ML20098F089

Response to Aslab 840910 Order Requesting Views of All Parties Re Procedure W/Respect to Unit 2 on Issues Covered in ALAB-763.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20098F089
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	09/28/1984
From:	Reynolds J CENTER FOR LAW IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, JOINT INTERVENORS - DIABLO CANYON
To:
References
CON-#484-156 OL, NUDOCS 8410020304
Download: ML20098F089 (10)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,, i BEFORE THE APPEAL BOARD I

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In the Matter of - . )

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

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) Docket Nos. 50-275 O.L.

) 50-323 0.L.

(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power - "

)

, Plant, Units 1 and 2) )

)

. JOINT INTERVENORS' RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 10, 1984 ORDER r

By order dated September 10, 1984, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (" Appeal Board") in the above-entitled proceeding requested the views of all parties regarding "how we should. proceed with respect to Unit 2" on the issues covered in ALAB-763. The Joint Intervenors hereby respond to that order.

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-First, it is important to recall the. context in which the issue-of design quality assurance must be considered for the

- Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant ("Diablo Canyon"). In an order issued on August 16, 1983, this Board noted the confidence of design. adequacy that is generally provided by "an effectively functioning design quality assurance program" and observed that:

In the case of Diablo Canyon, however, this confidence.has been seriously eroded by the existence of significant evidence that the design quality assurance program was faulty (i.e., it failed to comply with 10 CFR i Part 50, Appendix B). Hence, there is now substantial uncertainty whether any particular structure, system or component was designed in accordance with stated criteria and commit-

, ments. (Order, at 4-5.)

8410020304'840928

• PDR-ADOCK 05000275 0 PDR

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Accordingly, this Board ordered that the applicant has the burden of going forward and the burden of proving the adequacy of the ~

IDVP and the ITP to establish that the plant is properly designed. . . . (Id. at 6.)

Second, at the hearings held in November 1983 on the reopened design l'ssues, PGandE contended that the " verification ,

program" -- e.g., IDVP and ITP -- (1) established that the plant

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had been properly designed, despite conceded breakdowns in quality assurance during the 1970's and (2) provided at least the level of assurance that would have been provided by an effectively functioning quality assurance program. In ALAB-763, this Board essentially agreed, concluding that "the scope and the execution of the applicant's verification programs have been sufficient to establish that Diablo Canyon Unit 1 design adequately meets its licensing criteria." (ALAB-763, at 101. ) Jus to questions regarding the design of. Unit 12, however, the Board deferred a decision, choosing instead to sever the issues in light of differences in the verification effort for that unit, the fact

'that the applicant's verification program and the Staff's own review were still ongoing, and the fact that the Staff SER supplement on nit 2 verification had not yet been prepared. (Id.

at 20.)-

Third, the hearing record established,more specifically that:

(a) Units 1 and 2 were designed substantially by the same design organization (PG&E Panel 1, ff. Tr. D224, at 29; Tr. D2772); -

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(b) Much of the design work for Unit 2 was, thus, l completed under the applicant's deficient design quality

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assurance program (Tr. D2772);

4 (c) Because of its limited scope, the IDVP did not cover or reverify the design of Unit 2 (IDVP Final Rept. ,

PG&E Exh. 90, p.l.1-1; ALAB-763, at 20);

(d) Units 1 and 2 are not.. identical (Tr. D.2274).

Differences exist in numerous respects described at PG&E Panel 1, ff. Tr. D224, at 29, and in PGandE's recent letters to the NRC on the issue (Letters, Schuyler to Knighton, DCL-84-278 (July 31,1984) and DCL-84-310 (September 21, 1984));

(e) It is possible that design errors not found in Unit 1 could have occurred in Unit 2 (Tr. D1321-22, 2776) .

(f) The applicant's ITP was limited, particularly in the area of nonseismic design, so that the ITP alone provides an insufficient basis for confidence in the adequacy of the Unit 2 design. For example, although it is unclear how much of the nonseismic design was reviewed by the ITP, there is no

[ dispute (1) that it was significantly less than 50%, even for Unit 1, or (2) that it was "not intended to be a comprehensive program equivalent to that performed for Phase I." (PG&E Exh. 9 0, at 1. 4-4-1. 4-5. ) Further, the I

L ITP -- characterized by the IDVP only as " issue-oriented, i

responding on a case-by-case basis to specific non-seismic concerns" (id.) -- was not documented as a review process and failed to identify the nature or number of systems reviewed or the criteria against which the design of each was verifieu

. i (PG&E PFFCL, at 25). In short, the scope of the ITP was strictly limited even for Unit 1, although the extent of the

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limitation remains uncertain, particularly as applied to Unit 2; (g) This Board's decision in ALAB-763'is predicated on i

the " applicant's verification effort,'" which included the l IDVP and ITP (ALAB-763, at 43-44) . For Unit 2, the limited ITP constitutes the applicant's entire reverification effort, though, as noted in subparagraph (g) above, the 1TP was never conceived or designed for such a purpose.

Fourth, facts revealed since the November hearings undermine the reliability even of the limited 11P review. In

.particular, the investigation and findings of NRC Staff Inspector Isa Yin, who substantiated the allegations of former DCP engineer Charles Stokes, establish a generic breaPdown in the ITP's small

-and large bore piping work for Diablo Canyon. This breakdown resulted from numerous continuing deficiencies in the applicant's quality assurance program even since 1981, including a " Quick Fix" program that resulted in approximately 70% of the plant's small bore piping support design being " deviated" (SSER 25, Comments of Isa Yin). The existence of this breakdown undermines PGandE's I

contention that the ITP, in and of itself, constitutes an adequate substitute for an effectively functioning G3 program for the design of Unit 2.

Fifth, as this Board noted in ALAB-763, the applicant's verification of the design of Unit 2 was still in progress at the time the hearings were' held, and the NRC Staff had not reviewed that verification effort or issued an SSER for Unit 2. (ALAB-7 6 3,

1 at 20.) Consequently, the record does not now reflect (1) what has actually been done to verify the design of Unit 2; (2) the extent of deficiencies discovered; (3) the number and nature of modifications; and (4) the extent to which that reverification has been completed. -In contrast to " inspection activities" that arguably need not be completed prior to th'is Board's decision on the design adequacy of Unit 2, the focus of concern here is the fundamental and essential determination that Unit 2 has been designed to the requisite level of adequacy for initial licensing; in other words, the question here relates not to normal periodic inspection required at all nuclear plants, but design reverifi-cation undertaken as a substitute for a concededly deficient quality assurance program. Consequently, completion and review of the reverification must precede this Board's adjudication of the adequacy of the Unit 2 design.1/

In light of all of these points, the Joint Intervenors submit that PGandE has failed to meet its burden of proving -- as characterized by this Board - "the adequacy of the IDVP and the ITP to establish that the plant is properly designed . . . ."

(Order, at 6 (August 16, 1983).) In contrast to its conclusions A/ The fact that the Commission's November 19, 1981 Order did not require an IDVP for Unit 2 does not imply that, for pur-poses of initial licensing, no reverification effort was needed for Unit 2. At the time of the Commission's order Suspending License, only Unit 1 had been licensed, and the Commission did not

.have before it any question of licensing or enforcement for Unit 2. Thus, the critical point now is that the conceded quality assurance breakdown, which this Board found has undermined the requisite confidence in the plant's design, applied equally to Units 1 and 2. Therefore, the Joint Intervenors submit that the same measures needed to restore that confidence in the design of Unit 1 are needed to restore confidence in the design of Unit 2.

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regarding Unit 1, the limitations on verification of Unit 2 --

e.g., the lack of IDVP involvement, the limited and uncertain nature of the ITP, the incomplete nature af the Unit 2 reverification (or lack thereof) and Staff review at the, time of the reopened jesign hearings, and the subsequent evidence of QA deficiencies in the ITP revealed by plant Iworkers and the NRC Staff since that time -- all undermine similar conclusions of design adequacy for Unit 2. Consequently, the " substantial uncertainty" found by this Board in the above-cited order continues to exist as to Unit 2 and must be dispelled prior to the issuance of an operating license for the facility.

, With regcrd specifically to the question of whether further hearings are needed, the Joint Intervenors submit that on the present record -- without further hearings -- no license can 1

lawfully be issued because the requisite assurance as to the i

adequacy of Unit 2's design is lacking. In order to rectify this deficiency, PGandE must demonstrate -- just as it was required to do for Unit 1 in November 1983 -- (1) that the scope of the i

verification was adequate to provide a basis for a conclusion regarding the design of Unit 2, and (2) that the results 6f the Unit 2 verification effort have restored the essential reasonable assurance that Diablo Canyon has been designed and constructed consistent with the construction permit, the license application, the Comuission's regulations, and the Atomic Energy Act. 10

! C.F.R. S 50.57 (a) . Although the limited scope of the verification 7 program was established on-the-record in the reopened design i

j hearings -- e.g., no IDVP for Unit 2, limited ITP for nonseismic l

l design, etc. -- the, ultimate findings as to Unit 2 and the nature l '

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and extent of modifications required could not be addressed because the verification program as to Unit 2 was only then being ,

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undertaken. Consequently, further hearings are necessary prior to licensing, both to learn the status and findings of the verification program for Unit 2 and to address-the recent evidence _

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of QA breakdowns in the applicant'. .orrective Action Program.

If this Board concurs in this assessment, the Joint Intervenors propose the following hearing schedule:

SSER re Unit 2 completed Date to be provided and served . . . . . . . . . by NRC Staff Completion of discovery . . . . . 45 days after SSER issued Prehearing Conference and 45 days after SSER finalize con _tentions . . . . issued

, Testimony submitted . . . . . . . 2 weeks after Prehearing Conference Hearing commences . . . . . . . . 3 weeks after testimony submitted Hearing ends . . . . . . . . . . 2 weeks after hearing commences Proposed findings . . . . . . . . As prescribed in 10 C.F.R. S 2.754.

Dated: September 28, 1984 Respectfully submitted, JOEL R. REYNOLDS, ESQ.

_I ETHAN P. SCHULMAN, ESQ.

ERIC HAVIAN, ESQ.

JOHN R. PHILLIPS, ESQ.

Center for Law in the Public Interect 10951 W. Pico Boulevard Los Angeles, CA 90064 (213)470-3000  ;

i By EL R. p COLDS r Attorneys for Joint Intervenors

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION

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)-

In the Matter of )

)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY )

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Docket Nos. 50-275 0.L.

) 50-323 O.L.

(Diablo Canyon-Nuclear Power )

Plant,. Units 1 and 2) )

)

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 28th day of September, 1984, I have served copies of the foregoing JOINT INTERVENORS' RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 10, 1984 ORDER, ma' ling them through the U.S. mails, first class, '.sstage prepaid, to the attached list.

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. 4th sd AM P FDf/

l CHRISTINA CONCEPCION

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4-SERVICE LIST

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• Thomas S. Moore, Chairman *Dr. W. Reed Johnson _

Atomic Safety & Licensing Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board Appeal Board

. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Commission 4350 East West Highway 4350 East West Highway 3rd Floor Guard Desk 3rd Floor Guard Desk Bethesda, MD 20814 Bethesda, MD 20814

• Dr. John H. Buck -

• Docket and Service Branch Atomic Safety.& Licensing Office of the Secretary

' Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Reatlatory Commission Commisr*aa . Washington, D.C. 20555 4350 East West highway 3rd Floor Guard Desk Bethesda, MD 20814

• Laurence Chandler, Esq.

. Office of_the Executive Legal Director - BETH 042 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 David S. Fleischaker, Esq.

Post Office Box 1178 Oklahoma City, OK 73101

• Bruce Norton, Esq.

Norton, Burke, Berry & French 2002 E. Osborn

-Phoenix, AZ 85064

• Malcolm H. Furbush, Esq.

Philip A. Crane, Esq.

, Pacific Gas and Electric Company

-77 Beale Street San Francisco, CA 94106 4- John Van de Kamp, Attorney General Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Chief Attorney General Michael J. Strumwasser, Special Counsel to the Attorney General Office of the Attorney General State of California 3580 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 800 Los Angeles, CA 90010

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Richard B. Hubbard MHB Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue Suite K _

San Jose, CA 95125 Virginia and Gordon Bruno Pecho Ranch Post Office Box 6289 Los Osos, CA 93402 .

Sandra and Gordon Silver 1760 Alisal Street -

San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Carl Neiburger Telegram Tribune -

Post Office Box 112 San Luis Obispo, CA 93402 Tom Devine Government Accountability Project 1901 Que Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20009 Eric Havian, Esq.

Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe 44 Montgomery Street., 31st Floor San Francisco, CA 94133

• Via Express Mail.

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