ML20118D266
| ML20118D266 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 02/21/1966 |
| From: | Mcewen J US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML093631134 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9210120052 | |
| Download: ML20118D266 (10) | |
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i 50-293 j
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l Files February 21, 1966 l
THEU: Saul Levine, Chief, Test & Power Resetor 1
Safety Brsach, Division of Reactor Licensing J. E. itcEwen, Test & Power Reactor Safety Branch i
Division of Esactor Licensing l
PEEAPPLICATION }ZETING FOR PROPO3ED BOSTON EDISON PLANT - EUARY 26, 1966 i
k The subject meecing saa attanded by:
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l C. K Beck EEG E. E. Tsaa UE4C Bootsu W. G. Blessing 1 DE J. Bar=med GE - Weskingtoa A L. Doan DE
- 0. E. Ctaager M - San Jose i
B. Crier C0~
L B. Imatos E - San Jose l
L E. !: stand DEL W. N.-Oberly GE - Ssa Jose l
S. Levine DEL L B. Richards GE - San Jose M. M. Mana EEG E. T. Tafladies M - Boston J. E. McEwen DEL l
V. A. Moore DSS L M. Butler Bestaa Edisce J
F. Novell CRL J. J. ha d ggggga gd{ygg H. C. Gaska ACES Staff J. E. Howard-Boston Edison D. Okreat.*
Ar2R G. A. Orrok Bestem Edison D. A. Quina Boston Edisos F. M. Staasesky Boston $dison s
- Part-t.fme D.*. Doan opened the meeting with remarks regarding the siting of a large i
power router at a metropolitaa site such as was being considered by.
l Boston EM===. la order to =mka clear tha backgroaad regarding the sities of power reactors in metropolitan areas, he read escarpts (attasked to this memorandua) free speeches and testimony by Mr. Manly, Chairman of the ACES, and commissioner Ramey as well as portions of 10 CFE 100. He i'
i eiso gave each organisation septes of ascerpts from the 1962 ICEF reecer-l mandations which concained pertinest background information rosarding exposures of large naabers of people to radioactivity.
Dr. Doan's remarks included the -following specti'ic points:
a.
The siting criteria of 10 CFR 100 do not apply to a metro-politan reactor site; therefore, as a part of the review, y.
it will 14 secessary to establish criteria which are ap--
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plicania;
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b, Operating experience on reactors similar is size and destga features.will be required bsfore meaningful conclusions could _
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i 50 -293 riles February 21, 1966 i
We vill require more complete design information o aatecy c.
features for this reactor than we normally require at the construction permit stage.
Dr. Doan concluded by stating that because of the points outtimed above, a insaningful schwacle for obtainias a construction permit could met be predicted. Ea added that achieving the one year schedste piammad by
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Bostaa Edissa was highly improbable and that three er more years was met j
unlikely. Mr. Drrek stated that this informattom represented "a body i
blow" to Bestem Edines.'s plans, nousvar, after a briaf recess, he endaeated I
that he appreetated the straightforward approach t.aken by DEL on this anatter and that for th6 present Boston F.dison intended to adatesme with its plane for building the plaat.
i Dr. Beck made a sueer of remarks which is part rAstantiated Dr. Dean's statenmate. Me slee teek the opportunity to infore the app 11 cants of the AEC-assmented Safety Research progran dich should be of consider 61e in.
portance is obtaini== secessary taformation to help oopport thic applica-tion. Dr. Book also brought up the seject of pressere vessel failures as discussed is the recent ACES letter. ga indicated that 1dnere metre-polttaa sites are involved,; it is met at all certain that imenstry has reached se acceptable level of design and erectime *ompetence to reader a pressere vessel failure incredible.
Mr. Levinc made the following remarkas As Dr. Desa stated, prior operating arperience sa specifie a.
design features will be carefully==imad.
By operating experience, un mean estmal asperiesca with identical or similar festares os specific operating roasters, data gained from applicable experiments and tests,1sta obeat==d from f
reliability tests, etc. To generalise this potat, in ear minds operating emperience includes applicable data fram all souresag the balance of data in deteemining approval of any particular feature may be varied depending upon the specific characteristics of that feature.
j b.
As a corollary to the point made previously by Dr.. Does, car review of the reactor and sita under consideration by Bootes Edises will require that we be more certain at the construction permit review of the easiasering basis for specific fsatares of the plant than we would be for a site which had a larga geo-graphic evehton. This implies that although features d ish have been proposed and acceptad on other plaats may be used it, this plant, the design bases, supporcing data, and the apptwral basis will be re-exetined. To Rive examples of the kind of OFTICE >
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4 50 -293
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f Files February 21, 1966 4
4 things that would require careful attention, he mentioned the I
control systems for engineered safeguards, the understanding of metal-vater reactions and the methods of evaluating their safety implications, the bases for detarmining filter efficiencias, the l
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extent of process systems outside containment and their implica-
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tions on safety, the effect of possible tornadoes on the plant, and the idequacy of normal and emergency power supplias to en-I gineered safagmards.
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Hr. Levina then road a list of questions which have been developed, baasd j
on our review of the preliminary infetmation we have received to data.
t These questions are attached.
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In a series of questions, Mr. Richards asked (1) of we considered operating i
experiscee
.~_3 RG as abeeluta prerequisites to obtaisimp, an autherisation and (2) if a new design concept were proposed,==1d we met give credit-i i
j for it without operating asperience te verify it.
Dr. Beck stated that i
generally this was the case, but that operettag guyerir. nee, ta his mind.
l voeld not be a mandatory preregoisite. In his answer to Mr. Richard's j
question, Dr. Dona stated that be was incitand to believe that operating i
experience would be a mandatory prerognisite.
Dr. Mann asked what was the rationale used which prevented the plant's
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l design criteria from bains sero aspeours to the phb11e rather thas the factor of 10 below 10 CFR 10011mits as Boston Edison has presently pro-posed. This questions y subsegmently amplified.te ask 'why the contain-mest isn't desigand for sero leakaas rather than for sees limited rate.
No ready answer vos available since it was apparent that a misunderstanding
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conceratag design objectivas existed on this point between General Electrie and Boston Edison. Besten Edieet indicated that they wonid be prepared to i
address thansalves to this question is future diemussians.
t Boston Edison indicated that they useld review the geestions presented at 4
l the meeting and that they would probably request another meeting in the not-future.
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R. L. Do an E. G. Casc 1
' S. Levina
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WESTIONS RE(1AEDIN3 PROPOSED ICS2DN EDISON APPLICATION l
A.
Core bray System -
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Some experimental work has been done using a limited number of bested rods in a core m ckup.
Under vbat reactor conditions would the results -
i' of these be applicablet 2
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ht further testing is planned to demonstrate that adequate cooling L-b a,
f can be accomplished with a spray systemt -It appears that stena eroin.
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tion any cause deflection of the water and.thus prevent effective I
l cooling.
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ht considerations have been given to core spray cooling emps.bility for an accident which causes core disarrangement, or damage to tbs core 9
spray spargert
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B.
Core Flooding System -
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ht assurance can be given that the core shroud vill remain intact i
following a pipe ruptun in which assynetric pressure forces would be 1mposed on the com shroudt ht is, how can we be assured that there 4
1 is a pot for the watert 2.
ht consideration Las been given to the possibility that the reactor 3
f may go critical on reflooding, because one or mon controls did not i
enter the core following the accident or because the reactor is mon l
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,i reactive due to derangementi i
C.
Contaimeent Spray System -
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In the event that the system is.not. turned ou follmring the losa of i
T coolant accident, bev an.tch time is available before the primary con--
l tainment desi6n pressure or temperature is exceededt.
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ht assurance (testing or othervioe) is availabla st the syntes can and vill be started and operable iter, requiredt D.
Controls for Above Systems -
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7b vhat criteria vill the controls end instruments for these engineered safeguard systmas be designed and testedt 2.
h t instrmuentation vill be provided to assure that the necessary en-gineered safeguard systass are operating as expected?
5.
Will the design of-the starting controls for engineered safeguards
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incorporate mannal or automatic load saquencingt Will autoestic loat.
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3 transfer from, erternal to internal (or vice versa) power be required or providedt t,
E.
Primary Containment Integrity -
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ht provisions have been incorporated in the design to protect against missiles and local overbesting'of the containmentt 2.
ht is the proposed test pressure and test frequency during"operationt
. F.
Design armi Testability of Contat.rusent Penetrations -
In. view of the importance at this site of maintaining ccamplete savurance of penetration leak t$ htness and isolation valve operability, frequent 4
testing vill be required.
In scuse instances continuous leak monitoring may be needed to provide assurance of leak tightness.
h t censiderst* 2 has been given to impromnts in this regard over methods now used in other -
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plantat Vbere feasible, is continuove monitoring of each penetration plannadt
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G.
Metal-Water Anactions -
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ht experimental Ata an available to support the reaction rate i
model which leads to the conclusion that only 25% metal-vater reaction vill occur during the first bour following the accidentt 9
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Eov vould the reaction rate model be affected if it vere postulated that a nuclear excursion vere the initiatin6 event for the loss of coolant accidentt E.
Guaranteed Stack Release -
Io Iodine Filter Efficiency -
Frem the data available to us at this time, it is not clear that a
.y filter efficiency of 99% is justifiable. What data are available to support
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your contention that 99 9% is achievable under all conditionst What degree
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of entraimment is placed upon moistvre doentrsitzent to preserve the ef-i-
ficiency of the iodine filterst J.
Main-Steam Valve Isolation Failures -
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T.rtent of Procesi. Dystems Outside Contaizment -
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Control Rod Drive System -
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If it is postulated that a ne'chanical failure occurs in which a number
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.,n-of control rod drive hydraulic lines are damaged, it appears that the ability i
I to insert these rods could be lost. Vbat asuurance can be provided that such daange could not occur in con,j inction or as a result of _ other accidents in which tbe proper operation of these rods is anticipatedt
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1 S'J3JE CT: LOSTO ; EDISON REACTOR SITINC i
In preparation for the forthcomi; g meeting with Boston Edison on Janu-4 ary 26,1966, we have accumulated several publicly available statements re-l garding the Com=ission's concern over the siting of power reactors in urban
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j areas.
j The first definitive statement is contined in the " Statements of Con-sideration" dated April 12, 1962, upon which the Part 100 regulation is based 4 * * * *
- i "These guides and the tcchaical information document are intended to neflect 4
past practice and current policy of the Commissian of keepit.g stationary power 2
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and test reactors away from densely populated centers.
It should be equally understood, however, that applicants are free and indeed encouraged to demons-trate to the Commission the applicability and sign'.ficance of considerations l
other than those set forth in the guides.
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"The guides tend toward requiring sufficient isolation to preclude any immediate problam, in the meantime, opr. rating experience that will be acquired
'from plants already licensed to operate should provide a more'dcli itive basis n
. for weighing the effectiveness of engineered safeguards versus plant isolation as a public safeguard.",
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3 2-P. ore recently, testi.ony by Co nission representatives was given at the JCNJ Hearings on the AEC Incecnity 1.cgisla*. ion conducted in June 1965.
Pertin-ent rections are quoted below:
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'M r. RAME'l.
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'In acknowledging the continued need for competent technical judgment by i
both the applicants and the AEC in implementation, flexibility was deliberately l-written into the,pides.
The Cenaission endeavored to set forth the criteria l;
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in such a way t. hat they could be administred in an evolutionary manner, in so i
j doing, it was recognized that insufficient experience had been accumulated to pemic the writing of detailed standards for either the design or the siting of
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reactors.
2 "The basic principle underlying the reactor safety program is recognition I
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of the necessaty for effective engineered safeguards in the construction and
{. 9 operatton of reactors both to prevent major accidents and to control thei-
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consequences in the unlikely event they should, occur.
Under the site criteria j
(see p. 36 for digest of site criteria), provision is made to balance such en-
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ginected safepards in relati?n to the distance between reactor and population centers. The application of thir concept has had the ef fect of continuing the i
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AEC practice of keeping central station power and test,rce.ctors a reasonable l
distance from densely populate.d centers."
" Statement of William 3. Manly, c'iaiman, ACRS:
t-j "The engineering of reactor safety has been a process 'of evolution Much j
has been acco=plished; more remains to be done.
The larger power reactors now under construction or described in current license applications represent a E
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7, p3 large step in this process of evolution.
However, considerable further im-provements in safcty are required before la::ce pswer reactors mr.y be located cn sites close to populattun centers.
"one of the large ywer reactor facili-tics new under construction or described in current license applications 14 considered ruitable for location in metropolitan areas.
To put the matter in a dif ferent way, the devices and safeguards that prevent all accidents, large or small, must be made even me re reliabic than they are nov, and the consequences-7 limiting safeguarde must be made even more foolproof.
The questiops to be t.
settled are complex ones whose sceolution would depend on the nature and details t
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- of each proposal.
It also appears that novel reactor systems and reactors that have considerably higher power levels than previous ones should net'be operated in population centers."
"ACRS Response to JCAE Question 7" I.
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" Answer.--The Committee believes that placing large nuclear reactors clorer to population centers will require further improvement in methods of design and I.
construction, that would reduce even mort the probability of accidents, large
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and small.
In addition, consequenr 1 limiting safeguards must be made even more z.
reliable than at present.
j "Where people are nearby, small accidents become more important.
The design and construction should then be such as to reduce ele probability of such con-
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'ceivable malfunctions and to reduce the credible consequences, 4
i' "The Committee does not wish to discourage new applications for reactor s{
i construction, but only to point out that stricter conditions may be necessarf I
4 for more urban sites.
The Committee believes that these questions would be I
dealt with best by continuing the practice of reviewing individual reactor proposals."
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/.ithough not part of the public record, the conclusion from our draft i
a r, p-,r : to :he Acra on Revensvood dated N: vet.btr 12, 1963, is quoted below for 2
your convenience:
"The staf f conclusions on the unacceptability of the proposal to located a power reactor in New York City, discussed in this evaluation, is based upon i
the uncertainties involved in dotatmining the adequacy of the ene,ineering safe-i guards in-the event of a fission product release accident in light of the definite l
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cxpectation of significant leakage.
The problem of demonstrating a guaranteed 4
cssentially zero release of fission products in the even. of such an accident,
,lf in light of the current et. incering state-of-the art, appears overwhelming.
i However, although the proposed schemes are, in our opinion, ineffective for their
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intended purpose, other schemes may exist and would have to be evaluated on their own merits."
t In addition to the above statements which refer to the siting of reactors
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I in urban areas, attention should be drawn to the ACRS letter on pressure vessel t
j failure dated November 24, 1965, which contains the following conclusion:
"In view of the very small probability of pressure vessel rupture, the n
Co==ittee reconfirms its belief that no undue hazard to the health.and safety of the public exists, but suggests that the orderly growth of the industry, with concomitant increase in number, size, power level, and proxim!cy of nuclear 4
power reactors to large population centers will in the future make desirable, even prudent, incorporating in many reactors the design approaches whose develop-ment is reco= mended above."
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