ML20129J067
Text
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UNITED ST ATES
[9 aQ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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'f ATLANT A, GEORGI A 30323 8*
. D. E. C.12 L
MEMORANDUM FOR: George R. Jenkins, Director Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff
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Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguarcs Branch g '
William E. Cline, Chief FROM:
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
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g David R. McGuire, Chief p
Physical Security Section, NMSS, DRSS I
IM
SUBJECT:
ALLEGATION NO. RII-90-A-01W, ALLEGED FAILURE TO CONTROL AND REPORT DISCOVERY OF UNSECURED SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION On July 30, 1990, the Region II NRC Office of Investigation received in written form via U. S. mail, allegations relating to uncontrolled safeguards documents in the Georgia Power Company's Vogtle Project Offices and Southern Company Services (SCS) offices in Birmingham, AL, and in Bechtel vendor offices in Gaithersburg, MA, Los Angles, CA and Atlanta, GA. It was further alleged that licensee senior management officials had prevented or impeded reporting of events relating to unsecured safeguards materials to the NRC within the required time period, and had provided inaccurate and incomplete information to the NRC at an Enforcement Conference on May 22, 1990, with regard to the existence of a programmatic breakdown in the control and protection of Safeguards Information in the Southern Company Services and Bechtel Design Engineering areas in Birmingham, AL.
i The referenced allegations were presented by a member of the licensee's site management at Vogtle Nuclear Plant, who has since been terminated, and were discussed via telephone with a member of the NRC Office of Investigation prior to submission in written form.
Subsequently, the alleger joined with another former licensee employee in filing a 10 CFR 2.206 petition with the NRC that included the aforementioned safeguards issues in addition to several other safety related and licensing issues.
With regard to the safeguards issues it was alleged that a Georgia Power Company (GPC) Vice President made false statements to the NRC during an Enforcement Conference on May 22, 1990, about the status of safeguards materials in Birmingham, AL.
It was further alleged that GPC personnel (including a Vice President and General Manager, and a Southern Company Services Manager) knowingly and repeatedly hid safeguards problems from the NRC and willfully refused to comply with mandatory reporting requirements. It was specifically.11eged that the Vice President stated at the Enforcement Conference that controls in Birmingham had been reviewed and safeguards documents were all well controlled there by Document Control under a sound program.
When in fact, a programmatic breakdown existed in the design engineering area and safeguards documents had not been properly controlled in the past as evidenced by a known and unreported event in which a safeguards container had been found unsecured in the SCS Vogtle Project Design Engineering office in November 1989, and probably were not being properly controlled. The 7Y n
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9611040263 960827 PDR FOIA KOHN95-211 PDR
George R.'enkins 2
DEC 12 ESO
.J alleger further specified that on July 23, 1990, plant and GPC Senior I
Management ' prevented the Site ' Security Manager from making a Red Phone notification within one hour as required by 10 CFR 73.71.
The alleger i
contended that actions to prevent reporting was an effort to delay or defuse NRC knowledge of programmatic problems within GPC (and its design agencies 7
which include Southern Company Services) ' with safeguards documents.
The alleger cited several instances or related events in support of the contention
.that events. concerning the control and protection of safeguards information were not reported promptly, or a1 determination made that the significance of the safeguards material did not warrant reporting. The following examples were fprovided.
.l Upon learning of the. unsecured safeguards container discovered in the SCS Vogtle-Project Design Engineering Office in Bi rmingham, AL in l
November 1989, the Vogtle Security Manager informed a GPC Project Engineer vic telephone on July 23, 1990, that the event should be reported to the NRC via Red Phone. The Project Engineer responded by saying " don't call the NRC on~this;-I'm over in SCS and there is a problem here, and further stated, "you have to call Shipman'or Bailey before you call the NRC. The l
event was subsequently reported later that date.
As a minimum, GPC personnel know that the SCS and Bechtel design agencies did not have an adequate program control or procedures for years when they were designing the Vogtle Security System.
They also know that the potentially uncontrolled safeguards documents involve 150 boxes of records in Birmingham, Gaithersburg, a records storage location in Los Angles, and records located in Atlanta with the design group that designed the alternate security building at Vogtle.
The alleged breakdown in the control of safeguards information in the SCS and Bechtel design agencies was revealed to'the Vogtle security manager on July 25, 1990, and he concluded that a 1-hour Red Phone Report was warranted. However, after. conferring with the Vogtle General Manager and Vice President the decision to report the event was placed with the Vice President who delegated the decision to the GPC Engineering and Licensing Manager. The event was not reported to the NRC on July 25, 26, or 27, 1990, and was subsequently addressed in a written response to the civil 1
penalty violation issued in June 1990, for violation of requirements for i
the protection of safeguards information.
The alleged explanation provided the Security Manager for not reporting
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the event was, "the' lack of knowledge if any of the documents had been 2
uncontrolled" a GPC Project Engineer stated to the Vogtle Security Manager via telephone, "It's still unravelling and its real bad."
On July 19, 1990, a GPC Project Engineer telecopied a. listing of 14 documents that were found uncontrolled in the GPC offices in Birmingham, 4
AL'on or about~ June 15, 1990. The event was not reported to the NRC at that time. The alleger in his' official capacity concluded on July 19, i
1990, that the event should have been reported. GPC management personnel were informed, but took no action to report the event, claiming a " grace
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DEC 121990 period.for corrective actions following the civil penalty violation issued in June.1990.
Upon receipt and review of the documents in question at the Vogtle Site, it was determinated that two of the-14 documents actually contained
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safeguards.information and the event was subsequently reported to the NRC On July-23, 1990.
During a reactive safeguards inspection at Vogtle Nuclear Plant on October 16 -
17.- 1990,. the Vogtle Security Manager and two members of his staff _ were interviewed by a Safeguards Inspector relative to the allegations discussed herein.
During ' interview, the Vogtle. Security. Manager acknowledged having experienced difficulties in the past in convincing senior management at the corporate level of the ~ necessity to report Safeguards Events. He attributed the difficulty to philosophical differences in the view of reportability requirements and a desire by corporate management to incorporate all subsequent events. relating. to the protection of Safeguards Information into the Licensee
-.- Event Report (LER) as being identified by the corrective actions to the Civil Penalty violation issued in June 1990. The Security Manager further expressed the view that Vogtle Plant' Management, to include both the General Manager and Vice President supported his position relative to the reporting of. safeguards events upon understanding of the event circumstances and reporting requirements.
With regard to discussion of issues relating to the adequacy of protection provided safeguards information at the various licensee and vendors locations during the Enforcement. Conference on May 22, 1990, the Security Manager provided the following comments. He expressed the view that the Licensee's Corporate Management was concerned about potential problems with the protection of Safeguards Information possessed or maintained by the Licensee's vendors prior to the Enforcement Conference and saw the conference as an opportunity to commit to' corrective actions that would include reviewing and addressing the concerns to ensure that if problems did exist, they were ' corrected.
The Security Manager further expressed the view that Corporate Management was
..not actually aware that Safeguards Information in the possession of vendors and i
at the Licensee's various engineering design locations was not being adequately l'
. protected at the time of the conference and was not trying to conceal it. The Security Manager did not provide any further information that would assist in substantiating.the validity of the allegations, i
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- Interview of the.Vogtle Security Operations Supervisor who had participated in the telephone conference of July 23, 1990, relative to the discovery of the 14 documents believed to contain safeguards information in-the SCS Vogtle Project Design Enginee' ring Area in Birmingham, AL revealed the following. The Security Operations ' Supervisor-expressed the view that the Corporate Management personnel in Birmingham did display some general. reluctance to reporting the event involving the discovery.of the 14 documents' that were inadequately protected, which he attributed to the view by corporate personnel that the 1
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George R. Jenkins 4
DEC 121990 information contained in the documents were either old and outdated, or was insignificant relative to compromising the Vogtle Security System.
He noted that the Security Manager had argued the point with the corporate personnel that reporting of the event was a Vogtle Site responsibility.
The Security Operations Supervisor did not participate in, or have any knowledge cf activities and pre.paration leading up to or during the Enforcement Conference, specifically with regard to Senior Management awareness of existing safeguard problems at the licensee's corporate and various vendor locations.
The Security Operations Supervisor did not provide any further information that was beneficial in establishing or confirming the validity of the allegations.
i Interview ~ of a member of the Vogtle Security Staff, a Security Specialist responsible for reviewing security incident and event reports and providing recommended actions, to include reporting and disposition, revealed the following.
With regard to the event concerning the discovery of the 14 unprotected safeguards documents in the licensee's Birmingham offices that was discussed via telephone by the licensee'.s corporate and Vogtle site personnel, and subsequently reported to the NRC on July 23, 1990, the Security Specialist stated that did not see any indication of a reluctance to report the events, that it was not an issue of whether to report, but how. 'He noted that after participating in a discussion with the Security Manager and others regarding the reportability of the event, he accompanied the Security Manager to the office of the Plant General Manager where the event and reportability requirements were reviewed and further discussed, subsequently resulting in agreement by the General Manager that that event was reportable and a recommendation to the Site Vice President in Birmingham, AL via telephone that i
the event be reported.
The Security Specialist further stated that in his view, corporate management personnel felt that Vogtle Security Management was being overly conservative relative to reporting requirements.
He noted that safeguards events occurring at the Vogtle Site are reported to the NRC directly, whereas reporting of events occurring in the corporate and vendor offices in Birmingham and other locations are more difficult due to a lack of i
understanding of what constitutes a reportable event. The Security Specialist further provided.that he had seen no indication at the Vogtle Site that the licensee corporate management had knowledge of, or was aware or concerned about existing problems with Safeguards Information not being adequately protected in the Birmingham offices or other vendor locations. The Security Specialist did not provide any additional information that was pertinent to, or would assist in substantiating the validity of the allegations.
On November 6,1990, the alleger (the former Acting Assistant General Manager for Plant Support at Georgia Power Company's Vogtle Nuclear Plant) was interviewed by a Safeguards Inspector regarding the allegations of improprieties in the protection and reporting of events relating to the Safeguards Information Program at Plant Vogtle and the GPC corporate offices in Birmingham, AL.
The interview was conducted from 1125 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. to 3:05 p.m. in the Comfort Inn Motel, August, GA in the presence of NRC Investigators, L. L. Robinson and C. T. Tate. During the course of the interview, the alleger reiterated the allegations that GPC personnel (including a GPC Vice President and General Manager, and a Southern Company Services Manager) knowingly and repeatedly hid safeguards problems from the NRC and
George R. Jenkins 5
DEC 121990 willfully refused to comply with mandatory reporting requirements.
It was further alleged that the GPC Vice President made false statements to the NRC during an Enforcement Conference on May 22, 1990 about the security status of safeguards material in Birmingham, AL.
In response to specific questions relating to the allegations, the alleger provided the following information or expressed views.
The earliest known event by the alleger involving a failure to provide adequate protection for safeguards information in.which appropriate safeguards event reporting and corrective actions were not initiated, was the discovery of an unsecured safeguards container in the SCS Vogtle Project Design Engineering Area in Birmingham, AL in November 1989. The event was communicated to the Vogtle Security Manager via telephone on July 23, 1990. The alleger expressed the view that senior management, to include the Vogtle General Manager and the Vice President were reluctant to report the event and stalled and delayed reporting for several hours.
The alleger further stated that the SCS Engineering Manager who was responsible for the area in which the unsecured container was discovered and conducted the investigation of the event, was aware of the requirements for protecting Safeguards Information and failed to report the event at the time of the occurrence in accordance with regulatory requirements. As a consequence, the event was not reported for a period i
of more than 7 months.
During the week of July 16-20, 1990, a GPC Project Engineer located in Birmingham, AL notified the Vogtle Security Manager of the discovery of 14 documents that were either marked as safeguards information, or was believed to contain safeguards information.
The documents were found uncontrolled on book shelves, in files, desks and cubbards allegedly on or about June 15, 1990, as a result of personnel searching their work areas in response to an "all personnel" letter which was a licensee commitment for corrective action to the civil penalty violation cited in June 1990.
A listing of the documents were telecopied to the Vogtle Security Manager on July 19, 1990, and the documents were shipped to the Security Manager via Federal Express on July 20, 1990.
The alleger contended that he determined on July 19, 1990, after becoming aware of the circumstances of the event, that the event should have been reported as a 1-hour Red Phone Re p rt, and so advised the'Vogtle Assistant General Manager Plant Support, the GPC General Manager Plant Support, and the GPC Engineering and Licensing Manager. The alleger further contended that the GPC personnel denied any knowledge of the discovery of the documents and referred to the project engineer who had reported the discovery of the documents to the Vogtle Security Manager as being junior and inexperienced. The alleger stated that the GPC personnel expressed the view that they (the licensee) was in a " Grace Period" and took no action to report the event to the NRC.
The alleger further related that upon receipt of the documents they were reviewed by the Vogtle Security Manager and members of his staff on July 23, 1990, and a determination made that 2 of the 14 documents contained significant safeguards information.
After considerable review and discussion with the Vogtle General Manager and Vice President over a period of several hours, the
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event was reported via telephone to the NRC Operations Center.
The alleger again contended that high level GPC personnel including the Vice President, the General Manager Support, the Licensing Manager, and the Engineering and Licensing Manager impeded appropriate and timely reporting of the uncontrolled and unprotected safeguards documents.
The alleger contended that a statement by the Vogtle Vice President at the Enforcement Conference in Regio'n II on May 22, 1990, that the controls in Birmingham had been reviewed and safeguards documents we're all well controlled there by Document Control under a sound program" was false.
The alleger expressed.the view that the Vice President knew at the time that programmatic problems existed at other licensee and vendors locations relative to the control of safeguards information. The alleger further expressed the view that the NRC was snookered (misled) by senior GPC management at the Enforcement Conference, and that all senior managers are damage control experts.
The alleger expressed the belief that commitment dates for corrective actions for the civil penalty violation relating to control of safeguards information, issued in June 1990, were intentionally established to cover the periods in which additional events occurred.
1 The alleger stated that additional instances of safeguards materials being improperly controlled or unprotected, discovered in July and August 1990, occurred after completion of corrective actions committed to by the Licensee.
Included were the alleged existence of 150 boxes of records containing safeguards information at various licensee and vendor locations in Birmingham, AL, Atlanta, GA, Gaithersburg, MA and Los Angles, CA.
However, the alleger could provide no specific information regarding the content or location of the 150 boxes of records, or their disposition. He did note that some time during the month of August,1990, 2 boxes of safeguards documents were received by Vogtle Document Control from an unknown source, with instructions to destroy the documents.
It was eventually determined that the documents came from i
storage in a vault in Birmingham, AL and had previously been in the custody of Georgia Power Company in Atlanta, GA. The alleger stated that some of the documents and materials were not properly marked and were in loose leaf binders that would have allowed undetected removal. He noted that there was not a good inventory of the safeguards materials contained in the boxes, and that two boxes of safeguards materials were eventually returned to the licensee's 4
corporate office in Birmingham for disposition.
The alleger was unable to 1
demonstrate or provide any information to substantiate that the two boxes of safeguards materials had not been adequately controlled or protected.
In concluding, the alleger provided the following comments relative to events and circumstances that he believed impacted adversely on the licensee's fulfillment of responsibilities and commitments to control and protect safeguards information.
'The GPC Executive Vice President and Chief Operations dfficer and the Acting General. Manager of Vogtle Nuclear Plant do not believe in Safeguards Security.
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._ George R. Jenkins 7
DEC 12 inD l
_There ~are different views within GPC Management on Safeguards Event F
reportability requirements.
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. GPC Senior Management personnel's actions in response to the problems identified in the Safeguards Information Program was a way of doing i
business, it has worked at Farley Nuclear Plant.
a The alleger proposed the establishment of a " Safeguards Reading Room" at
'Vogtle to provide better control of safeguards information, did not receive'any support from Plant Management.
The GPC project engineer who reported a number of the events relating to' j
the failure to properly control safeguards materials in the licensee's offices in-Birmingham, AL was involved in the corrective action that resulted in the discovery of some of the uncontrolled documents. The same engineer was subsequently dispatched by GPC management to investigate _ the i
. existing problem with. the control of safeguards information.at other licensee and vendor locations.
This was the same project engineer preferred to by GPC Managers as being junior and unexperienced.
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With regard to preparation of a Licensee Event Report (LER) to address the 3
issue of potential safeguards problems at the licensee's vendor offices in Gaithersburg, MA, Atlanta, GA and Los Angles, CA, GPC Management personnel l
. informed the Vogtle Security Manager that the LER would be prepared in i
Birmingham. The alleger contended that the LER which was a supplemental i
report to the LER that' addressed the civil penalty violation issued in June 1990, was a crash project by GPC management personnel in Birmingham L
in an effort to include all subsequent safeguards events in the report as f
being identified in the course of accomplishing corrective actions for the i
civil penalty violation.
The alleger did not ' provide any additional information in support of or to
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substantiate the allegations.
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An Enforcement Conference was conducted in the Region II office on November 13, 1990 to. discuss the -licensee's continuing problems with the control and protection of safeguards infora;ntion.
The licensee provided a detailed briefing of the circumstances of several events relating to the protection of j
safeguards ~ information that had been identified and reported to the NRC since
-the Enforcement Conference of May 22, 1990.
The licensee acknowledge the occurrence of delays in reporting of-Safeguards Events to the NRC and attributed the delays to internal conflicts relative to what constituted Safeguards. Information and the degree of significance warranting 1-hour i
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telephone reporting versus logging in the quarterly Safeguards Event Log. The
_ licensee's presentation essentially addressed each of the specific instances of i
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failure to properly control safeguards information identified by the alleger in addition to more recent events that. were appropriately reported to - the NRC.
The failure to report the discovery of the unsecured Safeguards Containers in
~ he ;SCS _ Vogtle. Project Design Engineering Area in November 1989 was also t
. acknowledged.; The licensee further acknowledged that the scope of 'the problems o
in the' Safeguards Information Program was' not fully recognized at the time of
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DEC 121930 the Enforcement Conference on May 22, 1990. However, there was no information presented that would support or reflute the allegation that the GPC Vice President knowingly or willingly made f alse statements to the NRC during the Enforcement Conference on May 22, 1990, regarding awareness of existing problems in the licensee's safeguards program.
Based on available and developed information to date, it is apparent that the allegations relating to the failure to control and protect safeguards information, failure - to promptly report safeguards events relating to the failure to control and protect safeguards ~information, and the existence of a programmatic problem in the licensee safeguards information program are valid.
These issues were either specifically or in general addressed by the licensee during an Enforcement Conference on November 13, 1990, some of which were determined to have been identified by the corrective actions committed to by the licensee at the Enforcement Conference of May 22, 1990, and others that are included in pending escalated enforcement action concerning the licensee's safeguards information program.
Conversely, the allegation that a GPC Vice President provided false or misleading information to the NRC at an Enforcement Conference on May 22, 1990, has not been substantiated to date.
Information provided by the Vogtle Security Manager, members of his staff and the alleger did not establish validity of the allegation.
If the allegation is to be pursued further, it will necessitate as a minimum, interview of several members of the licensee's corporate staff in Birmingham, AL.
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Aum ey.i o inmn Safeguards Inspector
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