ML20118D315
| ML20118D315 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/1970 |
| From: | Rodgers J Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Hendrie J, Hill H, Okelly A US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML093631134 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9210120103 | |
| Download: ML20118D315 (19) | |
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RELEASED TO THE PDR l
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H. M. !!ill A. A. O' Kelly J. H.-Hendrie S1MMAEf 0F Tite ONE-HUNDRED-EICirtEElmt ACRS HEETING, FE3RUARY 5-7,1970 The attached summary is forwarded for_ your review and approvel.
approval, this summary will become the official record of the 118th
. Upon ACRS meeting held on February 5-7. 1970.
Please forward any consnenta you may have as soon as possible so that corrections may be made if necessary.
Copies of this sumary are boing sent to the rest of the Coornittee for information.
J. C. Rodgers Staff Assistant p
Summary,118th ACRS
' Meeting, 2/5-7/7C dated 2/20/70 cc w/attet: ACRSj ACRS; 91sg gCAS TA.smee % g gsf(ngg, n
Co r re spomb a. 2ho 9210120103 920520 PDR ORO NRCHIST PDR ACRS JCR/mey (,*oofed 2/20/70
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1* 18FN ACRS MEETING 3'
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l Seouoyah Nuclear Plant - The Caussittee completed its review of the app 1* cation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TTA) for authorisation to construct Units 1 and 2 of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (3411 MWt..
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Westinghouse units).
Items discussed during the review at the 118th i
ACRS meettag (this was the second of two full-Consittee reviews)'
included the followlegt L
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Flood Level -- The applicant discussed the general and special I
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criteria they propose for systems to be used la the orest of a flood j
exceedtag the level to which they have designed the plant. The in-l take building shall be used as a settling hasta for the river water.
i l-The cooling tower unter shall be used to cool the spent fuel pool-Raw unter shall be used to make up nearecoverable primary water.
I system leakage and will be used as feeduster to the secondary side i
of the steam generator.. The reactor. decay heat shall be removed by.
satural; convection in the primary coolant systees and by evaporattoa
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through relief valves in the secondary systen. The reactor butidias j
shall be dry during the flooded condition. Cables-secessary for use i
l durina the -flooded condittom of the plaat will be savironmentally l
tested and checked periodically for acceptability. The appitesat.is proposing that the shutdown systens be designed for a flood level up to 721 feet (the Corps of Engineers Probable Maximus Flood). They are not, however, desisming the plaat engineered safety features to tamain operational for floods above. 705 feet..
Westinghouse has performed natural circulat' ion tests at other Westing-i house plaats. (San Onofre. Gimna. Comaecticut Yaakee).
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. They have to investigate the Sequoyah plant design to determine the effects of raw i
water aska-a p in the primary and ' secondary systems.
The InL Staff asiatained their position that the safety l.
features should remain operable if a ' flood. up to the 721 feet = level--
occurs (FNF). - They have identified concerns to the applicant and have received feedback information which is-still under review.
gene con-earns outstandtag are the effect of river (rsw). water on the plant..
and natural circulation espebility.=
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The Camaittee decidad that the applie.aat's proposal was acceptabla I
assuntag an emergency decay beat reasoval system designed; to high standards (equivalent to an engineered safety _ system)/. It was believed
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Suannary,118th ACRS Heeting that a concurrent IDCA (requiring engineered safety features) and a flood above 705 feet would have a low enough probability so it need not be considered the basis for the plant design. This post-tion was revieved with Dr. Morris, and he stated that the DRL Staff will not now know what criteria should apply for future applications (res engineered safety featured operability at l't!F) and rc. quested guidance from the Coernittee tu its report on the Sequoyah Plant so that resolution with the applicant can be achieved.
b.
Less than Four-Pump Operation - Dr. liansuer asked if the instrumenta-tion to 11mit power for less than four-ptunp operation would meet IEEE-279 criteria. Westingbouse replied that it would, but noted that some instruments may require manual adjustment.
The DRL Staff will be meeting with Westinghouse to discuss this subject.
The Commaittee did not consider this item specifically during its deliberation at this meeting.
(It should be noted that the Cocanittee teak exception to manual adjustment of core thermal margin trip settings for less than four pump operation in the Palisades Plant (ACRS report dated January 27, 1970). The appli-cant agreed to operate the reactor at a reduced power level so that manual adjustment of the thermal margin trips is not required.)
c.
Actuation Circuits - Engineered Safety Features (ESP) - Westinghouse stated that they are still evaluating means for testing the normally de-energized actuation circuits associated with the ESP and t.lan to discuss this subject with the Regulatory Staff in about a month.
The Cocunittee decided that this ites is already included in its
" catch-all" paragraph regarding probicas applicable to all LWRa.
d.
Systematic Failures - Westinghouse stated that they hope to resolve the issue on systematic failures via discussion with the AEC/ACRS of the copical report they have submitted. TVA added that they are awaiting the outcome of any resolution of this subject.
This subject is specifAcally identified as an item to be resolved in the Consmittee's " catch-all" paragraph re coamon LWR problema, e.
Failure to Serse durine: Ant:cipated Transia TVA stated that they hope Westinghouse will determine what anticipated transiente csunot roa. rate a failure to scran as it affects plant safety. TVA intends to study this subject and hopes to have it resolved well befofe the plant operates. Westinghouse added that they have not discus' sed this subject with TVA.
(They are working on the problem for Indisa Point 2.)
i The Committee report identified the need for design featsres to take tolerable the ceasequences of failure to scram during anticipated-tranatents.
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Power Inercase - Westinghouse discussed the bases for a 57. power increase over previously accepted applications (3411 MWt vs 3250 MWt).
Examples to support the increase were beproved analyssa of thermal-hydraulic characteristics, improved QA/QC associated with fuel fabrication, and confirmation of design by operating experience. They noted that they have not changed the INBR, linear heat generation rate, etc., since 1965. Westinghouse g
conclud A that additional ECCS capability would not be required for this higher power core.
Parametric comparison of Indian Point 2, Zion, and TVA were disr\\ayed to support this conclusion.
Westinghouse plant to continue 1%D on this subject to obtain enore They n1ao concluded that the percentage of fuel rod answe rs.
cladding tAnich mightbburst as a result of a IDCA would not be significantly higher than has been calculated for a 3250 MWt ore.
The DRL Staff had no official position on the general subject of fuel failure prrpagation, and had no official objection to the power increase proposed in the Sequoyah application. They also had no official position as to what power level would require additional ECCS measurca.
!!owever, they believe the ECCS for Sequoysh is adequate.
The Connittee reconnended that appropriate studies be made to show that melting and subsequent disintegration of a portion of a fuel assembly will not lend to unacceptable conditions.
Dr. 11endrie noted that the Cocnittee was concerned that there amat be a rationale supporting the core cooling capability as *he volumet,
ric and linear heat generating rates increased.
(f to consider uays to arrive at a position on subjecto related(The Cocaittee f ~
3 to power increases.)
Arimuthal Xenon Oreillations - In response to a question, Westing-g.
house indicated that they believe their plant can be operated to preclude azimuthal xenon oscillations.
The Cosmittee did not discuss this itect in its deliberations, b.
Vibration Monitoring - Westinghouse stated that it would take about one year of lead time to incorporate a vibration monitoring program in a piant.
If Indian Point 2 does not provide the necessary I
results for Westingbouse reactors, there is time to incorporate the s
program into suceeeding reactors.
The Cosmittee did not discuss this itets in its deliberations.
1.
I, ilure to Scram All Rods in a Section or _gbe Core - Westinghouse a
beitaves that there is adequate shutdown smrgin in the control roda so that failure to scram a number of adjacent rods will not retain that portion of the reactor at power.
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118th ACRS Meeting Sunnary j.
Iec Condenser Containment _ Sv9tems - The Coasnittee reconuended th an independent check of the design of the ice condenser dividor barrier should be made.
The Connittee also recoa. mended that the appiteant continue his study of means of reducing doser to the public as a result of a DBA.
2.
Meetinghouse Hydraulic Ponitioning OlYPO) Control System - The Cocusittee reviewed a conceptual design for a HYPD Control System for the control rods in Westinghouse PWRs.
The Cocuittee concluded that this concept can be successfally engineered, subject to confirmation by additional tests and safety analyces, to provido a satisfactor/ reactor control system.
Items discussed during the review included the followingt a.
pes t en concept - Westinghcuse presented a brief description of the operation of the MYPO system. They described what they believe to be intrinsic advantages of the RYPD system over the present RCC
- system, e.g., rod ejection not possible, increased flucu f la ttening, and greater reliability.
The interface between the rod control system. EYPO mechanisms, and the rod ponition and fault indication system was briefly described.
An alarm would be used to identify a mismatch between where the rod is supposed to be and where it is detected to be.
The DRL Staf f has informed the applicant that hasmust meet require-ments $p diversity and redundancy.
e.g., the computer itself may not be adequate in this regard, i
i The Committee recommended that the HYPO s, stem be provided with redundant
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position-nending devices. with at 1 cast one means of senning and indicating rod position independent of the rod controller c i rcui t ry.
The holding force of the control rod is about two times the weight of the rod.
The upper position indicators are to be designed so that the force of the electrical and magnetic characteristics will be significantly less than the amount required to hold the control rod in the withdrawn position.
The DRL Staff has not been provided enough infonsstion to make c judgement as to whether the rods might levitate when not locked in the uithdrawn mode.
They also have not yet received the design margins associated with the forces in the system.
Westinghouse believes that about ten stuck rods (in withdrawn position) should be the criteria for " stuck rods".
tive drive-La of the rods is uarranted.
They do not think that post-They believe that gravity drop provides an adequate means and that the system is flexible enough to accommodate expected deflections.
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-S-The DRI. Staff has not yet considered a detailed stuck rod criteria for !!YPO.
The bighest leak rate postulated through a nozzle break is 18 gpcs (within plant makeup capability); @erefore, the control rod drive noezles vould not require inspection by the present Ante Codo.
Westinghouse believes that the Hypo System can flatten the peak flux in the core at least 107, over present control methods.
Westinghouse is continuing to review the swelling question associated with boron carbide absorbers. The absorber can be changed. If necessary, without change in core design.
Westinghouse expressed hope that the Cousaittee would be able to write a report which addressed the intrinsic benefits of the IITPO system that Westinghouse believes to be evident. The Cocunittee decided it was not ready to endorse the itetas mentioned by Westing-house (due in part to unavailability of detailed design, etc.)
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The Coannittee prepared a report on the conceptual design similar to its report of the Westinghouse ice condenser concept.
3.
AI/GPU 500 MWe FBR Demonstration Plant - The Cournittee reviewed the conceptual design proposed by Atomics International (A1) and General Public Utilities (CPU) for a 500 HWe sodium-cooled, fast-neutron reactor.
The Convaittee concluded that a reactor of the general type and power level reviewed, assuming satisfactory resolution of matters identified such as those identified in the ACPS report, is acceptable for locating at the proposed site.
(This was the recond of two full Cearsittee reviews.)
Items discussed during the review included:
Proicet Stenarv -kThe prospective applicants briefly reviewed their a.
program and indicated that they are in the project definition phase (PDP) of the program. A PSAR is tentatively scheduled to be sub-mitted la early 1971. The " applicants" were seeking " informal" guidance from the Conusittee regarding this project.
Dr. Hendrie noted that the Cocusittee normally writes a report that can be released to the public.
b.
S it e stmuna ry - Pennsylvania Electric Company (Penelec) noted that the site has been purchased wh re they propose constructing the FBR Demonstration Plant. Heetings have been held with public groups to inform them about the proposed project. A brief description was given of population (within 5 miles ~ 7800 by year 2005); geology (no significant fold or fault); flood level (Corps of Enginears INF of 673 feet used); earthquake (0.1g DBE); foundation (reactor and steam generator buildings on bedrock); cooling towers (reince gh p bup mjhtjj on river).
,)DQjh" The Committee noted the site characteristics in its report.
4 118th ACRS Heeting Stunmary Plant Destan - Al briefly described the plant design. The safety c.
and shim rods can either be gravity scrammsed or driven in at a rapid rate (750 lb. downward force). AI believes that, for calcu-lated worst misalignment between the shield top and core (1.85 inches) or for bouing (0 06 inches), the safety rode can be driven in by the fast insert motors. They believe that an independent shutdown system is not needed, e.g., safety rod espable of driving into a distorted core and shutting down the They stated that one safety rod or two shim rods have reactor.
enough reactivity worth to shutdown the reactor. They have looked at " boron-type" shutdown schases, but have found no practical possibility; e.g., lithium is ecenomically not feasible -- difficult to separate from the sodium and is corrosive. AI has not changed their design of the core which includes the use of stainless steel; however, they are studying means to acconnodate for the awelltag associated with 6tainless steel. They are considering unys of utilizing pressure pulse sensors in the reactor.
The Regulatory Staff believes the stainless steel swelling problem requires more study; they did not identify a simpler (economicK.
reactivity shutdown system that would provide diversity to the normal shutdown system.
The Cocatttee report recoaustaded that consideration be given to an l
additional diverse means of removing reactor decay heat.
i The Committee did not review the acceptability of the core schanical design (e.g.,
stainless steel swelling). The committee reconusended that the "appit-cant" continue his search for diversity in the reactivit; shutdown system.
d.
Safety Problems (Outstanding) - AI identified areas related to safety where they rre still evaluating means of assuring an adequate solution to the prociems.
They described various sources of problems, e.g.,
flow blockage, and identified what might result from the effects of such problems, e.g., clad meltthrough.
They also discussed some of the analyses of what might occur from different abnormalities, e.g.,
2 to 2\\ times the normal enrichment over 207, of the core volume would result in a 1000F core outlet temperature rise.
This should be readily detected during the rise to power.
There are keys designed into the bottom of the fuel assemblics which are intended to prevent improper location of fuel assemblieu.
failure propagation.
More study is planned for fuel The DRL Staff has not reviewed in detail the effects of thermal shock to the vessel walls if the*e#1 Ant,-pappst-eg,gs W4a regfjLrdess mot-The Committee reca====wled that further consideratima should be gegp.
e given to possible means for assuring protection totthe core even in the event of failure of pumps to shut down if a pipe leak occurred.
The Committee also noted in its report that the accidents chosen for evalu-stion by the "appiteant" provide an acceptable basis for definition of n Au.iQ o m ad 0 yy
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118th ACRS Heating Susanary
~7-the design requirements of the containment barriers and engineered safety systems.
General - AI answered questions related to thermal shock, redundancy e.
of control systems, diversity of heat removat systoon. aodium leakage, protection of steam generators assinst natural events, design basis for sodium-steen reaction.
f.
ED (Staf 0 - Dr. Stratton suggested that the Staff identify and classify fast reactor RD programs, e.g..
essential. desired, comforting.
4.
Duane Amold P.ncrty Center - The Comunittee reviewed the pisas of the Iowa Electric Light and Power Company to accommodace hypothetical piping fall-urea (pipe whip) in the Duane Arnold plant containment drywell.
The applicant briefly described his position regarding that desion criteria which will provide for protecting the coatsimment integrity from pipe whip due to pipe rupture. The use of cable restraints will be used where necessary, e.g., ring header, main steams piping. feed water piping.
Adequate core cooling will also be moeured in the event of a pipe rupture.
(Re: Amendment 15.)
The Comunittee prepared a report reconfirming its previous conclusions, that, if due consideration is given to itase discussed the plant can be constructed with reasonable assurance that it can be operated without undue risk to the public.
5.
Shoreham Nuclear power Station Unit 1 - The Comunittee reviewed the plans of I
the Long Island Lighting Company (LII40) to ace.ommodate hypothetical piping failures (pipe vbip) in the Shoreham Unit 1 plant containment drywell.
The applicant noted that his Amendment 11 identified new design criteria which will provide for protecting the containment integrity from pipe whip due to pipe rupture. The use of restraints and/or
- absorbing materials will be included-in the design. - (Similar to t patrick plant.)
LILCO intseda also to assure that adequate core cooling capsbility will be available in the event of a pipe rupt ure.
The Committee prepared a report reconfirming its previous conclusions regarding plant construction.
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- 118th ACES Heeting Summary.
Hecting with the Division of Reactor Licensing 1.
cinna - DRL reviewed the response of the Rochester Gas and Electric Co.
(RG*nE) to the ACRS report on the Ginna IVL.
Design flood level RGGE has decided to use the DRL recoer-mended level.
Strong motion accelograph To be installed on or before first refueling outage.
Control rod malposition Independent alarm system incorporated alams through computer (if both alarm systems out, reactor's power reduced to 937.).
Off-site doses due to drop RG&E reanalyzing. If required, charcoal of spent fuel assembly filters will be installed.
(DRL will handle the fuel cask drop issue generi-cally.)
Limits on cooldown/heatup DRL is satisfied with the RGEE proce-To prevent PV brittle dure.. (DRL assumed the Coensittee was fracture also satisfied since there was no Coasnittee conunent on the criteria distributed during the 117th ACRS meeting.)
Vibration monitoring
- Partly solved. Westinghouse will issue a report. DRL will handle as a generic Westinghouse item.
Seismic analysis Complete. Additional pipe supports installed (50).
DRL is satisfied.
NaOR spray additive Requires future study (NaOH system is in operatioital standby mode).
Systematic failures of DRL has to review Westinghouse topical control and safety report.
systems
- Dr. Okrent asked how the WestingbMee results (Ginna) ccuspared with Gen-eral Electric results (Nine Mile Point) ret vibration. _ DRL was not prepared to address this question.
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I 118th ACRS Heeting Sucunary 2.
W. S. SAVANNAH - DRL reported that there will not be funds to operate the SAVANNAH in JY 1971.
3.
Agenda - The following reports were tentatively scheduled for the 119th ACES a;eeting on March 5-7. 1970:
Project Est. Dt. DRL Rept. to ACRS Hutchinson Island - CP February 11. 1970 National Bureau of Februa ry 13, 1970 Standards Reactor - FDL Midland Plant - CP Februa ry 16, 1970 Beaver Valley - CP Pebrua ry 16. 1970 Dr. Siess asked that the Staff identify their tentative submission dates for reports to the ACRS for about two months ahead (to provide for plan-ning future activities).
Meeting with the Commissioners 1.
S a fety Research - Mr. Shaw briefed the Cocunittee on the outlook for future Reactor Safety Research activities. He comumented that the LVR Safety Research Program was dominated by the PBF aad 14Fr programs. These have not proceeded rapidly due, in part, to management changes. He bel! eves that thcNater Reactor Safety Program Plan should be the basis for the water re-i I
actor safety research effort. The AEC should press harder to get industry to take over more of the LWk R&D.
(The fast reactor program will push out LWR programs anyway.) Water research programe will be discontinued by the AEC when a reasonable answer appears evident. He urged closer t~ressent in-house as to what priority should esist. -it is difficult '
,Tn programs l
on and off with case. The FY 1971 funds for R&D are $2.513 less than they are for FY 1970.
Dr. Beck commented that the LOIT tests to date have given the Regulatory l
Staf f son guidance along the way. Tests which verify the Regulatory Staff l
accident analysis assumptions are desirable. Right now many assumptions are judgemet.u which have no verification by tests. Some Committee members stated that they personally, believe a quicker and cheaper approach to the IDFT integrel tests might be acceptable. Mr. Shaw replied that lack' of i
quality in the plant should not be the cause for failure of tests or equip-l ment. IDFr is scheduled to be operable in 1973, but Mr. Shaw indleated that some additional time will be required to " burn-up" the fuel, etc., for the required fission product source tens.
(Notes DRD&T (Pressesky) have con-finned that non-nuclear testing will begin in 1973 with nuclear testing to begin in late 1974 and into 1975.)
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118th ACRS Heeting Suumary
-10 Title 10 CTR parts 23 and 50, Routine Radioactive Releases - Mr. Price 2.
summarized three proposed methods of amending the Cosenission's regula-tions regarding routine release of radioactivity to the environment.
These are contained in Attachments I and II to a January 30, 1970 memorandum fronthe Director of Regulation to the Comunission, and in a February 3,1970 memorandtas from Cosanissioner Johnson to the other AEC Cossetssioners. Attachment I (the Regulatory Staff proposal) would require that applicants show that their proposed radioactive waste systems would maintain off-site doses in a low range with specific maximum numbers stated as dssign objectives.
The design objectives would be a maximum whole body dose to individuals of five taillireme per year from liquid effluente and a maximum whole body dose to indi-viduals of fifteen milliresas per year as a result of gaseous effluents.
The applicant could either accept quantity release rate limits stated in the regulations or propose higher values which he would have to demon-strate would not result in the above five and fifteen millirew limits being exceeded. 1 (Dr. Thompson's proposal) contains stror.g horcatory latiguage that the licensee shot.1d maintain the release of radioactive material to off-site areas as low as practicable.
Coeustesioner Johnson's memorandues attempts to combine the features of the above two pro-posals.
Part 50 vov1d be modified to provide that an applicant identify at the construction permit stage those systems and devices he plans to install to assure that effluents will be as low as practicable.
At the operating iteense stage, the licensee would have to propose how the abov.
equipment will be operated to assure that this objecHve will be met.
There *iould be flexibility for determining what "as low as practicable" means in each instance. Commissioner Johnson suggested that, if what constitutes "as low as practicable" became a subject of intervention, the Atomic Safety and 1.icensing Boards cr ald readily deal with this matter.
l Dr. Hendrie stated that each ACRS member would present his views regarding the proposed changes to the Commission's regulations relating to routine release of radioactivity to the environment.
He indicated he believed that, of the three proposed alternatives, Attachment I to the January 30, 1970 memorandum represents the only worthwhile means of reducing radiation doses and at the same tinte setting forth a practical means for admanistration.
Dr. Bush said that he prefetred to see utsabers presented in the regulations regarding pensissible release rates from water reactors.
Mr. Ramey stated that the numbers will inevitably be taken as an amendment to Part 20 and will set a precedent for other types of remetors and possibly for hasard pay.
Dr. Hendrie indicated he believes that a requirement of "as low as practi-cable" can be interpreted as zero.
Dr. Hanauer said that he would like to see numbers stated and favored the draft provided by the Rega'.atory Staff.
He suggested that the proposed lower pensisaible release rates might provide a good measure of how much radioactivity should be allowed to be released at fast reactor facilities. Regarding permissible doses to emply-ees, he doubted that the proposed reduced allowable emission rates would represent too severe a burden.
1
118th ACRS Meeting Summary Mr. Mangelsdorf thought that the use of numbers serves a good purpose.
He believed that a judge would umstrue "as low as praetteable" as Dr. Stratton asid that he was leery of a regulattoa which might sero.
require the use of a zero release rate limit.
He is reluctant to see numbers stated which may be too emell.
Dr. O' Kelly thought that, if usasbers are not presented in the regulations, and applicant will have to ask the Regulatory 18taff what values correspond to "es Lou se practicable".
Mr. Mill indiested he favored the use of numbers is the regulations.
Dr. Siese was also in favor of using manbers. He thought that these are needed to facilitate the safety review of a facility.
Mr. Squires believed that setting forth numbers _ would help the regulated as well as the regulators.
He. believed itets clear that the proposed naw Itaits refer to the existing types of water reactors, although he believed that future reactor types may also be required to meet these -
standards.
Mr. Squires said that it is not et all evident that the permissible radiation doses for workers would be affected.
Dr. Monsos did not believe that nuinbers are necessary and that there are many items in the Regulatory process for 7,ch numbers are not ave 11sble. He m
indicated, however, that the use of numbers we,ald help both the suelear industry and the Regulatory groups.
the proposed phrase "as low as practicable".Dr. Isbia questioned the meantas of The Movember 17, 1969 ACRS letter regarding reactor safety research called attention to a statement in the March 20, 1969 ACRS letter to the AEC Chairman. The statement suggested that attention be given to the long-range need for improvements in controlling routine releases and to research bearing on this matter. Wgests that consideration be given Dt.1sbin said that the Asc -is not having research perforsed to determine what is achievable to minimise the relesae of tritium and radioactive xenon.
Mr. gtherington believed that use of lower numbers for radioactive releases than presently required I,e desirable.
He suggested that it might be stated that this is not on th' basis of a real necessity but on the basis of what een be achieved.
Dr. Okreet pointed out that one applicant has stated that he will release almost no_ tritium, so "as low as practicable" should include nearly zero on tritium emission.
Dr. Seaborg ladicated that the commissioners' viewpoints range from support of what the Regulatory Staff has proposed to not whiting to make any changes in the regulationa st sil.
Mr. Ramey said be doubted that, if "as low as practicable" had been stated in Part 20, this would have re-quired that the meantas of these worda be deteumined in each case.
Mr. Johnson said that the commission like many.other administrative bodies. has to make deelstons without the use of numbers.Be ladicated that there had been a 3-month strika et Manford over the issue of an alloweble radiation dose of 3.5 versee 5 rods per year. Mr. Bloch stated that, in 1949. over 7,000 employees at Coassission facilities received more than 500 nr.
At sevennak Elver, 40% of the persons monitored reeelved greater than I r.
Dr. Beck reported that a strong element 'in the FRC recenaeadations was a partitimatas of the. allowable espesure amens the verloos activitise which might lead to radiattoa espoenre.
The Emmentive Seeretary of the FRC_ has indicated belief that, perkspo, the FRC has been too elee la ensuring
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e 118th ACRS Heeting Sunsaary that it or wee other group has considered risk versus benefit and portioned to allowable done.
Hr. Ramey said that he did not believe that it necessarily follows that, if the rolesse rate limits are lowered, the pemissible ex-posure to employees has to be lowered. Mr. Mangelsdorf stated that, historically, employees have accepted higher risks, although they will usually bring this matter up at the bargaining table. Dr. Seaborg indicated he believed the coveents from the individual ACRS members had been fairly uniform. He stated that the Coenaission util continue to give considerable attention to the proposed changes in the Ctaneission's regulatitens relative to permissible routine release rates for radio-active material.
Hectinn with the Director of Regulation 1.
Title 10 CFR PArtR 70 and SO,. Routine Rad {oactive Releanna - Mr. Price noted that there is no concensus among the Commoissioners about the acceptability of any of the three proposed drafts changing Title 10 CTR Parts 20 and 50 (re routine radioactive releases). He noted that neither drafr by Coaunissioners Johnson or Thompson identified done guide-lines in quantitative form. Ile added that this places the onus on the Regulatory Staff /ACRS/AS&LB to have to make an ad hoc rule for each case.
(This may result in the ACRS/ Regulatory Staff having to choose doses that are lov, but not too low.) lie indicated that his approach has been to use experience-to-date for establishing dose levels and from this experi-ence determine a range of acceptable levels for INRs. Iciustry would have a design objective to keep the routine releases below these levels.
They could meet this objective by:
(1) making a study of the site and estabitsh the quantity of curies which would be released to the surround-ing area on a routine basis, or (2) demonstrate a design which would meet the release limit objective (site study not required). The Technical Specifications could require a report (e.g., seemi-annus11y) identifying the actus1 releases.
If the releases are in excess of the design objective (e.g., 257. or over), inquiry could be made to determine what the linensee plans to do to correct this situation. Mr. Price added that all plants in operation would meet the new liquid release limit. All plants, except Humboldt Bay, uculd meet the gas release limits (it is not known if the large, new planta can meet the proposed limits).. It would not bother Hr. Price to let operating plants continue, even if the new limits were exceeded. Mr. Price does not know how to judge the influence such reduced radiation levels might have on esposure limits for industrial workers.
(It was noted that industrial workers are monitored for exposere on a continuing basis.)
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I 118th ACES Meeting Sumary In executive session, the Committee took a soft vote on th accepta-bility of the three drafts being proposed.
The vast majority favored the draft by Mr. Price over the draf ts of Commissioners Thompson and Johnson.
It was suggested that each member provide his individual feelings on the drafts sten the Committee met with the Commissioners.
2.
Arenda - Mr. Price stated that he found no difficulty in having the Regulatory Staff provide dates when Staff reports would be submitted to the Committee rather than the anticipated ACRS meeting for the Comittee review.
(The Conanittee vill inform DRL of the tentative agenda for specific project review af ter it has seen the DRL Staff report submission dates.) Mr. Pcice will inforu the Commissioners of this approach for scheduling ACRS ceeting mgenda.
3.
Oyster Creek (Jersev Central Management) - Dr. Mann reported that the AEC plans to discuss with Jersey Central or GPU *'e difficulties observed in the operation of Oyster Creek.
The aoC will attempt to find out how the utility can achieve adequate managerial control uver the plant.
Dr. Hendrie Lnquired as to whether the ACRS should become involved in reviewing the Oyster Creek operation.
He suggested that this utility management be informed of the concern of the ACRS.
stated that he would like to talk with the management before having the Dr. Mann ACRS become directly involved.
come of the discussion with Jersey Central /GPU)(He will inform the Commi Mr. Price noted that he vants to review the issue of management control with the Commissione rs.
He is not sure this is a unique attuation with Jersey Central / CPU:
1.e., there are probably a large number of utility top management personnel who are not very well informt bout the opera-tion of nuclear power plants.
4.
Saferv Guides - Dr. Beck briefly reviewed the status of the Safety Guides He recommended the guideline approach as a means of communicating Regula tory Staff positions to industry.
This won't solve the problem completely, but it will help.
If an entire guideline cannot be agreed to by all (Regulatory Staff /ACRS), the portions which can be agreed to should be issued.
The rec.aining portions could be issued later.
Dr. Bush reported that the Committee felt the safety guideline approach was a good one and had approved the concept.
wording of the preambic will be provided later. Specific connents on the Dr. Bush noted that the guidelonaThermal Shock to Reactor Pressure Vessels (
of the requiremsat regarding information to be provided in the public record (since it apewra to conflict with the proposed amendment to Part 2 on nuclear plant phye12a1 security with respect to the publication of information on plant se urity pl. ens, etc.); the guide for Instrumentation fer Measurement of Seismic Events requires revision to eliminate contro-versial items (such as the requiressents regarding continued plant operation vs shut down following a seismic event).
might be inaued as safety Guides.Dr. Beck is having a catalog of topica l
118th ACRS Heeting Suamary Hecting with the Division of Hateriale Licensing 1.
Radioactive Matt Is Transportation - The Director. Division of Haterials Licensing, Dr. McBride, described the curreat criteria and regulations for psekaging and transporting radiosetive materials.
lie described the hdividual and interdependent responsibilitiea of the Departnent of Transoortation (DOT) and the AEC in this light. lie noted that DOT has asked the AEC to assume the responsibility of regu-lating the carriage of materials (in the 1966 Hemorandum of Und c tetand-ing. DOT /AEC agreed that DOT wrun handle carriage responsibility when manned edequately). This is due to budgetary limitations and the DOT feeling that the hazard involved does not warrant the seaupower required for the review. If DOT is to keep the responsibility, they will publish guides and depend on the shipper to regulate himself.
DOT would involve themselves only in reviews of accidents.
Since a taak force initiated by the Ceneral Manager is in the process of reviewing procedures for handling, shipping, etc., of plutonium. includ-ing plutonium in liquid form. Dr. Itendrie asked iHL to report af ter the task force has completed its review of thin subject.
(Dr. O 'Ke 'ly was asked to provide guidance to Dr. McBride of the Committee's interest in this area.)
Meeting nith the Division of Compliance I
1.
Indian Point - The cooling water intake screena had to be removed to free ice which had formed in the intake system. Fish entered the intake system, causing public concern. The plant was shut down to install ateam spargers in the intake to prevent ice buildup.
2.
NFS - Students in the vicinity of the NPS facilities were carrying suti-NPS/AEC signs and distributing " hate sheets" on atomic power.
3.
Peach Bottom ? nnd 3 - It una determined that some concrete had been pumped through aluminum pipe during construction.
(Experience has shown that con-creta puisped through aluminum uay result w low strength concrets.)
Inspection and tests of the coocrete revealed that some concrete did not meet the design requirements because of lov strength. Bechtel, (the A-E) will issue a report on their resolution of this iter..
The Division of Compliance plans to have their consultants review the report.
4.
Cinna - The Division of Ccapliance reported on significant plant problems noted at theMinna Plant (handout dated February 5,1970). CO reported l
that the performance of the organization indicated that there are some deficiencies in e.anagement control in severmi areas. CO.has planned a
.poeting with RG&E. Accumulator blowdown tests r shed-FSAk analyses quite satisfactorily. Also, the vibration monitoring astruments are att11
-functioning. No sharp or abrupt changes in vibration of the reactor vessel were noted for cold vs hot functional tests.
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t 118th ACRS Hasting Sumanary
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Oyster Creek - Jersey Central han shut down the oyster Creek resetor i
to perfore leak tests on the main steam isolation valves.
also laspecting the Lasuistion to determine if burning /dherring of
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the compressed wood neutron shielding is a problem as occurred at the Tsuruga plant in Japon.
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i Mine Mile Point - The main steam isolation valve leakage rate is still en unresolved issue.
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i SgPOR - During in-service testing of emergency diesels it was found that the redundant set of equipment associated with each diesel was not tested
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during the preoperational phase of the program.
This was due in pe.rt to the plant operator not being aware of a redundant set
- components.
j mention of such equipment is in the FSAR).hquestions were raised by(No i
Comeitte members as how to avoid repeating) procedural' mistakes such as i
was noted in this case. Teveral problems were found in the system during
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this in-service testing.
t Executive Session 4
1.
Chairman's Report
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Meetina with Ccennissioners a.
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Title 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50. Routine Radioactive Releases -
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Dr. Hendrie reported that he had a discussion with Commissioner Johnson about Title 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50 Routine Radioa 1
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Releases.
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Three versions are befora the Commission (Coemsission ers Thompson's and Johmace's and Mr. Price's).
Comunissioner Johnson stated that he did not like numbers in the rule.
1 Dr. Hendrie remarked that he disegreed.
Dr. ".ansuer noted that Commissioner Thompson told him that the cour.ission has the in-pression that the Casumittee agrees with Mr. Price's approach (numbers provided in the _ rule).
have been due to his discussion with Commissioner Johnson.Dr. H I
(2) Safety Research
- Dr. Hendrie reported that Commissioner Johnsoc -
believes that the casesission needs to provide a more complete reply to the Committee letter on reactor safety research, dated November 12, 1969.
Dr. Naasuer noted that he had received a call i
fro.s a publisher about the ACRS report on safety research, asklas i
for infonsstion._ Apperentlye persaar.el_ in the public doomment r
room were unwilling to mail a popy of the report to the publieber.
I (The report had been read into the Diablo Canyon 2 publie hearing by en intervenor.)' Dr. Baasuer had to tactfully avoid diseassias i
the research report, Dr. Bendrie _edded that he use asked by the ABC (00C) whether the AcRS letter to the General Maasser, subjeet:
"Ca====*a on the Water Rosetor Safety Rosesseh ProgrJm". dated i
i March 20. 1969, could be placed in the publie decausset rees. The Procedurea Subsamnittee was consultedt they found no difficalty having the letter pleeed in the public docesset room, t
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9 f-a 118th ACRS Meeting Sumanary b.
Pipe Whip - Duane Arnold /Shoreham - Dr. Hendrie reported that Dr. Morris thought the Comuntttee should prepare a report on the pipe whip issue for Duane Arnold and Shoreham (before the public hearings).
Therefore, Dr. Hendrie asked that representatives of Duane Arnold and Shoreham appear before the Committee at the 118th meeting to review their present design criteria for pipe whip.
Fifteenth M*** Seat - Dr. Reedrie reported that the Commission c.
informed him that Mr. G. O. Wessensur was its choice for the 15th seat on the ACES.
He called Mr. Wessensur and discussed the ecamitments of an ACRS member.
Due to consulting commitments with the Tennessee Valley Authority, Mr. Wessensur was not sure whether he wanted to spend as much time as would be reqeired to participate on the ACES. - It was agreed that he would thtak about it for a while and then discuss it again with Dr. Hendria.
(Dr. Hendrio will,-
tentatively, call him during the Aek of February 16.)
(Commissioners Johnson ara Ramey acted that they tad Mr. Wessensur signet up to be sa AEC consultant but thought he would contribute more as am ACRs member.)
2.
Title _10 CFR Part 50 - Ouality Assurance criteris - Apeendix B - The committee approved the proposed amendment Opendix 2 to Title 10 CFR Part 50, Quality Assurance criteria, on the ree"ation of the Codes, Standards, and Criteria Subcommittee.
(Mr. Case was informed of this decision.)
3.
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Tentative Priority List to Resolv'e Asterisked Type Itema. nnAyT. SEB. 2/6/70 -
The Committee briefly reviewed the tentative priority list propered by Dr. Bush but came to no decision as how to dispose of the itsee ce the list.
(Note:
should be added to the "Py Guide".)"ECCS ve core power" and flux flattening Dr. Hendrie proposed that the Cossaittee members review this list of items to be resolved over the n two months and decide how best to deal with the items listed.
discussion will be held on this subject.
Further 4.
Leermancy Plaantam - The Committee approved the recommended change to Title 13 Part 50 proposed by the Regulatory Staff.
(Mr. Case was informed of this decision.)
5.
N. S. SAVARNAR - The Committee concludW that it would not be inapprodrate for interested members to make a short trip on the N. S. SAVAEBAE to observe operations even though operation of the SAVANNAH may terminate next year because of lack of funds.
February 25-2G.1970.)
(A trip has been scheduled for 4-. M... T. m.7 W J...a
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j 118th ACES Heating Sunnary
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CREST - The Cossaittee agreed to send Dr. Stratton to represent the ACRS at the CREST meeting (on Fast Reactor Safety) in Paris, France, on i
April 1 and 2,1970. The ACES Bylaws ret participation in non-ACRS activities are to apply as a guide.
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DRAFF. February 2.1970, on Seouoyah - Dr. Okrent identified three areas of concern associated with safety issues which should be addressed i
by the Cosmaittee as related to power level and power density incrosses (e.g., Sequoyah application is a 57, increase over previous applications).
the areasedeal with fuel failure propagation, ECCS capability, and failure 1
to scram associated with anticipated transients. The Committee scrived 0:
no specific decision as how best to address these safety issues. The items were placed on a list prepared by Dr. Bush which identified a utsaber of j
outstanding generic-type safety issues.
8.
Safety Guides Preamble (1/G/70) - The Committee approved the concept of the Safety a.
Guides approach to casesunicate between the AEC and industry. Dr. Besh asked the members to provide him with any recosumendations they may have for specific wording chenres.
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Thertaal Shock - The Cosmittee approved the Safety Guide entitled, " Thermal Shock to Pressure vessels", dated January 6,1970.
t Industrial Sabotage - Committee action on proposed Safety Guide entitled, c.
" Industrial Sabotage", dated January 6,1970, wee deferred until the guideline la rewritten to clarify the fact that the information does not have to be placed in the public record.
d.
Material SurveJ11ance/NDT Shift - The topic is to be handled as an AEC l
regulation.
I Core Blowdown Forces - Dr. Bush suggested this be held until the Double-e.
Ended Pipe Draak Subcoussittee makes a reca=====dation..
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Instrumentation for Earehouakes - This doctament should be ready for review at the 119th Otarch 1970) ACRs meeting. Dr. okrent suggested that further consideration should be given to the requirements for shut down for various intenaf *.ies of earthquakas, e.g., routine shut down for earthquakes of intensLty well below the OBE, prompt shut down at the OBE.
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Fuel Storane Facility Desian Basis (December 3.1969)' - Dr. Bush noted that there are two controversial items (missiisa and.redioactive re-lasses). La suggested that this guide be issued without the two above items and that they be added when they have been resolved \\
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l 118th ACES Meeting Susanary
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b.
Hydrosen Generation and Control Followinn a Q - The Comunittee discussed wep to arrive at a decision on this subject. Dr.11snauer i
suggested the following items be reviewed by an ad hoc group:
(1) What percent of metal-water reaction should be used as a design basist l
(2) What kind of fission product inventory should be available and where is it located 7 (3) What should the design "C" be?
(4) What concentration of hydrogen should be considered as existing in the contalanent building?
(5) Is there a basis to accept containment purging as a means of t
removing hydrogant If so, what is the basist i
The Chainmaa established an ed hoc group to review the hydrogen subject; the suggesticas of Dr. IDoouer should be reviewed.
(O' Kelly, Bush, Hausuer, Kaufa.am. Strattan) 1.
Preoserations! Startup Testima - This subject is to be reviewed by a separate ad hoc group.
J.
Non-Randos Systematic Failure (Comumn Failure Modes) - The Electrical Systems, Control and Instrumentation Subcoensittee is to review this ACRS W N *of 9.
Technical Specifiestions - Dr. Okreat suggested that the Coussittee givs further consideration to ACES review of TechnieJ1 Specifications durig POL review. He noted his 11nteatttoo review the proposed Technical Specifications as part of the Subcosunittee review of the Indian Point i
Unit 2 POL.
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