IR 05000305/1985006

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Insp Rept 50-305/85-06 on 850416-0615.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Surveillance,Maint,Independent Insp,Procedures,Regional Requests,Headquarters Requests & TMI-2 Task Items
ML20127M666
Person / Time
Site: Kewaunee Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 06/24/1985
From: Jackiw I
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127M645 List:
References
TASK-2.B.3, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-3.A.1.2, TASK-TM 50-305-85-06, 50-305-85-6, NUDOCS 8507010319
Download: ML20127M666 (9)


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U. S.-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-305/85006(DRP)

Docket No. 50-305 License No. DPR-43 ,

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. Licensee: Wisconsin Public Service Corporation '

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P. O. Box 19002 Green Bay, Wisconsin 54307-9002 Facility Name: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant

' Inspection At: Kewaunee Site, Kewaunee, WI

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Inspection Conducted: April 16-19, 22-26, 29, 1985 May 1-3, 6, 9-10, 20-24, 27-31, 1985

' June 3-4, 6-7, 10-14, 1985 r-Inspector: R. L. Nelson Approved By: . ' ac w, Chief 2bI Re ctor rojects Section 2B Date Inspection Summary

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Inspection on April 16 - June 15, 1985 (Report No. 50-305/85006(DRP)

Area Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by resident inspector of previous inspection findings; operational safety; surveillance; maintenance; independent inspection; procedures; regional requests; headquarters requests; shutdown margin; type B&C leakrate; TMI-2 task items; and plant startup. The inspection involved a total of 137 inspector-hours by one inspector including 28 inspector-hours onsite during off-shift Results: No violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000305 G PDR l

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, DETAILS

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1 Persons Contacted ja.s.'

  • C. R. Steinhardt, Plant Manager

. . C. Marchi, Plant Technical and Services Superintendent

  • R. P. Pulic, Plant Technical Supervisor g *R. W. Lange, Superintendent, Maintenance

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  • K. W. Evers, Superintendent, Operations D. W. McSwain, Assistant Superintendent, Instrument and Control M. M. Kwitek, Reactor Supervisor
  • K. H. Weinhauer, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance

' *G. J. Youngworth, Electrical Supervisor D. A. Faltynski, Plant Fire Protection Coordinator

/The inspector also talked with and interviewed members of the Operation,

,, Maintenance, Health Physics, Instrument and Control, Quality Control, and Security group * Denotes personnel attending exit interviews.

, Action on Previous Inspection Findings

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, * (CLOSED) Noncompliance (305/85001-01 [DRP]):

Unplanned release of radioactive gas while performing an unprocedural-y ized maintenance activity. This activity has been designated as an

, annual refueling activity. As such, it will be called up with an

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, e activity card which references procedural requirements for preventing a recurrence of this event. Further, a modification will be completed during the 1986 refueling outage which will remove the source of r

radioactive gas while performing the activit (CLOSED) Noncompliance (305/84015-02 [DRS]):

Failure to implement adequate compensatory measures for a potentially e

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inoperable-fire damper. Licensee's corrective actions were found to be adequate for this issu (WITHDRAWN) Noncompliance (3r!.t4015-06 [DRS]):

l Failure to have procedures fit n' ace specifying inspection or oper-

! ability demonstration of 702 P [gade/ fire team equipment. This item of noncompliance Le,$co y 4Lthdrawn, based on the fact that the inspection did not identify any equipment deficiencies, and that the

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licensee's inspection of equipment was being performed by a conscien-tious, qualified individua , (WITHDRAWN) Noncompliance (305/84015-08 [DRS]):

Failure to adequately train non-fire brigade personnel assigned fire

. watch duties in the use of fire suppression equipment. This item of noncompliance has been withdrawn, based on licensee's existing prac-tices and corrective action commitment .. . . .

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. (CLOSED) Unresolved Item (305/84015-04 [DRS]):

sThe inspection report indicated that the fire pumps, their con-r ' trollers, and the-isolation and check valves located in the fire-protection-system did not-have-a nationally recognized. laboratory

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label or stamp indicating that these components were approved for fire protection use. Subsequent inspection revealed that pumps and controllers were properly tagged,.and piping and valves were installed per ANSI B31.1-196 l (CLOSED) Open Item (305/84015-07 [DRS]):

EFailure to include a precaution in Fire Fighting Strategies, for areas that contain radioactive or contaminated materials, to don self-contained breathing apparatus prior to entering those area ~ Review 'of the Fire Fighting Strategies for the areas of concern revealed that they now contain a precaution which specifies that air masks are' require (CLOSED)' Open Item (305/84015-11 [DRS]):

Emergency Operating Procedure No. E-0-06 required Control Operator

"B".to leave his assigned area to perform an action in the area

. assigned to Control Operator "A". The procedure has been revised to assign the required action to Control Operator "A".

L (CLOSED) Open Item (305/84015-14 [DRS]):

Additional eight hour battery powered lights were required to provide

, lighting for the route between the Control Room and the dedicated shutdown panel. The additional lighting units have been installed and are operativ ' Reference the letter from R. L. Spessard, NRC, Region III, to D. C. Hintz, WPSC, dated April 19, 1985, for further information regarding items b, c, and No violations or deviations were identified.

.. Operational Safety Verification l The inspectorLobserved control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and_ conducted discussions with control room operators throughout the L inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected safety-related systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper-return to service of affected' components. Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted. During these tours, observations were made relative to plant equipment conditions, fire hazards, fire protection, adherence to procedures, radiological control and conditions, housekeeping, security, tagging of' equipment, ongoing maintenance and surveillance, con-tainment integrity, and availability of safety-related equipmen No violations or deviations were identifie .

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4. Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector reviewed / observed the following Technical Specification required surveillance testing:

Surveillance Procedure Test 41-001 Emergency Lighting 30-012 DDT and VCT Post-Accident Vent Reroute Leakage Test 36-018 Pressurizer Backup Group A&B Operational Test 48-046 Target Band Determination 30-052 Containment Sump Level Test 56-078 Containment Isolation Trip Test t

08-081 Fire Pump Test The following items were considered during the inspection: the_ testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the indi-vidual directing the test; and any deficiencies identified during the testing were reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions of operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; acti-vities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as l applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.

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The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

N Activity 30239 Replaced Spent Fuel Pit South Gate Seal - Preventative, End of life 28344 Appendix "R" Modification to "A" Residual Heat Removal Pump Area Cooling Fan 28810 Appendix "R" Modification to "A" Emergency Diesel Control Circuitry 30217 Replace Thermal Overload Heaters for

"B" Residual Heat Removal Area Fan Motor 28893 Replaced Faulty Pressurizer Level Transmitter No violations or deviations were identifie . Independent Inspection The inspector conducted a general inspection of operations, maintenance, health physics, security, quality assurance, and administrative activitie No violations or deviations were identifie . Procedures The following procedures were reviewed for Technical Content using IEEE Standards 450-1980, " Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries", IEEE Standard 484-1975,

" Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation of Large Lead Storage Batteries", and the Vendor Technical Manual for guidance:

  • SP 38-101 Station Battery Monthly Test
  • SP 38-102 Station Battery Load Test
  • SP 38-112 Station Battery Quarterly Test
  • SP 38-182 DC Supply and Distribution System (EDC)

Battery Connection Tightness The procedural requirements were found to be consistent with the requirements and recommendations of the Standards, except in one are IEEE 450-1980, Section 4.3.3 states, in part, "At least once each year

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a quarterly inspection should be augmented by checking and recording tightness of bolted connections to manufacturer's recommended torque value, followed.by cell-to-cell and terminal connection detail resistance".

The torque values are checked on an annual schedule using SP 38-182, but resistance measurements are not taken. The licensee has scheduled a meeting with the battery technical representative to discuss installation of corrosion preventative seal kits on the battery terminals, and will ..

also discuss the feasibility of taking terminal resistance readings. Until these issues have been resolved the bolted connection torque values will be checked on a quarterly schedule commencing September 1, 198 If the decision is made to install the seal kits, or take resistance measurements, or both,'the implementation of either or both activities will be initiated during the 1986 refueling outage. This is an open item (305/85006-01[DRP]).

No violations or deviations were identifie . Regional Requests

- A memorandum from C. E. Norelius, to all Senior Resident Inspectors, i

~ dated December 10, 1984, requested information as to whether or not seal table maintenance activities at pressure were specifically ,

-prohibited at their assigned plants. Review of the following proce--

l -dures, PMP.50.1, Incore Instrumentation Thimble Cleaning and Mainte-l nance, PMP 50.3, Removal of the Ten Path Transfer Assembly, CMP 50.1 L- Incore Instrumentation Thimble Cleanout, revealed that the prereq-uisitas of these procedures required the plant to be placed in the refueling shutdown mode prior to beginning maintenance. Following a discussion with the licensee, they have initiated a revision to the

'above procedures which will change the prerequisite for refueling shutdown mode to cold shutdown mode. The intent of the prerequisite will remain the same, that is, to preclude maintenance activities while the reactor coolant system is above 200 degrees F or atmospheric pressure. The-revision will prevent unnecessary boration and subse-quent dilution of the reactor coolant system, and unnecessary opera-tion of the boric acid recovery syste A memorandum from E. G. Greenman, to all Senior Resident Inspectors, dated March 26, 1985, requested that a review be conducted of imple-menting procedures for the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k); and 10 l CFR 50.54(M)(2)(iii). The following documents were reviewed:

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  • .ACD Shift Operations and Turnover
  • Technical Specification 6. Facility Staff t

, The review revealed the 10 CFR 50.54 requirements, and guidance

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provided by Regulatory Guide 1.114, has been adequately addressed, with one exception. Administrative Control Directive 4.5, Section 3.2, defined the Control Room as, " Control Room - an operator is considered to be out of the Control Room if he is in the kitchenette,

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i lavatory,- CAS, behind the vertical cabinets on the north wall."

Literal interpretation of the definition would have permitted the operator to enter the area behind the vertical control boards. The inspector.has never observed operators using this interpretatio To more clearly define and outline specific areas within the Control Room where the operator at the controls shall remain, ACD 4.5 will be

- revised to include a sketch of the Control Room defining acceptable areas of operator occupancy. The proposed revision-has been reviewed byLthe inspector and found to be acceptable. Until the procedure revision has completed the review.and approval process, a Night Order has-been issued which adequately addresses the inspector's concer ~ A_ memorandum from E. C. Norelius to all Senior Resident Inspectors, dated March 25, 1985, requested a review of station battery operation and maintenance procedures.at their assigned plants. See' Paragraph 7 of this report for detail No violations or deviations were identifie . -Headquarters Requests Temporary Instruction 2515/67 required that inspection be performed to determine the actions that licensees at operating plants are taking to address a selected sample of safety issues. These issues have been identi-

- fled. in IE Information Notices 83-75 " Improper Control Rod Manipulation",

and 84-06 " Steam Binding of' Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps". The following-procedures were reviewed:

  • A-CRD-49A Failure of Rod Control Bank to Move
  • A-CRD-49B Full Length Rod Misalignment
  • A-CRD-49C Dropped Rod
  • A-CRD-49D Malfunctioning Rod Position Indicator Implementation of the procedural requirements and the requirements of Technical Specification, Section 3.10, in conjunction with training received by licensed operators, appear adequate to prevent improper control rod manipulatio Discussion with the Licensee concerning steam binding of auxiliary feed- t water pumps at other facilities indicated that they have not experienced any similar events, as stated in IE Information Notice No. 84-06. They

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'have on two occasions experienced one of three pumps becoming hot. The first~ instance occurred approximately seven years ago with the plant at power operation. The equipment operator noted that-the discharge line for one pump was unusually warm. The shift supervisor ran'the pumps for a short period of time and, after stopping, no further heating occurred. The second instance occurred during startup from the 1985 refueling outage while the steam generators' pressures were at approximately 25 PSIG.

During an-investigation for the cause of an actuation of an ionization

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. smoke detector in the area of a pump, it was discovered that the seal leakage was flashing to steam. Cycling of the pump's discharge valve stopped any further heating of the pump. The Licensee has issued an instruction to all operating shifts, directing the' Equipment Operator to check the pumps discharge piping every four hours to determine if piping is above ambient' temperature. During the 1986 refueling outage the auxil-

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lary feedwater pumps discharge and the auxiliary feedwater lines check valves will be inspected and repaired as necessar No violations or deviations were identifie . Det'e rmination of Shutdown Margin

,The, Licensee does not perform a specific shutdown margin physics tes Results of control and shutdown bank rod worths, boron and power defect

. reactivity measurements obtained during startup reactor physics tests are used for verification of shutdown margin, as defined in Technical Specifi-

. cation 3.1 The inspector reviewed the licensee's calculated boron concentration versus MWD /MTU burnup plot for shutdown reactivity at HZ _

The plot covers the period of beginning of core life to end of core lif The curve indicates the required boron concentration to place the reactor in a-3.4%' shutdown condition with shutdown banks and highest worth control rod withdrawn, the indicated boron concentration includes an additional 100 PPM concentration greater than what is required for the 3.4% shutdown concentration. 'The inspector's evaluation indicated that the requirements

of Technical-Specification 3.10.a were me No violations or deviations were identifie . . Type-B&C Leakrate Tests Surveillance Procedure No.56-090 was reviewed for technical adequacy and proper approvals. The inspector observed that testing was performed, and test results were reviewed by experienced and qualified personnel; sur-veillance procedure exception reports and maintenance work requests were initiated when required; and identified problems were satisfactorily resolved prior to plant startup. Total "as-left" leakage was 42.9 SCFH, which is approximately 6.3% of the Technical Specification 11mi ~

No violations or deviations were identifie . TMI-2 Task Items II.B.3 " Post-Accident Sampling" Regional inspectors found the licensee's actions for implementation to be satsifactory, reference Inspection Report No. 305/82-20. The

! Item was held open pending review by NRR. Telecon on May 28, 1985 with N. Nicholson, RIII,'and May 29, 1985 with M. Fairtile, Licensing Project Manager, NRR, revealed that NRR review had been completed and the item could-be closed. Task Item II.B.3 is considered closed.

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, II.F.2.3 " Reactor Vessel Level Indication" During the 1985 refueling outage, the licensee installed the upper and lower reactor vessel instrument taps and installed piping from the taps to the isolation manifold. The system is scheduled for completion during the 1986 refueling outag ,, III.A.1.2 " Upgrade Emergency Support Facilities" III. " Emergency Preparedness" The above items were initially inspected during the period of June 8-19, 1981, and the findings documented in Inspection Report No. 305/81013. Subsequently, ten inspections have been conducted and documented in Inspection Report No.(s) 305/82003, 006, 011, 017, 023; 83013, 016; 84007, 014 and 017. Any deficiencies noted during the above inspections, which have not been resolved, will continue to be tracked per the routine inspection progra CFR 50, Appendix E,

" Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities" addresses the requirements of the above two task item Routine inspections will continue to be made for determination of licensee compliance with those requirements. Task Items III.A. and III.A.2 are considered close No violations or deviations were identifie . Plant Startup From Refueling Inspection consisted of verifying proper lineup of the Auxiliary Feedwater System and Emergency Diesel Generators, using startup checklists N-FW-05B-CL and N-DGM-10-CL; that all surveillance testing required to be performed before startup was satisfactorily completed; that startup was performed using adequate and approved procedures; and that startup activities were performed in accordance with Technical Specification requirement No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the period and at the conclusion of the inspection on June 14, 1985 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitie The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar