IR 05000305/1986009

Insp Rept 50-305/86-09 on 861016-1215.No Violations Identified.Operator Failure to Recognize That One Train of ESF Equipment Inadvertently Made Inoperable Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety,Surveillance & Maint

ML20209F836
Person / Time
Site:	Kewaunee
Issue date:	01/13/1986
From:	Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20209F755	List: IR 05000305/1986009 ML20209F751
References
50-305-86-09, 50-305-86-9, IEB-86-003, IEB-86-3, IEIN-86-072, IEIN-86-72, NUDOCS 8702050203
Download: ML20209F836 (7)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-305/86009(DRP)

' Docket No. 50-305 License No. DPR-43 Licensee: Wisconsin Public Service Corporation P. O. Box 19002 Green Bay, WI 54307-9002 Facility Name: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At: Kewaunee Site, Kewaunee, WI Inspection Conducted: October 16 through December 15, 1986 Inspector: R. L. Nelson A. 42, 'f Approved By: R. DeFayett hief Reactor Projects Section 2B I //b !O7 Date Inspection Summary Inspection on October 16 through December 15, 1986 (Report No. 50-305/86009(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of operational safety; surveillance; maintenance; regional request Information Notice followup; I.E. Bulletin followup; and emergency preparednes Results: No violations were identified. In the area of operational safety, however, an area of NRC safety concern is highlighted in that day shift control operators failed to recognize for about two hours that one train of ESF equipment had inadvertently been made inoperable. Further, the inoperable status was clearly indicated by a lighted status window on the Control Room Safety Injection Ready Status panel - (Details, Paragraph 2).

8702050203 870126 5 DR ADOCK 0500

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DETAILS Persons Contacted E. R. Mathews, Senior Vice President, Power Supply and Engineering C. W. Giesler, Vice President, Power Production D. C. Hintz, Vice President, Nuclear Power

• C. R. Steinhardt, Plant Manager K. H. Weinhauer, Assistant Manager, Plant Maintenance

• K. W. Evers, Assistant Manager, Plant Operations M. C. Marchi, Assistant Manager, Plant Technical and Services D. W. McSwain, Superintendent, Plant Instrument and Control D. R. Berg, Superintendent, Plant Quality Control

• D. T. Braun, Superintendent, Plant Operations M. T. Reinhart, Superintendent, Plant Radiation Protection

• R. P. Pulec, Plant Technical Supervisor T. J. Moore, Plant Security / Administrative Supervisor G. J. Youngworth, Plant Electrical Maintenance Supervisor The inspector also talked with and interviewed members of the Operation, Maintenance,HealthPhysics,InstrumengandControl,QualityControl, and Security group * Denotes personnel attending exit interview . Operational Safety Verification (71707 and 71710)

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators throughout the inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected safety-related systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted. During these tours, observations were made relative to plant equipment conditions, fire hazards, fire protection, adherence to procedures, radiological control and conditions, housekeeping, security, tagging of equipment, ongoing maintenance and surveillance, containment integrity, and availability of safety-related equipmen During the inspection period, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the auxiliary feedwater, fire protection, service water and emergency diesel generator systems to verify operabilit On November 25, 1986, at 12:55 p.m., with the plant at 100% power, a Control Room Operator who had been temporarily relieved returned to assume his duties. He questioned why the Safety Injection Ready Status Panel (SIRSP) window "ASV Exh Fan 1A Trip Not Reset" was li Investigation revealed that the status window had been lit for approximately two hours and had been recognized by the Control Room Operators at the time of actuation. However, they had associated the indication with their shifts' release of train "1A" SBV for maintenanc . _ _ _ _

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On the SIRSP, the "SBV Exh Fan 1A Trip Not Reset" window is directly above the "ASV Exh Fan 1A Trip Not Reset" windo On September 26, 1986, at 3:38 p.m., a high radiation alarm was received on the main condenser air ejector radiation monitor R-15, the alarm setpoint was 700 CPM. The alarm was due to high Argon-41 activity resulting from injection of Argon-40 into the Volume Control Tank. For further details regarding the cause and effect of the Argon-40 being present in the Volume Control Tank refer to Inspection Reports 305/86007 and 86008, and Licensee Event Report No. 86012. During the period of plant startup in April 1986, following a refueling outage until 12:00 noon on September 26, 1986, the indication on the R-15 radiation monitor had been consistently less than 100 CPM. During the time period of 7:00 a.m. to 3:38 p.m. on September 26, 1986, the R-15 indication increased from 45 CPM to the alarm setpoint of 700 CPM. Prior to the alarm, neither the day shift (7:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m.) nor the swing shift (3:00 p.m. - 11:00 p.m.) were aware of the increasing indicatio Both of the events discussed are examples of Control Room operating shift personnel not being alert to significant changes in the status of plant conditions. This is of concern to NRC and warrants further action on the part of the license No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector reviewed / observed the following Technical Specification required surveillance testing:

Surveillance Procedure Test 06-033 Steam Generator Flow Mismatch Instrument Channel Test 18-043 Containment Pressure Instrument Channel Test 54-063 Turbine Overspeed Protection Channel Trip Test 37-065 Reactor Coolant Chemistry Surveillance Procedures i 49-075 Control Rod Exercise 42-109 Diesel Generator Manual Test The following items were considered during the inspection: the testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by

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personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions of operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

N Activity 33070 Changed grease in Limitorque actuator for M0V-7003B 35258 Checked torque on all connections for station batteries 35449 Component cooling water MOV-4B would not operate

- stem bushing threads were worn, replaced stem bushing 35425 Shield building ventilation train IB failed to draw required D/P between auxiliary building and annulus - coupling was slipping between damper and actuator 34394 Service water leak on containment fan coil unit IA - replaced faulty return bends 34872 Containment hydrogen monitor A drifts in excess of acceptance tolerance - replaced faulty components 35197 Service water pump 1A1 breaker would not close -

dump valve linkage required machining and alignment No violations or deviations were identifie "

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. Followup (92701)

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5.1 IE Information Notice Followup:

IEIN 86-72, Failure 17-7 PH Stainless Steel Springs in Valcor Valves Due to Hydrogen Embrittlement. In response to Valcor Engineering 10 CFR 21 report on the above subject, dated April 14, 1986, the licensee reviewed their application of Valcor valves in the plant. The review revealed that 26 valves had been installed, five of which had been installed where the valves would be subjected to an operating temperature of greater than 440 degrees. The five valves were installed in 1980 and, after numerous operational problems, were replaced in 1984 with a different vendors'

valves. None of the operational problems were caused by failure of the springs. The other 21 Valcor valves are used in low temperature (less than 140 degrees) applications and no operational problems have been encountered with these valve .2 Regional Requests:

Memorandum from C. E. Norelius to all Senior Resident Inspectors, dated October 28, 1986, requested that information be obtained from the licensee regarding the extent of deficient splices involving heat shrinkable tubing (HST). The licensee started using Raychem HST during the 1985 refueling outage. The Raychem installation procedure was used and proper installation was verified by Quality Control personne Licensee personnel have attended a Raychem training seminar on the use of HST, and based on the guidelines and training received are confident that the HST was installed properly and no deficiencies exist. During the 1987 refueling outage some additional verification inspections will be mad During the 1987 refueling outage the resident inspector will implement Temporary Instruction 2500/17, " Inspection Guidance for Heat Shrinkable Tubing."

No violations or deviations were identifie , IE Bulletin Followup (92703)

For the following bulletin the inspector reviewed the licensee's written response to determine that the response was within the required time period; that the required information was provided; and that the licensee's actions were as described in the respons Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-0perated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line The licensee's response to the bulletin, dated November 12, 1986, provided the following information. The recirculation line at the Kewaunee plant has two in series motor operated valves. During normal operation these valves are administratively maintained in the open position. Two independent indications of each valve's position are

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provided in the plant Control Room to alert the operator if the valves are not open as required. Upon loss of control or motive power these motor operated valves fail as is. Thus during normal plant operation the valves would fail in the open position ensuring a path for SI minimum flow. With normal system alignment the SI system is not vulnerable to a single failure in the minimum flow bypass line that would disable the system functio One potential concern was identified during the evaluation of the bulletin. The plant inservice testing program for valves currently requires that the isolation valves in the SI minimum flow bypass line be cycled quarterly. With either of these valves in a closed position during this testing, a single failure could result in loss of the minimum flow bypass line. This concern was evaluated by the licensee and not deemed a safety issue since: (1) the SI pump shutoff head at 2165 psig is above the setpoint for SI initiation on low reactor coolant system pressure (1815 psig) and, (2) each valve is in the closed position for only a very short time period during valve stroke testin The inspector found the licensee's actions regarding the bulletin requirements and their written response to be adequate. In addition, it was observed that the angle globe stop valves are installed such that flow through the valves is from under the seat. Therefore, in the low probability event of a valve stem-plug separation, flow through the line would not be stoppe No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Preparedness Exercise (82301)

On October 14, 1986, an exercise was conducted to demonstrate the ability of Wisconsin Public Service Cooperation to implement the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan. The exercise involved partial participation by the State and local governments, that is, the demonstration of communication capabilities among State and local authorities and the license The inspector's specific observations included: Control Room (Simulator)

Emergency Action Levels were promptly identified and evaluate Emergency classifications were promptly made. Initial notifications for the Unusual Event and Alert were completed within the required 15-minute time period. Plant status announcements over the plant PA system were made on a timely and periodic basis with appropriate content. Multiple logkeeping practices were implemented, ensuring the recording of all significant events, actions, and activities, Technical Support Center (TSC)

The TSC team conducted their duties in an orderly, effective, and timely manner. The TSC Director, on a periodic basis, provided an

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update to the team, thereby keeping them well infonned of plant conditions. Recordkeeping and updating of status boards was very good. The transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room to the TSC and from the TSC to the Emergency Operations Facility was conducted in a clear and concise manne Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)

The E0F staff was well organized. Team members performed their individual duties well and were also cognizant of and supported the overall team effort. Recordkeeping was very good. The periodic printing and distribution of the sequence of events report was an excellent aid for all participants. Comunication personnel were able to effectively transfer and receive communications. The initial notifications for both Site Area Emergency and General Emergency were completed within the 15-minute requiremen Protective Action Recommendations were appropriate with consideration being given to plant conditions and meteorological forecasts. Meteorological data was updated throughout the exercis At the conclusion of the exercise, the licensee adequately discussed deactivation from a General Emergency, eventually downgrading to an Aler No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the period and at the conclusion of the inspection on December 15, 1986, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitie The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such do:uments or processes as proprietar