IR 05000305/1978015
| ML20147B785 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 09/05/1978 |
| From: | Choules N, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML111721367 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-305-78-15, NUDOCS 7810110185 | |
| Download: ML20147B785 (11) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OIFICE OF.1SPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-305/78-15 Docket No. 50-305 License No. DPR-43 Licensee:
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Post Office Box 1200 Green Bay, WI 54305 Facility Name:
Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At:
Kewaunee Site, Kewaunee, WI Inspection Conducted:
August 7-11, 1978
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Inspectors:
N. C. Choules h M tbt A h d#I
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Io J. E. Kohler R FLOO Approved By:
R..F.
Warnick, Chief 9/(CIhh9
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Reactor Projects Section 2 Inspection Summary Inspection on August 7-11, 1978 (Report No. 50-305/78-15)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of plant operations, refueling startup testing, review of plant operation after refueling, nonroutine event followup, IE Bulletin and Circular followup, safety injection reset procedures, and independent inspection.
The inspec-tion involved 51 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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l-L DETAILS
l Persons Contacted l
Site C. R. Luoma, (1)(2) Plant Superintendent C. R. Steinhardt, (1) Assirtant Superintendent, Operations J. S. Richmond, (1) Technical Supervisor D. M. McSwain, Instrument Ccatrol Engineer A. J. Ruege,' Plant Performance Engineer K. it. Evers, (2) Reactor Supervisor G. Ruiter, (1) Nuclear Systems Engineer J.nW. Tills, Maintenance Engineer The inspector also talked with and interviewed members of the Operations, Instrument and Control, and Maintenance Sections.
Corporate Office i
a C. W. Geisler, (3) Superintendent, Nuclear Power l
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l G. A. Spiering, (3) Quality Assurance Supervisor R. A. Soboe, (3) Manager, Fuel and Fossil Operation j
i M. C..Marchi, (3) Nuclear Systems Engineer
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i E. D. Novack, (3) Director, Field Services
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D. C. Hintz, (3) Nuclear Services Supervisor
.(1) Denotes those present ' at the exit. interview at the site on August 11, 1978.
(2) Denotes those present at the exit interview at the site on August 9,
-1978.
(3) Denotes those pres;ent at the exit interview at the corporate office on August 9, 1978.
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Section I Prepared by N. C. Choules Reviewed by R. F. Warnick, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2 1.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (IE Inspection Report No. 50-305/77-10)
Operation of the auxiliary feedwater with the redundant feedwater header cross connect valves normally open.
The licensee has-reviewed the above and. contacted Westinghouse concerning this operation. Westinghouse has concluded after rereview of this operation that the plart should still be operated with the cross connect valves open.
2.
Plant Operations a.
Plant Tour (1) The inspector performed a plant tour accompanied by a licensee representative.
The housekeeping in the plant was good.
(2) During the tour, selected " hold" and " danger" tags were reviewed for proper approval and the status log was
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reviewed to determine if the tags were properly accounted for. No discrepancies were noted.
('3)
Selected valves in'the emergency diesel generator cooling system were checked for proper alignment and no discrep-ancies were noted, b.
The j umper bypass log was reviewed and no discrepancies were noted.
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. Logbooks - The inspector reviewed the log sheets of the control I
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room log and the Shift Supervisors logs for selected days for the past two and a half months and confirmed that entries were filled out to identify the action, and the Operations Supervisor is reviewing and initialing the log sheets indicating his review.
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Night orders and temporary orders - The current subj ect orders were reviewed and no discrepancies pere noted.
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Incident Reports (IR's) - The inspector reviewed IR's 77-36 through 78-50.
No items of concern were identified.
3.
Reportable Occurrences The following reportable occurrences were reviewed by examination of logs and records and through discussions with plant personnel.
Occurrences vere reviewed for completion of reporting requirements, investigation and determination of cause, proposed corrective measures, and completion of corrective actions, a.
RO 50-305/78-141 - Shield building ventilation train failed to draw a vacuum.
b.
RO 50-305/78-15N - RHR vent valve open violating containment integrity. This event was identified and corrected by the licensee.
c.
RO 50-305/78-17
- Steam flow transmitter out of calibration.
d.
RO 50-305/78-lh - Pressurizer level transmitter out of calibration.
RO 50-305/78-lh - Raactor coolant flow transmitters out of e.
calibration, f.
RO 50-305/78-20W - Main steam line snubber found inoperable.
g.
RO 50-305/78-211 - Shield building ventilation train failed to draw a vacuum, R0 50-305/78-22_/ - Pressurizer level transmitter out of
h.
calibration.
1.
RO 50-305/78-2[- - Main iteam line snubber found inoperable, j.
RO 50-305/78-24
- Supply breaker for MCC 1-62F tripped open three times.
As indicated in the licensee's report, the cause of these breaker trips has not been identified.
The licensee has performed extensive system checking and is monitoring the currents to the breaker.
1/ LER 50-305/78-14, WPS to RIII, dtd 5/19/78.
2/ LER 50-305/78-15, WPS to RIII, dtd 5/23/78.
3/ LER 50-305/78-17, WPS to RIII, dtd 5/31/78.
4/ LER 50-305/78-18, WPS to RIII, dtd 5/31/78.
5/ LER 50-305/78-19, WPS to RIII, dtd 6/9/78.
6/ LER 50-305/78-20, WPS to RIII, dtd 6/14/78, 2/ LER 50-305/78-21, WPS to RIII, dtd 6/21/78.
8_/ LER 50-305/78-22, WPS to RIII, dtd 6/30/78.
9/ LER 50-305/78-23, WPS to RIII, dtd 6/30/78.
10/ LER 50-305/78-24, WPS to RIII, dtd 7/7/78, i
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RO 50-305/78-2511 - Containment air radiation monitor out of service for 39 hours4.513889e-4 days <br />0.0108 hours <br />6.448413e-5 weeks <br />1.48395e-5 months <br />.
ior this event a valve was left closed and sampling of containment air was not possible'
At the same
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time the cover gasket on the monitor leaked which negated the low flow alarm which would have informed the control room that the valve was shut.
The licensee identified these items and corrected thcm. The inspector suggested that a low flow check of the monitor should be made periodically to check that the gasket is not leaking.
The licensee stated they would review this suggestion.
RO 50-305/78-26[2/ - Load adjustment for 1A diesel generator
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could not be adjusted from the control room.
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RO 50-305/78-2712 - Steam pressure bistable instrument drift caused less conservative trip than required by Technical Specifications.
Review of these occurrences indicate the licensee's corrective
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actions appear to be adequate.
4.
IE Bulletin and Circular Followup a.
JEB 78-05 and 78-06 As stated in the licensee's responses 1b 11 to these bulletins, they do not have any electrical breakers and relays men 7.ioned in the bulletins and therefore, the bulletina are not applicable to the licensee, b.
IEC 78-02 The licensee reviewed the recomtrendations of this circular and determined that lubricating oil used at Kewaunee is equivalent to the equipment manufacturer's recommendation.
c.
IEC 78-04 The licensee has determined that they do not have the fire doors referenced in the circular, d.
IEC 78-05 The licensee had not experienced safety injection during cool-down as described in the circular, and has concluded that the 11/- LER 50-305/78-25 WPS to RIII, dtd 7/19178./ LER 50-305/78-26, WPS to RIII, dtd 7/21k78.
13/ LER 50-305/78-27, WPS to RIII, dtd 7/21/78.
14/ Ltr, WPS to RIII, dtd 5/1/78.
15/ Ltr, WPS to RIII, dtd 7/13/78.
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circular is not applicable since Kewaunee is a two-loop plant, not a four-loop plant as described in the circular.
e.
IEC 78-06 The licensee review of common mode flooding indicates they do not have this potential.
f.
IEC 78-07 Kewaunee does not have a Bergan-Patterson 25000 hydraulic test stand. The licensee's evaluation of the test stand they do have indicates the same problem referenced in the circular ] would not occur to their test stand.
g.
IEC 78-09 The licensee does not have any of the contactors referenced in the circular.
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IEC 78-13 The licensee inspects intake bays to the service water pumps annually and has not observed a build up of sand as discussed
in the circular.
5.
Sa f et:, Injection (AT) Reset Procedures The inspector reviewed the licensee's emergency operating procedures to determine if they contain instructions regarding required operator actions if a loss of offsite power or an accident occurs after the SI has been reset and before the engineered safety feature equipment is returned to the automatic starting sequence mode.
Also, procedures were s. viewed to see that they prevent the operator from moving any equipment out of the emergency mode prior to reset.
The following emergency procedures were reviewed.
E-0-07, Saf ety Inj ection Activation E-0-08, Steam Line Rupture E-0-09, Steam Generator Tube Rupture E-0-10, Loss of Reactor Coolant These procedures contain the instructions above except that the licensee is revising E-0-07 to include instructions.for the oper-ator to reset the reactor trip breaker following reset of the SI to return the system to the automatic sequence mode when the SI is spurious.
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Other Inspection Items ' a.
Lost Part-Evaluation ) i In a previous inspection 16/ the licensee agreed to perform an - evaluation on a small acorn nut which fell into the reactor ' vessel to assure that the nut would not block any core flow paths.
The licensee has performed an evaluation and concluded the flow effects are negligible.
b.
Temporary Changes to Procedures The licensee has revised ACD 8.6 and is in the process of revising ACD 8.2 to include instructions for making temporary chappys to procedures as the licensee previously committed to do.-- c.
Electrical Penetrations Qualification In a previous inspection 18/ the licensee was unable to provide - documentation that a containment penetration was tested with chemical spray.
The licensee's Architect / Engineer (A/E) reviewed this and found that the chemical spray test was not l performed.
The A/E and the penetration nenufacture have evaluated the corrosion effects of the chemical spray upon the - 1 I penetrations and have concluded that no deleterious effects would be experienced during the relatively short duration of exposure to this type solution during an accident.
This evalu-ation is documented in a letter to the licensee from Fluor Pioneer, Inc. dated June 20, 1978.
This item is considered closed, d.
Changes to Design Change Packages The licensee has revised ECD 4.1, Design Change Control, to include instructions for making changes to a design change afterithasbeenissuedforimplementaggpn.
This item was discussed during a previous inspection. -- 16/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-305/78-12.
j[7/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-305/78-01.
18/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-305/77-18. ' 19/.IE Inspection Report No. 50-305/77-18.
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Moderator Temperature Coefficient The inspector reviewed the results of the testing performed to determine moderator temperature coefficient.
The results of the experiment showed that the moderator temperature coefficient was negative and in approximate agreement with predicted values , supplied by the fuel manufacturer.
The measurement showed linearity.
The inspector has no further questions regarding this item, i 2.
Control Rod Worth Measurement , The inspector reviewed the results of measurements performed to determine control rod worth.
The procedure called for the worth to be determined by the rod swap technique.
A large disagreement between Westinghouse and licensee predictions of control rod worth was identified during low power physics testing performed prior to full power operation.
The disagreement in cal-culations made the amount of shutdown margin available at end of life (EOL)' uncertain.
The licensee, Westinghouse, and NRR investigated the cause of the _, disagreement and determined it to be a calculational error on the part of Westinghouse. At the present time, the licensee and NRR are in agreement that control rod worth for Cycle 4 was measured-with sufficient accuracy to assure minimum shutdown margin EOL.
3.
Rod Swap Technique The rod swap technique is under review by KRR.
Based on the latest
'information available, NRR may determine the rod swap technique to be unacceptable for substitution of control rod worth measurements made by boron dilution.
This item will be reviewed during a sub-sequent inspection.
4.
Shutdown Margin The licensee does not perform a specific, shutdown margin physics test.
Results of control rod worth measurements and calculations-8- {
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are used to calculate shutdown margin.
The control rod worth experiments and the shutdown margin EOL for Cycle 4 have been reviewed by NRR and found to be acceptable.
The inspector has no further questions regarding this item.
5.
Incore/Excore Calibration The inspector revicaed the procedures used to calibrate the excore instrumentation to assure that excore measurements of axial offset is in agreement with incore measurements.
The inspector determined that the calibration was performed for Cycle 4 and has no. further questions regarding this item.
6.
Power Distribution The inspector reviewed the full core maps taken at 72% power.
The review ind'uated that all thermal margins were within technical specifications requirements, all prerequisites were met, input - values into the incore computer analysis data were taken from actual plant conditions at the time of instrumentation, and predicted values calculated by the computer code were within the allowable acceptance criteria established by the licensee.
The inspector has no further questions regarding the incore power distribution maps.
7.
Axial Flux . l , The inspector reviewed the licensee's determination of target axial flux and axial flux difference.
The diagram for determining com-pliance with axial flux difference was available in the control room for operator use.
The inspector has no further questions regarding this item.
8.
Quadrant Power Tilt Measurements The inspector reviewed several months worth of quadrant power tilt measurements for the present cycle.
No tilt in excess of technical specifications was identified during power operation.
There was no indication of the incore/excore tilt phenomenon identified in a previous inspection report.
The inspector has , no further questions regarding this item.
9.
Review of Plant Operations After Refueling The inspector reviewed the startup package completed by the oper-ations department prior to startup of Cycle 4.
This package demonstrated that various plant systems described during the refueling outage were aligned according to approved procedures for startup. The inspector has no further (uestions regarding this item.
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Audit of Fuel Management Group The inspectors met with the Fuel Management Group (FMG) at the cor-porate headquarters in order to determine the progress that has been made in procedure preparation and implementation.
Lack of FMC pro-l c "S" t*"t'S '*P rt t the cedures was an area noted in an 1 57 "^The inspectors found that licensee and reported to the NRC.9-significant progress has been made in procedure preparation and implementation. However, the entire program is not yet fully imple-mented.
Attention was directed towards the manner in which changes to FMG computer codes are made.
The inspectors found that changes to computer codes were performed in a controlled manner with the use of a procedure change form.
Fuel Management Group procedures implementation will be followed up in a future inspection.
11.
PORC Review of FMG Procedures The Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) has the responsibility to review all procedures which are safety related and which may have an effect on the safe operation of the plant.
A Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee audit report for January 1978 states that the PORC must decide which FMG procedures require review.
To do this, the PORC has formed a subcommittee at the site to determine which FMG procedures require PORC review.
FMG procedures and activities receive a detailed review and audit f rom Nuclear Associates International (NAI) and an audit report is generated. If the licensee determines that he must review the FMC procedures to comply with the technical specifications, it would be permissible for the PORC to use NAI as its consultant.
The NAI audit report of FMG procedures could then be submitted to POEC for , review.
PORC review of NAI or findings for the FMG would meet the requirements of PORC review of FMG procedures.
This item will be reviewed in a future inspection.
12.
Open Items Identified in Inspection Report 50-305/77-10 a.
Inconsistency in procedure SP004.
The Inspector determined that procedure SP004 was modified so that achieving a positive A I is now optional.
This item is closed.
b.
Use of incore/excore ratio of 1.7.
The licensee supported the argument that use of 1.7 for the calibration of delta
20/ Ltr, WPS to RlII, dtd 10/21/77.
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flux comparators was conservative when the actual ratios ranged from 1.603 to 1.642.
This item is closed.
c.
Quadrant Power Tilt: No tilts have been observed for Cycles 3 or 4.
Westinghouse made recommendations regarding the pro-cedure for tilt measurement.
This item is closed, d.
Shutdovt Margin Determination.
This item is closed (Para-graph 4) Exit Intervie_ws The inspectors (Choules and Kohler) met with the licensee representative (denoted in Persons Contacted paragraph) at the plant site on August 9, 1978.
The inspectors also act with the other licensee representatives (denoted in Persons Contacted paragraph) at the corporate office on August 9, 1978.
Mr. Choules met with the licensee representative (denoted in Persons Contacted paragraph) at the conclusien of the inspection at the plant site on August 11, 1978.
The inspectors summa-rized the scope and findings of the inspection.
Inspection items in Section II, paragraphs 10 and 11 were discussed in detail.
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