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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAh RESULATORY COMMIS$10N REcION li l
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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3TER_Q1STRf (RefuestNo.RII-90-15/
TO:
James Y. Vorse, Director i
Office of Investigations j
Region II Field Office j
FROM:
Stewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator I
REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION Georgia Power Company 50-424, 50-425 Licensee
. Docket Nos.
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.RII 90-A10124<
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Facility Allegation No.
j A.
Request What is the matter that is being requested for investigation?
(Be as specific as possible regarding the underlying incident.)
During interviews conducted by the Office of Investipations with a CON-l FIDENTIAL SOURCE (CS), the CS alleged that Vogtle E ectric Generating 1
i Plant (VEGP) management had intentionally failed to fully disclose infoma-l tion materially relevant to the matter under discussion at an Enforcement j
Conference conducted on May 22, 1990, involving the licensee's Safeguards.
Infonnation Program, and had tnat infomation been disclosed by the l
licensee, the results of the subsequent enforcement action may have been more severe.
On May 22,1990, the licensee attended an Enforcement Conference in the l
Region II Office to discuss the circumstances surrounding a storage i
cabinet containing safeguards infonnation material' which was found
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unsecured by a member of the liccnsee's staff on April 25, 1990.
The violation, which was categorized at Severity Level III and documented in EA 90-090, was significant because of the volume and content of the i
safeguards information material that was stored in the cabinet.
During the Enforcement Conference there was-general discussion regarding the licensee's past poor performance in their Safeguards Information Program and that -factor was subsequently used to escalate the civil penalty by 100 percent.
The escalation was offset by mitigation of 50 percent for identification and reporting of the incident and by 50 percent for prompt corrective actions following the discovery of the unsecured storage cabinet. This adjustment resulte6 in the base civil penalty of $50,000.
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DEC s 61990 The CS alleged that at the Enforcement Conference licensee management was i
aware of another safeguards incident which occurred in the Birmingham I
offices in November 1989. The CS described the event as follows:
4
... a safeguards safe had been left open and uncontrolled for j
about 1/2 hour.
This event had been discovered at the time of the event and had been elevated in the chain of command to at least the SCS [ Southern Company Services] Vogtle Engineering Manager....
Being located in Birmingham, this safe was outside of a Protected area, making the event more serious in that regard.
No ' Red Phone' or other notification was made on this event, in violation of the requirements of 10 CFR 4
j 73.71.
No notification was made to Vogtle Security so that appropriate compensatory or precautionary measures could be taken at the site.
This event was discovered by Vogtle when a SONOPC0 [ Southern Nuclear l
personnel on [ July]23,1990] project engineer revealed the event to Operations Company the Vogtle Security Manager.
A typed report of the previous 4
investigation of this event was telecopied to the Security Manager.
The Security Manager expressed a belief that this l
incident should be Red Phoned to the NRC. The 50NOPC0 project engineer said, ' don't call the NRC on this.
I'm over in SCS l
and there is a problem here,' and then said, 'You have to i
call Shipman or Bailey before you call the NRC.'
Five hours after concluding that this event was reportable and only after arguing by the Security Manager with SONOPCO, this event was 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Red Phoned to the NRC at about 4:00 PM
[ July 23,1990].
The NRC was not aware of the events described above by the CS until receipt of a Safeguards Event Report on July 24, 1990, which reported the above incident.
1 The CS, during the Office of Investigations interviews, also alleged that:
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... unknown to the NRC was the fact that contrary to the Vice President's statement in the Enforcement Conference that i
safeguards documents were all well controlled in Binningham, a progranaatic breakdown existed in the design engineering area and safeguards documents had not been properly controlled t
in the past and probably were not being properly controlled.
The extent of this breakdown [was] not tully known even [as i
of July 27,1990].
As a mir.imum SONOPCO personnel [ knew]
that the SCS and Bechtel design agencies did not have an adequate program, controls or procedures for years when they were designing the Vogtle Security System.
They also
[ knew] that the potentially uncontrolled safeguards documents involve [d 150 boxes of records in Binningham, Gaithersburg i
[ Maryland;, a records storage location in Los Angeles, and i
records located in Atlanta with the design group that designed i
the alternate Security Building.
UfE HE DIRECTOR, 01 4
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3 DEC 3 61990 J
This breakdown was revealed to the Vogtle Security Manager on
[ July 25,1990] by the same SON 0PC0 Project Engineer.
The Security Manager concluded that this event should [have been]
Red Phoned as well and went to confer with the Vogtle General Manager and the Vogtle Vice President the afternoon of [ July 25, 199n1
"'ter conferring, the decision to Red Phone the 2
l mnt was placed with the Vice President who delegated it to SON 0PC0 Engineering and Licensing Manager.
4 On[ July 25,1990], at about 1:00 PM the SONOPC0 Engineering and Licensing Manager (for whom the Project Engineer works) i was ask[ed) about the 150 boxes and the Atlanta and Los Angeles safeguards information.
He was well aware of it but was not taking any action to report it to the NRC within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
He proceeded to play a round of golf at the Goshen
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Plantation Country Club.
i This event was not Red Phoned on the 25th, 26th or 27th. The explanation given to the Security Manager was that 'we really i
didn't know if any of the documents had been uncontrolled.'
However, SONOPC0 personnel apparently knew much more, as the i
Project-Engineer said, 'It's still unravelling and it's real bad' on one phone call. On another call the SONOPCO Licensing Manager said, '... potential breakdown, it's not potential. '
On [ July 27, 1990], SONOPC0 licensing and executives con-centrated on writing numerous versions of the programmatic breakdown in the recent violation instead of Red Phoning.
t' The question raised by the allegation is what licensee management knew with regard to the extent of safeguards problems prior to the Enforcement i.
Conference on May 22, 1990, specifically, if they knew there were " program-matic problems" in Safeguards as alleged.
The CS alleges that the SCS Vogtle Engineering Manager was aware of the November 1989 event in Biming-ham, Alabama, and that there was a "progranniatic breakdown" of the Safe-guards Information Program at the Bimingham SCS offices, as well as at the satellite Bechtel engineering offices in Los Angeles and Gaithersburg.
The CS also alleges that there was intentional delay on the part of l
management for reporting safeguards events as required by regulations and that high level licensee management personnel including the Vice President.
the General Manager for Support, the Licensing Manager, and the Engineering and Licensing Manager impeded appropriate and timely reporting of the 4
uncontrolled and unprotected safeguards documents. -
The CS contended that a statement by the VEGP Vice President at the
' Enforcement Conference that the safeguards controls in Birmingham had been-
. reviewed and safeguards documents were all well controlled was false in that he was aware of problems, yet failed to mention or acknowledge them during the conference.
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B; Purpose of' Investigation f
l 1.
What is the basis for the belief that the violation of a regulatory
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requirement is more likely to have been intentional or to have resulted from careless disregard or reckless indifference than from error or oversight? (Be as specific as possible.)
I During the period October 16-17, 1990, a reactive safeguards inspec-i i
tion was conducted at VEGP in an attempt 'to establish material facts relative to the allegations.
The inspector concluded that the allegations pertaining to the failure to control and protect safeguards i
.information, the failure to promptly report safeguards events relating to the failure to control and protect safeguards Information, and the i
j existence of a programmatic problem in the licensee's Safeguards
)
Information Program were valid.
No detemination was made, however, i
concerning licensee management role relative to allegedly providing i
misleading information at the May 22, 1990 Enforcement Conference, or i
the alleged impeding of reporting these matters to the NRC. A copy of the Memorandum to File that documents the reactive inspection is i
an enclosure to this request.
h Based on the information to date, it appears that if such activity i
did take place, it would have had to have been intentional. Therefore, personal interviews would be required to resolve these matters.
2.
What are the potential regulatory requirements that may have been l
violated?
t 10 CFR 50.9. 10 CFR 73.71 1
3.
If no violation is suspected, what is the specific regulatory concern?
N/A i
4.
Why is an investigation needed for regulatory action and what is the regulatory impact of this matter, if true?
e An investigation is needed to determine whether the allegations that i
licensee management withheld pertinent information from the staff
[
during an Enforcement Conference that resulted in escalated enforce-ment action.
An investigation is also required to determine if licensee management actively impeded reporting requirements pertain-i l
ing to safeguards events.
Such actions can only be determined at this point through formal investigative interviews. Confimation of i
the allegations would warrant consideration of possible escalated i
enforcement.
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SURE WJ LTHE._APPROVAt M @
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byTRIllDf!'dbHOTOCMilRE DEC 2 61990 1
2 C.
Requester's Priority 1.
Is the priority of the investigation high, normal, or low?
High 4
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i 2.
What example from Appendix 0517, Part III, does this incident most j.
closely fit, if any?
l 4.a.(1) 3.
What is the estimated date when the results of the investigation are needed?
j March 29, 1990 4.
What is the basis for the date and the impact of not meeting this 4
date? (For example, is there an immediate safety issue that must be addressed or are the results necessary to resolve any ongoing regulatory issue and if so, what actions are dependent on the out-comeoftheinvestigation?)
The date when the results of the investigation are needed is based on the urgent need to have multiple issues involving VEGP resolved on a i
timely basis. There are currently three other investigations pending that involve activity related to VEGP.
In addition, there is also a 10 CFR 2.206 petition which is currently pending before the NRC that involves the facility.
D.
Actions by Staff J
1.
What actions have been taken by the staff (e.g., inspections, Notice of Violation, Enforcement Conferences, Confirmatory Actions Letters, etc.)?
J' A reactive safeguards inspection has been conducted during the period October 16-17, 1990, as referred to above. An Enforcement Conference was conducted with the licensee on November 13, 1990, to discuss continuing problems in the Safeguards Information Program.
The enclosure discusses this Conference at page 7.
2.
Actions to be taken if investigation is closed without a report (based on currently.available information).
Evaluation of the current information will have to be made to determine if there is a recourse to regulatory action based on infonnation available at this time.
However, as noted in the Enclosure, there is no information available at this time that would support or refute the allegations as they now stand.
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EC 2 61990 f
I E.
Contact 1.
Staff members:
K. Brockman, Region II, Ext. 16299 A. Herdt, Region II Ext. 15583 B. Uryc, Region II, Ext. 14192 A11eger identification with address and telephone number if not 2.
confidential.
(Indicate if any confidential sources are involved and who may be contacted for the identifying details.)
A Confidential Source is involved in this matter.
Identifying data relative to the CS can be obtained from the Office of Investigations Field Office, Region II.
F.
Other Relevant Information A 10 CFR 2.206 petition was filed with the comission on September 11, That petition also alleges that "SONOPC0 repeatedly concealed 1990.
i safeguards problems from the NRC," and that licensee management " Willfully refused to comply with mandatory reporting requirements."
WA' L) i Stewart D. Ebneter
Enclosure:
Memorandum, Cline to Jenkins 12/12/90 cc w/o enc 1:
J. Taylor, EDO J. Sniezek, DEDR H. Thompson, DEDS B. Hayes.- 01 J. Lieberman, OE J. Partlow, NRR J. Goldberg, OGC
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.uanses m as F ' CLEAR REGULATORY 000sMC10N maannseven.e.s. asses g
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Deces6er27,1990 oe i
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i Nr. Kenneth A. Strahs l
Executive Vice pmsident j-Institute of Nuclear power Operations 1100 circle 7s pertuty l
Atlanta, 843083g l
Dear Hr. Strahat i
The NRC ' staff has noticed an increased tendency to perfers preventive maintenance
'during power operation. This includes malatenance of equipment required to A eperable by technical specifications.
In erder to perform this maintenance, utilities enter action statements of the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) i fn their technical specifications.
While it appears that utilities are l
attempting to limit the assuet of time spent in an LC0 to a reaseeable fraction l
of the total estage time allseed by the LCO in some cases the ereventive asintenance may be repeated several times during an operating cycle. This leads to a concern that the total unavailability of inversant plant equipment may be of special concern is the enteri's into higher than originally contemplated, en LCO near the end of an operating cycle for the erinary purpose of perfeming preventive matatenance in order to shorten the refueling outage. A frequently t
encountered asseple is the overhaul of diesel generaters.
l Seversi facters any'have centributed to this increase in on-line preventive to be-the influence-ef INp0 in encoursstag maintenance; among these.
encourages utilities,='... e anxistas t'he ensant of work-dene utilities to Itait the 1 of outaeos.
For exemple. INPO 89-017, l
The NRC staff is sencerned that the impetus to perform more preventive asintenance on-line map not have been thereaghly considered from the safety (risk) perspective, la sama insttacts the increase in on-line preveni 4 o
l maintenance ahich requires entering LC0 action statements may centribute to marr reliable on line performance of important plant semipment and enhance avr '
safety. However, go-line maintenance pristrily for
- purpose of limiting plea satage t;as er other operational convenience, should not be undertaken without 6 full appreciation of the effects of this practica en plant safety.
t in sind that the allowed outage time set by an LC0 takes inte j
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It should be le failure criterien, which is an important assumption in the account the s We therefore consider the frequent entering overall facility safety analyses.
of an LCO action statement to perform preventive maintenance, er perfoming extensive preventive natntenance en important safety equipment for tle purpose eutase time.-to be evtside of the original intent of the technical hl e
.of reduci specificaNonsallowedestagetime._
Although we believe a well founded preventive maintenance protras can centribute to plant safety and reliability, we aise believe that licensees should develop
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L jU Q 3 RFCEIVED C 2 8 E
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g, Mr, Kenneth Strahm 2
Deceeer 27,1990 i
a full understanding of the impact en plant safety when removing equipment from service for preventIvo maintenance. This may be an area where INPO could take a significant leadership role.
I would be pleased to discuss this matter further at your convenience.
s.
sincer.ir,
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nu11.hisk uhaty twentin Director for Nuclear Reactor lation Regtenal Operations' Research cci Z. Pate, INP0 l
J. Calvin, NUMARC i
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