IR 05000285/1993002
| ML20128D487 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 02/02/1993 |
| From: | Harrell P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128D480 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-93-02, 50-285-93-2, NUDOCS 9302100161 | |
| Download: ML20128D487 (10) | |
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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
inspection Report:
50-285/93-02 Operating License: OPR-40 Licensee: Omahn Public power District 444 South 16th Street Mall Omaha, Nebraska 68102-2247 Facility Name:
Fort Calhoun Station Inspection At:
Blair, Nebraska inspection Conducted:
January 3-30, 1993 Inspectors:
R. Hullikin, Senior Resident inspector R. Azua, Resident inspector Approved:
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Division < Reactor Projects inspection Summary Areas inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of onsite followup of events, operational safety verification, maintenance and surveillance observations, and followup of licensee event reports.
Results:
Licensee management's response to site events was prompt and
conservative (Section 2).
Operations, radiological protection, and security personnel performed
tieir duties in a professional manner (Section 3).
Procedural compliance by maintenance personnel was very good
(Section 4.1).
Attention to detail by quality control inspector was considered to be
notable (Section 4.1).
Communications between operations and maintenance personnel performing a
surveillance test was excellent (Section 5.1).
9302100161 930204 PDR ADOCK 05000205 G
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-2-Summary of Inspection findinas:
Licensee Event Report 92-29 was closed (Section 6.1).
- Violation 285/92-000 (EA 92-123) was closed (Section 7.1).
- Attachment:
Attachment - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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-3-DETAILS 1 PLANT STATUS The licensee operated the Fort Calhoun Station at 100 percent power throughout f
this inspection period,
2 ONSITE RESPONSE TO EVENTS (93702)
2.1 Boric Acid Storace Tank Inadeauate Surveillance
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On January 8,1993, the licensee discovered that the common control room level alarm for both boric acid storage tanks-was alarming prematurely.
The alarm
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was supposed to actuate when the icvel..in both storage tanks dropped below 83-percent. A subsequent investigation by the licensee identified that the Buric Acid Storage Tank (CH-llB) Level Switch LAS-253 was not functioning-correctly and was registering a low level.
Thus, when the level for Boric-Acid Storage Tank CH-llA dropped below 83 percent, the control room level alarm was actuated.
While reviewing the problem described above, the licensee revealed that a1...
Technical Specification required surveillance had been incorrectly performed.
Technical Specification 3.1. Table 3-2, requires that a daily check of each boric acid tank level channel be performed by comparing two independent sensors. Operations Surveillance Procedure OP-ST-SHIFT-0001, " Operations Technical Specification Required Shift Surveillance," satisfied this required surveillance by a daily comparison ofLthe local and remote level indicators.-
However, the licensee determined that the local 'and remote level indicators utilized the same tank tap line and, thus, were not totally independent. The!
licensee made the determination that the level channels were operable based on
the level transmitter and the level alarm. The level alarm uses a separate tap off of the. tanks.
The plant manager made the' decision to provide temporary independent level-indication.by.the installation-of Tygon tubing off-a-' local sample line. This was completed the following day.
Procedure OP-ST-SHIFT-0001 wasLrevised to require the auxiliary-operators to valve in the Tygon tubing, record the level indications,.and close the valve.
The inspector verified the completion of physical installation and that.the auxiliary _ operators had begun performing.-
this new evolution during their scheduled rounds.
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The inspectors will perform further followup during routine: review of Licensee.
Event-Report 285/93-01..
2.2 Inadequate Steam _ Generator low Signal Block permissive Setpoints-On January 22, 1993, while performing'a review of the current steam generator low signal block reset setpoints.(in response to a' question raised.by an NRC-
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regional inspector in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/92-23), the licensee determined that the setpoints were higher than allowed by the Technical Specifications.
The steam generator low ()ressure) signal provides an input to the engineered safeguards controls, whic1 initiates a steam generator isolation signal to isolate the affected steam generator.
To avoid activating the steam generator
l low signal when the plant is being shut down and depressurized for an outage, the pressure indicating controller provides a function that will block the signal.
The pressure indicating controller also provides an automatic reset function, which, in effect, will clear the signal block once the steam
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generator pressure increases above the preselected setpoint (550 psia).
The
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licensee identified, during their review, that the pressure indicating controllers were currently not operating as specified in Modification
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Request MR-FC-85-136, "SGLS Block Permissive Setpoints." The controllers were
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required to have an adjustable b1nck setpoint and a dead span for block reset of 10 psia.
Presently, the reset band for the installed controllers is
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approximately 26 psia, which would place the actual block reset setpoint l
higher than the 550 psia stated in Technical Specification 2.14, Table 2-1, Note (2).
It must be noted that the Technical Specification states that the
steam generator low signal be "... automatically reinstated above 550 psia."
The licensee has aresently determined that this may be an error and that the intent of the Tec1nical Specification is that the signal be automatically reset below or at 550 psia.
As a result, the licensee has determined that this condition is a reportable event.
Licensee management, upon identifying this issue, convened the Plant Review Committee to determine the safety significance, it was concluded that this
issue does not_have any affect on the current accident analysis, but licensee
management has decided that, in the event that the plant is shut down, the
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Plant Review Committee will reconvene on this issue prior to deciding to
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return to power. The licensee has verified that the steam generator low signal is not presently blocked.
The inspector will perform further followup during routine review of Licensee
Event Report 285/93-02.
2.3 Conclusions Licensee management response to the issues identified during this inspection period was prompt and conservative.-
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3 OPERATIONAL SAFETY VERIFICATION (71707)
3.1 Routine Control Room Observations The inspectors observed operational activities throughout this inspection period to verify that proper control room staffing and control room professionalism were maintained, Shift turnover meetings were conducted in a o
manner that provided for proper communication of plant status from one. shift
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to the other. Discussions with operators indicated that they were aware of plant and equipment status and reasons for lit annunciators.
The inspectors observed that Technical Specification limiting conditions for operations were properly documented and tracked. Operators were observed to properly control access into the control room operating area.
3.2 PJLantTours The inspectors routinely toured various areas of the plant to assess the safety conditions and adequacy of plant equipment. Housekeeping was noted as very good throughout the vital areas. The inspectors verified that various valve and switch positions were correct for the current plant conditions.
Personnel were observed obeying rules for personnel safety and rules for escorts, visitors, entry, and exits into and out of vital areas.
3.3 Radiological Protection Program Observations The inspectors verified that seiected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program were properly implemented.
Radiation and contaminated areas were properly posted and controlled.
Health physics personnel were observed routinely touring the controlled areas.
3.4 Security Program Observations The inspectors observed security personnel perform their duties of personnel and package search.
Vehicles were properly authorized and controlled or escorted within the protected area. Designated vehicles parked and unattended within the protected area were found to be locked and the keys removed.
The inspectors routinely toured the protected area perimeter _and found it maintained at an excellent level. Also noted was that proper compensatory measures were taken when a security barrier was inoperable.
i 3.5 Management Oversight L
During this inspection period, management involvement in plant activities was I
noted.
Senior plant management were seen touring the control room in the morning, and other times of the day, witnessing and participating'in control room shift turnovers. Management was also seen touring the plant and
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inspecting housekeeping conditions. _in the areas of Radiation Protection and Security, supervisors were routinely observed touring their areas of responsibility.
l 3.6 Conclusions
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Operations, radiological protection, and security personnel were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and performed their duties in a professional manner.
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-6-4 MAINTENANCE OBSERVATIONS (62703)
4.1 Installation of Heatless Air Dryer (CA-31)
On January 14, 1993, the inspector witnessed portions of the licensee effort to install Heatless Air Dryer CA-31 into the compressed air system. This effort was being performed to re) lace Air Dryer CA-4, as the backup air dryer to Heatless Air Dryer CA-12, witi Air Dryer CA-31. The purpose of this
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modification was to improve system reliability and quality of air provided by the backup air dryer'by installing a matching unit-to Air Dryer CA-12.- In addition, by installing a matching unit as=a backup, operating-and maintenance procedures for both air dryers would be the same.
This effort was performed under Construction Work Orders 92-0095'and 92-0119 and Modification-
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Request MR-FC-90-002.
The inspector reviewed selected portions of the construction work orders and the modification request and determined that these documents had been reviewed and approved by the licensee, as noted by the appropriate signatures. The procedures were technically adequate to' control this activity, providing sufficient information in the form of instructions and drawings.
Prior to initiating this effort and removing Air Dryer CA-4,- the licensee verified that redundant system components such as Air Dryer CA-12 were operable.
The inspector witnessed the installation of seismic conduit supports for the electrical conduits that were being installed to provide power to Air Dryer CA-31.
The electricians performing this effort were found to be knowledgeable of their responsibilities.
Procedural compliance was noted.
Also noted was licensee personnel compliance with personnel safety requirements, such as proper use of_ safety belts and_ correct use of ladders and scaffolding.
Quality control personnel were also observed performing their duties during.
this effort. The quality control inspector was_ thorough in his efforts while inspecting the holes that were drilled into. the east wall of Room 19 for the expansion-anchor bolts that would be used to fasten the~ conduit seism _ic-supports to the wall.
This_ was apparent when the quality. control inspector identified that the holes drilled for Conduit Support No. CS-03-B-187 were not-acceptable'due:to the fact--that they did not meet the requirements of the Civil Standard Specification CSS-5..This.was due to spalling,1which was
.probably the result of an air bubble that was located in the concrete wall at
- that location., When _the electricians, suggested ~ that they drill new-holes at a-new location _ a. few inches above the ones-that were unacceptable, the quality z
controlginspector noted that,_ although this was within the parameters of-the
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Seismic Conduit Support Work Procedure CWP-1-(i.e. these scismic supports had-to.be within 6-feet of each other and the new holes had.to-be at least two hole diameters distant:from-the previously drilled holes),:it would have
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This was also contrary to the requirements of Civil Standard Specification CSS-5.
As a result, the electricians identified a new location for the conduit seismic support, which was within the parameters of Conduit fupport Work Procedure CWP-1, and met the requirements of the above civil standard.
The construction engineer responsible for this effort reviewed the electricians proposal with the quality control inspector and no concerns,,ere identified.
The electricians were then given permission to continue tha installation effort.
The inspector also inspected the installed piping configuration for Air Dryer CA-31 against Isometric Piping Drawing No. C-4215. No discrepancies were noted.
4.2 Conclusions Maintenance personnel were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and maintained very good procedural compliance.
Attention to detail by the quality control inspector was notable.
5 SURVEILLANCE OBSERVATIONS (61726)
5.1 Emergenc_y Core Cooling S_ystem Quarterly Pump and Valve Test On January 26, 1993, the inspector observed portions of the surveillance test that was performed on the emergency core cooling system pumps and the pump suction and discharge valves.
This effort was performed to satisfy, in part, the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3(1)a, which addresses the inservice testing of Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Bniler and Pressure Vessel Code, as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Section 50.55a(g).
The inspector wituussed the test performance on low pressure Safety injection Pump SI-18, high pressure Safety injection Pump SI-28 and their associated suction and discharge valves. This effort was performed under Preventive Maintenance Orders 9300058 and 9300059, Preventive Maintenance Procedure EM-PM-MX-1000, " Vibration Monitoring of Rotating Equipment," and Surveillance Test Procedure OP-ST-SI-3008, " Safety injection and Containment Spray Pump Inservice Test and Valve Exercise Test."
The inspector reviewed the surveillance procedures for technical adequacy, for conformance to the Technical Specification requirements, and to verify that they had been reviewed and approved, as noted by the appropriate signatures.
It was noted that Procedure EM-PM-MX-1000, although technically adequate, did rely on the skill-of-the-craft for how to operate the monitoring instrumentation and where to place the instrumentation for monitoring.
The inspector interviewed the electrical maintenance personnel performing this procedure and found that they were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and had been trained to perform this effort.
The instrumentation being used to acquire data for this surveillance test was within its calibration cycle, as
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This was further verified through a review of the material and test equipment records.
The insoector noted that the licensee personnel had prestaged all the necessary equipment prior to the initiation of the test and that the electrical maintenance personnel complied with the radiation protection requirements for working in a contaminated area, as designated by the appropriate radiation work permit, which they had read and signed.
Communication between the personnei performing the test at the pump location and the control room was very good.
The inspector witnessed the starting and stopping of the pumps listed and the exercising of their associated suction and discharge valves. A review of the control room logs identified that the licensee entered the appropriate limiting conditions for operation when a particular pump or valve was being tested and later cleared them when the equipment was restored to its original operating status.
Finally, the inspector also reviewed the test data for accuracy and completeness and verified that they met the acceptance criteria set forth in Procedure OP-ST-SI-3008.
Conclusion Overall performance of the surveillance test was considered to be good, including electrical maintenance personnel adherence to good radiological protection practices.
Excellent communication between operations and surveillance personnel was noted.
The surveillance test was within the skill-of-the-craft.
6 ONSITE REVIEW OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (92700)
6.1 1 Closed) Licensee Event Renort 92-029:
Intake of Radioactive Materit This licensee event report documented an unanticipated intake of radioactive materials, which occurred on April 16, 1992.
This event was addressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/92-32 in which violations of NRC requirements were identified.
Routine followup of these violations will address the corrective actions taken by the licensee because of this event; therefore, this licensee event report is closed.
7 FOLLOWUP (92701)
7.1 (Closed)
Violation 285/92-000 (EA 92-123):
Inaccurate information Provided to the NRC This violation resulted from a routine inspection where inaccurate shif t technical advisor training records were provided to the inspector.
The inaccuracies were for certain training that was not provided although the records indicated it had.
The licensee performed an investigation and concluded that one individual was responsible for the creation of these false
training attendance records, apparently because he believed that the three l
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trainees had received this training in previous training sessions.
The NRC concluded that this incident appeared to be an isolated occurrence and that adequate training had been provided to shift technical advisor training candidates.
The licensee was required to monitor the performance of the individual responsible for the violation.
Reports of the results of this monitoring were required at 6 and 12 months after the violation was issued.
The licensee's letter, dated September 16, 1992, documented the-results of the 6-month monitoring of the individual. The licensee reported that the individual performed assigned tasks in a professional manner, with integrity, and in compliance with applicable NRC and licensee rules, regulations, and procedures. The 12-month report will be due in March 1993.
This violation is closed based upon the licensee's past monitoring of the individual, the inspector's observations of-the individual, and continued license monitorin r
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ATTACHMENT 1
PERSONS CONTACTED 1.]
Licensee Personnel i
- R. Andrews, Division Manager, Nuclear Services
- J. Chase, Manager, fort Calhoun Station
- G. Cook Supervisor, Station Licensing
- H. Frans Supervisor, Systems Engineering
- S. Gambhir, Division Manager, Production Engineering
- J. Gasper, Manager, Training
- W. Gates, Vice President, Nuclear
- L. Kusek, Manager, Nuclear Safety Review Group D. Lippy Licensing Engineer
- W. Orr, Manager, Quality Assurance and Quality Control
- T. Patterson, Division Manager, Nuclear Operations
- J. Sofick, Manager, Security Services C. Simmons, Station Licensing Engineer
- R. Short, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Industry Affairs J. Tills, Operations Supervisor in addition to the personnel listed above, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this inspection period.
- Denotes personnel that attended the exit meeting.
2 EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was conducted on February 1, 1993.
During this meeting, the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.