ML20115B118

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Forwards from Chairman,Acrs,For Info of Commission
ML20115B118
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/18/1966
From: Hobbs F
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
Shared Package
ML093631134 List: ... further results
References
AEC-R-135-1, NUDOCS 9210150278
Download: ML20115B118 (2)
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_ ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 3

l CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK (INDIAN POINT IIL DOCKET NO. 50-247

.s Note tc-the Acting Secretary The attached letter of August 16, ' 966 from the~ Ctdirman, ACRS, is circulated for the informatipn of the Commission.

The letter has been referred to the Director of Regulation'fo'r a, - -

g appropriate action.

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a F. T. hobbs Acting Secretary DISTRIBUTION COPY NO.

Secretary 1,58-66 Commissioners 2 - 6,,67 General Manager 7-8 Deputy Gen. Mgr.

9 Asst. Gen. Mgr.

10 Dir. of Regulation 11 - 13 Deputy Dir. of Regulation 14 Exec. Asst. to GM 15 Asst. GM for Admin.

16 Asst. GM for Operations 17 Asst. GM for Reactors 18 - 19 General Counsel 20 - 24 Compliance 25 - 30 921015o27e g g h Congr. Relations 31 - 32 PLa ORG PDR Inspection 33 N& val Reactors 34 - 35...

Noto by thn Acting Socretary v ',

The attached letter of August 16, 1966 from the Cha1xuan, ACRS, is circulated for the infozmatipn of the Comiccion.

The letter has been referred to the Director of Regulation for appropriate action.

F. T. Hobbs Acting Secretary DISTRIBUTION COPY NO.

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Sec re ';ary 1,58-66 Commissioners 2 - 6j67 General Manager-7-8

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Deputy Gen. Mgr. t 9

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10 Dir. of Regulation f '.

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15 Asst. GM for-Admin; T?

16 Asst. GM for-Operations 17 Asst. GM for Reactors 18 - 19

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Gefierar Counsel

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Compliance

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25 --30 Congr. Relations 31 - 32 r-Inspection

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33 34 35 Naval Reactors 36 - 37

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j Operational ~ Safety Plans & Reports 38 - 39 Public Information 40 - 41 4

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Reactor Dev. &. Tech.

42 --51 Reactor Licensing 52 - 53 Safety Standards 54 - 55 State & Lic. Relations 56 - 57

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2-e ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOP SAFEGUARDS _

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSIONi...,

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20545

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AUG 161966

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. _. Ti',fb Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg '

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Subject:

REPORT ON 1NDIAN -POINI NUCLEAR CENERATING -UNIT _ FO.12.';TF ^

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At its seventy-fifth meeting, July 14-16,_1966 and.its'apeci'al-meeting on-August 4-5, 1966_. the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards-com.

pleted its review of the application of Consolidated Edison-Company.

of New York, Inc.' for authorization to construct Indian' Point: Nuclear-

' Generating Unit No.52. This project had previously been# considered-

.at the seventy-second and seventy-third meetin'gs.of the"C'oonnii; tee, and,

, ' at' Subconnittee meetings on' March 30, May 3, and June 23719[667' DUring its review, the Committee had'the benefit of discussions with represea-c I'

'tatives 'of the Consolidated' Edison Company and theirchnbraciors and -

consultants and with representatives of the AEC Regulatory Sta' ff and their consultants. The Committee also had the benefit of the' docunents

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The Indian Point 2 plant is to'be a pressurized water rea[ tor system utilizing -a core fueled with slightly enriched uranium dioxide pellets-contained in Zircaloy fuel rods; it is to be controlled by a combination of rod cluster-type control rods and boron dissolved;in; the primary coolant system. The plant is rated at 2758 If4(t); the gross electrical output is estimated to be 916 HW(e).- Although the turbineL h'as an ad-ditional calculated gross capacity of about 107., the applicant has '

stated that there are no. plans for power-stretch in this plant.

The Indian Point _2 facility is the largest reactor that hast been con-sidered for licensing to date.

Furthermore, it will be located in a region of relative,1y high population density. For these reasons, particular attention has been given to improving and supplementing the protective features previously_ provided in other plants of this type.

A, The proposed design has a reinforced concrete containment with an in-ternal steel liner which is provided with facili. ties for pressurization of weld areas to reduce the possibility of leakage in these areas.

The containment design also includes an internal recirculation

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containment spray system and an air recirculation system consisting of five air handling units to provide long-term cooling of the con--

tainment without having to pump radioactive liquids outside the containment in the event of an accident. Even though the applicant,

anticipates negligible leakage from the containment, two independent means of iodin; removal within the containment have been provided.

These are an air filtration' system using activated charcoal filters, and a containment spray system which uses sodium thiosulfate in the spray water as a reagent to - aid removal of elemental-iodine.

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The reactor vessel and various other components of the system are j

surrounded by concrete shielding which provides protection to the / ~.

containment against missiles that might be generated if structural failure of such components were-to occur during operation at pressure.

.This includes missile protection against the highly unlikely failure of the reactor vessel by longitudinal splitting or by various modes of circumferential cracking. The Committee favors such protection for large reactors in regions of relatively high population density.

l The Indian Point 2 plant is provid'ed 'with two safety inject,io$ systems [

for, flooding' the core with borated water in the event of a pipe

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rupture in the primary system. The emergency core cooling systehs are of particular importance, and the ACRS believes that an increase' '

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in the flow capacity of these systems is needed; improvements

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other characteristics such as pump discharge pressure may be ap.

propriate. The forces imposed on various structural members within the pressure vessel during blowdown in a lo'ss-of-coolant accident l

should be reviewed to assure adequate design conservatism.

The Committee believes that these matters can be resolved during con-struction of these facilities. However, it believes that the AEC d

Regulatory Staf f and the Committee should review the final design l

.of the emergency core cooling systems and the pertinent structural members within the pressure vessel, prior to irrevocable. commitments 3

relative to construction of these items.

The applicant stated that, even if a significant fraction of the core were to melt during a loss-of '.oolant accident, the melted portion would not penetrate the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel owing to contact of the vessel with water in the -sump beneath it.

The applicant-also proposes to install a backup to the erergency core cooling systems, in the form of a water-cooled refractory-lined stainless steel tank beneath the reactor pressure vessel.

The Com-mittee would like to be advised of design details and their theo-retical and experimental bases when the design is completed.

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'In order to reduce still further t' e low pro 6bility of primary system rupture, the applicant should take the additional measures

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"" studies made by the applicant'in this connection, and cons ~equent proposals, as soon as theu are available.

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Design and fabrication techniques for the entire primary -

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system should be reviewed thoroughly to assure adequate, j

. 'A conservatism throughout and to make full use of practical;

'S existing inspection t'echniques which can provide still greater assurance of highest quality.

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Great attentio'n should be"placed iri design on in; service inspection possibilities and the detection of incipient 4

trouble in the entire primary system during reactor}*e+

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operat ion. _ Met'. 3s of ' leak detection should be employed g7 which provide a makithum'of protection against seriouse

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['httention should als'o be.given to quality control aspechs,' aI'vell y

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,y;:asjetress analysis evaluation, of the containment and.its liner.

'The~ Comittee recommends that'these items ~ be resolved between the

'~ AEC Regulatory Staff and the applicant as adequate information is

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' The applicant has ma'de studies of reactivity excursions resulting from the improbable event that structural failure leads to expulsion of a control rod from the core.

Such transients should be limited by design and operation so that they cannot result in gross primary-system rupture or disruption of the core, which could impair the effectivenesa of emergency core cooling. The reactivity transient

. problem is complicated by the existence of sizeable positive' re-

~ activity effects associated with vo 'ing the borated coolant water, particularly early in core life.

In addition, the ccurse of the transients is sensitive to various parameters, some of_ which remain to be fixed during the final design. Westinghouse' representatives

reported that the magnitude of such reactivity transients could be reduced by. installation of solid burnable poisons in the core to permit reduction of the soluble boron content of the moderator, there-

.by reducing the positive moderator coefficient.

The Com%ittee agrees with the applicant's plans to be prepared to install the burnable poison if necessary. The Committee wishes to review the question of reactivity transients as soon as the core design is set.

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s The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards believes that the various itees mentioned can be resolved during construction and that the proposed reactor can be constructed at the Indian Point site with reasonabl e assurance that it can be opetated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

Sincerely yours, f G-David Ukrent Chairman heferences:

1.

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2, Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, Volume 1, and Volume 2, Parts A & B, received December 7, 1965.

2.

First Supplement to Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, Jated March 31, 1966.

3.

Second Supplement to Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, received June 2,1966.

4.

Errata Sheets for Preliminary Safety (nalysis Report and First Supplement thereto, received June 13, 1966..

5.

Third Supplement to Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, re-ceived June 22, 1966.

6.

Fourth Susplement to Prcliminary Safety Analysis Report, re-ceived J: 1y 28,1966.

7.

Fif th Supplement to Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, re-ceived July 28, 1966.

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