 1
area.
2 MR. LIEBERMAN:
Is,there also another 3
message that someone may say if you deliberately 4
screwed up, but as long as you come clean on it, at 5
least you'll get a second chance, at least then you 6
have to be clean for 18 months and then the clock 7
begins again?
8 MR. McCOY:
Well, I think that's a key 9
issue here and this is a judgment, a management 10 judgment kind of issue.
You have to consider all l
11 the circumstances as we did in this case.
12 In some cases, this same event, I think 13 the action would have been termination as Bill i
14 pointed out.
In this particular case there was 15 sufficient reason to be1ieve that these employees
~
16 could perform and meet our expectations in the 17 future.
18 And this was an isolated case sufficient 19 to give them a second chance.
And I believe our 20 people at the plant clearly understand that.
They 21 do not believe that if they violate procedure or 22 falsify records, that they will necessarily get a 23 second chance.
24 MR. LIEBERMAN:
I want to make it clear, 25 I'm not suggesting that the only right sanction was
l 49 1
termination.
I'm not suggesting that at all.
2 But-in looking at the sanctions you 3
considered, I gather it's not under your policy ~of
'4 demotions, time off without pay, a week, two weeks, 5
whatever it might be, those types sanctions are not 6
part of 7
MR. McCOY:
That is correct.
Our program 8
is based on modifying people's behavior, not on 9
adverse actions or a penalty type system.
That's 10 why-it's called a positive discipline program.
11 MR. MCDONALD:
May we say something about 12 that?
Are you' familiar with the positive discipline l
L 13 programs?
l 14 MR. LIEBERMAN:
Not completely.
15 MR. MCDONALD:
This is pretty widely
'16 practiced in the industry, and before the positive 17 discipline programs many utilities, including some 18 of-us, had programs which would have a variety of 19
.the type of actions such as the_ones that you.have
- 2 0' mentioned.
i 21 The new wave of management, the new wave
.22 of human factors came along with this as a very 23 significant improvement.
It is much more powerful 24 in-our mind than the old type because the decision 25
_ making leave is a decisive. point.
l 50 1
And so I think if you might wish to 2
inquire of other people, there are a lot of 3
utilities that have gone to this type of a program.
4 MR. DOMBY:
Mr. Lieberman, if I may, your 5
' question seems to imply that the action taken, and I 6
am aware you are not. aware of the details of the 7
positive discipline program, but this was 8
established over six years ago.
And it was very 9
carefully crafted with a lot of input from experts 10 in the field.
11 And a DML, as it's termed, is in the 12 community of Georgia Power, in shorthand it's towing 13 the line, under the gun and, in fact, for union 14 employees that Bill pointed out, you know, things 15 like not washing car droppings off of a car are 16 supported when arbitrated in grievance.
17 I mean it's, you know, it's it's 18 tantamount to termination absent prompt, thorough 19 remedial action in the future.
So, I don't think 20 your question meant to trivialize the discipline.
21 And I understand you don't know all the background, 22.
but it's viewed by the labor lawyers and the company 23 and the culture as being very, very serious.
24 MR. LIEBERMAN:
No.
I am aware that 25; other-licensees have.used this_ program.
Question
51 1
is, and that we have to make a judgment on, is how 2
many-chances can you give to an employee who is 3
trained, knows what they are doing and then chooses 4
which requirements to follow, which requirements 5
not?
6 In this case the result was not 7
significant, fabricating data.
What action is 8
appropriate?
You are explaining why you took your 9
.ction.
And I want to make sure we understand why 10 you did what you did.
11 MR. SHIPMAN:
I think the program. Mr.
12 Lieberman, would say you only get one. chance at this.
13 kind of infraction.
And, i?~ fact, once you have had 14 this kind of infraction, a much smaller infraction 15 of another type is fatal as far as your employment 16 is concerned.
17 And as for the impact that this has had h
18 on our plant, I think you have previously heard 19 if'you didn't, you couldn't hear probably by 20 interviewing our employees, and I think you have
{
21 heard. statements from there two employees about what
- 22 they think the' impact. on our plant has been.
- 23 MR. LIEBERMAN:
How about if tomorrow the
- 24 lsame thing happens?
'25
'MR.
McCOY:
Well, let me go back on i
1 s
a..
52 1-this.
That is I think the fundamental question 2
is you have got to look case-by-case and we.have 3
given you several examples.
4 We had a case where an employee was sent 5
to do a valve lineup.
And in that case the 6
employee, even though he had a rationale that.these 7
were vent and drain valves, and if there was no 8
water coming out of a system that was in operation, 9-it wasn't necessary for him to verify they were 10 closed, he did not check those valves and when first 11 confronted, he did not come forward with the whole 12 story, and he was terminated.
13.
That was a union employee.
We have been 14 through grievances, et cetera, on that and we stick 15 knr our guns that was the right decision to make in 16 that case.
'17 That sent, I think, a clear message to 18 emloyees on what our expectations are.
We have had 19 a cetra of the utility man who basically lied about 20 doing a fire watch.
And in that case that was a 21 clear case of misrepresentation and he was fired 22 immediately for that.
23 This case there was some mitigating ideas 24.
in these people's-minds to our knowledge in our 25' investigation as to their rationale for why they d.
t 53 11 not follow the procedure, No.
1.
2 No.
2, when this event was discovered, i
3 they immediately came forward and laid out the whole 4
story.
They clearly understood and took personal 5
responsibility that they had made a mistake and came 6
forward with it.
7 In that case it is our judgment that 8
these people can live up to our expectations in the 9
future, No.
1.
That's a fundamental question I 10 think that you asked.
11 And No.
2, that by taking the 12 disciplinary accion that we did, we have reinforced 13 our desire for people to be forthright and open even 14 if they have made a mistake.
15 MR. LIEBERMAN:
So if tomorrow, given the 16 notices you have given, given el.is measure you have 17 taken, another team of people, individuals, have a 18 deliberate failure and then fess up, you might not 19 necessarily come up with the same result?
20 MR. McCOY:
That's correct, we may not
-21 come up with 22 MR. LIEBERMAN:
Given additional notice?
23 MR. McCOY:
Given that people have heard 24 of this. event, so.forth, if we had a similar event l
25 to.this occurred'with everybody having heard the i
54 1
discussions on this and so forth, then that would 2
certainly be a factor in the severity of the 3
discipline.
4 MR. LIEBERMAN:
Maybe we should move off 5
that and turn to some of the other issues.
One of 6
the issues had to do with the QC inspector.
Are you 7
satisfied with the role of QC in focusing on the "as 8
left" condition?
9 MR. McCOY:
Bill, you want to describe 10 what his specific role was and so forth?
11 MR. SHIPMAN:
He is charged with 12 specifically that, to verify that the "as left" 13 values or within the desired value tolerance, that 14 is the specific charge.
15 He has no charge to verify the process or 16 to verify the "as found" data.
He is called when 17 the data is found to be outside the desired value 18 plus the tolerance.
19 And then he is then required to witness 20 that it has been restored to the proper value.
And 4
21 that is the charge that he has in our system of QC 22 for this event.
t 23 MR. LIEBERMAN:
So he does not have a
-24.
charge to. assure that the number that has been 25 obtained.is done in accordance with the specific
._.. - -. ~.
- ~.
-D 55 1
procedure?
2 MR. McCOY:
No.
There is no way for him 3
to do that.
Because when he comes there, he comes 4
at a specific point, a witness point to witness a 5-specific step and that's all he. sees.
6 He doesn't see the whole procedure and 7
how it got there, nor is he trained in all of that.
8 MR. LIEBERMAN:
Except in this case he 9
was there for the whole time period, he may well not 10 be aware 11 MR. McCOY:
That I don't know.
of what the actual 12 MR. LIEBERMAN:
13 MR. SHIPMAN:
Mr. Lieberman, I have three 14 different stories of when he was there and you have 15 two different stories as to when he was there.
So, 16 neither of us knows exactly when he was there.
17 The QC inspector says he came and 18 verified as left".
i 19 MR. McCOY:
The fact of what I was saying 20 he is not an IEC technician, required to be an IEC
- 21 technician and he may or may not know enough about 22 the process and the overall program to know whether 23
.that program is being followed properly.
24
- What-he does know and what he is charged I
25' with is making sure that that data is what's on the t
l w
e g"
w.e n~
e-W
-. =,
e 56 4
~ 1 meter and what's reflected on the data sheet.
2 MR. LIEBERMAN:
Okay.
There is some 2
3 question, and you Mr. Shipman discussed this at the 4
beginning, concerning what the I&C foreman may have 5
said and what was perceived he said.
6 And whether he instructed them to tweak 7
it or follow the appropriate calibration 8
procedures.
9 Have you interviewed him?
10 MR. SHIPMAN:
Yes, I have, and I am 11 convinced and the thing that convinces me about his 12 story is the fact that he asked for the QC inspector 13 to be called.
14 If he were going to instruct these two 15 gentlemen to violate procedure and to give a 16 connotation to tweak that you have given it, then he 17 would want the QC inspector to be as far away from 18 the racks as he could possibly arrange for them to 19 be.
20 So, the supporting evidence to his 2 1-involvement is the fact that he called the QC 22 inspector, we need you down here or had him called, 23 we need you down here to verify some data.
We found 24 something out of tolerance.
25 MR. MATTHEW:
Bill, based on your m
i' 57 l'
. interview of him what did you see -.what'was your 2
-perspective as to what his role'was?
3' MR. SHIPMAN:
The I&C foreman?
4 14R.. MATTHEWS :
Because I have heard three t
5 different versions as well.
I.just wondered which j'
6 one which representation have you concluded is i
7
.the accurate one?
8 MR. SHIPMAN:
Well, I am convinced he was
_9 called when he was in the shop, and he either 10
-instructed someone to call or. he called the QC l-11 inspector to come to the control room.
12 He went to the control room.
He went i
13 back to the racks where the gentlemen were.
He saw 4
14 the data.
The "as found" data was not within 15
' tolerance.
He went to talk to the shift supervisor 16 and
a t the technicians were left to get the 17 bistable recalibrated and verified.
I 18 He was in the control room for that whole 19 duration because he is required, once they have 20 completed it, to verify switch settings, equipment 21 removal,. normal restoration of service.
That is the 22 story I believe for the foreman's involvement.
23 MR.. WARD:
Can I. add one thing to that?
'24 Lewis' Ward.
Under different circumstances, we coult
- 25
~have had a faulty card and he would~-- his
I 58 1
involvement at that time may have been to go draw 2
another card out of the wareho.use and put in a new 3
card and calibrate it.
4 So, he gets involved in that point in 5
giving direction on technically what to do with that 6
loop as a result of that problem.
In this case a 7
simple adjustment was all that was called for.
8 MR. MATTHEWS:
Bill, do you have you 9
concluded that it's reasonable to expect that he 10 wouldn't have had any knowledge that the calibration 11 procedure wasn't followed?
12 MF. SHIPMAN:
Yes, sir, I have concluded.
13 that.
14 MR. MATTHEWS:
Okay.
15 MR. LIEBERMAN:
I guess the only last 16 question I had on my list, and you have probably 17 answered it, what degree of responsibility does 18 Georgia Power as manager corporate entity place on 19 themselves in this event or do you place it fully in 20 the hands of the two individuals?
21 MR. McCOY:
I feel personally responsible 22 for all the actions that take place at that plant.
23 I.am held accountable for that plant's performance.
24 As I said in my opening statement, I 25 depend on the inte.grity and the truthfulness of the J '
9
4 J
59 1
employees.
I personally have a responsibility to 2
insure that we have those types of employees that 3
are there, that they clearly understand our 4
expectations.
s 5
And I feel completely responsible for 6
seeing that that's happened.
When this event 7
occurred Bill Shipman and I,
that was the gist of 8
our first discussions about this is is this a 9
possibility chat there is a breakdown or a weakness 10 in our plans, our expectations of people, being 11 communicated to people and so forth.
12 And we investigated that specifically and 13 as we have described, as Bill has described, we 14 concluded that based on our review of this that 15 there is not any basis to believe that our belief 16 and our expectation that people operate that plant 17 with integrity and that they are truthful in their 18 action is not the case.
19 We believe this was an isolated case and i
20 that's our conclusion.
But we certainly take 21 responsibility and we expect you to hold us 22 accountable for the performance of all of our 23 employees.
- 24 MR. EBENETER:
Well, let me ask you 25 something.
I have heard today two cases where i
60 1
technician g,ot into trouble because of the failure 2
of the corporation to upgrade procedures.
3 MR. McCOY:
Yes.
4 MR. EBENETER:
Right?
5 MR. McCOY:
Yes.
l 6-MR. EBENETER:
One case an individual is j
7 terminated and the other two you were a little more 8
just or whatever you want to call it.
9 But, what makes you think there aren't 50 10 or 100 more procedures out there that are or what's 11 the problem-here?
Is this not a problem, management 1
12 problem?
13 MR. McCOY:
This is a separate issue, 14 Stew, that i
15 MR. EBENETER:
It may be a separate issue
{
16 to you, it's not a separate issue to these 17 gentlemen.
You are leading them into getting into 18 trouble.
j 19 MR. McCOY:
That's right.
And let me 20 address that.
What I meant by that is that is not e
21 something that we addressed here in this 22
' presentation because this was not the issue as we 23 understood.that you wanted to discuss.
24 However, we did we identified this as 25'
.the root cause that led to.this event occurring.
i
61 1
And we have'had other problems with procedure, 2
accuracy of procedure update and I'd like for Bill 3
to address what we did in this particular case and 4
what we are doing in general to insure the accuracy 5
of our' procedures and then come back and summarize 6
that.
7 MR. SHIPMAN:
First of all, let me 8
address this case, because I don't think it falls in 9
the sense you stated it.
10 These procedures were revised temporarily 11 in January -- in December of
'91.
They were updated 12 with a permanent revision in January of
'92, 13 approximately two weeks after the temporary l
14 procedure change.
15 That update created ^an error.
It was not 16 a failure to you know, an attempt to get the 17 procedures corrected.
We certainly attempted that 18 and were quite successful three out of four of them, 19 but apparently we missed one set of data in one of 20 the procedures.
l 21 As a result of that particular event, the 22 people who write, revise and review procedures, 23 including the I&C Department, including the I&C 24 superintendent, who.happens to be sitting in the 25 room today, received counseling concerning their W
1
62 1
responsibility for accuracy in procedures.
2 Previous to this event last year we 3
implemented'a program in our maintenance department 4'
.to make it easier for people to change procedures 5
when we find these things that have different i
6 meanings to different people or that are just errors 7
in procedures, initiated a simpler method to get 8
those things identified and to get them into a l
9 system where procedures would be corrected.
10 We have put further emphasis on that i
11 program, as some of you have heard, in the I&C l
12 Department in particular to insure that that gets 13 done systematically and with emphasis so that it j
14 doesn't lag too long, i
15 Because some of the things that were l
16 happening is minor proposed revisions to procedures 17 would go into the file, the procedure revision file 18 and they might wait for six months until the next 19 major revision to that procedure was due before they l'
20 would be implemented.
21 And we tried to overcome that lag in our i
22.
system.
We are very sensitive to the issue you j
23 raise.
And it is a very difficult issue to deal
' 24 with because;there are so many procedures.
j 25 MR. EBENETER:
You haven't pursuaded me, j
i 4
4
+
O 63 1
I must say.
But I don't want to pursue it in this 2
meeting.
I think we need to meet and spend sometime 3
on it.
4 I was concerned about another comment 5
that was made earlier that temporary procedures, if 6
nothing is done within 6 14 days or something, 7
reverts back to the original thing.
I think you are 8
asking for trouble, you are setting these guys up.
9 MR. SIIIPMAN :
Excuse me, Mr. Ebeneter, we 1C-were in a meeting at that time when I was not 11 speaking and so I did not speak to that issue.
12 That issue is in error.
That is not a 13 fact.
And, you know, I think Brian is completely 14 aware of that.
15 MR. EBENETER:
Let's explore that outside 16 of this meeting.
I do have the impression, however, 17 as I stated, that you are setting these people up 18 with these procedures, the inaccuracy.
4 19 MR. McCOY:
Just one point on that, that 20 I would like to make that's related before we leave 21 it and that is that because of the huge volume and 22 detail in the procedures that we have, although it 23 is our desire to have those procedures 100 percent 24 accurate, we realize that practical limits exist and 25 there are going to be errors in procedures.
d 64 1
And one of the key parts of our program 2
that is emphasized over and over is if you find an 3
error or if something doesn't work right in the 4
procedure, that you stop, bring that to the 5
attention of the supervisor in charge at that point 6
and get it resolved.
7 And we have stressed that.
That is our
- 8 backup, if you will, position, but I don't want
- 9 to 10 MR. EBENETER:
Didn't work in this case.
11 MR. McCOY:
That's correct, it did not.
12 It would have had these people followed the 13 procedure, because when they went into the 14 calibration procedure it would have become evident 15 that it had not been properly corrected.
16 And if they had followed the procedure in 17 our guidance, then they would have stopped at that i
18 point and this would have never occurred.
19 MR. EBENETER:
Had a little bit of 20 difficulty with your hierarchy of discipline, I
)
21 guess.
You dismiss a guy for bird droppings on the 22 windshield, i
23 MR. McCOY:
The point that he was trying 24-to make there was not on that particular issue, but 25 that once a person has had a failure to perform 1
i w
65 1
their job adequately and they make-a commitment that 2
they arefgoing to do a quality job, then they are
'3 held to a very strict line of accountability.
.4 MR. HAIRSTON:
Once they are on DML, once 5
they are on DML 6
MR. MCDONALD:
Anything l
the threshold 7
MR. HAIRSTON:
8 MR. EBENETER:
He is on DML.
So don't
9
-you two guys do anything with bird droppings.
10 MR. McCOY:
This particular case that 11 Bill referred to happens to be a person whose job it 12 was to wash cars.
And'the point was that he did nog 13 do his job to the expectations that he clearly 14 understood.
15 MR. HAIRSTON:
Stu, let me go back to the 16 procedure thing.
Mr. Bonds has been tracking this 17 and I know, I think you have talked with him, I have 18 talked with him.
19 It's an issue of procedure compliance.
20 There have been several programs that we have been
~..
21 putting into effect-in the last year.
This goes 22 back several, several months something the residents 23.
are closely tracking.
24 We'are tracking specifically in the
.25 maintenance' department and I.just, felt like that,
=
66 1
you know, this is something we have been very 2
attentive to over the last few months.
Wanted to 3
bring that out.
4 MR. EBENETER:
As Jim said, I don't think 5
any of us are advocating that you terminate 6
employees automatically for issues and you certainly 7
ought to take it case-by-case.
8 But, our main concern is contributions 9
other than the individual that are causing these 10 things to happen.
11 MR. McCOY:
And we have asked ourselves 12 those questions.
We are equally concerned that 13 there might be something here that is setting 14 employees up or that maybe there is something that 15 we can do on a broader basis t'o prevent these kind 16 of problems.
17 And other than the things that we have 18 already shared with you, we have not identified f
19 ourselves the weakness that we believe is really 20 contributing to this.
21 MR. EBENETER:
Okay.
22 MR. JENKINS:
Bill, you talked about o
f-23 you gave some data, some numbers about. decision 24 making leave, number of cases and whatnot.
4
.25 I take'it_that was over the, I think Art 7
67 1
said six years that that program has been in effect, 2
was that the period of time?
3 MR. McCOY:
That was for Georgia Power 4
Company, not just Plant Vogtle.
5 MR. JENKINS:
Well, he said that.
6 MR. SHIPMAN:
Yes.
7 MR. DOMBY:
I believe that's the rate, we 8
got that from employee relations.
9 MR. JENKINS:
Several years?
10 MR. DOMBY:
Yes.
11 MR. JENKINS:
You talked about a memo 12 that you had recently put out to all Vogtle 13 employees that addressed the NRC Information Notice 14 and Wrong Doer Rule.
15 I guess maybe I should direct this to j
16 George or Pat, have you or are you considering 17 putting that out for Hatch employees or even for 18 Farley employees?
19 MR. HAIRSTON:
The Vogtle memo?
20 MR. JENKINS:
Well, the similar 21 information.
22 MR. HAIRSTON:
Both Hatch for Georgia 23 Power Company and Farley was Southern Nuclear, are 24 lboth looking at the Notice.
This.Vogtle instance is
?25 actually briefly and: described, I believe, in that t
+
1 68 i
1 notice.
And they are both reviewing that notice in 2
light of what they need to be doing at their plant.
3 There is some things you have to look at before you 4
just go out and write a memo.
And when was it, was 5
it Monday that we went out after staff meeting?
6 We had discussion amonst those three key 7
players Monday about being attentive to this notice 1
8 and they personally need to look into this and what what they were doing at their plants to 9
was 10 cvaluate this.
11 MR. McCOY:
And I have shared this, the 12 history of this with those with the two 13 responsible officers for those two plants.
They are 14 very much aware of what occurred here and they are 15 considering that in light of their circumstances.
16 MR. LIEBERMAN:
I think that's an 17 important point.
If there was a way that we could 18 send a notice to every employee, wouldn't we want to 19 do that, because the end analysis is people that 20 operate these plants, people have to appreciate that 21 we all recognize errors will be made, but that's 22 different from when someone makes a conscious 23 decision to do something that's wrong.
24-There is just no room for that in this 25 industry..
And to get that word out to everyone is i
W
I i
n 69 1
important.
2 MR. HAIRSTON:
Jim, that's going to 3
happen at these other two plants.
But what I'm 4
saying is maybe this memo or whatever may not be the 5
vehicle they choose.
6 It may be through the plant newspaper and 7
training.
All this is going to be covered in 1
8 training, you know, to go back over the industry
)
l 9
events and this has received a lot of discussion at 10 these plants and the message is out there.
11 And it's not something just somebody in 12 licensing is reviewing, i.e.,
Notice on some 13 particular check point.
The message is out.
They 14 know what has happened.
15 MR. MCDONALD:
Let me add to that, I 16 think the hiatory of what we have experienced at all 17 the plants is not an absence of awareness of the 18 need for intregrity and reporting and things l'ike 19 that.
20 There is not a there is not an 21 absence.
NRC has highlighted some cases at plants.
22 We have had this case.
But there are certain 23 prevalent understandings about the need for such 24-integrity.
1 25 In fact, we put out a put out, we live
4 3
70 1
out, discuss and point out a philosophy where the 2
. necessity for people in the nuclear business to have 3
integrity is one of the four I think there are 1
4 four specific personal values that we have to have, 5
they have to have it.
-6 And that's rightly disseminated, has been 7
disseminated as a standing point of how we do 8
business.
9 MR. WARD:
I called the maintenance 10 managers at Hatch and at Farley within a week or so 11 after this event and after we knew all of the 12 details because we do have a lot of horizontal 13 communication between the plants and I wanted to 14 make sure that they knew all of the facts as we knew 15 them at that time.
16 And at that point we had already 17 administered decision making leave for the 18 individuals.
And I wanted to make sure that they 19 knew to give them whatever lesson learned to the 20 maintenance departments at the other two facilities 21 at that time.
I 22 MR. HAIRSTON:
At the Farley Plant and 23
-Southern Nuclear and Hatch Plant and Georgia Power 24' Company, all both have positive discipline 25 programs..
.= _
.-.- ~
i.
l; l
71 L
f 1
Hatch has been under it f or some time and 4
2 Farley has been 3
MR. MCDONALD:
One year, a year and a l
l 4
half.
l approximately a year l
5 MR. HAIRSTON:
i' 6
and a half.
It's a fairly recent change at Farley.
7 And having been under the other system that we are 8
all familiar with, the punitive system, a lot of 9
soul searching, talked about converting Farley over 10 and the feedback I have gotten thus far is that this 11-is going to be a better system for correcting 12 people's performance and' behavior.
13 MR. LIEBERMAN:
If it works, more power 14 to it.
I appreciate, Pat, that no manager wants a
]
15 lack of integrity.
It's just unfortunate just 16 looking at I&C technicians I can think of two other 17 plants where IEC techniciant have a problem with 18 falsifying things, causing trips, not being candid.
-19 There is an issue here that needs each 20 company.as well as NRC needs-to deal with.
And 21 hopefully these variouu programs will get the 22 message out and=it will~be stopped.
23 MR. SHIPMAN:
LetLme tell you how serious 24
'I: took this. thing when-I wrote the memo..
There are
'25 many ways-you.can send out communications to the 3
.-.-,-.-4.
72 1-plants, you can put notices on the bulletin board, 2
you can put it in the paper, you can send a notice r
3-to all employees (indicating).
4 I wrote a letter, a personal letter to 5
each and every of a 1,050 employees and signed 1,050 6
letters and my hand still hurts.
7 But, I want each of those employees at 8
that plant to hear directly from me with no computer 9
signature, with my signature, and knowing that I'm 10 speaking to him or her how important I felt this 11 issue is.
12 And I believe they sensed by the fact 13 that I'm willing to sit down and do that how 14 important I feel it is.
I have had that feedback.
15 MR. MCDONALD:
Let me make one more 16 statement.
We are looking at integrity in a very 17 challenging sense where we have had a lawsuit in 18 some cases.
Integrity has two sides.
19 One integrity is don't do anything 20 wrong.
The other sense of integrity is speak up and 21 tell the truth when you think somebody else is doing I
22 something wrong or you think something isn't done 23 right.
24-So-there is many faces of integrity.
And 25 we don't want to imply that integrity.with I&C
[ --
v
i 73 1
calibration procedures is any greater or any less 2
than the full scope of integri,ty with which we need 3
to run our company and our plant.
4 So, I think that I do wish to say one 5
thing.
As we have seen to chose to mitigate this 6
case of lack of integrity, I want to commend the 7
people involved, commend Mrs. Davis and her husband l
8 for the manner which they when faced with the 9
problem came out and told us what it was.
10 Where you have a whip, we have a whip and 11 we have a carrot.
We have to figure out when to use 12 one and when to use both.
In this case we have used 13 both.
And we are expecting a lot of these people 14 and I have high confidence that our expectations are 15 well founded.
16 MR. LIEBERMAN:
With that without any 17 more I guess 18 MR. BBENETER:
Staff any comments?
19 Okay.
20 (Conference concluded at 3:45 p.m.)
21 22 23 24 25 l
I
.=
74 l'
C E. R T I F I CAT E 2
3 STATE OF GEORGIA:
4 COUNTY OF FULTON:
5 6
I hereby certify that the above and 7
foregoing proceedings were taken down, as 8
stated in the caption, and reduced to 9
typewriting under my direction, and that the 10 foregoing pages 1 through 73 represent a true, 11 correct, and complete transcript of said 12 proceedings.
13 This, the 16th day of May, 1992.
14 15 16 17 18
/u h-__ __h TINDA E.
WOOD, CCR-A-752 19 My commission expires the 13th day of September, 1993.
20 21 22 23
.24 25
.