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- r. ~3 ard J. T'.uner Otocutive Dircetor Joint Cc=nitted on Atotic Caorcy ConLTcco of the United L'tates Je.u !ir. Tr.ucer Wo copies of "Jeactor Ccnctruction Operience" !;C.0
- 72-1 arc cncloced for the infort:ation of the C=ittee.
- his report describes a fire which cecurred at Concolidated 2dicon'c Indian Point 2 nuclear Centrating station on I;ovc:ber 4,1971.
The fire caused substantial delay in pr2paration of the plant for initial operation, en activity that van in progress at the tine of the incident. Althouril nuclear cafety vac not jco. cardi::cd under the e::1ctinG circumstances, cic;nificant nr.sunts of cafety equipent vere danaced co that they were not availabic for cuto-natic operation.
Copics of thic report are being distributed to the nucicar industry for their infor.'.ation.
Sinecrcly, M VrCnce D.
I.c'.7,.'Irce tor Division of Ccaplir.ce
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. '- 72.J-1. (2 c73)
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4 UIJITE D CT AT ES ATOI.ilC E fJ C RGY COlaf.it?^.lO!!
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j January 1972 i
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RCE:72 1 i,
i FIRE AT A NUCl. EAR POh'ER l'LANT UNDER CO:'STRUCT103 i
g-I 1.0 Des c ri p t i on J
A serious fire occurred recently in the Pr.inary Auxiliary Building
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(PAD) at a PWR nuclear generating station..At the tirae of the fire, i
the status of the reactor facility was as follows:
I 1.1 The core uns f ully loaded, but not critical.
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l 1.2 All control rods vere in the " full in" positiun, s
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1.3 The primary coelant was borated for the shutdown condition, i
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1.4 The rccctor vessel head was removed.
l l-1.5 The primary ce.da:it uns being circulated by t'.c residual-
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heat term e.1 (il:R) p.:ps.
These punpr. are J occh in the l
lower icvel of the PAB.
I' 1.6 The boren addition svstem, clso Iccatcd in tha T1.'.1, was preperly 1. =d up to the suction side of the eL:.r;ing
, pur:ps.,- Those pumps vet,e not operating..
The fire was first detected at' about 7:00 P.M. by a roving operat.or
' who.netified the control room immediately.
The control room
. operator,.alcrted ' plant personnel on the pt:blic addresc system, and' the local fire departments. 'f fem the surrounding to'. ns were notified.
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The fire -departncntn frca these towns respended.
The Ifre uns extinguished at 9:00 P.M.
The fire departtcuts Jeft the site at-l 10:45 P.M.
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-In the~proccus of fighting the fire..the electrical p.eer to-the p/3 van 'ecered.
Thisi t et ici rd.dcred cert ain D rort vt react or systems :md cerc.ponents inoperative, including the, berie ccid t;vnt en, and the-ndn system.
The Joss ofi theco system and components ecoced ho Arcediate.r.c rety preb}enf..in that.t he _ rinctor rencined. in; a,: :tatic.
i shutdoun condition.
.loucver, itf ter.t he o]cetrical pwcr pas restored, l
comerinportant c.or.ponents rcimnined inopera tive ghte _.to cabic_ dbmage I
j from fire,. hoot, and voter..in addition,,the. fire caused.considerabic l
damage t o three 'notor control centers (liCC'r) ubich T rovj de = pove r t'o F:
many of the c'ngineered safety features for t he: power plant.
The",
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~ equipment that was cor7 etely or partially affected by the; fire is-1 r
given in Figure 1 at t t.ched.-
4 2.0 cause
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The fire start cd in a construction shack located Oithin the PAB in l-an area under the 1;CCs.
The shach van scheduled to be.Lremoved prior j-to. plant operation.
The plyvood.shach provided the source of heat that damaged or disabled cab 3cs'to_some of the engineered-safety systems.
Investigation-of the incident revealed ' evidence indicating pocsible arson.
3.0 Correction
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-A progrr.n and procedure for the cicanup, repair and reinstclJation of-clectrical cabling and equipment. has been_ formulated. _All'danaged-l sections of cabling vill.be replaced with new cabic.
Connectiona--
' between'the sections af cabic villabe r:ade in cable solicine boxes.
r The requirad physical'cnd.clectrical separation of rebundani r.aicty-i circuits vill bc :aintained by running cabic. pairs te_ dificrent. bo:.cs l
Jocated physically aper:.
All cables -arcio be ' t h:'rruthly ten ed i -.
to assure that operctienal characterictics havt not beca inpaired.
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A written directive has been issued to the operating plant personnel re-enphasiains the neu! far clot.cr curveillance of potent ial-fire
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Additional fire. catches cnd accurity racasures have been areas.
instituted.,'
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,4'.0 Observations is l
The fire' incident dermnstrat'ed th5t the less'of'enginected.safet)/
systems' can occur then ::CCs are located in the same area and redundant:
power cab 1cs are rout ed in close pro:timity to cach other.
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l pocer plants chould be derjriied c)ih chnt %uing 'ntr.ingent 2.t tention to:
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4.1 'lhc phy ical locatica of 1:CCu, 4;2 _ Tb r physica) !.(ta rn t 'i en if E r edund:n.. %0dyi oy h t en cd.l es.'
M Even thouch' r.eparated, the enb3c s should be prot ectbd hit'h j
- adcquste iire_ barricrs, and cendait' or covered cab 3e trays, 4.3 The routing of cahJec-should avoid arcas with a potential j
for a hostile enviromacut.
i' Dcbris and construction rateria]o of a f1cru.uble nature. sheuld be hept to a minimum during construction, and be removed from nuclear.
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cration buildings prior-to fuc1 loading.
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tach licensec should have-a vc13-orpanized progra$t to accure l
detcetion of hazardoun conditions;.to assure appropriate initial action by-vell-trained personnel upon detection of an emergency i
situation; and to :.ssure neccescry supporting groups are availabic l
vithin a renconab3c tir.c period. _1f.the necessary support is_not-j-
availabic, includin;; outside sources within a roast aabic time period, such support should be provided by appropriat o 'augr.cntation j
_of the on-site staff.
Turtherecre, the well-organiacd prograu described-a_bove tust provido assurance'that; expected _cmergency-conditions do not cause the safety of,the reactor to be compromised.
J The suspicious. nature of the cause of'the f$re cephasizes the
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importeneo of carefull: rcr:cnir. - (initia3 3y.cnd pericdicc13y),
i perr.onnb] ascociated eith nuclear reuor plants rho nibht br.ve t he
'opportur.ity of creatin;.; au cncrgency situction.
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i DivJsion of Compliance i
U. S. Atonic Energy Crimissien i
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' Note: 'B0E:71-7 v'as ' th'e' last..of' the 197r se:ien.
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.SY_ST._r"P. ~ rm CO'!!'O::"'.TS. AITl:CTI:n nY 'I PP T!ET. -
-(Hany of the synt ces or cor.iponents were operabic it.anually or electrically,
- but, vould noi, f unct io.n, au t oua ticolly. ),
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' ITrM TITI.E
- SYSTC! CO' PO"D:TP I?IOPERATIYC
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'1.
Safety Injection System' l'.
Motor-operated valves in this systen are cicetrically
. inoperative.
2.
livron injection tank heaters. -
3.
Boron injection temperature controller ]cyc1'transmittcr -
2.
Containment Spray System 1.
All four discharge stop valves.
3.
Containment Alr Reefreulation 1.
All 10 valves in the-charcoal Cooling and Tiltration Syst en filter housing units.
4.
Isolation Valve Scal Water 1.- Seal water return line isola-System tion valvo.
5.
Aur.111ary Coolant System i.
RC punp bearing CCW return isolation valve.
2.
RC pump thermal. barrier'rcturn isolaLion valvo.
I' 3.
T.HR hiat enchanger chut-off valves.
4.
'luo boor ter pure.pu.
'6.
llydroge n Rt.cc:abiner
-1.
Two units.
7,
- Diesel Generator Building 1.
All' normal and energency vent-fanc.
2.
Li;hting.
3.
Crant; case exhaust.
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- Compressors.
- 5. 'Fucl oil. pump.,
- 6. - Jpchet t:ater and lube oil.hcaters.
7; llca t tracing.
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Public Address Systen 1.
Pouer supply.
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ITD1 TITLE SYSTE!! Cn:1PO?:ENl'S-INOPERATIVE t
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Cont'ainment Buildin'g 1.
Prescure rc31cf fan.
2.
, Purge fans.=
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Di3ution fan.
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i-10.
Primary System
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Both presmurdzor po!.cor relief j
-line bicch valves.
- 11. -
Tecdwater Control System 1.
Two-bof]er f eed pump stop valves..
.p 12.
Boric Acid System 1.
Both norna3 and emergency-Lheat
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tracing systems.-
2.
Two tank-heaters.
3.
-Room heaters.
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4.
Evaporator feed-pumps.
5.
Transf er pump..
4-l 13.
Chemical 6 Voluue Control 1.
Volano control tank discharge F
Syatem valve.
i 2.
Make-up p rp.
4.
I-34.
Radiation }!onitoring System 1.
' Partial.lors of system.
1 2 '.
Cor.thinr:n t-air '~pcrtie'ulct e monitor blew r.
h, 15.
E]cetrical Tur.ncl Ventilation 1.-
Exhaust fcn.-.
l Systett l
16.
-Instrument Bus 1.
- One-potect. source - f or redundant -
instrumentr.;ica - reactor protectien, analog channelf4, g
.containmen:. ins t'ruments, and S15 -
analog.
4 17.
.. Air Conditioning Syst m 1/.Six. mo to r:s.
f-18.
.Frimary Auxiliary Building 1.
Exhaust fan.
2.
Sump pumps.
f 3.
Sun.p t ank pumps.
4.
Surply far..
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2.-
Overhead cranc.-
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Sunh.,,putap.
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11any miscellaneous $ tems '
.. including a twtor -operated
. door.
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