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NRC-2020-000169 - Resp 1 - Final, Agency Records Subject to the Request Are Enclosed. Part 3 of 9
	ML20108E923
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Issue date:	04/15/2020
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ML20108E919	List: ML20108E920; ML20108E921; ML20108E922; ML20108E923; ML20108E924; ML20108E925; ML20108E926; ML20108E927; ML20108E928; ML20108E929;
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lelObTi;C PROPRIETARY INFORMATION APPENDIX l.A: ALLOY X DESCRIPTION 1.A. l Introduction Alloy X is used within this licensing application to designate a group of stainless steel alloys. Alloy X can be any one of the following alloys:

Type 316

Type 316LN

Type 304

Type 304LN Qualification of structures made of Alloy X is accomplished by using the least favorable mechanical and thermal properties of the entire group for all MPC mechanical, structural, neutronic, radiological, and thermal conditions. The Alloy X approach is conservative because no matter which material is ultimately utilized, the Alloy X approach guarantees that the performance of the MPC will meet or exceed the analytical predictions.

This appendix defines the least favorable material properties of Alloy X.

1.A.2 Common Material Properties Several material properties do not vary significantly from one Alloy X constituent to the next. These common material properties are as fo llows:

density

specific heat

Young's Modulus (Modulus of Elasticity)

Poisson's Ratio The values utilized for this licensing application are provided in their appropriate chapters.

1.A.3 Least Favorable Material Properties The fo llowing material properties vary between the Alloy X constituents:

Design Stress Intensity (Sm)

Tensile (Ultimate) Strength (Su)

Yield Strength (Sy)

Coefficient of Them1al Expansion (a)

Coefficient of Themrnl Conductivity (k)

Each of these material properties are provided in the ASME Code Section II [ l .A. l]. Tables l .A. l through l .A.5 provide the ASME Code values for each constituent of Alloy X along with the least HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERTAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 l.A-1 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelObTi;C PROPRIETARY INFORMATION favorable value utilized in this licensing application. The ASME Code only provides values to -20°F.

The lower bound service temperature of the MPC is -40°F. Most of the above-mentioned prope1ties become increasingly favorable as the temperature drops. Conservatively, the values at the lowest design temperature for the HI-STORM FW System have been assumed to be equal to the lowest value stated in the ASME Code. The lone exception is the thermal conductivity. The thermal conductivity decreases with the decreasing temperature. The thermal conductivity value for -40°F is linearly extrapolated from the 70°F value using the difference from 70°F to 100°F.

The Alloy X material properties are the minimum values of the group for the design stress intensity, tensile strength, yield strength, and coefficient of thermal conductivity. Using minimum values of design stress intensity is conservative because lower design stress intensities lead to lower allowables that are based on design stress intensity. Similarly, using minimum values of tensile strength and yield strength is conservative because lower values of tensile strength and yield strength lead to lower a llowables that are based on tensile strength and yield strength. When compared to calculated values, these lower allowables result in factors of safety that are conservative for any of the constituent materials of Alloy X. The maximum and minimum values are used for the coefficient of thermal expansion of Alloy X. The maximum and minimum coefficients of thermal expansion are used as appropriate in this submittal.

l .A.4 References

[ l .A. l] ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section II, Materials (2007).

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERTAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 l.A-2 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION TABLE I.A.I DESIGN STRESS INTENSITY (Sm) vs. TEMPERATURE FOR THE ALLOY-X MATERIALS Alloy X (minimum of Temp. (°F) Type 304 Type 304LN Type 3 16 Type 316LN constituent values)

-40 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 100 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 200 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 300 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 400 18.6 18.6 19.3 18.9 18.6 500 17.5 17.5 18.0 17.5 17.5 600 16.6 16.6 17.0 16.5 16.5 650 16.2 16.2 16.6 16.0 16.0 700 15.8 15.8 16.3 15.6 15.6 750 15.5 15.5 16.1 15.2 15.2 800 15.2 15.2 15.9 14.8 14.8 Notes:

1. Source: Table 2A on pages 308, 312, 316, and 320 of[ 1.A. l] .

2. U nits of design stress intensity values are ksi.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERTAL REPORT HI-2 114830 Rev. 5 l.A-3 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION TABLE l.A.2 TENSILE STRENGTH (Su) vs. TEMPERATURE OF ALLOY-X MATERIALS Alloy X (minimum of Temp. (°F) Type 304 Type 304LN Type 316 Type 316LN constituent values)

-40 75.0 (70.0) 75.0 (70.0) 75.0 (70.0) 75.0 (70.0) 75.0 (70.0) 100 75.0 (70.0) 75.0 (70.0) 75.0 (70.0) 75.0 (70.0) 75.0 (70.0) 200 71.0 (66.3) 71.0 (66.3) 75.0 (70.0) 75.0 (70.0) 71.0 (66.3) 300 66.2 (61.8) 66.2 (61.8) 72.9 (68.0) 70.7 (66.0) 66.2 (61.8) 400 64.0 (59.7) 64.0 (59.7) 71.9 (67.1) 67.1 (62.6) 64.0 (59.7) 500 63.4 (59.2) 63.4 (59.2) 71.8 (67.0) 64.6 (60.3) 63.4 (59.2) 600 63.4 (59.2) 63.4 (59.2) 71.8 (67.0) 63.3 (59.0) 63.3 (59.0) 650 63.4 (59.2) 63.4 (59.2) 71.8 (67.0) 62.8 (58.6) 62.8 (58.6) 700 63.4 (59.2) 63.4 (59.2) 71.8 (67.0) 62.4 (58.3) 62.4 (58.3) 750 63.3 (59.0) 63.3 (59.0) 71.5 (66.7) 62. l (57.9) 62. l (57.9) 800 62.8 (58.6) 62.8 (58.6) 70.8 (66.1) 61.7 (57.6) 61.7 (57.6)

Notes:

1. Source: Table U on pages 514, 516, 518, 520, and 522 of[l.A. 1).

2. Units of tensile strength are ksi.

3. The ultimate stress of Alloy Xis dependent on the product form of the material (i.e., forging vs. plate). Values in parentheses are based on SA-336 forged materials (type F304, F304LN, F316, and F316LN), which are used solely for the one-piece construction MPC lids. All other va lues correspond to SA-240 plate material.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERTAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 l.A-4 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATIOl<l TABLE l.A.3 YIELD STRESSES (Sy) vs. TEMPERATURE OF ALLOY-X MATERIALS A lloy X (minimum of Temp. (°F) Type 304 Type 304LN Type 3 16 Type 316LN con stituent values)

-40 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 100 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 200 25.0 25.0 25.9 25.5 25.0 300 22.4 22.4 23.4 22.9 22.4 400 20.7 20.7 21.4 21.0 20.7 500 19.4 19.4 20.0 19.5 19.4 600 18.4 18.4 18.9 18.3 18.3 650 18.0 18.0 18.5 17.8 17.8 700 17.6 17.6 18.2 17.3 17.3 750 17.2 17.2 17.9 16.9 16.9 800 16.9 16.9 17.7 16.5 16.5 Notes:

1. Source: Table Y-1 on pages 634,638, 646, and 650 of[ l.A.l ].

2. Units of yie ld stress are ksi.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERTAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 l.A-5 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HO! IEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION TABLE l.A.4 COEFFICIENT OF THERMAL EXPANSION vs. TEMPERATURE OF ALLOY-X MATERIALS Temp. (°F) Type 304, 304LN, 316, 316LN

-40 --

100 8.6 150 8.8 200 8.9 250 9.1 300 9.2 350 9.4 400 9.5 450 9.6 500 9.7 550 9.8 600 9.8 650 9.9 700 10.0 750 10.0 800 10.1 850 10.2 900 10.2 950 10.3 1000 10.3 1050 10.4 1100 10.4 Notes:

1. Source: Group 3 alloys from Table TE-1 on pages 749 and 751 of (1.A.1].

2. Units of mean coefficient of thermal expansion are in./in./°F x 10*6*

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERTAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 l.A-6 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelObTi;C PROPRIETARY INFORMATION TABLE l.A.5 THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY vs. TEMPERATURE OF ALLOY-X MATERIALS Alloy X Type 304 Type 3 16 (minimum of Temp. (°F) and and constituent Type 304LN Type 316LN values)

-40 -- -- --

70 8.6 8.2 8.2 100 8.7 8.3 8.3 150 9.0 8.6 8.6 200 9.3 8.8 8.8 250 9.6 9.1 9. l 300 9.8 9.3 9.3 350 10. l 9.5 9.5 400 10.4 9.8 9.8 450 10.6 10.0 10.0 500 10.9 10.2 10.2 550 11.1 10.5 10.5 600 11.3 10.7 10.7 650 11.6 10.9 10.9 700 11.8 11.2 11.2 750 12.0 11.4 11.4 800 12.3 11.6 11.6 850 12.5 11.9 11.9 900 12.7 12.1 12. l 950 12.9 12.3 12.3 1000 13.1 12.5 12.5 1050 13.4 12.8 12.8 1100 13.6 13.0 13.0 Notes:

1. Source: Material groups J and Kin Table TCD on page 765, 766, and 775 of [1 .A. 1].

2. Units of thermal conductivity are Btu/hr-ft-°F.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERTAL REPORT HI-2 114830 Rev. 5 l.A-7 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATIOl<l CHAPTER2t: PRINCIPAL DESIGN CRITERIA

2.0 INTRODUCTION

The design characteristics of the HI-STORM FW System are presented in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.

This chapter contains a compilation of loadings and design criteria applicable to the HI-STORM FW System. The loadings and conditions prescribed herein for the MPC, particularly those pertaining to mechanical accidents, are consistent with those required for 10CFR72 compliance.

This chapter sets forth the loading conditions and relevant acceptance criteria; it does not provide results of any analyses. The analyses and results carried o ut to demonstrate compl iance with the structural design criteria are presented in the subsequent chapters of this FSAR.

This chapter is in fu ll compliance with NUREG- 1536, with the exceptions and clarifications provided in Table 1.0.3. 'fable 1.0.3 summarizes the NUREG-1536 review guidance, the justification for the exception or clarification, and the Holtec approach to meet the intent of the NUREG- 1536 guidance.

The design criteria for the MPCs, HI-STORM FW overpack, and HI-TRAC VW transfer cask are sununarized in Subsections 2.0.1, 2.0.2, and 2.0.3, respectively, and described in the sections that follow.

2.0.1 MPC Design Criteria General The MPC is engineered for a 60 year design life, while satisfying the requirements of 10CFR72.

The adequacy of the MPC to meet the above design life is discussed in Section 3.4. The design characteristics of the MPC are described in Section 1.2.

Structural The MPC is classified as impottant-to-safety. The MPC structural components include the fuel basket and the enclosure vessel. The fuel basket is des igned and fabricated to meet a more stringent displacement limit under mechanical loadings than those implicit in the stress limits of the ASME code (see Section 2.2). The MPC enclosure vessel is designed and fabricated as a Class 1 pressure vessel in accordance with Section III, Subsection NB of the ASME Code, with t This chapter has been prepared in the format and section organization set forth in Regulatory Guide 3.61. The material content of this chapter also fulfills the requirements of NUREG- 1536.

Pagination and numbering of sections, figures, and tables are consistent with the convention set down in Chapter I, Section 1.0, herein. All terms-of-art used in this chapter are consistent with the terminology of the Glossary.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2- 1 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEG PROPRIET.ARY INFORM4IION certain necessary alternatives, as discussed in Section 2.2. The principal exception to the above Code pe1tains to the MPC lid, vent and drain port cover plates, and closure ring welds to the MPC lid and shell, as discussed in Section 2.2. In addition, Threaded Anchor Locations (TALs) in the MPC lid are designed in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0612 for critical lifts to facilitate handling of the loaded MPC.

The MPC closure welds are partial penetration welds that are structurally qualified by analysis in Chapter 3. The MPC lid and closure ring welds are inspected by perfom1ing a liquid penetrant examination in accordance with the drawings contained in Section 1.5. The integrity of the MPC lid-to-shell weld is further verified by performing a progressive liquid penetrant examination of the weld layers, and a Code pressure test.

The structural analysis of the MPC, in conjunction with the redundant closures and nondestructive examination, pressure testing, and helium leak testing provides assurance of canister closure integrity in lieu of the specific weld joint configuration requirements of Section Ill, Subsection NB.

Compliance with the ASME Code, with respect to the design and fabrication of the MPC, and the associated j ustification are discussed in Section 2.2. The MPC design is analyzed for all design basis normal, off-normal, and postulated accident conditions, as defined in Section 2.2.

The required characteristics of the fuel assemblies to be stored in the MPC are limited in accordance with Section 2.1.

Thermal The thermal design and operation of the MPC in the HI-STORM FW System meets the intent of the review guidance contained in ISG-11 , Revision 3 [2.0.1]. Specifically, the ISG-11 provisions that are explicitly invoked and satisfied are:

1. The thermal acceptance criteria for all commercial spent fuel (CSF) authorized by the USNRC for operation in a commercial reactor are unified into one set of requirements.

11. The maximum value of the calculated temperature for all CSF under long-tenn normal conditions of storage must remain below 400°C (752°F). For short-term operations, including canister drying, helium backfill, and on-site cask transpo1t operations, the fuel cladding temperature must not exceed 400°C (752°F) for high burnup fuel (HBF) and 570°C (1058°F) for moderate burnup fuel.

iii. The maximum fuel cladding temperature as a result of an off-normal or accident event must not exceed 570°C (1058°F).

1v. For HBF, operating restrictions are imposed to limit the maximum temperature excursion during short-term operations to 65°C ( l 17°F) and the number of excursions to less than 10.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-2 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HObTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION To achieve compliance with the above criteria, certain design and operational changes are necessary, as summarized below.

1. The peak fuel claddjng temperature limit (PCT) for long term storage operations and short term operations is generally set at 400°C (752°F). However, for MPCs containing all moderate burnup fuel, the fuel cladding temperature limit for short-term operations is set at 570°C ( I058°F) because the nominal fue l cladding stress is shown to be less than 90 MPa [2.0.2). Appropriate analyses have been performed as discussed in Chapter 4 and operating restrictions have been added to ensure these limits are met.

11. A method of drying, such as forced he lium dehydration (FHD) is used if the above temperature limits for short-term operations cannot be met.

iii. The off-normal and accident condition PCT limit rema ins unchanged at 570 °C (1058°F).

The MPC cavity is dried, either with FHD or vacuum drying, and then it is backfilled with high purity helium to promote heat transfer and prevent cladding degradation.

The normal condition design temperatures for the stainless steel components in the MPC are provided in Table 2.2.3.

Each MPC model allows for regionalized storage where the basket is segregated into three regions as shown in Figures 1.2. l and 1.2.2. Decay heat limits for regionalized loading are presented in Tables 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 for MPC-37 and MPC-89, respectively. Specific requirements, such as approved locations for DFCs and non-fuel hardware are given in Section

2. 1.

Shielding The dose limits for an ISFSI using the HI-STORM FW System are delineated in 10CFR72.104 and 72. l 06. Compliance with these regulations for any pa11icular array of casks at an TSFST is necessarily site-specific and must be demonstrated by the licensee. Dose for a single cask and a representative cask array is iHustrated in Chapter 5.

The MPC provides axial shielding at the top and bottom ends to maintain occupational exposures ALARA during canister closure and handling operations. The HI-TRAC VW bottom lid also contains shielding. The occupational doses are controlled in accordance with plant-specific procedures and ALARA requirements (discussed in Chapter 9).

The dose evaluation is perfonned for a reference fuel (Table 1.0.4) as described in Section 5.2.

Calculated dose rates for each MPC are provi.ded in Section 5. 1. These dose rates are used to perform an occupational exposure (ALARA) evaluation, as discussed in Chapter 11.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-3 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLTEC PRO~RIETARY lt~FORMATION Criticality The MPC provides critica lity control for all design basis normal, off-normal, and postulated accident conditions, as discussed in Section 6.1. The effective neutron multiplication factor is limited to kerr < 0.95 for fresh (unirradiated) fuel with optimum water moderation and close reflection, including all biases, uncertainties, and manufacturing tolerances.

Criticality control is maintained by the geometric spacing of the fuel assemblies and the spatially distributed B-10 isotope in the Metamic-HT fuel basket, and for the PWR MPC model, the additional soluble boron in the MPC water. The minimum specified boron concentration in the purchasing specificatio n for Metamic-HT must be met in every lot of the material manufactured.

The guaranteed B-10 value in the neutron absorber, assured by the manufacturing process, is further reduced by 10% (90% credit is taken for the Metamic-HT) to accord with NUREG/CR-566 1. No credit is taken for fuel burnup or integral poisons such as gadolinia in BWR fuel. The soluble boron concentration requirements (for PWR fuel only) based on the initial enrichment of the fuel assemblies are delineated in Section 2. 1 consistent with the criticality analysis described in Chapter 6.

Confinement The MPC provides for confi nement of all radioactive materials for all design basis normal, off-nonnal, and postulated accident conditions. As discussed in Section 7. 1, the HI-STORM FW MPC design meets the guidance in Interim Staff Guidance (ISG)- 18 so that leakage of radiological matter from the confinement boundary is non-credible. Therefore, no confinement dose analysis is required or performed. The confinement function of the MPC is verified through pressure testing, helium leak testing of the MPC shell, base plate, and lid material along with the shell to base plate and shell to shell seam welds, and a rigorous we ld examination regimen executed in accordance with the acceptance test program in Chapter 10.

Operations There are no radioactive effluents that result from storage or transfer operations. Effluents generated during MPC loading are handled by the plant's radioactive waste system and procedures.

Generic operating procedures for the HI-STORM FW System are provided in Chapter 9.

Detailed operating procedures will be developed by the licensee using the information provided in Chapter 9 a long with the site-specific requirements that comply with the IOCFR50 Technica l Specifications for the plant, and the HI-STORM FW System Certificate of Compliance (CoC).

Acceptance Tests and Maintenance The acceptance criteria and maintenance program to be applied to the MPC are described in Chapter 10. The operational controls and limits to be applied to the MPC are discussed 111 HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-4 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Chapter 13. Application of these requirements will assure that the MPC is fabricated, operated, and maintained in a manner that satisfies the design criteria defined in this chapter.

Decommissioning The MPC is designed to be transportable in a HI-STAR overpack and is not required to be unloaded prior to shipment off-site. Decommissioning of the HI-STORM FW System is addressed in Section 2.4.

2.0.2 HI-STORM FW Overpack Design Criteria General The HI-STORM FW overpack is engineered for a 60 year Design Life whi le satisfying the requirements of 10CFR72. The adequacy of the overpack to meet the required design life is discussed in Subsection 3.4.7. The design characteristics of the HI-STORM FW overpack are summarized in Subsection 1.2.1.

Structural The HI-STORM FW overpack includes both concrete and structural steel parts that are classified as important-to-safety.

The concrete material is defined as important-to-safety because of its shielding function. The primary function of the HI-STORM FW overpack concrete is shielding of the gamma and neutron radiation emitted by the spent nuclear fuel.

The HI-STORM FW overpack plain concrete is enclosed in steel inner and outer shells connected to each other by radial ribs, and top and bottom plates. As the HI-STORM FW overpack concrete is not reinforced, the structural analysis of the overpack only credits the compressive strength of the concrete in the analysis to provide an appropriate simulation of the accident conditions postulated in this FSAR. The technical requirements on testing and qualification of the HI-STORM FW overpack plain concrete are in Appendix 1.0 of the HI-STORM 100 FSAR. Appendix 1.0 is incorporated in this FSAR by reference.

There is no U.S. or international code that is sufficiently comprehensive to provide a completely prescriptive set of requirements for the design, manufacturing, and structural qualification of the overpack. The various sections of the ASME Codes, however, contain a broad range of specifications that can be assembled to provide a complete set of requirements for the design, analysis, shop manufacturing, and final field construction of the overpack. The portions or whole of the Codes and Standards that are invoked for the various elements of the overpack design, analysis, and manufacturing activities (viz., materials, fabrication and inspection) are summarized in Tables 1.2.6, and 1.2. 7.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-5 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code)Section III, Subsection NF Class 3,

[2.0.3], is the applicable code to determine stress limits for the load bearing components of the overpack when required by the acceptance criteria set down in this chapter. The material types used in the components of the HI-STORM FW System are listed in the licensing drawings.

ACI 318-05 [2.0.4] is the applicable reference code to establ ish the limits on unreinforced concrete (in the Closure L id), which is subject to secondary structural loadings. The HI-STORM 100 FSAR Appendix l .D contains the design, construction, and testing criteria applicable to the plain concrete in the overpack lid.

As mandated by IOCFR72.24(c)(3) and §72.44(d), Holtec International's qual ity assurance (QA) program requires all constituent parts of an SSC subject to NRC certification under 10CFR72 to be assigned an ITS category appropriate to its function in the control and confinement of radiation. The ITS designations (ITS or NITS) for the constituent parts of the HI-STORM FW System are provided in the licensing drawings. The QA categorization level (A, B, or C) for ITS parts is provided in Tables 2.0.l through 2.0.9. A table exists for each licensing drawing and provides the QA level for the parts designated as ITS on the licensing drawings.

The excerpts from the codes, standards, and generally recognized industry publications invoked in this FSAR, supplemented by the commitments in Holtec 's QA procedures, provide the necessary technical framework to ensure that the as-installed system would meet the intent of

§72.24(c), §72.120(a) and §72.236(b). As requ ired by Holtec's QA Program (discussed in Chapter 14), all operations on ITS components must be performed under QA validated written procedures and specifications that are in compliance with the governing citations of codes, standards, and practices set down in this FSAR.

The overpack is designed for a ll normal, off-normal, and design basis accident condition loadings, as defined in Section 2.2.

Thermal The temperature limits for the plain concrete in the overpack for long term and short term temperatures are in Table 2.2.3. The allowable temperatures for the structural steel components are based on the maximum temperature for which materia l properties and allowable stresses are provided in Section II of the ASME Code. The specific allowable temperatures for the structural steel components of the overpack are provided in Table 2.2.3.

The overpack is designed for extreme cold conditions, as discussed in Subsection 2.2.2. The brittle fracture assessment of structural steel materia ls used in the storage cask is considered in Section 3.1.

The overpack is designed to dissipate the maximum allowable heat load (shown in Tables 1.2.3 and 1.2.4) from the MPC. The thermal characteristics of the MPC stored inside the overpack are evaluated in Chapter 4.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-6 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

AOL I EC PROPRIE I ARV INFORMA I ION Shielding The off-site dose for normal operating conditions to a real individual beyond the controlled area boundary is limited by I0CFR72.l04(a) to a maximum of 25 mrem/year whole body, 75 mrem/year thyroid, and 25 mrem/year for other critical organs, including contributions from all nuclear fuel cycle operations. Since these limits are dependent on plant operations as well as site-specific conditions (e.g., the ISFSI design and proximity to the controlled area boundary, and the number and arrangement of loaded storage casks on the ISFSI pad), the determination and comparison of ISFSI doses to this limit are necessarily site-specific. Dose rates for a single cask and a range of typical ISFSis using the HI-STORM FW System are provided in Chapter 5. The determination of site-specific ISFSI dose rates at the site boundary and demonstration of compliance with regulatory limits is to be performed by the licensee in accordance with 10CFR72.212.

The overpack is designed to limit the calculated surface dose rates on the cask for all MPC designs as defined in Subsection 2.3.5. The overpack is also designed to maintain occupational exposures ALARA during MPC processing, in accordance with 10CFR20. The calculated overpack dose rates are determined in Section 5.1. These dose rates are used to perform a generic occupational exposure estimate for MPC operations and a site boundary dose assessment for a typical ISFSI, as described in Chapter 11 . The shielding performance of plain concrete under transient conditions is discussed in the HI-STORM 100 FSAR Appendix l .D, which is incorporated by reference into this FSAR.

Confi nement The overpack does not perfonn any confinement function. Confinement during storage is provided by the MPC. The overpack provides physical protection and radiation shielding of the MPC contents during dry storage operations.

Operations There are no radioactive effluents that result from MPC operations after the MPC is sealed or during storage operations. Effluents generated during MPC loading and closure operations are handled by the plant's radwaste system and procedures under the licensee's 10CFR50 license.

Generic operating procedures for the HI-STORM FW System are provided in Chapter 9. The licensee is required to develop detailed operating procedures based on Chapter 9 with due consideration of site-specific conditions including the applicable IOCFR50 technical specification requirements for the site, and the HI-STORM FW System CoC.

Acceptance Tests and Mainte nance The acceptance criteria and maintenance program to be applied to the overpack are described in Chapter 10. The operational controls and limits to be applied to the overpack are contained in Chapter 13. Application of these requirements will assure that the overpack ts fabricated, HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-7 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOL'fEC PROPRIETARY l~IFORMATION operated, and maintained in a manner that satisfies the design criteria defined in this chapter.

Decommissioning Decommissioning considerations for the HI-STORM FW System, including the overpack, are addressed in Section 2.4.

2.0.3 HI-TRAC VW Transfer Cask Design Criteria General The HI-TRAC VW transfer cask is engineered for a 60 year design life. The adequacy of the HI-TRAC VW to meet the above design life commitment is discussed in Section 3.4. The design characteristics of the HI-TRAC VW cask are presented in Subsection 1.2.1.

Structural The HI-TRAC VW transfer cask includes both structural and non-structural radiation shielding components that are classified as important-to-safety. The structural steel components of the HI-TRAC VW are designed to meet the stress limits of Section III, Subsection NF, of the ASME Code for normal and off-normal storage conditions. The threaded anchor locations or lifting trunnions for lifting and handling of the transfer cask are designed in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0612 and Regulatory Guide 3.61 for interfacing lift points.

The HI-TRAC VW transfer cask design is analyzed for all normal, off-normal, and design basis accident condition loadings, as defined in Section 2.2. Under accident conditions, the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask must protect the MPC from unacceptable deformation, provide continued shielding, and remain in a condition such that the MPC can be removed from it. The loads applicable to the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask are defined in Tables 2.2.6 and 2.2.13 and Table 3.1.1. The physical characteristics of each MPC for which the HI-TRAC VW is designed are presented in Subsection 1.2.1.

Thermal The allowable temperatures for the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask structural steel components are based on the maximum temperature for material properties and allowable stress values provided in Section II of the ASME Code. The allowable temperatures for the structural steel and shie lding components of the HI-TRAC VW are provided in Table 2.2.3. The HI-TRAC VW is designed for off-normal environmental cold conditions, as discussed in Subsection 2.2.2. The evaluation of the potential for brittle fracture in strnctural steel materials is presented in Section

3. 1.

The HI-TRAC VW is designed and evaluated for the maximum heat load analyzed for storage operations. The maximum allowable temperature of water in the HI-TRAC jacket is a function of the internal pressure. To preclude over- pressurization of the water jacket due to boiling of the HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-8 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION neutron shield liquid (water), the maximum temperature of the water is restricted to be less than the saturation temperature at the shell design pressure. Even though the analysis shows that the water j acket will not over-pressurize, a relief device is placed at the top of the water jacket shell.

In addition, the water is precluded from freezing during off-no1mal cold conditions by limiting the minimum allowable operating temperature and by adding ethylene glycol. The thermal characteristics of the fue l for each MPC for which the transfer cask is designed are defined in Section 2. 1. The working a rea ambient temperature limit for loading operations is limited in accordance with Table 2.2.2.

Shielding The HI-TRAC VW transfer cask provides shielding to maintain occupational exposures ALARA in accordance with 10CFR20, while also maintaining the maximum load on the plant's crane hook to below the rated capacity of the crane. As discussed in Subsection 1.2.1, the shielding in HI-TRAC VW is maximized within the constraint of the a llowable weight at a plant site. The HI-TRAC VW calculated dose rates for a set of reference conditions are reported in Section 5. 1.

These dose rates are used to perform a generic occupational exposure estimate for MPC loading, closure, and transfer operations, as described in Chapter 11. A postulated HI-TRAC VW accident condition, which includes the loss of the liquid neutron shield (water), is also evaluated in Chapter 5.

The annular area between the MPC outer surface and the HI-TRAC VW inner surface can be isolated to minimize the potential for surface contamination of the MPC by spent fuel p ool water during wet loading operations. The HI-TRAC VW surfaces expected to require decontamination are coated with a suitable coating. The maximum permissible surface contamination for the HI-TRAC VW is in accordance with plant-specific procedures and ALARA requirements (discussed in Chapter 11 ).

Confinement The HI-TRAC VW transfer cask does not perform any confinement function. The HI-TRAC VW provides physical protection and radiation shielding of the MPC contents during MPC loading, unloading, and transfer operations.

Operations There are no radioactive effluents that result from MPC transfer operations using HI-TRAC VW.

Effluents generated during MPC loading and closure operations are handled by the plant's radwaste system and procedures.

Generic operating procedures for the HI-STORM FW System are provided in Chapter 9. The licensee will develop detailed operating procedures based on Chapter 9 along with plant-specific requirements including the Part 50 Technical Specification and SAR, and the HI-STORM FW System CoC.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-9 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Acceptance Tests and Maintenance The acceptance criteria and maintenance program to be applied to the HI-TRAC VW Transfer Cask are described in Chapter 10. The operational controls and limits to be applied to the HI-TRAC VW are contained in Chapter 13. Application of these requirements will assure that the HI-TRAC VW is fabricated, operated, and maintained in a manner that satisfies the design criteria given in this chapter.

Decommissioning Decommissioning considerations for the HI-STORM FW Systems, including the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask, are addressed in Section 2.4.

2.0.4 Pr1ncipal Des1gn Criteria for the TSFSI Pad 2.0.4.1 Design and Construction Criteria In compliance with 10CFR72, Subpart F, "General Design Criteria", the HI-STORM FW cask system is classified as "important-to-safety" (ITS). This FSAR explicitly recognizes the HI-STORM FW System as an assemblage of equipment containing numerous ITS components. The reinforced concrete pad, on which the cask is situated, however, is designated as a "not important to safety" (NITS) structure because of a lack of a physical connection between the cask and the pad.

Because the geological conditions vary widely across the United States, it is not possible to, a 'priori, define the detailed design of the ISFSI pad. Accordingly, in this FSAR, the limiting requirements on the design and installation of the pad are provided. The user of the HI-STORM FW System bears the responsibility to ensure that all requirements on the pad set forth in this FSAR are fulfilled by the pad design. Specifically, the ISFSI owner must ensure that:

The pad design complies with the structural provis ions of this FSAR.

The material of construction of the pad (viz., the additives used in the pad concrete) are compatible with the ambient environment at the ISFSI site.

Appropriate structural evaluations are performed pursuant to 10CFR72.212 to demonstrate that the pad is structurally competent to permit the cask to withstand the seismic and other credible inertial loadings at the site.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2- 10 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelObTi;C PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 2.0.4.2 Load Combinations and Applicable Codes Factored load combinations for ISFSI pad design are provided in NUREG-1536 [ 1.0.3]. The factored loads applicable to the pad design consist of dead weight of the cask, thermal gradient loads, impact loads arising from handling and accident events, external missiles, and bounding environmental phenomena (such as earthquakes, wind, tornado, and flood).

The factored load combinations presented in Table 3-1 of NUREG 1536 are reduced in number by eliminating loading types that are not germane or controlling in a HI-STORM lSFSI pad des ign. The applicable factored load combinations are accordingly adapted from the HI-STORM 100 FSAR and presented below.

a. Definitions D= Dead load L= Live load T= Thermal load E= DBE seismic load Uc= Reinforced concrete available strength

b. Load Combinations for the Concrete Pad Normal Events Uc> 1.4D + l.7L Off-Normal Events Uc > 1.05 D + 1.275 (L+T)

Accidents Uc > D + L + T + E As an interfacing structure, the ISFSl pad and its underlying substrate must possess the structural strength to satisfy the above inequalities. As discussed in the HI-STAR 100 FSAR, thermal gradient loads are generally s mall; therefore, the Off-Normal Event does not generally provide a governing load combination.

Table 2.2.9 provides a refere nce set of parameters for the ISFSI pad and its foundatio n that are used solely as input to the non-mechanistic tipover analysis. Analyses in Chapter 3 show that this reference pad design does not violate the design criterion applicable to the non-mechanistic tip-over of the HI-STORM FW storage system. The pad design may be customized to meet the HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-11 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

1IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATlmJ requirements of a particular site, without perfonning a site-specific tipover analysis, provided that all ISFSI pad strength properties are less than or equal to the values in Table 2.2.9.

Applicable sections of industry codes such as ACI 318-05, "Building Code Requirements for Strnctural Concrete"; ACI 360R-92, "Design of Slabs on Grade"; ACI 302. lR, "Guide for Concrete Floor and Slab Construction"; and ACI 224R-90, "Control of Cracking in Concrete Structmes" may be used in the design, shuctural evaluation, and construction of the concrete pad. However, load combinations in ACI 318-05 are not applicable to the ISFSI pad sh*uctural evaluation, and are replaced by the load combinations stated in subparagraph 2.0.4.2.b.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-12 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelObTi;C PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 2.0. la - HI-STORM FW Assembly (Drawing # 6494)

Item Part Name ITS QA Safety Number* Category l Assembly, Lid, HI-STORM 0 113 B.C. B 2 Lid-Stud B 3 Heavy Hex Nut, 3 Y<i" - 4 UNC B 5 Plate, HI-STORM FW Heat Shield B 6 Shielding, HI-STORM FW Body B 8 Block, HI-STORM FW Cask Anchor B 11 Plate, HI-STORM FW Body Base B 15 Shell, HI-STORM FW Outer Shell B 16 Shell, HI-STORM FW Inner Shell B 17 Rib, HI-STORM FW Lifting Rib B 18 Plate, HI-STORM FW Cask Body Top B 20 Plate, Gamma Shield C 21 Tube, MPC Guide C 22 Tube, MPC Guide C 24 Closure Bolt B

Item N umbers are non-consecutive because they are consistent with Parts List on drawing.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-1 3 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

l'IOLTEC PROPRIE I ARV INFORMA I ION Table 2.0. lb - Assembly, Closure Lid Version XL, HI-STORM FW (Drawing# 9964)

Item Part Name ITS QA Safety Number Category l Plate, HI-STORM Lid Base B 2 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Type 1 Rib B 3 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Type 2 Rib B 4 Tube, HI-STORM Lid Bolt B 5 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Type 3 Rib B 6 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Inner Ring B 7 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Vent B 8 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Gamma Shield Ring B 9 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Outer Ring B 10 Concrete, HI-STORM Lid B 11 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Round B 12 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Shield Ring B HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-14 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 2.0.2 - MPC-37 Enclosure Vessel (Drawing# 6505)

Item Number* Part Name ITS QA Safety Category 1 Shell, Enclosure Vessel A 2 Plate, Enclosure Vessel Base A 3 Plate, Enclosure Vessel Lift Lug C 4 Plate, Enclosure Vessel Upper Lid A 5 Plate, Enclosure Vessel Lower Lid B 6 Ring, Enclosure Vessel Closure A 7 Block, Enclosure Vessel Vent/Drain Upper B 8 Port, Enclosure Vessel Vent/Drain C 9 Plug, Enclosure Vessel Vent /Drain C 10 Block, Enclosure Vessel Lower Drain C 12 Block, Enclosure Vessel Vent Shielding C 13 Plate, Enclosure Vessel Vent/Drain Po11 Cover A 16 Purge Tool Port Plug C 21 Shim, Enclosure Vessel Type l PWR Fuel Basket C 22 Shim, Enclosure Vessel Type 2 PWR Fuel Basket C 23 Solid Shim C

Item N umbers are non-consecutive because they are consistent with Parts List on drawing.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2- 15 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

l:IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INf'O~MA I ION Table 2.0.3 - Assembly, MPC-37 Fuel Basket (Drawing# 6506)

Item Number Pait Name ITS QA Safety Category 1 Panel, Type 1 Cell Wall A 2 Panel, Type 2 Cell Wall A 3 Panel, Type 3 Cell Wall A 4 Panel, Type 4 Cell Wall A 5 Panel, Type 5 Cell Wall A 6 Panel, Type 6 Cell Wall A HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT Hl-2114830 Rev. 5 2-16 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

1IOLTEC PROPRIETARY l~IFORMATION Table 2.0.4 - Assembly, MPC-89 Fuel Basket (Drawing # 6507)

Item Number Part Name ITS QA Safety Category 1 Panel, Type 1 Cell Wall A 2 Panel, Type 2 Cell Wall A 3 Panel, Type 3 Cell Wall A 4 Panel, Type 4 Cell Wall A 5 Panel, Type 5 Cell Wall A 6 Panel, Type 6 Cell Wall A 7 Panel, Type 7 Cell Wall A 8 Panel, Type 8 Cell Wall A HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT Hl-2114830 Rev. 5 2-17 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLTEC flROflRIETARY lt~FORMATION Table 2.0.5 - Assembly, Lid, HI-STORM 0113 B.C. (Drawing# 6508)

Item N umber* Part Name ITS QA Safety Category 1 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Base B 2 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Type 1 Round B 3 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Type 2 Round B 4 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Type l Ring B 5 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Type 2 Ring B 6 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Type 3 Ring B 7 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Type 4 Ring B 8 P late, HI-STORM Lid Type 5 R ing B 9 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Type 6 Ring B 10 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Upper Shim B 11 Plate, HI-STORM Lid Lower Shim B 13 Gusset, HI-STORM Lid B 16 Shielding, HI-STORM Lid Lower B 17 Shielding, HI-STORM Lid U pper B 18 Plate, Heat Shield B 20 Block, HI-STORM Lid Lifting Anchor B

Item N umbers are non-consecutive because they are consistent with Parts List on drawing.

Note: Important to safety categorization of the Version XL lid and Domed Lid assemblies can be found on the drawings included in Section 1.5.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-18 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelObTi;C PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 2.0.6 - MPC-89 Enclosure Vessel (Drawing # 6512)

Item N umber* Part Name ITS QA Safety Category 1 Shell, Enclosure Vessel A 2 Plate, Enclosure Vessel Base A 3 Plate, Enclosure Vessel Lift Lug C 4 Plate, Enclosure Vessel Upper Lid A 5 Plate, Enclosure Vessel Lower Lid B 6 Ring, Enclosure Vessel Closure A 7 Block, Enclosure Vessel Vent/Drain Upper B 8 Port, Enclosure Vessel Vent/Drain C 9 Plug, Enclosure Vessel Vent/Drain C 10 Block, Enclosure Vessel Lower Drain C 12 Block, Enclosure Vessel Vent Shielding C 13 Plate, Enclosure Vessel Vent/Drain Po11 Cover A 16 Purge Tool Port Plug C 21 Shim, Enclosure Vessel Type l BWR Fuel Basket C 22 Shim, Enclosure Vessel Type 2 BWR Fuel Basket C 23 Shim, Enclosure Vessel Type 3 BWR Fuel Basket C 24 Solid Shim C

Item N umbers are non-consecutive because they are consistent with Parts List on drawing.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-19 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLfEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 2.0.7 - HI-TRAC VW - MPC-37 (Drawing # 65 14)

Item Number* Part Name ITS QA Safety Category 1 Flange, Bottom B 3 Hex Bolt, 2-4 Yi UNC X 6" LG. B 4 Shell, Inner B 5 Shielding, Gamma B 6 Flange, Top A 7 Shell, Water Jacket B 10 Pipe, Bolt Recess B 11 Cap, Bolt Recess B 12 Bottom Lid B 13 Shell, Outer B 14 Rib, Extended B 15 Rib, Short B

Item Numbers are non-consecutive because they are consistent with Parts List on drawing.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-20 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelOLTEC PROPRIETARY l~FORMA I IO'l'r Table 2.0.8 - HI-TRAC VW- MPC-89 (Drawing # 6799)

Item Number* Part Name ITS QA Safety Category 1 Flange, Bottom B 3 Hex Bolt, 2-4 Yi UNC X 6" LG. B 4 Shell, Inner B 5 Shielding, Gamma B 6 Flange, Top A 7 Shell, Water Jacket B 10 Pipe, Bolt Recess B 11 Cap, Bolt Recess B 12 Bottom Lid B 13 Shell, Outer B 14 Rib, Extended B 15 Rib, Short B

Item N umbers are non-consecutive because they are consistent with Parts List on drawing.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-2 1 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

1IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFO~MATION Table 2.0.9 - HI-TRAC VW Version P - MPC-89 (Drawing# 10115)

Item Number Part Name ITS QA Safety I Category Per Licensing Drawing in Section 1.5 HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT Hl-2114830 Rev. 5 2-22 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATIOl<l 2.1 SPENT FUEL TO BE STORED 2.1.1 Determination of the Design Basis Fuel A central object in the design of the HI-STORM FW System is to ensure that all SNF discharged from the U.S. reactors and not yet loaded into dry storage systems can be stored in a HI-STORM FW MPC. Publications such as references [2.1.1] and [2.1.2] provide a comprehensive description offuel discharged from U.S. reactors.

The cell openings in the fuel baskets have been sized to accommodate BWR and PWR assemblies. The cavity length of the MPC will be determined for a specific site to accord with the fuel assembly length used at that site, including non-fuel hardware and damaged fuel containers, as applicable.

Table 2. l . l summarizes the authorized contents for the HI-STORM FW System. Tables 2.1.2 and 2.1 .3, which are referenced in Table 2.1.1, provide the fuel characteristics of all groups of fuel assembly types determined to be acceptable for storage in the HI-STORM FW System. Any fuel assembly that has fuel characteristics within the range of Tables 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 and meets the other limits specified in Table 2.1. l is acceptable for storage in the HI-STORM FW System.

The groups of fuel assembly types presented in Tables 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 are defined as "a1ny/classes" as described in further detail in Chapter 6. Table 2.1.4 lists the BWR and PWR fuel assembly designs which are found to govern for three qualification criteria, namely reactivity, shielding, and thermal, or that are used as reference assembly design is those analyses.

Additional information on the design basis fuel definition is presented in the following subsections.

2.1.2 Undamaged SNF Specifications Undamaged fuel is defined in the Glossary.

2.1.3 Damaged SNF and Fuel Debris Specifications Damaged fuel and fuel debris are defined in the Glossary.

Damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris will be loaded into damaged fuel containers (DFCs)

(Figure 2.1.6) that have mesh screens on the top and bottom. The DFC will have a removable lid to allow the fue l assembly to be inserted. In storage, the lid will be latched in place. DFC's used to move fuel assemblies will be designed for lifting with either the lid installed or with a separate handling lid and retrievability guidance described in ISG-2 [2.3.1]. DFC's used to handle fuel and the associated lifting tools will designed in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0612. The DFC will be fabricated from structural aluminum or stainless steel. The appropriate structw-al, thermal, shielding, criticality, and confinement evaluations have been performed to account for damaged fuel and fuel debris and are described in their respective chapters that follow. The limiting design characteristics for damaged fuel assemblies and restrictions on the HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-23 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HO! IEC PROPRIET,t\RY INFORMATION number and location of damaged fuel containers authorized for loading in each MPC model are provided in this chapter.

2.1.4 Structural Parameters for Design Basis SNF The main physical parameters of an SNF assembly applicable to the structural evaluation are the fuel assembly length, cross sectional dimensions, and weight. These parameters, which define the mechanical and stmctural design, are specified in Subsection 2. I .8. An appropriate axial clearance is provided to prevent interference due to the irradiation and thermal growth of the fuel assemblies.

2.1.5 Thermal Parameters for Design Basis SNF The principal thermal design parameter for the stored fuel is the fuel's peak cladding temperature (PCT) which is a function of the maximum decay heat per assembly and the decay heat removal capabilities of the HI-STORM FW System.

To ensure the permissible PCT lim its are not exceeded, Subsection 1.2 specifies the maximum allowable decay heat per assembly for each MPC model in the three-region configuration (see also Table 1.2.3 and 1.2.4).

The fuel cladding temperature is also affected by the heat transfer characteristics of the fuel assemblies. The design basis fuel assembly for them1al calculations for both PWR and BWR fuel is provided in Table 2. 1.4.

Finally, the axial variation in the heat generation rate in the design basis fuel assembly is defined based on the axial burnup distribution. For this purpose, the data provided in references [2.1.3]

and [2.1.4] are utilized and summarized in Table 2.1.5 and Figures 2.1.3 and 2.1.4. These distributions are representative of fuel assemblies with the design basis burn up levels considered.

These distributions are used for analyses only, and do not provide a criteria for fuel assembly acceptability for storage in the HI-STORM FW System.

2.1.6 Radiological Parameters for Design Basis SNF The principal rad iological design criteria for the HI-STORM FW System are the IOCFR72 § 104 and § 106 operator-controlled boundary dose rate limits, and the requirement to maintain operational dose rates as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). The radiation dose is directly affected by the gamma and neutron source terms of the assembly, which is a function of the assembly type, and the burnup, enrichment and cooling time of the assemblies. Dose rates are furth er directly affected by the size and arrangement of the ISFSI, and the specifics of the loading operations. All these parameters are site-dependent, and the compliance with the regulatory dose rate requirements are performed in site-specific calculations. The evaluations here are therefore performed with reference fuel assemblies, and with parameters that result in HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-24 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEG PROPRIET.ARY INFORMATION reasonably conservative dose rates. The reference assemblies given m Table 1.0.4 are the predominant assemblies used in the industry.

The design basis dose rates can be met by a variety of bumup levels and cooling times. Table 2.1.1 provides the acceptable ranges of bumup, enrichment and cooling time for all of the authorized fue l assembly array/classes. Table 2. 1.5 and Figmes 2. 1.3 and 2. 1.4 provide the axial distribution for the rad iological source terms for PWR and BWR fuel assemblies based on the axial bumup distribution. The axial bumup distributions are representative of fuel assemblies with the design basis bumup levels considered. These distributions are used for analyses only, and do not provide a criteria for fue l assembly acceptability for storage in the HI-STORM FW System.

Non-fuel hardware, as defined in the Glossary, has been evaluated and is also authorized for storage in the PWR MPCs as specified in Table 2.1. l.

2. 1.7 Criticality Parameters for Design Basis SNF The criticality ana lyses for the MPC-37 are performed with credit taken for soluble boron in the MPC water during wet loading and unloading operations. Table 2.1.6 provides the required soluble boron concentrations for this MPC.

2.1.8 Summary of Authorized Contents Tables 2. 1. l through 2. 1.3 specify the limits for spent fuel and non-fuel hardware authorized for storage in the HI-STORM FW System. The limits in these tables are derived from the safety analyses described in the following chapters of this FSAR.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-25 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HObTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 2. 1.1 MATERIAL TO BE STORED PARAMETER VALUE MPC-37 MPC-89 Fuel Type Uranium oxide undamaged Uranium oxide undamaged fuel fuel assemblies, damaged fuel assemblies, damaged fue l assemblies, and fue l debris assemblies, with or without meeting the limits in Table channels, fuel debris meeting the 2.1.2 for the applicable limits in Table 2. 1.3 for the array/class. applicable array/class.

Cladding Type ZR (see Glossary for ZR (see G lossary for defin ition) definition)

Maximum Initial Rod Depending on soluble boron ~ 5.0 wt. % U-235 Enrichment levels and assembly array/class as specified in Table 2.1.6 Post-irradiation cooling Minimum Cooling Time: 3 Minimum Cooling Time: 3 years time and average burnup years per assembly Maximum Assembly Average Maximum Assembly Average Bumup: 65 GWd/mtU Burnup: 68.2 GWd/mtU Non-fuel hardware post- Minimum Cooling Time: 3 NIA in-adiation cooling time and years burnup Maximum Burnupt:

- BPRAs, W ABAs and vibration suppressors: 60 GWd/mtU

- TPDs, NSAs, APSRs, RCCAs, CRAs, CEAs, water displacement guide tube plugs and orifice rod assemblies: 630 GWd/mtU

- ITTRs: not aoolicable Decay heat per fue l storage Regionalized Loading: See Regionalized Load ing: See Table location Table 1.2.3 1.2.4 t Burnups for non-fuel hardware are to be determined based on the burnup and uran ium mass of the fuel assemblies in which the component was inserted during reactor operation. Bumup not applicable for ITTRs since installed post-irradiation.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-26 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HO! rec PROPRIET,t\RY INFORMATION Table 2.1.1 (continued)

MATERIAL TO BE STORED PARAMETER VALUE MPC-37 MPC-89 Fuel Assembly Nominal Minimum: (1) All except Minimum: 171 Length (in.) l5xl5I:I:: 157 (with NFH); (2)

Reference:

176.5 15x151: 149 (with NFH)§ Maximum: 181.5 (with DFC)

Reference:

167.2 (with NFH)

Maximum: 199.2 (with NFH and DFC)

Fuel Assembly Width (in.) ::::: 8.54 (nominal design) :S 5.95 (nominal design)

Fuel Assembly Weight (lb)

Reference:

1600 (without NFH) 750 (without DFC),

1750 (with NFH), 850 (with DFC) 1850 (with NFH and DFC)

Maximum: Maximum:

2050 (including NFH and 850 (including DFC)

DFC) t See Table 2.1.2 for l 5x 151 foe! assembly array/class characteristics.

§ Minimum nominal fuel assembly length for JSx 1STfuel assembly array/class is 149". The unique design of 15xl5I fuel requires al" nominal fuel shim to properly support the assembly. Therefore the minimum MPC cavity height for l 5x 151 fuel is based on 150" fuel length.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-27 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 2.l.1 (continued)

MATERIAL TO BE STORED PARAMETER VALUE MPC-37 MPC-89 Othe r Limita tions

Quantity is limited to 37

Quantity is limited to 89 undamaged ZR clad PWR undamaged ZR clad BWR fuel fue l assemblies with or assembl ies. Up to 16 da maged without non-fuel hardware. fuel containers containing BWR Up to 12 damaged fuel damaged fuel and/or fuel debris containers containing PWR may be stored in locations damaged fuel and/or fuel denoted in Figure 2.1 .2 with the debris may be stored in the remaining basket cells locations denoted in Figure conta ining undamaged Z R fuel

2. 1.1 with the remaining assemblies, up to a total of 89.

basket cells containing undamaged ZR fuel assemblies, up to a total of 37.

One NSA .

Up to 30 BPRAs .

BPRAs, TPDs, W ABAs, water displacement guide tube plugs, orifice rod assemblies, and/or vibration suppressor inserts may be stored with fue l assemblies in any fuel cell location.

CRAs, RCCAs, CEAs, NSAs, and/or APSRs may be stored with fuel assemblies in fuel cell locations specified in Figure 2.1.5.

HOLT EC INTERNATION AL C OPYRIGHTED MA TERJAL REPORT HI-2 114830 R ev. 5 2-28 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMA I ION Table 2.1.2 PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

Fuel Assembly 14xl 4 A 14 x14 B 14x l 4 C 15x l 5 B 15x l 5 C Array/ Class No. of Fuel Rod Locations 179 179 176 204 204 Fuel Clad 0 .D. (in.) ~ 0.400 ~ 0.417 ~ 0.440 ~ 0.420 ~ 0.417 Fuel Clad I.D. (in.) :5 0.3514 :5 0.374 :5 0.3880 :5 0.3736 :5 0.3640 Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)

5 0.3444 :5 0.367 :5 0.3805 :5 0.3671 :5 0.3570 (Note 3)

Fuel Rod Pitch (in.) :5 0.556 :5 0.566 :5 0.580 :5 0.563 :5 0.563 Active Fuel Length (in.) :5 150 :S 150 :S 150 :5 150 :S 150 No. of Guide and/or 5 17 17 21 21 Instrument Tubes (Note 2)

Guide/Instrument Tube

~ 0.017 ~ 0.017 ~ 0.038 ~ 0.015 ~ 0.0165 Thickness (in.)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-29 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

~OL I EC PROPRIETARY lrffORMATIGN Table 2.1.2 (continued)

PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note l)

Fuel Assembly 15x15 D 15x15 E 15x15 F 15x15 H 15x15 I Array/Class No. of Fuel Rod 208 208 208 208 2 16 (Note 4)

Locations Fuel Clad 0.D. (in.) 2: 0.430 2: 0.428 2: 0.428 2: 0.414 2: 0.413 Fuel Clad l.D. (in.) ::S 0.3800 ::S 0.3790 ::S 0 .3820 ::S 0.3700 ::S 0.3670 Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)

S 0.3735 ::S 0.3707 ::S 0.3742 ::S 0.3622 ::S 0.3600 (Note 3)

Fuel Rod Pitch (in.) ::S 0.568 ::S 0.568 ::S 0.568 ::S 0.568 ::S 0.550 Active Fuel Length

S 150 ::S 150 :S 150 ::S 150 ::S 150 (in.)

No. of Guide and/or 17 17 17 17 9 (Note 4)

Instrument Tubes Guide/Instrument 2: 0.0150 2: 0.0140 2: 0.0140 2: 0.0140 2: 0.0140 Tube Thickness (in.)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-30 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEG PROPRIET.ARY lf)IFORMAJIQN Table 2.1.2 (continued)

PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

Fuel Assembly 16x16 A 16x16B 16x l6 C Array and Class No. of Fuel Rod 236 236 235 Locations Fuel Clad 0.0. (in.) 2: 0.382 2: 0.374 2: 0.374 Fuel Clad I.D. (in.) :S 0.3350 :S 0.3290 :S 0.3290 Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)

S 0.3255 :S 0.3225 :S 0.3225 (Note 3)

Fuel Rod Pitch (in.) :S 0.506 :S 0.506 :S 0.485 Active Fuel length

S I 50 :S 150 :S J 50 (in.)

No. of Guide and/or 5 (Note 2) 5 (Note 2) 21 Instrument Tubes Guide/ instrument 2: 0.0350 2: 0.04 2: 0.0157 Tube Thickness (in.)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-3 1 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HO! IEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 2.1.2 (continued)

PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note l)

Fuel Assembly 17xl7A 17x17 B 17x17 C 17x17 D 17x17 E Array and Class No. of Fuel Rod 264 264 264 264 265 Locations Fuel Clad 0.D. (in.) 2: 0.360 2: 0.372 2: 0.377 2: 0.372 2: 0.372 Fuel Clad 1.0. (in.) :5 0.3 150 :5 0.3310 :5 0.3330 :5 0.3310 :5 0.3310 Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)

5 0.3088 :5 0.3232 :5 0.3252 :5 0.3232 :5 0.3232 (Note 3)

Fuel Rod Pitch (in.) :5 0.496 :5 0.496 :5 0.502 :5 0.496 :5 0.496 Active Fuel length

5 150 :5 150 :5 150 :5 170 :5 170 (in.)

No. of Guide and/or 25 25 25 25 24 Instrument Tubes Guide/Instrument 2: 0.016 2: 0.01 4 2: 0.020 2: 0.014 2: 0.014 Tube Thickness (in.)

Notes:

1. All dimensions are design nominal values. Maximum and minimum dimensions are specified to bound variations in design nominal values among fuel assemblies within a given array/class.

2. Each guide tube replaces four fuel rods.

3. Annular fuel pellets are allowed in the top and bottom 12" of the active fuel length.

4. Assemblies have one Instrument Tube and eight Guide Bars (Solid ZR). Some assemblies have up to 8 fuel rods removed or replaced by Guide Tubes.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-32 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelOb.TEG PROPRIETARY INFORMATIOl<l Table 2.1.3 BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

Fuel Assembly Array and 7x7 B 8x8B 8x8 C 8x8D 8x8E Class Maximum Planar-Average Initial Enrichment (wt.%

m u) S 4.8 S 4.8 S 4.8 S 4.8 S 4.8 (Note 14)

No. of Fuel Rod Locations 49 63 or 64 62 60 or 61 59 Fuel C lad O.D. (in.) 2: 0.5630 2: 0.4840 2: 0.4830 2: 0.4830 2: 0.4930 Fuel Clad T.D. (in.) S 0.4990 S 0.4295 S 0.4250 S 0.4230 S 0.4250 Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.) S 0.4910 S 0.4195 S 0.4160 S 0.4140 S 0.4160 Fuel Rod Pitch (in.) S 0.738 S 0.642 s o.641 S 0.640 S 0.640 Design Active Fuel Length S 150 S 150 S 150 S 150 S 150 (in.)

No. of Water Rods I -4 0 1 or 0 2 5 (Note 10) (Note 6)

Water Rod Thickness (in .) NIA 2: 0.034 > 0.00 > 0.00 2: 0.034 Channel Thickness (in.) ::: 0.120 ::: 0.120 ::: 0.120 ::: 0.1 20 s o.100 HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 R ev. 5 2-33 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 2.1.3 (continued)

BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

Fuel Assembly Array 8x8F 9x9A 9x9 B 9x9C 9x9D and Class Maximum Planar-Average Initial ::::: 4.5

4.8 ::::: 4.8 ::::: 4.8 ::: 4.8 Enrichment (wt.% 235U) (Note 12)

(Note 14)

No. of Fuel Rod 74/66 64 72 80 79 Locations (Note 4)

Fuel Clad 0.D. (in.) ~ 0.4576 ~ 0.4400 ::: 0.4330 ~ 0.4230 ~ 0.4240 Fuel Clad I.D. (in.) ::: 0.3996 ::: 0.3840 ::: 0.3810 ::: 0.3640 ::: 0.3640 Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.) ::::: 0.3913 ::: 0.3760 ::: 0.3740 ::: 0.3565 ::: 0.3565 Fuel Rod Pitch (in.) ::: 0.609 ::: 0.566 ::: 0.572 ::: 0.572 ::: 0.572 Design Active Fuel

.:::: 150 .:::: 150 ::: 150 ::: 150 .:::: 150 Length (in.)

No. of Water Rods NIA 2 l I 2 (Note 10) (Note 2) (Note 5)

Water Rod Thickness

~ 0.0315 > 0.00 > 0.00 ~ 0.020 ~ 0.0300 (in.)

Channel Thickness (in.) ::: 0.055 ::: 0.120 .:::: 0.120 ::: 0.100 .:::: 0. 100 HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-34 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATIOl<l Table 2.1.3 (continued)

BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note l)

Fuel Assembly Array 9x9E 9x9F 9x9 G l Oxl OA lOxlO B and Class (Note 3) (Note 3)

Maximum Planar-Average Initial .:5. 4.5 .:5. 4.5 235 .:5. 4.8 .:5. 4.8 .:5. 4.8 Enrichment (wt.% U) (Note 12) (Note 12)

(Note 14)

No. of Fuel Rod 92/78 91/83 76 76 72 Locations (Note 7) (Note 8)

Fuel Clad 0.D. (in.) ~ 0.4170 ~ 0.4430 ~ 0.4240 ~ 0.4040 ~ 0.3957 Fuel Clad LD. (in.) .:5. 0.3640 .:5. 0.3860 :S 0.3640 :S 0.3520 :S 0.3480 Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.) .:5. 0.3530 :S 0.3745 :S 0.3565 :S 0.3455 :S 0.3420 Fuel Rod Pitch (in.) :S 0.572 :S 0.572 :S 0.572 :s 0.510 :s 0.510 Design Active Fue l

S 150 :S 150 .:5. 150 :S 150 :S 150 Length (in.)

No. of Water Rods l l 5 5 2 (Note 10) (Note 5) (Note 5)

Water Rod Thickness

~ 0.0120 ~ 0.0120 ~ 0.0320 ~ 0.030 > 0.00 (in.)

Channel Thickness (in.) .:5. 0.120 :s o.120 :S 0.120 .:5. 0.120 .:5. 0. 120 HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-35 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

AOL I EC PROPRIETAR ( lf~FORMATION Table 2.1.3 (continued)

BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note l)

Fuel Assembly Array and Class 10x10 C l0x10 F IOxlO G Maximum Planar-Average Initia l Enrichment (wt.% 235 U) _'.S 4.8

5 4.7 :::: 4.6 (Note 13) (Note 12)

(Note 14)

No. of Fuel Rod Locations 92/78 96 96/84 (Note 7)

Fuel Clad O.D. (in.) 2: 0.3780 2: 0.4035 2: 0.387 F uel Clad 1.0. (in.) :5 0.3294 :5 0.3570 :5 0.340 F uel Pellet Dia. (in.) .:S 0.3224 :S 0.3500 :S 0.334 Fuel Rod Pitch (in.) :S 0.488 :S 0.510 :S 0.5 12 Design Active Fuel Le ngth (in.) :S 150 :S 150 :S 150 No. of Water Rods 5 5 2

(Note 10) (Note 9) (Note 9)

Water Rod Thickness (in.) 2: 0.031 2: 0.030 2: 0.031 Channel Thickness (in.) S 0.055 S 0.120 S 0.060 HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-36 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelObTi;C PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 2. 1.3 (continued)

BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS NOTES:

1. All dimensions are design nominal values. Max imum and minimum dimensions are specified to bound variations in design nominal values among fuel assemblies within a given array/class.

2. This assembly is known as "QUAD+." It has four rectangular water cross segments dividing the assembly into four quadrants.

3. For the SPC 9x9-5 fue l assembly, each fuel rod must meet either the 9x9E or the 9x9F set of limits or clad 0.D., clad I.D., and pellet diameter

4. This assembly class contains 74 total rods; 66 full length rods and 8 partial length rods.

5. Square, replacing nine fuel rods.

6. Variable.

7. This assembly contains 92 total fuel rods; 78 full length rods and 14 partial length rods.

8. This assembly class contains 91 total fuel rods; 83 full length rods and 8 partial length rods.

9. One diamond-shaped water rod replacing the four center fuel rods and four rectangular water rods dividing the assembly into four quadrants.

10. These rods may also be sealed at both ends and contain ZR materi al in lieu of water.

11. Not Used

12. When loading fuel assemblies classified as damaged fuel assemblies, all assemblies in the MPC are limited to 4.0 wt.% U-235.

13. When loading fuel assemblies classified as damaged fuel assemblies, all assemblies in the MPC are limited to 4.6 wt.% U-235.

14. In accordance with the definition of undamaged fuel assembly, certain assemblies may be limited to 3.3 wt.% U-235. When loading these fue l assemblies, all assemblies in the MPC are limited to 3.3 wt.% U-235.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-37 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOI IEC PROPRl6TARY INFORMATlmJ Table 2.1.4 DESIGN BASIS FUEL ASSEMBLY FOR EACH DESIGN CRITERIO Criterion BWR PWR Reactivity/Criticality GE-12/ 14 lOxlO Westinghouse 17x 17 0 FA (Array/Class 1Oxl OA) (Array/Class 17x l 7B)

Shielding GE-12/ 14 lOx 10 Westinghouse 17xl7 OFA Thermal-Hydraulic GE-12/14 lOxlO Westinghouse 17x 17 0 FA HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT Hl-2114830 Rev. 5 2-38 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HO! IEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 2.1.5 NORMALIZED DISTRIBUTION BASED ON BURNUP PROFILE 1

PWR DISTRIBUTION Axial Distance From Bottom of Active Fuel Normalized Interval

(% of Active Fuel Length) Distribution I 0% to 4-1/6% 0.5485 2 4-1 /6% to 8-1/3% 0.8477 3 8-1/3% to 16-2/3% 1.0770 4 16-2/3% to 33-1/3% 1. 1050 5 33-1/3% to 50% 1.0980 6 50% to 66-2/3% 1.0790 7 66-2/3% to 83-1/3% 1.0501 8 83-1 /3% to 91-2/3% 0.9604 9 91-2/3% to 95-5/6% 0.7338 10 95-5/6% to 100% 0.4670 BWR DISTRIBUTION2 Axial Distance From Bottom of Active Fuel Normalized Interval

(% of Active Fuel Length) Distribution 1 0% to 4-1/6% 0.2200 2 4-1/6% to 8-1 /3% 0.7600 3 8-1/3% to 16-2/3% 1.0350 4 16-2/3% to 33-1/3% 1.1675 5 33-1/3% to 50% 1.1950 6 50% to 66-2/3% 1.1625 7 66-2/3% to 83-1/3% 1.0725 8 83- 1/3% to 9 1-2/3% 0.8650 9 91-2/3% to 95-5/6% 0.6200 10 95-5/6% to 100% 0.2200 Reference 2. 1. 7 2

Reference 2.1 .8 HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-39 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 2. 1.6 Soluble Boron Requirements for MPC-37 Wet Loading and Unloading Operations One or More Damaged Fuel All Undamaged Fuel Assemblies Assemblies and/or Fuel Debris Array/Class Maximum Initial Maximum Initial Maximum Initial Maximum Initial Enrichment Enrichment Enrichment Enrichment

4.0 wt% 235U 5.0 wt% mu :::: 4.0 wt% mu 5.0 wt% 235U (ppmb) (ppmb) (ppmb) (ppmb)

All 14xl4 and 1,000 1,500 1,300 1,800 16x16 All 15xl5 and 1,500 2,000 1,800 2,300 17x17 Note:

1. For maximum initial enrichments between 4.0 wt% and 5.0 wt% 235U, the minimum soluble boron concentration may be determined by linear interpolation between the minimum soluble boron concentrations at 4.0 wt% and 5.0 wt% 235U.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-40 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOL'fEC PROPRIETARY l~IFORMATION 3-1 3-2 3-3 3-4 2-1 2-2 2-3 3-5 3-6 2-4 1-1 1-2 1-3 2-5 3-7 3-8 2-6 1-4 1-5 1-6 2-7 3-9 3-10 2-8 1-7 1-8 1-9 2-9 3-11 3-12 2-10 2-11 2-12 3-13 3-14 3-15 3-16 Figure 2.1 . l Location of DFCs for Damaged Fuel or Fuel Debris in the MPC-37(Shaded Cells)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-4 1 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

""FIDL I EC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 3-1 3-2 3-3 3-4 3-5 3-6 2-1 3-7 3-8 3-9 3-10 3-11 2-2 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-6 3-12 3-13 3-14 2-7 2-8 2-9 2-10 2-11 2-12 2-13 3-15 3-16 3-17 2-14 2-15 1-1 1-2 1-3 2-16 2-17 3-18 3-19 3-20 2-18 2-19 2-20 1-4 1-5 1-6 2-21 2-22 2-23 3-21 3-22 3-23 2-24 2-25 1-7 1-8 1-9 2-26 2-27 3-24 3-25 3-26 2-28 2-29 2-30 2-31 2-32 2-33 2-34 3-27 3-28 3-29 2-35 2-36 2-37 2-38 2-39 3-30 3-31 3-32 3-33 3-34 2-40 3-35 3-36 3-37 3-38 3-39 3-40 Figure 2.1.2 Location of DFCs for Damaged Fuel or Fuel Debris in the MPC-89 (Shaded Cells)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-42 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelOb:TEG PROPRIETARY l~FORMA I ION PWR Axial Bumup Distribution 1.0000

o. 0.8000 J

l 0.6000

~

z 0.4000 0.2000 0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 108 120 132 144 Active Fuel Length (in.)

Figure 2. 1.3 PWR Axial Burnup Profile with Normalized Distribution HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-43 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLTEC F'ROPRIETARY lt~FORMATION BWR Axial Burnup Distribution 1.40 1.20 1.00

~

i 0.80 I

~

0.60 0.40 0.20 0.00 0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 108 120 132 144 Active Fuel Length (in.)

Figure 2. 1.4 BWR Axial Bumup Profile with Normalized Distribution HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-44 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HO! IEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 3-1 3-2 3-3 3-4 2-1 2-2 2-3 3-5 3-6 2-4 1-1 1-2 1-3 2-5 3-7 3-8 2-6 1-4 1-5 1-6 2-7 3-9 3-10 2-8 1-7 1-8 1-9 2-9 3-11 3-12 2-10 2-11 2-12 3-13 3-14 3-15 3-16 Figure 2. 1.5: Location of NS As, APSRs, RCCAs, CEAs, and CRAs in the MPC-37 (Shaded Cells)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-45 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

H9LTEG PR9PRIE'FAR¥-tNFeRMA'fteN-(b)(4)

Figure 2. 1.6: Damaged Fuel Container (Typical)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2 114830 Rev.5 2-46 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelOb:rEG PROPRIETARY INFORMATIOl<l 2.2 HI-STORM FW DESIGN LOADINGS The HI-STORM FW System is engineered for unprotected outside storage for the duration of its design life. Accordingly, the cask system is designed to withstand normal, off-normal, and environmental phenomena and accident conditions of storage. Normal conditions include the conditions that are expected to occur regularly or frequently in the course of normal operation.

Off-normal conditions include those infrequent events that could reasonably be expected to occur during the lifetime of the cask system. Environmental phenomena and accident conditions include events that are postulated because their consideration establishes a conservative design basis.

Normal condition loads act in combination with all other loads (off-norma l or environmental phenomena/accident). Off-normal condition loads and environmental phenomena and accident condition loads are not applied in combination. However, loads that occur as a result of the same phenomena are applied simultaneously. For example, the tornado winds loads are applied in combination with the tornado missile loads.

In the following subsections, the design criteria are establi.shed for nom1al, off-normal, and accident conditions for storage. The following conditions of storage and associated loads are identified:

1. Normal (Long-Term Storage) Condition: Dead Weight, Handling, Pressure, Temperature, Snow.

11. Off-Normal Condition: Pressure, Temperature, Leakage of One Seal, Partia l Blockage of Air Inlets.

111. Accident Condition: Handling Accident, Non-Mechanistic Tip-Over, Fire, Partial Blockage of MPC Basket Flow Holes, Tornado, Flood, Earthquake, Fuel Rod Rupture, Confinement Boundary Leakage, Explosion, Lightning, Burial Under Debris, 100%

Blockage of Air Inlets, Extreme Environmental Temperature.

1v. Short-Term Operations: Th is loading condition is defined to accord with ISG- 11, Revision 3 [2.0.l] guidance. This includes those normal operational evolutions necessary to support fuel loading or unloading activities. These include, but are not limited to MPC cavity drying, helium backfi ll, MPC transfer, and on-site handling of a loaded HI-TRAC VW transfer cask.

Each of these conditions and the applicable loads are identified herein with their applicable design criteria. A design criterion is deemed to be satisfied if the allowable limits for the specific loading conditions are not exceeded.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-47 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROP~IETARV INFORMA I ION 2.2.1 Loadings Applicable to Normal Conditions of Storage

a. Dead Weight The HI-STORM FW System must withstand the static Loads due to the weights of each of its components, including the weight of the HI-TRAC VW with the loaded MPC stacked on top the storage overpack during the MPC transfer.

b. Handling Evolutions The HI-STORM FW System must withstand loads experienced during routine handling. Nonna!

handling includes:

1. Vertical lifting and transfer to the ISFSI of the HI-STORM FW overpack containing a loaded MPC.

11. Vertical lifting and handling of the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask containing a loaded MPC (or non-vertical lifting and handling Subsection 4.5.1 ).

111. Lifting of a loaded MPC.

The dead load of the lifted component is increased by 15% in the stress qualification analyses (to meet ANSI Nl4.6 gu idance) to account fo r dynamic effects from lifting operations as suggested in CMAA #70 [2.2.1].

Handling operations of the loaded HI-TRAC VW transfer cask or HI-STORM FW overpack are limited to working area ambient temperatures specified in Table 2.2.2. This limitation is specified to ensure a sufficient safety margin against brittle fracture during handling operations.

Table 2.2.6 summarizes the analyses required to qualify all threaded anchor locations in the HI-STORM FW System. Table 1.2.10 outlines the analyses required to qualify the lifting trunnion in HI-TRAC VW Version P.

C. Pressure The MPC internal pressure is dependent on the initial volume of cover gas (helium), the volume of fill gas in the fuel rods, the fraction of fission gas released from the fuel matrix, the number of fuel rods assumed to have ruptured, and temperature.

The normal condition MPC internal design pressure bounds the cumulative effects of the maximum fill gas volume, normal environmental ambient temperatures, the maximum MPC heat load, and an assumed l % of the fuel rods ruptured with l 00% of the fill gas and 30% of the sign ificant radioactive gases (e.g., H3, Kr, and Xe) released in accordance with NUREG-1536.

For the storage of damaged fuel assemblies or fuel debris in a damaged fuel container (DFC), it shall be conservatively assumed that 100% of the fuel rods are ruptured with l 00% of the rod fill gas and 30% of the significant radioactive gases (e.g., H 3, Kr, and Xe) li berated. For PWR HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-48 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

AOL I EC PROPRIETAR ( ll~FORMATION assemblies stored with non-fuel hardware, 100% of the* gases in the non-fuel hardware (e.g.,

BPRAs) shall be assumed to be released. The accident condition design pressure shall envelop the case of 100% of the fue l rods ruptured.

The MPC internal pressure under the normal condition of storage must remain below the design pressure specified in Table 2 .2.1.

The MPC external pressure is a function of environmental conditions, which may produce a pressure loading. The normal condition external design pressure is specified in Table 2.2.1.

The HI-STORM FW overpack is not capable of retaining internal pressure due to its open design, and therefore no analysis is required or provided for the overpack internal pressure.

The HI-TRAC VW transfer cask is not capable of reta ining internal pressure due to its open design. Therefore, no analys is is required for the internal pressure loading in HI-TRAC VW transfer cask. However, the H I-TRAC VW transfer cask water jacket may experience an internal vapor pressure due to the heat-up of the water contained in the water jacket. Analysis is performed in Chapter 3 of this report to demonstrate that the water jacket can withstand the design pressme in Table 2.2. l without a structural failure and that the water jacket design pressure will not be exceeded. To provide an additional layer of safety, a pressure relief device is used to ensure that the water jacket design pressure will not be exceeded.

d. Environmental Temperatures and Pressures To evaluate the long-term effects of ambient temperatures on the HI-STORM FW System, an upper bound value on the annual average ambient temperature for the continental United States is used. The annual average temperature is termed the nonnal ambient temperature for storage.

The normal ambient temperature specified in Table 2.2.2 is bounding for all reactor sites in the contiguous United States. The normal ambient temperature set fo1th in Table 2.2.2 is intended to ensure that it is greater than the annual average of ambient temperature at any location in the continental United States. In the northern region of the U.S., the design basis norma l ambient temperature used in this FSAR will be exceeded only for brief periods, whereas in the southern U.S, it may be straddled daily in summer months. Inasmuch as the sole effect of the no1mal temperature is on the computed fuel cladding temperature to establ ish long-term fue l integrity, it should not lie below the time averaged yearly mean for the ISFSI site. Previously licensed cask systems have employed lower norn1al temperatures (viz., 75° Fin Docket 72-1007) by utilizing national meteorological data.

Likewise, within the the1mal analysis, a conservatively assumed soil temperature of the value specified in Table 2.2.2 is utilized to bound the annual average soil temperatures for the continental United States. The 1987 ASHRAE Handbook (HVAC Systems and Applications) reports average earth temperatures, from O to IO feet below grade, throughout the continental United States. The highest reported annual average value for the continental United States is 77°F for Key West, Florida. Therefore, this value is specified in Table 2.2.2 as the bounding soil temperature.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-49 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMA I ION Confirmation of the site-specific annual average ambient temperature and soil temperature is to be performed by the licensee, in accordance with 10CFR 72.212. Insolation based on 10CFR71.71 input averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> shall be used as the additional heat input under the no1mal and off-nonnal conditions of storage.

The ambient pressure shall be assumed to be 760mm of Hg coincident with the normal condition temperature, whose bounding value is provided in Table 2.2.2. For sites located substantially above sea level ( elevation > 1500 feet ), it will be necessary to perform a site specific evaluation of the peak cladding temperature using the site specific ambient temperature (max imum average annual temperature based on 40 year meteorological data for the site). ISG 11, Revision 3

[2.0.1] temperature limits will continue to apply.

All of the above requirements are consistent with those in the HI-STORM I00 FSAR.

e. Design Temperatures The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code) requires that the value of the vessel design temperature be established with appropriate consideration for the effect of heat generation internal or external to the vessel. The decay heat load from the spent nuclear fuel is the internal heat generation source for the HI-STORM FW System. The ASME Code (Section III, Paragraph NCA-2142) requires the design temperature to be set at or above the maximum through thickness mean metal temperature of the pressure part under normal service (Level A) condition.

Consistent with the terminology of NUREG-1536, thi s temperature is referred to as the "Design Temperature for Normal Conditions". Conservative calculations of the steady-state temperature field in the HI-STORM FW System, under assumed environmental normal temperatures with the maximum decay heat load, result in HI-STORM FW component temperatures at or below the nonnal condition design temperatures for the HI-STORM FW System defined in Table 2.2.3.

Maintaining fuel rod cladding integrity is also a design consideration. The fuel rod peak cladding temperature (PCT) limits for the long-term storage and short-term operating conditions shall meet the intent of the guidance in ISG- 11 , Revision 3 [2.0.l]. For moderate bumup fuel the PCT limit for short-term operations is higher than for high burn.up fuel [2.0.2].

f. Snow and Ice The HI-STORM FW System must be capable of withstanding pressure loads due to snow and ice. Section 7.0 of ANSl/ASCE 7-05 [2.2.3] provides empirical formu las and tables to compute the effective design pressure on the overpack due to the accumulation of snow for the contiguous U.S. and Alaska. Typical calculated values for heated structures such as the HI-STORM FW System range from 50 to 70 pounds per square foot. For conservatism, the snow pressure load (Table 2.2.8) is set to bound the ANSI/ASCE 7-05 recommendation.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-50 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 2.2.2 Loadings Applicable to Off-Normal Conditions As the HI-STORM FW System is passive, loss of power and instrumentation failures are not defined as off-nom,al conditions. The off-normal condition design criteria are defined in thi s subsection.

A discussion of the effects of each off-normal condition and the corrective action for each off-nonnal condition is provided in Section 12.1. Table 2.2.7 contains a list of all normal and off-normal loadings and their applicable acceptance criteria.

a. Pressure The HI-STORM FW System must withstand loads due to off-nonnal pressure. The off-normal condition for the MPC internal design pressure, defined herein in Table 2.2.1, bounds the cumulative effects of the maximum fill gas volume, off-normal environmental ambient temperatures, the maximum MPC heat load, and an assumed 10% of the fuel rods ruptured with 100% of the fill gas and 30% of the significant radioactive gases (e.g., H 3, Kr, and Xe) released as suggested in NUREG-1536.

b. Environmental Temperatures The HI-STORM FW System must withstand off-nonnal environmental temperatures. The off-no1mal environmental temperatures are specified in Table 2.2.2. The lower bound temperature occurs with no solar loads and the upper bound temperature occurs with steady-state insolation.

Each bounding temperature is assumed to persist for a sufficient duration to allow the system to reach steady-state temperatures.

Limits on the peaks in the time-varying ambient temperature at an ISFSI site are recognized in the FSAR in the specification of the off-no1mal temperatures. The lower bound off-normal temperature is defined as the minimum of the 72-hour average of the ambient temperature at an ISFSI site. Likewise, the upper bound off-normal temperature is defined by the maximum of 72-hour average of the ambient temperature. The lower and upper bound off-normal temperatures listed in Table 2.2.2 are intended to cover all ISFSI sites in the continental U.S. The 72-hom average of temperatw*e used in the definition of the off-normal temperature recognizes the considerable thermal inertia of the HI-STORM FW storage system which essentially flattens the effect of daily temperature variations on the internals of the MPC.

C. Design Temperatures In addition to the nonnal condition design temperatures, which apply to long-term storage conditions, an off-normal/accident condition temperature pursuant to the provisions of NUREG-1536 and Regulatory Guide 3.61 is also defined. This is the temperature which may ex ist during a transient event (examples of such an instance is the blockage of the overpack inlet/outlet vents or the fire accident). The off-normal/accident condition temperatures of Table 2.2.3 are given to bound the maximax (maximum in time and space) value of the thru-th ickness average HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-5 1 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HO! TEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATIOl<l temperature of the structural or non-structural part, as applicable, during the transient event.

These enveloping values, therefore, will bound the maximum temperature reached anywhere in the part, excl uding skin effects, during or immediately after, a transient event.

The off-normal/accident condition temperatures for stainless steel and carbon steel components are chosen such that the material 's ultimate tensi le strength does not fa ll below 30% of its room temperature value, based on data in published references [2.2.4 and 2.2.5]. This ensures that the material will not be subject to significant creep rates during these short duration transient events.

Additionally, temperature limits are also defined for short-term normal operating conditions which include but are not limited to MPC drying operations and onsite transport operations. The short-tem1 temperature limits for all the components are specified in Table 2.2.3.

d. Leakage of One Seal The MPC enclosure vessel does not contain gaskets or seals: All confinement boundary closure locations are welded. Because the material of construction (Alloy X, see Appendix I.A) is known from extensive indu strial experience to lend to high integrity, high ductility and high fracture strength welds, the MPC enclosure vessel welds provide a secure barrier against leakage.

The confinement boundary is defined by the MPC shell , MPC baseplate, MPC lid, port cover plates, closure ring, and associated welds. Most confinement boundary welds are inspected by radiography or ultrasonic examination. Field welds are examined by the liquid penetrant method on the root ( if more than one weld pass is required) and final weld passes. In addition to multi-pass liquid penetrant examination, the MPC lid-to-shell weld is pressure tested. The vent and drain port cover plates are also subject to proven non-destructive evaluations for leak detection s uch as liquid penetrant examination. These inspection and testing techniques are performed to verify the integrity of the confinement boundary. Therefore, leakage of one seal is not evaluated for its consequence to the storage system.

e. Partia l Blockage of Air Inlets/Outlets The loaded HI-STORM FW overpack must withstand the partial blockage of the air vents.

Because the overpack air inlets and out lets are covered by screens and inspected routinely ( or alternatively, equipped with temperature monitoring devices), significant blockage of all vents by blowing debris, critters, etc., is very unlikely. Nevertheless, the inherent thermal stability of the HI-STORM FW System shall be demonstrated by assuming all air inlets and/or outlets are partially blocked as an off-normal event. Pa11ial blockag e of the overpack vents is di scussed in Section 4.6.

f. Malfunction of FHD The FHD system is a forced helium circulation device used to effectuate moisture removal from loaded MPCs. For circulating helium, the FHD system is equipped with active components requiring external power for normal operation.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-52 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HO! IEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Initiating events of FHD malfunction are: (i) a loss of external power to the FHD System and (ii) an active component trip. In both cases a stoppage of forced helium circulation occurs and heat dissipation in the MPC transitions to natural convection cooling.

Although the FHD System is monitored during its operation, stoppage of FHD operations does not require actions to restore fo rced cooling for adequate heat di ssipation. This is because the condition of natural convection cooling evaluated in Section 4.6 shows that the fuel temperatures remain below off-nonnal limits. An FHD malfunction is detected by operator response to control panel visual displays and alarms.

2.2.3 Environmental Phenomena and Accident Condition Design Criteria Environmental phenomena and accident condition design criteria are defined in the following subsections.

The minimum acceptance criteria for the eva luation of the accident conditions are that the MPC confi nement boundary continues to confi ne the radioactive material, the MPC fu el basket stmcture maintains the configuration of the contents, the canister can be recovered from the overpack, and the system continues to provide adequate shielding.

A discussion of the effects of each environmental phenomenon and accident condition is provided in Section 12.2. The consequences of each accident or environmental phenomenon are eva luated against the require ments of 10CFR72. 106 and 10CFR20. Section 12.2 also provides the corrective action for each event.

a. Handling Accident A handling accident in the Pa11 72 jurisdiction is precluded by the requirements and provisions specified in this FSAR. The loaded HI-STORM FW components will be lifted in the Part 72 operations jurisdiction in accordance with written and Q.A. validated procedures and shall use lifting devices which comply with ANSI NI 4.6- 1993 [2.2.2] or applicable code. Also, the lifting and handling equipment (typically the cask transpo11er, which has specific requirements identified in paragraph 1.2. 1.5) is required to have a built-in redundancy against uncontrolled lowering of the load. Further, the HI-STORM FW is a vertically deployed system, and the handling evolutions in short term operations, as discussed in Chapter 9, do not involve downending of the loaded cask to the horizontal configuration (or upending from the horizonta l state), except as described in Subsection 4.5. 1. In particular, the loaded MPC shall be lowered into the HI-STORM FW overpack or raised from the overpack using the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask and a MPC lifting system designed in accordance with ANSI N 14.6 or applicable code.

Therefore, analysis of a handling accident event involving a HI-STORM system component is not required.

HOLTEC INTERNATION AL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-53 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEG PROPRleT.ARY INFORMATION

b. Non-Mechanistic Tip-Over The freestand ing loaded HI-STORM FW overpack is demonstrated by analysis to remain kinematically stable under all design basis environmental phenomena (tornado, earthquake, etc.)

and postulated accident conditions. The cask tip-over is not an outcome of any environmental phenomenon or accident condition and the cask tip-over is considered a non-mechanistic event.

Nevertheless, the HI-STORM FW overpack and MPC is ana lyzed for a hypothetica l tip-over event, and the structural integrity of a loaded HI-STORM FW System after a tip-over onto a reinforced concrete pad is demonstrated by analysis to show compliance with 10 CFR 72.236(m) with regards to the future transportability of the MPC.

The following requirements and acceptance criteria apply to the HI-STORM FW overpack under the tipover event:

1. In order to maximize the target stiffness (based on experience with ISFSI pad designs),

the ISFSI pad and underlying soil are conservatively modeled using the data in Table 2.2.9.

11. The tipover is simulated as a gravity-directed rotation of the cask from rest with its CG above its edge on the pad as the system's initial condition. The tipover begins when the cask is given an infinitesimal outward displacement in the radial plane of its tilted configuration.

iii. The MPC will remain in the HI-STORM FW overpack after the tipover event and the overpack will not suffer any ovalization which wou ld preclude the removal of the MPC.

1v. The maximum plastic deformation sustained by the fuel basket panels is limited to the value given in Table 2 .2.11.

v. The HI-STORM FW overpack will not suffer a significant loss of shielding.

v1. The confinement boundary will not be breached.

c. Fire The potentia l of a fire accident near an TSFSI pad is considered to be rendered extremely remote by ensuring that there are no significant combustible materials in the area. The only credible concern is related to a transport vehicle fuel tank fire engulfing the loaded HI-STORM FW overpack or loaded HI-TRAC VW transfer cask while it is being moved to the ISFSI.

The HI-STORM FW System must withstand elevated temperatures due to a fire event. The HI-STORM FW overpack and HI-TRAC VW transfer cask fire accidents for storage are conservatively postulated to be the result of the spillage and ignition of 50 gallons of combustible transporter fuel. The HI-STORM FW overpack and HI-TRAC VW transfer cask surfaces are considered to receive an incident radiation and forced convection heat flux from the fire. Table 2.2.8 provi.d es the fire durations for the HI-STORM FW overpack and HI-TRAC VW transfer cask based on the amount of flammable materials assumed. The temperature of fire is assumed to be 1475° F to accord with the provisions in 10CFR71.73.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-54 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION The following acceptance criteria apply to the fire accident:

1. The peak cladding te mperature during and after a fire accident shall not exceed the ISG-11 [2.0.1] pem1issible limit (see Table 2.2.3).

11. The local average temperature of concrete at any section shall not exceed its short-term limit in Table 2.2.3.

iii. The steel structure of the overpack shall rema in physica lly stable; i.e., no ri sk of structural instability such as gross buckling.

d. Partial Blockage ofMPC Basket Flow Holes The HI-STORM FW MPC is designed to prevent reduction of thermosiphon action due to partial blockage of the MPC basket flow holes by fuel cladding failure, fuel debris and crud. The HI-STORM FW System maintains the SNF in an inert environment with fuel rod cladd ing temperatures below accepted values (Table 2.2.3). Therefore, there is no credible mechanism for gross fuel cladding degradation of fuel classified as undamaged during storage in the HI-STORM FW. Fuel classified as damaged fuel or fue l debris are placed in damaged fuel containers. The damaged fuel container is equipped with mesh screens which ensure that the damaged fuel and fuel debris will not escape to block the MPC basket flow holes. The MPC is loaded once for long-term storage and, therefore, buildup of crud in the MPC due to numerous loadings is precluded. Using crud quantities for fuel assemblies reported in an Empire State Electric Energy Research Corporation Report [2.2.6] determines a layer of crud of conservative depth that is assumed to partially block the MPC basket flow holes. The crud depth is listed in Table 2.2.8. The fl ow holes in the bottom of the fuel basket are designed (as can be seen on the licensing drawings) to ensure that this amount of crud does not block the internal helium circulation.

e. Tornado The HI-STORM FW System must withstand pressures, wind loads, and missiles generated by a tornado. The prescribed design basis tornado and wind loads for the HI-STORM FW System are consistent with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.76 [2.2.7], ANSI 57.9 [2.2.8], and ASCE 7-05 [2.2.3].

Table 2.2.4 provides the wind speeds and pressure drops the HI-STORM FW overpack can withstand whi le maintaining kinematic stability. The pressure drop is bounded by the accident condition MPC externa l design pressure.

The kinematic stability of the HI-STORM FW overpack , and continued integrity of the MPC confinement boundary, within the storage overpack or HI-TRAC VW transfer cask, must be demonstrated under impact from tornado-generated missiles in conj unction with the w ind loadings. Standard Review Plan (SRP) 3.5.1.4 of NUREG-0800 [2.2.9] stipulates that the postulated missiles include at least three objects: a massive high kinetic energy missile that deforms on impact (large missile); a rigid mi ssile to test penetration resistance (penetrant missile); and a small rigid missile of a size sufficient to pass through any openings in the protective barriers (micro-missile). SRP 3.5. 1.4 suggests an automobile for a large missile, a rigid solid steel cylinder for the penetrating missile, and a solid sphere for the small rigid missile, HOLTEC INTERNATION AL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-55 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLTEC PRO~RIETARY lt~FORMATION all impacting at 35% of the maximum horizontal wind speed of the design basis tornado. Table 2.2.5 provides the missile data used in the analysis, which is based on the above SRP guidelines.

f. Flood The HI-STORM FW System must withstand pressme and water forces associated with deep and moving flood waters. Resu ltant loads on the HI-STORM FW System consist of buoyancy effects, static pressure loads, and velocity pressure due to water velocity. The flood is assumed to deeply submerge the HI-STORM FW System (see Table 2.2.8). The flood water depth is based on the hydrostatic pressure which is bounded by the MPC external pressure stated in Table 2.2.1.

It is shown that the MPC does not collapse, buckle, or allow water in-leakage under the hydrostatic pressure from the flood.

The flood water is assumed to be moving. The maximum allowable flood water velocity (Table 2.2.8) is established so that the pressure loading from the water is less than the pressure loading which would cause the HI-STORM FW System to slide or tip over. Site-specific safety reviews by the licensee must confirm that flood parameters at the proposed ISFSI site do not exceed the flood depth or water velocity given in Table 2.2.8.

If the flood water depth exceeds the elevation of the top of the HI-STORM FW overpack inlet vents, then the cooling air flow would be blocked. The flood water may also carry debris which may act to block the air inlets of the overpack. Blockage of the air inlets is addressed in 2.2.3 (I).

The hydrological conditions at most reactor sites are characterized as required by Paragraph 100.IO(c) of 10CFR100 and further articulated in Reg. Guide 1.59, "Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants" and Reg. Guide 1.102, "Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants." It is assumed that a complete characterization of the ISFSI's hydrosphere including the effects of hurricanes, floods, seiches, and tsunamis is available to enable a site-specific evaluation of the HI-STORM FW System for kinematic stability, if necessary. An evaluation for tsunamist for certain coastal sites should also be performed to demonstrate that the maximum flood depth in Table 2.2.8 will not be exceeded. The factor of safety against sliding or overturning of the cask under the moving flood waters shall be equal to or greater than the value in Table 2.2.8.

The scenario where the flood water raises high enough to block the inlet ducts (and thus cut-off ventilation) and remains stagnant is the most adverse flood condition (the1mally) for the storage system. As discussed in Chapter 1, the HI-STORM FW System inlet vent design makes it resistant to such adverse flood scenarios. The results of this analysis are presented in Chapter 4.

t A tsunami is an ocean wave from seismic or volcanic activity or from submarine landslides. A tsunami may be the result of nearby or distant events. A tsunami loading may ex ist in combination with wave splash and spray, storm surge and tides.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-56 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION

g. Earthquakes The principal effect of an earthquake on the loaded HI-STORM FW overpack is the movement of the MPC inside the overpack cavity causing impact with the cavity inner wall, and, if the earthquake is sufficiently strong, the potential sliding and tilting of the storage system. The acceptance criteria for the storage system under the site's Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) are as fo llows:

i. The loaded overpacks will not impact each other during the DBE event.

ii. The loaded overpack will not slide off the JSFSI.

iii. The loaded overpack will not tip over.

iv. The confinement boundary will not be breached.

To minimize the need for a seismic analysis at each ISFSI site, the approach utilized in Docket No. 72-1014 is adopted for HI-STORM FW, wh ich divides the DBE into two categories, labeled herein as (i) low intensity and (ii) high intensity. A low intensity earthquake is one whose ZPA is low enough to pass the "static equilibrium test". A high intensity earthquake is one that cannot pass the "static equil ibrium test". The limiting value of the static friction coefficient, µ , has been set at 0.53 for freestanding HI-STORM overpack on a reinforced concrete pad in Docket No. 72-1014. The same limit is observed for HI-STORM FW overpack in this report. The criterion for static equilibrium is derived from e lementary statics with the simplifying assumption that the cask and its contents are fixed and emulate a rigid body with six degrees-of-freedom. The earthquake is represented by its ZPA in horizontal (the vector sum of the two horizontal ZPAs for a 3-D earthquake site) and ve1tical directions. The limjts on a 11 and av for HI-STORM FW are readily derived as fo llows:

1. Prevention of sliding: Assuming the vertical ZP A to be acting to reduce the weight of the cask, horizontal force equilibrium yields:

W

aH ~ µ

W' (1-av)

Or aH ~ (1-av) * µ

11. Prevention against "edging" of the cask:

Balancing the moment about the cask' s pivot point for edging yields:

W

aH

h ~ W * (1-av)

r Or Where:

r: radius of the footprint of the cask's base h: height of the CG of the cask

µ: Static friction coefficient between the cask and the ISFSI pad.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-57 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEG PROPRIET.ARY INFORM4IION The above two inequalities define the limits on aH and av for a site if the earthquake is to be considered of " low intensity." For low intensity earthquake sites, additional analysis to demonstrate integrity of the confinement boundary is not required.

However, if the earthquake's ZPAs do not satisfy either of the above inequalities, then a dynamic ana lysis using the methodo logy specified in Chapter 3 shall be performed as a part of the

§72.212 safety evaluation.

h. I00% Fue l Rod Rupture The HI-STORM FW System must withstand loads due to 100% fuel rod rupture. For conservatism, l 00% of the fuel rods are assumed to rupture with 100% of the fill gas and 30% of the significant radioactive gases (e.g., H 3, Kr, and Xe) released in accordance with NUREG-1536. A ll of the fill gas contained in non-fuel hardware, such as burnable poison rod assemblies (BPRAs), is also assumed to be released concomitantly.

1. Confinement Boundary Leakage None of the postulated environmental phenomenon or accident conditions identified will cause failure of the confinement boundary. Section 7.1 provides the rationale to treat leakage of the rad iological contents from the MPC as a non-credible event.

J. External Pressure on the MPC Due to Explosion The loaded HI-STORM FW overpack must withstand loads due to an explosion. The accident condition MPC external pressure and overpack pressure differential specified in Table 2.2. 1 bounds all credible external explosion events. There are no credible internal explosive events since all materials are compatible with the various operating environments, as discussed in Subsection 3.4.1, or appropriate preventive measures are taken to preclude internal explosive events (see Subsection 1.2. l ). The MPC is composed of non explosive materials and maintains an inert gas environment. Thus explosion during long term storage is not credible. Likewise, the mandatory use of the protective measures at nuclear plants to prevent fires and explosions and the absence of any need for an exp losive material during loading and un loading operations eliminates the scenario of an explosion as a credible event. Furthermore, because the MPC is internally pressurized, any short-term external pressure from explosion or even submergence in flood waters will act to reduce the tensile state of stress in the enclosure vessel. Nevertheless, a design basis external pressure (Table 2.2. l) has been defined as a design basis load ing event wherein the internal pressure is non-mechanistica lly assumed to be absent.

k. Lightning The HI-STORM FW System must withstand loads due to lightning. The effect of lightning on the HI-STORM FW System is evaluated in Chapter 12.

HOLTEC INTERNATION AL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-58 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEG PROPRIET.ARY lf)IFORMAJIQN I. Burial Under Debris and Duct Blockage Debris may collect on the HI-STORM FW overpack vent screens as a result of floods, wind storms, or mud slides. Siting of the ISFSI pad shall ensure that the storage location is not located over shifting soil. However, if bur ial under debris is a credible event for an ISFSI, then a thermal analysis to analyze the effect of such an accident condition shall be performed for the site using the analysis methodology presented in Chapter 4. The duration of the burial-under-debris scenario will be based on the ISFSI owner 's emergency preparedness program. The following acceptance criteria apply to the burial-under-debris accident event:

1. The fuel cladding temperature shall not exceed the ISG-11 , Revision 3 [2.0.1 ]

temperature limits.

11. The internal pressure in the MPC cavity shall not exceed the accident condition design pressure limit in Table 2.2.1.

The burial-under-debris analys is will be perfo rmed if app licable, for the site-specific conditions and heat loads.

The scenario of complete blockage of inlet and/or outlet ducts is described and evaluated in Section 4.6.

m. Extreme E nvironmental Temperature The HI-STORM FW System must withstand extreme environmental temperatures. The extreme accident level temperature is specified in Table 2.2.2. The extreme accident level temperature is assumed to occur with steady-state insolation. This temperature is assumed to persist fo r a sufficient duration to allow the system to reach steady-state temperatures. The HI-STORM FW overpack and MPC have a large thermal inertia; therefore, extreme environmental temperature is a 3-day average for the ISFS I site.

All accident events and extreme environmental phenomena loadings that require analysis are listed in Table 2.2. 13 along w ith the applicable acceptance criteria.

The loadings listed in Table 2 .2. l 3 fall into two broad categories; namely, (i) those that primarily affect kinematic stability, and (ii) those that produce significant stresses and strains. The loadings in the former category are principally applicable to the overpack. Tornado wind (W), earthquake (E), and tornado-borne missile (M) are essentially loadings which can destabilize a cask.

Analyses reported in Chapter 3 show that the HI-STORM FW overpack structure will remain kinematically stable under these loadings. Additionally, for the tornado-borne missile (M),

analyses that demonstrate that the overpack structure remains unbreached by the postulated missiles are provided in Chapter 3.

Loadings in the second category produce global deformations that must be shown to comply with the applicable acceptance criteria. The relevant loading combinations for the fuel basket, the HOLTEC INTERNATION AL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-59 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

AOL I EC PROPRIE I ARV INFORMA I ION MPC, the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask and the HI-STORM FW overpack are different because of differences in their function. For example, the fuel basket does not experience a pressure loading because it is not a pressure vessel.

2.2.4 Applicability of Governing DocumentsSection III Subsection NB of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code),

[2.2.10), is the governing code for the structural design of the MPC. The alternatives to the ASME Code,Section III Subsection NB, applicable to the MPC in Docket Nos. 72-1008 and 72-1014 are also applicable to the MPC in the HI-STORM FW System, as documented in Table 2.2.14.

The stress limits of ASME Section III Subsection NF [2.0.3) are applied to the HI-STORM FW and HI-TRAC VW structural parts where the applicable loading is designated as a code service condition.

The fuel basket, made of Metamic-HT, is subject to the requirements in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1.4 and is designed to a specific (lateral) deformation limit of its walls under accident conditions of loading (credible and non-mechanistic) (see Table 2.2.11 ). The basis for the lateral deflection limit in the active fuel region, e, is provided in [2.2.11].

ACI 318 is the reference code for the plain concrete in the HI-STORM FW overpack. ACI 318.1-85(05) is the applicable code utilized to determine the allowable compressive strength of the plain concrete credited in strength ana lysis.

Each structure, system and component (SSC) of the HI-STORM FW System that is identified as important-to-safety is shown on the licensing drawings.

Tables 1.2.6 and 1.2.7 provide the information on the applicable Codes and Standards for material procurement, design, fabrication and inspection of the components of the H I-STORM FW System. In particular, the ASME Code is relied on to define allowable stresses for structural analyses of Code materials.

2.2.5 Service Limits In the ASME Code, plant and system operating conditions are common ly referred to as normal, upset, emergency, and faulted. Consistent with the terminology in NRC documents, this FSAR utilizes the terms normal, off-normal, and accident conditions.

The ASME Code defines fow- service conditions in addition to the Design Limits for nuclear components. They are referred to as Level A, Level B, Level C, and Level D service limits, respectively. Their definitions are provided in Paragraph NCA-2142.4 of the ASME Code. The four levels are used in this FSAR as fo llows:

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-60 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION

1. Level A Service Limits are used to establish allowables for normal condition load combinations.

11. Level B Service Limits are used to establish allowables for off-normal conditions.

u1. Level C Service Limits are not used.

1v. Level D Service Limits are used to establish allowables for certain accident conditions.

The ASME Code service limits are used in the structural analyses for defin ition of allowable stresses and allowable stress intensities, as applicable. A llowable stresses and stress intensities for structural analyses are tabulated in Chapter 3. These service limits are matched with normal, off-normal, and accident condition loads combinations in the following subsections.

The MPC confinement boundary is required to meet Section III, Class 1, Subsection NB stress intensity limits. Table 2.2.10 lists the stress intensity limits for Design and Service Levels A, B, and D for Class 1 structures extracted from the ASME Code. Table 2.2. 12 lists allowable stress lim its for the steel structure of the HI-STORM FW overpack and HI-TRAC VW tra nsfer cask which are analyzed to meet the stress limits of Subsection NF, Class 3 for loadings defined as service levels A, B, and D are applicable.

2.2.6 Loads Subsections 2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 2.2.3 describe the design criteria for normal, off-normal, and accident conditions, respectively. The loads are listed in Tables 2.2. 7 and 2.2.13, along with the applicable acceptance criteria.

2.2.7 Design Basis Loads Where appropriate, for each loading type, a bounding value is selected in this FSAR to impute an additional margin for the associated loading events. Such bounding loads are referred to as Design Basis Loads (DBL) in this FSAR. For example, the Design Basis External Pressure on the MPC, set down in Table 2.2.1, is a DBL, as it grossly exceeds any credible externa l pressure that may be postulated for an ISFSI site.

2.2.8 Allowable Limits The stress intensity limits for the MPC confinement boundary for the design condition and the service conditions are provided in Table 2.2. l 0. The MPC confinement boundary stress intensity limits are obtained from ASME Code,Section III, Subsection NB. The displacement limit for the MPC fuel basket is expressed as a dimensionless parameter 8 defined as [2.2.11)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-61 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEG PROPRIET.ARY INFORM4IION where 8 is defined as the maximum total deflection sustained by the basket panels under the loading event and w is the nominal inside (width) dimension of the storage cell. The limiting value of 0 is provided in Table 2.2. 11. Finally, the steel structure of the overpack and the HI-TRAC VW must meet the stress lim its of Subsection N F of ASME Code,Section III for the applicable service conditions.

The following defin itions of terms apply to the tables on stress intensity limits; these definitions are the same as those used throughout the ASME Code:

S111 : Value of Design Stress Intensity listed in ASME Code Section II, Part D, Tables 2A, 2B and 4 Sy: M inimum yie ld strength at temperature Su: Minimum ultimate strength at temperature HOLTEC INTERNATION AL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-62 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOL'fEC PROPRIETARY l~IFORMATION Table 2.2.1 PRESSURE LIMITS Pressure Location Condition Pressure (psig)

MPC Internal Pressure Design I Long-Term Normal 100 Short-Term Normal 120 Off-Normal 120 Accident 200 MPC External Pressure Normal (0) Ambient Off-Normal/Short-Term (0) Ambient Accident 55 HI-TRAC Water Jacket Accident 65 Internal Pressure Normal (0) Ambient Overpack External Pressure Off-Normal/Short-Term (0) Ambient Accident See Paragraph 3. l .2.1.d HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-63 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HObTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 2.2.2 ENVIRONMENT AL TEMPERATURES HI-STORM FW Overpack Condition Temperature (0 f) Comments Normal Ambient Bounding annual average from 80 Temperature the contiguous United States Bounding annual average fro m SoiI Temperature 77 the contiguous United States Lower bound does not consider insolation.

Off-Normal Ambient -40 (min)

Temperature 100 (max) Upper bound is a 3-day daily average and analysis includes insolation.

Extreme Ambient 3-day daily average and analysis 125 Temperature includes insolation Limit is specified in the technical Sho1t-Term Operations 0 (min) specifications.

HI-TRAC VW Transfer Cask Condition Temperature (0 f) Comments Sho1t-Term Operations 0 (min.) The lower bound lim it is specified (Outside) 90 (max.) in the technical specifications.

The upper bound limit is a 3-day daily average with insolation and can be increased for a specific site if justified by the appropriate thermal analys is.

Sh01t-Term Operations 0 (min.) The lower bound limit is specified (Inside a Build ing) 110 (max.) in the technica l specifications.

The ambient temperature limit is a 3-day daily average and can be increased for a specific site if justified by the appropriate thermal analysis. Solar insolation is not applicable inside a building.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-64 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelObTEG PROPRIETARY INFORMATIOl<l Table 2.2.3 TEMPERATURE LIMITS I Normal Short-Term Condition of Off-Normal and Eventstt HI-STORMFW Storage Accident Condition Temperature Component Temperature Temperature Limits t Limits Limits (OF)

(OF)

MPC shell 600 800 800 MPC basket 752 932 932 MPC basket shims 752 932 932 MPClid 600 800 800 MPC closure ring 500 800 800 MPC baseplate 400 800 800 HI-TRAC VW inner shell - 600 700 HI-TRAC VW outer shell - 500 700 HI-TRAC VW water jacket shell

- 500 700**

HI-TRAC VW bottom lid - 500 700 HI-TRAC VW top flange - 500 650 HI-TRAC VW bottom lid seals - 400 NIA HI-TRAC VW bottom lid bolts - 400 800 HI-TRAC VW bottom flange - 400 700 HI-TRAC VW radial neutron shield

- 311 NIA tt Short term operations include but are not limited to MPC drying and onsite transport. The I 058°F temperature limit applies to MPCs containing all moderate burnup fuel. The limit for MPCs containing one or more high burnup fuel assemblies is 752° F.

t For accident conditions that involve heating of the steel structures and no mechanical loading (such as the blocked air duct accident), the permissible metal temperature of the steel parts is defined by Table I A of ASME Section II (Part D) for Section III, Class 3 materials as 700°F. For the ISFSI fire event, the local temperature limit of HI-STORM concrete is l 100°F (HI-STORM 100 FSAR Appendix 1.D), and the steel structure is required to remain physically stable (i.e., so there will be no risk of strnctural instability such as gross buckling, the maximum temperature shall be less than 50% of the component's melting temperature and the specific temperature limits in this table do not apply). Concrete that exceeds l 100°F shall be considered unavai lable for shielding of the overpack.

""" For fire accidents, the steel structure is required to remain physically stable similar to HI-STORM overpack steel.

General note: The normal condition temperature limits are used in the design basis structural evaluations for MPC and HI-STORM . The short-term condition temperature limits are used in the design basis structural evaluations for HI-TRAC. All other short-term, off-normal and accident condition structural evaluations are based on bounding te mperatures from thermal evaluations presented in Chapter 4.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2 114830 Rev. 5 2-65 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLTEC PRO~RIETARY lt~FORMATION Table 2.2.3 TEMPERATURE LIMITS I Normal Short-Term Condition of Off-Normal and Eventstt HI-STORMFW Storage Accident Condition Temperature Component Temperature Temperature Limits t Limits (OF)

Limits (OF)

(OF)

HI-TRAC VW radial lead gamma shield

- 600 600 I 1058 Fuel Cladding 752 752 or 1058tt (Off-Normal and I Accident Conditions)

Overpack concrete 650 (on local 300 (See HI-STORM 100 FSAR Appendix 300 temperature of shieldinf L D) concrete except for fire Overpack Lid Top and Bottom Plate 450 450 700 I Remainder of overpack steel structure 350 350 700 I HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2 114830 R ev. 5 2-66 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

MOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATlmJ Table 2.2.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF REFERENCE TORNADO Condition Value Rotational wind speed (mph) 290 Translational speed (mph) 70 Maximum wind speed (mph) 360 Pressure drop (psi) 3.0 HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT Hl-2114830 Rev. 5 2-67 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

1IOLTEG PRGPRIET.ARY INFORMATION Table 2.2.5 TORNADO-GE ERATED MISSILES Missile Description Mass (kg) Velocity (mph)

Automobile 1800 126 Rigid solid steel cylinder 125 126 (8 in. diameter)

Solid sphere 0.22 126 (1 in . diameter)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT Hl-2114830 Rev. 5 2-68 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 2.2.6 LIFTING ANALYSIS CASES Loading Item Location of Bounding Dynamic Permissible Case Threaded Anchor Stress (psi)

Weight Amplification or Lift Point (Note 1)

Factor (Material)

HA. LoadedMPC Top Lid (stainless Section 1.15 Lesser of steel) 3.2 0.1 Su or S/3 HB. Loaded HI- Top F lange of the Section 1.15 Lesser of TRAC Cask (C.S. 3.2 0.1 Su or Transfer Cask forging) S/3 (Standard Version)

HC. Loaded HI- Threaded cylinder Section 1.15 S/3 STORMFW embedded and 3.2 Module with Lid welded to the radia l connectors near the top of the cask (carbon steel forging)

HD. Loaded HI- Trunnions Section 1.15 Trunnion:

TRAC Transfer installed radially 3.2 Lesser of Cask (Version P) in Top Flange of 0.1 Su or the cask (C.S. S/3 forging)

Top Flange:

Subsection NF of the ASMECode

[2.0.3]

Note 1: For threaded anchors, the permissible stress applies to the material of the part in which the lift anchor location is tapped. Minimum threaded length of the top shall be used in the analysis. Su = ultimate sh*ength; Sy = yield strength HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-69 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 2.2.7 LOADS APPLICABLE TO THE NORMAL AND OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS OF STORAGE Loading Loading Affected Item and Part Magnitude Acceptance Criterion Case of Loading The stress in the steel Top lid of HI-STORM structure must meet NA. Snow and Ice Table 2.2.8 FW overpack NF Class 3 limits for linear structures Meet "NB" stress Internal Pressure tt MPC Enclosure Vessel Table 2.2. 1 intensity limits

a. Design or Long- Design condition term Normal MPC Enclosure Vessel Table 2.2.1 limits on primary Condition stress intensities Level A limits on

b. Short-term MPC Enclosure Vessel Table 2.2.1 primary and secondary NB. Normal Condition stress intensities

c. Short-term Level A limits on Normal Lifting MPC Enclosure Vessel Table 2.2.1 primary stress Operation intensities Level B limits on

d. Off-Normal MPC Enclosure Vessel Table 2.2.1 primary and secondary Condition stress intensities.

ti' Normal condition internal pressure is bounded by the Design Internal Pressure in Table 2.2. l. Because the top and bottom extremities of the MPC Enclosure Vessel arc each at a uniform temperature due to the recirculating helium, thermal stresses are minimal. Therefore, the Design Internal Pressure envelops the case of the Normal Service condition for the MPC. The same remark applies to the Off-Normal Service condition.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-70 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

AOL I EC PROPRIE I ARV INFORMATION Table 2.2.8 ADDITIONAL D ESIGN INPUT DATA FOR NORMAL, OFF-NORMAL, AND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS Jtem Condition Value Snow Pressure Loading (lb/ft2) Normal lOO Assumed Blockage of MPC Basket Flow Opening Accident by Crud Settling (Depth of Crud, in.) 1 Cask Environment During the Postulated Fire Accident 1475 Event (Deg. F)

HT-STORM FW Overpack Fire Duration Accident 208 (seconds)

HI-TRAC VW Transfer Cask F ire Duration Accident 4.64 (minutes)

Maximum Submergence Depth due to Flood (ft) Accident 125 Factor of safety against sliding or overturning Accident l.l from moving flood waters HOLT EC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2 114830 R ev. 5 2-71 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

MOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMA I ION Table 2.2.9 ISFSI PAD DATA FOR NON-MECHANISTIC TIP-OVER ANALYSIS Thickness (inch) 36 Concrete Pad Compressive Strength (psi) 7,000 Modulus of elasticity of the sub grade (psi) 28,000 HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT Hl-2114830 Rev. 5 2-72 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelOLTEC PROPRIETARY l~FORMA I IO'l'r Table 2.2.10 MPC CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY STRESS INTENSITY LIMITS FOR DIFFERENT LOADING CONDITIONS (ELASTIC ANALYSIS PER NB-3220) t Stress Category Design Level A* Level Dtt Primary Membrane, Pm Sm Sm AMIN (2.4Sm, 0.7Su)

Local Membrane, PL l.5Sm l.5Sm 150% of Pm Limit Membrane plus Primary Bending l.5Sm l.5Sm 150% of PmLimit Primary Membrane plus Primary Bending 1.5Sm NIA 150% of PmL imit Membrane plus Primary Bending plus Secondary NIA 3Sm NIA Average Shear Stresstnt 0.6Sm 0.6S 111 0.42Su Stress combinations including F (peak stress) apply to fatigue evaluations only.

tt Governed by Appendix F, Paragraph F-1331 of the ASME Code, Section TIT.

ttt1' Governed by NB-3227.2 or F-1331.l(d).

The values of Level A Service Limits shall apply for Level B Service Limits, except that for primary stress intensities generated by Level B Service Loadings, allowable stress intensity values of 110% of Level A limits shall apply per NB-3223.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-73 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATIOl<l Table 2.2.11 STRUCTURAL DESIGN CRITERIA FOR THE FUEL BASKET PARAMETER VALUE M inimum service temperature -40°F Maximum total (lateral) deflection in the active fuel region - dimensionless 0.005 HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-74 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

AOL I EC PROPRIETAR ( !~FORMATION Table 2.2.1 2 STRESS AND ACCEPTANCE LIMITS FOR DIFFERENT LOADING CONDITIONS FOR THE STEEL STRUCTURE OF THE HI-STORM FW OVERPACK AND HI-TRAC VW STRESS DESIGN + OFF-NORMAL ACCIDENTt CATEGORY NORMAL Primary Membrane, s l .33*S See footnote Pm Primary Membrane, l.5* S 1.995*S See footnote Pm, plus Primary Bending, Pb Shear Stress 0.6*S 0.6*S See footnote (Average)

Definitions:

S = Allowable Stress Va lue for Table lA, ASME Section II, Part D.

Sm = Allowable Stress Intensity Value from Table 2A, ASME Section II, Part D Su = Ultimate Stress Under accident conditions, the cask must maintain its physical integrity, the loss of solid shielding (lead, concrete, steel, as applicable) shall. be minimal and the MPC must remain recoverable.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-75 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 2.2.13 LOADING EVENTS AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA APPLICABLE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS AND EXTREME ENVIRONMENTAL PHENOMENA Loading Loading or Affected Item or Characteristics of Notes and Acceptance Case Event Part Loading Criterion AA. Non- HI-STORMFW Impactive load See Paragraph 2.2.3(b)

Mechanistic overpack, Fuel from the slap-down Tip-Over Basket and of the loaded Enclosure Vessel overpack AB. Fire Fue l Cladding, Significant radiant See Paragraph 2.2.3(c)

Shielding heat input over a Concrete, and FW short time overpack steel structure AC. Tornado- HI-STORM FW Impactive loading See Paragraph 2.2.3(e)

Borne overpack (Table 2.2.5)

Missile

a. Large HI-STORMFW Acting to tip-over Use lower bound cask Missile overpack the loaded overpack weight, demonstrate kinematic stability

b. Medium HI-STORM FW May damage Use lower bound cask Missile overpack shielding concrete weight, demonstrate kinematic stabi lity

c. Small HI-STORMFW Penetration Prevent penetration of Missile overpack the cask and access to the MPC AD. Moving Loaded Storage Acting to tip-over See Paragraph 2.2.3 (f).

Floodwaters Module the loaded overpack Use both lower bound (Table 2.2.8) and upper bound cask height and weight to demonstrate kinematic stability.

AE. Design Loaded Storage Acting to See Paragraph 2.2.3(g).

Basis Module destabilize the cask Earthquake AF. 100% Rod MPC confinement Acts to See Paragraph 2.2.301).

Rupture boundary overpressure the Demonstrate that the MPC and raise the equilibrium pressure in temperature of the the MPC remains below fuel cladding the Accident Condition Design Pressure (Table 2.2.1) and ISG-1 1 temperature limits are met by the fuel cladding.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-76 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEG PROPRle+,ARY lf)IFORMAJIQN Table 2.2.13 LOADING EVENTS AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA APPLICABLE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS AND EXTREME ENVIRONMENTAL PHENOMENA AG. Burial Stored SNF Blocks convection See Paragraph 2.2.3(1).

Under and retards Detem1ine the Debris conduction as permissible time e lapsed means for heat under debris so that the dissipation pressure in the MPC does not exceed the Accident Condition Design Pressure and the fuel cladding temperature remains below the TSG-1 1 limit.

AH Design MPC Enclosure An assumed non- Demonstrate that the Basis Vessel mechanistic load MPC Enclosure Vessel External from deep will not buckle, i.e.,

Pressure submergence in become structurally flood water or unstable explosion in the vicinity of the ISFSI AJ. Internal HI-TRAC Water A non-mechanistic The water jacket will pressure Jacket (postulated) event meet Level D stress developed limits for "NF" in the HI- components.

TRAC water jacket HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERTAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-77 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION TABLE 2.2. 14 List of ASME Code Alternatives for Multi-Purpose Canisters (MPCs)

MPC EnclosW"e Subsection General Requirements. Because the MPC is not an ASME Code Vessel NCA Requires preparation of a stamped vessel, none of the specifications, Design Specification, Design reports, certificates, or other general Report, Overpressure requirements specified by NCA are Protection Report, required. In lieu of a Design Specification Certification of Constn 1ction and Design Report, the HI-STORM FSAR Report, Data Report, and includes the design criteria, service other administrative controls conditions, and load combinations for the for an ASME Code stamped design and operation of the MPCs as well as vessel. the results of the stress analyses to demonstrate that applicable Code stress limits are met. Additionally, the fabricator is not required to have an ASME-ccrtificd QA program. All important-to-safety activities are governed by the NRC-approved Holtec QA program.

Because the cask components are not certified to the Code, the terms "Certificate Holder" and "lnspector" are not germane to the manufacturing of NRC-certified cask components. To eliminate ambiguity, the responsibilities assigned to the Certificate Holder in the Code, as applicable, shall be interpreted to apply to the NRC Certificate of Compliance (CoC) holder (and by extension, to the component fabri,cator) if the requirement must be fulfilled. The Code term "Inspector" means the QNQC personnel of the CoC holder and its vendors assigned to oversee and inspect the manufacturing process.

MPC Enclosure NB-1100 Statement of requirements for MPC Enclosure Vessel is designed and will Vessel Code stamping of be fabricated in accordance with ASME components. Code,Section III, Subsection NB to the maximum practical extent, but Code stamping is not required.

MPC basket NB-1130 NB-1132.2(d) requires that The lugs that are used exclusively for lifting supports the first connecting weld of a an empty MPC are welded to the inside of and lift lugs non-pressure retaining the pressure-retaining MPC shell, but are structural attachment to a not designed in accordance with Subsection component shall be NB. The lug-to-Enclosure Vessel Weld is considered part of the required to meet the stress limits of Reg.

component unless the weld is Guide 3.61 in lieu of Subsection NB of the more than 2t from the Code.

pressure retaining portion of the component, where t is the HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-78 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

ROLTEC i;iROPRIETARY lf)IFORMATION TABLE 2.2.14 List of ASME Code Alternatives for Multi-Purpose Canisters (MPCs) nominal thickness of the pressure retaining material.

NB-1 132.2(e) requires that the first connecting weld of a welded nonstructural attachment to a component shall conform to NB-4430 if the connecting weld is within 2t from the pressure retaining portion of the component.

MPC Enclosure NB-2000 Requires materials to be Materials will be supplied by Holtec Vessel supplied by ASME-approved approved suppliers with Certified Material material suppl ier. Test Reports (CMTRs) in accordance with NB-2000 requirements.

MPC Enclosure NB-3100 Provides requirements for These requirements arc subsumed by the Vessel NF-3100 determining design loading HI-STORM FW FSAR, serving as the conditions, such as pressure, Design Specification, which establishes the temperature, and mechanical service conditions and load combinations loads. for the storage system.

MPC Enclosure NB-4120 NB-4121.2 and NF-4121.2 ln-shop operations of short duration that Vessel provide requirements for apply heat to a component, such as plasma repetition of tensile or impact cutting of plate stock, welding, machining, tests for material subjected to and coating are not, unless explicitly stated heat treatment during by the Code, defined as heat treatment fabrication or installation. operations.

MPC Enclosure NB-4220 Requires certa in formi ng The cylindricity measurements on the rolled Vessel tolerances to be met for shells are not specifically recorded in the cylindrical, conical, or shop travelers, as would be the case for a spherical shells of a vessel. Code-stamped pressure vessel. Rather, the requirements on inter-component clearances (such as the MPC-to-transfer cask) are guaranteed through fixture-controlled manufacturing. The fabrication specification and shop procedures ensure that all dimensional design objectives, including inter-component annular clearances are satisfied. The dimensions required to be met in fabrication are chosen to meet the functional requirements of the dry storage components. Thus, although the post-forming Code cylindricity requirements are not evaluated for compliance directly, they are indirectly satisfied (actually exceeded) in the fina l manufactured components.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-79 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION TABLE 2.2.14 List of ASME Code Alternatives for Multi-Purpose Canisters (MPCs)

MPC Enclosure NB-4122 Implies that with the MPCs are built in lots. Material traceability Vessel exception of studs, bolts, nuts on raw materials to a heat number and and heat exchanger tubes, corresponding CMTR is maintained by CMTRs must be traceable to a Holtec through markings on the raw specific piece of material in a material. Where material is cut or component. processed, markings are transferred accordingly to assure traceability. As materials are assembled into the lot of MPCs being manufactured, documentation is maintained to identify the heat numbers of materials being used for that item in the multiple MPCs being manufactured under that lot. A specific item within a specific MPC will have a number of heat numbers identified as possibly being used for the item in that particular MPC of which one or more of those heat numbers (and corresponding CMTRS) will have actually been used. All of the heat numbers identified will comply with the requirements for the particular item.

MPC Lid and NB-4243 Full penetration welds MPC lid and closure ring arc not full Closure Ring required for Category C Joints penetration welds. They arc welded Welds (flat head to main shell per independently to provide a redundant seal.

NB-3352.3)

MPC Closure NB-5230 Radiographic (RT) or Root (if more than one weld pass is Ring, Vent and ultrasonic (UT) examination required) and final liquid penetrant Drain Cover required. examination to be performed in accordance Plate Welds with NB-5245. The closure ring provides independent redundant closure for vent and drain cover plates. Vent and drain port cover plate welds are helium leakage tested.

MPC Lid to NB-5230 Radiographic (RT) or Only progressive liquid pcnetrant (PT)

Shell Weld ultrasonic (UT) examination examination is permitted. PT examination required. will include the root and final weld layers and each approx. 3/8" of weld depth.

MPC Enclosure NB-6111 All completed pressure The MPC vessel is seal welded in the field Vessel and Lid retaining systems shall be following fuel assembly loading. The MPC pressure tested. vessel shall then be pressure tested as defined in Chapter I 0. Accessibi lity for leakage inspections preclude a Code compliant pressure test. All MPC enclosure vessel welds (except closure ring and vent/drain cover plate) are inspected by volumetric examination. MPC shell and shell to baseplate welds arc subject to a fabrication helium leak test prior to loading.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-80 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelOLTEC PROPRIETARY l~FORMA I ION TABLE 2.2.14 List of ASME Code Alternatives for Multi-Purpose Canisters (MPCs)

The MPC lid-to-shell weld shall be verified by progressive PT examination. PT must include the root and final layers and each approximately 3/8 inch of weld depth.

The inspection results, including relevant findings (indications) shall be made a permanent part of the user's records by video, photographic, of other means which provide an equivalent record of weld integrity. The video or photograph ic records should be taken during the final interpretation period described in ASME Section V, Article 6, T-676. The vent/drain cover plate and the closure ring welds are confirmed by liquid penetrant examination.

The inspectio n of the weld must b e performed by qualified personnel and shall meet the acceptance requirements of ASME Code Section JTT, NB-5350.

MPC Enclosure NB-7000 Vessels are required to have No overpressure protection is provided.

Vessel overpressure protection. Function of MPC enclosure vessel is to contain radioactive contents under normal, off-normal, and accident conditions of storage. MPC vessel is designed to withstand maximum internal pressure considering 100% fuel rod failure and maximum accident temperatures.

MPC E nclosure NB-8000 States requirements for The HI-STORM FW System is to be Vessel nameplates, stamping and marked and identified in accordance with reports per NC A-8000. 10CFR7 1 and 10CFR72 requirements.

Code stamping is not required. QA data package to be in accordance with Holtec approved QA program.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-81 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 2.3 SAFETY PROTECTION SYSTEMS 2.3.l General The HI-STORM FW System is engineered to provide for the safe long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). The HI-STORM FW will withstand all normal, off-nom1al, and postulated accident conditions without release of radioactive material or excessive radiation exposure to workers or members of the public. Special considerations in the design have been made to ensure long-term integrity and confinement of the stored SNF throughout all cask normal and off-normal operating conditions and its retrievability for further processing or ultimate disposal in accordance with 10 CFR 72.122(1) and ISG-2 [2.3.1].

2.3.2 Protection by Multiple Confinement BaITiers and Systems 2.3.2.1 Confinement Barriers and Systems The radioactivity which the HI-STORM FW System must confine originates from the spent fuel assemblies and, to a lesser extent, any radioactive particles from contaminated water in the fuel pool which may remain inside the MPC. This radioactivity is confined by multiple engineered barriers.

Contamination on the outside of the MPC from the fuel pool water is minimized by preventing contact, removing the contaminated water, and decontamination. An inflatable seal in the annular gap between the MPC and HI-TRAC VW, and the elastomer seal in the HI-TRAC VW bottom lid (see Chapter 9) prevent the fuel pool water from contacting the exterior of the MPC and interior of the HI-TRAC VW while submerged for fuel loading.

The MPC is a seal welded enclosure which provides the confinement boundary. The MPC confinement boundary is defined by the MPC baseplate, MPC shell, MPC lid, closure ring, port cover plates, and associated welds.

The MPC confinement boundary has been designed to withstand any postulated off-normal operations, accident cond itions, or external natural phenomena. Redundant closure of the MPC is provided by the MPC closure ring welds which provide a second barrier to the release of radioactive material from the MPC internal cavity. Therefore, no monitoring system for the confinement boundary is required.

Confinement is discussed further in Chapter 7. MPC field weld examinations, helium leakage testing of the port cover plate welds, and pressure testing are performed to verify the confinement function. Fabrication inspections and tests are also performed, as discussed in Chapter 10, to verify the integrity of the confinement boundary.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-82 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLTEC PROPRIE I ARV INFORMA I ION 2.3.2.2 Cask Cooling To ensure that an effective passive heat removal capability exists for long term satisfactory performance, several thermal design features are incorporated in the storage system. They are as follows:

The MPC fue l basket is formed by a honeycomb structure of Metamic-HT plates which allows the unimpeded conduction of heat from the center of the basket to the periphery.. The MPC cavity is equipped with the capability to circulate helium internally by natural buoyancy effects and transport heat from the interior region of the canister to the peripheral region (Holtec Patent 5,898,747).

The MPC confinement boundary ensures that the inert gas (helium) atmosphere inside the MPC is maintained during normal, off-normal, and accident conditions of storage and transfer. The MPC confinement boundary maintains the helium confinement atmosphere below the design temperatures and pressures stated in Table 2.2.3 and Table 2.2. l, respectively.

The MPC thermal design maintains the fuel rod cladding temperatures below the ISG-11 limits such that fuel cladding does not experience degradation during the long term storage period.

The HI-STORM FW is optimally designed, with cooling vents and an MPC to overpack annulus, which maxim ize air flow by ensuring a turbulent flow regime at maximum heat loads.

Eight inlet ducts located circumferentially around the bottom of the overpack and the outlet vent which circumscribes the entire lid of HI-STORM FW render the venti lation action insensitive to shifting wind conditions.

2.3.3 Protection by Equipment and Instrumentation Selection 2.3.3.1 Equipment Design criteria for the HI-STORM FW System are described in Section 2.2. The HI-STORM FW System may include use of ancillary or support equipment for ISFSJ implementation.

Ancillary equipment and structures utilized outside of the reactor facility 10CFR Patt 50 structures may be broken down into two broad categories, namely Important-to-Safety (ITS) anci llary equipment and Not Important to Safety (NITS) a ncillary equipment. NUREG/CR-6407 provides guidance for the determination of a component's safety classification [ 1.1.4].

Users may perform the MPC transfer between the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask and the HI-STORM FW overpack in a location of their choice, depending upon site-specific needs and capabilities. For those users choosing to perfotm the MPC transfer using devices not integral to structures governed by the regulations of 10 CFR Part 50 (e.g., fuel handling or reactor building),

a Canister Transfer Facility (CTF) is required. The CTF is typically a concrete lined cavity of a suitable depth to stage the overpack inside it so that the top of the cask is near grade level (Holtec Patent 7, 139,358B2). With the overpack staged inside the cavity, the mating device is installed on top and the HI-TRAC VW is mounted on top of the mating device. The MPC HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-83 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION transfer is carried out by actuating the mating device and moving the MPC vertically to the cylindrical cavity of the recipient cask. The mating device is actuated by removing the bottom lid of the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask (see Figure 1.1.2). The device utilized to lift the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask to place it on the overpack and to vertically transfer the MPC may be of stationary or mobile type, but it must have redundant drop protection features. The cask transporter can be the load handling device at the CTF.

2.3.3.2 Instrumentation As a consequence of the passive nature of the HI-STORM FW System, instrumentation, which is important to safety, is not necessary. No instrumentation is required or provided for HI-STORM FW storage operations, other than normal security service instruments and dosimeters.

However, in lieu of performing the periodic inspectio n of the HI-STORM FW overpack vent screens, temperature elements may be installed in the overpack exit vents to continuously monitor the air temperature. If the temperature elements and associated temperature monitoring instrumentation are used, the y shall be designated important to safety.

2.3.4 Nuclear Criticality Safety The criticality safety criteria stipulates that the effective neutron multiplication factor, kcrr, including statistical uncertainties and biases, is less than 0.95 for all postulated arrangements of fuel within the cask under all credible conditions.

2.3.4.1 Control Methods for Prevention of Criticality The control methods and design features used to prevent criticality for all MPC configurations are the following:

Fuel basket constructed of neutron absorbing material with no potential of detachment.

Favorable geometry provided by the MPC fuel basket.

A high B-10 concentration (50% greater than the concentration used in the existing state-of-the art designs certified under 10CFR72) leads to a lower reactivity level under all operating scenarios.

Administrative controls shall be used to ensure that fuel placed in the HI-STORM FW System meets the requirements described in Chapters 2 and 6. A ll appropriate criticality analyses are presented in C hapter 6.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-84 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 2.3.4.2 Error Contingency Criteria Provision for error contingency is built into the criticality analyses performed in Chapter 6.

Because biases and uncertainties are explicitly evaluated in the analysis, it is not necessary to introduce additional contingency for error.

2.3.4.3 Verification Analyses In Chapter 6, critical experiments are selected which reflect the design configurations. These critical experiments are evaluated using the same calculation methods, and a suitable bias is incorporated in the reactivity calculation.

2.3.5 Radiological Protection 2.3.5.1 Access Control As required by 10CFR72, uncontrolled access to the ISFSI is prevented through physical protection means. A security fence surrounded by a physical barrier fence with an appropriate locking and monitoring system is a standard approach to limit access if the ISFSI is located outside the controlled area. The details of the access control systems and procedures, including division of the site into radiation protection areas, w ill be developed by the licensee (user) of the ISFSI utilizing the HI-STORM FW System.

2.3.5.2 Shielding The objective of shielding is to assure that radiation dose rates at key locations are as low as practical in order to maintain occupational doses to operating personnel As Low As Reasonably Ach ievable (ALARA) and to meet the requirements of IO CFR 72.104 and IO CFR 72. 106 for dose at the controlled area boundary.

The HI-STORM FW is designed to limit dose rates in accordance with 10CFR72.104 and 10CFR72. l 06 which provide radiation dose limits for any real individual located at or beyond the nearest boundary of the controlled area. The individual must not receive doses in excess of the limits given in Table 2.3.1 for normal, off-normal, and accident conditions.

Three locations are of particu lar interest in the storage mode:

immediate vicin ity of the cask restricted area boundary controlled area (site) boundary Dose rates in the immediate vicinity of the loaded overpack are important in consideration of occupational exposure. Conservative evaluations of dose rate have been performed and are described in Chapter 5 based on Reference BWR and PWR fuel (Table 1.0.4).

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-85 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEG PROPRIET.ARY INFORMATION Consistent with 10 CFR 72, there is no single dose rate limit established for the HI-STORM FW System. Compliance with the regulatory limits on occupational and controlled area doses is performance-based, as demonstrated by dose monitoring performed by each cask user.

Design objective dose rates for the HI-STORM FW overpack surfaces are presented in Table 2.3.2.

Because of the passive nature of the HI-STORM FW System, human activity related to the system after deployment in storage is infrequent and of short duration. Personnel exposmes due to operational and maintenance activities are discussed in Chapter 11 , wherein measures to reduce occupational dose are also discussed. The estimated occupational doses for personnel provided in Chapter 11 comply with the requirements of 10CFR20. As discussed in Chapter 11 ,

the HI-STORM FW System has been configured to minimize both the site bow1dary dose in storage and occupational dose during short term operations to the maximum extent possible.

The analyses and discussions presented in Chapters 5, 9, and 11 demonstrate that the Hl-STORM FW System is capable of meeting the radiation dose limits set down in Table 2.3. l.

2.3.5.3 Radiological Alarm System The HI-STORM FW does not require a radio logical alarm system. There are no credible events that cou ld result in release of radioactive materials from the system and direct radiation exposure from the ISFSI is monitored using the plant' s existing dose monitoring system.

2.3.6 Fire and Explosion Protection There are no combustible or explosive materials associated with the HI-STORM FW System.

Combustible materials will not be stored w ithin an ISFSI. However, for conservatism, a hypothetical fire accident has been analyzed as a bounding condition for HI-STORM FW System. The evaluation of the HI-STORM FW System fire accident is discussed in Chapter 12.

Explosive material will not be stored within an ISFSI. Small overpressures may resu lt from accidents involving explosive materials which are stored or transported in the vicinity of the site.

Explosion is an accident loading condition considered in Chapter 12.

HOLTEC INTERNATION AL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-86 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

""""AOL I EC F'RO~RIETARY IMFORMATIOlll Table 2.3.l RADIOLOGICAL SITE BOUNDARY REQUIREMENTS MINIMUM DISTANCE TO BOUNDARY OF 100 CONTROLLED AREA (m)

NORMAL AND OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS:

-Whole Body (mrem/yr) 25

-Thyroid (mrem/yr) 75

-Any Other Critical Organ (mrem/yr) 25 DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT:

-TEDE (rem) 5

-DDE + CDE to any individual organ or tissue (other 50 than lens of the eye) (rem)

-Lens dose equivalent (rem) 15

-Shallow dose equivalent to skin or any extremity 50 (rem)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-87 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I-IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INrORM4TION Table 2.3.2 - Design Objective Dose Rates for HI-STORM FW Overpack Surfaces Area of Interest Dose Rate (mrem/hr)

Radial Surface Excluding Vents 300 Inlet and Outlet Vents 300 Top of the Lid (Horizontal Surface at approximate center) 30 HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT Hl-2114830 Rev. 5 2-88 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMA I ION 2.4 DECOMMISSIONING CONSIDERATIONS Efficient decommissioning of the ISFSI is a paramount objective of the HI-STORM F W System.

The HI-STORM FW System is ideally configured to facilitate rapid, safe, and economical decommiss ioning of the storage site. As discussed below, Holtec International has taken appropriate steps to ensure that the necessary equipment designs and certifications shall be available to the user of the HI-STORM FW System to expeditiously decommission the ISFSI at the end of the storage facility's required service life.

Towards that end, the MPC has been designed with the objective to transport it in a HI-STAR 190 transportation cask (Figure 2.4.1). Since the loaded MPC is a self-contained "Waste Package", no further handling of the SNF stored in the MPC is required prior to transport to a licensed centralized storage fac ility or repository.

The MPC which holds the SNF assemblies is engineered to be suitable as a waste package for permanent internment in a deep Mined Geological Disposal System (MGDS). The materials of construction permitted for the MPC are known to be highly resistant to severe environmental conditions. No carbon steel, paint, or coatings are used or permi tted in the MPC in areas where they could be exposed to spent fuel pool water or the ambient environment. Therefore, the SNF assemblies stored in the MPC do not need to be removed. However, to ensure a practical, feas ible method to defuel the MPC, the top of the MPC is equipped with suffi cient gamma shielding and markings locating the drain and vent locations to enable semiautomatic ( or remotely actuated) severing of the MPC closure ring to provide access to the MPC vent and drain. The circumferential welds of the MPC closure lid can be removed by semiautomatic or remotely actuated means, providing access to the SNF.

Likewise, the overpack consists of steel and concrete rendering it suitable for permanent burial.

Alternatively, the MPC can be removed from the overpack, and the latter reused for storage of other MPCs. In either case, the overpack would be expected to have no interior or exterior radioactive surface contamination. Any neutron activation of the steel and concrete is expected to be extremely small, and the assembly would qualify as Class A waste in a stable form based on definiti ons and requirements in IOCFR6 1.55. As such, the material wou ld be suitable for burial in a near-surface disposal site as Low Specific Activity (LSA) material.

If the SNF needs to be removed fro m the MPC before it is placed into the MGDS, the MPC interior metal surfaces can be decontaminated using ex isting mechanical or chemical methods to allow for its disposal. This will be facilitated by the smooth metal surfaces designed to minimize crud traps. After the surface contamination is removed, the MPC radioactiv ity will be diminished significantly, allowing near-surface burial or secondary applications at the licensee's facility.

It is also likely that both the overpack and MPC, or extensive portions of both, can be further decontami nated to allow recycle or reuse options. After decontamination, the only radiological hazard the HI-STORM FW System may pose is slight activation of the HI-STORM FW materials caused by irradiation over the storage period.

HOLTEC INTERNATION AL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-89 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I-IOLTl::C PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Due to the design of the HI-STORM FW System, no residual contamination is expected to be left behind on the concrete ISFSI pad. The base pad, fence, and peripheral utility structures will require no decontamination or special handling after the last overpack is removed.

The long-lived radionuclides produced by the irradiation of the HI-STORM FW System components are listed in Table 2.4.1. The activation of the Ill-STORM FW components shall be limited to a cumulative activity of 10 Ci per cubic meter before decommissioning and disposal of the activated item can be carried out.

In any case, the Ill-STORM FW System would not impose any additional decommissioning requirements on the licensee of the ISFSI facility per 10CFR72.30, since the HI-STORM FW System could eventually be shipped from the site.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-90 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HO! IEC PROPRIET,t\RY INFORMATION Table 2.4.1 PRINCIPAL LONG-LNED ISOTOPES PRODUCED DURING IRRADIATION OF THE HI-STORM FW COMPONENTS Nuclide MPC Stainless Steel HI-STORM Steel ID-STORM Concrete

)"Mn X X X

))Fe X X X

,yNi X - -

0

°Co X - -

<>JNi X - -

j 9 Ar - - X 41Ca - - X HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT Hl-2114830 Rev. 5 2-91 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOt'fl:e PROPRIETARY INFO~MAIION (b)(4l Figure 2.4.1 : Jll-ST AR 190 Transportation Overpack and MPC Shown in Exploded, Cut-Away View HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-211 4830 R ev. 5 2-92 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOI TEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 2.5 REGULATORY COMPLIANCE Chapter 2 provides the principal design criteria and applicable loading related to HI-STORM FW shuctures, systems, and components designated as important-to-safety. These criteria include specifications regarding the fuel, as well as, external conditions that may exist in the operating environment during normal and off-normal operations, accident conditions, and natural phenomena events. The chapter has been written to provide sufficient information to allow verification of compliance with 10CFR72, NUREG-1536, and Regulatory Guide 3.61. A detailed evaluation of the design criteria and an assessment of compliance with those criteria are provided in Chapters 3 through 12.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT Hl-2114830 Rev. 5 2-93 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMA I ION

2.6 REFERENCES

[2.0.1] ISG- 11, "Cladding Considerations for the Transport and Storage of Spent Fuel," USNRC, Washington, DC, Revision 3, November 17, 2003.

[2.0.2] USNRC Memorandum from Christopher L. Brown to M. Wayne Hodges, "Scoping Calculations for Cladding Hoop Stresses in Low Burnup Fuel,"

dated January 29, 2004.

[2.0.3] ASME Code,Section III, Subsection NF and Appendix F, and Code Section II, Part D, Materials, 2007.

[2.0.4] ACI-318-05, Building Code Requirements for Structural Concrete (ACI 318-05) and Commentary ( ACI 3 l SR-05), Chapter 22, American Concrete Institute, 2005.

[2.1.1] ORNL/TM-10902, "Physical Characteristics of GE BWR Fuel Assemblies", by R.S. Moore and K.J. Notz, Martin Marietta (1989).

[2.1.2] U.S. DOE SRC/CNEAF/96-01, Spent Nuclear Fuel Discharges from U.S.

Reactors 1994, Feb. 1996.

[2.1.3] S.E. Turner, " Uncertainty Analysis - Axial Burnup Distribution Effects,"

presented in "Proceedings of a Workshop on the Use of Burnup Credit in Spent Fuel Transport Casks", SAND-89-0018, Sandia National Laboratory, Oct., 1989.

[2.1.4] Commonwealth Edison Company, Letter No. NFS-BND-95-083, Chicago, Illinois.

[2.2.1] Crane Manufacturer's Association of America (CMAA), Specification

70, J988, Section 3.3.

[2.2.2] ANSI Nl4.6-1993, "American Nationa l Standard for Radioactive Materials - Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weig hing 10,000 Pounds (4500 Kg) or More" , American National Standards Institute, Inc, Washington, DC, June 1993.

[2.2.3] ANSI/ASCE 7-05 (formerly ANSI A58. l), "Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures," American Society of Civi l Engineers, New York, NY, 2006.

[2.2.4] D. Peckner and J.M. Bernstein, "Handbook of Stainless Steels," McGraw Hill Book Company, 1977.

[2.2.5] "Nuclear Systems Materials Handbook," Oak Ridge National Laboratory, TID 26666, Volume 1.

[2.2.6] "Debris Collection System for Boi ling Water Reactor Consolidation Equipment", EPRI Project 3100-02 and ESEERCO Project EP91-29, October 1995.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-94 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEG PROPRle+,ARY lf)IFORMAJIQN

[2.2.7] Regulatory Guide 1.76, "Design Basis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants," United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 2007.

[2.2.8] ANSI/ANS 57 .9-1992, "Design Criteria for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (Dry Type)", American Nuclear Society, LaGrange Park, IL, May 1992.

[2.2.9] NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan," United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, April 1996

[2.2.1 O] ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Subsection NB. "Class 1 Components," American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, 2007

[2.2.11] Holtec Proprietary Position Paper DS-331 , "Structural Acceptance Criteria for the Metamic-HT Fuel Basket", (USNRC Docket No. 71-9325).

[2.3.1] ISG-2, "Fuel Retrievability", Revision 0, USNRC, Washington DC HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERJAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 2-95 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelObTi;C PROPRIETARY INFORMATION CHAPTER 3: STRUCTURAL EVALUATIONt 3.0 OVERVIEW In this chapter, the structural components of the HI-STORM FW system subject to certification by the USNRC are identified and described. The objective of the structural analyses is to ensure that the integrity of the HI-STORM FW system is maintained under all credible loadings under nonnal, off-normal and extreme environmental conditions as well all credible accident events. The results of the stmctural analyses, summarized in this FSAR, suppo1t the conclusion that the confinement, criticality control, radiation shielding, and retrievability criteria set forth under 10CFR72.236(1),

10CFR72. l 24(a), 10CFR72. l04, 10CFR72.106, and 10CFR72.1 22(1) shall be met by the storage system. In particular, the design basis information contained in the previous two chapters and in this chapter provides the necessary data to permit all needed structural evaluations for demonstrating compliance with the requirements of 10CFR72.236(a), (b), (d) (e), (f), (g),and (1). To facilitate regulatory review, the assumptions and conservatisms inherent in the analyses are identified along with a concise description of the analytical methods, models, and acceptance criteria. A summary of the system's ability to maintain its structural integrity under other slow acting (degene rative) or precipitous (sudden) effects that may contribute to structural failure, such as, corrosion, fatigue, buckling, and non-ductile fracture is also provided. The information presented herein is intended to comply with the guidelines ofNUREG-1536 and ISG-21 pertaining to use of finite element codes.

In particular, every Computational Modeling Software (CMS) deployed to perform the structural analyses is identified and its implementation appropriately justified as suggested in ISG-21. The information on benchmarking and validation of each Computational Modeling Software is also provided (in Subsection 3.6.2).

Where appropriate, the structural analyses have been performed using classical strength materials solution . Such calculations are presented in this FSAR in transparent detail.

Furthe1more, the input data and analyses using Computational Modeling Software (CMS) are described in sufficient detail to enable an independent evaluation of safety conclusions reached in this chapter.

The safety analyses summarized in this chapter demonstrate acceptable margins to the allowable limits under all design basis loading conditions and operational modes. Minor changes to the design parameters that inevitably occur during the product's life cycle which are treated within the purview t This chapter has been prepared in the format and section organization set forth in Regulato1y Guide 3.61. However, the material content of this chapter also fulfills the requirements ofNUREG- 1536. Pagination and numbering of sections, figures, and tables are consistent with the convention set down in Chapter I, Section 1.0, herein. Finally, all terms-of-art used in this chapter are consistent with the tcnn inology of the Glossary.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2 114830 Rev. 5 3- l HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION of 10CFR72.48 and are ascertained to have an insignificant effect on the computed safety factors may not prompt a formal reanalysis and revision of the results and associated data in the tables of this chapter unless the cumulative effect of all such unquantified changes on the reduction of any of the computed safety margins cannot be deemed to be insignificant. For purposes of this determination, an insignificant loss of safety margin with reference to an acceptance criterion is defined as the estimated reduction that is no more than one order of magnitude below the available margin reported in the FSAR. To ensure rigorous configuration control, the information in the Licensing drawings in Section 1.5 should be treated as the authoritative source for numerical analysis at all times. Reliance on the input data and associated results in this chapter for additional mathematical computations may not be appropriate as they serve the sole purpose of establishing safety compliance in accordance with the acceptance criteria set down in Chapter 2 and in thi s chapter.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-2 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 3.1 STRUCTURAL DESIGN 3.1.1 Discussion The HI-STORM FW system consists of the Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) and the storage overpack (Figure 1. 1. l ). The components subject to certification on this docket consist ofthe HI-STORM FW system components and the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask (please see Table 1.0.1 ). A complete description of the design details of these three components are provided in Section 1.2. This section discusses the structural aspects of the MPC, the storage overpack, and the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask. Detailed licensing drawings for each component are provided in Section 1.5.

(i) The Mu lti-Purpose Canister (MPC)

The design of the MPC seeks to attain three objectives that are central to its functional adequacy:

Ability to Dissipate Heat: The the1mal energy produced by the stored spent fuel must be transported to the outside surface of the MPC to maintain the fuel cladding and fuel basket metal walls below the regulatory temperature limits.

Ability to Withstand Large Impact Loads: The MPC, with its payload ofnuclear fuel, must withstand the large impact loads associated with the non-mechanistic tipover event.

Restraint of Free End Expansion: The MPC structure is designed so that membrane and bending (primary) stresses produced by constrained thermal expansion of the fuel basket do not arise.

As stated in Chapter 1, the MPC Enclosure Vessel is a confinement vessel designed to meet the stress limits in ASME Code,Section III, Subsection NB. The enveloping canister shell, baseplate, and the lid system form a complete Confinement Boundary for the stored fuel that is referred to as the "Enclosure Vessel". Within this cylindrical shell confinement vessel is an egg-crate assemblage ofMetamic-HT plates that form prismatic cells with square cross sectional openings for fue l storage, referred to as the fue l basket. All multi-purpose canisters designed for deployment in the HI-STORM FW have identical external diameters. The essential difference between the different MPCs lies in the fuel baskets, each of which is designed to house different types of fuel assemblies. All fuel basket designs are configured to max imize structural integrity through extensive inter-cell connectivity.

Although all fuel basket designs are structurally similar, analyses for each of the MPC types is carried out separately to ensure structural compliance.

The design criteria of components in the HI-STORM FW system important to safety are defined in Chapter 2.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-3 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION The principal structural functions of the MPC in storage mode are:

1. To position the fuel in a subcritical configuration, and

11. To provide a leak tight Confinement Boundary.

The key structural functions of the overpack during storage are:

1. To serve as a missile barrier for the MPC,

11. To provide flow paths for natural convection,

m. To provide a kinematically stable SNF storage configuration, 1v. To provide fixed and reliable radiation shielding, and

v. To allow safe translocation of the overpack with a loaded MPC inside.

Some stmctural features of the MPCs that allow the system to perform these functions are summarized below:

There are no gasketed ports or openings in the MPC. The MPC does not rely on any mechanical sealing arrangement except welding. The absence of any gasketed or flanged joints makes the MPC structure immune from joint leaks. The Confinement Boundary contains no valves or other pressure relief devices.

The closure system for the MPCs consists of two components, namely, the MPC lid and the closure ring. The MPC lid can be either a single thick circular plate continuously welded to the MPC shell along its circumference or a two-piece lid, dual lids welded around their common periphe,y. When using a two p iece lid on ly the top portion of the lid is considered as part of the closure system, the bottomportion is only for shielding purposes. The MPC closure system is shown in the licensing drawings in Section 1.5.

The MPC lid is equipped with vent and drain potts, which are used both for evacuating moisture and air from the MPC fo llowing fuel loading and subsequent backfilling with an inert gas (helium) at a specified mass. The vent and drain ports are covered by a cover plate and welded before the closure ring is installed. The closure ring is a circular annu lar plate edge-welded to the MPC lid and shell. The two closure members are interconnected by welding around the inner diameter ofthe ring. Lift points for the MPC are provided on the MPC lid.

The MPC fuel baskets consist of an array of interconnecting plates. The number of storage cells formed by this interconnection process varies depending on the type of fuel being stored. Basket configurations designed for both PWR and BWR fuel are explained in detail in Section 1.2. All baskets are designed to fit into the same MPC shell.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-4 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelObTEG PROPRIETARY INFORMATIOl<l

The MPC basket is separated from its lateral supports (basket shims) by a small, calibrated gap designed to prevent thermal stressing associated with the thermal expansion mismatches between the fuel basket and the basket support structure. The gap is designed to ensure that the basket remains unconstrained when subjected to the thermal heat generated by the spent nuclear fuel.

The MPC fuel basket maintains the spent nuclear fuel in a subcritical arrangement. Its safe operation is assured by maintaining the physical configuration ofthe storage cell cavities intact in the aftermath of a non-mechanistic tipover event. This requirement is satisfied if the MPC fuel basket plates undergo a minimal deflection (see Table 2.2.11). The fue l basket strains are shown in Subsection 3.4.4. 1.4 to remain essentially elastic, and, therefore, there is no impairment in the recoverability or retrievability of the fuel and the subcriticality of the stored fuel is unchallenged.

The MPC Confinement Boundary contains no valves or other pressure relief devices. In addition, the analyses presented in Subsections 3.4.3, 3.4.4.1.5, and 3.4.4.1.6 show thatthe MPC Enclosure Vessel meets the stress intensity criteria of the ASME Code,Section III, Subsection NB for all service conditions. Therefore, the demonstration that the MPC Enclosure Vessel meets Subsection NB stress limits ensures that there will be no discernible release of radioactive materials from the MPC.

(ii) Storage Overpack The HI-STORM FW storage overpack is a steel cylindrical structure consisting of inner and outer low carbon steel shells, a lid, and a baseplate. Between the two shells is a thick cylinder of un-reinforced (plain) concrete. Plain concrete is also installed in the lid to minimize skyshine. The storage overpack serves as a missile and radiation barrier, provides flow paths for natural convection, provides kinematic stability to the system, and acts as a shock absorber for the MPC in the event of a postulated tipover accident. The storage overpack is not a pressure vessel since it contains cooling vents. The structural steel weldment of the HI-STORM FW overpack is designed to meet the stress limits of the ASME Code,Section III, Subsection NF, Class 3 for nonnal and off-nonnal loading conditions and Regulato1y G uide 3.6 1 for handling conditions.

As discussed in Chapters I and 2, the principal shielding material utilized in the HI-STORM FW overpack is plain concrete. The plain concrete in the HI-STORM FW serves a structural function only to the extent that it may participate in supporting direct compressive or punching loads. The allowable compression/bearing resistance is defined and quantified in ACI -318-05 [3.3.5]. Strength analyses of the HI-STORM FW overpack and its confined concrete have been carried out in Subsections 3.4.4.1.3 and 3 .4.4.1.4 to show that the concrete is able to perform its radiation protection function and that retrievability of the MPC subsequent to any postulated accident condition of storage or handling is maintained.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-5 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION (iii) Transfer Cask The HI-TRAC VW transfer cask is the third component type subject to ce1tification. Strictly speaking, the transfer cask is an ancillary equipment which serves to enable the short term operations to be carried out safely and ALARA. Specifically, the transfer cask provides a missile and radiation barrier during transport of the MPC from the fuel pool to the HI-STORM FW overpack.

Because of its critical role in insuring a safe dry storage implementation, the transfer cask is subject to certification under 10CFR 72 even though it is not a device for storing spent fuel.

The HI-TRAC VW body is a double-walled steel cylinder that constitutes its structural system.

Contained between the two steel shells is an intermediate lead cylinder. Integral to the exterior ofthe HI-TRAC VW body outer shell is a water jacket that acts as a radiation barrier. The HI-TRAC VW is not a pressW'e vessel since it contains penetrations and openings. The structural steel components of the HI-TRAC VW are subject to the stress limits of the ASME Code,Section III, Subsection NF, Class 3 for normal and off-normal loading conditions.

Since the HI-TRAC VW may serve as an MPC carrier, its lifting attachments are designed to meet the design safety factor requirements ofNUREG-0612 [3. 1.1] and Regulatory Guide 3.61 [1.0.2] for single-failure-proof lifting equipment.

3.1.2 Design Criteria and Applicable Loads Principal design criteria for nonnal, off-normal, and accident/environmental events are discussed in Section 2.2. In this section, the loads, load combinations, and the structural performance of the HI-STORM FW system under the required loading events are presented.

Consistent with the provisions of NUREG-1536, the central objective of the structural analysis presented in this chapter is to ensure that the HI-STORM FW system possesses sufficient structural capabi lity to withstand normal and off-normal loads and the worst case loads under natural phenomenon or accident events. Withstanding such loadings implies that the HI-STORM FW system will successfully preclude the following:

unacceptable r isk of criticality

unacceptable release of radioactive materials

unacceptable radiation levels

impairment of ready retrievability of the SNF HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-6 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelObTi;C PROPRIETARY INFORMATION The above design objectives for the HI-STORM FW system can be pa1ticularized for individual components as follows:

The objectives of the strnctural analysis of the MPC are to demonstrate that:

1. Confinement ofrad ioactive material is maintained under normal, off-normal, accident conditions, and natural phenomenon events.

11. The MPC basket does not deform under credible loading conditions such that the subcriticality or retrievability of the SNF is jeopardized.

The objectives of the strnctural analysis of the storage overpack are to demonstrate that:

1. Large energetic missiles such as tornado-generated missiles do not compromise the integrity of the MPC Confinement Boundary.

11. The radiation shielding remains properly positioned in the case of any norma l, off-normal, or natural phenomenon or accident event.

iii. The flow path for the cooling a irflow shall remain available under normal and off-normal conditions of storage and after a natural phenomenon or accident event.

1v. The loads arising from normal, off-normal, and accident level cond itions exerted on the contained MPC do not violate the structural design criteria of theMPC.

v. No geometry changes occur under any normal, off-normal, and accident level conditions of storage that preclude ready retrievability ofthe contained MPC.

v1. A freestanding storage overpack loaded with a MPC can safely withstand a non-mechanistic tip-over event.

vii. The inter-cask transfer of a loaded MPC can be carried out without exceeding the structural capacity of the HI-STORM FW overpack, provided all required auxiliary equipment and components specific to an ISFSI site comply with their design criteria set forth in this FSAR and the handling operations are in full compliance with operational limits and controls prescribed in t his FSAR.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2 114830 Rev. 5 3-7 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION

The objective of the structural analysis of the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask is to demonstrate that:

1. Tornado generated missiles do not compromise the integrity of the MPC Confinement Boundary while the MPC is contained within HI-TRAC YW.

11. No geometry changes occur unde r any postulated handling or storage conditions that may preclude ready retrievability of the contained MPC.

iii. The structural components perform their intended function during lifting and handling with the loaded MPC.

iv. The radiation shielding remains properly positioned under all applicable hand li ng service cond itions for ID-TRAC VW.

The above design objectives are deemed to be satisfied for the MPC, the overpack, and the HI-TRAC VW, if stresses (or stress intensities or strains, as applicable) calculated by the appropriate structural analyses are less than the allowables defined in Subsection 3.1.2.3, and ifthe diametral change in the storage overpack (or HI-TRAC VW), if any, after any event of structural consequence to the overpack (or transfer cask), does not preclude ready retrievability of the contained MPC.

Stresses arise in the components of the HI-STORM FW system due to various loads that originate under normal, off-normal, or accident conditions. These individual loads are combined to fom1 load combinations. Stresses, strains, displacements, and stress intensities, as applicable, resulting from the load combinations are compared to their respective allowable limits. The following subsections present loads, load combinations, and the allowable limits ge1mane to them for use in the structural analyses of the MPC, the overpack, and the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask.

3.1.2.1 Applicable Loadings The individual loads applicable to the HI-STORM FW system and the HI-TRAC VW cask are defined in Section 2.2 of this FSAR. Load combinations are developed by assembling the individual loads that may act concurrently, and possibly, synergistically. In this subsection, the individual loads are further clarified as appropriate and the required load combinations are identified. Table 3. 1. l contains the governing load cases and the affected components. Loadings are applied to the mathematical models of the MPCs, the overpack, and the HI-TRAC VW. Results of the ana lyses carried out under bounding load combinations are compared with their respective allowable limits.

The analysis results from the bounding load combinations are also evaluated to ensure satisfaction of the functional performance criteria discussed in the foregoing.

The individual loads that address each design criterion applicable to the structural design of the HI-STORM FW system are cataloged in Tables 2.2.6, 2.2.7, a nd 2.2.13 for the handling, normal, off-n01mal, and accident (Design Basis Loads) conditions, respectively. The magnitude of loadings HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-8 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelOLTEC PROPRIETARY l~FORMA I ION associated with accident condition and natural phenomena-induced events, in general, do not have a regulatory limit. For example, the impact load from a tornado-borne missile, or the overturning load under flood or tsunami, cannot be prescribed as design basis values with absolute certainty that all ISFSI sites w ill be covered. Therefore, as applicable, representative magnitudes of such load ings are drawn from regulatory and industry documents (such as for tornado missiles and wind from Reg.

Guide l. 76). In the following, the essential characteristics of both credible and non-credible loadings analyzed in this FSAR are explained.

a. Tip-Over The freestanding HI-STORM FW storage overpack, containing a loaded MPC, must not tip over as a resu lt of postulated natural phenomenon events, including tornado wind, a tornado-generated missile, a seismic or a hydrological event (flood). However, to demonstrate the defense-in-depth features of the design, a non-mechanistic tip-over scenario per NUREG-1536 is analyzed (Subsection 2.2.3) in this chapter. For MPC transfers that will occur outside of a Patt 50 controlled strncture, the potential of the HI-STORM FW overpack tipping over during the lowering (or raising) of the loaded MPC from (or into) the mounted HI-TRAC VW cask is ruled out because of the safeguards and devices mandated by this FSAR for such operations (Subsection 2.3.3). The physical and procedw*al barriers imposed during MPC handling operations, as described in this FSAR, prevent overturning ofthe HI-STORM/HI-TRAC assemblage with an extremely high level of certainty. Among the physical barriers to prevent the overturning of the HI-STORM/HI-TRAC stack during MPC transfer is the use of the Canister Transfer Facility illustrated in Figure 1.1.2 which secures the HI-STORM FW inside an engineered pit.

b. Handling Accident The handling of all heavy loads that are within Part 72 jurisdiction must be canied out u sing high integrity handling equipment, and single failure-proof lifting devices to render an uncontrolled lowering of the load non-credible (please see Subsection 2.2.3).

c. Flood Flood at an ISFSI is designated as an extreme environmental event and is described in Subsection 2.2.3 (f).

The postulated flood event has two discrete potential structural consequences; namely,

1. stability of the HI-STORM FW system due to flood water velocity, and

11. structural effects of hydrostatic pressure and water velocity induced lateral pressure.

The maximum hydrostatic pressure on the cask in a flood where the water level is conservatively set per Table 2.2.8 is calculated as fo llows:

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-9 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Using p = the maximum hydrostatic pressure on the system (psi),

3 y = weight density of water = 62.4 lb/ft ,

h = the height of the water level = 125 ft; The maximum hydrostatic pressure is 3 2 2 p = yh = (62.4 lb/ft )(125 ft)(l ft /144 in ) = 54.2 psi It is noted that the accident condition design external pressure for the MPC (Table 2.2.1) bounds the maximum hydrostatic pressure exerted by the flood.

The maximum acceptable water velocity for a moving flood water scenario is computed using the procedure in Subsection 3.4.4.1.1.

d. Explosion Explosion, by definition, is a transient event. Explosive materials (except for the short duration when a limited quantity of motive fuel for placing the loaded MPC on the ISFSI pad is present in the tow vehicle or transpotter) are prohibited in the controlled area by specific stipulation in the HI-STORM FW Technical Specification. However, pressure waves emanating from explosions in areas outside the ISFSI are credible.

Pressure waves from an explosive blast in a property near the ISFSI site result in an impulsive aerodynamic loading on the stored HI-STORM FW overpacks. Depending on the rapidity of the pressure build-up, the inside and outside pressures on the HI-STORM FW METCON' shell may not equalize, leading to a net lateral loading on the upright overpack as the pressure wave traverses the overpack. The magnitude of the dynamic pressure wave is conservatively set to a value below the magnitude of the pressure differential that would cause a tip-over of the cask if the pulse duration were set infinite.

The a llowable pressure from explosion, Pe, can be computed from static equilibrium to prevent sliding or tipping of the cask. A simplified inequality to ensure that the cask will not slide is given by p 0 DL ~ µW where:

D: diameter of the cask L: height of the cask above the JSFSJ pad

µ: limiting value of the interface friction coefficient W: weight of the cask (lower bound weight, assuming that the MPC has only one fuel assembly)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3- 10 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HO! rec PROPRleT,t\RY INFORMATION

< µW (A)

Pe - DL The inequality for protection against tipping is obtained by moment equilibrium.

w or Pe -< -L2 (B)

The allowable value of Pe must be lesser of the two values given by inequalities (A) and (B) above.

In contrast to the overpack, the MPC is a c losed pressure vessel. Because ofthe enveloping overpack around it, the explosive pressure wave would manifest as an external pressure on the external surface of the MPC.

The maximum overpressure on the MPC resulting from an explosion is limited by the HI-STORM FW Technical Specification to be equa l to or less than the accident condition design external pressure specified in Table 2.2.1.

e. Tornado The tornado loading is described in Subsection 2.2.3 (e). The three components of a tornado load are:

1. pressure changes,

2. wind loads, and

3. tornado-generated missiles.

Reference values of wind speeds and tornado-induced pressure drop are specified in Table 2.2.4.

Tornado missiles are listed in Table 2.2.5. A central functional objective of a storage overpack is to maintain the integrity of the "Confinement Boundary", namely, the multi-purpose canister stored inside it. T his operational imperative requires that the mechanical loadings associated with a tornado at the ISFSI do not jeopardize the physical integrity of the loaded MPC. Potential consequences of a tornado on the cask system are:

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-1 1 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

AOL I EC PROPRIETAR ( ll~FORMATION

h1stability (tip-over) due to tornado missile impact plus either steady wind or impulse from the pressure drop

Loadings applied on the MPC transmitted to the inside of the overpack through its openings or as a secondary effect of loading on the enveloping overpack structure.

Excessive storage overpack permanent deformation that may prevent ready retrievability of the MPC.

Excessive storage overpack permanent deformation that may significantly reduce the shielding effectiveness of the storage overpack.

Analyses must be performed to ensure that, due to the tornado-induced loadings:

The overpack does not deform plastically such that the retrievability of the stored MPC is threatened.

The MPC Confinement Boundary is not breached.

The MPC fuel basket does not deform beyond the pe1mitted limit (Table 2.2.11) to preserve its subcriticality margins (requires evaluation if the overpack tips over).

f. Earthquake The earthquake loading and the associated acceptance criteria are presented in Subsection 2.2.3(g).

The Design Basis Earthquake for an ISFSI site shall be obtained on the top surface ofthe pad using an appropriate soil-structure interaction Code such as SHAKE2000 [3.1.7]. The seismic analysis methodology is provided in Subsection 3.4.4.1.2.

g. Lightning The HI-STORM FW overpack contains over 50,000 lb ofbighly conductive carbon steel with over 700 square feet of external surface area. It is known from experience that such a large surface area and metal mass is adequate to dissipate any lightning that may strike the HI-STORM FW system.

There are no combustible materials on the HI-STORM FW surface. Therefore, a postulated lightning strike event w ill not impair the structural performance of components of the HI-STORM FW system that are important-to-safety.

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I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION

h. Fire The fire event applicable to an ISFSI is described in Subsection 2.2.3(c) wherein the acceptance criteria are also presented.

i. 100% Fuel Rod Rupture The sole effect of the postulated 100% fuel rod rupture is to increase the internal pressure in the MPC. Calculations in Chapter 4 show that the accident internal pressure limit set in Chapter 2 bounds the pressure from 100% fuel rod rnpture. Therefore, 100% rod rupture does not define a new controlling loading event.

3.1.2.2 Design Basis Loads and Load Combinations As discussed in Subsection 2.2.7, the number of discrete loadings for each situational condition (i.e.,

no1mal, off-normal, etc.) is consolidated by defining bounding loads for certain groups of loadings.

Thus, the accident condition pressure P O* bounds the surface loadings arising from accident and extreme natural phenomenon events, namely, tornado wind W', flood F, and explosion E*. These bounding loads are referred to as "Design Basis Loads".

The Design Basis Loads are ana lyzed in combination w ith other permanent loads, i.e., loads that are present at all times. The permanent loads consist of:

The dead load of weight of each component.

Internal pressure in the MPC.

For conservatism, the upper or lower bound of the dead load, D, of a component is used for a DBL to maximize the response. Thus, the lower bound value of Dis used in the stability of the HI-STORM FW system under flood. Likewise, the value of internal pressure in the MPC is represented by the Design Pressure (Table 2.2.1), which envelops the actual internal pressure under each service condition.

As noted previously, certain loads, namely earthquake E, flowing water under flood condition F, force from an explosion pressure pulse F*, and tornado missile M, act to destabilize a cask.

Additionally, these loads act on the overpack and produce essentially localized stresses at the HI-STORM FW system to ISFSI interface. Table 3 .1. 1 provides the load combinations that are relevant to the stability analyses of freestanding casks.

The major constituents in the HI-STORM FW system are: (i) the fu el basket, (ii) the Enclosure Vessel, (iii) the HI-STORM FW overpack, and (iv) the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask. The fuel basket and the Enclosure Vessel (EV) together constitute the multi-pmpose canister. A complete account of analyses and results for all applicable loadings for all four constituent parts is provided in Section 3 .4 as suggested in Regulatory Guide 3.61.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3- 13 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLTEC F'ROF'RIETAR ( l~FORMATIOl<l In the following, the loadings listed as applicable for each situational condition are addressed in meaningful load combinations for the fuel basket, Enclosure Vessel, and the overpack. Each component is considered separately.

a. Fuel Basket Table 3.1.1 summarizes the loading cases (derived from Tables 2.2.6, 2.2.7, and 2.2.13) that are germane to demonstrating compliance of the loaded fuel baskets inside the MPC Enclosure Vessel.

The fuel basket is not a pressure vessel; therefore, the pressure loadings are not meaningful loads for the basket. Further, the basket is physically disconnected from the Enclosure Vessel. The gap between the basket and the Enclosure Vessel is sized to ensure that no constraint of free-end thermal expansion of the basket occurs. The demonstration of the adequacy ofthe basket-to-Enclosure Vessel (EV) gap to ensure absence of interference due to differential thermal expansion is addressed in Chapter 4.

The normal handling of the MPC within the HI-STORM FW system or the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask does not produce any significant stresses in the fuel basket because the operating procedures involve handling evolutions in the vertical orientation. The only departure from a pure ly vertical orientation of the transfer cask is described in subsection 4.5.1. In such cases, the stresses in the fuel basket must be established on a site-specific basis.

b. Enclosure Vessel Table 3. 1.1 summarizes all load cases that are applicable to structural analysis of the Enclosure Vessel to ensure integrity of the Confinement Boundary.

The Enclosure Vessel is a pressure retaining device consisting of a cylindrical shell, a thick circular baseplate at the bottom, and a thick circu lar lid at the top. This pressure vessel must be shown to meet the primary stress intensity limits per ASME Section III Class 1 at the design temperature and primary plus secondary stress intensity limits under the combined action of pressure plu s thermal loads (Level A service condition in the Code).

Normal handling of the Enclosure Vessel is considered in Section 2.2; the handling loads are independent of whether the E nclosure Vessel is within the storage overpack or HI-TRAC VW cask.

c. Storage Overpack Table 3. 1. l identifies the load cases to be cons idered for t he overpack. The fo llowing acceptance criteria apply:

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I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION

1. Normal Conditions

The dead load of the HI-TRAC VW with the heaviest loaded MPC (dry) on top ofthe HI-STORM FW overpack must be shown to be able to be supported by the metal-concrete (METCON') structure consisting of the two concentric steel shells and the radial ribs.

The stress field in the steel strncture of the overpack must meet Level A (Subsection NF) limits.

11. Accident Conditions

Maximum flood water velocity for the overpack with a near empty MPC (only one SNF stored) shall not cause sliding or tip-over of the cask.

Tornado missile plus wind on an overpack (with an empty MPC) (see Table 2.2.4) must not lead to violation of the acceptance criteria in 3. 1.2.l(e).

Large or medium penetrant missiles (see Table 2.2.5) must not be able to access the MPC. The small missile must be shown not to penetrate the MPC pressure vessel boundary since, in principle, it can enter the overpack cavity through the (curvilinear) vent inlet vent passages.

Under seismic conditions, a freestanding HI-STORM FW overpack must be demonstrated to not tip over under the DBE events. The maximum sliding of the overpack must demonstrate that casks will not impact each other.

Under a non-mechanistic tip-over of a fully loaded, freestanding HI-STORM FW overpack, the overpack lid must not dislodge.

Accident condition induced gross general defonnations of the storage overpack must be limited to values that do not prevent ready retrievability of the MPC.

d. HI-TRAC VW Transfer Cask Table 3.1.1 culled from Tables 2.2.6, 2.2.7 and 2.2.13 identifies load cases applicable to the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask.

The HI-TRAC VW transfer cask must provide radiation protection, must act as a handling cask when carrying a loaded MPC, and in the event of a postulated accident must not suffer permanent deformation to the extent that ready retrievability of the MPC is compromised.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3- 15 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

AOL I EC PROPRIETAR ( ll~FORMATION 3.1.2.3 Allowables The important-to-safety (ITS) components of the HI-STORM FW system are identified on the drawings in Section 1.5. Allowable stresses, as appropriate, are tabulated for these components for all service conditions.

In Section 2.2, the applicable service level from the ASME Code for determination of allowables is listed. Tables 2.2.6, 2.2. 7 and 2.2. 13 (condensed in Table 3. l .1) provide a tabulation of loadings for normal, off-normal, and accident conditions and the applicable acceptance criteria.

Relationships for allowable stresses and stress intensities for NB and NF components are provided in Tables 2.2.10 and 2.2.1 2, respectively. Tables 3. 1.2 through 3.1.8 contain numerical values of the allowable stresses/stress intensities for all MPC, overpack, and HI-TRAC VW load bearing Code materials as a function of temperature. The tabulated values for the allowable stresses/stress intensities are used in Subsections 3.4.3 and 3 .4.4, as applicable, to compute factors of safety for the ITS components of the HI-STORM FW system for various loadings.

In all tables the terms S, Sm, Sy, and Su, respectively, denote the des ign stress, design stress intensity, minimum yield strength, and the ultimate strength. Property values at intermediate temperatures that are not reported in the ASME Code are obtained by linear interpolation. Property values are not extrapolated beyond the limits of the Code in any strnctural calculation.

Additional terms relevant to the stress analysis of the HI-STORM FW system extracted from the ASME Code (see Figure NB-3222-1, for example) are listed in Table 3. 1.10.

3.1.2.4 Brittle Fracture Section 8.4.3 discusses the low temperature ductility of the HI-STORM FW system materials. Table 3.1.9 provides a summary of impact testing requirements to insure prevention of brittle fracture.

3.1.2.5 Fatigue Fatigue is a consequence of a cyclic state of stress applied on a metal part. Failure from fatigue occurs if the combination of amplitude of the cyclic stress, aa, and the number ofcycles, nr, reaches a threshold value at which failure occurs. ASME Code, Section Ill, Subsection NCA provides the cr3 -nr 6

curves for a num ber of material types. At nr = l 0 , the required cra is referred to as the "Endurance Limit". The Endurance Limit for sta inless steel (the mate ria l used in the MPC) according to the ASME Code,Section III, Div. 1, Appendices, Table 1.9.2, is approximately 28 ksi.

The causative factors for fatigue expenditure in a non-active system (i.e., no moving parts) such as the HI-STORM FW system may be:

I. rapid temperature changes

11. significant pressure changes HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2 114830 Rev. 5 3- 16 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION The HI-STORM FW system is exposed to the fluctuating thermal state of the ambient environment.

Effect of wind and relative humidity also play a role in affecting the temperature of the cask components. However, the most significant effects are the large thermal ine1tia ofthe system and the relatively low heat transfer coefficients that act to smooth out the daily temperature cycles. As a result, the amplitude of the cyclic stresses, to the extent that they are developed, remains orders of magnitude below the cask material's Endurance Limit.

The second causative factor, namely, pressure pulsation, is limited to the only pressure vessel in the system - the MPC. Pressure produces several types of stresses in the MPC (see Table 3. l . l 0), all of which are equally effective in causing fatigue expenditure in the metal. However, the amplitude of stress from the pressure cycling (due to the changes in the ambient conditions) is quite small and well below the endurance limit of the stainless steel material.

Therefore, failure from fatigue is not a credible concern for the HI-STORM FW system components.

3.1.2.6 Buckling Buckling is caused by a compressive stress acting on a slender section. In the HI-STORM FW system, the steel weldment in the overpack is not slender; its height-to-diameter ratio being less than

2. There is no source of compressive stress except from the self-weight of the shell and the overpack weight of the HI-TRAC VW in the stacked condition, which produces a modest state of compressive stress. The state of a small compressive stress combined with a low slenderness ratio makes the HI-STORM FW overpack safe from the buckling mode of failure. The same statement also applies to the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask, which is a radially buttressed triple shell (in comparison to the dual she ll construction in HI-STORM FW) structure.

The MPC Enclosure Vessel is protected from buckling of by the permanent tensile stress in both boop and longitudinal directions due to internal pressure.

Finally, the fuel basket, which is an egg-crate strncture, as shown in Figures 1.1.6 and l. 1.7 (an intrinsically resistant structural form to buckling from axial compressive loads), is subject to minor compressive stresses from its own weight. The absence of buckling in the Metamic-HT fuel basket is based on the fact that there are no causative scenarios (normal or accident) that produce a significant in-plane compressive stress in the basket structure. A lower bound Euler Buckling strength for the 1

Metamic-HT fuel basket can be obtained by assuming that the basket walls are fully continuous over the entire height of the MPC fuel basket, neglecting the strengthening effect of the honeycomb completely, and h*eating the Metamic-HT basket wall as an end-loaded plate 199.5" high by 8.94" wide by 0.59" thick (corresponding to the maximum height MPC-37 fuel basket). The top and l In reality, the basket walls are not fully continuous in the vertical direction since the fuel basket is assembled by vertically stacking narrow width Metamic-HT panels in a honeycomb pattern (see drawing 6506 in Chapter I of HI-STORM FW SAR). For the above buckling strength evaluation, the assumption that the basket walls are continuous over the full height of the fuel basket is extremely conservative since the critical buckling load is inversely proportional to the square of the height.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3- 17 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION bottom edges are assumed to be pinned and the lateral edges are assumed to be free to minimize the permissible buckling load (a particularly severe modeling artifice to minimize buckling strength).

The Euler buckling load for this geometry is given by (see Timoshenko et al., "Theory of Elastic Stabi lity", 211d Edition):

2 1r El Pc,= - - = 125.2/bf h2 where E = Young's Modu lus ofMetamic-HT at 500°C = 3,300 ksi, I = moment of inertia of 8.94" wide by 0.59" thick plate = 0.153 in4, h = maximum height of fuel basket = 199.5" The corresponding compress.ive axia l stress is given by:

P,. , 125.2/bf = 23 _7 psi (Yer =A= (8.94in)(0.59in)

The factor of safety against buckling is given by (where ab is the compressive stress in the basket due to self weight):

SF= (Yer = 23.7 psi = 1. 2 !

(J'b 19.5 psi Thus, even with an exceedingly conservative model, the safety margin against buckling is more than 20%.

Therefore, buckling is ruled out as a credible fa ilure mechanism in the HI-STORM FW system components. Nevertheless, a Design Basis Load consisting of external pressure is specified in Table 2.2.1 with the (evidently, non-mechanistic) conservative assumption that the internal pressure, which will counteract buckling behavior, is zero psig. (In reality, internal pressure cannot be zero because of the positive helium fi ll pressure established at the time of canister backfill.)

3.1.2.7 Consideration of Manufacturing and Material Deviations Departure from the assumed values of material properties in the safety analyses clearly can have a significant effect on the computed margins. Likewise, the presence of deviations in manufacturing that inevitably occur in custom fabrication of capital equ ipment may detract from the safety factors reported in this chapter. In what follows, the method and measures adopted to insure that deviations in material properties or in the fabricated hardware will not undermine the structural safety conclusions are summarized ..

That the yield and ultimate strengths of materials used in manufacturing the HI-STORM FW components will be greater than that assumed in the structural analyses is insured by the requirement HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3- 18 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATIOl<l in the ASME Code which mandates all Code materials to meet the minimum certified property values set down in the Code tables. Holtec International requires the material supplier to provide a Certified Mill Test Report in the format specified in the Code to insure compliance of all physical prope1ties of the supplied material with the specified Code minimums. The same protocol to insure that the actual property values are above the minimum specified values is followed in the manufacture ofMetamic-HT (Section 1.2.1.4. 1 and Subsection 10.1.3). An additional margin in the actual physica l properties vis-a-vis the Code values exists in the case of the MPC Confinement Boundary material by virtue of the Alloy X definition (Appendix l .A): The physical propetties of Alloy X at each temperature are set down at the lowest of that property value in the Code from a group of austenitic stain less steels.

The above measures make the probability of an actual materia l strength property to be fa lling below the assumed value in the structural analysis in this chapter to be non-credible. On the contrary, Holtec's manufacturing experience suggests that the actual properties are likely to be uniformly and substantially greater than the assumed values.

A similarly conservative approach is used to insure that the fabrication processes do not degrade the computed safety margins. Towards this end, the fabrication documents (drawings, travelers and shop procedures) implement a number of pro-active measures to prevent all known sources of development of a strength-adverse condition, such as:

1. All welding procedures are quali fied to yield better physical properties than the Code minimums. All essential variables that affect weld quality are tightly controlled.

11. Only those craftsmen who have passed the welding skill criteria implemented in the shop are permitted to weld.

t11. A rigorous weld material quality overcheck program is employed to insure that every weld wire spool meets its respective Code specification.

1v. All welds are specified as minimums: 1n practice, most exceed the specified minimums significantly. All primary structural welds are subject to Q.C. overcheck and sign-off.

v. The Threaded Anchor Locations (TALs) are machined to a depth greater than the specified minimum. The stress analyses utilize the minimum thread depths/lengths per the licensing drawings.

In the event of a deviation that may depress the computed safety margin, a non-conformance report is prepared by the manufacturer and subject to a safety analysis by Holtec lntemational's corporate engineering using the same methodology as that described in this FSAR. The item is accepted only if the safety evaluation musters part 72.48 acceptance criteria. A complete documentation of the life cycle of the NCR is archived in the Company's Permanent Filing System and shared with the designated system user.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-19 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION The above processes and measures have been in place at the Holtec Manufacturing Division to insure that an unacceptable reduction in the safety factors due to variation in material prope1ties and manufacturing processes does not occur. The manufacturing experience over the past 20 years corroborates the effectiveness of the above measures.

3.1.3 Stress Analysis Models To evaluate the effect ofloads on the HI-STORM FW system components, finite element models for stress and deformation analysis are developed. The essential attributes of the finite element models for the HI-STORM overpack and the MPC are presented in this subsection. These models are used to perform the structural analysis of the system components under the loadings listed in Tables 2.2.6, 2.2.7 and 2.2.13, and summarized in Table 3.1.1 herein for handling, nonnal, off-nom1al, and accident conditions, respectively. The HI-TRAC VW transfer cask, on the other hand, is conservatively analyzed using strength of materials principles, as described in Subsection 3. 1.3.3.

All finite element models are three-dimensional and are prepared to the level of discretization appropriate to the problem to be solved. The models are suitable for implementation in ANSYS and LS-DYNA general purpose codes, which are described in Subsection 3.6.2.

In the following, the finite element models of the HI-STORM overpack (body and lid) and the MPC (Confinement Boundary and the fuel baskets) are presented. Pursuant to ISG-21 , the description of the computational model for each component addresses the following areas:

Description of the model, its key attributes and its conservative aspects Types of finite elements used and the rationale for their selection Material properties and applicable temperature ranges Modeling simplifications and their underlying logic In subsequent subsections, where the finite element models are deployed to analyze the different load cases, the presentation includes the consideration of:

Geometric compliance of the simulation with the physics of the problem Boundary conditions Effect of tolerances on the results Convergence (numerical) of the solutions reported in this FSAR The input files prepared to implement the finite element solutions as well as detailed results are archived in the Calculation Packages [3 .4.11, 3 .4.13] within the Company's Configuration Control HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-20 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLTEC F'RO~RIETARY lt~FORMATION System. Essential portions of the results for each loading case necessary to draw safety conclusions are extracted from the Calculation Packages and reported in this FSAR. Specifically, the results summarized from the finite element solutions in this chapter are self-contained to enable an independent assessment of the system's safety. Input data is provided in tabular fonn as suggested in ISG-21. For consistency, the following units are employed to document input data throughout this chapter:

Time: second Mass: pound Length: inch 3.1.3.1 HI-STORM FW Overpack The physical geometry and materials of construction ofthe ID-STORM FW overpack are provided in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 and the drawings in Section 1.5. The finite element simulation of the overpack consists of two discrete mode ls, one for the overpack body and the other for the top lid. Because the loaded overpack is virtually identical in weight and height for the standard, XL, and domed versions, the analyses that do not require a detailed simulation of the lid apply to all configurations. However, loading events that require a detailed characterization of the lid's response such as lid lifting and tornado missile impact on the HI-STORM FW lid are analyzed for each lid type separate ly [3.4.13, 3.4.15].

The models are initially developed using the finite element code ANSYS [3.4.1)[3.4.25], and then, depending on the load case, numerical simulations are performed e ither in ANSYS or in LS-DYNA

[3.1.8]. For example, the handling loads (Load Case 9) and the snow load (Load Case 10) are simulated in ANSYS, and the non-mechanistic tipover event (Load Case 4) is simulated in LS-DYNA For the non-mechani stic tipover analysis, two distinct finite element models are created: one for the HI-STORM FW overpack cany ing the maximum length MPC-37 and one for the HI-STORM FW overpack carrying the maximum length MPC-89 (Figures 3.4.lOA and 3.4.lOB).

The key attributes of the HI-STORM FW overpack models (implemented in ANSYS) are:

1. The finite element discretization of the overpack is sufficiently detailed to accurately articulate the primary membrane and bending stresses as well as the secondary stresses at locations of gross structural discontinuity. The fi nite element layout of the HI-STORM FW overpack body and the top lid are pictorially illustrated in Figures 3.4.3 and 3.4.5A/3.4.5B, respectively. The overpack model consists of over 70,000 nodes and 50,000 elements, which exceed the number of nodes and elements in the HI-STORM 100 tipover model utilized in

[3.1.4]. Table 3.1.1 1 summarizes the key input data that is used to create the finite element models of the HI-STORM FW overpack body and top lid.

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I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION

11. The overpack baseplate, anchor blocks, and the lid studs are modeled with SOLID45 elements. The overpack inner and outer shells, bottom vent shells, and the lifting ribs are modeled with SHELL63 elements. A combination ofSOLID45, SHELL63, and SOLSH190 elements is used to model the steel components in the HI-STORM FW standard lid. A combination ofSOLID185 and SOLSH190 elements is used to model the steel components in the HI-STORM FW Version XL lid. These element types are well suited for the overpack geometry and loading conditions, and they have been used successfully in previous cask licensing applications [3. l .10, 3.3.2].

111. All overpack steel members are represented by their linear elastic material properties (at 300°F) based on the data provided in Section 3.3. The concrete material in the overpack body is not explicitly modeled. Its mass, however, is accounted for by applying a uniformly distributed pressure on the baseplate annular area between the inner and outer shells (see Figure 3.4.26). The plain concrete in the HI-STORM FW standard and Version XL lid is explicitly modeled in ANSYS using SOLID65 elements along with the input parameters listed in Table 3. 1.12.

1v. To implement the ANSYS finite element model in LS-DYNA, the SOLID45, SHELL63, and SOLSH190 elements are converted to solid, shell, and thick shell elements, respectively, in LS-DYNA. The SOLID65 elements used to model the plain concrete in the HI-STORM FW lid are replaced by MAT_PSEUDO_TENSOR (or MAT_O16) elements in LS-DYNA. The p lain concrete in the overpack body is a lso mode led in LS-DYNA using MAT- PSEUDO- TENSOR elements.

v. In LS-DYNA, all overpack steel members are represented by their applicable nonlinear elastic-plastic true stress-strain relationships. The methodology used for obtaining a true stress-strain curve from a set of engineering stress-strain data (e.g., strength properties from

[3.3.1]) is provided in [3.1.9], which utilizes the following power law relation to represent the flow curve of metal in the plastic deformation region:

n cr = K e where n is the strain-hardening exponent and K is the strength coefficient. Table 3.1.13 provides the values of K and n that are used to model the behavior of the overpack steel materials in LS-DYNA Further details of the development of the true stress-strain relations for these materials are found in [3.4.11]. The concrete material is modeled in LS-DYNA using a non-linear material model (i.e., MAT_PSEUDO_TENSOR or MAT_016) based on the properties listed in Section 3.3.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-22 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HObTEC PROPRIETARY INEORMATIQN 3.1.3.2 Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC)

The two constituent parts of the MPC, namely (i) the Enclosure Vessel and (ii) the Fuel Basket, are modeled separately. The model for the Enclosure Vessel is focused to quantify its stress and strain field under the various loading conditions. The model for the Fuel Basket is focused on characterizing its strain and displacement behavior during a non-mechanistic tipover event. For the non-mechanistic tipover analysis, two distinct finite element models are created: one for the maximum length MPC-37 and one for the maximum length MPC-89 (Figures 3.4. 11 and 3.4.12).

The key attributes of the MPC fin ite element models (imp lemented in ANSYS) are:

1. The finite e lement layout of the Enclosure Vessel is pictoria lly illustrated in Figure 3.4.1.

The finite element discretization of the Enclosure Vessel is sufficiently detailed to accurately articulate the primary membrane and bending stresses as well as the secondary stresses at locations of gross structural discontinuity, particularly at the MPC shell to baseplate juncture.

This has been confirmed by comparing the ANSYS stress results with the analytical solution provided in [3.4.16] (specifically Cases 4a and 4b of Table 31) for the discontinuity stress at the junction between a cylindrical shell and a flat circular plate under internal pressure ( 100 psig). The two solutions agree within 3% indicating that the fin ite element mesh for the Enclosure Vessel is adequately sized. Table 3 .1.14 summarizes the key input data that is used to create the finite element model of the Enclosure Vessel.

11. The Enclosure Vessel shell, baseplate, and upper and lower lids are meshed using SOLID 185 elements. The MPC Iid-to-shell weld and the reinforcing fi llet weld at the shell-to-baseplate juncture are also explicitly modeled using SOLID185 elements (see Figure 3.4.1).

m. Consistent with the drawings in Section 1.5, the MPC lid is modeled as two separate plates, which are joined together along their perimeter edge. The upper lid is conservatively modeled as 4.5" thick, which is less than the minimum thickness specified on the licensing drawing (see Section 1.5). "Surface-to-surface" contact is defined over the interior interface between the two lid plates using CONTAl 73 and TARGEl 70 contact elements.

iv. The materials used to represent the Enclosure Vessel are assumed to be isotropic and are assigned linear elastic materia l properties based on the Alloy X material data provided in Section 3.3. The Young's modulus value varies throughout the model based on the applied temperature distribution, which is shown in Figure 3.4.27 and conservatively bounds the temperature distributfon for the maximum length MPC-37 as determined by the thermal analyses in Chapter 4 for short-term normal operations.

v. The fue l basket models (Figures 3.4.12A and 3.4. 12B), which are implemented in LS-DYNA, are assembled from intersecting plates per the licensing drawings in Section 1.5, include all potential contacts and allow for relative rotations between intersecting plates. For conservatism, a bounding gap is assumed at contact interfaces between any two perpendicular basket plates to a llow fo r impacts and, therefore, maximize the stress and HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2 114830 Rev. 5 3-23 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLTEC F'RO~RIETARY INFORMATION deformation of the fuel basket plate. The fuel basket plates are modeled in LS-DYNA using thick shell elements, which behave like solid elements in contact, but can also accurately simulate the bending behavior of the fuel basket plates. To ensure numerical accuracy, full integration thick shell elements with 10 through-thickness integration points are used. This modeling approach is consistent with the approach taken in [3.1.10) to qualify the F-32 and F-37 fuel baskets.

v1. In LS-DYNA, the fuel basket plates are represented by their applicable non linear elastic-plastic true stress-strain relationships in the same manner as the steel members of the HI-STORM FW overpack (see Subsection 3.1 .3. 1). Table 3. 1.13 provides the values ofK and n that are used to model the behavior of the fuel basket plates in LS-DYNA. Details of the development of the true stress-strain relations are found in [3.4.11].

3.1.3.3 HI-TRAC VW Transfer Cask The stress analysis of the transfer cask addresses three performance features that are of safety consequence. They are:

1. Performance of the water jacket as a pressure retaining enclosure under an accident condition leading to overheating of water.

11. Performance of the threaded anchor locations/lifting trunnions in the HI-TRAC VW top flange under the max:imum lifted load.

iii. Perfonnance of the HI-TRAC VW bottom lid under its own self weight plus the weight of the heaviest MPC.

The above HI-TRAC VW components are analyzed separately using strength of materials formu la, the details of which are provided in Subsections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-24 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLTeC PROPRIETARY l~ffORMATION Table 3. l. l GOVERNING CASES AND AFFECTED COMPONENTS Case Loading Loading Event Affected Objective of the Analysis For Case I.D. Components additional from HI-STORM MPC HI- discussion, Tables TRAC refer to 2.2.6, 2.2.7 Subsection and 2.2.13 I AD Moving Flood X - - Determine the flood velocity 2.2.3 Moving Floodwater with loaded HI-STORM on the that will not overturn the pad. overpack.

2. AE Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) X X - Determine the maximum 2.2.3 Loaded HI-STORMs arrayed on the ISFSI pad magnitude of the earthquake subject to ISFSI' s DBE that meets the acceptance criteria of 2.2.3(g).

3 AC Tornado Missile X X X Demonstrate that the 2.2.3 A large, medium or small tornado missile strikes a accep tance criteria of 2.2.3(e) loaded HI-STORM on the ISFSI pad or HI-TRAC. will be met.

4 AA Non-Mechanistic Tip-Over X X - Satisfy the acceptance criteria 2.2.3 A loaded HI-STORM is assumed to tip over and of2.2.3(b).

strike the pad.

5 NB Design, Short-Term Normal and Off-Nom1al Internal - X - Demonstrate that the MPC 2.2. l Pressure meets "NB" stress intensity MPC under the Design, Short-term normal and Off- limits.

normal Internal Pressure 6 NB Maximum Internal Pressure Under the Accident - X - Demonstrate that the Level D 2.2.l Condition stress intensity limits are met.

MPC under the accident condition internal pressure (from Table 2.2.1)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-25 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSA R Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFOR~ATION Table 3 .1.1 (continued)

GOVERNING CASES AND AFFECTED COMPONENTS Case Loading Loading Event Affected Objective of the Analysis For Case I.D. Components additional from discussion, Tables HI-STORM MPC HI- refer to 2.2.6, 2.2.7 TRAC Subsection and 2.2.13 7 AH Design External Pressure - X - The Enclosure Vessel must not 2.2.3 MPC under the accident cond ition external pressure buckle.

(from Table 2.2.1 )

8 AJ HI-TRAC Non-Mechanistic Heat-Up - - X Demonstrate that the stresses in 2.2.1 Postulate the water jacket's internal pressure reaches the water j acket meet the the Design Pressure (defined in Table 2.2.1) ASME Code Section III Subsection Class 3 limits for the Desi1m Condition.

9. HA, HB, Handling of Components X X X Demonstrate that the tapped 2.2.1 andHC anchor locations (TALs) meet the Regulatory Guide 3.61 and NUREG-0612 stress limits (as aoolicable).

10. NA Snow Load X - - Demonstrate that the top lid's 2.2.1 steel structure meets NF

stress limit for normal condition.

11. NA MPC Reflood Event - X - Demonstrate that there is no 12.3.1 breach of the fuel rod cladding.

12. HD Handling of Components X Demonstrate that the lifting 2.2.1 trunnions in HT-TRAC VW Version P meet the Regulatory Guide 3.61 and NUREG 061 2 stress limits (as aoolicable)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTE D MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-26 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 3.1.2 DESIGN AND LEVEL A: STRESS Reference Code: ASMENF Material: SA36 Service Conditions: Design and Normal Item: Stress Classification and Value (ksi)

Temp. (Deg. F)

Membrane plus s Membrane Stress Bending Stress

-20 to 650 16.6 16.6 24.9 700 15.6 15.6 23.4 Notes:

1. S = Maximum allowable stress values from Table lA of ASME Code, Section IJ, Part D.

2. Stress classification per Paragraph NF-3260.

3. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2. 12.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2 114830 Rev. 5 3-27 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLTEC F'RO~RIETARY INFORMATION Table 3.1.3 LEVEL B: STRESS Reference Code: ASME NF Material: SA36 Service Conditions: Off-Normal Item: Stress Classification and Value (ksi)

Temp. (Deg. F) Membrane plus Membrane Stress Bending Stress

-20 to 650 22.1 33.1 700 20.7 31.1 Notes:

1. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2.12 with allowables from Table 3.1.2.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-28 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

AOL I EC PROPRIETAR ( lf~FORMATION Table 3.1.4 DESIGN AND LEVEL A SERVICE CONDITIONS: ALLOWABLE STRESS Code: ASME NF Material: SA5 16 (SA5 15) Grade 70, SA350-LF3 (SA350-LF2)

Service Conditions: Design and Normal Item: Allowable Stress Classification and Value (ksi)

Temp. (Deg. F) Membrane plus s Membrane Stress Bending Stress

-20 to 400 20.0 20.0 30.0 500 19.6 19.6 29.4 600 18.4 18.4 27.6 650 17.8 17.8 26.7 700 17.2 17.2 25.8 Notes:

1. S = Max imum allowable stress values from Table 1A of ASME Code, Section Il, Part D.

2. Stress classification per Paragraph NF-3260.

3. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2. 12.

4. Maximum allowable stress values are the lowest of all values for the candidate materials (SA516 (SA5 15) Grade 70, SA350-LF3 (SA350-LF2)) at corresponding temperature.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-29 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 3.1.5 LEVEL B: ALLOWABLE STRESS Code: ASME NF Material: SA5 16 (SA5 15) Grade 70, SA350-LF3 (SA350-LF2)

Service Conditions: Off-Normal Item: Allowable Stress Classification and Value (ksi)

Temp. (Deg. F) Membrane plus Membrane Stress Bending Stress

-20 to 400 26.6 39.9 500 26.1 39.l 600 24.5 36.7 650 23.7 35.5 700 22.9 34.3 Notes:

1. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2. 12 with allowables from Table 3.1 .4.

2. Maxi mum allowable stress values are the lowest of all values for the candidate materials (SA516 (SA5 15) Grade 70, SA350-LF3 (SA350-LF2)) at corresponding temperature.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-30 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLTEC F'RO~RIETARY lt~FORMATION Table 3.1.6 LEVEL D: STRESS INTENSITY Code: ASME NF Material: SA5 16 (SA5 15) Grade 70 Service Conditions: Accident Item: Stress Intensity Classification and Value (ksi)

Temp. (Deg. F) Pm Pm+ Pb Sm AMAX ( 1.2Sy, 150% of Pm l.5Sm), but < 0.7 Su

-20 to 100 23.3 45.6 68.4 200 23.2 41.8 62.7 300 22.4 40.3 60.4 400 21.6 39.0 58.5 500 20.6 37.2 55.8 600 19.4 34.9 52.4 650 18.8 33.8 50.7 700 18.1 32.9 49.4 Notes:

1. Level D allowable stress intensities per Appendix F, Paragraph F-1332.

2. S111 = Stress intensity values per Table 2A of ASME,Section II, Part D.

3. Pm and Pb are defined in Table 3.1.10.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-3 1 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HO! TEC PROPRIET,t\RY INFORMATION Table 3.1.7 DESIGN, LEVELS A AND B: STRESS INTENSITY Code: ASME NB Material: Alloy X Service Conditions: Design, Levels A and B (Normal and Off-Normal)

Item: Stress Intensity Classification and Numerical Value Temp.

(Deg. F) PL+ Pett Sm Pn/ p Lt PL+ pbt Pb+Qtt

-20to 100 20.0 20.0 30.0 30.0 60.0 60.0 200 20.0 20.0 30.0 30.0 60.0 60.0 300 20.0 20.0 30.0 30.0 60.0 60.0 400 18.6 18.6 27.9 27.9 55.8 55.8 500 17.5 17.5 26.3 26.3 52.5 52.5 600 16.5 16.5 24.75 24.75 49.5 49.5 650 16.0 16.0 24.0 24.0 48.0 48.0 700 15.6 15.6 23.4 23.4 46.8 46.8 750 15.2 15.2 22.8 22.8 45.6 45.6 800 14.8 14.8 22.2 22.2 44.4 44.4 Notes:

1. S01 = Stress intensity values per Table 2A of ASME II, Part D.

2. Alloy X S111 values are the lowest values for each of the candidate materials at corresponding temperature.

3. Stress classification per NB-3220.

4. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2. 10.

5. P111 , PL, Pb, Q, and Pe are defined in Table 3 .1.10.

6. Allowable pri maty stress intensities under Level B Service Loadings shall be 110%

of allowable primary stress intensities under Level A Service Loading per NB-3223.

t Evaluation required for Design condition only.

ti" Evaluation required for Levels A, B conditions only. Pe not applicable to vessels.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-32 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 3.1.8 LEVEL D: STRESS INTENSITY Code: ASMENB Material: Alloy X Service Conditions: Level D (Accident)

Item: Stress Intensity Temp. (Deg. Classification and Value (ksi)

F) Pm PL PL+ Pb

-20 to 100 48.0 72.0 72.0 200 48.0 72.0 72.0 300 46.3 69.45 69.45 400 44.6 66.9 66.9 500 42.0 63.0 63.0 600 39.6 59.4 59.4 650 38.4 57.6 57.6 700 37.4 56.1 56.1 750 36.5 54.8 54.8 800 35.5 53.25 53.25 Notes:

1. Level D stress intensities per ASME NB-3225 and Appendix F, Paragraph F- 1331.

2. The average primary shear strength across a section loaded in pure shear may not exceed 0.42 Su,

3. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2. 10.

4. Pm, PL, and Pb are defined in Table 3.1.10.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-33 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOlTEC PROPRIETARY l~IFORMATION Table 3.1.9 FRACTURE TOUGHNESS TEST REQUIREMENTS - FOR HI-STORM FW OVERPACK Material Test Requirement Test Acceptance Temperature Criterion Bolting (SA193 B7) Not required per NF-231 l (b)(l3) and Note (e) to - -

Figure NF-231 l(b)- 1 Material with a nominal section thickness of 5/8" and Jess Not required perNF-23 1 J(b)(l) - -

Normalized SA516 Gr. 70 (thicknesses 2-1/2" and less) Not required per NF-231 l(b)(lO) for service - -

temperatures greater than or equal to 0°F (i.e.,

handling operations), and per NF-23 l l(b)(7) for service temperatures less than 0°F and greater than or equal to -40°F (i.e., non-handling operations)

Normalized SA5 l 6 Gr. 70 used for HI-STORM FW base Not required per NF-23 1 l(b)(7) - -

plate (thickness greater than 2-1/2")

As rolled SA51 6 Gr. 70 used for HI-STORM FW inner and Not required per NF-231 I(b)(7) - -

outer shells, base plate, top plate, inlet shell plate, inlet vent top plate, gamma shield plate, lid lower shim plate and lid gusset (for standard lid), inner ring plate, lid vent plate, outer ring plate, and lid round plate (for Version XL lid)

Lid baseplate, lid outer ring, lid vent plate, and domed lid head plate (for Domed lid)

SA36 (thickness greater than 5/8") Not required per NF-231 l(b)(7) - -

SA350-LF2 (thickness greater than 5/8") and as rolled SA5 I 6 Per NF-2331 -40°F Table NF-233 l (a)-

Gr. 70 used for HJ-STORM FW lifting rib (Also must meet 3 or Figure NF-ASME Section HA 2331 (a)-2 requirements) (Also must meet ASME Section UA requirements)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-34 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLTEC PROPRIETARY ltffORMATION Table 3 .1.9 (continued)

FRACTURE TOUGHNESS TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR HI-TRAC VW TRANSFER CASK Material Test Requirement Test Acceptance Temperature Criterion Weld material Test per NF-2430 if: -40°F Per NF-2331

( I ) either of the base materials of the production weld requires impact testing, or; (2) either of the base materials is SA5 l 6 Gr. 70 with nominal section thickness greater than 5/8" .

Bolting (SA564 630 HI 150) PerNF-2333 0°F Table NF-2333-1 (Also must meet (Also must meet ASME Section ASME Section ILA requirements) ll.A requirements)

Material with a nominal section thickness of 5/8" and less Not required per NF-231 1(b)(I) - -

Nom1alized SA516 Gr. 70 (thicknesses 2-1/2" and less) Not required per NF-2311 (b)( I 0) - -

Normalized SAS 16 Gr. 70 used for HT-TRAC VW bottom Not required per NF-23 I I (b)(7) - -

lid (thickness greater than 2-1/2")

As rolled SA5 l 6 Gr. 70 used for HJ-TRAC VW inner and Not required per NF-2311 (b)(7) - -

outer shells, bottom flange, extended rib, short rib, bolt recess cap, and bottom lid SA36 (thickness greater than 5/8") Not required per NF-23 11(b)(7) - -

SA515 Gr. 70, SA106 Gr. C, and SA350-Lf3 (thickness Per NF-2331 0°F Table NF-233l (a)-

greater than 5/8") (Also must meet 3 or Figure NF-ASME Section HA 233 l (a)-2 requirements) (Also must meet ASME Section llA requirements)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-35 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HObTeC PROPRIETARY l~ffORMATION Table 3 .1.9 (continued)

FRACTURE TOUGHNESS TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR HI-TRAC VW TRANSFER CASK Material Test Requirement Test Acceptance Temperature Criterion Weld material Test per NF-2430 if: 0°F Per NF-2331

( I) either of the base materials of the production weld requires impact testing, or; (2) either of the base materials is SA5 l 6 Gr. 70 with nominal section thickness greater than 5/8".

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-36 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROP~IETARV INFORMA I ION Table 3.1.10 ORIGIN, TYPE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STRESSES IN THE HI-STORM FW SYSEM Symbol Description Notes Primary membrane Excludes effects of discontinuities and concentrations. Produced by pressure stress and mechanical loads. Primary membrane stress develops in the MPC Enclosure Vessel shell. Limits on Pmexist for design, normal (Level A), off-normal (Level B), and accident (Level D) service conditions.

Local membrane Considers effects of discontinuities but not concentrations. Produced by stress pressure and mechanical loads, including earthquake inertial effects. PL develops in the MPC Enclosure Vessel wall due to impact between the overpack guide tubes and the MPC (near the top of the MPC) under an earthquake (Level D condition) or non-mechanistic tip-over event. However, because there is no Code limit on PLunder Level D event, a limit on the local strnin consistent with the approach in the HI-STORM I 00 docket is used (see Subsection 3.4.4.1.4).

Primary bending Component of primary stress proportional to the distance from the centroid ofa stress solid section. Excludes the effects of discontinuities and concentrations.

Produced by pressure and mechanical loads, including earthquake inertial effects. Primary bending stress develops in the top lid and baseplate of the MPC, which is a pressurized vessel. Lifting of the loaded MPC using the so-called "lift cleats" also produces primary bending stress in the MPC lid.

Similarly, the top lid of the HT-STORM FW module, a plate-type structure, withstands the snow load (Table 2.2.8) by developing primary bending stress.

Secondary Stresses that result from the constraint of free-end displacement. Considers expansion stress effects of discontinuities but not local stress concentration (not applicable to vessels). It is shown that there is no interference between component parts due to free thermal expansion. Therefore, P. does not develop within any HI-STORM FW component.

Q Secondary Self-equilibrating stress necessary to satisfy continuity of structure. Occurs at membrane plus gross structural discontinuities. Can be caused by pressure, mechanical loads, or bending stress differential thermal expansion. The junction of MPC shell with the baseplate and top lid locations of gross structural discontinuity, where secondary stresses develop as a result of internal pressure. Secondary stresses would also develop at the two extremities of the MPC shell if a thermal gradient were to exist.

However, because the top and bottom regions of the MPC cavity also serve as the top and bottom plenums, respectively, for the recirculating helium, the temperature field in the regions of gross discontinuity is essentially uniform, and as a result, the thermal stress adder is insignificant and neglected (see Paragraph 3.1.2.5).

F Peak stress Increment added to primary or secondary stress by a concentration (notch), or, certain thermal stresses that may cause fatigue but not distortion. Because fatigue is not a credible source of failure in a passive system with gradual temperature changes, fatigue damage is not computed for HI-STORM FW components.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-37 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 3.1.11 KEY INPUT DATA FOR FINITE ELEMENT MODEL OF HI-STORM FW OVERPACK Item Value Overall height of HI-STORM FW (including top 221 .5 in (for maximum length BWR fuel) lid) 239.5 in (for maximum length PWR fuel)

Height of overpack body 199.25 (for max imum length BWR fuel) 217.25 in (for maximum length PWR fuel)

Height of top lid above top of overpack body 22.25 in Top lid diameter 103 in Inside diameter of HI-STORM FW storage 81 in cavity Outside diameter of HI-STORM FW overpack 139 in Inner shell thickness 0.75 in Outer she ll thickness 0.75 in Lifting rib thickness 1 in Baseplate thickness 3 in Material Various (see licensing drawings in Section 1.5)

Ref. temperature for material properties 300°F (implemented in ANSYS)

Table 3.1.13 (implemented in LS-DYNA)

Concrete density 200 lbf/ft3 HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-38 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

AOL I EC PROPRIETAR ( INFORMATION Table 3.1.12 INPUT PARAMETERS FOR SOLID65 CONCRETE ELEMENTS

-USED IN HI-STORM FW LID MODEL Input Parameter Value Density 3

- Standard lid 200 lbf/ft

- Version XL lid 155 lbf/ft3 Poisson's ratio 0.17 Compressive strength 3,000 psi Young's modulus 3. 122 x 10° psi Shear transfer coefficient for open cracks 0.1 Shear transfer coefficient for closed cracks 0.3 HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-39 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 3.1.13 VALUES OF "K" AND "n" USED TO MODEL ELASTIC-PLASTIC BERA VIOR OF HI-STORM SYSTEM COMPONENTS IN LS-DYNA Ref. KT Component Material nt Temperature (psi) 365°C }.421 X 104 0.059 4

350°c 1.506 X 10 0.062 4

325°c 1.705 X 10 0.055 Fuel Basket Metamic-HT 4 300°c 1.901 X 10 0.049 0 4 2so c 2. 184 X 10 0.064 4

200°c 2.461 X 10 0.075 5

MPCLid Alloy X 500°F 1.055 X 10 0.235 5

MPC Shell Alloy X 450°f 1.152 X 10 0.244 5

MPC Baseplate Alloy X 350°F 1.161 X 10 0.236 5

HI-STORM Anchor SA-350 LF2 250°F 1.160 X 10 0.189 Block HI-STORM Lid Stud SA-193 B7 250°F 1.399 X 105 0.082 4

HI-STORM Inlet Shield SA-53 250°F 9.464 X 10 0.1 6 1 Pipe 5

HI-STORM Bodyrr SA-516Gr. 70 300°F 1.144 X 10 0.18 1 5

HI-STORM Lid SA-516 Gr. 70 250°F 1.139 X 10 0.179 4

HI-STORM Inlet Shell SA-36 250°F 8.952 X 10 0.150 Plate, Inlet Vent Top Plate, & Lid t Kand n are defined in Subsection 3. 1.3.1.

tt Includes all components in HI-STORM overpack body made from SA-5 16 Gr. 70 material (e.g., baseplate, inner and outer shells, lifting ribs, etc.).

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-40 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEG PROPRIET.ARY INFORMATION Table 3.1.14 KEY INPUT DATA FOR ANSYS MODEL OF MPC ENCLOSURE VESSEL Item Value Overall Height of MPC 195 in (for maximum length BWR fuel) 213 in (for maximum length PWR fuel)

Outside diameter ofMPC 75.75 in MPC upper lid thickness 4.5 in MPC lower lid thickness 4.5 in MPC shell thickness 0.5 in MPC baseplate thickness 3.0 in Material Alloy X Ref. temperature for material properties Figure 3.4.27 (implemented in ANSYS)

Table 3.1.13 (implemented in LS-DYNA)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-41 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelObTEG PROPRIETARY INFORMATIOl<l 3.2 WEIGHTS AND CENTERS OF GRAVITY As stated in Chapter 1, while the diameters of the MPC, HI-STORM FW, and HI-TRAC VW are fixed, their height is dependent on the length of the fuel assembly. The MPC cavity height (which determines the external he ight of the MPC) is set equal to the nominal fuel length (along with control components, if any) plus!:!,., where I::!,. is between 1.5" (minimum), 2.0" (maximum), I::!,. is increased above 1.5" so that the MPC cavity height is a full inch or half-inch number. Thus, for the PWR reference fuel (Table 1.0.4), whose length including control components is 167.2" (Table 2.1.1), /j,. =

1.8" so that the MPC cavity height, c, becomes 169". l::i. is provided to account for irradiation and thermal growth of the fuel in the reactor. Table 3.2.1 provides the height ofthe internal cavities and bottom-to-top external dimension of all system components. Table 3.2.2 provides the parameters that affect the weight of cask components and their range of values assumed in this FSAR.

The cavity heights of the HI-STORM FW overpack and the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask are set greater than the MPC height by fixed amounts to account for differential thermal expansion and manufacturing tolerances. Ta ble 3.2. 1 provides the height data on HJ-STORM FW, HI-TRAC VW, and the MPC as the adder to the MPC cavity length.

Table 3.2.5 provides the reference weight of the HI-STORM FW overpack for storing MPC-3 7 and MPC-89 containing reference PWR and BWR fuel, respectively. The weight of the HI-STORM FW overpack body is provided for two discrete concrete densities and for two discrete heights for PWR and BWR fuel for both standard and Version XL configurations. The weight at any other density and any other height can be obtained by linear interpolation. Similarly the weight of the standard HI-STORM FW lid is provided for two discrete values of concrete density. The weight corresponding to any other density can be computed by linear interpolation.

As discussed in Section 1.2, the weight of the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask is maximized for a particular site to take full advantage ofthe plant's crane capacity within the architectural limitations of the Fuel Building. Accordingly, the thickness of the lead shield and outer diameter of the water jacket can be increased to maximize shie lding. The weight of the empty HI-TRAC VW cask in Table 3.2.4 is provided for three lengths corresponding to PWR fuel. Using the data for three le ngths, the transfer cask's weight corresponding to any other length can be obtained by linear interpolation (or extrapolation). For MPC-89, the weight data is provided for the minimum and reference fuel lengths, as well as the reference fuel assembly with a DFC and therefore likewise the transfer cask's weight corresponding to any other length can be obtained by linear interpolation (or extrapolation).

The approximate change in the empty weight of HI-TRAC VW (in kilo pounds) ofa certain height, h (inch), by vi1tue of changing the thickness of the lead by an amount, o (inch), is given by the formula:

1::!,.W/ead = O. l 128(h - 13.5) (5 HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-42 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION The approximate change in the empty weight of HI-TRAC VW (in kilo pounds) of a certain length, h (inch), by virtue of changing the thickness of the water layer by 8 (inch) is given by:

flW,m,er = 0.01077 (h - 13.5) J The above formulas serve as a reasonable approximation for the weight change whether the thickness of lead (or water) is being increased or decreased.

The weights of the loaded MPCs containing "reference SNF" with and without water are provided in Table 3.2.3. All weights in the aforementioned tables are nominal values computed using the SOLIDWORKS' computer code or using standard material density and geometric shapes for the respective subcomponents of the equipment.

Table 3.2.5 provides the loaded weight of the HI-STORM FW system on the ISFSI pad for two different concrete densities a nd for both PWR and BWR reference fuel for both standard and XL versions. As can be ascertained from the data in the table, both versions have roughly the same on-ISFSI pad weight. Table 3.2.6 contains the weight data on loaded HI-TRAC VW under the various handling scenarios expected during loading.

The maximum and minimum locations of the centers of gravity (CGs) are presented (in dimensionless form) in Table 3.2.7. The radial eccentricity,~' of a cask system is defined as:

¢ = ~ x 100 (~ is dimensionless)

D where fir is the radial offset distance between the CG of the cask system and the geometric centerline of the cask, and Dis the outside diameter of the cask. In other words, the value of~ defines a circle around the axis of symmetry of the cask within which the CG lies (see Figure 3.2. 1). All centers of gravity are located close to the geometric centerline of the cylindrical cask since the non-axisymmetric effects of the cask system and its contents are very small. The vertical eccentricity, 'I',

of a cask system is defined similarly as:

'I' = ~ x 100 ('I' is dimensionless)

H Where flv is the vertical offset distance between the CG of the cask system and the geometric center of the cask (i.e., cask mid-he ight), and H is the overall he ight of the cask. A positive value of 'I' indicates that the CG is located above the cask mid-height, and a negative value indicates that the CG is located below the cask mid-height. Figure 3.2.2 illustrates how 'I' is defined.

The values of~ and'¥ given in Table 3.2.7 are bounding values, which take into consideration material and fabricat ion tolerances. The tabu lated values of ~ and 'I' can be converted into dimensionless form using the equations above. For example, from Table 3.2.7 the empty HI-STORM FW with lid installed has maximum eccentricities of~ = 2.0 and 'I' = +/-3.0. Therefore, the maximum radial and vertical offset distances are (D= l40", H=207.75" for PWR reference fuel):

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-43 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

1IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATlmJ

./1 . = ¢D = (2.0)(140in) = l. 8in I 100 100 A

u

'¥H

--

(+/-3.0)(207.75in) = +/- 6 .23 in

. (CG h e1g . h t re 1atlve

. to H/ 2)

V 100 100 The C.G. information provided above shall be used in designing the lifting and handling ancillary for the HI-STORM FW cask components. In addition, the maximum CG height per Table 3.2.7 shall be used for the stability analysis of the HI-STORM FW under DBE conditions. Using the weight data in the previously mentioned tables, Table 3.2.8 has been constructed to provide the bounding weights for structural analyses so that every load case is analyzed using the most conservative data (to minimize the computed safety margins). The weight data in Table 3.2.8 is used in all structural analyses in this chapter.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-44 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 3.2.1 OPTIMIZED MPC, HI-TRAC, AND HJ-STORM HEIGHT DATA FOR A SPECIFIC UNIRRADIATED FUEL LENGTH, f t MPC Cavity Height, c f + ~t MPC Height (including top lid, excluding c + 12" closure ring), h HI-TRAC VW Cavity Height h + l" HI-TRAC VW Total Height h + 6.5" HI-STORM FW Cavity Height

- Standard version h + 3.5"

- Version XL h + 3.5" Hi-STORM FW Body Height (he ight from the bottom of the HI-STORM FW to the top surface of the shea r ring at the top of the HI-STORM FW body)

- Standard version h + 4.5"

- Version XL h + 7.5" HI-STORM FW He ight (loaded over the pad)

- Standard version h + 27"

- Version XL overpack with XL lid h + 21.5"

- Version XL overpack with Domed lid h +28" t Fuel Length, C, shall be based o n the fuel assembly length with or without a damaged fuel container (DFC). Users planning to store fuel in DFCs shall adjust the length f to include the additional height of the DFC. The maximum additional height for the DFC shall be 5". Note that users who plan to store any fuel in a DFC will need to utilize a system designed for the additional length and will need to use fuel shims (if required) to reduce the gap between the fuel without a DFC and the enclosure cavity to approximately 1.5-2.5 inches.

t t:.. shall be selected as 1.5" < t:.. < 2.0" so that c is an integral multiple of l/2 inch (add 1.5" to the fuel length and round up to the nearest l/2" or full inch).

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-45 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 3.2.2 LIMITING PARAMETERS Item PWR BWR

1. Minimum fuel assembly length, inch 150 171

2. Max imum fuel assembly length, inch 199.2 18l.5J

3. Nominal thickness of the lead cylinder in the lowest weight 2.75 2.50 HI-TRAC VW, inch

4. Maximum nominal thickness of the 4.25 4.25 lead cylinder, inch

5. Nominal (radial) thickness of the 4.75 4.75 water in the external jacket, inch 3

Maximum fue l assembly length for the BWR fuel assembly refers to the maximum fue l assembly length plus an additional 5" to account for a Damage Fuel Container (DFC).

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-46 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HO! IEC PROPRIET,t\RY INFORMATION Table 3.2.3 MPC WEIGHT DATA (COMPUTED NOMINAL VALVES)

BWRFuel PWRFuel Based on length below Based on length below Shortest Longest Shortest Longest from from from from Item Reference Table Table Reference Table Table 3.2.2 3.2.2 3.2.2 3.2.2 Enclosure Vessel 27,500 27,100 27,800 28,600 25,600 31,100 Fuel Basket 8,600 8,300 8,800 7,900 7,000 9,400 Water in the MPC @ SG= 1 16,700 16,200 18,900 15,400 14,000 18,700 (See Note 1)

Water mass displaced by a 30,800 29,900 31,600 29,300 26,600 34,500 closed MPC Enclosure Vessel (SG = l)

SG = Specific Gravity Note 1: Water weight in the MPC assumes that water volume displaced by the fuel is equal to the fuel weight divided by an average fuel assembly density of 0.396 lb/in3* The fuel weights used for calculating the fuel volumes for Reference/Shortest/Longest PWR and BWR fuel assemblies are 1750/1450/2050 and 750/700/850 pounds respectively.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-47 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PRO~RIETARY INFORMATIOl<l Table 3.2.4 HJ-TRAC VW WEIGHT DATA t (COMPUTED NOMINAL VALUES)

BWR Fuel PWRFuel Based on length below Based on length below Shortest Longest Shortest Longest Item from from from from Reference Reference Table Table Table Table 3.2.2 3.2.2 3.2.2 3.2.2 HI-TRACVW Body (no Bottom Lid, 84,000 81,700 86,200 85,200 78,000 99,600 water jacket empty)

HI-TRACVW Bottom Lid 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 MPCwith 36,100 35,400 36,600 36,500 32,600 40,500 Basket Fuel Weight 66,800 64,600 71,200 62,000 53,700 69,400 (assume 50% (750 lb per (725 lb (800 lb (1 ,675 lb (1 ,450 lb ( 1,875 lb with control assembly per per per per per components or average) assembly assembly assembly assembly assembly channels, as average) average) average) average) average) applicable)

Water in the 600 600 600 600 600 700 Annulus Water in the 8,800 8,500 9,000 8,400 7,600 9,900 Water Jacket Displaced Water Mass by the 18,900 18,400 19,400 18,600 17,500 21,600 Cask in the Pool (Excludes MPC) t Tabulated weights are for standard HI-TRAC VW. For HI-TRAC VW Version P, weights are provided on licensing drawing in Section 1.5.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-48 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HO! TEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 3.2.5 ON-ISFSI WEIGHT OF LOADED HI-STORM FW STANDARD VERSION Scenario Weight of Cask Weight of HI-STORM FW Body Standard Lid Fuel Type HI-STORMFW (kilo-pounds) (kilo-pounds)

Concrete Density (lb/cubic feet)

Ref PWR 150 198.0 20.1 Ref PWR 200 246.2 23.3 Maximum 150 229.0 20.1 length -

PWR Maximum 200 286.l 23.3 length -

PWR Ref BWR 150 206.7 20.1 Ref BWR 200 257.4 23.3 Maximum 150 2 11.6 20.1 length -

BWR Maximum 200 263.7 23.3 length -

BWR HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MA TERIAL REPORT HI-2 114830 Rev. 5 3-49 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATIOl<l Table 3.2.5 (continued)

ON-ISFSI WEIGHT OF LOADED HI-STORM FW VERSIONS WITH XL AND DOMED LID Scenario Weight of Bounding Bounding Cask Weight of Weight of Fuel Type HI- HI- HI- Body HI- HI-STORM STORM STORM (kilo- STORM STORM FWXL FW XL Lid FW Domed pounds) XL Lid Domed Body Concrete Lid (kilo- Lid (kilo-Concrete Density Concrete pounds) pounds)

Density (lb/cubic Density (lb/cubic feet) (lb/cubic feet) feet)

Ref. PWR 155 155 155 213.2 23.0 33.0 Ref PWR 200 155 155 249.7 23.0 33.0 Maximum 155 155 155 246.3 23.0 33.0 length PWR Maximum 200 155 155 289.2 23.0 33.0 length PWR Ref. BWR 155 155 155 222.7 23.0 33.0 Ref. BWR 200 155 155 261.0 23.0 33.0 Maximum 155 155 155 227.7 23.0 33.0 length BWR Maximum length BWR 200 155 155 267.0 23.0 33.0 I

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-50 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

HOLTEC F'RO~RIETARY lt~FORMATION Table 3.2.6 HI-TRAC VW OPERATING WEIGHT DATA FOR REFERENCE FUEL (See Note I)

Scenario HI-TRACVW Weight in Kilo-Pounds (See Notes 2 & 3)

Water in the Water in the Cask in (pool) Ref. PWR Ref. BWR Fuel MPC Water Jacket Water/Air Fuel Yes Yes Water 167.7 173.3 Yes Yes Air 215.5 222.9 Yes No Water 159.4 164.6 No No Water 143.7 147.9 No Yes Air 199.9 206.2 No No Air 191.5 197.5 Notes:

1) Tabulated weights are for standard HI-TRAC VW. For HI-TRAC VW Version P, weights are provided on the licensing drawing in Section 1.5.

2) Weights above include the weight of the fuel assembly alone and do not include any additional weight for non-fuel hardware or damaged fuel containers.

3) Add 4,000 lbs for the weight of the lift yoke.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-5 1 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 3.2.7 LOCATION OF C.G. WITH RESPECT TO THE CENTERPOINT ON THE EQ UIPMENT'S GEOMETRIC CENTERLINE Radial eccentricity Vertical eccentricity (dimensionless),~ (dimensionless),

Item Above(+)* or Below

(-), \II (See Note 1)

1. Empty HI-STORM FW with lid installed 2.0 +/-3.0

2. Empty HI-STORM FW without top lid 2.0 +/-3.0

3. HI-STORM FW with fully loaded stored 2.0 +/-2.0 MPC w ithout top lid

4. HI-STORM FW with lid and a fu lly 2.0 +/-3.0 loaded MPC

5. HI-TRAC VW with Bottom lid and 2.0 +/-2.0 loaded MPC

6. Empty HI-TRAC VW without bottom lid 2.0 +/-2.0 Notes:

1) Tabu lated vertical eccentricities are for standard HI-TRAC VW. For HI-TRAC VW Version P, maximum C.G. heights are provided on the licensing drawing in Section 1.5 5

~ and \J' are dimension values as explained in Section 3.2.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-52 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 3.2.8 BOUNDING WEIGHTS FOR STRUCTURAL ANALYSES (Height from Tables 3.2.1 and 3.2.2)

Assumed Case Purpose Weight (Kilo-pounds)

1. Loaded HI-STORM FW on the pad Sizing and analysis of lifting and containing maximum length/weight handling locations and cask fuel and 200 lb/cubic feet concrete stability analysis under overturning 425.7NOTE 1

- maximum possible weight loads such as flood and earthquake scenario

2. Loaded HI-STORM FW on the pad Stability analysis under missile with 150 lb concrete, shortest strike 285.7 length MPC

3. Loaded HI-TRAC VW with Analysis for NUREG-0612 maximum length fuel and compliance oflifting and handling 270.0 maximum lead and water shielding locations (TALs and Trunnions)

4. Loaded HI-TRAC VW with Stability analysis under missile sho1test length MPC and minimum strike 183.5 lead and water shielding

5. Loaded MPC containing maximum Analysis for NUREG-0612 length/weight fuel - maximum compliance of lifting and handling 116.4 possible weight scenario locations (TALs)

NOTE 1: For users of the HI-STORM FW Version XL with domed lid, a site specific evaluation shall be performed for cask lifting and stability if the bounding weight in this Table is exceeded.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-53 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

I IOLTEC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION CG LOCATION OF FABRICATED CASK SYSTEM W ILL LIE ON OR WITH IN THIS CIRCLE.

CASK DIAMETER "D" <l>D fir= -

100 GEOMETRIC CENTER OF CASK Top View of Cask Figure 3.2. 1: Radial Eccentricity of Cask Center of Gravity HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-54 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

lelOLTEC PROPRIETARY l~FORMA I ION CG LOCATION OF FABRICATED CASK SYSTEM WILL LIE BETWEEN +Av AND -Av

+b.v =(*j)H 100 l __

+/-=

-A - (- j)H v- 100

-T-- H H/2 Elevation View of Cask Figure 3.2.2: Vertical Eccentricity of Cask Center of Gravity HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPORT HI-2114830 Rev. 5 3-55 HI-STORM FW SYSTEM FSAR Revision 5, June 20, 2017

ML20108E923

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2.0 INTRODUCTION

Reference:

Reference:

Reference:

Reference:

2.6 REFERENCES

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