ML20079Q396
| ML20079Q396 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek, Callaway, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 01/27/1984 |
| From: | STANDARDIZED NUCLEAR UNIT POWER PLANT SYSTEM |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20079Q371 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8402010149 | |
| Download: ML20079Q396 (22) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_, e - - . - 2_.4 ---. - 9,m-- s W -b, r- a 4 SNUPPS REPORT ON THE l CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS REV. 1 i i e f a t I l l l [ k, O r l-. r 8402010149 840127 PDR ADOCK 05000482 A pg
,,, - ,e---,- y-.s- ,, ma,w.,. e., -
,-s,,,, . . , . . ,- e ,,,,,-r,-----,-.,w,,-,--,. ..-,.,-,m, . - - ,na,mm._,nn~.,,.------~_, ,-- ,,n-. - - -- - - - , ---w.,
SNUPPS REPORT ON THE CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS REV. 1 Remove Insert Page 1 Page 1, Rev. 1 Page la, Rev. 1 Page 6 Page 6, Rev. 1 Page 6a, Rev. 1 Page 12 Page 12, Rev. 1 Page 13 Page 13, Rev. 1 Page 14 Page 14, Rev. 1 Page 15 Page 15, Rev. 1 Page 16 Page 16, Rev. 1 Page 17 Page 17, Rev. 1 Page 17a, Rev. 1 Page 21 Page 21, T.ev. 1 Page 22 Page 22, Rev. 1 Table 1 (Sheet 1) Table 1 (Sheet 1), Rev. 1 Table 1 (Sheet 3) Table 1 (Sheet 3), Rev. 1 Figure 12 Figure 12, Rev. 1 Figure 13 Figure 13, Rev. 1 Figure 14 Figure 14, Rev. 1 Figure 23 Figure 23, Rev. 1 Figure 24 Figure 24, Rev. 1 i Rev. 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
AND
SUMMARY
This report addresses the concerns of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants - Resolution of TAP A-36," and provides information and the results of analyses performed in response to the NRC's Generic Letter 81-07, dated December 22, 1980. The term " heavy load" is defined in NUEEG-0612 as a load whose weight is greater than the combined weight of a single spent fuel assembly and its handling tool.- For the SNUPPS plant, this weight is approximately 2000 pounds. Contained herein are the requested 6- and 9-month responses to the NRC's letter. The 6-month response was previously submitted to the NRC under the cover of SLNRC 81-48, dated June 22, 1981. To facilitate a clear understanding of the analyses performed for the SNUPPS facilities, and the results of the review, the subsections of Section 2.0 of this report are numbered in the sequence provided in the generic letter. No modifications of the SNUPPS power block cranes or structures insulted from this review due to: 1) the inherent physical horizontal separation provided in the layout of the plant, 2) previous consideration of the effects of heavy loads carried near the spent fuel pool, 3) the refueling sequence which indicates that the carrying of heavy loads by the polar crane will normally be done only after cold shutdown has been obtained, and infrequent use of the polar crane for light (less than heavy) loads during hot standby and hot shutdown, and 4) elec-trical interlocks, mechanical stops, and administrative proce-dures provided for a few known areas of concern. To help orient the reader, the following descriptions summarize the methodology and results of the heavy loads review of the SNUPPS plant:
- a. Through the use of limit switches and mechanicsl stops,- the cask handling crane is prohibited from traveling near the spent fuel. Therefore, a cask drop into the fuel is not credible. Heavy loads over the spent fuel pool will be limited to potential energies previously analyzed by the rack manufacturer. No crushing of the fuel is postulated or analyzed. Fuel drops were previously analyzed in the SNUPPS FSAR.
- b. Loads carried over the reactor vessel are prohibited during all modes, except cold shutdown and refueling.
Once the upper internals are removed, crane hook travel 4 will be prohibited over the open Idactor vessel area except for required reactor vessel servicing activities such as irradiation sample removal described in Sec-tion 5.3.1.6 of the SNUPPS FSAR. The core will not be subject to crushing drops; therefore, no analyses are 1 Rev. 1
required. Adequate supplies of borated water are avail-i able to ensure core cooling during all modes of operution. Fuel drops inside the containment were previously ana-lyzed in the SNUPPS FSAR. 1 I I I i t . i i la Rev. 1 l
t The two types . of hoist uppe'r limit switches, geared and weight-operated, are redundant and independent. This is to say that . if the geared-type limit switch were to fail, the weight-operated limit switch would stop the load block from rising higher and
=would prevent the occurrence of a two-blocking event. -
;,. Fuel-Building' Cask Handling Crane
' -The fuel building. cask handling crane'is a CMAA No. 70, Class A
. type, indoor electrical overhead traveling bridge crane with a
. single trolley-and all the necessary motors, controls, and.
brakes and a festooned pendant control station. The main hoist capacity is 150 tons. The crane and accessories are used to
- handle spent fuel shipping casks between the railroad cars or
' trucks, the loading pool, and the washdown-pit.
The cask handling crane is equipped with a monorail and hoist which are used to transfer new fuel from the new fuel storage vault to the new fuel elevator. The monorail and hoist'are also used for moving new fuel shipping containers. The mono-rail hoist is rated at 5 tons. The festooned pend &nt control station or radio control unit is utilized for controlling the
-cask handling crane and monorail hoist.
!- Limit switches, mechanical stops, and administrative procedures are used to prevent any crane (other than the spent fuel pool bridge crane) from traveling over the spent fuel pool while carrying a load. Refer to Figures 22 and 23 for arrangement l and areas of movement of the fuel building cask handling crane and Table l'for travel speed and lifting capacity data. l During scheduled maintenance periods, the cask handling crane - [ is used to provide access for servicing of lights and a fire detector over the spent fuel pool. area. During these periods, the rail stops'are removed and' interlocks are bypassed to allow crane travel, and the crane _does not carry a load. .The rail stops are actually hinged such that they can be rotated clear of the path of.the cask handling crane to allow travel. The
- hinged connections are permanently attached to'the crane rail support girder, thus precluding a drop of the rail stops.
Administrative procedures are used to control removal and re-placement of the interlocks and rail stops and to position the hoist and hook so as not to travel above the pool during use of the cask _ handling crane above the pool. Geared-type _ upper and lower limit switches are used in the control circuit of each ~ hoist system of the fuel building cask handling ~ crane. In addition to the geared-type limit switches, a weight-operated hoist _ upper limit switch is used in each hoist system of the. cask handling crane. The two types of hoist upper limit switches are redundant and independent. If the geared-type limit switch were to fail, the weight-operated i limit switch would cut off power to the hoist, thus preventing l vertical motion of the lifting block and the occurrence of a [ two-blocking event. 6 Rev. 1 i
Spent Fuel Pool Bridge Crane The spent fuel pool bridge crane is a CMAA No. 70, Class B type, designed to maintain its integrity during an SSE. The crane consists of a 5-ton-capacity wheeled bridge structure with steel deck walkway, a 2-ton motorized monorail trolley, and a 5-ton manual push-type trolley. The crane has inter-locking capabilities with the new fuel elevator,_ fuel transfer canal gate, and cask loading gate. In addition, the crane also has a -inch bridge and trolley positioning capability. l 6a Rev. 1 l
Miscellaneous Hoists Other load handling . operations which are not part of the fuel handling system include miscellaneous hoists and monorails in
-the reactor, auxiliary, fuel, control, and diesel generator buildings. The hoists' travel paths are restricted to the mo.norail layout by mechanical stops.
Table 2 identifies primary loads lifted and hoist capacities for-the miscellaneous hoists. No special lifting devices are used with the miscellaneous hoists. Lifting devices for these hoists are in accordance with guidance provided by ANSI B30.9-1971, as clarified by NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1.(5). Tables 1 and 2 provide a listing of each applicable crane or hoist and loads to be handled. Lifting devices are described below.
-Certain of the typical PWR heavy loads identified in NUREG-0612 Table 3.1-1 are not applicable to SNUPPS and are not covered by Tables 1 and 2. The SNUPPS missile shield is mounted en a dedicated transfer cart that shares the refueling machine rails and is not normally handled by a crane.
The reactor head lifting rig is attached to the vessel head; the tripod for attaching the polar crane is handled separately from the vessel head. In addition, certain heavy loads such as the spent fuel cask have not been specifically designed for SNUPPS at this time; however, load values that envelope the expected weight of these items are included in the evaluation. Compliance with ANSI N14.6-1978 for the cask lifting device will be provided. Written procedures that reflect the results of this evaluation will be developed to govern the handling of all heavy loads ' whose drop could damage fuel or safe shutdown equipment. These procedures will incorporate the requirements provided in
-Section 5.1.1.(2) of NUREG-0612.
The supplier (Westinghouse) has performed analyses of the reactor vessel head lifting device (HKE02), and reactor vessel internals lifting device (HKE03), with regard to compliance with ANSI N14.6-1978. The results of these analyses are documented in WCAP-10164. 12 Rev. 1
I The reactor vessel head lifting rig weighs approximately 15,000 pounds, and is designed to the requirements of ASME Section III, Subsection NF. Plant procedures will be developed for inspection, testing, and maintenance of those cranes identified in Table 1. These l procedures will include the guidance provided by Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, as clarified in NUREG-0612, Paragraph 5.1.1.(6) with regard to frequency of inspections, tests, and maintenance. Regarding inspection frequencies, the SNUPPS cranes are clas-sified as standby cranes which are not exposed to adverse con-ditions. Therefore, inspections will be done in accordance with Section 2-2.1.4.b and Section 2-2.1.3, Periodic Inspecticns, as modified by Paragraph 5.1.1(6) of NUREG-0612. The frequent visual inspection guidelines of Section 2-2.1.2 will be followed during periods of use except for item 2 concerning limit switches. The main upper limit switch will be subject to the requirements of Section 2-3.2.4 at the beginning of each shift when the cranes are in use. Miscellaneous hoists identified in Table 2 will be inspected, tested, and maintained based on the manufacturer's recommenda- l tions. The containment polar crane, the cask handling crane, the spent fuel pool bridge crane, and the refueling machine are designed to the standards of CMAA No. 70 (1975). The SNUPIS cranes were ordered in 1974, and their purchcse specifications included reference to ANSI B30.2-1967 for design requirements. The miscellaneous hoists throughout the plant are designed in
&ccordance with the requirements of ANSI B30.10-1975, Hooks; ANSI B30.11-1973, Monorail Systems and Underhung Cranes; and ANSI B30.16-1973, Safety Standards for Overhead Hoists.
Specific plant procedures will be developed that address crane operator training, qualification, and' conduct for those cranes identified in Table 1. These procedures will incorporate the guidance provided by ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2.3. 13 Rev. 1
. - .- - ., _ = . . - _ . ..
t 2.2 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF FUEL STORAGE POOLS The fuel building houses the spent fuel storage pool. Figures 12, 13 and-14 show plan and elevation views of the fuel building ' and indicate the cranes, crane rails, hook limits, and' stops for the-cask handling crane and the spent fuel pool bridge crane. The following paragraphs address the information requested in the numbered subitems of Section 2.2 of the NRC's Generic Letter 81-07. 2.2.1 CRANES CAPABLE OF OPERATING OVER THE FUEL POOL e
'The-locations and equipment numbers'of the cask handling crane and spent fuel pool bridge crane are shown on Figures 12, 13 and 14. Both cranes can handle loads over the spent fuel pool.
i 2.2.2 - PREVENTION OF TRAVEL OVER FUEL POOL The cask handling crane is prevented from traveling near or over the spent fuel pool during normal operation by both mech- l anical and electrical interlocks. By design, the distance be-tween the edge of the spent fuel pool and the center of gravity of the shipping cask for the SNUPPS units is approximately 11 feet. 4 Calculations have been performed to assure that in the event of i ' a cask tip, the cask center of gravity will not go beyond the edge of the spent fuel pool, thus precluding the possibility of
~
a cask drop into the pool. The details of this analysis are described in SNUPPS FSAR Section 9.1.4.3, Safety Evaluation Six and is' attached hereto as Appendix B for the convenience of the reader. l 2.2.3 SINGLE-FAILURE -PROOF CRANES I The SNUPPS design provides highly reliable cranes with many L safety features. However, the cranes are not claimed to be
" single failure proof."
2.2.4 COMPLIANCE TO NUREG-0612 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
. Compliance with Acceptance Criteria I, II, and'III of NUREG-0612 is ensured for~the identified cranes in _he vicinity of the SNUPPS fuel storage pool.
Cask Handling Crane - Alternative No. 2 of NUREG-0612, Sec-tion 5.d.2 is utilized to ensure that the cask is not dropped Hor tipped over into the fuel storage pool. Since all spent fuel--storage racks will be installed initially and no other L l- _ heavy loads'need to be handled over the spent fuel pool by the ! cask handling crane, there is no identified need to bypass the electrical interlocks or remove the mechanical stops for purposes of carrying a load once the spent fuel racks are placed in the pool. Servicing of lights and a fire detector ! over'the spent fuel pool area will require the use of the cask 14 Rev. I l' 1 l .. - . - , - - ,-.- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
handling crane as a platform from which maintenance personnel will work. period. No loads will be carried by the crane during this Redundant electrical interlocks will prevent the cask from being raised beyond 3 inches above the floor level. This precludes the cask from tipping over should it be dropped near the pool. (Refer to Appendix B of this report.) Mechanical stops prevent crane travel over the spent fuel pool cooling systems, which are required for pool cooling during safe shutdown. No cask drop analyses are required to ensure safe shutdown. Similarly, electrical interlocks prevent the cask handling crane from traveling over the new fuel storage area. Spent Fuel Pool Bridge Crane - Alternative No. 4 o.f NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.2 is utilized to ensure that the loads carried over the spent fuel pool will meet Acceptance Criteria I, II, and III. A fuel handling accident in the fuel building is analyzed in SNUPPS FSAR Section 15.7.4, and the doses as shown on Table 15.7-8 are well within one-fourth of the Part 100 limits. Administrative procedures will ensure that heavy loads carried over the spent fuel will be limited in lift height to potential energies less than that analyzed by the rack vendor. Therefore , racks containing fuel will not be subject to damaging drops which could change K to lerger than 0.95 or could damage more than one fuel aIkkmbly.
- The basemat below the spent fuel pool is 12 feet thick and cannot be damaged by a heavy Joad drop such that excessive i leakage results. As described in SNUPPS FSAR Section 9.1.3.2.3.1, makeup to the spent fuel pool can be supplied by the reactor makeup water system, the refueling water storage tank, or the essential service water system. Liner plate leakage is col-i lected by a leak chase system. All piping penetrating the spent fuel pool is designed to preclude draining the pool below Elevation 2040 (approximately 18 feet of water above the top of l the storage racks).
2.3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF OVERHEAD HANDLING S,YSTEMS OPERATING IN THE CONTAINMENT i Figures'1 through 11 provide plan and elevation views of the containment structure and indicate the cranes, crane rails, hook limits, and stops. Section 2.4 below describes load handling inside the containment with respect to safe shutdown. The following paragraphs aadress the information requested in j j the numbered subitems of Section 2.3 of the NRC's Generic Letter 81-07. I 15 Rev. 1 l
2.3.1 CRANES CAPABLE OF HANDLING LOADS OVER THE REACTOR VESSEL The polar crane and refueling machine are capable of handling loads and traveling over the reactor vessel. The jib cranes cannot physically reach the vessel area. 2.3.2 PREVENTION OF TRAVEL OVER THE VESSEL Once the reactor vessel head and upper internals are removed, i the polar crane will be administratively controlled to preclude ' travel over the open vessel while fuel is in the reactor except for required vessel servicing operations such as irradiation sample removal. All heavy loads handled inside the containment may be moved to or from the equipment hatch without the necessity of traveling over the open vessel. 2.3.3 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF CRANES The SNUPPS design provides highly reliable cranes with many safety features;~however, the cranes are not " single-failure-proof" as defined by NUREG-0554. A detailed evaluation of the SNUPPS cranes with respect to the features of design, fabrication, inspection, testing, and operation as delineated in NUREG-0554, " Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants," has been performed. The results are included in Appendix D. p 2.3.4 COMPLIANCE TO NUREG-0612 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Compliance to Acceptance Criteria I, II, and-III of NUREG-0612 is ensured for the identified cranes in the vicinity of the reactor vessel. Polar Crane - SNUPPS FSAR Section 9.1.4.2.3.1 provides a detailed description of the refueling sequence phases. As noted therein, once cold shutdown is achieved during a re-fueling outage, the reactor coolant system is prepared for the refueling process, and the polar crane and refueling machine are checked for proper operation. The polar crane will not normally be utilized for lifting of significant loads until the core has been borated to cold shutdown conditions and cooled to cold conditions. (some maintenance operations that require use of the polar crane can be performed while the plant is being cooled down or heated up.) As described in Phase II of the refueling sequence, the reactor cavity seal ring is installed and the head is unbolted. The RHR system, taking suction from the RWST, is used to flood the refueling canal through the open reactor vessel (the head is only raised high enough above the vessel flange to allow visual verification that the head is properly freed from the compo-16 Rev. 1 i e
nents in the core). Once the refueling canal water level is raised above the vessel flange, the head is raised as the water level is increased to a safe shielding . level. At that point, E the head is moved horizontally (southward) within the refueling canal, stand. raised above the canal, and finally moved to its storage Safety Evaluation Six of SNUPPS FSAR Section 9.1.4.3 provides the results of the reactor vessel head drop analyses, and is attached hereto as Appendix C for the convenience of the reader. These cases are highly conservative and have ensured that the reactor vessel and core remain intact during a head drop incident. No fuel damage results; therefore, no dose calculations are required. A drop of the upper internals package and lifting rig would produce smaller loads on the reactor vessel, reactor vessel nozzles, analyses. and fuel assemblies than the reactor vessel head drop Since the polar crane will be prohibited from traveling over the reactor vessel once the upper internals are removed, except for required vessel servicing operations, and the servicing com-ponents are light loads, heavy load drops into the open vessel are not analyzed. Therefore, criticality and damaged core cal-culations are not required. Drops of the reactor vessel head onto the vessel flange may damage the seal rings and allow water te leak from the refuel-ing canal into the lower levels of the containment. The water volume of the RWST is sufficient to continue core cooling antil the RHR pump suction is manually transferred to-the normal suc-tion lines located on RCS hot legs 1 and/or 4._ Operation of the RHR system can continue indefinitely with the water level at the reactor vessel flange. No make-up water is required from other L borated water sources. It should be noted that the fuel transfer tube gate valve remains closed during head movement; there fore, the spent fuel pool water level will not be affected by a head drop which could produce a seal leak. [ Refueling Machine - Section 2.1 provides a detailed discussion of the refueling machine safety features, interlocks, and design parameters. The SNUPPS FSAR provides an analysis of a t fuel handling accident inside the containment (refer to Sec-l tion 15.7.4). The assumptions and methodology used in the i analyses are presented'therein, and the results are given in Table 15.4-8. .The doses are well within one-fourth of the Part 100 limits. f 17 Rev. 1
2.4 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVEPREAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN PLANT AREAS CONTAINING EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR REACTOR SNUTDOWN, CORE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL, OR SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING The design and layout of the SNUPPS plant has been developed to ensure that safe cold shutdown can be achieved for a wide variety of hazardous events and conditions. The results of i r l-l f l t i 17a Rev. 1 l
. - , ..~. -- . . . . -. . - - - .
' motor from the pump, it is assumed that the motor will be
- lifted to the operating deck. These very infrequent lifts will be carefully planned and executed, since a drop from the maximum lift height required could cause a significant impact
'cn1 the pump casing with a potential for structural deformation of;the pump supports and loop piping. . The drop of the motor
-from lesser heights would only affect the primary system branch lines if the motor tumbled off of the pump casing following impact- thereon and fell upon the branch line(s). This case is addressed in the preceding paragraph. t I' ~
The drop of the reactor coolant pump motor is not postulated to ' be a credible event due to the special precautions taken by the plant staff. , Polar Crane Durinc Hot Standby and Hot Shutdown - The polar crane will be usec. during hot standby and hot shutdown (Modes 3 and 4).to' minimize critical path outage times for cold shutdowns and refuelings,"and to assist with maintenance that can be ' performed in_a hot plant condition.. Planned usage includes 4
. activities.such as crane inspections, operability checks, and movement of' tools and equipment required for the cold
~ shutdown / refueling outage. .It is anticipated that most lifts during Modes 3 and 4 will be of light Icads and will allow unrestricted' movement.
;The lifting of heavy loads during Modes 3 and 4 is expected to i be infrequent. The significance of the operation and the importance of proper rigging and restricted load movement will be-stressed _to those invofved-vith heavy load lifts. . Both the main and auxiliary hcoks are provided with independent and .
redundant limit switches which preclude the possibility of a two-blocking event. Minimum practical lift-heights will be used throughout the load movement process. Certain anticipated heavy" load movements have been analyzed,' and restricted areas and safe.-load paths have been defined. However, all specific loads ' - and : load paths cannot be defined prior to the operations. For
.these' cases, safe load path considerations will be based on com-parison.with. analyzed cases, previously defined safe movement
' areas, and previously defined restricted areas.
~
L l For example, since integrity of the' primary side pressure boundary is important i i during Modes 3 and'4, the area inside the secondary shield wall
-will be avoided if practical.
(- During Modes 3 and 4, containment integrity will be maintained in accordance,with plant Technical Specifications. A breach of '
- . either the primary or secondary side / pressure boundaries will !
not result in radioactivity I'eleases - that are a "significant
> portion of 10 CPR 100 limits. The time of tuse of the polar '
4 crane during these modes is a small percentage of total plant operation time. The time for lifting heavy loads is a still 1
- smaller percentage. Postulated load drops would result in
I l t I
- . 21 Rev. 1 i l
1 , ',... - . - ,. -. - ...~..,_,__.m.___
consequences that are economic rather than public safety concerns. Therefore, the relative small risk involved, cou with load path considerations and procedures and training, pled justifies the use of the polar crane during Modes 3 and 4. Polar Crane During Refueling - During refueling, the polar crane is utilized to remove the reactor vessel head. Refer to Section 2.3 above. Should a heavy load drop impact an operat-ing RHR line or a Class I branch line, the effects would be no more severe than the cases discussed above for the cold shut-down mode. Should the primary system or refueling pool boundary leak or rupture at any location, sufficient water is available to ensure that adequate NPSH is available for switchover to recirculation from the containment sump. i { o Containment Jib Cranes (HKF03A-D) During all Modes - The 1 l containment jib cranes (3-ton capacity) are utilized to remove I l the hydrogen mixing fans from their bottom skirts. The hydro-l gen mixing fans are located directly above the reactor coolant
. pumps on slabs which are removable for access to the RC pumps.
i An analysis has been performed to ensure that the removable l slabs would not fail. Refer to Appendix A for the worst-case analysis. The removable slabs which support the hydrogen mixing fans can 1 l only be removed by the polar crane during Modes 5 and 6. There i is a sequence to be followed in removing the concrete slabs. ! This sequence involves lifting each slab a few inches and
. moving it away from the supporting beams prior to lifting eue ,
i slab up to its required height for removal from the area. The consequences of a drop of any of the slabs are considered in ) the polar crane discussions. Secondary Shield Wall Area Jib Crane (HKF05) During Cold Shutdown And Refueling - The jib crane (3-ton capacity) located near the pressurizer will be used during cold shutdown and refueling to I handle components located in the pressurizer compartments. The : discussions of cold shutdown operation of the polar crane are l l also applicable to this jib crane. Rupturing of the reactor , coolant pressure boundary at the pressurizer during cold shut- ' down would be no more severe than potential ruptures caused by j polar crane drops. Core cooling would not be interrupted. ' During refueling, the water level of the reactor coolant system is belo.w the pressurizer normal level, and there would be no l 1 effect on decay heat removal should a drop breach the pressurizer boundary. i Containment Equipment Hatch Hoist (HKF04A AND B) During Cold ! Shutdown - The equipment hatch hoist is used to handle the equipment hatch during Modes 5 and 6. A drop of the hatch will not affect safe shutdown or decay heat removal. As required by 22 Rev. 1
TABLE 1 FUEL HANDLING CRANE DATA (1) Name of Crane Spent Fuel ,. , Cask Handling' Pool Bridge Refueling' Parameters JPolar Crane TCrane
\- ,,
~~
Crane Machine- ' i Capacity of main hoist - ,. 3 s 260 tons ^fl50 tons ' ' 2 tons 2.4 tons -
~ Capacity of auxiliary .,
'e ,~ ?". .
u
- u. .
^
~
monorail hoist (const) 25 tonsJ
.6_
tons '; ' Capacity ' o f auxiliary - ,
. 5 tons and-s; -
~
monorail tioist (ngrinal) ' ' -
,25 s tons 'd 2 tons (2), ;_ j, L- '-
_,._,f-
~ ~'
Capacity Of.mbin trolleyl k 6O tons' ' 150 tons 2 toes ~ 1.5 tons capacity. of, lift beaml / 500 tons 2.4 tons Maximum main hofb speed ' (tiormal)f ' 5 fpm . 3. 75 fpm .. ,, 21'fpm .",. -- 20 fpm - i s. ,, Minimum main hoist speed .
+ -
(normal).
'~
~,
3 ipm # 2.5'ipm
~
. ; 7 fpm !
Maximum auxiliary monorail s A '. , hoiss. speed (normal) 40 fpm
^ '
. ~ s -
, .- ~
,/
Minimum auxiliary monorail , hoist speed (normal) 3 fpm -s,
. ,n .
Maximum troll'cygneed -
.f (normal)- -
51.5 fpm - 20 fpm 30.fpm. 20 fpm Minimum trolley speed (normal) 6 fpm 18 ipm 10 fpm. l Maximum bridge speed 4 (normal) 51.5 fpm 20 fpm 30 fpm 40 fpm Rev. 1
~
TABLE-1 (Sheet 3) Name of Crane .
. Spent Fuel
. Cask Handling Pool Bridge Refueling Parameters Polar Crane Crane Crane Machine Maximum monorail holst ,
speed 20 fpm 22 fpm Minimum monorail hoist ! speed 10 fpm 7 fpm l Maximum monorail trolley speed 32 fpm Minimum monorail trolley speed 10.7 fpm l. Lifting limitation 28.5 ft Cask bottom 24'-3" (above vessel 3 inches (Hook limit is flange) above floor 2066'-11 15/16") l El. 2047'-6" Seismic class (3) (3) (3) (4) r l l Rev. 1
a
- e e 4 y e l m I w e t i U !
. N L 4./ I . llfi' Q.- g g t- g . l .I I a e"- t a ~l lyla h
' '{ I! il A Ig
. m, . -- - ,
lt r[f 11'M ,r n o s 1 ili' 2 me , lr s% ,,A p ,;luf1.y1 .-,,_I. jlI
., d '.
=
. . m.
I I dWi .I 426 llll ts.,lji i l 3 u -
.It EE.g A" 4.f. l gloL ... y' yl 3
,g! . -
He I [3lh . I-[ 4e
. . a _ . .u . .
,L j
]
gl , l a'> M.s: I
- - .k ;)
i il
- 552 g 1 g t-.y +: L .a.. 2.
.-. _,..:y,;.Q w b I If
' u u.ulg i ,,, 'l
-re'[h, n
'I I
'* _wk II,,- F. .l~.c~!r i ,6
. I r -
; .I d- ~
-r-- : T~~ l' @
E
- m. s',# ,
I r -y '- 's. .
] lj ie dp, iM I qJ
., I i
.I I
+, lh ,
i, L .e.: i
- q. i.u4+ap-r-/*
.% e g
'd;i ;rji . M-s @g* I
,, 3 ~.
s
' , II I:
d igi 5 ~~ r j%ig3d d':' ~l [q.fgJ;Eas=tyh2j%,8f9)!! E F.Anr h y m nd -at- i a .n = ac=w,n n, j jig
.. m- g i ,< ,
i
,i ,
- n.
~
~
r n- ,
. . -. . .._- f! j'.l..~u -h ,,
1,, e--- 9,
- 1. ;i . 1.1 - g-w d
' . *u-%- --. $L.M- _, iI L ~l i, Ca ym ,& _ , _ ;f ,,,, ^w\_, .,-+y "T' D,*,.
~~
,q g . .,f __ ,,:- 'I5 I '
3u JRi!!! IllIAnd*M-up -I cm. . , __ ' iga l15.'i3.._ia.p l ,: y : p_ j m P ,; :t r'_ b.p.q,,,lL
+%
l d a ' i, ,+4,r . 3 .L l r ,;q _ 1 1. ! . . L"i =i 3' - Wi3 I
,~p' L - !'
li! i-
/
y' g- ,
. P,j -g ,J ,_, , pr d,j%.3
. i
;i, .,y .m cnl[n. ,1
_.y.__ ig -
.. h. .
il t
. , . .a. ' _i _ , _ . , %r-_. ,,
,.i y ,
. .ll .g
,i -
e
. . l' .Ip . . i ,e. N.'e ' ;lf;'
i.! ll l 1I' 1 II'I l . r'- d-l ,uL;I j i
'l.' u.Aa IAI Wl v3 =r 5
n i LH [lill ' il!i Nl!
-2. W' b-- 'i6., xi ; -
'q. @pii l bi;W~Mgr.-tin i +M,4'I -._, E=1 l! e.ii Ilh W;!)L, :
- e. I o L_ .-!! -D3-cm.r=
i ~ . - - - LA n: .. yi 0 .,. .
.- n. .
n
.a ,[ : .
g . mt.y _ _. . ._.p..,; [];._ 2 1_._.._ .tpl =.T =:- ":~_, ;. l J.: l. e-ll[I .l g i t ;
- r. - 7 I!
,<-. a..qi. .,. il- _.
/.' -._ . . ., s , a** .;p.pp !!ga
.-- _ c ... =.
}'ll .b.
]..-- g l =:" .k" r _ <.- =sq' ., 7h'= a.# l .e l~-
-l a .l
- u .:
j _.
- 8 I '
; -1.
3 ..4 i h ! x= d; _ _,- .:li_ . 2 .~'l i e , _,.5
.t f e : :
e
. . t . . 4 . o 1 2
II! l1 Eo E a. e liI 3a e a ,
, t I t ~ dd 8; i i* alt = lig I*
.c*
* ~
. I ft !! E e I y 0 E
. lr
, ,, ,e N.d.0 -
a 74 -~ II5.Mi! I: Ili 7;- j! I
;4 % . ..__._ - .-
~l
- 1. II
*** t . p' --
4,
- g ,, -1I! J s h 14 l
.e.
.ql il,
-pg w .
7 . f- -v t
] 3l . . lI l! h. -t -- - A ! ,
~
- e pg
- ly f . .
l ~~ h.,
- 9.m .. .
~
i , ,- , ,.- -.4 l
~
1 i li i e E'. . I i N t_J}
,t 1 -
L i i!l'! !- -l1 if ! ,.. ;' Y ' A " r- ':
- lil ;
hi. _ .d' ! t,x - .. r
. -=
=
q l : > ;i- ,t l] c_ . - C'_ {, H.h ijt - j;:i l ,,Il , s , I 8
- - lji - =
- I cp i
, % - ti, i[g - l l h.
i ,5 - Zs H * .: i .: - ;..... T:T-~.5 CtM- ' '- R a 7,~$ji g , a i
' l * - '~
* !I]* ; sl il' P 'P :: , I; -8 ;~ -' l~ ~~ ~ '
T h v~ 3 i ]-I , %)e %s . .-: Of
., -1 .. 1.
'l
. i l's~{ '
be - +-e . _ : j.-M -( ~' - IT2i : a ,J ..P
.~~~_ '
_f _- u .
-1;q_
,?3 s .~n
,.. 1p: > ' i
,8j
- I y\) .
- - " ~ ' ' - - - - - -
i
=
l h..,"(I~',r.i:s. g ,, g., g , - --
- _
4 '
..:. a = %gr,.---i ;
,;! -!;lIh'4' t
- t. .g - 'L . _'[
- - -(NmGU '8 #
ll! M
"! d.
f 4tt 1[ qM .ejil
.~. g. Z_,. -
g #q2--. .re
=-- ci
' . ;i i;;_ ' l-
,ij l.i q 7 i ," {
;- ls. a. .
l , i!d
.I if, , .
i- ~ ,*, eg,.m n-- a3 - __g gw -g tr ,_=_ . J' _ _ m...- . = y; 7 :. ,, i :: a ?! ""_f:7 ]};
?t ..t > 1 1 $ l p.L j__ . .
%~{* ,:l 1 ;.' .
i . . p. . i*
,:1 ,'
I,
.. i I; !.
l, i i
.t t n i I i. i 6 1t. .. . . . I, i . il,,
, lt . [=. 1i 9
_ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ __ _ J
y, - , - - - - , - - , . - , - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - , - - -- 4 O . 9 3 W. l h I W h A i w l a 1.. - 4
*l m *
~g W 6 t
' Il l 3 8 5
)
ll
+M-4' i.
I L u[ I ll ll ,Il ii:lt g
-- <1 g, p cJ 3 i' r:m -li Iq;l!)h E i,i wi ~ .t i N,t 3, _ -
l 'l_- . mz __ a {I ' g,s':31r a 4 h r ,e o i. l !> I
- l. L. .J .. i8 y- g . l _ h' .. _
^
4 --_ . Q i ~ i- bT-~~~~'- -
- l1 .
i
._wvl; -
I;- p
- i g eA _ .-
i j rr E l' e,w !i.! ! ali sii k; ! i i il 0 ji
. i. 1!)a(
,. !:!if >
j
. r- t.. .
H,- v1 ,_ m u, ;c. i l __ ! il l. . _3 --. 4 1
= - = -
l l _ L';
,,I 88 r
- i
' I Ly.
h* ?~~~ l
. :llI - lIl 'l~l=
e l J"* If F
- P
!i .. lC.
l'g .___ ! ti -+l; i-- b-- t' : , i 1 ". ~i i - rl5%l Z 81 i _.i. H1 4_ _._.__-__j g)p _ _ _t ,, - _ . . - _ _ - -
._ll .
d i 'l! II pI !I!:i i' 'J-l p'! L
- l I i :
ya si t'I- :i;s. s
- itht; sl ? '
-- r - . e: :=l. i ll - -!l Il-
'y p .#- q . _
( i._In
~
',, k' h 1 '.
il ,.. n h[.*il,i . , ,. f< !)ilIe- --. _M_i e... r;
-- 1, ei- -- -
I f l y.-= a I l _ _ilim It itp l1 8ytj ! %r 'lc c ar 9 !s- ~ ~ ~ ,
~I (F_ , i}
. l ;. -
i *, , y
': ,- s j gu c- . _ _ _ _ - "-
s - - . - - - _ i_',
@.Li.
j;
- h flM_ 3
~!
I b)} [ l 16
. 1 ll l e n!
n h a ('
4 . .
, e-- FACE OF BUMPEi2 STOP RA)L hy M TOi COLUMN UNE F-7
~ -
- t. - g = 23'-6"
.D 10' N -
( {3" - LOADtMQ PnT p a m - - y eag"tto.g,.f Ak D l MEW FUEL STORAQE AREA l Set 5 E RE mp 2t ow, shMsw e 191 0" 7 ; 3 G" t
*
- b(g=
w=a[ [
~*3. ., . 7'3' [_g.st zom o-n l
i
.,{
F 3 a> r ,9
,. t
)
p[/
' ~
'6fs'd'dsic'6'ikFA ~f " ~
h Z"
/, 2'-o a i
- e y ,/ /[/ -
s {// M w&%m,,
" -{ SECTION A-A AREA *AKM'ONLY_
l I' / ,/ o fi m k A
,/jy,/;//,a;;y' //
/ y ,c a wxmw ww .ww id
- W urTino $bh$YW YYN f h's'"^' .t v ^
esa eno sev, cuEt t
!n t,
HEAD LAYDOWN AREA ELCVATOR
- 8"- I
$ 'D cesx '*i-EF
~ ~
'o^ "40 PIT ,
i 9 s~uars PLAN "
! FfGURE 23
,N gn UW - __ RAll F _ _
ifif FUYBUNI G CASK
+-- FACE OF BUMPER Stop HANDLING CR ANE
t ED . r aw' N l'3 M b d & 4s ,- F
=
r ,
, - - , [6 l
' v_y_)
~
OSN.[hN ilil k-WdEEL - l e-r Ac me.rm -- r r m. os, two6.oq .=
~
ETu?.* (E.11r?M i OVERHEAD I BE AM
$s L _co,, ,,L.. , i pauts
**" g*. -44 W HEE.L.
pcwoxsr . g [~ I RE AC" 7 k N- = + a 0 i .__ (tosiw 2oscN w.a tow ettv. stw. G. RAlt. Q RAtt
,f
- i NH- / ,~ c, roEptATE f, 46*-(J SPAN _
_1\ 4 /4 hA AU
" PER FL EL. 7.041.c; PLAN
[t $y.",'g%-f^ g,-d "L
-*' , tei.c; *
'd SPtuTFUELPool Id 12 SEC. TION A- A MA i 9 1 2 5'-o* M AX.
HOOKQ SAFETY CPAIN
) PSTH ENDb T2P OF PLATFORM-gBRIDGE CAPAttTM BR1DGE - 5 TOM
\ , drive Ettc. HotST '2. TOM gj iTYP) MANUAL wonST - 5 Ton A '
-7 I A' MAY. t.tFT SPEED - 21FPM t 10'4 f .) :
min. LIFT SPEEC 7 FPM t 10'k TYP) HOOK - _ woo A__ Liwr M Ax. BRIDGE SP EED - 30 FPM I 10 7 To toss. \ 01P) min. BRIDGE SPEED - to FPM Inc% pev. 1 psAtto m '7'-to* - L otATFORM - reAx TROLLEY .QFGED 30 F9m t ro7. wiOTH WN Tho' LEY OFEED 50 F Pmt 10 y, SNUPPS __ AS RECfD FIGURE 24 par,TENANCE PLnTFCEM - NOT SetoVVN ARR ANCEME NT OR AWiMC por gast Ettv4Ticiet 2047*- 7 & " SPENT FUEL BRIDGE CRANE _SECTION Bi-b M - i _}}