ML20116D159

Proposed Change 15 to Tech Specs Incorporating Refueling & Special Test Conditions

ML20116D159
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	04/22/1985
From:	NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML20116D156	List: ML20116D159 NLS8500068, Application for Amend to License DPR-46,consisting of Proposed Change 15 to Tech Specs to Incorporate Description of Conditions for Performing Special Tests & to Outline Conditions for Refueling.Fee Paid
References
NUDOCS 8504290308
Download: ML20116D159 (21)

Text

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• Attachmtnt 1 Revised Technical Specifications for Special Tests and Exceptions 11 122 205a 215a 111 128 206 215d iv 165 209a 216b1 through 216b4 (new pages) 121 194 209b The current Technical Specifications for Cooper Nuclear Station has requirements for refueling and special plant conditions located in scattered parts throughout. This proposed change will incorporate these requirements in one place to better ensure their compliance. In addition, a new section for special tests and exceptions is added to provide restrictions and requirements for various evolutions that do not fit the ordinary conditions for " shutdown" or "startup/ operating".

The proposed change shall be considered in two parts.

- Part 1-The following currently incorporated Technical Specifications change location in this change, although their technical content remains unaltered:

Proposed Technical Specification Old Location 3.10.E (205a) 3.7.B.3 and 3.9.A.2 (165, 194) 3.10.F (205a) 3.5.F.4 and 3.5.F.6 (121, 122) 3.10.G (206) 3.12.A.3 and 3.12.A.4 (215a) 3.10.H (206) 3.10.E (206) 3.22.B (216b2) 3.5.F.7 (122, 215a) 3.22.C.1 (216b3) 3.7.A.2 (160)

Some wording was changed in proposed Specification 3.10.F to change nomenclature from LPCI system to LPCI mode of Residual Heat Removal System to achieve consistency with plant usage.

Evaluation of Part I with Respect to 10CFR50.92 This part is judged to involve no significant hazards based on guidance provided by the Commission in the form of certain examples (48FR14870). The examples include "(i) A purely administrative change to Technical Specifications. . ."

The proposed relocation of various Technical Specifications in this part without an altering of their technical content and the change of nomenclature is clearly encompassed by the above example.

- Part 2 -

Present CNS Technical Specifications provide vague guidance on the conductance of various special tests where plant conditions are not in the normal modes of

" shutdown" or "startup". One example is the shutdown margin demonstration which requires other than normal operation of the reactor mode selector switch and rod control sequence system. To reduce possible confusion and ensure 8504290308 850422 PDR ADOCK 05000298 p PDR

proper conductance of these tests, Nebraska Public Power District proposes to add a new section to the CNS Technical Specification to specify the conditions and requirements for performing these tests. These proposed Specifications were patterned after the Special Test Exceptions in NUREG-0123, GE Standard Technical Specifications in the following way:

Proposed Technical Specification NUREG-0123 3.22.A.1 and 3.22.A.2 (216bi, 216b2) 3.10.2 and 3.10.3 3.22.C.2 (216b3) 3.10.4 3.22.D.1 (216b3) 3.10.5 3.22.D.2 (216b3) 3.10.4 3.22.A.4 (216b2) 3.6.1 and 3.10.3 4.22.A.1 (216b1) 4.10.3 4.22.A.2 (216b1) 4.10.2 (GROUP NOTCH) 4.22.B (216b2) 4.10.6 4.22.C.1 (216b3) 4.10.4.2 4.22.C.2 (216b3) 4.10.4.1 4.22.D (216b3) 4.10.4.1 Proposed Specification 3.22.A.3 allows the RHR system to be lined up in the same mode as for a training startup when thermal power is allowed to reach one percent of rated thermal power. This is a conservative requirement as reactor power is not allowed to approach this level while conducting the shutdown margin demonstration.

Evaluation of Part 2 with Respect to 10CFR50.92 A. This part of the proposed change is judged to involve no significant hazards based on the following:

1. Does the proposed license amendment involve'a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Evaluation:

Because the proposed change incorporates in one place requirements for special tests and exceptions which were previously not addressed and clarifies them for the operator, it does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed license amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously  ;

evaluated? l 1

Evaluation: l Because the proposed change does not introduce any new mode of l operation, the possibility of an accident of a different type than I

analyzed in the final Safety Analysis Report would not result from the change; therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Evaluation:

Because these changes clarify the requirements for performance and surveillance of several special tests and exceptions they do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

B. Additional basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:

The commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists by providing certain examples (48FR14870). The examples include:

"(ii) A change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the Technical Specifications . . ."

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd)

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SURVEILLANCE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENTS 3.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS 4.5 114 - 131 A. Core Spray and LPCI Subsystems A 114 B. Containment Cooling Subsystem (RHR Service Water) B 116 C. HPCI Subsystem C 117 D. RCIC Subsystem D 118 E. Automatic Depressurization System E 119 i F. Minimum Low Pressure Cooling System Diesel Generator Availability F 120 G. Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe G 122 H. Engineered Safeguards Compartments Cooling H 123 3.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY 4.6 132 - 158 A. Thermal and Pressurization Limitations A 132 B. Coolant Chemistry B 133a C. Coolant Leakage C 135 D. Safety and Relief Valves D 136 E. Jet Pumps E 137 F. Jet Pump Flow Mismatch F 137 G. Inservice Inspection G 137 H. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) H 137a 3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 4.7 159 - 192 A. Primary Containment A 159 B. Standby Gas Treatment System B 165 C. Secondary Containment C 165a D. Primary Containment Isolation Valves D 166 3.8 MISCELLANEOUS RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SOURCES 4.8 185 - 186 3.9 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 4.9 193 - 202 A. Auxiliary Electrical Equipment A 193 B. Operation with Inoperable Equipment B 195

'3.10 CORE ALTERATIONS 4.10 203 - 209 A. Refueling Interlocks A 203 B. Core Monitoring B 205 C. Spent Fuel Pool Water Level C 205a D. Time Limitation D 205a E. Standby Gas Treatment System E 205a F. Core Standby Cooling Systems F 205a G. Control Room Air Treatment G 206 H. Spent Fuel Cask Handling H 206 3.11 FUEL RODS 4.11 210 - 214e A. Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR) A 210 B. Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR) B 210 C. Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) C 212-D. Thermal-hydraulic Stability D 212a' TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd.)

Page No.

SURVEILLANCE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENTS 3.12 ADDITIONAL SAFETY RELATED PLANT CAPABILITIES 4.12 215 - 215f A. Main Control Room Ventilation A 215 B. Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System B 215b C. Service Water System C 215c D. Battery Room Vent D 215c 3.13 RIVER LEVEL 4.13 216 3.14 FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM 4.14 216b

~3.15 FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SYSTEM 4.15 216b 3.16 SPRAY AND/0R SPRINKLER SYSTEM (FIRE PROTECTION) 4.16 216e 3.17 CARBON DIOXIDE SYSTEM 4.17 216f 3.18 FIRE HOSE STATIONS 4.18 216g 3.19 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION FIRE SEALS 4.19 216h 3.20 YARD FIRE HYDRANT AND HYDRANT HOSE HOUSE 4.20 2161 3.21 ENVIRONMENTAL / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 4.21 216n 3.22 SPECIAL TESTS / EXCEPTIONS 4.22 216b1 A. Shutdown Margin Demonstration 216b1 B. Training Startup 216b2 C. Physics Tests 216b2 D. Startup Test Program 216b3 5.0 MAJOR DESIGN FEATURES 5.1 Site Features 217 5.2 Reactor 217 5.3 Reactor Vessel 217 5.4 Containment 217 5.5 Fuel Storage 218 5.6 Seismic Design 218 5.7 Barge Traffic 218

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd.) l l

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SURVEILLANCE l

. LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENTS 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 6.1 Organization 219 l 6.1.1 Responsibility 219 6.1.2 Offsite 219 l 6.1.3 Plant Staff - Shift Complement 219 6.1.4 Plant Staff - Qualificationi 219a

! 6.2 Review and Audit 220 6.2.1.A Station Operations Review Committee (SORC) 220 A.1 Membership 220 A.2 Meeting Frequency 220

- A.3 Quorum 220 A.4 Responsibilities 220 A.5 Authority 221 A.6 Records 221 A7 Procedures 222 6.2.1.B NPPD Safety Review and Audit Board (SRAB) 222 B.1 . Membership 223 B.2 Meeting Frequency 223 B.3 Quorum 223 1

B.4 Review 223 t

B.5 Authority 224 B.6 Records 225 B.7 Audits 225 6.3 Procedures and Programs 226 6.3.1 Introduction 226 6.3.2 Procedures 226

, 6.3.3 Maintenance and Test Procedures 226 f 6. 3. !- Radiation Control Procedures 226 l .a High Radiation Areas 226a l 6.3.5 Temporary Changes 226a

! 6.3.6 Exercise of Procedures 226a l 6.3.7 Programs 226a j .A Systems Integrity Monitoring Prog'am 226a

.B Iodine Monitoring Program 226a l .C Environmental Qualification Program 226a-l .D Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) 227 6.4 Record Retention 228 l

! 6.4.1 5 year retention 228 6.4.2 Life retention 228 6.4.3 2 year retention 229 6.5 Station Reporting Requirements 230 1

6.5.1 Routine Reports 230

.A Introduction 230

.B Startup Report 230

.C Annual Reports 230

.D Monthly Operating Report 231 6.5.2 Reportable Events 231 6.5.3 Unique Reporting Requirements 235

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.F (cont'd.) 4.5.F (cont'd.)

3. Any combination of inoperable compo-nents in the core and containment cooling systems shall not defeat the capability of the remaining operable components to fulfill the cooling functions.

4. When irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and the reactor is in the Cold Shutdown Condition, both core spray systems, the LPCI and containment cooling subsystems may be inoperable, provided no work is being done which has the potential for draining the reactor vessel. Refueling require-ments are as specified in Specifi-cation 3.10.F.

5. With irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, one control rod drive housing may be open while the suppression chamber is completely drained provided that:

a. The reactor vessel head is removed.

b. The spent fuel pool gates are open and the fuel pool water level is maintained at a level > 33 feet.

c. The condensate transfer system is operable and a minimum of 230,000 gallons of water is in the conden-sate storage tank.

d. The automatic mode of the drywell sump pump is disabled.

e. No maintainance is being conducted which will prevent filling the suppression chamber to a level above the core spray and LPCI suctions.

f. With the exception of the suppres-sion chamber water supply, both core spray systems and the LPCI system are operable.

g. The control rod is withdrawn to the backseat.

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.5.F (cont 'd) 4.5.F (cont'd)

h. A special flange, capable of sealing a leaking control rod housing, is available for immediate use.

1. The control rod housing is covered with the special flange following the removal of the control rod drive.

j. No work is being performed in the vessel while the housing is open.

G. Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe G. Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe Whenever core spray subsystems, LPCI The following surveillance requirements subsystems, HPCI, or RCIC are required shall be adhered to, to assure that the to be operable, the discharge piping discharge piping of the core spray from the pump discharge of these sys- subsystems, LPCI subsystems, HPCI and tems to the last block valve shall RCIC are filled:

be filled.

1. Whenever the Core Spray, LPCI, HPCI or RCIC systems are made operable, the discharge piping shall be vented from the high point of the system and water flow observed initially and on a monthly basis.

2. The pressure switches which monitor the LPCI, core spray, HPCI and RCIC lines to ensure they are full shall be functionally tested and calibrated every three months.

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3.5 BASES (cont'd) ment is available at all times. It is during refueling outages that major maintenance is performed and during such time that all low pressure core cooling systems may be out of service. Specification 3.5.F.4 provides that should this occur, no work will be performed on the primary system which could lead to draining the vessel. This work would include work on certain control rod drive components and recirculation system. Thus, the specifica-tion precludes the events which could require core cooling. Specification 3.5.F.5 recognizes that, concurrent with control rod drive maintenance during the refueling outage, it may be necessary to drain the suppression chamber for maintenance or for the inspection required by Specification 4.7.A.2.h. In this case, if excessive control rod housing leakage occurred, three levels of protection against loss of core cooling would exist. First, a special flange would be used to stop the leak. Second, sufficient inven-cory of water is maintained to provide, under worst case leak conditions, approximately 60 minutes of core cooling while attempts to secure the leak are made. This inventory includes water in the reactor well, spent fuel pool, and condensate storage tank. If a leak should occur, manually operated valves in the condensate transfer system can be opened to supply either the core spray system or the spent fuel pool. Third, sufficient inventory of water is maintained to permit the water which has drained from the vessel to fill the torus to a level above the core spray and LPCI suction strainers. These systems could then recycle the water to the vessel. Since the system cannot be pressurized during refueling, the potential need for core flooding only exists and the specified combination of the core spray or the LPCI system can provide this. This specification also provides for the highly unlikely case that both diesel generators are found to be inoper-able. The reduction of rated power to 25% will provide a very stable operating condition. The allowable repair time" of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> will provide an opportunity to repair the diesel and thereby prevent the necessity of taking the plant down through the less stable shutdown condition. If the necessary repairs cannot be made in the allowed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the plant will be shutdown in an orderly fashion. This will be accomplished while the two off-site sources of power required by Specification 3.9. A.1 are available.

G. Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe If the discharge piping of the core spray, LPCI subsystem, HPCI, and RCIC are not filled, a water hammer can develop in this piping when the pump and/or pumps are started. If a water hammer were to occur at the time at which the system were required, the system would still perform its design functions.

However, to minimize damage to the discharge piping and to ensure added mar-gin in the operation of these systems, this Technical Specificacian requires the discharge lines to be filled whenever the system is in an operable condi-tion.

H. Engineered Safeguards Compartments Cooling The unit cooler in each pump compartment is capable of providing adequate ven-tilation flow and cooling. Engineering analyses indicate that the temperature rise in safequards compartments without adequate ventilation flow or cooling is such that continued operation of the safeguards equipment or associated auxiliary equipment cannot be assured.

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7. (cont'd.) 4.7 (cont'd.)

B. Standby Cas Treatment System B. Standby Gas Treatment System

1. Except as specified in 3.7.B.3 below, 1. At least once per operating cycle both standby gas treatment systems the following conditions shall be shall be operable at all times when demonstrated.

secondary containment integrity is required, a. Pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber 2.a. The results of the in-place cold DOP banks is less than 6 inches of and halogenated hydrocarbon tests at water at the system design flow design flows on HEPA filters and rate.

charcoal adsorber banks shall show

>99% DOP removal and >99% halogenated b. Inlet heater input is capable of hydrocarbon removal. reducing R.H. from 100 to 70% R.H.

b. The results of laboratory carbon 2.a. The tests and sample analysis of sample analysis shall show >99%

Specification 3.7.B.2 shall be radioactive methyl iodide removai performed at least once per year at a velocity within 20 percent gf for standby service or af ter every actual system design, >1.75 mg/m 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of system operation and inlet methyl iodide concentration, following significant painting,

>70% R.H. and <30 C. fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating

c. Fans shall be shown to operate within with the system.

+10% design flow,

b. Cold DOP testing shall be performed

3. From and after the date that one after each complete or partial standby gas treatment system is made replacement of the HEPA filter or found to be inoperable for any bank or after any structural reason, reactor operation is per- maintenance on the system housing.

missible only during the succeeding seven days unless such system is c. Halogenated hydrocarbon testing sooner made operable, provided that shall be performed after each during such seven days all active complete or partial replacement components of the other standby gas of the charcoal adsorber bank treatment system, and its associated or after any structural main-diesel generator, shall be operable. tenance en the system housing.

Fuel handling requirements are specified in Specification 3.10.E. d. Each system shall be operated with the heaters on at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> every month,

e. Test sealing of gaskets for housing doors downstream of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers shall be performed at, and in conformance with, each test performed for compliance with Specification 4.7.B.2.a and Specification 3.7.B.2.a.

3. System drains where present shall be inspected quarterly for adequate water level in loop-seals.

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.9.A 4.9.A.2 (cont'd)

During the monthly generator test the diesel generator starting air compressor shall be checked for operation and its ability to recharge air receivers.

The operation of the diesel fuel oil transfe. pumps and fuel oil day tank level switches shall be demonstrated, and the diesel starting time to reach rated voltage and frequency shall be logged.

b. Once every 18 months the condition under which the diesel generator is required will be simulated and a test conducted to demonstrate that it will start and accept the emergency load within the specified time sequence. The results shall be logged.

c. Specification 4.9.A.2.c deleted.

d. Once a month the quantity of diesel fuel available shall be logged.

e. Every three months and upon delivery a sample of diesel fuel shall be checked for quality. The quality shall be within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-68 for Nos. 1D or 2D and logged.

f. Each diesel generator shall be given an annual inspection in accordance with instructions based on the manufacturer's recommendations.

3. Unic Batteries

a. Every week the specific gravity, the voltage and temperature of the pilot

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.10.B (Cont'd) 4.10 (Cont'd)

4. During spiral reload, SRM operability will be verified by using a portable external source every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> until the required amount of fuel is loaded to maintain 3 cps. As an alternative to the above, two fuel assemblies will be loaded in different cells contain-ing control blades around each SRM to obtain the required 3 cps. Until these two assemblies have been loaded, the 3 cps requirement is not necessary.

C. Spent Fuel Pool Water Level C. Spent Fuel Pool Water Level Whenever irradiated fuel is stored in When irradiated fuel is stored in the the spent fuel pool, the pool water spent fuel pool, the water level shall level shall be maintained at or above be recorded daily.

8 ' above the top of the fuel.

D. Time Limitation Irradiated fuel shall not be handled in or above the reactor prior to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after reactor shutdown.

E. Standby Gas Treatment System From and after the date that one standby gas treatment system is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, fuel handling is permissible only during the suc-ceeding seven days unless such system is soone'r made operable, provided that during such seven days all active components of the other standby gas treatment system, and its associated diesel generator, shall be operable.

At least one diesel generator shall be operable during fuel handling operations. This one diesel shall be capable of supplying power to an operable Standby Gas Treatment System.

F. Core Standby Cooling Systems During a refueling outage, refuel-ing operation may continue with one core spray system or the LPCI mode of RHR inoperable for a period of 30 days. Refueling is permitted with the suppression chamber drain-ed provided an operable core spray system or subsystem of the LPCI mode of RHR is aligned to take a suction on the condensate storage tank containing at least 150,000 gallons (>14 ft. indicated level). i

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LIMITYNG CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.10 (Cont'd) 3.10 (Cont'd)

G. Control Room Air Treatment H. Spent Fuel Cask Handling From and after the date that the 1. Prior to fuel cask handling operations, control room air treatment system the redundant crane including the is made or found to be inoperable rope, hooks, slings, shackles and for any reason, refueling opera- other operating mechanisms will be tions are permissible only during inspected.

the succeeding seven days unless such circuit is sooner made oper- The rope will be replaced if any able. If these conditions cannot of .he following conditions exist:

be met, refueling operations shall be terminated in an orderly manner, a. Twelve (12) randomly distributed broken wires in one lay or four H. Spent Fuel Cask Handling (4) broken wires in one strand of one rope lay.

1. Fuel cask handling above the 931' level of the Reactor Building will b. Wear of one-third the original be done in the RESTRICTED MODE diameter of outside individual

[ only except as specified in 3.10.H.2. wire.

2. Fuel cask handling in other than the c. Kinking, crushing, or any other RESTRICTED MODE will be permitted damage resulting in distortion in emergency or equipment failure of the rope.

situations only to the extent necessary to get the cask to the d. Evidence of any type of heat closest acceptable stable location. damage,

e. Reductions from nominal diameter of more than 1/16 inch for a rope diameter from 7/8" to 1 1/4" inclusive.

3. Operation with a failed controlled 2. Prior to operations in the RESTRICTED area limit switch is permissible for MODE 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> providing an operator is on the refueling floor to assure the a. the controlled area limit switches crane is operated within the will be tested; restricted zone painted on the floor.

b. the "two-block" limit switches

4. Spent fuel casks weighing in excess will be tested; of 140,000 lbs. shall not be handled.

c. the " inching hoist" controls will be tested.

3. The empty spent fuel cask will be lifted free of all support by a maximum of 1 foot and left hanging for 5 minutes prior to any series of fuel cask handling operations.

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3.10 BASES (Cont'd)

D. Time Limitation The radiological consequences of a fuel handling accident are based upon the accident occurring at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after reactor shutdown.

E. Standby Gas Treatment System Only one of the two standby gas treatment systems is needed to clean up the reactor building atmosphere upon containment isolation. If one system is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the containment system performance and refueling operation may continue while repairs are being made. If neither system is operable, the plant is brought to a con-dition where the standby gas treatment system is not required.

F. Core Standby Cooling Systems During refueling the system cannot be pressurized, so only the potential need for core flooding exists and the specified combination of the core spray or LPCI mode can provide this. A more detailed discussion is con-tained in the bases for 3.5.F.

G. Control Room Air Treatment If the system is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the control room and refueling operation may continue for a limited period of time while repairs are being made. If the system cannot be repaired within seven days, refueling operations will be terminated.

H. Spent Fuel Cask Handling l

The operation of the redundant crane in the Restricted Mode during fuel cask handling operations assures that the cask remains within the controlled area once it has been removed from its transport vehicle (i.e., once it is above the 931' elevation). Handling of the cask on the Refueling Floor in the Unrestricted Mode is allowed only in the case of equipment failures or emergency conditions when the cask is already suspended. The Unrestricted Mode of operation is allowed only to the extent necessary to get the cask to a suitable stationary position so the required repairs can be made. Operation with a failed controlled area microswitch will be allowed for a 48-hour period providing an Operator is on the floor in addition to the crane operator to assure that the cask handling is limited to the controlled area as marked on l the floor. This will allow adequate time to make repairs but still l will not restrict cask handling operations unduly.

l l 4.10 BASES A. Refueling Interlocks Complete functional testing of all refueling interlocks before any l

l refueling outage will provide positive indication that the interlocks operate in the situations for which they were designed. By loading each hoist with a weight equal to the fuel assembly, positioning the refueling platform and withdrawing control rods, the interlocks can be subjected to valid operational tests. Where redundancy is provided in l

the logic circuitry, tests can be performed to assure that each redundant l logic element can independently perform its functions.

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4.10 BASES (Cont'd)

B. Core Monitoring Requiring the SRM's to be functionally tested prior to any core alteration assures that the SRM's will be operable at the start of that alteration.

The daily response check (or 12-hour check for spiral reload) of the SRM's ensures their continued operability.

H. Spent Fuel Cask Handling The Surveillance Requirements specified assure that the redundant crane is adequately inspected in accordance with the accepted ANSI Standard (B.30.2.0) and manufacturer's recommendations to determine that the equipment is in satisfactory condition. The testing of the controlled area limit switches assures that the crane operation will be limited to the designated area in the Restricted Mode of operation. The test of the "two-block" limit switch assures the power to the hoisting motor will be interrupted before an actual "two-blocking" incident can occur.

The test of the inching hoist assures that this mode of load control is available when required.

Requiring the lifting and holding of the cask for 5 minutes during the initial lift of each series of cask handling operations puts a load test on the entire crane lifting mechanism as well as the braking l system.

Performing this test when the cask is being lifted initially from the cask car assures that the system is operable prior to liftir.g the load to an excessive height.

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. . i LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.12.A (cont'd) 4.12.A (cont'd)  !

2.d. Each circuit shall be operated at l least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> every month.

3. From and after the date that the 3. At least once per operating cycle control room air treatment automatic initiation of the system system is made or found to be shall be demonstrated.

inoperable for any reason, reactor l operations are permissible only ,

during the succeeeding seven days unless such circuit is sooner made operable. Refueling requirements are as specified in Specification 3.10.G.

4. If these conditions cannot be met, reactor shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

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3.12 3ASES A. Main Control Room Ventilation System The control room ventilation system is designed to filter the control room atmosphere for intake air and/or for recirculation during control room isolation conditions. The system is designed to automatically start upon control room isolation and to maintain the control room pressure to the design positive pressure so that all leakage should be out leakage.

High efficiency particulate absolute (HEPA) filters are installed before the charcoal adsorbers to prevent clogging of the iodine adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential intake of radiciodine to the control room. The in-place test results should indicate a system leak tightness of less than 1 percent bypass leakage for the charcoal adsorbers and a HEPA efficiency of at least 99 percent removal of DOP particulates.

The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 99 percent for expected accident conditions. If the efficiencies of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers are as specified, the resulting doses will be less than the allowable levels stated in Criterion 19 of the General Design Criteria for Nuclear Poser Plants, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Operation of the fans significantly different from the design flow will change the removal efficiency of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

If the system is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the control room and reactor operation may continue for a limited period of time while repairs are being made. If the system cannot be repaired l

within seven days, the reactor is shutdown and brought to cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. l B. Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System The reactor building closed cooling water system has two pumps and one heat exchanger in each of two loops. Each loop is capable of supplying the cooling requirements of the essential services following design accident conditions with only one pump in either loop.

The system has additional flexibility provided by the capability of inter-connection of the two loops and the backup water supply to the critical loop by the service water system. This flexibility and the need for only one pump in one loop to meet the design accident requirements justifies the 30 day repair time during normal operation and the reduced requirements during head-off operations requiring the availability of LPCI or the core spray systems.

C. Service Water System The service water system consists of four vertical service water pumps located in the intake structure, and associated strainers, piping, valving and instrumentation. The pumps discharge.to a common header from which independent piping supplies two Seismic Class I cooling water loons and one turbine building loop. Automatic valving is provided to shutoff all supply to the turbine building loop on drop in header pressure thus assuring supply to the Seismic Class I loops each of which feeds one diesel generator, two RHR service water booster pumps, one control room basement fan coil unit and one RBCCW

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURUEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 3.22 SPECIAL TESTS / EXCEPTIONS 4.22 SPECIAL TESTS / EXCEPTIONS APPLICABILITY APPLICABILITY Applies to conditions of operation for Applies to the surveillance requirements performing various special tests, for the performance of various special tests.

OBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE To assure that various special tests are To verify that various special tests are safely conducted by providing limiting safely conducted.

conditions for operation for their per-formance.

SPECIFICATIONS SPECIFICATIONS

- A. Shutd'.,wn Margin Demonstration A. Shutdown Margin Demonstration

1. Reactor Mode Selector Switch 1. Within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> prior to and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> The reactor mode selector switch during the performance of a may be placed in the Startup/ Hot shutdown margin demonstration,

, Standby position to allow more verify that:

than one control rod to be with-drawn for the shutdown margin a. The source range monitors are demonstration provided all the OPERABLE.

, following requirements are met:

b. The rod worth minimizer is

a. Source range monitors are OPERABLE or a second quali-OPERABLE with at least tw fied operator is present and channels having an observed verifies compliance with the count rate equal to or greater

shutdown margin demonstration than three counts per second procedures.

with the corresponding detec-tors fully inserted.

( c. No core alterations are in

! b. Rod worth minimizer is progress.

OPERABLE and is programmed for the shutdown margin l demonstration, or a second licensed operator or other qualified employee shall verify that the operator at the reactor console is _

conforming with the shut-down margin demonstration procedure.

c. The " rod-out-notch-override" control shall not be used during out-of-sequence move-ments of the control rods.

d. No CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress.

l If the above requirements are not satisfied, immediately place the reactor mode selector switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position.

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVETLLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

3.22 SPECIAL TESTS / EXCEPTIONS (CONT'D) 4.22 SPECIAL TESTS / EXCEPTIONS (CONT'D)

2. Red Sequence Control System (RSCS) 2. When the constraints imposed on control rod groups by the RSCS The sequence constraints imposed are bypassed, verify:

on control rod groups by the RSCS may be suspended by means of the a. That the RWM is OPERABLE.

individual rod position bypass switches or jumpers, provided b. Conformance with this speci-that the rod worth minimizer is fication and procedures by a OPERABLE, for this and the second licensed operator or following special tests. other qualified employee.

a. Control rod scram timing.

b. Control rod friction measure-ments,

c. Startup test program with thermal power less than 20%

of rated thermal power.

If the above requirement is not satisfied, the R5CS shall be operable.

3. RHR System The RHR system may be aligned in the shutdown cooling mode with at least one shutdown -cooling mode loop OPERABLE while performing the Shutdown Margin Demonstration.

4. Containment Systems Primary containment is not re-quired while performing the Shutdown Margin Demonstration when reactor water temperature is equal to or less than 212*F.

B. Training Startup B. Training Startup

1. LPCI Mode of RHR The reactor vessel shall be verified to be unpressurized and the thermal The LPCI mode is required to be Power verified to be less than 1% of operable with the exception that rated thermal power at least once the RHR system may be aligned in Per hour during training startups.

the shutdown cooling mode rather than the LPCI mode while perform-ing training startups at atmos-pheric pressure at power levels less than 1% of rated thermal power.

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LIMITING COWDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.22 SPECIAL TESTS / EXCEPTIONS (CONT'D) 4.22 SPECIAL TESTS / EXCEPTIONS (CONT'D)

C. Physics Tests C. Physics Tests

1. Primary Containment 1. Thermal power shall be deter-mined to be less than 5MW(T)

Primary containment integrity may of rated thermal power et be relaxed while performing "open least once per hour.

vessel" physics tests at power levels not to exceed 5 MW (T). 2. Verify at least once per hour If this thermal power limit is that the recirculation loops exceeded, immediately place the have been out of service for reactor mode selector switch in less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

the Shutdown position.

2. Re'c'irculation Loops Recirculation loops need not be in operation for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> while performing "open vessel" physics tests. If this time limit is exceeded, insert all control rods.

D. Startup Test Program D. Startup Test Program

1. Oxygen Concentration Verify at least once per hour that the recirculation loops have been During the startup test program, out of service for less than 24 there is no requirement on oxygen hours, concentration in the primary con-tainment. This supersedes the provisions of Specification 3.7.A.5.a.

2. Recirculation Loops Recirculation loops need not be in operation for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> while performing the startup test program. If this time limit is exceeded, insert all

control rods.

I

+

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3.22 & 4.22 BASES A. Shutdown Margin Demonstration Performance of shutdown margin demonstrations requires additional restrictions in order to ensure that criticality does not occur. In order to perform the test it is necessary to bypass the sequence restraints on control rod movement.

Additional surveillance requirements ensure that shutdown margin requirements and individual rod worths do not exceed values assumed in the safety analysis.

Since power levels attained during the demonstration are kept below the level of significant heat addition, the residual heat removal system can remain ~

aligned in the shutdown cooling mode.

i B. Training Startup Specification 3.22.B provides for the performance of training startups without realigning the residual heat removal system from the shutdown cooling mode to the LPCI mode. Power levels during training startups are kept below the level of significant heat addition.

This exception is made in order to minimize contaminated water discharge to the radioactive waste disposal system.

C. Physics Tests An exception is made to primary containment integrity during initial core loading and while the low power test program is being conducted and ready access to the reactor vessel is required. There will be no pressure on the system at this time, thus greatly reducing the chances of a pipe break. The reactor may be taken critical during this period; however, restrictive operating procedures will be in effect again to minimize the probability of an accident occurring.

Procedures and the rod worth minimizer would limit control worth such that a rod drop would not result in any fuel damage. In addition, in the unlikely event that an excursion did occur, the reactor building and standby gas treat-ment system, which shall be operational during this time, offer a sufficient barrier to keep off-site doses well below 10CFR100 limits.

j D. Startup Test Program Relief from the oxygen concentration specifications is necessary in order to provide access to the primary containment during the initial startup and testing phase of operation. Without this access the startup and test program could be

( restricted and delayed.

l l

The recirculation flow exception permits reactor criticality under no-flow con-l ditions and is required to perform certain startup and physics tests while at low l thermal power levels.

i l

l l

l l

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