ML20096G982
| ML20096G982 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 09/07/1984 |
| From: | Krimm R Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8409110222 | |
| Download: ML20096G982 (1) | |
Text
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+ i% Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472
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@7g MEMORANDUM FOR: Federal Radiological Preparedness r nati tee . j
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FROM: W. Krimm j Chairman, Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee
SUBJECT:
Review of the Nebraska and Iowa State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness for the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station . In accordance with 44 CFR 350, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region VII, has completed evaluations of the Nebraska and Iowa State and local of fsite radiological emergency plans and preparedness for the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station. These evaluations have been accomplished in accordance with provisions of section 350.11. Pursuant to section 350.12, FEMA intends to make a finding and determination with respect to the status of offsite plans and preparedness in the vicinity of the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station by October 31, 1984 The following attachments are for your review and discussion with members of your organization who are directly involved in Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) activity supporting FEMA Region VII. However, at this point in time, only the sections relating to Nebraska should be reviewed. The attachments concerned with the FEMA Region VII evaluation are:
- 1. The Regional Director's Evaivation;
- 2. The RAC's Formal Review of Nebraska ~ and Iowa State and local radiological emergency plans and preparedness; and
- 3. Exercise reports of the July 22, 1981, September 15, 1982, and December 6-7, 1983, exercises.
Due to excessive volume, the actual plans and other relevant materials are not attached. They are available for your review in Room 506, Federal Center Plaza, 500 C Street, S.W. If you have questions, please contact Ms. Melita Rodeck at 287-0291. We solicit your comments as they relate to your agency's responsibilities in this area. If your comments are to be considered in our finding and determination they should be provided in writing or by telephone to Ms. Melita Rodeck within thirty (30) days from the date of this memorandum. Attachments As Stated i B409i10222 B40907 DR'ADOCK00000g
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r - ) l # A::97iFederal Emergency Management Agency l , ('j,, -w . ! Region VII 911 Walnut Street Kansa City, Missouri 64106 September 4, 1981 l MEMORANDIDi TO: Jack Crandall, Director, Office of Disaster Services, Iowa Fran Laden, Assistant Director, State of Nebraska Civil Defense Regional Assistance Com:nittee 1 Gaut, Preparedness Review - FEMA National ERCH: ephen W. Ferris, Regional Assistance Committee Chairman l Plans & Preparedness Division - Region VII
SUBJECT:
Post-Exercise Evaluation Report for the Ft. Calhoun exercise. Enclosed is the Post-Exercise Evaluation Report for the 7t. Calhoun exercise conducted on July 22, 1981. Enclosure 63d> 8) c(34 I
[( ' ms POST-EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT p' %, y EXERCISE OF STATE AND LOCAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCT RESPONSE PLANS FOR AREAS IN NEBRASKA AND IOWA NEAR THE FORT CALHOUN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT s h JULY 22, 1981
.l]hQl b) b b Y '
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, REGION VII
-PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS DIVISION
- 911 WALNUT, ROOM 300 '
M SAS CITY, MISSOURI 64106 . A_/ -
TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE I, INTRODUCTION- 1 II. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
4 y4 III. EXERCISE SCENARIO 6
, IV. EVALUATIONS AND RECWMENDATIONS - NEBRASKA 8 C
- A. Assignment of Responsibility (Organizational Control) 8 State Local Recommendations B. Onsite Emergency Organization 9 C. Emergency Response Support and Resources 10 State-Local i Recommendation t D. Emergency Classification System 11 State and Local Reconsnandation E. Notification Methods and Procedures 12
_ State Local
- Reconunendation F. Emergency Communications 13 State Local Recomunendations G. Public Education and Information 14 State Loca1 Recocanendations -
15 H. Emergency Facilities and Equipment 16 i State Local Recomunendations I. Accident Assessment 17 State Local - Reco::nnendation j J. Protective Response 18 u) S ta te Local Reconunendations I l
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% K. .. Radiological Exposure Control 19 State Local Recormnendations L. Medical and Public Health Support 20 State and Local e Recommendations M. Recevery and Reentry P1maning and Post Accident , 21 w operations State Local Roccanendations N. Exercises and Drills 22 State and Local Recommendations I
- 0. Radiological Emergency Response Training 23 State and Local i Recommendations P. Radiological Emergency Response P1=aafag 24 State and Local Recommendations V. EVALUATIONS AND RECCHMENDATIONS - IOWA 25 i
! A. Assignment of Responsibility (Organizational Control) 25 State Local
- Raccamendations 26
- 3. Onsite Bnergency Organisation 27 C. Emergency Response Support and Resources 28 State Local L. Recommendations t
D. Emergency Classification Systan 29 State Local Recommendations E.- Notification Methods and Procedures 30 State Local
- Reconnendations -
i F. Emergency Communications 31 _ ; State v Local Recommendati as 1
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z G. Public Education.and Informaticn 32 T . State "" - Local --O ' Recommendations - n, H. Emergency facilities and.. Equipment' 33 State. '
,i Local' Recommendations % I. : Accident Assessmenc -
35 State Reconsiendations . . J. Protective' Response 36 State x 1 Local ' m i , - Recommendations 1, ,~ s4 it K. RadiologiEa1 Exposure Control 37 State - w \ Local 1 Recommendations L L.' -Medical and Public Health Support 38 State and; Local a .'t .- .; Recommendacions s..w c-$- ; sa n
' " -M.i.. Reentry 'asi Recovery r; '
- t el <: 39
-State
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-Recismendation -
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,w N. Excercises and'yDrills .
40 State and Local'- \' Recommendations O. Radiological Emergency Respons's Training 41 State
- Local , ; i Recommendation ,
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[ P. Radiological = Emergency Response Planning 42
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State and Local '" [ Recommendation ' R% e l ,'
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I, INTRODUCTION On December 7,1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management
- Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response. >
- 1. FEMA's immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility-Radio-logical Emergency Planning include:
- a. Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and review and evalua-tion of state and local government emergency plans for adequacy.
- b. Deter =4a4ag whether the plans can be implemented, based upon o,bserva-tion and evaluation of exercises conducted in these jurisdictions.
- c. Coordinating the activities of other involved Federal and Volunteer Agenciasit (1) Nuclear Regulatory Connaission (NRC) '
(2) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (3) Department of Energy (DOE) (4) Department of Health and Human Services -(PBS and FDA)
-(5) Department of Transportation (DOT)
(6) Department of Agriculture (USDA) . p (7) . Department of Commerce (NOAA)
; Representatives of.these agencias serve as members of the Regional Advisory
[. Comunittee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA. Subnission of emergency plans l to the RAC by the states and involved local jurisdictions is followed by
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! the evaluation, exercising, and critiquing of those plans. A Public Meet-ing is held to acquaint the citizenry with contents of the plans, answer
. questions about them, and receive suggestions on the plans.
- . 2. A radiological emergency exercise was conducted in cooperation with Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) July 22, 1981, between the hours of about 8
- 00 A.M. and approximately 3:00 P.M. by the States of Nebraska and Iowa to assess the adequacy of the state and local radiological emergency response plans and~ preparations to protect the public in the event.of a
, radiological emergency involving the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Power Plant (FCNPP) near Blair, Nebraska. The FCNPP is operated by the Omaha Public ,
-Power District, and is located on the Nebraska side of the Missouri River
[ vhich is also the boundary between Nebraska and Iowa. In liebraska, parts ' of Washington and Douglas Counties are within the 10-mile plume Emergency [ .,
, Planning Zone (EPZ), affecting about 12,300 residents. In Iowa, parts of
!~ 7 Harrison and Pottawattamie Counties are within the EPZ, affecting about
; 'V .5,300 residents. .Thus this report addresses the off-site response acti-vities that were demonstrated in both states during the exercise.
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_ 3. A critique of the July 22 exercise for the participants and the public s meeting was held at-7:00 P.M., July 23, 1981, at the Blair Central School in Blair, Nebraska. l 4.- :Public meetings were subsequently held at the Blair Central School at 1:00 P.L on August 4, 1981, and at 7:00 P.M. at the High School, Missouri Valley, Iowa, on August 5,1981, to discuss the state and local radiological
, emergency response plans for the areas near:the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Power Plant.
- 5. General RAC objectives were to exercise and evaluate the operational (and observable) elements described under the Planning Standards and Evaluation Criteria which are set forth under.Section II of NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1.
Rev 1. These criteria are also the basis for development and evaluation of the state and local plans which were being exercised.
- 6. ~ Principal organizations in Nebraska and Iowa participating in the exercise included:
s State of Nebraska Civil Defense Agency \ Department of Health - Division of Radiological Health State Patrol University of Nebraska Other state agencies in supporting rol'as Washington County, Nebraska Dodge County, Nebraska . Douglas County, Nebraska Omaha Public Power District State of Iowa ' i. Office of Disaster Services Department of Environmental Quality (: Department of Health Department of Public Safety University of Iowa [: - Iowa State University l - Other State Agencies in supporting roles E Harrison County, Iowa Pottawattamie-County, Iowa I. Crawford County, Iowa - l' 7. A 24-member Federal observer team was established by the FEMA, Region VII
') . RAC for observing the response ~in Nebraska and Iowa. Observers included:
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% OBSERVER H.' Pickering FEMA Region VII Various (RAC Chairman)
G. Barber (CPR)* Washington County EOC (Blair, Nebraska) Dr. H. Beimnn USDA Iowa State EOC (Des Moines) W. Biedenfeld PHS Health and Medical Sites in Iowa C. Big:;s FEMA Region VII Pottawattamie County EOC (Council Bluffs, IA) W. Bridek EPA NE Forward Conmand Post (adjacent to FCNPP) J. Crafton Amer. Red Cross Host Area Facilities (Denison, Iowa) S. Delach FEMA (CPR) Host Area Facilities (Fremont, NE) J. Devlin .-F MA (CPR Harrison County EOC (Logan, Iowa) S. Ferris FEMA Region VII Pottawattamie County EOC t =Dr. W. Hope PHS Health and Medical Sites in Nebraska l C. Huyett FEMA Region VII Nebraska State EOC (Lincoln)
~A. Isom FEMA Region VII Harrison County EOC Dr. G. Jacobsen FDA Iowa State EOC
-H. King FEMA (CPR) Media Release Center (Omaha, NE)
R. McCabe FEMA Region VII Iowa State EOC J. Meyers- DOT Washington County EOC J. Montgomery NRC FCNPP EOF / Nebraska Monitoring Teams i B. Morrow FAA Washington County EOC 1 l C. Reese FEMA Region VII Info. Authentication Center-(adj. to FCNPP) l Dr. J. Shannon USDA Nebraska State EOC
- . J. Sutch FEMA (CPR) Pottawattamie County EOC l
D. Wilson FEMA Region VII FCNPP EOF A. Zahn DOT Harrison County EOC l . ,
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- Center for Planning and Research, Inc. (under contract to FEMA)
- 8. Under Parts IV and V of this report for the States of Nebraska and Iowa, respectively, are evaluations and recommendations for actions necessary ,
to improve emergency response capabilities. These evaluations and
- -recommendations are organized according to the Planning Standards and l
1 Evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of NUREG-0654. In this report 29 recommendations for correcting deficiencies in Nebraska, and 34 recouncudations for correcting deficiencies in Iowa, are provided in continuing numerical sequence following the critique of each observed function. Reconmendation 1 for each state is located in Part III. State and local jurisdictions should establish
- a schedule of corrective measures, on a point-by-point basis, directed to the formal recommendations
, of~the RAC. State and local gave mnent should examine each reconmendation ( and establish a schedule of corrective actions necessary to remedy the l deficiencies noted in this report. This schedule of corrective measures ! should be provided to the RAC Chairman within 30 days of receipt of this report. The respanse to this report, itemizing the measures to be insti-tuted immediately and the schedule of future corrective measures, will become part of the submission package to FEMA Headquarters. 9
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II. EXECUTIVE SUlffARY The objectives of the exercise were to assess and evaluate the adequacy of the Nebraska and Iowa-radiological emergency response plans and capabilities of the state and local governments to protect the public in the event of a radio- I logical emergency at the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Power Plant (FCNPP) operated by l the Omaha Public Power District (OPPD). The consensus of the 24-member Fed- l
'eral Observer Tesa involved in observing the response in the two states is that the objectives of the exercise were achieved, i.e., the team was able to observe and evaluate the response by the off-site participants. ,
The exercise focused on the state and local off-site response. The OPPD and the FCNPP'also participated to demonstrate the capability of the utility to cope'with such an emergency on-site, as well as to provide appropriate inter- ) face with the state and local jurisdictions for issuing notification of simu- ! lated emergency event classifications and radiological releases through the FCNPP Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) adjacent to the FCNPP. The principal Nebraska State agencies involved in the exercise were the Civil Defense Agency (CDA), the Department of Health - Division of Radiological Health (DRH), and the State Patrol; all demonstrated a capability to respond , at their facilities in Lincoln and in the field. State-leveltperformance } l included cation the State Center (IAC)Forward both located Command adjacent Post to(CRUSH) the FCNPP, andas the Information well Authenti- l as the Media Release' Center (MRC) located in the Omaha-Douglas County EOC in Omaha. Sev-eral deficiencies were observed concerning the state-level response. 3 Both Washington and Dodge Counties participated, the latter being designated
,, as a reception center to accommodate those people directed to evacuate from areas within the EPZ. Both of these jurisdictions demonstrated that a good capability for protecting the public exists, with only minor improvements needed.
In Iowa, the state-level response at the capital in Des Moines was acceptably descastrated and was coordinated by the Office of Disaster Services (ODS) . A detailed evaluation of the Iowa State EOC operations was provided as a result of the exercise conducted at the Quad Cities Nuclear Station on May 20, 1981. Accident assessment field teams, directed by the Department of Environmental Quality and supported by teams from the University of Iowa and Iowa State
- University, generally performed well. Some deficiencies were observed concern-ing the state-level response.
Demonstrated local response capabilities in Iowa by Harrison and Pottawatamie Counties and by the City of Denison in Crawford County-(host area) varied con-siderably. 'At Pottawattamie County, which was not well exercised by the scenario of events, response capability was marginally demonstrated. The single protect-ive action that the county was required to take in the exercise was accomplished satisfactorily. Ihe capability demonstrated by Harrison County was m1Mmm1, at f bes.t .and reflected a serious lack of complete plans, preparations and partici " pation by local officials and staff, as well as apparently reflecting inadequate minimal state-level capabilities to support the county before and during the - i exercise. Many deficiencies were observed which must be rectified for an
^ acceptable response capability to exist in both counties. The best local
, . [O] demonstartion observed in Iowa was the hosting function that was shown in
. Denison, all elements of which were considered to be above the minimum standards.
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., In summary, in Iowa there is a general need for improvement in radiological
~Y ' response readiness in the major areas of planning, organization (including
-more support by elected officials and intensified state-local efforts),
facilities, consnunications, and training. Affected local governments need special help from both the state and utility in these areas. Positive observation highlights included: c The response demonstrated by Washington County, Nebraska, including the' dedication and support by local officials and staff. Demonstrations of local hosting capabilities and functions in both
. Nebraska and Iowa.
Excellent pamphlet developed and distributed by OPPD concerning indi-
. vidual and family protection measures.
Negative observations included: s Poor response demonstration by Harrison County, Iowa.
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Accident assessment deficiencies in Nebraska. 1 Lack of sufficient ODS staff to provide for continuous operations at any location: the media center in Omaha, the State EOC in Des Moines, or liaison to local government. n o se 9 6 l .
i III. EXERCISE SCENARIO t SYNOPSIS AND CRITIQUE: '
~ The exercise scenario was developed by the Omaha Public Power District in coord-ination with the States of Nebraska and Iowa to provide'an outline of a possible course of events at.the Fort'Calhoun Nuclear Pcwer Plant (FCNPP). These events were simulated on July 22, 1981. The simulated incident was designed to enable a detailed response by the FCNPP and Omaha Public Power District personnel, as C well as to accousmodate the off-site response exercise in which the FCNPP provided appropriate interface with the two states. Thus, the state and local exercise eventspersonnel.
plant were driven by the simulated events and actual response l times by FCNPP e i The exercise scenario posed a malfunction at the FCNPP, ultimately resulting in
. .a worsening condition that tested both the on-site capability to respond and make appropriate repairs and activated response, including appropriate protective and recovery actions gy off-site state and local governments.
The exercise started with a notification of UNUSUAL EVENT by che plant. Agency notifications were initiated. s 1 Shortly afterwards conditions worsened and the plant declared a SITE EMERGENCY. Notifications to selected state, local and Federal agencies were initiated and governseat response centers were activated. F In Nebraska the Governor simulated a disaster plant. declaration and the State Field Command Post was dispatched to the Two simulated casualties were sustained at the plant requiring medical
- evacuation to the University of Nebraska Medical Center at Omaha. The plant EOF became operational. The IAC and MRC were activated.
Plant conditions continued to deteriorate resulting in a declaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY. About this time the Nebraska State Field Consnand Post became opera-tional, as did the Information Authentication Center adjacent to the FCNPP EOF. While the exercise date was known, basic exercise information, such as accident information, radiation' levels, meteorological information, time of the specific events, 'and the affected off-site areas was not to be known in advance and was to be introduced by the FCNPP at appropriate times during the course of the exercise. However, many of the state and local participants did know the details of the scenario prior to the exercise, which could have affected the performance. The simulated release, approximately one-hour in duration, was sufficient to result in reconsnandations for sheltering of the affected population but did not result in any simulated evacuation actions. However,'for exercise purposes, a host area in each state carried out functions to demonstrate its capability as if an evacua-tion had occurred in accordance with the scenario. The scenario called for the simulated plume to travel' northward along the Missouri River, so as to affect both states in a similar manner. A summary of the exercise incidents is tabulated below. The times are actual for the exercise data, but are approximate since the exercise was driven according to the incidents and response within the FCNPP.
., Incidents Approximate Times Notification of UNUSUAL EVENT 0755 Notification of SITE EMERGENCY 0805 Notification of GENERAL EMERGENCY. 1045 .
Notification of Release Occurring 1120 - I -u ~ End of Release 1220 Exercise Ends 1530
' In general, it was felt that the scenario failed to adequately stress the off-site response capabilities as a result of minimal release levels. In addition, the direction of the plume essentially meant that Pottawattamie County faced little response challenge.
Reconsnandations pertaining to the exercise in general are given under appropriate sections in the evaluations provided in the following Parts IV and V of this report. RECGefANDATION: s
- 1. The timetable outlined in Guidance Memorandum 17 should be followed as closely as possible to allow Federal Agency examination of the scenario sufficiently in advance to assure a realistic scenario that will adequately stress the
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participating organizations. (This recommendation pertaics to both the States of Nebraska and Iowa.) e 0 e
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r s , IV. ~ EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - NEBRASKA i u. 3
-j A. -Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control)
- f. STATE
. j Capabilities pertaining to organization and assignment of responsibilities met 1.
_or exceeded standards. Each organization' reported, appeared knowledgeable of responsibilities, and carried out roles accordingly as the scenario required. The Department of Health did not demonstrate 'a 24-hour capability to conduct i i protracted operations. Current plans and procedures do not describe the utili-f.zationofsupplementalaccidentassessmentmonitoringteamsfromtheCooper Nuclear Power Station. I LOCAL The Washington County civil defense director and local officials were well organ-ized and effectively conducted emergency response direction and control activities. Excellent leadership and dedication by the elected officials was evident. A successful demonstration of organization and responsibilitiestoccurred at the hosting facilities in the Fremont EOC. There was no demonstratlon of hosting capabilities at Bellevue, Nebraska since the direction of the plume did not. involve the area served by this reception center. Neither Washington County nor.Fremont demonstrated a 24-hour capability to conduct
. protracted operations by conducting a shif t change, but Fremont displayed a capability by showing a listing of replacement personnel te the observer, and several Washington County officials discussed the matter wich observers thereby providing some indication that'they could operate for a protracted period, if necessary. In both cases, the first-shi'f t participants were skilled .in their fields and capable of carrying out necessary responsibilities.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
- 2. In future exercises each state agency and local jurisdiction should demon-strate a clear capability to function on a 24-hour basis for an extended time
.by replacing all personnel during the exercise and by briefing all incoming personnel.to bring than quickly up to date and provide continuity of opera-tions.
- 3. Existing plans should be amended to include augmentation of off-site monitor-ing capability by personnel from nearby non-affected nuclear power facilities.
4.- Additional experience and/or training drills are recommended in order to E
. improve direction and control procedures, increase staff familiarization with the plans and procedures, and fine tune and maintain the demonstrated
- good' performance by state and local emergency response personnel.
- 5. ' Future exercises should demonstrate the reception center operations at -
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B, ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION
-g Section B, NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP-1, pertains only to licensee responsibilities for emergency response and is not included in the exercise evaluation of state and
< local plans. W e
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.i . C. Emernency Response Support and Resources
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STATE:
~ Space at the FCNPP interim EOF is insufficient to ful.ly accommodate state needs i (which presumably will be corrected when a permanent EOF is built). State Radia-tion. Health personnel,. when questioned, indicated that the State Radiation Health
' Laboratory capability is inadequate because much of its equipment is currently L
~ inoperable. Apparently this is due to insufficient state funding, thus steps are
. necessary to rectify the situation. Other state support and resources met or 3 . exceeded the standards. IRAP assistance was requested in accordance with the state plan.
LOCAL: Local capabilities to support Federal response appeared to meet standards and
'will improve once the Washington County EOC is completed.
RECOMMENDATION: s
- 6. Investigate conditions at the State Radiation Health Laboratory, and strongly urge that appropriate corrective measures be taken. t y
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D. Emergency Classification Gystem STATE AND LOCAL: Both state and local governments effectively used the emergency classification system to make proper notifications, mobilize resources, and initiate appropri-
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ate protective actions. RECOMMENDATION: NONE.
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4 _ E. Notification Methods and Procedures STATE: 4 Notification, mobilizstion, and response 'of state personnel was effectively accom-plished. All responded promptly upon notification.
;-o LOCAL:
Local staff was notified in a timely manner, but the informality of the instruc-tional messages, which did not describe the condition class, suggested that all were primed for the exercise. An actual event would call for more specific
- description of conditions.
Local notification of the public is primarily by a few existing sirens and by emergency vehicles traveling designated routes which was simulated. However, the
.:athods were well discussed and planned among the EOC staff following receipt of the recosamendations (sectors and distances) made by the state. The capability to make such notifications using emergency vehicles was apparent.
RECOMMENDATION: (See Recommendation 28.) T t e i r. l
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L F. Emergency Comununications _.i STATE: Overall point-to-point communications capabilities were adequate and back-up radio systems were good, but a number of specific deficiencies were identified, including: Overload of the limited telephone capacity at CRUSH and IAC within the - ELE. However, Nebraska did demonstrate the arrangamments and capabili-ties to augment the number of telephones in the IAC. _ Need for additional telephone service to accommodate the media at the MRC.
- . . Need to improve both state and local discipline during exercises to designate (by preface and close) all exercise messages with terms indi-cating that they are for exercise use only.
Need to bgtter identify individual messages. LOCAL: Generally a very good communications capability, including 24-hour coverage, was shown to exist.- Backup radio comununications were actually needed at Fremont and
-worked well. The Douglas County REACT Communications team reported to the Wash-.
ington County EOC s.nd provided good support, and also provided similar support to Dodge County EOC. The Washington County EOC internal communications will be improved once the EOC is completed. Some delay in communication between Washing-
. ton County and the CRUSH occurred due to telephone overload, but the state radio backup worked well. A major problem appeared when the Washington County ambulance responding to the simulated injury at the FCNPP could not comununicate with the FCNPF, the Omaha Fire Dispatch, or the University of Nebraska Medical Center, ch'un a common radio frequency appears needed.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
- 7. Provide additional telephone service for the CRUSE, and the MRC as indicated
-above.
8. Improve message identification and proper exercise designation procedures by providing date-time-group sad numbers and assure proper message exercise designation during future exercises and drills. l l 9. l Take steps to provide for comunications capability (comanon frequencies) between Washington County emergency service vehicles and the FCNPP, and spe-cifically medical response vehicles to also include the Omaha Fire Dispatch i Center and the University of Nebraska Medical Center in Omaha. I l i
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.. G. Public Education and Information STATE:
The State EOC:in Lincoln did not receive copies of the press releases from the MRC. The IAC appeared to function wel1~under somewhat crowded conditions. EBS J= releases were simulated. but apparently would work well under actual conditions. 4 The' EOF needs' to have the capability to monitor radio and TV releases. An excellent pamphlet was' developed by the OPPD and mailed ' to the public. How-
- .. ever, the mailing was apparently not entirely comple,ted prior to the exercise.
The MRC was effectively used and demonstrated a quick reaction with a "real l- . release" to reassure the~ public that radio transinissions overheard were for an
. exercise, not an actual incident. Cooperation among the two state Pios and the OPPD PIO at the NRC .was outstanding. Rapport with the media was. excellent. All MRC staff took their functions seriously and professionally. The EOC Director,
-Bob 0'Brien provided full support to the PI effort. However, a ntsaber of improve-ments at the MRC appear necessary to improve its operations, including:
Greater caution must be applied to differentiate between exercises and actual events. Copy was not always adequately labelled " Exercise Only". . Available duplication equipment was not utilized, as a result no hard copy was provided to the media. At times apparent duplication of effort occurred between the states and the OPPD, when a ' joint news release would have sufficed. + All news releases should be issued from the MRC, or cleared beft r_e '
- release.
News briefings should be more formally structured as opposed to the question-and-answer format used. The technical spokesperson generally dominated the briefings rather than supporting them. ' Rumor control arrangements were very good, but no provisions were made for publicizing the public phone number- . Facilities were adequate, but could have been better utilized. For j example, the PIO staff for OPPD and the states could use the central EOC room for preparation (in private); the adjoining communications room could be designated for NRC and the County Surveyor's office for FDfA. [ Also the basement warehouse space could be provided for the media work area, and finally, the legislative chamber could be used for press briefings for large groups. I News briefings should be scheduled on a regulse basis (adjusted as the j emergency conditions warrant) and kept to a strict time schedule. Radios and TVs should be provided for all PIO agencies far monitoring [... 5 t e. purposes. ' l\ / i
. Additional ~ dedicated telephone service is needed for media use.
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, LOCAL:
1 V Wa'shington County EOC had no means to monitor radio and TV releases. Also, the MRC did not provide the county PIO with releases. There was some expression by the county officials that the MRC is too far away. While the Blair Central School has been designated as an alternate MRC, some (including observers) feel that it may likely become the main MRC if an actual incident occurs. The incom-plete dissemination of the excellent OPPD pamphlet was evident as not all of the local officials in Blair had seen it before the exercise.
. RECOMMENDATIONS:
- 10. Provide capability for the E0P, State, and local EOCs, and the MRC to moni-tor radio and TV releases, 11% Improve local-MRC interface, possibly by providing local representatives at the MRC who can maintain telephone contact with their jurisdictions.
- 12. Take steps to fully consider and implement, as deemed appropriate, the a improvements for the MRC as observed and suggested above (observations noted under " STATE"). \
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- 13. Consider the possibility of the designated alternate MRC at the Blair Central School becoming the main site!for interface with the media in an actual inci-dent, and take appropriate steps to enhance the facility for that eventual-ity.
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-.( - H. Emergency Facilities and Equipment
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STATE: The' State EOC at Lincoln has sufficient space which was well utilized. The For-ward Connand Post (CRUSH) was overcrowded but well utilized; however, it may prove inadequate during an actual emergency. The current FCNPP EOF space for y state staff was inadequate, but probably will be adequate when the new EOF is built.. The MRC facility was described under Section G.
. p. The State Radiation Health radiological equipment was inadequate. Basic moni-toring instrumentation was either not available or not available in sufficient quantity. Some of the equipment was borrowed.from other state agencies, thus
.may noc always be available in an actual emergency. Much of the needed labora-tory equipment is inoperable (see Section C) indicating that field sample analy-sis cannot be made.
LOCAL: s Local EOC facilities at Washington County and Fremont were adequate. Improve-ments are underway at the Washington County EOC including construction of a m communications room. Primary map displays at the Washington Cdunty were adequate and heavily used. No status board was available, but this apparently did not significantly impair emergency operations because of the tightly knit official-staff relationship. The hosting, registration and congregate care facilities in Fremont were good and appeared to be well organized.
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. RECOMMENDATIONS:
, - .s.,
- 14. Steps should be immediately taken to provide adequate radiological equipment
' for the State Radiation Health team's and laboratory support, without which the accident accessme'.t functions cannot be carried out.
- 15. Washington County should continue to complete its EOC facility, provide a status board, and make provision for posting of the four classifications as they occur, in order to improve on its already good performance.
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I. Accident Assessment STATE: Accident assessment calculations were done well, but were sometimes slow as the one person making them was overloaded with related tasks, including conference
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calls, field team control, calls to the State EOC, etc. A second person is . required at this position. A major problem is that the field monitors lack necessary equipment. Basic moni-
. toring instrumentation was either not available or available in insufficient quantity. Some of the equipment was borrowed from other state agencies, and therefore may not always be available for use in an actual emergency. - Much needed laboratory equipment is inoperable or in need-of repair. As a result, no field sample analysis can be performed. No central point was established for sample collection or record keeping.
Radiological Health teams were somewhat slow in mobilizing; this includes the merging of the state teams with the team from the Cooper power station. Commu-nication with the field teams was good most of the time, although a few prob-less with blank locations occurred. It was felt that the direction and utili-zation of the field teams could be improved. 1 LOCAL: Local jurisdictions have ministan accident assessment responsibilities in accord-7,, ance with the plans. RECO)MENDATION:
- 16. The Nebraska Division of Radiation Health needs to improve its operations, including providing an assistant to the primary staff person at the EOF, '
better direction and utilization of the field monitoring teams, and providing more rapid information to the state and local EOCs. l i t l i I s"' % V i 17 -
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2 J. Protective Response fN . v STATE: Response actions were ordered promptly by the state based upon information pro-vided by the FCNPP. The only dairy herd in the area was sheltered. However, protective actions that were recommended were not followed up by state field measurement confirmation in a timely manner - apparently waiting for the , scenario times.- In this. exercise, . protective actions for the general public were limited to sheltering. LOCAL:
, i Receipt of protective response information from the state (CRUSH) appeared to be very slow.- - This also reflects to the general lack of current information on the overall situation provided to the local EOC. Local response for taking protective
. actions was carefully considered, appropriately decided upon, and well organized.
Although evacuation was not. called for in the scenario for this exercise, a ; successful demonstration of the capability to receive and process evacuees took l place in Fremont. However, a similar demonstration at Bellevue was not scheduled
- to take' place in this exercise. The Fremont High School was op4ned to serve as a shelter. Several local volunteers from Fremont were processed. All procedures were demonstrated including the monitoring of evacuees for possible contamination.
This procedure included provisions for disposal of cone ==inated clothing, taking of showers, and covering up with a white coverup wrap (supplied by the Red Cross).
-; There was a nurse present who checked the overall health condition of each ;
j registraut.. All personnel involved appeared knowledgeable of their responsibilities and - capable of carrying them out. While not observed, transportation for moving - evacuees to shelters was reported to be provided by school buses (if needed to supplement the private vehicles of the evacuees). A status board showing the ! . assignment-of evacuees from the Registration Center to specific shelters was not , in evidence, but the observer was told that one will be available. [ RECOMMENDATIONS:
- 17. Provision should be made for more rapid provision of current information from the. state to local EOCs, particularly for preparing for the ta'cing of protective actions (see also Recounsendation 16).
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- 18. See Reconumendation 5. t f
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P K. Radiological Exposure Control i: ' STATE: . Potassium Iodide (KI) was made available to the field monitoring teams, but not to the aerial monitoring teams. Field team dosimetry was handled well, self-reading and permanent record dosimeters were used, dose records were kept, and periodic readings were ordered. The field monitoring teams did not consider protective actions (e.g. use of protective clothing) while monitoring, although unnecessary since the scenario did not exact a full range of protective actions. Decontamination of the field monitoring teams was not well carried out. Poor
. procedures were utilized and contamination would not have been effectively con-tained. The US 30 bridge over the Missouri River was closed successfully on the Nebraska side, but this action was not coordinated with Iowa.
t LOCAL: Dosimeters were issued at the Washington County EOC and recorded. Return record-ings were not observed. Traffic control measures were well devised by the EOC staff, with each traffic control point designated and later adjusted as the situation changed. However, no emergency vehicles were dispatched to actually man traffic control points. (
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RECG9tENDATIONS:
- 19. Aerial Monitoring teams should be provided with a special kit which includes KI, protective clothing, etc. (See also Recomunendation 14.)
- 20. Access control measures taken by one state should be carefully coordinated
.. with the other for areas comanon to both.
- 21. Training and drills should be conducted on field' team decontamination pro-cedures.
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L. Medical and Public Health Support STATE AND LOCAL: The exercise provided the opportunity to test procedures for the care and trans-port of an injured person exposed to radiation. The patient was cared for and transported from the FCNPP to the University of Nebraska Medical Center (UNMC) in Omaha. The activity was carried out successfully, but a number of signifi-cant problems were identified including: Lack of communications capability between the Washington County ambu-lance, the FCNFP, Omaha Fire Dispatch Center, and the Medical Center. Need for major training for personnel at the FCNPP, rescue squad, and the Medical Center for treatment of such patients. Some deficiency of local specialized rescue equipment for such patients. Local ambulance almost too small to handle such patients together with necessary attendent equipment and personnel.
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Additional needs include the need for more drills - probably on a quarterly basis for pacient evacuation and treatment. A protocol may need to be done or redone. Also, there is a need for a person to be trained to serve as a public health liaison staff person at the Washington County Eoc.
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4 O P. Radiological Emergency Response Planning STATE AND LOCAL: Most of the participants seemed familiar with and satisfied with the existing radiological response plans, which were developed by the State Civil Defense Agency (and jointly with affected local governments). Some refinements to
, existing plans probably are needed based on this exercise. One specific change
- is necessary to reflect the utilization of supporting monitoring teams from other nuclear power facilities within the state.
RECOMMENDATION: (See Recommendation.3 which refers to radiological emergency response planning).
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. ,. .V. EVALUATIWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - IOWA s
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- A. Assinament of Responsibility (Organization Control)
STATE:
' The State EOC demonstrated a capability to mobilize for emergency in accordance '
with existing plans. Each organization reported, appeared knowledgeable of responsibilities,. and carried out roles as the scenario required. Support by the Governor and state officials was considered adequate by exercise observers.
'However, it appears that-there was not enoueh stress placed on state agency activities, as'some state agency representatives at the State EOC indicated a ;
lack of meaningful activity during the exercise. Finally, there is a need for ! logical. emergency response - perhaps by the use of trained state employees - directly assisting local government officials. M: The Harrison County Radiological Emergency Response Plan was incomplete (e.g., insufficient guidance on requirements to respond to developing emergency classi-fication levels as specified in NUREG-0654). Further, the existing plans apper-l ently had not been disseminated to responsible staff members and field elements. t Therefore, knowledge concerning assigned responsibilities was limited. This- t detracted from the offective participation of the fev Harrison County officials l in'this. exercise. In addition to completing the basic plan, Harrison County needs detailed SOPS and implementation checklists to aid officials in assuring
, , that appropriate actions are taken. + .L' ) _
l 7 Early direction and control was adequate at Pottawattrale County, but was reported !
- ineffective later in the day. The local officials reported to the EOC and were l
~ appropriately briefed as a result of the SITE EMERGENCY condition. When it became obvious that the plume would not affect Pottawattamie County, the EOC
- I staff was told that they c'ould leave the EOC by the Civil Defense Coordinator, and that they would be contacted later if conditions should warrant. This occurred prior ~ to declaration of GENERAL IMERGENCT. While'the scenario did not
. impose a large response effort upon the county, these officials were never sub-
[ sequently informed of the GENERAL IMERGENCY situation which could have been a l' serious problem in a real incident, particularly if there had been a shift in 4 the wind direction. The organizational control over the commurications center L was weak. Most actions taken were suggested and/or accomplished by the state < representative on the scene. ' Effective coordination among local governsent agencies was not adequately demonstrated. There was a good demonstration of the reception and care capabilities by the host area; Crawford County'and the City of Denison. A token group of simulated
. evacuees were properly cared for, and the officials and workers carried out I
their assigned duties in accordance with existing plans.
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Most of the local jurisdictions did not demonstrate a capability for 24-hour c protracted operations by conducting a full shift change. Support by officials . also varied among the local jurisdictions. In Harrison County, participation by elected officials probably would have enhanced the effectiveness of this exer-(% cise. Involvement by local officials in the decision-making process was gener-l V ally inadequate in Pottawattamie County and non-existent in Harrison County.
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- --( RECOMMENDATIONS:
'f 4 2. Local government radiological emergency response plans should be completed and taproved in the light of experience in'thic exercise. Sufficient copies should be distributed to responsible' officials (elected and assigned),
including provision for training of all concerned in their assigned roles,
so that appropriate measures will be taken to protect the public when necessary.
- 3. Additional experience and/or training drills are recoammended for all emer-gency response personnel in order to improve direction and control proced-ures and increase staff familiarization with the plans and procedures.
- 4. In futura exercises, each local jurisdiction should demonstrate a clear capability to function on a 24-hour basis for an extended time by replacing all personnel during the exercise, and by briefing all incomlng personnel to bring them quickly up-to-date and provide continuity of operations.
- 5. Increased state support of local governments in the EPZ is required.
- Support should occur during both the emergency operation phase and the training and planning phases of radiological response. ',
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r-B. On-Site Emersency Ornanization
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(- Section B, NUREG 0654/FDfA REP-1, pertains only to licensee responsibilities for emergency response and is not included in the exercise evaluation of state and local plans. O
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9 9 e 6 S T 96 C. Emergency Response Support and Resources STATE: The Iowa State EOC and other state support and resources met or exceeded the standards. Agencies responded at the State EOC in a timely manner. Most state agencies exhibited a capability to operate on a protracted basis. However, ODS o did 'not and could not demonstrate such operations due to lack of staff. IRAP assistance was successfully requested. , LOCAL: In Harrison County emergency response support and resources were lacking and not demonstrated. The City of Council Bluffs (outside the 10-mile EPZ) and the private sector (pri-marily the utilities) were well represented in the Pottawattamie County EOC. However, that portion of the county contained in the 10-mile EPZ was not ade - quately represented. Conspicuously absent was the County Sheriff and representa- ; tion from the County Board of Supervisors. Requested health physics support i from OPPD worked well. This individual served as a temporary, rad team coord-inator until the designated Team Leader arrived from Iowa City.- RECOMMENDATION: ~~ '
- 6. The ODS staff must have a capsbility to operate on a protracted basis.
This might be accomplished 1through augmentation from other agencies, by increasing the ODS regular staff (also see Recommendation # 5), or a com-
,, bination of these two.
- 7. Organizations,/which can be relied *upon for assistance, should be identified and included in future exercises in Harrison County.
- 8. Those officials responsible for the portion of Pottawartamie County within the 10-mile EPZ must be represented in the County EOC for effective decision-making.
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s D. Emergency Classification System
.l STATE:
. All parties at the State EOC correctly used the emergency classification system.
LOCAL: Knowledge of the standard emergency classification levels and relevant actions ' to be taken was not demonstrated in Harrison County. The terms SITE EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY were never displayed for the information and guidance of the staff dt the EOC. Except for the Civil Defense Director of Pottawattamie County, there was no , evidence of knowledge of the procedures consistent with the emergency level classification system. Staff participants were unfsmiliar with the signifi-cance of the various action levsls. RECOMMENDATIONS: s
- 9. Checklists and SOPS should be developed k'ayed to the emergency classifica-
, tion system that can be used for the famillarization of key officials, as well as in actual emergency conditions.
- 10. Provisions should be made for posting the emergency classifications, as they occur, in a prominent place within each local EOC.
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E. Notification Methods and Procedures
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,. STATE: ,
Notification, mobilization, and response of state personnel was effectively accomplished t2 sing telephones and the Iowa Warning and Alerting System (IWAS). The state staff reported to the EOC promptly with the exception of the Depart-
~ .- ment of Environmental Quality (DEQ) representatives, who were'an hour late.
LOCAL:
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Notifications in Harrison County were routinely transmitted, but no follow-up occurred when only a few members of the emergency staff reported. The sheriff simulated alerting the public upon receipt of the notification of UNUSUAL EVENT (prematurely) apparently without coordinating with the local civil defense director, reflecting the lack of familiarity with the appropriate procedures ~ based upon the emergency classifications. . At Pottawattamie County, public notification was not simulated: Upon question-ing by observers, the director stated that he assumed this was to be accomplished by the utility or Nebraska. -Notification of the emergency personnel was adequate initially, but not followed up. Prescribed written messages were used only once, toward the . conclusion of the exercise, and not for timely release of information to.the public. RECOMMENDATIONS: < / 11. Notification, alerting, and mobilizations of 6fficial. and staff, as
'_ , well as the notification of the general public (simuluted or actual) should be better demonstrated in future exercises.
- 12. In a developing radiological emergency, emphasis should be given go the importance of appropriate follow up actions after each change in the emer-gency classification.
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1 F, Emergency Communications STATE: Apparently the " Hot Line" between the FCNPP, and Nebraska and Iowa worked well, as did the IWAS, although there was little communication observed between State-level and County-level activities. LOCAL:
?Conununicationsoperatorswerenotawareofthesignificanceofthe" Hotline" in Pottawattamie County. Coumanications support to the radiation monitoring teams was provided by Pottawattamie County through the Sheriff's office and worked well'. The console operators within the Pottawattamie County Consnunication Center took messages from the field teams directly, although some problems occurred due to the lack of knowledge of pertinent technical terms by the commu-nications personnel. In the communications center, utilization of message forms and message handling procedures was inadequate and there was no message control.
There was little interaction between the Civil Defense Director and the connuni-cations center. There was no inter-county consnunication observed..
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At Harrison County there was no communication between County and the FCNPP because the " Hot Line" link has not been installed. There was also a lack of communications between the State EOC and the. County EOC. As a result, the County EOC did not receive information concerning wind direction and speed, amount of radiation release, or the order to take protective. action (shelter) . Also, there was no coordination with Pottawattamie County or the State of Nebraska. What consnunications were received from the state came through Crawford County (in
.]. accordance with State-County communications systems, but not in accordance with the plans).-.The EOCs in both counties had insufficient telephones for conduct-ing such emergency operations.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
- 13. A " Hot Line link should be established between the FCNPP and the local governments within the plume EPZ, especially Harrison County.
- 14. .Both Harrison and Pottawattamie Counties' communications personnel need additional training on utilization of existing systems related to nuclear power plant incidents, including familiarity with appropriate terminology associated with such incidents.
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G. Public Information and Education
-i.
. STATE:
! The handling of public information at the state-level was adequate. A state representative was present at the MRC in Omaha. Four press releases concerning
; the exercise were made, and TV coverage was allowed in the EOC. Press releases
.- . were simulated on EBS which provided continuing shelter information to the public.
LOCAL: h It was reported that the excellent public information pamphlet prepared by the j OPPD was distributed to all homes in the plume EPZ. Nevertheless, there was a
; lack of guidance to the public during the exercise and no prearrangements (e.g.,
canned news releases) were made. No point of contact was established for the media in Pottawattamie County. The Director gave uncoordinated briefings over the telephone, without referring the media representatives to the MRC. In Harrison County, guidance to the public concerning the emergency situation was lacking. s RECOMMENDATIONS:
- 15. Clarification of the public information interface between the State of Iowa, the local jurisdictions within the plume EPZ, and the Media Release Center
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(MRC) in Omaha is necessary. Since' the affected population resides in the Omaha media area (local TV, radio, newspapers, etc.), it would appear that all public information releases should be focused at the MRC rather than from the State PIO at a place as distant as Des Moines. 16.~ Provide capability for the state and local ~~OCs.to monitor radio and TV releases. , l l l (._ i I . l- !
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~H. Emergenev Facilities and Equipment
-_3 STATE:
The State EOC in Des Moines was adequate to conduct emergency operations.~ No dedicated space was allocated to the Radiation Team coordinator at the Potta-wattamie County EOC. He operated from inside the communications center but with
- no area for maps or plotting of field data. The Radiation Team Coordinator was overloaded in attempting to direct the field team, plot data, communicate with the State EOC and the utility, and prepare. dose calculations based on the field
- o. ; data.
LOCAL: .
... Both County EOCs provided marginal capability to conduct such emergency opera-tions.
Space is designated for the Pottawattamie County EOC, but deficiencies included: Space undeveloped and poorly arranged !
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Poor linkage between communications and operations areas
- No status boards and inadequate maps
- No telephones available for operations personnel
- No space for_ Rad Team Coordinator The Harrison County EOC failed to meet minimum standards; deficiencies included:
Insufficient operating space for the staff - No situation board or other displays such as maps Weak message control Insufficient telephones j; RECOMMENDATIONS:
- 17. Both Harrison and Pottawattamie Counties should provide adequate emergency operations-facilities and commiun& cations-to support the emergency response.
- 18. In addition to providing adequate facilities, both Harrison and Pottawattamie
. Counties should. equip their EOCs with appropriate displays and train the-personnel in their use. Specifically,'a status board should be designed < -and provided for each EOC. It should provide a means to retain a record of key events and/or problems, showing at a minimum (1) the time of the event,
-(2) description statemen::, (3) where the responsibiltiy is assigned (e.g.,. ~
local department or agency), and (4) time when the action is completed. t Standardized maps and other displays should be developed and made a require- !~ 3 ment.-(covered with Plastic for ease of change of condition). l 1_/
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~ ' ' .; - 19. An adequate dedicated position should be developed in Pottawattamie County is for the Radiation Team Coordinator. Sufficient space needs to be provided for proper displays and maps *to allow data plotting.
- 20. The Radiation Team Coordinator needs assistance to relieve him of the burden of communications so that he may concentrate on his primary task of team management and data acquisition.
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I. Accident Assessment n
-v STATE:
The State, primarily through the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), demonstrated an acceptable capability for providing methods, equipment, and expertise for rapid assessment of real or potential radiological hazards during this simulated incident. This included activation, notification, transporta-tion, communications, and monitoring equipment. While the exercise objective utilizes both the University of Iowa and Iowa State radiation monitoring teams, bad weather prevented the transportation of the University of Iowa team to the exercise (via State ?atrol aircraf t). The Iowa State team was quickly pressed into service and a health physicist from the utility called in for support until the Team Coordinator could obtain commercial transportation from Iowa City. The transition from the utility representative to the Team Leader. functioned smoothly. There was some delay in receipt of monitoring data, which came in by conference. call and hamperedsuas of the computer by the DEQ personnel. Local jurisdictions have a minimal role in accident assessment except to provide communications' support to the field monitoring teams. However,1 radiological information was not provided to local jurisdictions in any form during this exercize. RECOMMENDATIONS:
- 21. Procedures should be developed for providing essential radiological infor-
_ ,, nation to each County EOC so that the County Radiological Defense Officers, where they exist, can follow and interpret the radiological situation and
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be in a position to advise local officials of likely or pending decisions, and explanations for protective actions.-
- 22. The conference call system for data transmission should be examined care-fully. A better system may be available for the timely transmission of monitoring data.
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J. Protective Response rs
. STATE:
During the exercise the state demonstrated a capability to make appropriate
- decisions regarding protective actions based on the simulated emergency des-cribed in the scenario.
LOCAL:
, At Pott'awatt'amie County, the limited protective response activities were accept-able. The only actions required, based upon the scenario, for this exercise was the closing of the water works as a result of a simulated release of material from FCNPP into the Missouri River which is the source of the . local water supply.
In addition to closing the water works (and monitoring the situation), a notice was provided to the public requesting water conservation. As a result of unfamiliarity with the plans and the protective actions that should be taken under various emergency classifications, the response in Harrison County was minimal. This was compounded by the lack of essential information concerning sector population, direction of the plume, etc. \ s A fine demonstration of host area activities was ccaducted at Denison in Crawford County. A dozen people had volunteered to simulate evacuees and were processed at the Denison High School.' They were met by. law enforcement personnel, directed to the rear area of the parking lot where their cars were monitored for contamin-
' ation, and then directed to specific parking areas. . Evacuees were separated by sex, tested for contanination, then underwent appropriate decontamination measures,
', followed by registration and shelter assignment. .All emergency personnel had been issued dosimeters and emergency protective clothing. Arrangements had been made to carry on a 24-hour operation. C'redit for the fine demonstration is due to 'the joint activity by the County Civil Defense Director, and the Iowa Stata Health Department. Local participants included personnel from the Department of Social Services and the Red Cross. As a sideline, one of the evacuees simult_ed a heart attack and was rushed to the local hospital; another simulated radia ion poisoning.
RECOMMENDATION: f 23. Both Harrison and Pottawattamie Counties need to gain additional experience l-through training and future exercises in order to achieve improvement in procedures and greater faniliarization with plans, in order to provide effective response. I L I l,A L '~
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K, Radiological Expoeure Control STATE:- State-level exposure control activity was not observed. LOCAL: In Pottawattamie County the Sheriff's Deputies were not equipped with dosimeters and appeared _to have no knowledge of exposure control matters, even though it is
, part of their role to accompany the radiation monitoring teams in the field to assist with communications. The scenario did not provide the need for other exposure control measures in the county. Harrison County demonstrated a total
' lack of knowledgg of exposure control measures. The Sheriff was not aware of traffic control responsibilities. Closing of the Blair bridge by Nebraska was not cocrdinated with Harrison County, which caused a problem.
RECOMENDATION:
- 24. All local jurisdictions should participate more fully in exposure control measures and develop required capabilities. At a minimum, the following
.should occur: (1) issuing dosimeters to emergency workers; (2) establish-
.ing roadblocks (although not actually impeding traffic); and (3) making preparations for the use of KI by emergency workers.
- 25. Access control measures taken~by one state should be carefully coordinate'd with the other state for areas common to both.
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L, Medical and Public Health Support STATE AND LOCAL: There was no obsarvation of any State-level activity. County Health Directors in both Pottawattamie and Harrison Counties did not participate. In P'ottawattamie County, the Jennie Edmundson Hospital is the primary faci'.ity designat.eo in the plan :.o. treat personnel with radiation injuries, and the Cass
~ County Memorial Hospital in Atlantic is the alternate facility. However, the . Edmundson Hospital had no plan and did not know that they were designated.
The Cass County Hospital does have a plan, but because of its size, has limited resources. It appeared that the Edmundson Hospital staff had little or no train-ing-in radiation injuries and no dedicated space to treat such patients. RECOMMENDATIONS:
- 26. Appropriate plans and procedures should be developed concerning medical facilities and the interface with local governments for handling and trans-porting radiation-injured patients. This should involve the County Health Departments, the State Health Department, local Civil Defense Directors, and local rescue and ambulance services. 1
- 27. Future exercises should contain sufficient medical activity related to nuc-lear accident incidents to involve local health agencies and one or more designated local hospitals.
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., M. Reentrv and Recovery ST'TE:
A State-level reentry and recovery functions appeared to be acceptable. LOCAL: In both Harrison and Pottawattamie Counties there was no discussion or action taken involving recovery operations. In Crawford County, existing reentry plans
' are adequate, but this phase of operations was not demonstrated at the reception ,
center. RECOMMENDATION:
- 28. More emphaiss should be given to reentry and recovery activities in planning
_and training in future exercises, and the scenario should provide for appro-priate activity including, if possible, partial reentry (seme areas deter-uined clear earlier than others) as well as full reentry play. r
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N. Exercises and Drills STATE AND LOCAL: The scenario could have more thoroughly tested state and local capabilities. Prior knbwledge of scenario events by some of the participants did not appear to
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significantly impact on the demonstration, particularly at the local level where lack of preparedness and familiarization with the plans had a much greater impact. However, it was evident that the exercise provided significant benefits to the e participants, particularly the local jurisdictions where the lack of adequate preparations and response capability (except in Crawford County) was clearly dem-onstrated. . Also the exercise objectives were not delineated for local play. RECOMMENDATIONS:
- 29. A detailed review of all aspects of the exercise should be made so 'that par-ticipants can profit from the lessons learned, and take steps to rectify deficiencies to meet the standards. Some areas identified as needing drills include the person &l safety of field employees..(exposure control measures, requirements for dosimeters, and the use of KI) and review of evacuation procedures from areas such as the Desoto Bend Refuge where there is no shelter and the only protective measure is evacuation. t
- 30. Iowa State-level agencies should provide more exercise' support to local governments within the plume EPZ.
, 31. The scenario should be provided to the RAC for review and comment well in
(~, advance of an exercise to assure a realistic scenario that will adequately
~ stress the participating organizations. Actions to be simulated in the
= exercise should be identified in advance by the state and local. jurisdictions.
- 32. Exercise scenarios should also be closely guarded so that a realistic demon-stration of capabilities will occur.
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*s O. Radiological Emergency Response Training
' i ST1.TE: '
There were enough senior people at the Iowa State EOC.for two shifts; however, more trained people _ appear needed for a longer term situation and to provide more support for the local jurisdictions. LOCAL:
, . ~There was a noticeable lack of training in familiarity with radiological matters and emergency response plans by the officials and staff in several locations.
Evidence of basic ragiological emergency response training was not shown in
-Harrison County, and'while the Civil Defense Director of Pottawattamie County has attended training courses, there was little apparent evidence of transmit-tal of his knowledge to the officials and staff. Lack of participation of Health Department personnel in both counties precluded observation of their
. capabilities, but training needs were evident for backup medical facility per-sonnel. s RECOMMENDATION: (See also Recommendations 3, 11, 17, 19, and.25) 1
- 33. Appropriate familiarization and skills training and support in radiological matters and the emergency response plans should be provided by the state to local officials and emergency services (police, fire, rescue, highway, etc.)
personnel. 4 9 1 1 1 I~
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P. _ Radiological Emergency Resoonse Planning STATE AND LOCAL: Local radiological emergency response plans are not complete, and the over-all state planning support to the local governments in the EPZ appears to need a rigoroue review.- There is a major need for detailed procedures or checklists at Harrison and Pottawattamie Counties, as none were in evidence durinr; the exercise.
- RECOMMENDATION:
- 34. Priority should be given to developing and improving radiglogical emergency response plans and procedures together with efforts to assure familir.rity with these plans by all affected jurisdictions and emergency response per-sonnel by conducting appropriate training and exercises.
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l e FINAL REPORT 1 Evaluation of the Implementation of Iowa and Nebraska State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the {~ Ft. Calhoun Nuclear Station Exercise Conducted September 15, 1982 l Prepared by Federal Emergency Management Agency Region VII l f30 8 l[ <b2 af3
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(, D I. INTRODUCTION A. ' A radiological emergency exercise was conducted on September 15, 1982, to evaluate the adequacy of State and local emergency plans and response
. capabilities in Iowa and Nebraska in the event of an emergency at the Ft.
.Calhoun Nuclear Station. The plans evaluated included the Iowa Emergency Plan,' the Harrison County. Radiological Emergency Response Plan, the
, Pottawattamie County Radiological Faergency Response Plan, the Nebraska Radiological Emergency Response Plan, and the Washington County Radiological Emergency Response Plan.
The exercise was conducted ' jointly by Omaha Public Power District, the States of Nebraska and Iowa and associated local governments. Observations and evaluations of the e=ercise were performed by members of the Region VII Regional Assistance Committee, FEMA Regional staff, and qualified Federally-contracted evaluators. The following is a complete list of evaluators, their agency affiliations, and their evaluation assignments: Eval'uator Agency Assignment ' i S. Ferris TEMA Iowa State EOC M. Carroll FEMA Pottawattamie Co. EOC R. Leonard FEMA Harrison Co. EOC S. Kinser FEMA Washington Co. EOC R. Baer NRC Iowa Field Team W. Brinck EPA Iowa RAD Coor. J. Meyers DOT' Iowa FCP
- M. Cres's DOT Iowa FCP J. Nagel ANL Pottawattamie Co.<EOC R. Hotizman ANL Washington Co. EOC C. Saricks ANL EOF /IAC L. Hoffman INEL Iowa Field Team G. Kaszynski ANL Media Release Center K. Lerner ANL Iowa State EOC B. An exit ' interview was conducted with the participants at 10:00 a.m.,
September 16, 1982, in the Federal Building in Council Bluffs, Iowa. Details of the evaluators' findings were presented at this exit interview. ! A public briefing was conducted at the same location at 2:00 p.m. the same day. At this briefing, highlights of the exercise evaluators' findings were
. presented by both the RAC Chairman and NRC Team Leader. State and local officials were invited to participate in the briefing; though present, they declined direct involvement.
C. This report represents the findings of the evaluators specific to the objectives identified in Attachments 1 and 2. l D. This report shall be provided to the States of Iowa and Nebraska in order that they may act on the recommendations contained herein to improve the emergency response capabilities of both State and local governments. l
- . - . . . . - - _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . . _ . . . _ - . _ . _ . , - - - _ . _ , _ . . . - . . . . . _ . , _ . . . ~ _ - . _ _ , _ . . _ . - - . . . _ . , - . . - . . - - . ~ .
II. EXECUTIVE SUMMt.RY The exercise of September 15, 1982, was the "second round" for both Iowa and 4 Nebraska under the provisions of NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP-1 at the Ft. Calhoun
. facility.
Nebraska chose to play the exercise "small scale" as defined in 10 CFR 50; they
* ,- had participated " full scale" ~at the Cooper Nuclear Station exercise conducted
.in March, 1982. The limited Nebraska State and local objectives are identified in Attachment 2. No major deficiencies were identified.
Iowa State and local participation was " full scale"; all levels of government
,. participated to the maximum possible under the provisions of the exercise objectives and the scenario. No major. deficiencies were identified during the exercise.
The following examples of excellent performance were observed during the exercise.
\
- 1. Interstate coordination '
- 2. Appropriate protective actions based on actual field measurements 3 Utilization of personnel 4 Professionalism of field monitoring teams
- 5. ParticipaP. ion of appointed and elected officials While no major deficiencies were noted, some general areas for improvement were.
identified during exercise.
- 1. Need for greater involvement by local government in direction and ~
- control and decision making. -
( l 2.- Improvement in local government operating facilities which are presently l .under construction in each county. I Both Iowa State and local plans need to be updated to include the 3 present (demonstrated) concepts of operations. Special comment must be made concerning the exercise scenario. The events, developed by the utility,_did not sufficiently involve off-site authorities to l1 fully demonstrate the designed off-site objectives. (e.g., no off-site l- radiation release was planned even though some Iowa cue cards indicated a
.significant release.) The detailed scenario, with sufficient information to 1 evaluate its potential to off-site participants, was not received by the FEMA ,
Regional Office prior to the exercise.
! )
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. . - . . _ . . - . , _ . _ . _ _ _ , _ _ . . . ~ _ . _ _ _ . _ . . _ . . _ - . . . _ _ _ _ _ - _ . . - - _ _ _ . . - . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . - _ _
-m l
Despite the scenario deficiencies, State and local authorities performed well; reacting to developing events in a realistic manner in accordance with existing plans. With the exception of some areas for improvement noted in Part IV of this report, both states met the objectives that they were able to demonstrate under the scenario constraints. Both Iowa and Nebraska demonstrated that there exists a reasonable assurance that preparedness around the Ft. Calhoun facility is sufficient to protect public health and safety. e a e
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III. EVALUATION A. IOWA
- 1. Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources
~
Objective: a. Demonstrate adequate communications between emergency o response facilities and field activities.
- b. Demonstrate coordinated communications with the utility by State and. County authorities.
State: Communications between the State EOC and field activities was accomplished by a conference telephone arrangerent with Harrison County and Pottawattamie
' County. Notification of State government was accomplished by the utility using a dedicated line and coastercial telephone. All systems functioned effectively with the exception of the conference line to Harrison County.
This line was weak and difficult to understand, causing delays and misunderstanding of messages. The Natianal Guard communications operators had some difficulty in understanding message content directed to the State ECC from the utility over the dedicated line. The Forward Command Post,
^
located in Missouri Valley, had excellent communications with the
-[ respective agencies represented (National Guard, Conservation Commission and Department of Transportation and Highway Patrol) and the headquarters personnel.
Systems at the Harrison County EOC for communicating with the field team utilized a Sheriff's vehicle for radio contact with the Field Team Coordinator. Information on plant conditions was received from the facility by facsimile. The method was slow (30-45 minutes from declaration of a plant status change to receipt of the information by the Field Team
- Coordinator) . The result was that the field team was not kept informed of current plant conditions.
County l In Harrison County, communications systems were adequate to support the j operation with the dedicated line to the plant, the conference line to the State EOC and radio capability with field personnel. As indicated above, ! however, the conference line with the state was of poor quality. All lines l were terminated at instruments located on a single table in the Sheriff's ! Office. The physical arrangement of the telephones resulted in overcrowding i and poor utilization of available space. (see below) . [ In Pottawattamie County the communications with the facility and the State EOC functioned smoothly via the dedicated line and the conference telephone, respectively. _ lf CBJECTIVE: Demonstrate the existence of adequate emergency facilities and y equipment to support response efforts.
i ' .D ' State
- The State EOC has adequate space. Noise levels are reasonably low with a good working environment. Security was clearly demonstrated by limiting access to one entrance, posting of a guard, the use of sign in/out procedures, and badges for all participants.
., Internal communications and displays were lacking in the following manner:
- a. emergency action levels were not posted where they could be seen by participants-i
- b. No person was assigned the task-of updating the status board.
- c. Sector maps of the EPZ did not have preplotted information (e.g.
r evacuation routes, radiological monitoring points, or population distribution). The"FCP had aaps of the EPZ, but none of the pre-designated Information was - l- plotted. County In Harrison County the potentially adequate operations room was used
- 3. sparingly due to the placement of all communications equipment downstairs in y the Sheriff's Office. Space in the operations room was adequate to accommodate expected staff loads; it was well lighted and ventilated, as l well. Displays and maps were lacking as follows:
- a. no status board
- b. emergency classification was not posted
- c. saps did not indicate necessary information (e.g., evacuation routes, monitoring points, traffic control points, or population i
distribution). No internal sessage handling procedures were used and no general briefing of participants was accomplished. In Pottawattamie County, the EOC working space was crowded for space. Maps i were displayed, but lacked the information listed above.
- 2. Alerting and Mobilization of Officials .
OBJECTIVE: Demonstrate the capability to alert and mobilize emergency
- response personnel.
? % .)
.- _ _ ~ . - - __
i L l n ! j i L State The State performed the alerting of response personnel in a timely fashion. A duty officer system and pagers to key agency personnel provides a 24-hour activation capability. The Field team arrived on the scene from Ames approximately three hours after notification (a reasonable period). ( The personnel staffing the liaison positions at the Harrison and l Pottawattamie County EOCs and the FCP staff were propositioned. Thus,
- alerting and mobilization of these personnel was not demonst' rated.
l ! County In Harrison County, the Sheriff notified emergency response personnel within 20 minutes. Wildlife Refuge Officers were not alerted as called for in the plan. No call list or written procedures was utilized. Staffing of the EOC was accomplished in a timely fashion. A In Pottawattamie County a cascade call system was used to notify response personnel. 3 Emersency Operations Management
~,. No specific exercise objectives were established to meet this evaluation
.[~'
v standard.
- 4. Public Alerting and Notification j' OBJECTIVE: Demonstrate prompt Notification system including public j alert, notification (full siren sounding), and the activation of the EmerFency Broadcast System.
State / County 1-l .The Iowa Plan calls for local activation of the fixed warning system I (sirens). This was accomplished in a timely manner. A message was l broadcast over the EBS station at the time of siren activation. This l- message was the standard explanation of siren testing used during the normal (
- testing cycle. According to the plan, informational EBS messages are l formulated at the State EOC and transmitted by facsimile to local government L for dissemination. This system functioned reasonable well during the exercise with one notable exception. The writing of the EBS message for the i
Site Area Emergency notification of the public took approximately 30 l ainutes. Since this message would have been the initial notification to the l public at siren activation (except during this exercise), the notification time would have been excessive. Additionally, the conversion of sector
- designations to those understood by the public is left to local officials to include in the EBS messages. This would add considerable delay to the broadcast of messages unless pre-defined conversions are provided in operating procedures (no such pre-definition has occurred).
V l
T __ Since a primary area of concern during the exercisas was the Wilson Island /DeSoto Bend region, transient population in this remote area presented a problem for -timely notification. The plans call for individual contact by park officers. Upon questioning, these officers stated that timely notification would be impossible without an aircraft fitted with PA _. capabilities.
'5 Public and Media Relations OBJECTIVE: a. Participate in the OPPD media release center.
- b. Demonstrate the ability to develop and issue applicable press releases.
State - The Iown representative at the media release center (MRC) in Omaha
. functioned well with the representatives from the State of Nebraska and
'OPPD. The information utilized by the Iowa PIO was sent via FAX free Des
- Moines. The only information available for use in his spokesperson role at
- the MRC was contained in the release itself. Because of the l'imited participation by the press, no questions on operations were asked of him.
However, more detailed knowledge should be given to the spokesperson on the overall extent of operations in Iowa for presentation to the media.
- 6. -Accident Assessment OBJECTIVES: a. Demonstrate the capability of local and state -
radiological control staffs to monitor environmental conditions and make appropriate recommendations to ECC decision makers.
- b. Demonctrate initiation, direction and control of radiological monitoring teams.
- c. Demonstrate plume tracking techniques by the radiological monitoring teams, including equipment operation, radiological measurements, environmental sampling and data reporting,
- d. Demonstrate dose assessment, dose projection and protactive action methodology.
[- j- State Because of a lack of transportation, only one field team was available' (from Iowa State University). The limited number made effective tracking of the plume impossible. However, this capability has been adequately demonstrated at previous exercise. l . i .a l
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Whole body cloud gamma readings were accurate and communicated and recorded in proper units. No generator was available to operate the air pump; i 1 therefore the capability to measure radiciodine in the field was lacking. I Technique, as described in field procedures, was analyzed by the evaluator and changes recommended directly to the State. i Calculations of dose projections from the field team coordinator were
-accomplished in a professional and timely fashion.
'- i
. No observed' integration of information by the State and utility field teams j -was observed.
- i
' 7. Actions to Frotect the Public OBIECTIVE: a. Demonstrate the capability to formulate and execute measures to protect the public.
- b. Damonstrate the capability of local jurisdictions to control access to areas potentially affected by off-site releases. \
\
State While .the utility did not recommend protective actions, the State identified, evaluated and recosumended evacuation of the population. The utility insisted that no release ever occurred, however, cue cards for the (-
~
Iowa field team clearly indicated high radioiodine concentrations. The field readings were accurately reported and correct dose projections made from those readings. Despite the utility's insistence that no release had occurred, the state made the app opriate protective action decision under L
. the circumstances. The decision was coordinated with Nebraska prior to its l- simulated implementation.
There were no actions taken once the decision had been made, however. The evacuation instructions were forimulated for public dissemination in the State EOC and transmitted to the County EOC where they stopped. Reception areas were not alerted for the expected influx of evacuees nor was any } public notification simulated. Protective actions for the ingestion pathway that should have been mandatory and automatic free the plan were not implemented even with the high radiciodine content of the release sensured in the field. No shift to stored feed or sampling of food products was observed. Sheriff's vehicles were observed at the traffic control points in Harrison ' and Pottawattamie Counties. J
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- 8. Health, Medical 'and Exposure Control No exercise . objectives were directed toward this element, however, certain actions were observed as part of the evaluation of the ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT
.. elements. The following are general observations of shortcomings:
- a. The field monitoring teams had both self-reading and permanent record dosimetry. However, they did not read them regularly (the plan
- 4. is lacking in this respect).
- b. KI was available for use by the field team only. The plan calls for its use by all emergency workers. ' The KI was in crystal fona.
. Team members were unaware of the proper dosage and the bottle was
. undated.
9 Recovery and Reentry Operations OBJECTIVE: Demonstrate de-escalation from the various emergency classifications. i s State / County The only observed activity was a termination message to EBS and activity by the field team coordinator to order soil and vegetation samples for reentry
'~s determinations. Since the scenario did not call for de-escalation, no off-site actions could be evaluated. Local officials received the EBS "close out" message and dismissed participants. No discussion of the relaxation of protective measures was accomplished.
-10. Relevance of the Exercise Experience The State and local participants demonstrated their capabilities as best as could be expected under the handicap of an inadequate scenario. Without the sistake on the field team cue card, the demonstration of many of the objectives of the exercise would not have been possible. As scenario events progressed very slowly, local officials grew bored and scoe terminated their i vesen esaturely.
.B.. NEBRASKA
'1. Emo -- cy Operations Facilities and Resources l OBJECTIVE: a. To test State and local communications.
l
- b. To test local communications and coordination with all involved agencies.
l
- c. To demonstrate activation of the local Emergency Operating Center.
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.e State / County Communications at State and local EOCs and the CRUSH were adequate to keep
. . all parties informed of the developing situation or the need to implement protective actions. . This exercise demonstrated improved telephone conference and facsimile capabilities over previous events.
The Information Authentication _ Center (IAC), located in the EOF, had only one' telephone line available for State personnel. This caused delays in the transmission of situation reports to local government. FAX messages were improperly numbered (unnumbered or out of sequence). This led to some confusion among staff members on the currency of information. As identified in the July, 1981 exercise report, the dual use of MRC telephone $ restricts the use of the communications systems. The emergency nubers are merely extensions of routine office numbers in the remainder of i the building, which allows routine business calls to be routed to the MRC facility. . 1 The Washington County ECC is presently under development. Full staffing, resulting from an actual emergenc;r, would tax the facility as it presently exists, but this would be alleviated with the final phase of construction.
~.
% 2. - Alerting and Mobilization of Officials ,
OBJECTIVE: a. To demonstrate state capability to deploy the State Field Command Post to include local and long-range communications,
- b. Demonstrate local capability for initial notification receipt and alerting of key personnel.
l State / County The deployment of the Field Command Post (CRUSH) was accomplished in a timely manner. Other notifications at the State and County levels were l ' observed by the Federal evaluators. . State notification to Federal response organizations on occurred as described in the State plan and were accomplished a timely manner. The Nuclear Accident Report forms were not always completed properly, e.g., no plant classification status, improper indication of release status and non-sequential nubering of messages. The PCP was not notified by the ' plant or the State EOC of the Site Area Bnergency. Likewise, they did not receive a General Emergency notification. i
- 1. s *%
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, . . . . . , . , - - . - , . - . . - ,- . . . . . . . - . _ . _ - . - , - . , , . . . - ~ . , . , _ . . - _ . . - . . . - _ . . . _ , . _ - . - _ . - . . - - _ - . - - . .
-e'* .*
i i- , 3 Emergency Operations Management
- No specific exercise objectives were established to test this evaluation standard. Generally, however, organizations (both State and local) functioned efficiently within the scope of the limited scenario. Support by
.- local officials was good (elected representatives from both county government and the City of Blair). Because of their level of participation, there was only a limited opportunity for local officials to demonstrate
, their knowledge _of planning responsibilities.
- 4. Public Alerting and Notification OBJECTIVE: a. To demonstrate the plume exposure pathway warning system and the state and local governments ability to activate it.
b'. To test mechanism for dissemination of public warning through the EBS System. State / County , Upon the declaration of the Site Area Emergency by the plant, hocal government activated the siren warning system and the EBS station (KFAB) was notified. While no actual broadcast was made the ability to activate the system in a timely manner was demonstrated. ex 5. Public and Media Relations .
' (-
OBJECTIVES: a. To desonstrate the state's ability to brief the media accurately and exped..tiously as to emergency status and infomation.
- b. To demonstrate State Civil Defense support for the IAC and MRC.
- c. Local demonstration of coordination of public infomation activities.
l State t Little coordination of actual releases to the public was accomplished among
- the Pios. Only information sharing occurred. Generally each PIO prepared a j separate release for each situation.
The plant PIO continually referred to herself as the " designated spokesperson for the MRC.* This violates the principle in the State plan that a government official shall speak for government operations. i I ll
.s County Local government officials stated that a radio should be available in the EOC to monitor EBS and other media broadcasts. Because no local ... representative was present at the IAC, the local PIO was to determine physical boundaries for the media release and transmit the information to the IAC. The lack of adequate telephone lines into the IAC made contact for , _ information verification difficult.
- 6. Accident Assessment No radiological monitoring activities or accident assessment functions were
. demonstrated during the exercise, f
- 7. Actions to Protect the Public Protective actions were recommended by the State after consultation with the plant and the State of Iowa. Conflicting reports on release status resulted in some confusion, but off-site officials took the conservation approach and ordered appropriate protective measures. *
- 8. Health, Medical and Exposure Control Dosimetry was provided to the Washington County staff only after the
(. t declaration of the General Emergency condition. Once issued no regular reading of the instruments was conducted. x,,
- 9. Recovery and Reentry Operations This aspects of emergency operations was not tested during the exercise.
- 10. Relevance of the Exercise Experience i
l The state and local participants demonstrated their capabilities as l described in the exercise objectives as well as possible under the limited f- handicap of an inadequate scenario. l I
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s- % ' V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT A._ IOWA State /Cunty
- 1. Communications' operators at all government levels should be trained on
., the use of reporting forms and terminology appropriate to REP emergency response.
- 2. Field personnel aust be kept appraised of changing plant conditions and status in order to accomplish necessary personnel protection.
- 3 Current ' emergency classification information should be posted in EOCs in a highly visible location.-
- 4. Maps and displays in EOCs should have pre-plotted data showing evacuation routes, radiological monitoring points and population distribution. Status boards should be kept current.
- 5. Telephones in the Harrison County EOC should be relocated to the second
- floor to better utilize available operational space. \
1
- 6. The formulation of the initial EBS public information message should be the responsibility of local government. This and other time sensitive notifications could be more quickly formulated by . local government utilizing the pre-written tomat in the plan. State involvement would
,vs. . , be accomplished, if necessary, through the telephone conference.
- 7. _ An adequate method of notifying transients in the Wilson Island /DeSoto r Bend recreational areas should be developed to provide timely alert and l
' notification. - An aircraft fitted with PA capabilities may be necessary
, to fulfill this ites.
- 8. The Iowa spokesperson should be given more detailed information
- concerning Iowa's response than is contained in the media releases themselves. _ This position. requires detailed knowledge of events and
. actions to adequately respond to media inquiries.
(~~ 9.. A minimum of two field monitoring teams are required.to track the plume. (see attached 4 for a detailed technique for such monitoring.) l
- 10. A generator to operate the field monitoring team air pump is needed.
- 11. Closer sharing ~of field team data between the utility and the Iowa Field Team Coordinator would facilitate accident assessment.
- 12. With the_ high iodine concentrations detected by the field monitoring team, automatic provisions of the plan for protecting the in6estion pathway, should have been 1m7. Jaented.
- 13. Pre-defined boundaries for physically describing the affected area of the EPZ would facilitate more rapid release of infomation to the public.
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- 14. Only operating concepts identified in the plans should be utilized during the exercise.
B. NEBRASKA State / County
. 1. Additional telephone lines are needed at the IAC.
- 2. Messages and Accident Report forms should be carefully numbered
, sequentially to avoid confusion on the currency of information and plant status.
3'. The CRUSH should be notified by the facility or the State EOC of changes in plant status or emergency classification. 4 All spokespersons/ Pios should carefully coordinate the content of . releases. Preferably, a single release representing all jurisdictions would be developed.
- 5. The presence of a local government representative in the IAC would 1
expedite the development of EBS messages and media releases, e.g., determination of physical boundaries for the protective actions.
- 6. Pre-defined boundaries for describing the physical area affected by the accident would facilitate rapid disseminatien of information to the public.
s - s O I v
A?fAeNMcar /. IOWA ~ s r q .s o e a e e n v s s Ft. Callmun Muc&r Stattu (kaha P4lic Power District Exercise m GENERAL OBJECTIVES Activation and Mobilization
- 1. Demonstrate the capability to alert and mobilize emergency response personnel. .
Protective Action Response 1.' Demonstrate decision-making support from appropriate elected or
. appointed public officials.
, ,, , 2. Demonstrate the capability to formulate and execute measures to protect the public.
- 3. Demonstrate the capabilit;y of local jurisdictions to control access to areas potentially affected by off-site releases.
- 4. Demonstrate the capabfifty of local and State radiological control staffs to monitor envirornental conditions and make appropriate recommendations to EOC decision makers. - -
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND EXTENDED CAPABILITIES \
- 1. Demonstrate adequate connunications between emergency response
' facilities and field activities,
~
i 2. Demonstrate the existence of adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support response efforts.
, S_PECIFIC ~0FF-SITE FMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS (City / County / State)
- 1. Prompt notification s'ystee:
(a) Public alert, notiff. cation, and infornatica, including full siren sounding. (b) Activate the Emergency Broadcast System.
- 2. Inititation, direction, and contrml of radiological monitoring teams.
- 3. Pltne tracking techniques by the radiological monitoring teams, including equipment operation, radiological measurements, erivirornental sampling, and data reporti.ng.
- 4. Initial notification and follow-up status infonnation for recovery organization personnel and off-site authorities.
- 5. Coordinate'd conrunication with off-site: authorities.- State and County.
~
- 6. Dose assessment, dose projection, and protective action methodology.
- 7. Participation in the OPPD sedia release center.
! 8. Press release development and applicable press release issuances. i
- 9. Coordination of off-site radiological monitoring activities.
- 10. De-escalation from the various emergency classifications and emergency termination decisions. .
1 F . .. - ...-..;.- . . . - - . - . . . p t .
h ACRM&TT* 2 .
. Hon. Charles Thone STATE o[ NEBRASKA MILITARY DEPARTMENT -
Major General Edward C. Binder iY~ STATE CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY Francu Ahden 1300 MilitW Road Assistant Director Lincoln. Nebrsska 68508 (402)471 3241-24 August 1982 e SCENARIO FCRT CAIJiOUN NUCLEAR PCWER PIANT TEXT EXERCISE 15 September 1982
\
s I. INTRCCUCTICN The licensing procedures of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
/ '- require the Fort Calhoun Station to hold an annual emergency exercise. , i. _ tsis exercise must simulate an emergency resulting in an offsite l , radiological release requiring response by offsite authorities. The State of Nebraska also has to demonstrate that significant features of State and local emergency response plans and operptions are adequate to l cope with an emergency situation.
The definition-of an exercise includes mobiliza' tion of State and local resources adequate to verify the integrated capability and a major portion I of the basic elements of the State and local plans to respond to an accident scenario requiring response (NUREG 0654 FEMA. REP 1 Rav 1). Iowa State and local governments will also be tested by means of locally prepared scenarios and objectives based on the broad framework provided by the Plant scenario.
. Initial observer briefings will.be held at 1300 hours on 14 September 1982 in the Conference Room of the Omahr Public Power District (OPPD) Electric Operations Building at 43rd Street and Leavenworth in downtown Cmaha.
This will be a combined session for Federal inspectors observing internal plant operations plus the Stats observers who will be checking offsite emergency operations. A critique for participants and observers will be held in the same location on 1G September 1982 at 1300 hours. II. G JECTIVES OF THE EXERCISE
;. 1. Test the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan.
a .
=
- 2. The following Nebraska State support capabilities as listed in the State Response Plan will be tested.
.,T 1/ a. . To . demonstrate State capability to deploy the State Field Comand Post to include local and long-range communications.
- b. To . demonstrate State capabilities to notify other State, local, Federal and private 'agencias of, incident classification and other
, significant changed conditions.
- c. , Tb demonstrate ' State ability to brief media accurately and
,. expeditiously as to emergency status and information.
'j
- d. To demonstrate effectiveness of plume exposure pathway warning system and State and local governments ability to activate it.
- e. . to demonstrate State CD support for Information Authentication
. Center (IAC) and Media Release Center (MRC) .
- f. To test State and local communications.
- g. . To test mechanisms for dissemination of public warn,ing through the EBS system. g
- 3. The, following Nebraska local support capabilities as listed in appropriate local plans will be- tested: '
- a. Initia1 notification receipt and alerting of key people.
(./ b. r ~4 cations and coordination with all involved agencies. .
- c. Activation of local Emergency operating Center (ECC) .
- d. Coordination of local p5blic information activities. Includes preparations for notification of the public with actual notification
- being simulated.
- e. Provision of fire and rescue support as required by plant.
f l f. Transport and reception of simulated radiation casualties.
- i
- 4. Iowa objectives will be developed as part of the Iowa scenario.
III. PORT CALHCUN EXERd SE - - l
' This exercise will begin when the plant notifies the Nebraska State Patrol that they have experienced an equipment malfunction whicit has released radioactive gas which is in excess of Technical Specification limits from the auxiliary building. (NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT)
A personal injury accident will occur to a worker involved with isolating the malfunctioning equipment. Later, a failed fuel monitor will indicate a fuel failure greater than it. This will require an " ALERT" Classification. Y ./ e
- 2-
+ y,.- . - -
r- --c.-- -.y-,,,w-9.-wr- - , . ...,,...ew.,- ,,. , , - , . - , m.,- ee ,--.-e. ..-,r, . , , - , , - . - , - ..----,rm,..., .---r.--- - . , - .., .~,.r.- ,r
*e. ,
A SITE AREA EMEMENCY classification will be announced when the reac*.or coolant leakage rate exceeds the available charging Pumps,make-up T capacity. 1 i Escalation to a GENERAI. EMEEENCY win occur after the following' series of events have been experienced. Firs t, reactor coolant system pressure win drop dramatically indicating a large break IcCA. Second, when amargency power is required one diesel generator will not start. Finally, '., offsite power will' be lost.. These events lead to a potential core melt condition.
~
Sometime after declaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY, a gaseous radioactive 1 release will leak from the containment structure to the environment. This
, _ . , ,, release win consist of noble gases and iodine gas. Radiological
- monitoring teams win be dispatched to both onsite and offsite areas to
[ identify the plume and to: verify dose / concentration projections and ! projected plume behavior. Protective action reconsnendations will *be j determined and coordinated with offsite agencies. ,- Meanwhile, plant status will improve with the initiation of long-term core cooling. When plant is in a stable condition, the emergency l-
- j. classification win be de-escalated. The exercise win be terminated j when offsite agencies have relaxed protective actions.
' s l IV. CONCEPT OF EXERCISE l-l 1. State Field Connand Post will be sent to the Plant EOF once ALERT l _
' ~'
has been declared. Use of BLUEBIRD and State aircraft win be ~ l simulated. - a v
- 2. IAC at the EOF and the MRC at the Omaha / Douglas County EOC will be activated. When local sirens are sounded, IAC/MRC will issue immediate public information releases. ;
- 3. State EOC will be partially activated. Agency notifications and
- follow-up transmission of exercise information will be accomplished.
L Department of Health ' representative will be at the State EOC. An j' other Agency involvement win be simulated.
- 4. Washington County EOC will be activated on a limited basis for the duration of the exercise. Fun activation win take place from
-1130 to 1500 hours. Iccal outdoor warning sirens for Plume EPZ will be sounded. '
- 5. State observer assignments:
- a. Plant EOF
- b. State Field Command Post
! . c. . Washington County ECC
- d. ' state ECC 6.- State observers win attend meetings listed in Section I above.
p -. l I i 3
.~. . . . . _ . _ _.____ _ __ _._ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ , . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ , ,
<, Attachment 3
. NRC ~
SCENARIO D E S C RIP TIO N, OBJECTIVES, & SCENARIO FORT CALHOUN STATION n 1962 EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCOPE f ' SCENARIO DESCRIPTION The 1982 annual emergency exercise at the Fort Calhoun Station will ' involve an inadvertent release of gaseous radioactivity from the auxi-Ifary building, a rapid increase in the failed fuel monitor reading, and a large break LOCA, concurrent with a loss-of-offsite power. This 4 sequence of events will eventually result in a " General Emergency"
. classification, after sequentially attaining the other three emergency action levels.. This sequence of events will also result in the mobili-
. . .zation of the complete Emergency Response and Recovery Organization.
The exercise will commence with the reactor operating at 100% power. .with one charging pump and one high pressure safety injection pump removed from service for maintenance. Between midnight and 6:00 a.m., there will be a release of radioactive gas, due to equipment
- . malfunction, from the auxiliary building to the environment which will be in excess of the Technical Specification limits. As required by the Fort Calhoun Station Radiological Emergency Response Plan and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, the " Notification of Unusual
- Event" emergency classification will be declantd and all necessary
, notifications and actions will be taken. A personnel injury will occur while attempting to isolate the malfunctioned equipment and will be treated accordingly. Exercise Objectives 1. 4. 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, . g'; and 20 of Attachment 2 will be addressed by this emergency classification.
Approximately one hour after the " Notification of Unusual Event" classification is declared, the emergency exercise will ' escalate to the
" Alert" category, due to the failed fuel monitor indicating greater than a 1% fuel failure. All necessary notifications and actions associated with this classification will be taken. This emergency action level will address Exercise Objectives 1, 2, 9,10, and 11 of Attachment 2.
. Approximately two hours into the event, a fire will be indicated in L the old maintenance shop by the fire detector alann, the fire will be visually verified, and the Fort Calhoun Station fire brigade will be
. activated. This event will address Exercise Objective 3 of Attachment l 2. .
During the period of two to four hours into the emergency, primary 1 ., systam parameters will indicate progressively higher leakage rates from the reactor coolant system. Approximately four hours into the emer- ' gency, the reactor coolant leakage rate will exceed the available charging pumps make-up capacity and the emergency will escalate to the
" Site Area Emergency" classification. All necessary notifications and actions associated with this classification will be taken. After the
" Site Area Emergency" is declared and before the reactor is tripped.- the
' reactor coolant system pressure will dmp . dramatically, indicating a
-large break LOCA. The reactor will shut down as a result of the reactor pmtective systam and the engineered safeguards will initiate emergency
' .") core cooling and emergency AC power. One diesel generator will not s tart. -
I l l l I I
. _ _ _ _ . . . . _ - _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ , - . . _ . _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Approximately ten minutes after definite indication of the large -
- break LOCA, offsite AC power will be lost. Because of the loss of ..
offsite power, the loss of one diesel generator, the unavailability of one high pressure safety injection pump and one charging pump, and the indication of a large break 1.0CA, a " General Esnergency" will then be declared'due to the potential for core melt conditions. An operator will be dispatched to the diesel generator room to evaluate and detemine the reason for the malfunction of the diesel - . generator. Testing and repair of the disabled diesel generator will be - planned and initiated. This action will demonstrate Exercise Objective
. - 6 of Attachment 2.
The gaseous fission product activity will be released to the I environment at a containment leak rate of 0.2 percent of the free - volume of . containment per twenty-four hours. It is anticipated that a significant number of fuel rods in the core will rupture and release fission products to the containment atmosphere. Of the radioactivity released to containment,100% of the noble gases and 25% of the iodir.e gases will be available for release to the environment. 1 1 Radiological monitoring teams will be dispatched to both ensite and offsite areas to track the plume of released activity and to verify dose / concentration projections and projected plume behavior. Specific exercise objectives of Attachnent 2 demonstrated by this sequence are i tems 1. 2, 4, 5, 8 9.10,11.12,13,14,15,16,17, and 18. After the " General Emergency" classification is declared and all required notifications are completed and innediate actions taken, long tem core cooling will be initiated. The monitoring teams will continue with the plume tracking and monitoring. The post-accident sampling system (PASS), if fully operational, will be operated to provide pertinent l information to the Recovery Organization during recovery planning. Output data from the PASS will also be used by the Technical Support Center staff to quantify core damage. Operation of the PASS will demonstrate Exercise Objective 7 of Attachment 2. At the time the plant is considered to be in a stable condition, the emergency classification will be de-escalated based upon the dis'- cretion of tne Recovery Organization and offsite support agencies. The emergency exercise will then be tenninatec. This action will de:non-strate Exercise Objective 19 of Attachnent 2. This scenario should provide for the demonstration of all Exercise Objectives as detailed in Attachnent 2. 4 e W
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FDP.T CALHOUN STATION
~
% 1982 EMERGENCT EXERCISE 08JECTIVES.
DESCRIPTION OF PERFORMANCE GOALS The scenario was prepared in a manner to demonstrate specific pre-planned objectives. The following twenty (20) objectives have been
. incorporated into the 1982 emergency exercise for the Fort Calhoun Station and should be demonstrated:
1.- A capability to initiate the appropriate emergency classi-fication and commence necessary actions consistent with . . . equipment status and instrument parameters. 2.' Notification methods of emergency response personnel and augmentation of the on-shift personnel.
- 3. Fire brigade activation, practices, and comunication.
t , l 4. Initiation, direction, and control of radiological monitor teams. g .
- 5. Pitzne tracking techniques by the radiological monitor taams, including equipment operation, radiological measurements, envirersnental sampling, and data reporting.
, 6. The initiation, direction, and completion of damage control and eme'rgency repair capabilities by the onsite emergency organization.
- 7. Operation of the reactor coolant post-accident sampling system, if fully operational, by the onsite emergency organi-zation group.
- 8. Simulated evacuation of personnel from the site, including proper instruction to ensure evacuation to a safe offsite assembly area.
- 9. Initial notification and follow-up status information for
. recovery organization personnel and offsite authorities.
- 10. Coordinit'ed comunication between the. control room, Operations
- Support Center, Technical Support Center, and E
- nergency t
Operations Facility.
- 11. Coordinated communication with offsite authorities.
! 12. Dose assessment, dcse projection, and protective action methodology.
- 12. Engineering evaluations of station conditions and proposed corrective action directives, k .
- ~ . __ _ _ , . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . _ _ . .
2
- 14. Public alert, notification, and infomation, including full
^
siren sounding. --
- 15. Activation and operation of the Media Release Center.
- 16. Press release development and applicable press release is-suances.
. 17. Accountability of personnel within the owner controlled area.
. . 18. Coordination of offsite radiological monitoring activities.
- 19. De-escalation from the various emergency classifications and emergency temination decisions.
- 20. Rescue of injured personnel, transport to medical facility, and radiological treatment.
\
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1 \ l.
. ,w l
i i I I l- . i
\e
,i. .
s Fort Calhoun 5tation Unit No. I 1982 EMERGENCY EXERCISE - Detailed scenario 5x. t-o EVENT DESCRIPTION ANTICIPATED ACTION Mi.n..) . i
.4 ~ Waste Gas Header Rupture in the gas com-pressor room. -
i- ~Contml Room Operator Cue Card Annunciator Alam ,
' Waste Disposal System Malfunction' NotifyAuxiliaryBulldingOperatorof alam. Conti,nue normal operational functions.
,' Auxiliary Building Operator Cue Card Annunciator Alarm on AI-100
' Standby Gas Decay Tank Operating' .
You enter Room 16 to isolate gas decay After the injured operator has reported ! tank VD-29C and route flow to tar.L t'0-298. .the situation to the control room, the
- After closing valve WD-160 to isolate the Re
- : cue Squad should be sumoned and tank, the line ruptures downstream (tank someone sent to assist the injured op-side) of check valv'e WD-161. Shrapnel erator.
from the ruptured l'ine strikes you on the front of your right shoulder, cutting you These actions will demonstrate objective and knocking you down. You fall and strike number 20. your head and are disori.ented for approxi- . mately 2 minutes. You make your way out . . of the room and report the situtation to the' control room. The rupture cannot be " , l . isolated. l _. l-03 Control Room Operator Cue Card Annunciator Alam Check radiation monitor panel. T ' Main Stack Gross Rad / Iodine High . V Radiation' ! Radiation Monitor Alam
Fort Calhoun Station Unit No.1
't 1982 Emergency Exercise
, Detailed Scenario Initial Conditions: 1. Operation at 1005 (1500 MWth) for 240 Effective Full Power Days. , ,
- 2. Presently at 1005 1
- 3. 161Xv offsite AC power feedline is out of service
-. - and is projected to be out of service until' approx-imately noon.
- 4. Equipment Status: HPSI pung: SI-2C, out for service Charging ptsup CH-1A, out for service .
Auxilfafy Building Ventilation . Fans ruhning:. 3 exhaust
. 2 supply
- 5. . Weather Conditions: Wind Speed = 2 mph
- w.
' '~
Wind Direction - 3000 10meterTemp.=130C(550F) e e e l. l l e 9
- v - < , , ~------m,,- wee,m-,,-,,,.e -,w-,r-,,-v-w- - - , w,-,-e,-----y,--,-e---vmven-g,-y,,--om--w,-w,we.nn-,,,,----em-e -m,-,.
l
- - i
'RM-062 Alert' '
f '- RM-061 = 500 cpm RM-062 = 2700 cpm . - RM-052 = 1200 cpm RM-060 = 140 cpm RM-078 = 2 mr/hr - RM-076 = 1 mr/hr 36' Contr'1-Room o Oper_ator Cue Card s Radiation Monitor Alana Declare a Hotification of Unusual Event Emergency per EPIP-05C-1 Item
'RM-062 High' IV.1.b.1). Activate the Emergency Plan per EPIP-OSC-2. Respond to the
' AM-078 Alert' Unusual Event classification per EPIP-05C-3. s RM-061 = 1100 cpm
% 062 = 3000 cpm
- RM-052 = 1500 cpm RM-060 = 200 cpm RM-078 = 4 mr/hr
' ~
RM-076 = 2 mr/hr - Annunciator Alarm Respond per EP-11. High Radioactivity. I
' Ventilation Isolaf'an Connand' Special Control Room 0oerator Cu_e__ Card _
If an operator attempts to shutdown the ventilation exhaust fans. the indicator lights will show that fans VA-40A and. VA-408 have stopped. Operation of -the switch for VA-40C will not give a
. Green light. The ammeter for VA-40C
~
will indicate that the fan is running. This sequence will demonstrate ob,1ect-ive numbers 1, 2. and 9. 12 control Room Operator Cue Card , e Radiation Monitor Alarms if the ventil- Initial Dose Assessment per EPIP-05C-11 ation system exhaust fans are running. should begin in the OSC. Assessment of the impact of venting the Auxiliary
'RM-060 Alert' Building to the atmosphere in an au-thorfied controlled manner should also
. 'RM-061 Alert' begin. The necessity of repairing the damanad want hander should be assessed. ,
These actions.will demonstrata objec-
'RM-076 Alert' tives numbered 11,.12 and 13. -
RM-052 = 8600 cpm
- Any initiation of vent header repair will denonstrate objective number 6.
RM-060 a'275. cpm
' RM-062 = 12.000 cpm RM-061 = 2300 cpm .
RM-078 = 5 mr/hr h076 = 3 ar/hr , s
) Control Room Operator Cue Card No change in Primary Systaa Parameters. -
Tgy and TCOLD are normal. NOTE \
\
Pressurizer Level = 62% - When the Auxiliary Building Ventila-tion Exhaust fans have been shutdown, VCT Level = 92% the stack monitor readings will de-crease to background over a period RM-076 thru RM-079 = 6.mr/hr of an hour. RM-080 = 0.5 mr/hr RM-081 = 1.0 mr/hr RM-082 = 1.5 mr/hr RM-083 = 0.2 mr/hr
- RM-084 = 1.0 mr/hr RM-085 thru RM-089 = nomal back-ground RM-070 thru RM-075 = novsal back- . . .
.. ground-RM-091A/S = nomal background 0 Control Room Operator Cue Card No change in Primary System Parameters. Dose Assessment is continuing at the All levels and pressures are normal. 05C per EPIP-OSC-11. .
. ARM Readinos
\s RM-070 thru RM-075 = normal u.ck- .
ground S .
...,..,rm....--, ,,...ym.,, ,,_,,m._,, -...-----,,.._ - , . - - -
c
~
RM-091A/B o n: mal b:ckground . RM-078 = 6 mr/hr .
./ E 084 = 2 mr/hr
~
RM-088 = 0.75 mr/hr RM-089 = 0.2 mr/hr .
;0 Control Room Operator Cue Card .
Annunciator Alam Respond per' EP-23, Reactor Coolant
"* System High Activity, which re-I Reactor Coolant Gama Activity High' quires RC sampling and analysis.
Note:' RC sampling and anlaysis will require approximately 1 hour. Radiation Monitor Alarm Declare Alert Emergency per EPIP-OSC-1,
. Item IV.2.a.2). Respond per EPIP-05C-4.
'RR-214 PRM-1 High' s Sound Nuclear Emergency Alarm to evac-
'RR-214 PRM-2 Alert' ,
uate all non-essential personnel. Incore detector 30 alans then reset Response to these alams should demon-strate objectives 1, 2, 7, 9, 11 and 13. i' - Area Radiation Monitor readings are stable Primary Systes levels temperatures and pressures are nonnal. , , Stack PRMs read normal background. , s36 Control Room Operator Cue Card Incora detector 26 alann then reset , l .
- 45 Control Room Operator Cue Card -
No change in RR-214 PRM-1 & 2 readings
- or Primary System parameters.
l .
=00 Control Room Operator Cue Card RR-214 PRM-1 & 2 readings are stable.
t No changes in Primary System parameters. - Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) Readings: AM-076 thru RM-079 = 4 mr/hr I RM-080 thru RM-084 = 3 mr/hr eas nas neve eM.0AA = ? mr/hr
- _ - _ . _ ~. _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _
~
~
l06089'onormaibackground
~
l RM-091A/S = .nomal background - O RM-070 thru RM-075 = nomal background .
~ 5 tack PRMs read normal background 30- Control Room Operator Cue Card - -
z RR-214 Phi reading has gone off scale
, ;high RR-214 PRM-2 has returned to normal
_ Initial Levels g Pressurizer Level = 62% VCT Level ='92% ARM Readings:
\
5 070 thru RM-075 = normal background ' RM-076 thru RM-084 = 3.5 mr/hr RM-085 thru RM-088 = 3 mr/hr
~
RM-089 = 0.2 mr/hr , I . . RM-091A/B = normal background , Stack PRMs read nomal background '
- Control Room Operator Cue Card l00 ~
. Pressurizer Level Indicators L-101X/Y read 61.5%
l-Pressurizer Pressure Indicators P-103 X/Y read 2100 psia. , , Primary System Temperatures are normal VCT Level = 915 .
~
ARM Readinos < RM-070 = 151 mr/hr RM-074 = 101 mr/hr . (. RM-091A = normal. RM-078 4 3.5 mr/hr - RM-084 = 3.5 mr/hr -
.= . - .. . .- .
AM-088 = 3.3 mr/hr RM-089 = 0.2 mr/hr - s , Stack PRMs read normal backgmund . , Cue Card to Chemist Chemists should. notify the Control Room that RC activity is normal RC Activity is as indicated on the compu- Initiate electrical check of monitors ter printout.of the isotopic analysis, to determine the cause of the alarms. 36 . . Control Room Coerator Cue Card l VCT Level = 90.55 NOTD Pressurizer Level = 615 If the operators request a leak rate, the following information should be Pressurizer Pressure = 2l00 psi provided: Primary System leak rate i . is 1.5 gpa at this time. Letdown Flow = 36 gpm t s 18 Control Room Ooerator Cue Card NOTE
. Pressurizer Level = 60.85 If the operators request a leak rate, r m, - the following information- should be
(,_, Pressurizar Pressure = 2100 psi provided: Leak Rate at this time is 2 gpa if determination was started at VCT Level = 905 time 3.0 hours. Letdown Flow = 36 gpm . Respond per EP-28. Reactor Cooling Leak RM-050/051 = 5.5 E+04 cpa/4.0E404 cpm . (Contairnent position) - RM-070/074 = 151/101 mr/hr 30 g ntrol Room Operator Cue card observe system behavior. Pressurizer Level = 605; If the operators request a leak rate, the following information should be Pressurizer Pressure = 2099 psi provided: Leak Rate is 3.5 gpm at this time. Primary System Temperatures are normal VCT Level = 87.55 Letdown Flow = 26 ~gpm containment humidity is above normal ,
-- ARM Readinos RM.070 = 152 mr/hr 1
- 5 074 = 102 mr/hr , # ;RM-091A = off scale icw 5078 = 3.4 mr/hr- .
h 084 =;3.4 mr/hr
- AM-088 = 3.4 mr/hr 5 089 = 0.2 mr/hr 1 L Stack Monitors read nomal background.
"' ~
Auxiliary Buildina Operator Cue Card - Containment Sump Level Alam on AI-100 SumpLevel=21"(901)
.2 - Contml Room Oce' rat 6r Cue Card Observe system behavior.
Pressurizer Level = 591 If the operators request a leak rate, the following information should be Pressurizar Pressure = 2097 psia provided: Leak Rate is 4.25 gpa at
. this time.
,3 VCT Level = 83%
~
~
Containment humidity is increasing
-54 Control Room Doerator Cue Card , ,
Charging Pump CH-1C start If the operators request a Leak Rate, the following infomation should be VCT Level = 761 provided: RCS Leak Rate is 6.5 gpm at this time. Letdown Flow = 26 gpm Pressurizer Pressure = 2095 psi Control Room Oce'rStor Cue Card Respond to fire alam per IP_-10. l 00 I ! Fire Alam in Service Building If the anerators request a leak rate, the following information should be Pressurizer Level = 615 and rising provided: RCS Leak Rate is 7.5 gpm at this time. Primary System Temperatures are normal VCT Level = 661 Cue Card for Operator Investicatino Alarm f Letdown Flow = 36 gpa 011 Fire in area of Auxiliary Boiler. Pressurizer Pressure = 2100 psi , Activate Fire Brigada 8 050/051 = 9.0E+04 cpm /4.4E+04 cpm Actions in response to the fire alam will demonstrate ob,iective number 3. l om.ntn/nn . us; aemc/150 mr/hr l.
1 1 . . Fm Control Room Doerator Cue Card If the operators " request a leak rate. ; the following information should be Charging Pump CH-1C auto start provided: RCS Leak Rate is 12 gpm at this time. Pressurizar Level = 58t
.' Pressurizer Pressure = 2095 psi -
RM-050/051 = 9.5E+04/4.9E+04 cpm . VCT Level = 605 IIM-070/074 = 500/200 mr/hr _A _ ' l1 Control Room Operator Cue Card
'VCT Low Level Alann' Make up to VCT from Concentrated Boric Acid Tank CH-llA-CH-llA Level = 865 -
. \
l Pressurizer Level = 61.55 . Pressurizer Pressure = 2100 psi _VCT Level = 495
-30 Control Room Ocerator Cue Card If the operators ' request a leak rate, the following infonnation should be provided:.
Pressurizar Level = 58% ,
. RC5 Leak Bate is 25 gpm at this time. !
i Pressurizar Pressure = 2093 psi Stop VC'T makeup after VCT Level exceeds Primary Systems Temperatures are normal 905. VCT Level = 905 CH llA = 655 RM-050/051 9.7E+04/4.8E+04 cps Charging Pump CH-lc auto start RM-070/074 = 500/200 mr/hr 45 Control Room Ooerator__ Cue Card If the operators requMt a leak rate, the following information should be provided: Pressurt:er Pressure = 2085 psi RCS Leak Rate is 33 gpm at 'this time. Pressuri:er Level lo' j and rising slowly.per L-10lX/Y = 605 l VCT Level = 54% and dropping fast i CH-11A Level is decreasing i i
,- , , - . _ . _ , . - _ , - _ - . . _ _ , . . _ _ - . - - - _ - , . _ , . - -,_.._m _ , _ - . - . .
- .= . - - - - --- .- -
~
s ,- . . Cue Card to the Fire Brigade Leader C Fire near Auxiliary Boiler has been extin- Initiate clean up of the area of the' fire. quished. - (8 Control Room Goerator Cue Card Check: 1) VCT Level and boric acid i batching system. : Annunciator Alarm l
. 'VCT Level Mi-Lo' Make up to VCT fran CH-11A.
VCT Level = 51.7% If the operators request a leak rate, the , following information should be provided:
"* CH-11A Level = 651 RC5 Leak Rate is 40 gpm at this time.
s Pressurizar Level is steady at 61%. Declare site Area Emergency per EPIP- ' 05C-1, Item IV.3.a.. Respond per EPIP. 05C-5. Dose Assessment per EPIP-E0F-6 should begin if not in progress. 00 Contr'o1 Room Operator Cue Card If an operator asks for a leak rate, pm-vide the following information: RCS Leak Annunciator Alarm: 'TM/ Low Pressure Channel Rate is 55 gpa at this time. Pretrip.'
. Early Warning System sounded.
Primary System Temperatures are nonnel - Pressurizer Pressure = 1984 psi. If VCT make up has been initiated, the VCT 1evel equals 65%. If VCT make up Pressurizer Level = 54.5% ' has not been initiated, the VCT level equals 301 and is decreasing rapidly at RM-050/051 = 1.5E+05/7.5E+04 cpm 2.55 per minute. RM-070/074 = 1000/450 ar/hr CH-11A Level = 40% if making up to VCT Wind speed change from 2.0 mph to CH-11A Level = 65% if not making up to VCT ' 6.5 mph. , Response to these actions will demonstrate ' objectives tnmbered 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, ' 12, 13, 14 and 18. ' 9 Control Room 00erator Cue Card t Annunciator Alarm ,. .
'TM/ Low Pressure Channel Trip' Respond per EP-1 and find: ,
' Pressurizer Safety Injection Signal 1) All CEA's are on the bottom Lo-Lo Press' 2) Turbine isolation valves closed
- 3) Generator breakers are open tj ' Reactor Trip' Check: 1 Pressurizer pressure and
' Safety Injection Coninand' -
- level. 2 SI pumps start, 3) Diesel Generators start and come up to speed. ;
1
---n.-,,-,,....,,,--,---_,,,-,,,.-m,,.,,,,e,,,- __ _ m ,_.w _ _ ,- ,. - -n. .__ -,n-,_,,,,,
- g.. -
If an operator asks. Transfomer T-1 is
' Turbine Trip' available to backfeed offsite p6wer.
n ' Diesel Auto start Demand' - Pressurizar Pressure = 1585 psi , Activate the Media Release Canter and prepara a pubite infonnation broadcast. ~ Pressurizer Level = 38%
. Primary System Temperatures are slowly decreasing , SI Pumps running This action will demonstrate objective numbers 15 and 16.
Diesels are at speed and synchronized VCT Level = 255 if make up not in progress , 605 if make up is in progress 3 Control Room Operator Cue Card Pressurizer' Level and Pressure drop from Large LOCA is indicatad. - 35% and 14g5 psi to 05 and 100 psi in a ~ period of 17 seconds. Respond per EP-5. Containment Pressure increase from 1 psig to 48 psig in a period'of 20 seconds.
' containment Pressure H'igh Signal' Cdntainmenti Spray Connand Containment ARM's: - -
RM-070/074 = 1.0E+04/5.0E+03 mr/hr - AM-091A/8 = off scale low RM-050/05T High Alanns RM-050/051 = 1.0E+06/6.0E+05 cpm 5078 = 3.1 mr/hr ~ 1 . . . RM-084 = 3.1 mr/hr
% 088 = 3.1 mr/hr ,
i RM-061/062 = 100/50 cpm containment Sump Level = 1005
- Cantainment Sump Pumps are running.
5 Control Room Ooerator Cue _ Card special Continoency Cue Card for the Control Room Operator 51RWT Level = 60". - If the operator is onckfeectng through l
.3 T-1, initiate the following sequence RCS Pressure = 25 psia with a cue card:
',s Pressurizar Level = 05 1) Breakers 3451-4/5 Tripped RM-070/074 = 2.2E+05/g.3E+04'ar/hr 2) Transfomer.T-1 winding temp. high RM-050/051 = >106 cpm. (off scale) 3) Transfomer T-1011 Level Lo 011
, Temp. High RM-091A/8 = 90 R/hr -
- 4) Transformer T-1 Cooler. Failure
.' RM-061/062 100/50 cpm . ;
, 5) Loss of offsite power is indicated Containment Pressure = 17 psig Control Room Operator Cue Card Ofesel #2 Annunciator Alana
Diesel Trouble' Declare General Emergency per EPIP-OSC-1, Item IV.4.a. b, and c. Respond per Annunciator Alam EPIP-0SC-6
'4160V Sus 1A4 Low' Voltage' Issue news release regarding escalation of the emergency class to General 1
' Recirculation Actuation Signal' Emergency.
- RM-050/051 = >106 cpm (off scale)
RM-070/074 = 1.0E+06/5.0E+05 mr/hr These actions will demonstrate objective
- nsabers 1, E,10,11,13,14,15 and 16.
RM-091A/B = 4.9E+2 R/hr , , RM-061/062 = 100/50 cpm ', " Crntainment Pressure = 15 psig i Control Room Doerator Cue Card Primary System Temperature = 3500F Offsite Radiological Monitoring is in Progress Primary System Pressuru =. 24 psia . . . The Primary Systen is stable and Long Containment Pressure = 14 psig Term core Cooling Procedures are being implemented per EP-58. Containment Sump Level = 1005 Dose Assessment pmjections are in pro-Containment Sump Post Accident Level = 245' gress to reflect current conditions inside on LIC-384. containment. RM-050/051 = off scal ~e high Protective Actions for the general public , will be recomended based upon Dose Assess-ment projections. l ( .. RM-070/074 = 5.0E+06 mc/hr RM-091A/S = 5.0E+03 R/hr - These actions will demonstrate objective RM-061/062 = 100/50 cpm
. . . = - . _ _ -. _. .
C:v.rn Roc . C':erator C::e Car:: foicarySysterPressure=24 r psia il Necraska Aiicraft nacic1 ;tesi Surysy T start.
. Pri:r.ary Syster. Temperature = 3200F
- Containment Pressure = 12 psig l RM-050/051 = off scale high RM-070/07'4 = 7.5E+06 'mr/hr
, RM-091A/B = 7.4E+03 R/hr
,RM-061/062 = 100/50 cpm Wind direction change from 3000 to 3200 g Controi Room Goerator Cue Card RCS Temperature equals 3000 F.
Contairrnent Pressure = 10 psig Radiological Monitoring is continuing. RCS Pressure = 24 psia- Recovery Organization assessment and RM-050/051 = off. scale high , 1RM-070/074 = >107 mr/hr-(off scale) These actions are a continuing demonstra-tion of objective numbers 5. 9, 10, 11, RM-091A/B = 1.0E+04 R/hr 12, 13 and 18. RM-061/062 = 100/50 cpm . . Control Room Operator Cue Card RCS Temperature = 2800F - shutdown Cooling System is on line. RCS Pressure = 22 psia l - Containment Pressure = 5 psig RM-070/074 = 1.0E+07 mr/hr RM-091A/S = 9.5E+03 R/ar RM-050/051 = off scale high - l , RM-061/062 = 100/50 cpm i
- _ Control Room Goerator_ Cue Card 1
l ' ' - ' RCS Temperature = 2600F Notify EOF that release conditions have
- been tenninated.
l RCS Pressure = 20 psia l
- , - _ . _ _ . _ . _ . . - . . . _ _ _ . ~ . . - , _ . . _ . - _ , _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . . _ - _ . _ . . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ - - . . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
o/ , . .
' containment Pressure = 0 ps'ig -
( ' N 050/051 = off scale high-RM-070/074.= 1.0E+07 mr/hr Recovery Organizatto i av.tvities con-tinue to demonstrate objective nu:c.bers RM-091A/B_= 9.5E+03 R/hr 6, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13.
. RM-061/062 = 100/50 cpm -
.0 Contro1 Room ooerator Cue. Card
. RCS Temperature = 240*F Containment Pressure = 0~psig. Recovery Organization Activities con-tinue. ,
RCS Pressure = 15 psia Iss.ue news release regarding " emergency" RM-050/051 = off scale high status change. -
. RM-070/074.= 9.8E+06 mr/hr Radiological Monitoring Activities con-tinue. '
% 0S1A/B = 9.4E+03 R/hr These actions will demonstrate objective RM-061/062 = 100/50 cpm numbers 6,13,18 and 19.
j Recovery Manager Cue Card s De-escalate to site Area Emergency if the situation warrants this action. . 30 Control Room Operator Cue Card ' . Primary System is stable and cooling down. f2 Airc' raft Radiological Survey start. 10 Control Room Ooerator Cue Card Primary Systee is stable and cooling down. Results of #2 aircraft survey and ground suneys indicate radiation readings have returned to normal in the EPZ. Recovery Manager Cue Card - - 4 . Terminate the exercise when all objec- Issue news release regarding temination tives have been met. of the " emergency". v
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% October 8, 1982 gd 4
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Recommendations for Monitoring Teams
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' Steve Ferris
^ Federal Emergency Management Agency 911 Walnut Street l Kansas City, MO 64106 1
Reference:
1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Emergency Management Agency, NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, Criteria ' for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, (November 1980).
- 2. U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA-REP-2, Guidance on Offsite Emergency Radioation Measurement Systems Phase 1 - Airborne Release. (September 1980).
A-
Dear Mr. Ferris:
Questions have been raised by some of the State and local governments on deter. mining the adequate number of field monit'oring teams necessary to verify a plume
.resulting { rom a nuclear incident. Planning Standards I-7, I-8, and I-11 in NUREG 0654 address requirements for organization and composition of field teams and plume monitoring capability. However, NUREG 0654 does not provide specific adequately monitor the plume. guidance on the number of teams or their mode of de These concerns are addressed in FEMA-RE?-2.
These recommendations in FEMA-REP-2 suggest 8-16 two-man teams for each site with 100% replacement every 12 hours. This many teams may not be necessary L if instructions for monitoring a plume are detailed in the emergency plan. - i The recommendations for one approach for monitoring a plume are: !' 1. l The minimum number of monitoring teams required to monitor a plume is two. c This number is adequate only if an acceptable method (see example below) of deploying teams is described in detail in the emergency plan.
- 2. The two team minimum is for a 12 hour shift, i.e. four teams for 24 hour coverage.
! 3. i Communications should be coordinated between the utility of fsite monitoring teams and State and/or local monitoring teams, if the minimum number is , used. This will maximize the amount of information about the plume and
- reduce any duplication of effort.
l .? l l- - - . - - . - - . - - . - . - . _ - - . _ _ _ - - . _ - _ . _ - - . - - - .
- October 8, 1982 LGH 23-82 Page 2 fu
- A method to monitor the plume and verify dose projections is di.agramed below.
Teams should be simultaneously sent into the plume from opposite directions, initially near the reactor site. Teams should report instrument readings as they proceed. into,the projected plume. If the readings indicate that doses are
'+ .
at or above the turn back value, they should return to the edge of the plume.
. move farther'away from the site, and repeat the procedure. The objective of the
_ moni.toring _should beJo .defineuthe plumeAs and to_deteriine dosellt_th4~~ 6 plume centerline. To aid ihls process several monitoring tracks, at various
?TistWees witlFpredetermined sampling points, should be established in the plan.
Based on the-projections. .the monitoring teams should enter the track at loca-tions outside the plume and proceed toward plume centerline. The tracks should be arranged as symmetrically as possible considering roads and other constraints. The most valuable data is then taken at as nearly the same time as possible by both teams' This will allow the field team coordinator to map and define the plume and verify that doses are those projected by the utility. It is important that this individual be aware of the Ilkely uncertainties in the projections so that he can effectively evaluate the fleid monitoring data. The nhaber of teams required is dependent on the method used to1 monitor the plume. Finally, if a detailed description of plume verification is not pro-vided in the emergency plan, then the 8-16 teams should be used as described in the guidance in FEMA-REP-2. . l I hope you find this information useful. Sincerely yours, . L. G. Hof fman jr cc: W. Brink - EPA - C. Siebentritt - FEMA M. Stangler - FEMA 4 t 1 4 9 e
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Team 1 Team 2 Start here St*ft h*(* {_ w n o r p s v e' v O w c' w n m n , U Y O O O O Y Y O M A D D n A l l l l e Projected Plume
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' EXERCISE EVALUATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STATE "' AND LOCAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCF RESPONSE PLANS
.g. FOR THE FORT CALHOUN NUCLEAR STATION Blair, Weshington County, Nebraska Omaha Public Power District, Licensee EXERCISE CONDUCTED -\
- December 6-7, 1983 1 t
PARTICIPANTS: State of Iowc State of Nebraska County of Harrison County of Dodge County'of Pottawattamie County of Washington
.(All jurisdiccians with inhalation pathway responsibilities participated) y 5 ' $ h Ell 3
. . pr'epared by Federal Emergency Managernent Agency Region.VII
'- March'15, 1984 t
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CONTENTS i v AB B REVIATIONS AND ACR0NYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii . EXERCISE
SUMMARY
1 1 INTRO DU CT ION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 . . . . I
. 1 4 Exe r ci s e 5a ck ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1 2 1.2 Exercise Ev41uators............................................... 3 1.3 Evaluation Criteria............................................... 3 1.4 Exercise objectives............................................... 6 1.5~ Exercise Scenario................................................. 9 1.6 Milestones for Exercise Objectives and Critiques.................. 10 1.7. State and Local Resources....,..................................... 12 2 EXERCISE EV ALU ATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.1 Ne b raska Op e ra t i on s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.1.1 State E0C.......................................!........... 15 2.1.2 State Civil Def ense Portable Operations Center - CRUSH..... 17 2.1.3 State Patrol Mobile Communications Facility - Bluebird..... 18 2.1.4 Field Monitoring Teams..................................... 18 2.1.4.1 Nebraska Team..................................... 20 2.1.4.2 Cooper NPS Team................................... 23 2.1.5 _ Radiological Laboratory.................................... 24 2.1.6 Dana College Colis eum Decontamir ation Cente r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.7 University of Nebraska Medical Cancer and the Blair 25 Rescue Squad............................................... 26 2.2 Nebraska County Operations........................................ 26 2.2.1 Washington County.......................................... 28 2.2.2 . Dodge County............................................... 30 2.3 . Iowa State operations............................................. 30 2.3.1 State E0C........... . ...................................... 34 2.3.2 Field Monitoring Activities................................ 36 2.3.3 Forward Command Post-Radiation Team Operations............. 39 2.3.4 Medical Support............................................ 40 2.4 Iowa County Operations............................................ 40 2.4.1 Ha rris on County E0C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 2.4.2 Pottawattamie County E0C................................... 46 2.5 Combined State Operations......................................... 46 2.5.1 Eme rgenev operations Facili ty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 2.5.2 Inf ormation Authentication Cente r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 2.5.3 Media Release Center....................................... 54 3
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tii
e e 4 e
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRO'NYMS BLUEBIRD Nebraska State Patrol Mobile Emergency Communications Center CD Civil Defense 6.USH Nebraska Civil Defense Portable Operations Center _ . EARO . Emergency Assessment and Recovery Operations o Emergency Broadcast System EBS EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EFZ Emergency Planning Zone FAA Federal Aviation Administration . FCNPS Forr Calhoun Nuclear Power Station FCP Field Command Post
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RCEOC Harrison County Emergency Operations Center \ IAC Information Authentication Center ISEOC Iowa State Emergency Operations Center KI- Potassius Iodide LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident MRC Media Release Center NUREG-OoS4 Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1) ODS Office of Disaster Services OPPD Omaha Public Power District PCEOC Pottawattamie County Emergency Operations Center PIO Public Information Of ficer RAC Regional Assis tance Committee SOP Standard Operating Procedure TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter v l
F O 1 e
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1 4. O I Vi
EXERCISE
SUMMARY
NEBRASKA OPERATIONS The State EOC was an excellent f acility and activation and s taf fing occurred in a timely manner. The exercise indicated that a need to review the state plan may be necessary with regard to identification of minimum s taf fing
.o. needs and documentation of the State EOC interaction .with the Field Command Post (FCP). Management of the Sta te EOC was good and communications functioned well. Timely coordination of communications existed between the State EOC, the TCP and Washington County; this corrected an earlier identified deficiency .- Dose assessment .and protective action recommendations were overall well coordinated between the State EOC, the TCP and CRUSH. However, Iowa and . Nebraska needed to coordinate decision making for inglementing consistent protective actions on either side of the Missouri River boundary.
Pro tective action instructions were effectively conveyed to the public; familiar' geographical boundaries would be more understandable in descripcions
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to the public.
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The CRUSH mobile unit performed well as a communication link. Dose calculations performed at CRUSH were performed acceptably. However, delays in receipt of data f rom the utility made independent dose calculations too late for useful s tate decision making. In one ins tanc e, incorrect data was transmitted to. the s tate by the utility resulting in dose projections tha t were significantly dif ferent than the utility's. No apparent attempt was made at CRUSH or the State EOC to resolve this data -discrepancy. Radiological exposure control was good except demonstration of the availability of permanent . record dosimeters was needed. Also, the predetermined conditions for use of radioprotective drugs by emergency workers need to be re viewe d.
. Scenario source term data were not compatible with the plume measuremen t source term data provided to the field teams. Als o, this data was not in the proper form.
l The Bluebird cortmunications facility functioned as planned and no ! comammications or message interpretation problems were identified. Overall, decision making, message flow, and management we re well demonstrated and no deficiencies or areas for. improvement were identified. The two field monitoring teams (Nebraska State Team and the Cooper ' Nuclear Power Station Team) were activated promptly. Neither team was briefed on plant or meteorological conditions nor were they kept informed of these conditions throughout the exercise. Comunanications equipment functioned well between ' ,ch the field teams and CRUSH. The Nebraska team was well-equipped, however, one counter did not work. ~he Cooper team was also suitably equipped except one radiation monitoring ins trument was not operational. Charcoal cartridges we re not-available for air sampling. Technical operations were l generally performed well by bo th field teams. Additional training will L improve use of some instruments and some field procedures need to be clarified l vii L -
l 1 in the plan or SOPS . . Bo th teams had adequa te dosime try and displayed generally good knowledge in radiological exposure control procedures. Overall, it was indicated that the field teams were not used as ef fectively as they could have been to track the plume. Samples from additional monitoring
, points would be useful to create worthwhile fielo team exercises.
, Activities at the - Dana College Coliseum decontamination center were
, primarily simulated and considered to be acceptable. Additional s tate health
' physics personnel may be needed for extended operations. A full demonstration of decontamination capabilities should be carried out in a future exercise.
The University of Nebraska Medical Center performed professionally and had excellent facilities to care for.the inju red-contaminated (s imulated) individual that was brought to the medical center by the Blair Rescue Squad. On the other hand, adequate consunications, protective equipment, and training are needed for the Blair Rescue Squad. Nebraska County Operations g i Emergency operations management, connunications equipment and s taffings public alerting and notification,' and facilities were good at the Washington l County EOC. - Additional training and review of plan procedures are needed in
- i the notification of staff and conveying correct emergency classification level information. Several special issues regarding school evacuacions and needs of the mobility-igaired were identified and need to be resolved. Direct-read dosimeters were available in satisfactory numbers. However, permanent record dosimeters were not available .and a review of procedur es for reading dosimecars is suggesced.
Operations in Dodge County consisted of exercising the County EOC and a decontamination center. The' Dodge County EOC,was an acceptable facility for emergency response operations. Emergency operations management, appropriate I public notifi.tation activities, and radiological exposure control were all L effectively carried out. The Dodge County relocation center also performed !~ , well in regis tering, monftoring, decontaminating, and providing congregate care of evacuees. Overall, some review of procedures would help to refine some of the already acceptable activities demonstrated ac' the two' Dodge County sites during the exercise.
' IOWA OPERATIONS The Iowa State ECC was well-managed and decis ion-making procedures followed those prescribed in the plan. Alert and notification of the EOC s taf f was done promp tly. Participation by s tate and volunteer agencies was good, but three agencies identified in the plan did not participate. All EOC staf f displayed adequate training and knowledge. Facilities at the EOC were I
satisfactorv, although not all of the reccamended visual aids were pos te d. viii i
.~ --. - _ ., _ _ . _ - . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ , _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ . . _ . _ - _ . - . . . _ . _ .
Fur the r, the s tate and OPPD should agree on a common map designating and identifying radiological monitoring . sites. Protective action recommendations for the plume and ingestion pathways were made. Provisions for the promp t bro'adcase of EBS messages following siren activation requires icp rovemen t. Dose assessment functions were effectively carried out. However, the decision to adminis ter KI to emergency workers in the field was made late and wcs not justified by projected doses made at the forward command post. Field monitoring ceans were mobilized promptly from Iowa City and f Ames. The teams were well-equipped, however one team had no power supply for their air sangler. Procedures for collecting air samples had been modified to correct deficiencies identified in prior exercises. More training is requirad s for members of the field monitoring teams in de termining the need fo r-decontamination of emergency personnel, supplies, and . equipment. The Blue team also requires training in the proper. collection procedures for, and determination of radioiodine concentrations in the field. Coordination of the field radiological monitoring teams was done from the . forward command post located at the Harrison County EOC. The team coordinator managed the operation well, but was handicapped by inadequate communica tions to the field, conflicting maps of the locations of field monitoring sites, and tne lack of an administrative interface with the ecunty EOC. ~ The latter was most evident in poor message handling and plant condition briefings.
-The Missouri Valley Hospital has recen tly been added as a resource hospital for accepting radiologically contaminated persons with injuries. For this exercise, the simulated injured person was diverted to the University of
- Nebraska Medical Cen te r. No medical support activities were observe d.
Hospital personnel were familiar with the appropriate procedures, bu t needed expe rience because they have not been exercised. . Furthe r, the hospital did not have adequate radiological monitioring instruments. Iowa County Ooerations The Harrison County EOC was activated p romp tly . However, several persons with . no emargency responsibility under the current plan were also called .in.' In general, the staff displayed adequate knowledge and training. Round-the-clock s caffing capability - was demonserated. Command and contro1 functions were ' ncit effectively demonstrated since the Office of Disas ter . Services (ODS) representative officially in charge was occupied with comnunication functions. The EOC facilities were generally adequate and - all recommended visual aids were posted. All efforts put forth by the EOC to alert the public was done proc:p tly and well. Traffic control poin ts we re ef f ectively implemented. The county needs to learn the locations of mobility-1 paired persons and develop orocedures for their proc:p t evacuation. ix
, . - , - _ . - , . . - , , . - _ _ - - - . , , _ , ~ , - - - _ - - . , . _. , . - , . ~ _ . - - , - .
l The Pottawattamie County EOC's primary function was public notification. As such, the entire EOC was not activated. All key managerial staf f were -. on duty , and were well-trained for their assigned duties. The director. of consnunications was effectively in charge. The facilities we re adequate and the center could support ext nded operations. However, no maps or displays indicating evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control
. - points or . population distribution were present. Communications equipment functioned well. The EOC~ responded to a greater degree than was expected under .the exercise scenario. . Traffic control pgints were actiirated , route- * ' alerting was simulated, and an omission in' the state plan regarding the number of residences in. the 2-mile EPZ was identified. However, this strong performance in the field brought out the need for extensive training in the use of do'imeters s and provisions for the use of potassium iodide.
COMBINED' STATE FUNCTIONS The EOF was promptly and adequately staffed with key personnel. However, no support staff were available to relieve officials of-routine telephone calls and to properly handle messages. The Iowa representatives ned training in their duties. Space and equipment for E07 staff were very limited. The room was evercrowded and .no displays or maps - of required information were available. Additional training is recostmended in management and decision-making responsibilities, emphasizing familiarization with
. procedures in the plan. .
Activation of the information authentication center (IAC) was promptly denonstrated by PIDs from the. utility, Nebraska Civil Defense, and the NRC. The state of Iowa was not represented at the IAC. The facilities at the IAC , were adequate. The IAC was also well-equipped with communications equipment. Periodic briefings were held at the IAC throughout the day. On occasion,.the content of emergency messages transmitted to . the media release center were
'found to be erroneous or in conflict with instructions contained in the public
- information brochure.
The media release center (MRC) was effectively activated by representa-tives from the utility and each of the states. The facilities .st the MRC were adequata, however, maps and displays -to facilitate dissemination -of information we re small and generally inadequate. Communications equipment were sufficient and operated well. Media kits providing reporters with background information were available. The participants were well-trained and knowledgable. Media briefing sessions were conducted and a technical liaison
~ from the utility was present to answer technical questions. The rumor control 4 lines were activated and the operators were well-trained. Rumor control operators were also kept uo to date through continuous interaction with the MRC staff.
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1 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND ' A radiological emergency exercise was conducted on December 7,1983, to _ evaluate the l adequacy of state and local emergency plans and response capa-bilities in States of Iowa and Nebraska in the event of an emergency at the .j
. Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station located near Blair, Nebraska. .The plans l
' evaluated included the Radiological Emergency Response Plans for Nuclear Power
- Plant Incidents of, respectively, the state of Nebraska and Washington County
( NE) , . . and the Nuclear Incident Reception Plans of Dodge and Sarpf Counties (NE). - Also evaluated were the Iowa Emergency Plan, the Harrison' County (IA) Radiological Contingency Plan, and the Potiawattamie County (IA) Radiological Emergency Plan. The current Harrison and Pottawattamie County plans .are not in compliance wi':h NUREG-0654, II criteria and therefore are inadequate as emergency plans. The state of Iowa has assumed responsibility for emergency management and has adapted the Compensatory Measures Plan to Chapter 12 of the State Plan. The Co gensa tory Measures Plan will provide guidance to the 1 counties' until the appropriate county plans are finalized. The exercise was conducted jointly by the Omaha Public Power Dis trict and the States of Iowa and Nebraska (and associated local governments). All relevant jurisdictions in the States of Iowa and Nebraska participated, except for two counties with reception and care responsibilities (Crawfor'd County, IA and Sarpy County, NE) that were not exercised in those locations. However, the Sarpy County EOC was activated (for comaanications purposes only), and was not observed ' during the exercise. l_ An exit interview was conducted with the participants a t 10:00 a.m. , December ~ 8, 1983, in the Douglas County EOC in Omaha, Nebraska. Details of
- the evalua tor s findings ' vere presented at ' this exic interview. A public l briefing was conducted following the exit interview at 3
- 00 p.m. in Room E-14 of the Federal Euilcing in Council Bluffs, Iowa. At this briefing, highlights of the exercise evaluators' findings were presented by both the RAC Chairman and the NRC Team I.e ade r. State atd local officials we re invited to participate in the briefing.
This_ report represents the findings of the evaluators specific to the objectives identified in Se c. 1.4 While various problem areas may be identified as needing corrective attention, the principal focus of the report is on the success of the participating agencies in accoglishing thes e ( objectives and in establishing whe ther past deficiencies have been corrected. Because this was the 'first exercise conducted under revised state and local plans for several jurisdictions in both Iowa and Nebraska, it serves as' al baseline agains t which to determine whe the r, over the course of time, offsite response organizations will have fulfilled all 35 ' core objectives" identified by FEMA Headquarters. l l _ - .-. . ._- . _ .- _ . _ _ _ _ _ ~ . - . , . _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ . -
l 2 This report shall be provided to the States of Iowa and Nebraska in order they it may act on the recommendations contained herein to improve the emergency response capabilities of both State and local governments. Sixty days from the date of receipt of this document, State and local governments should submit to the Regional Director, FEMA VII, their comments on the report and any proposal for remedial action concerning the problems identified in
. .Sec. 3 of this document.
- 1.2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS Observations and evaluations of the exercise were performed by members of the Region VII Regional Assistance Connaittee , FEMA Regional staff and qualified Federally employed and contracted evaluators. The following is a complete list of evaluators, their agency affiliations,' and their evaluation assignments:
Evaluator Agency Assignment M. Carroll FEMA I Iowa FCP (at Harrison Co. Sheriff's Dept.) s
- 3. Brinck EPA- Iowa FCP (Rad Team Ops.)
E. Jenkins FEMA EOF 3 G. Jacobson FDA Iowa State EOC K. Waller FEMA Iowa State EOC J. Opelka ANL Blair Rescue Squad /UNMC Radiation Center R. Honkus INEL 5 Iowa Field Team W. Biedenfeld HMS 0 Iowa Field Team-
- 3. Salmonson INEL Iowa Field Team P. Stahlschmidt FEMA. Media Release Center S. Iinser FEMA Pottawattamie Co. Sheriff's Dept.
7
-L. Wilborn
. NRC EOF - Iowa Operations (North Omaha Station) 0 D. Nevitt USDA ~ Nebraska State EOC 9
S. Kouba DOE Nebraska' State EOC R. Leonard FEMA Washington County EOC . T. Rogan FEMA Washington Co. EOC
- 4. Scott FEMA Dodge Co. EOC G. McClure FEMA Nebraska EOF /IAC 10 M. Browne DOT Nebraska F0F/IAC
! J. Keller INEL Nebraska State FCP (Accidant Assessment)
- l. 'L. Wilborn NRC Iowa-EOF North Omaha Station J. Meyers DOT Nebraska State FCP (Police)
C. Merzenberg ANL Nebraska Field Team N. Chipman INEL NPPD Field Team (Cooper NS) I FEMA. Federal Emergency Management Agency 2 l EPA Environmental Protection Agency i
a RELEVANT NUREG-0654 - 01UECTIVE CRITERIA
- 1) INITIATE AND DEMONSTRATE the notification and E.2, E.5-E.7 -
warning activities of the appropriate action
, levels continuing throughout escalacion and
' de-escalation, including recovery and reentry time.
- 2) INITIATE AND DEMONSTRATE che public information/ E.5, E.7, G.3.a. C.4, education activities at the appropriate emer- (all) gency action level, continuing throughout escalation and deescalation.
- 3) ACTIVATE AND DEMONSTRATE radiological monitoring C.1.b, C.3, I.8, I.9, off-site with proper interface between State and I.11 monitoring teams and readiness to request federal assistance if necessary. g
\
a - 4) PERFORM one assessment and make subsequent pro- I.10, J.9 tective action guide recommendations.
- 5) ACTIVATE AND DEMONSTRATE functions of the fixed E.2, E.6, H.3, H.4 Iowa forward control pos t.
- 6) ACTIVATE AND' OEMONSTRATE telephone coordination E.7, F (all-)
and implement hardcopy data transmission for public .information and radiological data
. purposes during the exercise.
- 7) ACTIVATE Iowa Scace EOC with operational and
~
A.I.d, E.2, H.3, H.4 decision 1meking functionaries.
- 8) ACTIVATE AND DEMONSTRATE, as, appropriate, bi- A.3, E.5-E.7, F.1.b, scate coordination on radiological data G.4 (all), H.12, I.7, collection and analysis; recommendations and I.10, J.9, J.10 (all) -
[ implementations of protective actions; and i dissemination of warning and public information. J l l The S tate of Nebrask.a. in a com mnication to FEMA VII dated 19 Sep tember 1983, reported the intention of affected s tate and local gove rn-ment (s) in' Nebraska to test (demons trate) the following support capabilities ! at the December 7, 1983 emergency response exercise for the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station. I {' l,, 4 - -n - - - - - , -, -,-n--v, .--,-,,.w-- m ,,-,-,--~r-- ,,.-,.a,co , - - , .,,,m-,-.~-.-,w . . . , , , - - , , - , - - - -
3 3 FDA Food and Drug Adminiseration
'ANL Argonne National Laboratory 5
1NEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 0 MHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 7
, NRC. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8
0SDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 9
. COE U.S. Department of Energy -
10 DCT U.S. Department of Transportation 1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The exercise evaluations presented in Sec. 2 are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (November, 1980). Following the overview narrative for each jurisdiction, deficiencies are presen ted with, accompanying recommendations. Deficiencies can be presented in two categories. The first category -includes those deficiencies that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance cr.a t appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living near the site in a . radiological emergency. These are " Class A" deficiencies that lead to a negative finding. A negative finding nas t be based on at least one deficiency of this type. There were no deficiencies in this category at this exercise of the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Power Station.
. The second category includes " Class B" deficiencies where demonstrated l
(and observed) performance during the exercise was considered faulty and corrective actions are considered necessary, but other f actors indicate that reasonable assurance could be given that, in the event of a real radiological emergency, appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public. l 1.4 EXERCISE O&JECTIVES i The Scace of Iowa, in a cormninication to FEMA Region VII dated August j' 19, 1983, identified the following formal objectives for the state, to be accouplished at the December 7,1983 emergency response exercise for the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station. l l
5 RELEVANT NUREG-0654 STATE RESPONSE CRITERIA
- 1) Deployment and operation of the Scace Field E.2, F.1 (all), H.4 Command Pos t to include local and long-range o connanica tions.
2). Notif,1 cation and follow-up contacts with State, A.1 (all) , A.3, E.1,
- o Federal and private agencies having responsi-F.1 (all) bilities under the Nebraska Plan.
- 3) Demonstration of reaction times and supporting C. I .b, C.I .c, E .2 resources estimates for key state and selected federal agencies.
- 4) State field radiological monitoring activities I.8, I.10, I.11, field health hazard assessment, and coordination- J.9, J.1,0.m of protective action recommendations with 5 Governor's Authorized Representative and State i EOC - to include State aerial radiological moni-coring to roughly define the parameters of the airborne plume.
- 5) Assumption _of operational status and functioning A.3, E.2, F.1.b, H.4 of State EOC as well as coordination with agencies and field elements, including inter-state coordination between State EOCs.
- 6) . State EOC coordination of simulated federal C.I.b, C.4, F.1.c technical and non-technical support under the National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan (NREPP), including message flow and simulated support by NRC, DOE and FEMA.
- 7) ' State CD support for the jointly operated E.5, E.7. G.3.4, G.4 Information Authentication Center (IAC) and (all)
Media Release Center (MRC).
- 3) Agricultural agency response, as coordinated A.2.a. A.3, C.I.b, by the USDA Scace Emergency Board acting in J.ll conjunction with the State Department of Agricul ture, to support the protective measures determined by the State' Health Department.
l 6 l RELEVANT NUREG-0654 LOCAL RESPONSE CRITERIA
- 1) Initial notification receipt and alerting of E.1, E.2 key people.,
- 2) Consunications and coordination with all A . I . b , 'A .3 , F (a ll) ,
involved _ agencies. G.4 (all) e
- 3) Activation of local Emergency Operating Centers E.2, E.6, H.3, H.4
-(EOCs ) . -
. 4) Practice of coordinated access control and J.10.j security by selected law enforcement agencies.
- 5) Increased readiness measures for potential H.4, J.10.h, J.12 operation of a relocation center, including possible testing of facilities and locations at alternate sites.
- 6) Decontamination s tation operation, including H.4, K.5.b evaluation of facilities and locations to be considered as alternate sites.
' 7) Coordination of public information activities, F.5-E.7, G.3.a G.4
' including preparations for notification of the (all) public with actual notification being simulated.
- 8) Provision of fire and rescue support as required A.2.a. A.3, (B.9) by plant.
- 9) Transport and reception of simulated radiation A.2.a. (B.9), L.1, L.4 casualties.
^
l 1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO Initial conditions included a severe ice storm in progress in the EPZ, which knocked out power in two major transmission lines. There was a major power outage in the Blair area. The plant was operating at full power along a third unaffected 345 KV transmission line because the -ice s torm had caused a grid ' emergency. Unknown to anyone, damage to a s team pressure vent valve leading from containment had opened a hole in the valve allowing air to pass into the . vent line. An explosion of the UF6 s torage area subsequent to receip t of a threatening telephone call initiated a notification of UNUSUAL EVENT on the night of December 6. Af ter turning over the investigation of the
-t*- i--r- w9- ,e e-y. m. y y-ws, -* *e t--9 w ---r--'-4f ee-c-m-4--vtw-t-m-ww- yee3 '5- -T wr9T mP' 99W9-d --^"'-' -
l 1 7 incident to the Washington County Sherif f 's Department, the UNUSUAL EVENT was 1 to have been terminated. l At 6:00 a.m. the following morning, a seized rotor led to a pressure
" spike" followed by short-term failure of the steam bypass valves. Although most valves reseat properly, the still unknown leak in the damaged vent valve resulted in increasing radiation activity in containment. This led to a
" puff" release sometime after 6:30 a.m., causing declaration of an ALERT.
, Following failure of offsite power to the plant, radioactive leakage continued increasing, and led to declaration of SITE AREA EMERGENCY sometime after 9:10 a.m. During this time period, a plant technician sustained a heart attack while drawing a sample of primary coolant, resulting in his (simulated) contamination and need for offsite decontamination / ambulance transport. Also, the plant sustained a small break LOCA which, coupled with failure of all onsite a.c. power due to a piston seizure in the diesel generator, precipitated declaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY at approximately 11:00 a.m. on December 7. Release . of radioactive gases to the environment terminated at about 2:00 p.m. following discovery and plugging of a steam line leak upstream of the defective valve, with subsequent downgrading of the event leading to exercise termination by about 4:30.
Table I shows the timeline for notification and receipt of information concerning changes in emergency classification levels at each of the offsite facilities activated for this exercise.
- , ,,en - -,, , -,,,,-----.,-?, ,y, ---,a-,, , . , , , ,y,--- - , - - + p-w,,m---.., c
e M Table l'
^
Selected Events Times, Locat1ons i Nebraska Iowa Washington Dodge llaLrrison State State County, County, County, Pottawattante EOC EOC NRC EOF IAC Ne. .Ne. Ia. County,Ia. Alert 6:24 6:20 6:27 N.O. 6:20 6:47 N.O. 7:26 ,7:45 Nottf! cation N.O. 6:20 N.O. 6:30 6:55 6:$3 6:24 7:29 8:41 EOC Activated N.O. 8:00 8:05 9:20 N.O. N.O. N.O. 11:10 not activated
- EOC Staffed 8
- 49 8:10 10:02 9:00 8:36 8:10 9:42 11:08 8:00 Site Area Emergency 9:25 9:26 9:27 9:27 9:27 9:28 9:32 9:26 9:31 Strens N.O. 9:35 N.O. 9:27 N.O. 9:33 9:42 9:26 9:34 Shelter Nessage 11:09 9:35 11:25 10:45 N.O. 11:17 N.O. 11:25 11:10-Evacuate 2 at i1:43 11:25 11:25 N.O. N.O. I1:45 N.O. I1:25 11:12 Evacuate 5 ml 12:45 N.O. 1:21 12:45 N.O. N.O. N.O. 12:59 12:42 Evaceiate 10 ml 1:05 12:38- N.O. 1:33 N.O. N.O. N.O. 2:08 e 12:59 Cen. Emergency 11:09 Il 1i 11:09 11:09 11:10 11:10 11:09 11:05 11:12
) Strens N.O. 11:12 N.O. N.O. N.O. N .O . - N.O. 12:09 9:34 EES Broadcaut N.O. 10:05 N.O. N.O. N.O. N.O. N.O. N.O. N.O.
- Downgrade N.O. N.O. 4
- 55 4:20 N.O. N.O. N.O. N.O. 4:29 1
1 N.O. not observed. - 4 9 3 . e
9 1.6 MILESTONES FOR EXERCISE OlLJECTIVES AND CRITIQUES Indicated below are milestones for exercise observacions and critiques l with scheduled and actual completion dates. ) Activity Scheduled Ac tual Commen t State and licensee jointly submit Se p t. 23 Sep t. 19 IA, NE exercise objectives to FEMA and NRC regional offices FEMA and NRC regional offices discuss Oct. 7 Oct. 18 and meet with licensee / state as necessary and prepare response State and licenses scenario developers. Oct. 24 Oct. 24 Inadequate submit exercise scenario to FEMA and scenario NRC regions for review \ detail for emission and me t da ta FEMA and NRC regions notify ' state and Nov. 2 Informslly licensee of scenario acceptability discussed FEMA and NRC regions develop specific Nov. 7 Nov. 30 Informally post exercise critique schedule with discussed the state and advise FEMA and NRC earlier;
' hesdquarters letter sent (11/30)
RAC chairman and NRL team leader meet Nov. 22 -Informally to develop observer actica plan discussed . Meeting in the exercise area, of all De c. 6 De c. 6 federal observers both onsite and offsite to finalize assignments, and give ins tructions
~ Exercise Dec. 6 & 7 Dec. 6 & 7 FEMA and RAC observers caucus 'to De c. 7 De c. 7 collate observations. NRC observers also caucus to collace observations.
. RAC chairman and NRC team leader meet, Dec. 8 Dec. 8 as soon af ter their respective caucuses as practical, to coordinate federal' participation in critique Joint RAC/NRC critique Dec. 8 Dec. 8
_ _ , ,,,__y_,,a . , . -, ,. _ . . . . . - - - . . _ _ - , _ _ _ - . . . _ , _ . - - , - , . _ , , , . _ , . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . . . - - . - -
10 1.7 STATE AND LOCAL RESOURCES
' Indicated below is a list of organizations whic'h planned to participata
. in the exercise.
,. Omaha Public Power Dis trict Federal Government , ,
- 1. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III
. State of Iowa
- 1. Iowa Office of Disas ter Services t
- 2. Iowa State Department of Health
- 3. Iowa National Cuard
- 4. Iowa Department of Public -Safety (Iowa Highway Patrol)
- 5. Iowa Department of Water, Air & Waste Management 1,
- 6. Iowa Department of Transportation
- 7. University Eygienic Laboratory
- 8. Office of the Governor, State of Iows
- 9. Office of the Attorney General, State of Iowa
- 10. ' Iowa Department of Social Services
- 11. Iowa Department of Agriculture
- 12. Iowa Commission on Aging *
- 13. Iowa Conservation Commission 14 Iowa Commerce Commission Counties
- 1. Harrison /Pottawattamie County Municipal Civil Defense and Disas car Services
- 2. Harrison /Pottawattamie County Health Departments
- 3. . Harrison /Pattawattamie County Sheriff's Departments 4 Harrison /Pettawattamie County Highway Engieeering Departments
- 5. - Harrison /Pottawattamie County Red Cross
- 6. - Harrison /Pottawattamie County Board of Supervisors
- State of Nebraska
- 1. Office of'the Governor
- 2. Civil Defense Agency
- 3. Department of Health 4.
, _ , -. w . - , s. . _,___,.-.,,,.,...,,_m-.,,_,.,-_.,,,-___m%..._y.--, , . .
..,.,,,...,%,.,._--.+_,.,,,.%._-ry.en.-,, m.,,_ .
t 11 1
- 4. State Patrol
- 5. Department of Aeronautics
'6. Commission on Aging
- 7. Department of Agriculture
- 8. University of Nebraska
- 9. Department of Economic Development
- 10. Department of Education
- 11. Educational Television Commission
, 12. State Fire Marshall '13.- Came and Parks Commission
- 84. National Guard
- 15. Commission on Indian Affairs
- 16. Department of Insurance
- 17. Department of.Public Ins titutions
- 18. Department of Public Welfare
- 19. Department of Roads
- 20. Department of Veterans Af fairs
- 21. Department of Environmental Control
~
1 Nebraska Counties
- 1. Washington County Civil Defense
- 2. Washington County Sheriff
- 3. _ Washington County Chairman of Commissioners 4 City of Blair: Mayor and City Administrator
-- 5 . Washington County Chamber of Commerce
- 6. Douglas and Dodge County REACT
- 7. . Blair Rescue Squad
- 8. Douglas County Civil Defense 9 .- Douglas County Fire Department
- 10. . Douglas County Beard
- 11. Douglas County Sheriff
- 12. Dodge County Civil Defense
- 13. City of Fremont Police Depart:sent 14 City of Fremont Civil Defense
- 15. City of Fremont Fire Department Volunteer Agencies ,
American Red Cross Salvation Arme
12
*1 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION This section presents the exercise evaluation grouped by State and county.- For each jurisdiction, there is an overview section, s. list of deficiencies, and NUREG-0654 Criteria . Element-by-Element (Planning Standard)
. l review.. Planning standards are designated by letters, corresponding to the NUREG-0654 letter . designations. The evaluation includes only those planning standards which are appropriate ' for off-site emergency response activities.
- . The evaluation criteria are fully described in Sec. 1.3 of this report.
However, it - should be reiterated that there were no ' deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding ' at this exercise of the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Power Station.- All deficiencies observed are in the second category. This category includes deficiencies, with accompanying recommendations, where demonstrated (and observed) performance during the exercise was considered faulty and corrective - actions are considered necessary, but other factors indicate that reasonable assurance could be given that, in a real radiological emergency.
- appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public. g s
2.~ 1 NE3RASKA OPERATIONS 2.1.1 - State EOC Overview
.The State EOC was activated and staffed in a timely manner according to
. established internal procedures. However, in a few cases the written call up
' list was' not up. to date. A representative of the State Police, Departaent of
~
Games and Parks, Department of Agriculture , Departnant of Health, Civil Defense, and the American Red Cross were present as well as a logging clerk. i' A capability for 24-hour staffing was - demonstrated by the presentatica of a ! roster for two shif t operation. These shif ts have been used and found to be
~ during natural disaster emergencies and corrects a previously adequate identified deficiency. The exercise indicated that actions taken by t e hState
} of Nebraska were adequate to protect the health and safety . of . ths pubhc. E However, the State plan fails to adequately describe the minimum siaff necessary to operate the EOC. Also, the state plan does not indicate how the
- State EOC interacts with the field command post (FCP) in making dose assess-
! sent calculations and procactive action recommendations. Management of the State EOC was good. The operations officer utili:ed the public address system to keep EOC. staff informed. The staff was involved in decision making and this was accomplished in an effective manner. Several [ copies of the plan were available. 'The operations officer informed the county - l
13 EOCs of emergency classification status changes immediately upon receipt froe
, the utility. Security measures were not provided at the entrances to the EOC. <
' The facilities at the State EOC were excellent. The EOC can be operated on a continuous basis through the use of a backup generator, bunks, showers, and a kitchen. Displays were adequate and a clearly visible status
- board Jwas kept up to date. The plume EPZ asp was divided. into sectors as specified in NUREG-0654 An overlay system was used to identify sheltering and evacuation areas
- and to display meteorological conditions.
.t Communications consisted .of telephone, civil defense national radio systems, and a high speed telecopier; there were no difficulties with the communications equipment during the exercise. Han radio operators were also 1
~available, if required. Conferencing was also available between the EOCs in Nebraska and Iowa , the media release center and the EOF. There was timely coordination - between the State EOC, the FC?, and the Washington County EOC.
This demonstration corrects a previously identified deficiency. Dose assessment and protective action recommendations were coordinated between EOC, the FCP, and CRUSH. The FCP served as the central point for the r
. receipt and analysis of radiological sonitoring data received from field teams dispatched by the State. The majority of all detailed calculations related to dose assessment were performed in the FCP. The radiological health representative in . the State EOC checked calculations using simple empirical graphs and/or equations. 'In most cases, data provided by the utility, and in
] .some cases, existing weather and road conditions, were used to aske plume " pathway protective action decisions. Ingestion pathway decisions were made in a similar manner. Due to the small amount of radioiodine released, only emergency workers within the plume EPZ were advised to take KI. Protective action recommendations made by Nebraska and Iowa could cause confusion between Nebraska and Iowa residences if the two states independently recommend different protective actions. This particular problem was demonstrated ' during the exercise when, at the same time in the exercise, the State of Iowa was reconnending evacuation of population and the State of L Nebraska was recossending caly placing livestock on stored feed. This problem becomes more significant when the population on both sides of the Missouri River are listening to the saas Emergency Broadcast Station (EBS) for instructions. Residences of Nebraska and Iowa would benefit if the two states
-would define an equivalent basis and decision chain for making protective actions relative to siren activation, sheltering, evacuation, etc.
L I.ccal Civil Defense personnel actions to activate the siren systems were initiated by a utility recommendation that was ' relayed to the local level by.the State EOC. This same recommendation initiated actions to notify the area. EBS station. Following the test signal made by the EBS station, an announcement was conveyed relating to the Fort Calhoun exercise. The EBS
~. -- l 14 ! l f message was made in less than 15 minutes af ter receiving the initial utility's l recommendation. Protective action instructions to the public were prepared as a joint venture by the State EOC and the FCP. Instructions made by the state, in most . cases, used NUREG-0654 sector designations rather than geographical boundaries which would be more familiar to local residents.
, The . county has responsibility for evacuation and access control with assistance from various state agencies. During the exercise, the state patrol assisted with access control points and representatives ,at the EOC were .. avellable to monitor traffic flow using aircraft. The FAA was notified by the Department of Aeronautics to restrict air space and the Coast Guard was notified to blockade water traffic on the Missouri River. ,
Dairy- farms were instructed to go on stored feed at the Alert stage as a precautionary measure. Listings and maps of dairy farms, food processing plants, and produce crop farne were available. In addition, updated statistical data on crops could be made available. An underground water supply in -the involved area precluded any necessity for water supply - protective actions.
\
The states' media activities were implemented at the :nedia release center (MRC) and the information authentication center ( IAC) . The IAC was located at the EOF and a State PIO was stationed there. Press releases were
,telefaxed to the State EOC.
The exercise objectives did not include recovery and reentry functions. Therefore, Nebraska's demonstration of this activity was extremely limited. Actions taken at the State EOC were made in response to input from state field operations. Deficiencies That Would Imad to a Negative Finding No deficiencias that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the State EOC during this exercise. (Deficiencies and Recosnandations '
- 1. Deficiency: The written State plan fails to adequately describe the minimum number of personnel to operate the EOC and how the State EOC interacts with the Field Command Post personnel in asking dose assessment calculations and protective action decisions (NUREG-0654, II, A.I.b, A.2.a).
Recommendation: It would be beneficial if the State plan was clarified in order to allow maximum flexibility of existing conditions and available state resources.
15
~
- 2. Deficiency: A potential problem between the radiological health decision makers in Nebraska and Iowa exists in how protective . actions recommendations are made for sectors adjacent to and-overlapping the Missouri River.
Recotunendation: When the plume travels across the
' Missouri -River, residents of Iowa and Nebraska would
, . benefit if the two states would define an equivalent basis
* .and decision chain - for making protective actions relative
'to siren activation, sheltering, evacuation, etc.
- 3. Deficiency: Protective action instructions to the public were provided using NUREG-0654 sector designations rather than familiar geographical boundaries.
Recommendstion: - Use - of familiar geographical boundaries in describing areas affected by protective actions and recommendations would be more clearly understandable to local residents. \
\
2.1.2 State Civil Defense Portable Operations Center - CRUSH Overview-The CRUSH is a mobile van that primarily performs ' a communication function for 'the various response organizations. It provides the main communications link between the field command post and the state EOC. CRUSH
.has capability for connunications with local governments and the EOF. The mobile unit . also provides an operational area for the Governor's repres~enta-tives and an area for staff to perform dose assessment calculations.
The communications equipment was excellent and well-trained personnel .. performed- all .of the necessary communication activities. Telephone l~ . connections and AC power vere provided and a backup powee generator was 1.
- available. ~ The radio equipment included several frequencies. A reposter was-available on - the frequency used by, the field monitoring teams. thus " dead"
[ spots were ' eliminated. Additional hand-held radios were also available if [" needed. j1 The dose calculations were performed at CRUSH in an acceptable manner following procedures recommended by EPA. The calculations were made in a timely fashion af ter the data was received from the utility by CRUSH. Delays of up to 45 minutes in receiving the utility data were encountered. Thus, independent dose calculations by the state were too late for useful decision making. On . one occasion. incorrect data was supplied to CRUSH from the utility, thus state dose projections were significantly different from the
t 16 utility. No ' apparent attempt was made to resolve this data discrepancy probles. Also, because the projected plume' track as not plotted, inefficient use of the field monitoring teams was evident.
.The staff at CRUSH and ~ one of the field teams were issued simulated -
TLDs. The use of simulated TLDs created concerns as to whether a sufficient number of TLDs were actually available when clearly an insufficient number of staulated TLDs were distributed. Direct-read dosimeters were available and K1 was administered to the field monitoring teams. The order for the use of, KI ,
- came late in the emergency phase. .If KI was to be used, it should have been administer =d l' to' 2 hours earlier and should have been based on a, source tera sufficiently high to warrant such use.
, Significant problems were encountered - with the scenario data. The source terms used during the exercise were not compatible with the plume measurement data provided to the field teams. In addition, information provided to the field teams was not in the proper form; the information provided was not field data, the data consisted of calculations derived from field data.
\
s Deficiencies That Would Imad to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative were observed at CRUSH '. during this exercise. Deficiencies and Recommendations
- 1. Deficiency: Delays of up to 45 minutes were encountered in the receipt of utility data at CRUSH. On one occasion incorrect data was supplied to. CRUSH from the utility, rasulting in state dose projections that were j significantly different from the utility's. No apparent
- j. attempt was ande by the state to resolve this data discrepancy (NUREG-0654, II, I.8, I.10).
Recommendation: The cause of the delays in receipt of data needs to be identified and a remedy implemented. !' Additional training and/or a review of procedures in
- verifying accuracy of utility data is needed.
- 2. pficiency: The lack of sufficient simulated TLDs raises l
i- concerns as to whether a sufficient number of TLDs could actually be made available in a real ~ emergency (NLTEC-
'0654. II, K.3.a).
1 i
17 Recommenddelin: The use of simulated TLDs as a means to display capability is not . recommended. It is suggested that. permanent-record dosimetry availability be demon-strated in future exercises.
- 3. Deficiency: The order for the use of KI occurred late in the exercise; KI should have been administered 1 to 2 hours earlier and should have been based on source terms .
, sufficiently high to warrant its use (NUREG-0654 II, J.10.f).
Recommendation: The predccernined conditions under which
. decisions are made to administer radioprotective drugs to off-site emergency workers should be reviewed.
4 Deficiency: The-. source terms used during the exercise were . not compatible with the field data - provided. Alro, fie'Ld data supplied to the field teams were not in the
' proper form; the . data provided were calculations derived from field data (NUREG-0654, II.I).
Recommendation: Assure that source teras used during the
. exercise are compatible with the field data provided and make provisions to ensure that field data supplied to field . teams are ; in the proper form. The final scenario should be provided to FEMA to review for completeness s.nd
, accuracy at leasti '45 days. prior to the exercise.
2.1.3 . State Patrol Mobile Communications Facility - Bluebird t'
- Overview g
The Bluebird. uni.. is part of the State 71 eld Command Post complex and provides . alternate communications for CRUSH as well as support ' for law enforcement operations in the plume' EPZ. Bluebird maintains radio or mobile telephone contact with CRUSH. This operation was performed as planned and no communications or sessage interpretation probleas were identified. All appropriate . asps and SOPS were available and the Bluebird team demonstrated effective knowledge of operating procedures. The ::1uebird cean simulated many activities, including refueling patrol autos, the Bluebird bus. and power
. generators. Twenty-four hour staffing of the Bluebird bus and patrol officers was evident' 'and an individual was being trained during the exercise to add future staffing flexibility and-depth. Overall, decision making, message flow and management were well demonstrated and no deficiencies were identified.
l . m
. .. - - -. - ~, - - - - . - - . . . . _ _ - - - - - - - - - - . . . - : . __ _ . -
18 2.1.4 Field Monitoring Teams . Two teams were involved in field monitoring in' Nebraska. An overview-and deficiencies and recommendations are provided below for each team from the state of Nebraska and from the Cooper Nuclear Power Station. 2.1.4.1 Nebraska Tess Overview . The early phases of field team mobilization seem to have been conducted expeditiously. Team member were notified f rom a written call list, which included home and work telephone numbers and a listing of backup personnel.
- Team members arrived at the EOF from Lincoln in 1.5 hours. A 4-wheel drive vehicle with equipment packed was ready for rapid deployment. However, before deployment the team was not briefed on current plant or meteorological conditions. Consunications between the Nebraska field team and CRUSH were established immediately by use of UHF and VHF radios. This
- communications link was maintained throughout the exercise and generally functioned well.
The Nebraska field team was well-equipped. N four-wheel drive was suitable for most terrain but experienced an electrical problem which required that it be jump started whenever the engine was turned off. h field team had a checklist for equipment which was contained in the vehicle. According to team members the equipment had been calibrated in March or April, 1983. Radiation monitoring equipment included a hand-held 0-2000 mR/hr survey meter, a 0-50R/hr full range Ionization chamber instrument, and a sodium iodida scintillation counter with multichannel analyzer, which was not functional. Air sampling equipment operated on power from the vehicle and both charcoal and silver zeolite cartridges were available. Additional sampling equipment. included a soil or snow sampling shovel, plastic collection bags, containers, writing materials, identification labels, and plastic jugs for water and milk
-saeples.
Field team technical operations were performed reasonably well. h team did not perfora calculations in the field. Instrument readings were transmitted by radio to the health physicist at CRUSH who was to perfora the calculations. h team was generally familiar with the area being monitored. h team had their G-M counter activated and the battery checked, but did not use a radioactive sou:ce for on-the-spot calibration. Team
~ members used the instruments correctly to obtain ground and air readings. An air sample was collected using equipment in the vehicle. The team also drove to a stationary air sampler near the plant and simulated a cartridge change.
A . snow sample was collected and placed in a plastic bag rather than in a leakproof container. Overall, the team members were reasonably well acquainted with their equipment, but some minor confusion in operation of the insenaments occurred. The team had not had an adequate opportunity to become W
4
. ( .
/
3 1
\ 19 familiar with their sodium iodide i gaana spectrometry system prior to the exercise.
Radiological exposure control equipment was good. Each - team :nember had both a mid-range _-(0-20 R) and a high range (0-100 R) dosimeter; these dosimetees 'were read and recorded with acceptable frequency. A survey meter
.. was kepff operating . in thy ,enicle - to provide a continuous indication of
. counting ( cace.gthus providing an indication if they were moving into the plume.vf A'
- charger for the dosimeters was available. Film badges were availa' oleYbu6 TLDs were simulated. Simulated KI was taken when instructions from CRUSH indkdated to do so. Additional equipment available included anti-contnaination s2'.cs, boots, gloves, and air tanks with respirators. There was
~
- indication cf a.1 teed to familiarize the team members;with maximum dose allowed without auth'osization inii what procedures should be carried out if an excess dose was , received.
Overall, the scenario did not well utilize or effectively test the Nebraska field, team. Isstrument readings were taken from only one monitoring point. This was not a field team inadequacy, the team performed well as directed..-However, the field team was not directed properly to obtain usefdl plume informatica.' Furthermore, a controller with cue ' cards was not assigned to chef 'ffaid team, thus, the only source of exercise data was an incomplete listing' ot' whole$ body dose rate and iodine concentration that was available to the federaf observer. Deficiencies That 1pImad' to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed for the Nebraska field radiological monitoring team. r i f > a Deficie' ncies and Recommendations ~
. t-7 . ,
4
- 1. Deficiency: 3efore dekloyment,. khe fiald team was not brieged on current, plant or meteorological conditions (NURIC-0654;II.F.). 'x
, V~
Recommen'dation: ,
'driefing of the field team prior to deployment , wo sic . better snable the team to respond to radiological %onditions as they change.
y ,
- 2. Deficiency: The sodium iodide scintillation counter was not fully functional 'and' was not used during the exercise.v. T'te field ' vehicle experienced an electrical starting probles. p Also,'aquipment available to the team was. not consiste: t with the plan (NUREG-06%,II.H.10).
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1 20
-Recommendation:- The causes of any instrument zalfunctions should be identified and remedial actions taken to ensure that this instrument and - all equipment, including vehicles, are working properly; field- teams should have adequate , opportunity to - become fully familiar. with new equipment prior - to an exercise. The plan or equipment available 'needs to be ' adjusted to reflect consistency. -
- 3. Deficiency: A snow sample was placed in a plastic bag- -
. rather - than a properly sealed container to prevent its
~1ose by leakage.
Recommendation: A review of procedures and equipment-needs for snow sampling is suggested
- 24 Deficiency: Low range dosimeters were not available and familiarization was. not -evident with regard to maximum
' dose allowed ' without authorization, and what procedures should be implemented if an excess dose was received
. (NUREG-0654 II, K.3.a. K.5.a) .
s Recommendation: Low-range dosimeters are needed for field team members. 'Also, . additional training is needed on understanding maximum doses allowed without authorization and' procedures to be implemented if . an excess dose is received.
- 5. Deficiency: The Nebraska ~ field team was not directed properly to obtain 'useful plume information (NUREG-0654, II.I.8).
Recommendation: . Samples from additional monitoring points are needed - to obtain useful information on the plume. A controller ~ needs to.be assigned 'to the field teams to input essential data that- will allow complete and worthwhile field team exercising.
~2.1.4.2 Cooper Nuclear Power Station Team
- Overview The field monitoring team consisted of professional staff from the Cooper Nuclear Power Station. The team - was notified at about 7:30 a.m., was dispatched from' the Cooper Station at approximately 8:00 a.m. and arrived at the EOF at 9:40 a.m. Prior to their deployment the field team was not briefed w- -- e y e iw w w-m,e-- --3-- -e-t--e-c-%ew w -we- m e s Mr --- rmv er a. ,er------mrwa rw + arwe enmer ,,-w.p-s,,w.sw, y 9, w es g --w--w=e
-21 i l
on t plant or meteorological conditions nor were they kept informed of these t conditions throughout the exercise; c The Coop 4r field team communicated with CRUSH by radio. The radio and
. antenna were installed in their vehicle upon their arrival at their deployment point. A hand-held portable radio was available, but the field team did not
.- obtain one.- Overall,_ communications were very good with no - dead spots noted. However, when the field team went ~ to the decontamination center'they were -not in communication with CRUSH for about, 20 minute _s.
The field vehicle was adequate for the- team members and equipment and was suitable for all expected terrain - and weather conditions. Radiation monitoring instruments were available. All appropriate air sampling equipment was .available except .for charcoal cartridges. Plastic bags, writing materials,. and identification labels were available for soil and water sampling. -Equipment was not available'for taking water or slik samples.
~The field . team completed an operational check of the equipment;
- batteries were installed and instrumener were source-checked. A large map
_ clearly indicated color-coded predetermined sampling points.
- Access to the sample locations was good. However, because ' sampling occurred at only two monitoring points and these were not in the plume, the monicoring team was not used effectively for tracking the plume. The team took ground readings at . the
' two monitoring points and recorded them on a form. An air sample was taken
' and the calibration curve on the air pump was used to determine the time to take a 5 ft3 -air saapic. Silver' zeolite cartridges were available in the kic; a blank cartridge was used for the exercise. Counting (simulated) outside the plume was done with an Eberline E-140 with an HP210 pancake head. Conversion from mR/hr to -uCi/cc was ' accomplished using 'a chart and interpolating between table values. This method was not described in the plan.
.The Cooper monitoring team had anti-contamination clothing and full- ,
f ace respirators with charcoal cartridges. .The team members were issued K1
.(simulated), however, it was administered too late in the exercise. Only low-range (0-1 R) dosimeters were available; aid- to high-range dosimeters .were not available. Overall, the monitoring team was choroughly trained in the use of dosimetry equipment.
Deficiencies That Would had to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed for the field radiological monitoring teaa 'from the Cooper Nuclear Power Station.
22 { l 1
- Deficiencies and Recossendations !
- 1. . Deficiency: Prior to field team deployment, the Cooper team was not briefed on plant or meteorological conditions
- nor was - the .teaa ' nt informed of these ' conditions throughout the exercise. The- team also was not in couaunication with CRUSH while it was at the decontamination center (NUREG-0654, II.F).
Recommendation: Field teams. should be briefed on plant conditions prior to deployment and communications should . be maintained throughout the exercise.
- 2. Deficiency: The Cooper field team did not have charcoal cartridges for air sampling. Equipment was not available for water and milk sampling. The team also did not acquire a hand-held portable radio (NUREG-0654, II.
H.7,'10). Recommendation: Monitoring and communication equipment should be available to accomplish the assigned field monitoring responsibilities of. the Cooper team.
- 3. Deficiency: Conversions from mR/hr to pCi/cc. was accomplished using a chart a'2d interpolating between table values; thia . method was not in the -plan (NUREG-0654 II.
, I.7). I Recommendation: Review the plan or procedures regarding this activity and 'make changes and/or revisions as appropriate. 4 Deficiency: Only low-range (0-1 R) dosimeters vera available. Permanent record devices were simulated (NUREG-t 0654, II, K.3.a), l Recommendation: Provide the field team with mid- and
- -high-range dosimetry. Availability and use of permanent j record devices should be demonstrated in. a future exercise.
! 5. Deficiency: The monitoring team was not used effectively for tracking the plume because only' two non-plume L monitoring points were sampled (NUREG-0654. II, I.8). Recommendation: Samples from additional monitoring points within the plume need to be taken to effectively track the f ' plume. The plan should be reviewed to assure proper use and management of the field teams. l i w 4 - < m-ge- -,w-~~e e-e ,-,e-.,-,-,e-,,--m , .e s_mwn.e----e,--e.-,,,,, ,-w,wem-n-~e-nn,---,weaeee-se,,-,,e,wwe,-non ew e,,--+n--,o-mee-w-ew---.n e
23 2.1.5 Radiological bboratory Overview The ' radiological laboratory did not actually participate in the exercise, but laboratory operations were reviewed prior _ to the exercise at the request of the state. The radiological laboratory equipment was sufficient to perform the sample analyses. Equipment included a multichannel analyzer, a TLD reader, an: alpha and beta co' u nter, a liquid scintillation spectrometer, and semi-conduceer detectors. The TLD system was not operational. Except for
- a ' liquid scintillation system, no other backup equipment were present.
, Equipment was calibrated using EPA quality control standards.
The staff consists of one part-time chemist plus a consultant on call'. Two additional chemists are available with minimal radiochemistry training for back up. One additional trained and experienced individual would be desirable to provide two shif ts of two persons each. The staff training was adequate, but participation in drills or exercises would provide needed experience. 1 A commercial telephone was available to communicate with the EOF. Communication between . the laboratory and the field monitoring teams could be relayed'chrough the EOF. Procedures for identification and quantitative measurement of gamma-emitting radioisotopes using the multichannel analyzer were discussed. No-technical operations were observed at the radiological laboratory during this exercise so- that performance was not demonstrated. Overall, considerable improvements -have been nade since the previous observation. Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding There were no deficiencies that would. lead to a negative finding observed at, the radiological laboratory during this exercise. Deficiencies and Recommendations
- 1. Deficiency: The radiological laboratory should be able to demonstrate a capability to function over a prolonged period (NUREG-0654, II, A.4).
' Recommendation: One additional trained and experienced individual would be desirable to provide two shif ts of two persons each.
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24
- 2. Deficiency: Backup equipment for analfzing media samples were not present (NUREG-0654,.II, H.10).
Recommandation: Provisions and arrangement for backup equipment should be made. Sufficient analytical equipment may be available through the use of backup laboratories.
- 3. ~ Deficiency: No technical operations were observed .at the radiological laboratory during this exercise (NUREG-0654,
*- II,' N.2.d).
Recommendation: The exercise should include analysis of sample media and a demonstration of communications and record keeping.
- 2.1.6 Dana College Coliseum Decontamination Center
\
Overviev. . 1 The Dana College Coliseum was used as the decontamination center because the primary site, the Blair High School, was not available for use. The operation of the center was simulated. Evacuee monitoring points were identified, sufficient monitoring equipment was available and pathways for contaminated and .non-contaminated persons were shown. Methods were described for decontamination . and shower facilities were available.- Provisions for i disposing of contaminated waste and for temporary replacement clothing were L evident. Decontamination of vehicles was not demonstrated. It was indicated that in warm weather, a parking lot would be'used for decontamination and that an indoor bay. at the fire station would be used in winter. l Deficiencies That Would Imad to a Negative Finding I lI No deficiencies were observed at the decontamination center that would l'esd to a negative finding. l Deficiencies and Recommendations
- 1. Deficiency: The availability of State health physics personnel .over an- extended . period of time was not demon-strated (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a). '
Recommendation: State health physics personnel should be assigned .to provide 24-hour capability. 1 i
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- 2. Deficiency: Activities presented at the decontamination facility were simulated.
Recommendation:- A demonstration of decontamination center capabilities should be carried out in a future exercise. 2.1.7 University of Nebraska Medical Center and the Blair Rescue Squad Overview The Blair Rescue Squad provided ambulance service for the transfer of an injured-contaminated (simulated) individual from the plant to the University ; ' of Nebraska Medical Center (UNHC). Appropriate radio cotusunications between the ambulance service and the hospital were not evident. The ambulance service personnel were also not provided with appropriate protective. equipment, dosimeters, and radiation monitoring equipment. The ambulance crew was 'also not trained in radiological activities. 1 The utility informed the UNMC that the Blair Rescue Squad would be transporting an individual to the hospital. The hospital was fully prepared and facilities were excellent to ' handle injured-contaminated individuals. Several medical doctors and health (radiation) physicists were - present and properly attired. Procedures for dealing with injured-contaminated persons were thoroughly demonstrated. Contaminated areas were isolated from non-contaminated areas and equipment was available for analysis 'of smears, whole body (internal) measurements, and thyroid scans. Overall, the hsalth activities and professional performance at the hospital were excellent. ( ' Deficiencies That k*ould Lead to a Negative Finding 1 There were . no deficiencies that , would lead to a negative finding observed at. the University of Nebraska Medical Center, i.
. Deficiencias and Recommendations
- 1. Deficiency: The Blair Ambulance Crew was not provided with radiation monitoring equipment, dosimetry, protective clothing. . adequate communications , . and radiation . training
[, (NURIG-0654 II, L.). - l i' l'
5 26 9 Recommendation: All appropriate equipment should be provided to rescue squads and. ambulance services involved in the transport- of injured-contaminated individuals. Training is also needed in all aspects of radiation
-control. ,
1 2.2 ' NEBRASKA' COUNTY OPERATIONS 2.2.1 Washington' County Overview
' The Washington County EOC had adequate furniture, space, lighting and telephones to carry out the assigned emergency _ response functions. Backup power was available and is tested monthly. The emergency classification level was posted and-a status board was available; however, the status board was not kept updated. Appropriate maps were either posted or available in planning documents..
The Nebraska State Patrol notified the County Sheriff dispatcher of the Alert classific.ation. The dispatcher conveyed this information to the County
- CD Director. The. CD Director understood the message to be ap Unusual Event rather than an Alert. Thus, a delay in staff activation occurred. All appropriate organizations were represented at the EOC. In general all staff displayed - good ~ training. and knowledge in their respective emergency response functions. It was indicated that 24-hour staffing would -require backup' support for the CD Director and the County PIO.
Emergency operations management was effe~ctively carried out by the CD Director with coordination with 'the state liaison ' to the EOC and the County. Sheriff._ Appropriate staff were involved in decision making. Plans, written procedures and checklist.s were available, ~1ogs were kept, and internal message , handling was efficient. Security measures for control of access to the EOC were good.
- ' The Washington County EOC _was properly equipped and demonstraced good communications capabilities. All . appropriate primary and backup communica-tions links were available and used effectively.
It was not totally clear as to the degree to which the RAM and REACT volunteer organizations would be utilized in an actual emergency. The EOC staff, -in coordination with the county communications center (County Sheriff . Dispatch) demonstrated good capability to alert the public on a timely basis. Public alerting included siren activation and transmission of
. an l initial sessage to the EBS station, and overall activation of the system
- within 15 'sinutes of the receipt of the Site Area Emergency declaration.
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27 Further instructions in response to the need for protective actions following the General Emergency declaration were formulated and released by the information auch< acication . center and the media release center. The County EOC provided descriptions of areas affected by protective actions by landmarks that were understandable to the public.
.Special evacuation issues were identified and related to the availabil .
, icy of buses for school evacuations, communications between the school
=
superintendent and the EOC, the alerting and a'vailability of bus drivers, and expectations of evacuation of school children by parents rather than by buses. A system was not inplace for the identification of noninstitutional-ized mobility-impaired individuals or provisions for their transportation. Similarly, procedures have not been established for notifying institutions and acquiring necessary means of transportation for individuals included therein. The County appeared to have an adequate supply of aid-range dosimeters. Permanent record dosimeters were not available. Instructions were issued along with the self-reading dosimeters that indicated reading and reporting of dosimeters by the field personnel on an hourly ' basis. These readings were reported to the Blair Police Chief or the County Sh2triff. Reentry. activities were adequately audressed following receipt of recommendations and directions from the State. Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding There were no deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding at the Washington County EOC. Deficiencies and Recommendations
- 1. aiciency: A misunderstanding of the emergency classifi-cation existed between the County Sheriff Dispatcher and the CD Director. This caused a delay in staff notifica-tion and activation (NURIC-0654, II, D.3,4).
i Recommendation: Additional training in notification procedures and a review of verification procedures is suggested.
- 2. Deficiency: It was not clear to what extent the HAM and REACT volunteer radio operators would be available at the~
EOC in the event of an actual emergency (NUREG-0654, II, A.2.a). l l I i
. - - , , , - . , ~ , , . . . , - - - . ,,_,,n,.---,._,-,,,-.-,,--.,n,,--,,,,-,., , , , , , , - - , , , , - , , . , ~ , - - r---
28 Recommendation: The county plan should include a descrip-tion of the extent that these volunteer organizations will
, participate in an actual emergency . Appropriate letters of agreement would help to . define the axtent of availa-bility.
, 3. Deficiency:. Special issues relating to the evacuation of
. schools and the mobility-impaired 'have not been adequately
, addressed (NUREG-0654 II, J.10.c, J.10.d). *
' Recommendation: Procedures which need to be defined for the - evacuation of schools include: the extent to which 1 buses will be used, coordination and coanunication between the .EOC and the ' school superintendents, alerting and availability of. bus drivers, and expectations of parents picking their children up at the schocis. Activities ,
which _ need to be addressed in the evacuation of mobility-impaired include. a systes for the identification of noninstitutionalized individuals. Provision for'ghair evacuation plus notification of institutions, is needed. 4 Deficiency Low-range (0-200 mR) and permanent record dosimeters were not available. Dosimeters were read on an hourly basis, this is not frequent enough under certain circumstances (NUREC-0654, II,'K.3.a). Recommendation: Low-range, direct-read' and permanent record dosimeters- are -needed. The interval between readings of the dosimeters is dependent upon ene dose rate to . which the workers are exposed. An interval of 15 minutes or even more frequent could be required in high radiation fields (greater- than 1 R/h). Changes to instructions provided with dosimeters should be considered. 2.2.2 Dodge County Overview-Dodge. County activated the County EOC and a relocation center. These two operations were performed separately, with the relocation / congregate care / decontamination activities taking place apart from the EOC and at a site alternate to the principal location. The Dodge County ECC had sufficient furniture, space, and lighting for
. emergency operations. Portable equipment would be brought in to support i
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29 extended operations. Noise was controlled and backup power was available and demonstrated. The emergency classification level was clearly visible and posted at the status - board. The status board was kept up to date and all appropriate maps were posted or available. The coemunications ' system was exceptional with at least one person on duty at all times. Emergency operations management was handled by the emergency coordinator.- All messages received prompt responses. Staff briefings were
- held periodica11y ' and appropriate staff were involved in decision making.
Security provisions were also evident. Overall, the staff displayed excellent training . and knowledge from demonstrating activation and staffing procedures to performing emergency response activities throughout the exercise.
. Sirens and EBS massages we re carried out (simulated) in a timely - manne r. Several subsequent EBS messages were provided; these were coordinated with the IAC (simulated) and messages were monitored over the radio.
The Police Chief (also the County CD Director) coordinated radiological exposure control activities and performed the duties commendably. Low- and mid-range dosimeters were available in sufficient quantities. The availability of. permanent record dosiesters was not observed. Activities at the Dodge. County relocation center included registering, monitoring, decontaminating, and congregate care of evacuees. The center 'was opened - by 11:00 a.m. with the Red Cross and volunteer personnel handling registration operations. A police officer and two communication operators were also on duty. Police directed incoming automobiles to an area where they would . be' monitored. Two individuals checked evacuees as they entered the registration building. Evacuees were then directed to the registration area where the registration coordinator and volunteers processed the evacuees. The individuals performed well, however, registration cards were not forwarded. with evacuees when they proceeded to the congregate care area. This was corrected immediately when evacuees arrived at the congregate care area. A call. back to the registration area confirmed that evacuees had been registered. Overall, the registration and congregate care functions were carried out . effectively and acciommodations for medical and congregate care were sufficient. Proper procedures were used to check evacuees and vehicles for
. contamination. The outer clothing including shoes as well as exposed hair and skin were well checked on each evacues. Two showers were available and additional portable showers were also available. Any contaminated clothing or materials would be placed in a sealed container. All areas of automobiles pote'ntially in contact with~ radiation (cires, air filters, pedals, and exterior surfaces) would be checked and decontaminated if necessary using fire hoses for exterior surfaces and interior areas would be cleaned. This process would ' be repeated if necessary. Wastewater would flow into the sever system and would not be disposed of in streams or into the groundwater.
l
30 l
'Overall, activities were performed well at the Dodge County EOC and the relocation center. Procedures were generally adequate and equipment appeared to be sa tisf actory . It is sugges ted that some additional training, in the 1 form of a refresher course or an exercise review session, be conducted to I refine the already acceptable procedures demonstrated during the exercise.
- Deficiencies That Would I.ead to a Negative Finding There were no deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding .
observed at the Dodge County EOC. 2.3 109A STATE OPERATIONS 2.3.1 State EOC
\
Overview s Alert and notification of the Iowa State EOC (ISEOC) was done
- p ro mp tly . The Fort Calhoun Nuclear Power Station (FCNPS) contacted the state public radio initially, who in turn notified the ISEOC. The communication network is continuously monitored. Notification to activate the ISEOC was received at 0620 hours. Staf f mobilization procedures were demonstrated using an up-to-date, written call lis t. The Alert notification was initiated during
, the period when some s taf f membe rs were enroute to work. As a result,
- notification was not couplete until the participants arrived at work. The center was staf fed and operational within 2 hours of the initial notifica-tion. A total of 10 agencies were represented at the ISEOC. Three agencies identified in the plan were not represented during the exercise
- the American Rad Cross, the Iowa Department of Aging, and the Iowa Depart:nent of Water, Air, and Was te Management.
All-ISEOC staf f displayed adequate training and knowledge. Round-the-clock staffing was' demonstrated using shif t changes for the Depar tmen ts of Commerce, Agriculture, and Conservation. One representative was prepositioned at the EOF to function as liaison wi.th the ISEOC and to act as a public infortantion of ficer (PIO). The ISEOC was well-managed and decis ion-:naking procedures followed those described in the plan. The ISEOC staff and all agency personnel functioned well as an integrated unit. Facilities at the ISECC were satisfactory. With kitchen, sleeping, showe r, . and emergency backup power facilities, the ISEOC can function over extended periods. The status board was clearly visible to all participants and kep t . up to date. Other displays, including maps of the plume EPZ,
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1 31 evacuation routes, access control points, and radiological sonitoring sites, were posted. However, different identification of radiological sonitoring sites by the utility and state led to some confusion. Maps of population
- density by evacuation area, and relocation centers were not posted. '
Installation of speaker phones for the operations staff and radiological monitoring teams greatly enhanced the telephone communications and overail- coordination. In general, all communications systems identified in the plan were operational and functioned well. A telefax linking the media release center (MRC) and the ISEOC was slow. However, the utility installed a
. dedicated telefax line from the EOF to the ISEOC which produced timely and
- high quality copies.
Dose assessment. functions were effectively carried out. Expected doses were derived from plant release data and field readings. Field data were reported promptly. Dose calculations were performed. by hand and using simulation models. The plume was correctly defined and plotted on a map.
. Periodic estimates of total population exposure were made.
Protective action recommendations for the plume and ingestion pathways were made. All pertinent factors were considered in asking these recommendations including plant- status, evacuation times, and meteorology.
. The - protective action recommendations were promptly reviewed and updated as conditions changed. The recommendations were not well-coordinated between Iowa and Nebraska. Emergency public instructions were developed in the ISEOC. Prescripted Esergency Broadcast System (EBS) messages were clear and appropriate to the situation. To avoid confusion, Iowa issued protective action orders using well-known, local landmarks rather than just sectors.
The ISE0C played a primary role 'in public alerting when the Site Area Emergency was declared at 0926. Forasi and informal briefings were conducted regarding the appropriate protective action recommendations. Iowa also discussed current ~ developments with Nebraska officials. Iowa elected to recommend via EBS in-house sheltering. The siren system was activated at 0935, but the EBS message broadcast was delayed until 1005. The decision was made to order evacuation of the 2-mile radius at 1112. The highway patrol notified all families individually by dispatching a patrol car to conduct the house-to-house notification. Only 26 people were affected within the 2-mile . EPZ and everyone was contacted within 20 minutes. An EBS message was also prepared. At L238, evacuation was ordered for the 10-alle ' EPZ. This ' increased the number of affected residents to 384, requiring
- evacuation to the relocation center. The location of mobility-impaired and special needs persons was known and checked. The highway patrol did an
- excellent job in conducting the evacuation and the control of access points.
No problems were encountered with these activities. Current information was available for dairy farms, food processing plants, water supply intakes, and detailed crop information. Recommendations
32 were prepared. regarding ingestion pathway protective actions. The few cattle located --within the 10-mile EPZ were to be sheltered and placed on stored I feed. Representatives from the state Department of Agriculture were knowledgable of the plan and were well-integrated into the EOC staff. Although agricultural . play was limited, the representative volunteered briefings to the observers. He demonstrated accurate and enthusiastic e - responses to alternative situations requiring his involvement. -
.The decision to order potassium iodide . (KI) for the radiological 'e aonitoring team was based on projected radioiodine releases and consistent with the plan. ~ There was not an adequate supply of KI for other energency workers, however. The EOF was contacted for additional KI for members of the highway patrol., . The utility did not kamt if they had sufficient amounts at first, but quickly located and ande available 'the amount requested. Personnel were adequately protected,- but sufficient KI should be on hand according to the plan. ' The Iowa National Guard prepositioned KI t.earby in the event troops were required to go into the area later. The state health official did an excellent Job in decision making regarding reentry. The ISEOC thoroughly
- discussed the FCNPS recommendation to conduct recovery operations, despite no downgrade from the General Emergency classification level. As ag result, Iowa delayed reentry and recovery activities until official dose readings were received confirming that the area was safe to reenter.
Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding
-There were no deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding observed at the ISEOC.
Deficiencies and Recommendations
~
- 1. Deficiency: All organizations having energency responsibilities and' identified in the plan did not participate in the exercise (NUREG-0654 II, N.1.b).
Recommendation: Each organization shall establish procedures for alerting, notifying, and mobilizing emergency response personnel.
- 2. Deficiency: The siren system was activated at 0935, but the EBS message broadcast was delayed until 1005 (NUREG-0654 II, E.5,6).
Recommendation: Procedures need to be developed to ensure proept broadcast of EBS messages following siren activation.
33
- 3. Deficiency: -Maps or - displays of population density by evacuation area, and relocation centers were not posted ;
-(NUREG-0654, II, J.10.a,b). I Recommendation: Maps showing population distribution , around .the nuclear facility by evacuation areas, and maps showing relocation, centers in _ host areas should be prepared and posted.- .
- 4. Deficiency: The current state plan was discovered to - be in error identifying the number of families residing within the 2-mile EPZ -in Pottawattamie County (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.b).
Recommendation: The plan should be updated to indicate the correct number of families residing within each emergency planning zone.
- 5. Deficiency: Designations for. the same radio 1'ogical sonitoring site differed -between the utility and the state. The difference apparently created some confusion (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.a). -
Recommendation: The utility and the state should use a common designater for radiological monitoring sites.
- 6. De ficiency: An adequate supply of KI was not present for all emergency workers (NUREC-0654, II, J.10.e).
Recommendation: Provisions for the use of radioprotective drugs, including adequate quantities, - storage, and means of distribution, particularly for emergency workers must be made.
- 7. Deficionev:- No direct contact was made with the PCEOC afcar 1248 hours on the ' open line. The line remained operational, but .no one confirmed the county's presence during this critical period of' the exercise (NUREG-0654, II, Appendix 3, 2.b).
Recommendation: It is suggested that procedures for
. communications checks (e.g., a roll call) be developed to assure communications operation and receipt of messages.
S. Deficienev: The ' recommendation to administer KI was not based on the appropriate guidelines or justified based on the dose projections made by . the field team coordinator. Further, the recommendat' ion was made too late (NUREG-0654,
.II, J.10.e,f).
b 34 Recommendation: Closer coordination is - required between the ISEOC and the forward command pos c. The ISEOC should involve the forward command post in decision making a,nd
'ecommendations.
r 32.3.2. Field Monitorinat Activities Overview Field monitoring teams were mobilized from Iowa Ci ty and Ames.
- Additional staff were placed on standby to provide 24-hour capability. The team. froe Iowa City had . traveled part way the previous day, but the Ames team traveled _'in . real time. Upon notification each team mobilized and arrived at th.t Harrison County, EOC promp tly. The teams were fully equipped and ready for
. dispatch upon arrival. The teams were befefed on plant status and meteorology prior to deployment. However, after deployment, no further briefings were provided.
- The teams (designated as Blue and Green) we re well equipped with the sa cerials identified in the plan. Both teams had high- and low-range de tectors and air sampling equipment. All . equipment had been calibrated in Octobe r. ' Backup supplies and equipment trere adequate.- Procedures for collecting air samples had been modified to correct deficiencies identified in prior exercises.
The Blue team needed more training in emergency response and monitoring
, procedures. The . Blue team members were - not certain as to proper collection procedures and calculation of radioiodine concentrations in the field. Their
. iodine monitoring procedures had inadvercently been left wich the Green team. Further, their air sampler operated only on AC, rendering it unavailable for use. - A power supply . for the AC-driven air pump needs to be
. procured.
The Green team was well-trained in their responsibilities and f unctions and performed them well. 'It is important to note that equipment and procedures used by the two teams are different. If Ames personnel were to be used , on the Iowa City tese, or vice-versa, cross training on equipment and procedures would be necessary. The comm nication link to the field teams was indirect through the
- state police escort accompanying the team. No dead spots were encountered and the sys tem functioned marginally. A direct cocmunication link with the ISEOC would have been more convenient and ef fective. It was apparent tha t not all the team members we re equally trained ' in the use of the hand-held field radios.
~35 Dosimeters, including direct-reading and permanent record, were worn by
~ all team members. Team members were aware of the procedures and adhered to them.- Howeve r, . additional emphasis should be placed on the regular reading j
and recording of dosimeter values. Adequate supplies of protective clothing and ' equipment we re con tained in the team ~ ki ts . Team members knew the procedures for administering KI when directed to do so by ' the ISEOC. It was apparent during the exercise that the teams ' require more training in
- procedures for determining the need and means for decontamination of emergency , personnel, supplies, equipment, and waste disposal.
4 Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding There were no deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding observed during the fisld monitoring activities. Deficiencies and Recommendations
\
- 1. Deficiency: The Blue team was not certain of the proper collection procedures for, and calculations of radiciodine concentrations in the field. The written procedures had .
been misplaced (NUREG-0654, II. I.8, N.2.d, 0.4.c) . Recommenda tion: The Blue team requires more training in emergency response and radiological monitoring procedures. A check, prior to deployment, for all equipment and procedural manuals should be verified on a checklis c. 1
- 2. Deficionev: The Blue team's air sampling equipment was non operable because no power supply for the air' pump was available (NUREG-0654, II. R.11, I.8).
Recommendation: The plan should specify and identify the requirement for an air sampler power supply in the ! cheeklis c.
~
- 3. Deficionev: Following deployment, the radiological monitoring teams were not provided with periodic updates of plant s tatus and meteorology (NUREC-0654, II. F).
Reconnenda tion: The field team coordinato r should transmit periodic updates of the plant s tatus and ' current meteorological conditions to the radiological monitoring teams. i {
1 1 1 i 36
- 4. Deficiencv: The radiological monitoring teams we re no t familiar with the equipment or procedures used by the o ther teams (NUREG-0654, II. I.8, 9,11) .
Recommendation: Additional training- is recommended to
-familiarize radiological field monitoring team members with the different equipment and procedures in use.
- 5. Deficiency:
All members of the field teams did not demons trate adequate proficiency with hand-held field radios (NUREG-0654, II. F.1.d, N.2.a).
' Recommendation: Forther training in the use of field radio equipment is recommended for radiological monitoring team members.
- 6. Defic'iency: Radiological field monitoring team personnel did.not regularly read and record dose values from their personal dosimeters (NUREG-0654, II. K.3.b). s s
Recommendation: Procedures to ensure that dosimeters are read at appropriate frequencies and dose records are J maintained should be established.
- 7. Deficionev: Radiological field monitoring teams were not .
proficient .in determining the need and means for decontamination of emergency personnel, supplies, equipeone, and con tamina ted was te disposal (NUREG-0654, II. K.5.a,b). Recommenda tion: Field teams require additional training in the areas of de termining the need and means for decon tamina tion of emergency personnel, supplies, and equipment, and for disposal of contaminated wastes. 2.3.3 Forward Command Pos t-Radiation Team Operations Overview Coordination of . the radiological field monitoring teams was done f rom the forward commend post located at the Harrison County EOC (HCEOC). Respons e time of the rese coordinator and the field teams was excellent. The field teams were dispatched from Iowa City 'and Ames. Additional s taff were placed ou s tandby. The field team coordinator, identified in the plan, managed his teams well. However, aside from a briefing upon deployment of the teams to l the field, no other briefings were provided. The required self-reading and l l l
.-,,--.,,_,.,..l....
1 37
- permanent record dosiaeeers were available and provided to the field teams and other emergency J response : personnel.. Records were ande of the dosime te r readings. An adequate supply of potassium iodide (KI) was on hand. The team coordinator had a current copy of .che plan and written procedures and checklists were effectively used. Messages were loosely recorded and were not
. gene rally l dis tributed. Clerical support for the ' team coordina cor . would be desirable.
The team coordinator occupied a small room adjacsnt to, but separate from the' HCEOC. .Overall, the facilities f'or the team coordinator were minimal, but adequate. Interaction with the rest of the HCEOC was limited as
. the coordinator had 'to continually monitor the telephone. The s tatus board
~
and emergency classification level .in the HCEOC were not visible to the coordinator. Information was generally received late as the team coordinator did not appear. to be part of the flow of information within the HCEOC. The
- coordinator's role in the overall management structure may not be well-enough defined to provide a smooth interface with the rest of the operation.
Visual aids were lacking except for maps identifying the, plume EPZ and the radiological monitoring points. Prelocated monitoring points were on a map used . by the team coordinator and prepared by the s tate. Another map
. prepared by the utility indicated a different set of points.
Some confusion ' arose because both maps used similar numbering systems, bu t points with the same designations were as f ar as nine miles apart. It is s trongly recommended that a single map be prepared indicating and. identifying all necessary points in a consistent manner. The team coordinator received information from the utility and the [ ISEOC by celephone. Commanications to the field teams was indirect and cluany via telephone intercos to the sheriff's dispatcher, . then to the s tate patrol
- radio sys tes to a patrol car with a team member in .it. A monitor (receive only) was difficult to understand and was located some distance f rom the tema leader's position. This system is inadequate since it is vulnerable to the propogation of error and precludes lengthy briefings and updates. Overall, comminication equipment and procedures for field ' team coordination requires upgrading. '
Dose assessment was performed using plant release data and field readings. Field monitoring ceans were progtly. directed to the various . field monitoring locations. The plume was correctly defined and all.information was transmitted to the ISEOC. Calculations were made rapidly and checked using
' both hand calculations and programmable calcula tors. However, it was not obvious that "the _ data were used in decision asking.
Pro tective action recommendations were made for plume and inges tion pathway hazards at the ISECC. The recommendations were reviewed and updated as conditions changed. The recommendations were not coordinated between the ' s tates at this location. Potassium iodide (KI) was recommended for emergency workers in the field, but not based en the appropriate guidelines. The use of
38 l KI was not justified based on the dose projections made by the team coordina to r. Further, the recommendation was made late and plant releases and air concentrations had declined by the time the radioprotective drug would have been used. The team coordina tor had arranged for the necessary monitoring and sampling to provide data upon which recommendations could be based.'
. _ l 1
Deficiencies That TJould I.ead to a Negative Findinst No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed in field team coordination or dose assessment functions during this exercise. Deficiencies and Recommendations
- 1. Deficionev: Message handling and dis tribu tion we re inadequate, resulting in the team coordinator not being curre.at on the lates t developments (NUREG-0654, II, A,.3) .
1 Recommenda tion: The importance and function of the field team coordinator should be clearly defined in the plan. Although the coordination of field teams is a state func-tion, the interf ace with the HCEOC should be clarified. The field team coordinator should have adequate adminis tra tive authority to perform his function. Clerical support- for the team coordinator would be desirable.
- 2. Deficionev: Visual aids were lacking except for maps of the plume EPZ and radiological monitoring sites. Maps of radiological monitoring sites were inconsis ten t in the location and identification of the sites (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.a ) .
l l Re commenda tion: ' The necessary visual aids and maps should ! be developed and pos ted in the dose assessment area. i Further, the states nad the u tility should agree on a common map of radiological monitoring sites and identifiers for those sites.
- 3. Deficionev: Consunication with the radiological monitoring teams was not adequate (NUREG-0654, II, F.1.d,
. I .8) .
Re comenda tion: A direct form of comsanication be tween j the field coordinator and the field monitoring teams should be established through upgraded equipment. I I
39 2.3.4 Mediesi Supeort Overstew The Missouri Valley Hospital has recently been added as a resource
' hospital for accepting radiologically contaminated persons with injuries. For this' exercise, a radiologically contaminated and injured person was to be sent ..
- to Missouri Valley Hospital. However, this person was diverted instead to the University of Nebraska Medical Center. As such, no medical support activities were observed. It was apparent that the hospital lacked survey equipment. A member of the radiological monitoring field team brought necessary equipment to the hospital.
Hospital personnel were interested in participating in the exercise and discussed procedures and injuries with the observe r. Personnel appeared f amiliar with the appropriate procedures, but lacked experience because they have not been exercised. ~
\
It is recommended that the state of Iowa consider developipg some form of triage esthodology based on the level of contamination (if measurable) for contamina ted individuals. In addition, a specific communication channel or system could be identified for use when contaminated individuals are not being transported by ambulance.
, Deficiencies and Recommendations
- 1. Deficienev: The Missouri Valley Hospital did not have adequate radiological monitoring instruments (NUREG-0654, II, L.1,3).
Re commenda tion: Missouri Valley Hospital should acquire appropriate ins truments to be able to radiologically monitor contaminated persons. l 2. Deficionev: A practiced procedu re for admitting radiological 17 contaminate d, injured persons was not evident at the Missouri Valley Hospital (NUREG-0654, II, N.2.c). Re commenda tion: Procedures should be developed and demonstrated for the trea tment of radiologically contaminated victims at the Missouri Valley Hospital. Additional training of hospital staff may be necessary. Mercy Hospital in Cedar Rapids has a videotape of l = procedures which migh t prove useful. The s taging of a l medical drill would cast procedures currently described. 1 1
40 1
.1 2.4 .-IOWA COUNTY OPERATIONS.
i l
~
2.4.1 Harrison County EOC Io overview - - The Harrison County . EOC (HCEOC) was ac tiva ted promp tly. The call initiating activation was received . f ron ' the utility at approximately 0730. ~ The notification was verified and s taff mobilization procedures were demons trated. A call up system was in place to contact staff members at any hour of the day. Notification of key s taff members was actually conducted in . Des Moines for this exercise. An up-to-date version of the state plan was not present at the HCEOC. Some confusion resul ted when individuals with no current emergency responsibilities were notified and reported to the HCEOC. The ' HCEOC was. fully staffed by ' approximately 1110 when the radiological-sonitoring teams arrived from Ames and Iowa City. In general, the s taf f displayed adequate knowledge and ' training for this exercise. Round-the-clock s taf fing capability was demonstrated through the presentation of 4. duty coster and double scaffing. The Civil Defense Director and the deputy sheriff were in charge of the-HCEOC, . initially. When the county coesissioners arrived, they were fully briefed. Representatives from the Iowa Department of Transportation, State Police, and National Guard were briefed upon arrival and performed their assigned duties well. The CD Director and ' deputy sheriff relinquished their responsibilities to the state representatives, but leadership at the HCEOC was never clearly demons trated. The Iowa ODS representative was officially in charge, but was primarily occupied with communication functions. . The CD Director remained available for information concerning county matters, but his function was constrained by the plan. i The deputy sheriff kept everyone briefed with periodic upda tes. l l Message logs vere maintained, but no distribution of messages was observed. Changes in emergency classification levels were announced and posted on the s tatus ; board. The status board, in this case, was a blackboard. When it was filled, updates _. written on legal-sized _ sheets were attached to it. Of ten information was received out of sequence and back-fitted onto the board. As a result, confusion arose regarding the effective time versus time of receipt of L' messages. An improved status board and message handling proceaures would be i desirable at the HCEOC. The HCEOC facilities were generally adequate, although space could be !_ more efficiently used. The center could support extended operations by utilizing the jail's bunk, shower, and kitchen f acilities located downstairs. Backup power was available for the jail facilities and radio room, only. Maps and displays of the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers, access i l
r 41 control points, radiological monitoring points, and population by evacuation area were all pos ted. Primary and backup communica tions with the ISEOC, PCEOC, contiguous s ta tes , license e, and EOF were all operational and functioned well. Due to
- the lack of a telefax device, no hard copies of EBS messages, press releases, or other protective action messages were available. Although the HCE9C was informed of the content of curren t messages, a telefax would casure
, - consistency of content and enhance broader dissemination of information.
The HCEOC was responsible for sounding the siren alert sys tem. The siren was sounded promptly, but in addition individual families were contacted by telephone. Fu r the r, a police officer was dispatched to perform route-alerting. All efforts put forth by the HCEOC to alert the public were well done. For this exercise, a very small population was affected. But, if an additional sector had been affected, greater reliance would have been placed on the siren systems and EBS broadcasts. Ac tivation of traffic control points were prog tlys ordered and es timates of expected traffic volume were mad e. Appropria te resources for removing stalled or wrecked cars were available, as well as supplies of salt and sand for pottatially icy roads. According to EOC s taf f , the plan resources are adequate to handle all traffic and access control functions simultaneous ly. Since DOT, the Narton 1 Cuard, and state police are all involved in maintaining access controt points and roadblocks, it is important
- f. hat each is aware of consistent protective action decisions.
'The HCEOC staff were not aware of the locations of mobility-impaired and special needs persons. A house-to-house search was discussed and it was suggested that the Harrison County van be used if the s itua tion arose to evacuate such persons. Harrison County should cogile a lis t of mobility-igaired . and . special needs persons.
A letter of agreemant might also be needed to use the county van. Only high-range (0-200 R) dosimeters were available at cae HCEOC. The supply of dosimeters, chargers, and record cards was more clan adequate. Appropriate instructions were iPsued with the dosimeters, but the only person to use one was the sherif f 's deputy who was to perform the house-to-house search. According to the plan, local equipment would not be used. The radiological monitoring team leader was aware of proper procedures concerning the use of KI and decontamination. The National Guard wanted to offer their services in fu ture exercises or actual events to assist with radiological monitoring. They have sufficient squipment and trained s taf f. The National Guard could also provide a valuable backup to enhance extended operations and to reduce extended, personal exposure. Only one press inquiry was received before the MRC was activated. The CD Director briefed the individual on the exe rcis e, the eurgency classifi-cation levels, and HCEOC responsibilities. The status board and other maps
t 42 and displays were also explained. The individual was informed of the location of the MRC in Omaha and indicated that it was being activated. Training is advised for the HCEOC spokesperson since some erroneous statements regarding agency responsibilities were made. Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding - There were no deficiencies that would lead to a nega tive finding observed at the HCEOC. Deficiencies and Recommendations
- 1. Deficiency:
Command and control of the HCEOC was not effectively demonstrated. The ODS representative officially in charge was occupied with commu nica tion functions (NUREG-0654, II, A.2.a).
\
3 Re commenda tion: The HCEOC should designate a deputy to - manage the EOC during times when he is unavail:ble.
- 2. Deficiency: The HCEOC provided a press briefing during the exercise. The spokesperson was not adequately trained regarding con tac t with the press and specific agency responsibilities (NU2EG-0654, II, G.3.a. 4.a) .
Recommendation: The HCEOC should designate the points of contact and physical locations for use by the news media during an emergency and in compliance with the plan. Fur the r, a spokesperson should be designated and trained to interact with the media.
- 3. Deficionev: The HCEOC s taf f we re not aware of the locations of mobility-impaired and special needs persons (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.d).
Re commenda tion: The HCEOC should compile a lis t of mobility-inpaired and special needs persons. Provisions I should be developed for the protection or evacuation of these persons during a radiological emergency. 4 Deficionev: Only high-range (0-200 R) dosime te rs we re available for emergency workers (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.4) . Re commenda tion: Low-range (0-200 mR) pocket dosimeters I and TLDs should be available for emergency workers who enter radiation fieids. l l l 4 1
43
- 5. Deficionev: . A copy . of the current - s tate plan was not available. Confusion in personnel and responsibility
- resulted' (NUREG-0654, II, A.2.a) .
Recommendation: A copy 'of the curren t state plan should be ' asintained in the HCEOC. - Key staf f members should be e thoroughly ._ familiar with their respective . responsibili-ties.
- 6. Deficiency: The HCEOC s tatus board was noe adequate. The board was too small to pos t the necessary plant s tatus
'inforamtion.
Recommendation: The RCEOC 'should design a s ta tus board
- which will identify the current emergency classification level; include effective times for p ro tective action decisions; and a brief description of protective actions -
in effect.
\
- 7. Deficiency: Some personnel reported to the HCEOC M en
. they had no emergency responsibilities. Apparently the
. call list in use is no longer up to date (NUREG-0654, II, A.2.4).
- Re commendation: An up-to-date ' call list identifying
. persons with emergency responsibilities consistent with the current plan should be prepared.
- 8. Deficiency: Hard copies of the content of EBS messages ,
press releases, and protective action recommendations were
- not available at the HCEOC because there was no telefax machine..
Reconumendation: The procurement 'of a telefax link with the MRC and the ISEOC would enhance the consis ten t ' dissemination of emergency-rela ted information to the HCEOC s caf f. 2.* 2 Pottawattamie County EOC Overview The Pottawattamie County EOC (PCEOC)- was located at the Pottawattamie County sheriff's depa r tmen t. The . PCEOC was not fully activated for this exercise. The primary functions of the PCEOC we re (1) notification and alerting of key staff and (2) public notification and warning activities. The 1 e
~ - , --,n -,p-..w.-.m-.-g-~,e--- ,-,w,--- ,.
,s,,.wn,,w-y-emewmg,,,c,,,.---,-,-. a.ww mem,, ,w,g--,,,,,,yv-gw_,,g_,m,,w.
I 44 ! 1 organiza tions present it the PCEOC included the county CD Director, communications director, sherif f 's department, and the Iowa State Police. Except for the Iowa State Police, all participan ts were on du ty by 0800 hours. The PCEOC has a direct concunication link with the utility which is monitored round-the-clock. A sheriff's dispatcher has a call-up lis t and procedures to notify PCEOC staff at any hour of the day. Except for the CD
- Director and consunications director, a 24-hour s taf fing capability was demons trated.
~
All participants demonstratad adequate training and knowledge
.of . their assigned duties.
The director of consunications was in charge of the PCEOC, however, this is not clearly indicated in the plan. Appropriate staff were involved in
- decision making. Access was controlled to the communications area. Comple te message logs were maintained. A copy of the current plan was available for reference, but the staff did not have written procedures or checklists.
Facilities at the PCEOC were adequate and the center could support extended operations with existing s14eping, shower, and kitchen f acilities. The emergency classification level was posted on the status board and a map of the plume EPZ and associated sectors was displayed. Howe ve r', g no maps or displays were posted indicating evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control poin ts , radiological monitoring poin ts , or population density by evacuation area. Commnication equipment included landlines to the ISEOC, MRC, licensee, contiguous states, and local EOCs. An open conference line linked the PCEOC i with the . ISEOC, MRC, and HCECC. No direct contact was made with the PCEOC af car 1248 hrs on the open line. The line remained operational, but no one
- confirmed the county's presence during this critical period of the exercise.
It is suggested that procedures for comannications checks be developed. Othe r consunications equipment included the sheriff's department radio network. No direct coanunication's capability with the EOF were observed. Existing agreements require only that the Pottawattamie County sheriff activate the siren warning sys tem. This was accomplished promptly when directed by the ISEOC. When the decision ordering the evacuation of the 2-mile EPZ was given, the PCEOC brought to the ISEOC's a tten tion tha t four , families would be involved, identifying an error in the plan. The PCEOC followed up with sinulated telephone notification of. the affected families. When notified to evacuate to five siles, actual calls to five of f-du ty sheriff's deputies were promptly ende, sinulating dispatch to the field. The PCEOC s taf f was aware of the location of mobility impaired persons, should , their evacuation be necessary. The PCEOC promp tly activated craf fic control ooints when ordered to do
- so. The county dispatched eight sheriff's deputies to help with the evacuation. This response was apparently under existing county procedures,
- separate from the radiological emergency plan. According to PCEOC staff, sufficient personnel and vehicles we re available to cover all traffic and v
I a
* * %e+-e ,#,w .-..,.-%,-.,----_w--------,---,-,-.-4--,,,,%--ww,,.,,,w m e ..w w# ww y,u,,w -,-+,,-.,,-w-w,r-.-,-,--,,,,.-y,,,,,,m,ww_
45-access control functions simultaneously. In addition, necessary materials and equipment were available to keep evacuation routes clear in the event of bad weather or to remove stalled or wrecked vehicles. Furthat announcements received over the ISEOC open line extended the evacuation to the 10-mile EPZ and indicated that KI was being distributed to the staca patrol officers working'in the field. The sheriff's depactaent had no information regarding the administration of KI. The sheriff's deputies
, , were equipped with personal . dosiasters, bu t apparently were not trained to read thes. ' Observer inquiries revealed that dosimeter readings were to be
, made and recorded when the deputies returned from the field. No periodic readings were taken and ,no apparent knowledge of KI usage was demonstrated. s Deficionef es that would I.ead to a Negative Finding No deficinncies that would . lead to a negative finding were observed at the PCEOC.
\
\
Deficiencies and Recommendations
- 1. Deficiency: The director of communications was in charge of the PCEOC, but this role was not clearly in the plan (NUREG-0654, II. A.2.a) .
Recommendation: The PCEOC should specify the function and responsibility for key individuals by title for commend and control.
- 2. Deficionev: The, FCEOC s taff did not have specific written procedures or, checklist for their respective assigned duties (NUREG- 0654 II. A.1.b) .
Ite commenda tion: The PCEOC should devnlop written procedures or checklists to aid the emerp ncy response staff in effectively performing their du ties.
- 3. Deficiencv: No maps or displays were posted indicating evacua tion routes, relocation centers, access control points, radiological monitoring . points, or population density by evacuation ' area (NUREG-0654, II. J.10.a,b) .
Recommendation: The PCE0C should develop maps or displays identifying evacuation, preselected radiological sampling and monitoring points, relocation centers in host areas, and population distribution around the nuclear f acility by evacuation area.
46
- 4. Deficionev: No direct communications capab'ility with the EOF was observed (NUREC-0654, II. F.1.d).
Recommendation: Provision for communications between the licensee's near-aite EOF and the PCEOC should be made. ~ o 5. IDeficiency: The Pottawattamie County Sheriff's Department had no knowledge or procedures regarding the adminis tration of. KI (NUREG-0654, II. J.10.e, f). F
~
Recommendation: Provisions for the use of radioprotective drugs, particularly for emergency workers should be made, including quantities, storage, means of distribution, and the predetermined conditions under which such drugs may be used by emergency workers.
- 9
'6. Deficiency: The Pottawattamie County Sheriff's deputies were , not trained in the use or periodic reading and recording of . personal dosimeters _(NOREG-0654, II. K.3,.b) .
1 Recommends tion: .The PCEOC should . ensure thae dosimeters are read at appropriate frequencies and provide for esintaining dose records for emergency workers. 2.5 COMBINED STATE OPERATIONS 2.5.1 Emergency Operations Facility Ove rview The notice to . activate the emergency operations facility (EOF) was ' received at approxiantely 0630 hours via che Nebraska Highway Patrol dispatcher. Nebraska personnel, the mobile state civil defense operations
, center (CRUSH), and the state patrol mobile commanications center (BLUEBIRD) all arrived at the EOF ' within two hours. Nebraska personnel tested their radio and telephone equipmen t, ande necessary adjus tments , and ac tivated BLUEBIRD. The EOF was declared fully operational by 0920. Overall, the activation of the EOF was consistent with the plan, ahead of schedule, and
, professionally accoglished.
Nebraska provided adequate staffing at the EOF for the functions of operations, commanications, information authentication, and health physics. A gove rnor's representative was also present. Each staff member was we ll-trained and knowledgeable of their respective functions. However, the lack of clerical support' to record and handle messages created a va rie ty' of i
. + .
l p r
,- 47 i ,
problems. The message lok was poorly maintained and replies to requests for information were some times overlooked, or lacked sufficient con ten t. Each s taf f meskel w$s forced to record and handle messages in addition to their regula r , du ties.) s
~
TNe j command and control functions of decision making and providing prottetive action re.comendations were sometimes inconsis tent with the plan. Such incongistencies in decision making were observed on at least two
,, occasions when: , , (1) the. order to . issue KI to emergency workers was made at approximately;' 1330 hrs, and (2) , an order was given to reduce protective actiops while the' emergency classification leval of the plant remained at
, General l Emergency (between 1415 and- 1510 hrs).
In the firs t case, it was not clear.yhe ther the decision was made at the EOF or the EOC, since there had been no such discussion observed at the EOF- prior to the decision. In the
- second case, the decision was ove,rridden and delayed. In each case, the ,
decision making and protective action recoenendations were not made according to the + proced. ares specified in the plan. The record of protective action recommendations indicates 'nine actions were recommended or implemented. Some vere implementied prior to EOF 1 recommendation. The remainder were rccommended
~
in ccep ance with the plan. ' '
,. Space abd equipment for EOF personnel were set aside, bu t we re limi ted. No visual aids were displayed and maps identifying EFZ sectors and evacuation routeg were not p resen t. The facility was normally an office and did not have adequate wall space for maps. As a result, the staff procured a map and spread it on the floor. Communications facilities were adequate and functionedy well. 'Ihe utility proVided telephones and the state activated radio equipment to commnicate the s tace and local EOCs , and with BLUEBIRD and CRUSH. A dedicated line was provided to commnicate with the state radiation health - team. Capability for conference calls was possible on the dedicated line and 'a telephone line between the EOF, Lincoln', and the Nebraska Civil Defense. ' '
- Dose assessment calculations and some protective action recommendations were made in the utility's endegency assessment and tecovery operations (EARO) room and at CRUSH. The dose assessment procedures were not observed in the EOF. The health physicist was required to commte constantly between EARD and the EOF in performing his duties. During mch of the exercise, the health physicist was in EARO, coordinating with the utility monitoring ceams. In the EOF, he coordinated with the s tate and local governments and recommended pratective actions. CRUSH duplicated the work of the EOF staf f. The use of CRUSH strained the limited s taff resources at the EOF and generated additional message traffic.
y Iowa me t exercise objectives by demons tra ting the capability to
- mobili::e representatives to coordinate and support emergency response efforts at the EOF. Generally, one Iowa representative would be dispatched to the
-EOF, bu t for this exercise two were presen t.
~
Iowa maintains a file of individuals that : ay be contacted at any hour of the day to s taf f the EOF. l <.- ' o . 5 LJ .
48
~
The Iowa s taf f did no t display or demonstrate adequate knowledge or training in the functions they were to perform at the EOF. Messages were not cons is tently logged and frequently no one was availabl( to respond to the phone. As a resul t, the representatives were not well-informed of information applicable to directing and controlling response functions. The space available in the EOF for Iowa operations appeared adequate. Accommodations were reasonably comfortable with low noise levels. The only cosaanications equipment for the Iowa representative was a commercial telephone. No backup commanications were available. Deficiencies That Would 1.ead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the EOF during this exercise. Deficiencies and Recommendations g i
- 1. Deficiency: Decision making and recommendations for pro tective actions were not always made according to the procedures specified in the plan (NUREG-0654, II. A.2.a).
Recommendation: Additional training is necessary in management and decision making responsibilities. Familiarization with the procedures in the plan should be euphasized.
- 2. Deficiencv: The EOF was too small to be osed effectively (NUREG-0654, II, H).
Recoatmandation: Adequate emergency facilities and-equipment to support the emergency should be provide d. The single office should be expanded.
- 3. Deficionev: Maps or displays indicating population
- - dis tribution, sampling points, EPZ sectors, and relocation centers were absent (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.a,b).
Re commenda tion: Maps or displays indicating evacuation routes, evacuation areas, radiological sampling and monitoring poin ts , relocation centers, and population distributions should be developed and posted. 4 Deficfenev: No support s caf f were available to assise the emergency response personnel with message receipt or handling (NUREG-0654, II. A.4).
- s. .
.' 49 Re commenda tion: Arrangements should be made to have sufficient support staff at the EOF to relieve officials -
of routine telephone calls and to properly handle messages.
- 5. Deficionev: The Iowa representatives we re not sufficiently trained to perform their function vell.
. Message logging and handling was ine.oglete and telephonas ,
were = sometimes left unanswered (NUREG-0654, II., A.2.a. 0.5). Re cossendation: Additional training should be ' provided for the EOF representa tives to ensure they are knowledgeable in their duties. 6., Deficiency: Comaanications equipment was not adequate for the Iowa representatives (NUREG-0654, II., F.1.d). t Recossendation: The Iowa representatives shouldi be provided with reliable primary and backup means of cosaunication between the EOF and state and local EOCs and radiological monitoring teams. * , 2.5.2 Information Authentication center Overview-Publie information officers -(PIOS) from the utility, Nebraska Civil Defense, and^the NiiC were located at the EOF and operated the information authentication center ~(IAC). The _ s tate of Iowa was not represented at the
- j. IAC. The IAC has no direct contact with the media and releases information
'directly co ~ the media release center (MRC) in accordance with the plan.
l
. Activation cf the IAC was promptly and effectively demonstrated. Key personnel were contacted through telephone pagers. When alerted, these individuals ' contact the rese of the s caf f. The IAC can be contacted ae any hcut of the day,- and demonstrated a 24-hour s taffing capability using double shifts. A full . staffing ' capability was ' demons trated at this exercise. The Ptos were all cogatent technically, and worked well as a unit.
l The facilities at the IAC were adequate in terms of space, furniture '
- -- lighting, and comnanications equipment. Acoustics within the IAC were good.
- l. Maps and displays were available for reference. Only one manual typewriter
- was available in the IAC for utility staff. Nebraska representatives prepared and -disseminated messages in longhand.. The NRC brought portable word l, _ processing and telefax equipment f or their use.
I
50 Commercial telephones were the primary communication links between the IAC 'and the state and local EOCs and the EOF. A telefax was used to transmit releases to the MRC. In addition, a 2-way radio was used to' commnicate with CRUSH. Overall, the IAC was well-equipped for commnications functions. ,
, Five major briefings were provided by the IAC. The briefings were accurate, complete, and understandable. The PIOS ef fectively exchanged and coordinated information to be released.
. The Nebraska Civil Defense used prescripted emergency public messages
' bu t the PIO of the utility and the NRC represen tative drafted their own messages as situations arose. .The messages were generally clear and unders tandable. Howeve r, on several occasions the content of the messages were found by the MRC to be erroneous or confusing. For example, in one message instructions for evacuation were provided when in fact, sheltering was the recommended protective action. In o ther cases, informa tion in the messages was inconsistent with information contained in the public information brochure. In Nebraska releases, sectors for protective actions were identified, as illustrated in che brochure, but referral to the brochure was not made. At least two releases made by the NRC were not expected by the MRC, indicating a breakdown in coordination.
' Deficiencies Thae Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the IAC during this exercise.
Deficiencies and Recommendations e
- 1. Deficiency: On occasion, the content of messages released '
by the IAC were found to be erroneous or confusing (NUREG-0654, II, E.4.1, E.5-7). l - l Recommendation: Provisions should be made for more careful authentication of the content of messages released to the media and the public.
- 2. Deficionev: The content of some messages released to the media was not clear and cons is ten t with information contained in the public information brochure. Further, the brochure was not indicated as a source of information (NUREG-0654, II, E.6,7; G.1).
. - .__._ _ _~_. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ . . . , _ _ _ _ __ _ _ . _ . . _ ._
. - ~ .
51 - Recommendation: Provisions should be made to ensure protective action recommendations provided in the public l information brochure and media releases are consistent. When pro tective action recommendations include EPZ identifiers, the message should (1) refer the public to a ," source where the sector boundaries are defined (e.g., the brochure), or (2) include the sector boundaries, identified clearly by geographic landmarks , in the messages, or (3) both. 2.5.3 Media Release Center
. Overview
.The media release center (MRC), located in the Omaha / Douglas County Civic Center was serving both Nebraska and Iowa, was proepcly activated. by representatives from the utility and each of the s tates. Each organization 1
provided two PIOS. The MRC was fully operacional by 0805 hrs. A regular notification sys tem to activate the MRC at any hour of the day was demonstrated. The call up list identifies first and second shif t personnel. The utility demonstrated a shift change while Nebraska provide a two-shif t ros te r. Iowa's capability for demonstrating a shif t change was limited since only two persons are available. In general, the PIOS demonstrated adequate training and knowledge of .their assigned duties. [ The MRC had adequate space,- furniture, lighting, and typewriters. Additional equipment included a telefax (linked to the IAC) and a photocopy machine. Backup powe r was available at the MRC. Maps and displays to facilitate disseminacion of information were small and generally inadequate. However, a letter of agreement with Nebraska indicates larger maps and wall charts will be installed in the near futut e. It was not known if the new visual aids will also cover - the appropriate areas +-in Iowa. The PIOS were i provided with a private conference area. Approximately 25-30 reporters could l be acecamodated in the MRC, but an additional'canacity of 300 could be handled in the legislative chambers on another floor. Comananica tions equipment at the MRC were adequace and operated well. The utility had a dedicated line to the EOF. Iowa and Nebraska each used commercial telephones. Iowa maintained an open line to che s tace and local EOCs and the EOF. Secondary commanication links in the form of a telefax were demonstrated to each s tate EOC and the EOF. Conferencing capability was i
- possible between the MRC and the state and local EOCs and the EOF. Telephone lines and jacks were - provided for reporters. Reporters would have been required to bring their own telephone unit to use the lines.
Media kits were available containing general background information on nuclear plancs, the utility and the local area. These briefings were l w 4 -.----..--,.,.r, -..,.-.w - , . . r . . . . , , > . ,,.-.,..-,.,m,--w- m.e..c.--, -, ,- --,--e v -
52 4 conduc ted, bu t no media representatives we re present. The PI0s held pre-
, briefing meetings to ensure coordinating. Howeve r, the NRC issued two news releases with no advance notice or coordination with the MRC. No indication of the source or location of the release was made (ref er to Sec. 2.5.2) . The media briefings were generally accurate and complete. A technical liaison from the hcility was present to clarify technical matters. Hard copies of sedia briefings would have been pos ted and, made available had any media j representa tives attended.
Radio broadcasts were not monitored in the MRC j
' because radio reception was poor within the building. As a resul t, the MRC was unable to keep track of information the public was actually receiving. No sys tem was identified to rectify errors in information received by the
- public.
Public instructions were draf ted at the IAC and transmitted to the MRC (refer to Sec. 2.5.2) . Overall, the quality of public instruction and news releases was not adequa te. The messages were generally too brief and contained errors on several occasions. Pro tective action areas were accurately described in terns of f amiliar boundaries and landmarks for Iowa, but only by EPZ sectors for Nebraska. Nowhere were the boundaries of the sectors defined, and no reference was made to the public informat; ion brochure which illustrates the sectors. Ins tructions provided for sheltering in Nebraska inadvertently and incorrectively gave vacuation measures ins tead. This error was never caught or corrected. The puulic information brochure was never referenced in the briefings, and no ins truc tions for its use or
< - acquisition were made. -
- The Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) 'and other electronic media were notified to broadcast the emergency instructions. The timing of public instruction was delayed and not well-coordina ted with the public alerting ~
process (refer to Sec. 2.3.1). Two operators and four telephone lines were activated for rumor control ~ functions during the exercise. Rumor control has the capability to handle 10 telephone lines simul taneously. The operators were well prepared to answer questions as they . were kept continually up to date through briefings. The rumor control number was publicized only once in an EBS message prepared by the utility. The states and the utility neglected to cention rumor control in their briefings. Tuo calls were received by rumor control providing valuable exercise feedback. These calls indicated that the sirens were weak in one
-area, however, this information was never passed on to the s ta tes or the EOF.
i l-Def tciencies That Would I.ead to a Neestive Finding } No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the MRC during this exercise. i
53 Deficiencies and Recommendations
- 1. Deficiency: Maps and displays to f acilitate dissemination of information at the MRC were s, mall and generally inadequate. Agreements have been reached with Nebraska to
, upgrade the MRC visual aids. It was not clear if the new visuals would include. the affected portions of Iowa (NUREG-0654, II, C). 'o Recoaunenda tion: The new visual aids for the MRC should depict- the entire planning area surrounding the Fort Calhoun facility, including affected portions of Iowa.
- 2. Deficte'nev: EBS broadcas ts should be monitored in the MRC to evaluate the accuracy of the _ information the public is receiving. Procedures to correct erroneous information were not developed (NUREG-0654, II, E.4.1, G.2.c) .
~
\
Recommendation: Installation of an antenna would enhance
' radio reception and allow for the monitoring of EBS messages. Procedures should be developed to- correct erroneous broadcasts.
- 3. Deficienev: Overall, the quality of public instruction and news releases was inadequate -(see also Se c. 2.5.2)
(NUREG-0654, II, E.5,7, G.4.b). Recommendation: More training in the authentication and quality of - public information is suggested. Procedures for . coordina ting and reviewing the contents of public instructions are needed. -
- 4. Deficionev: The timing of public instruction was delayed and not well-coordinated with the public alerting process (see also Se c. 2.3.1) (NUREG-0654 II, E.6; Ap pendix 3, B.2.a, B.3).
Racommendation: Procedures to expedite the broadcas t of the EBS messages, closely following the activation of the alerting signal are needed.
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1
, 34 ll 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES: December 6-7, 1983, EXERCISE 4
Section 2 of this report lis ts deficiencies based on the findings and b recommenda tions 'of federal observers at the radiological emergency preparedness exercise for the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Power Station held on December 6-7, c1983. These evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in (NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev. 1
, (Nov. 1980) and objectives for the exercise agreed upon by the state, FEMA, and the RAC.
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support. Washingto n, D.C., t that any deficiencies that require corrective actions have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plans as appropriate. FEMA reques ts that both the s ta te and local jurisdictions submi t a
- schedule of actions they have taken or intend to take to correct these deficiencies.- FEMA recommends tha t a de tailed plan, including dates of coupletion for scheduling and implementing recommendations, b'e g provided if corrective actions cannot be instituted immediately.
No deficiencies were observed at the state or county level that would cause a finding that o f f-s ite emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public livitg in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency. Other deficiencies observed at the December 6-7,1983, exercise for the FCNPS require that a schedule of corrective actions be developed. These other deficiencies are summarized in the following table. 3 I
G. t e i FT. CAI.lefM80f IRICI. EAR POWER STATinst EXERCISE-RDIEDIAI. ACTIONS December 6-7, 194) Fase I of 29
^
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'U-RAC Netus isnJatlos Correcttva Action State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) sI' 0 3 FDtA Evaluation of State / county Response new I4E wom{
IU@u EM8M A.I.b, hbramba St ate EOC A.2.s
- 1. The written State plan. falle to
' adestuately deserthe the stalmue u neseber of personnel to operate the
- EfC anel him. tieu State EOC Interacts l wi t te the Field Connand Post person-net .in making ' does assessment calcestations and protective action dectatune. It would be beneficial if tiee State plan was clarifled in arder to al t sas mastnum flestbility of estating canditions and avall-i able state remensrces.
felt 2. A pot ent i al problem I.e t ween the radinlogical health dectolon makers
- in E braska an.1 lava esiste in hise
, protective actione recommendations are ma.le for sectore adjacent to - an.1 overlapping alie Missenart . Elver. , ^ When t hat plume travels across the Missourl Niver, reef dent e of Iowa i an.1 W hraska sanald benefit if the
- two mentes vouslel define an equiva-
] lent hasta and elec t alen chain for j mak i nst p rot ect i ve actions relative
- 5 to stren activation, sheltering, ev4cnallHn, etC.
l a
+
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.,3 g - ,. m-FT. CAIJinsiel NiaC1. EAR realEN STATInff EXERCISg-RIMEill AL ACTInsl5 lhecember 6-7 194)
Page 2 of 29' g 2" -
.- *: S.
2 3%. *3 3 83. * ,g. " h"IC NAC Recus: endat Isen Correctivu Actluas L Statu (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTlati) R "k *. fella Evaluatlee 'of State / County Response o
$08
- a ar e j E" uo{
IU u A M u{d IIst 1. prot ect i ve acttoo lastrisctionne to alie public were provided melag IlifREC-8454 eactor dealsnatione retleer than faelllar geographical y'
'Immanderles. Else of feellier geo-graphical houn.larles In descalbing.
areas affected by pratertive . actions an.1 recommandatloans wonel 1 be unge clearly understandable to Inral' residents. St ate Ci vil tief ense Portable Operations Center - OkIIS61 1.4 4 laelays of up to 45 minutes were 5.14 caceneant e red la tlee receipt of est i li t y data at ChilSil. On one neration lacorrect data was sup-piled to 8 311581 free El.a est i li t y , resulting in stata dose projections - t liat wetre significantly different s frna Llw utility's. Die apparent attempt was ma le by t he state to
- rarantve chle data discrepancy. The casse.: of sl e .lelays la receipt of data nee.le ao be Ident I f Ie.1 and a .
rear.ly implement eel. Ad.llt ional . training .an.8/nr a review of proced-earce in vertlying arruracy of esti!Iey el.eea 1m c calc.I.
.m _ _
' I
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FT. CAIJenINI 8AICIIAR PillW.R STATinst EMe!stCISE-AFMtpIAI. ACTIOllS flecembe r 6-7, 1983 Page'3 of 29
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'O NAC ketos. cuJat ion Currective Actium State (5)/Cananty (C) Respeusse (ACTltet) R"k u.rt3tA Evaluation of State / County Response o
MuS new w2 ;lSR e"{ o E"*2 l 2 ls Eu5c w<uw K.1.a 5. The lack of mefficient elemstated TIAs raises conceras as to whettier a sufficient nualser of TI.De canald actually le made available in a
- vi i
real en.rxency. The use of almaa- " l lated TI.De an a amans to display capetil li t y Im not recommended. It
- la mugxcu s e.l that pataanent-record
- doelmet ry availability le demon-ntrate.1 In festurn exercises.
8.10.f 4 The order for. al.a esse of KI occurre.1 late les ' t he eserciani El aliould have 1.cen a.letnistered I to
'2 luna r e cartier and shou l.3 leave !
heen Iname.1 on source terme sufft- , cicutly bi r,h to warrant its use. The ' pre.leaermisie.1 candieIon.a use.le r. whic h elecisions are mad.s In admin- , Inter t.a.lloprotective druge to of f- - allet emerr.nry workers shenald be - revieve.l. - . i 4 e
- s 1
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o n C e / J ) a S c ( _ . e T t a F t S ete .d i e e e e - ae- rsr er - oel ht ol mnrlihl t l noeo seroug t was ef ci i aof t h a e e e t c s e t iwl i ois od c nr m t t i f c Aff t s r nrr eg i t a ne rl aA gh n t p d las4 Mt d E es ep T e dab o l o
.he ol eu t i l i l bl p a o l
e p i pc ru wbel c ir A rb ui t e reea Flpa y g n i ni u dtd r a a .d mi ef all o md i f t nsnm udra e. v a e opct pd e na t o c5 r o e g i d mi t eedeb adl d e tamie a nd o 4t t er oar e riee n t c e s ov h r mia s i ls ut t tt oe a e s codr e t wd e s h efdt s n r e e a1 pt et t i vt a a ci d
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o mn r ap i pi d ei e r mc od i rel e T elpp , l a t n oe e e I. r fi dI ol sau
- l. f e v i
a te rdea utsl t u wo m t o ui e r n s f .n st e ir eani r ml y e a p a s
.i o f a a s n r p e ie c e. n re a s
i e r ro e yc lga t a ew dt aepr r a a o r m dhcr lp r igit t o a fo luir m t d c f t t ae r s t o deb o n s n u eedwt d esneudat 1 e cwue l a i a c a n di ee o n si e c a t lof mt i w aif a e lcd elire lewce R eor oy l o c ld ed s v eah a r no o l t
. r eeeeae r aeeopol v1 i t rl nppoi t o f st gpae e l s I.
u h , e h uhi el eisil arrn eno e eaenecu k T mtf t a dt ef amparat s. B wmI l. a r r C b A . . B 7 ie l 8
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% e FT. CAIJ400el 888CI. EAR pnWEst .%TATIslet EXEstCiser-sperenI AI, ACTIosts flecembur fi-7, 1981 Pages 5 of . 29 O -
a Q*- -
- a : e.
o e o! ll'! &R* R ?ce G E.': g kN DAC Recos. a:ndat tuu Currect ive ' Ac t insi . Statae (S)/ County (C) Neupon/a (ACTliel) M 0 gl FEMA Evaluatiose of State /Camunty Respons. "j" I- E lIIIu uNO? l ! 11 . 1 0 9. he soill .se Indide scintillation j causat er v4s not fully fianct ional
. and was not used during tlee muer-J cine.
enred, ft.e field vehicle espers-are . electrical- starting y ] j . problem. 'Also, equipment avall- ] ahin to slee team was not canalst-9 cut with the plan. Thee caames of . - l any Innt riement malfunctione aluwald hu 1lentille.1 an.1 remedial actions taken to enmure that this lastru- , ment an.l all . equi pment , includiag j vehicles, are working properly; ! an.1 fleid teams mienuld have adequate npportosalty ao .became leel l y f amiliar witte new equipment < . pring tu an eserclue. The plan or eq.si pment available snee.le to be l' a.ljusteel tu reflect canalstenry. int 14 A snow sample was place.1 in a - plastle lag ratleer than a properly
- mea le.1 container to prevent ite .
lose by leak age. A review of I proce l.e res .anel equipment sece.le for
- . ., ans. n ..,8 i . . .. .t m.i .
l l 4 l 4 4 ) I
. s e..
1 l EXFRCISF.-REME1684L ACTinelS FT. CAIJefM800 IRICl. EAR FinfER STATinsl December 6-7, 1981- , Page 6 of 29. 4 A e l g Q~ - i . _S. I' : 233 . -
- "3 83" a t~
g State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTI(Ill) 1"k a. o nue was{ } a.e NAC lancuamessJ.ition Corrective Action $l c 8 FDIA Evaluation of State / County tempanse j j "E . 7. u i N ? 4 K.1.e. 11. I.nu ran., doelmeters were not 1 K.S.a available a' f*ettlertsation was
- not . evident witle retgard to easimia j done allowed williowt autlior t s-atinn, and what procedieres uliculd
}- Iwo implemented if an maceae dose o was received. Imw-range doel-i meterm are needed for field team members. Also, a.idi t iona l train- < long is needcJ on understan.llna j ma s s man dosce allowed without autleus t aat tswa and procedures to I.e Implemented If an escese dose is received. 8.8 82. Tlie NerInt aak a field team was not directed properly to obtale insefial
, pliame Information. Samples from Additional monitoring pointo are nee. led to obt ai n useful Informa- -
t lens .us the plume. .A contenlier i nee.le tu leu as s i gne.1 t o s tic field t e.smo to input essential data that t will allene eumplete and inesthwlille f iel.1 t rae caercialeeg. 4 4 i ?l \ - 1
t, e 't
?
s i, FT.
~
CAIJIGIIII seact. EAR FiafEN STATl4HI F.NENCISE-NFJIEDIA1. ACTIGIIS .!' Ikcember 6-7, BW I Page 7. of 29-O e l i g 2- -
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- 8m
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** g 83 det" a
o Ru "f e u-a v ,2 - monk d FEMA Evaluation of State / County Response ajn e
- 'O RAC tecommendation Currective Actions State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTI(ed) S E EURO )
yggg 4 ggug NFS Radiological lionitoring_ Teme l F 1. Pelor to field ,tese deployment, , the Cooper teme was not briefed on plant or arseorological coswaltions ,$ ! anor was the team hept Informed of these condIttone t hrosaghoset - LI e , esercine. Ylee team also was not in communication wi tin CIlllSil wlille at wies at the elecont aal nat ion cent e r . Fleid teams shoest d he terlef ed on plant conditions prior
- to deployment asul coassanicat ions 1
maintained t h reiesgliout the eser-j c l ear. M.F.10 14 The Cooper fleIJ team did not have charcoal ca r t r ielges f or ai r maap-11ng. F.elul psen t was not available 4-f or water and milk a sep I t seg. The team alma .314 not ' acquire a hand- - , leeld portable radle. Monitoring , , and communication equipment sloould ' he available to accompItali llee
! ansigned f l e l.1 aminitoring respon-sibilitice of the Cooper team, l
i 1.7 4%. Conversions from ast/hr to pC1/cc w.nu accompIlstee.1 using a chart men.1
- i nt er polat ing lus t ween table val-4 ucs; thlm m.
- t ho.1 v.es not in the plan. Neview tlee plan or proce.l-ures rega rellseg this activity and i m.ske cisangen an.1/or revisions as j appropriate.
i
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( ne te P I I R ) . A C ( E. E C y I I t N n u 4 o UI C H / 0 J ) I S A ( . C e
. t T a F t S
sd e dse d e- . geeed d - ddd s rrdhnet emt d nhhh n l l eel t n eoigaci s s unei t a a n l gnuf t cvi i t ulpmpot ol r o ohnioi o eeoh yvu haoawh i mrr t ef mt d e . s pl r s liusmsa t eak o t l P did ai1 c aut _ A c e ot nl ai a o teme nh snner e ycr r p l a w o d n u a nt h e .- bd arn setre oa l a. e sg t v nddl i lp p t a a I. i
) a ei l o cd an- el winr aey r od a r te nl e R
mee ovd vr e t m rl o a ri r c e r ta 8 Pets. hA t a mc aa k oe nn a nw ol i pvl l eanpe i b a tr vin etdi iv . o h. r u 0 ( i t ai.t n ts r e r t t o w at r t ref e dh e c i p o. g r l s odI n l. a r par C s w yne n o e m si l an d n e le mr a o gort s t a
- l. t e f e nt t a
amo c eo t u g n bar a e at er me teem d i nf r yl o l o oh nf lia f mieT o o r igleiect o e t ne n cGe n s le.n a t r l e oynprt im o u s a iw l w e . l o t t l irh r d w va d e i t e f iwt o n la f e prape n l o b ee n v d e diot es o ased f n em e l ei odl nie . we l a al o.at s at c sges J c s u a cf e la c unl t neeg c rbt a n leu m r u yei g eaipne sia i c l r v ene u e ef cr mik s a v n ighe.a yrd e t ie ne el asl si hf eua oal e a. w enef l Owdt r ua e T eht S pt pr m l Tt l pah o _ o _ C il A . . _ k 6. 1 7 Ng 8 1 1 U3eU s. PhM 1 4 4 K 1 4
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l
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d. 9 e FT. CAIJetMIII IAICI. EAR PelWER STATIOII EllEttCISE-ItEMEDI AI. ACTiollS December 6-2,194) Page 9 of 29 O e nt: 8 2
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,,U 'A .ajo e f. 1'*A p'd l g 3
. s!* g3 ff.MA Eva!uation of State / County pesponse R .e 4 08Ag k ItAC hecus .eeutatlun Currective Action State (S)/ County (C) Nesposame (ACTisel)
((0 l}{u as < u s C.14 19 Barkup espelpmeest for analysing media samples were not present. Prnwletone and arrangement for p.
.I.ackup e epsipmeest shoes td be made. 4.a Sesi f icient analytical eepsipment may tw* available Elirsuagli alae use -
eef hacbeap tal. oratories. C.2.4 20 No t eclini cal operations were ohnerve.1 at . alin ra.llological t alwirat or y elis ting this exercise. The eserclue should tactiede analysis est mample smedi a and a demons t rat leus of enamunnications < and secur.1 keeping. Dana Colle t peIIncum Decontamination EcetrL E.1.a 21. The availability of St at e health - phystre perneennel over aos entended g pe r i n.l of Iime was not denuui-marated. State health physica permannel slumild he assigne.1 to prowlsle 24-lusier capabilit y. let 22. Act i vi t ten presented at the
.l. cons aminat teus facility were m i en t at e.l . A denuuist rat tani of
.lcrant ami n4t l.wi center capalelli-slem slums t.1 he carried <w.? In a future eserclae.
64 (1) c3stdmosut (3) 633Idso3 uoissy
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b o-C. (I) a3*nbepetti (y) atenbspy ) e I
-y osuodsay b
e a a L e al m
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as
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o
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= 1 cot 3aiduo3 g poecdozd U
m e. ^ WG M @ E W - ; 3 M st?
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4
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m 1 .
'3-u f m
a a 4
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s-
- a. = o.w .e. .E, w.
g c w.3c e .- w .ew
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I E - eYey5* *E w - * "u 8 y*i"r w i e~*y 4 aI. , e*?=* = ,
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, . =-- .-5 m w e. = tea ge 3 ce w w
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- E-
- 4da e e a
Q e = ==S 3 y" w
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- f ee9 ,, .a; e *-=3 **
e 2 J a : T g er. et as a g g ** e e e 2. .
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.=
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%3 3 w a eo e- a y a.g ,,.,. I. ,.5y e .. .E. l ,- 3
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- g -g 3=M C6I et blt .e T Ek S Ee-Tw 4& S 'O"T2* -
C C
= C w =W b = b =
g j E == w a. T. =9 & == T
. C- e & as ==
I e w e.=> == . D s
-- G. J C C: mt = " == e6 t .- y 3 m ==3 == = ==aw3 & a .s -
3 2 3 "T & C *I e= = UT 5 W a e.i g ea= w e - e =. w
- a. s v e e r. = .e. Ta.eIu- I.a e9
'a. C es e == es T me w M
<r 6z.g a e= s:T.:e6v=> e
... 3l ae -.
l D Ji t
' dC e.es t. e .
5 ' ** g at
".S. ! tl N 3 N
=al- -
p a =
*r= + --ww+ ..- , -
.m-.o ,,y -s,.my---e w - - - , - - , - . , - - - - e,e cr+- ,, ..--,-r--ww--i-,,w-swe ,-. w = ,w--e.
+. . .
t 'e o t FT. cal.NfMHI BillCI.F.A't F0WER 9 G5000 EXE;'CISE-BDGElbl AI. ACTIN 00S lben.,he r 3 4 . 1981, rag. 18 of 29. O n g 2' n"
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"3e .
83:
- ct" R
o "k u. new vosI N MAC Recue wndatlun Cortect ive Act f un State (S)/ County (C) Nesponse (ACTI(84) $* 0 8 ' FEMA Evaluation of State / County itemponse $4E m<w IUN8
- n. Il ~was not clear to upsat enGiit "Eug"a
! n.E.e 1 time IIAM an.I DEACT wolienteer radio operators wou l.1 he avallable at t he Ef aC la t he event of an actosal . . emergency. Tlie cousit y plan sloonald m t tje inclu.le a deactlption of Llw . . antent that these volunteer . } organlantions will participate in {- an actesa l emergency. Apprnpriate letterm of agreement would help to , define the entent of availability. e
.l.10.c. 26. Special leeues relating to the 1.14.4 evarustIsus of schools en1' 44.0 muhl li t y-Impai red have not 'heen adequately a.l.ireu sed. Proce. lures j wiel tli nee.l to 8.e ele fined for the evareset t on ut erhools includes the c at ent to which insees ut il be
- une.l . ro..r.li na t i on and communi ca-
- tion lu
- t wcces the DiC and the -
i neluent supe r i n t en. lent s, alerting , an.1 availability of Inna drivers, j an.1 .empcetasInnu of- parents
- picking s teci r children esp at the
] achools. Activit ics wisicle nee.1 to 4 1.e a.1.Irceime.1 in the evaceaation of mot.I I s t y-I mpai red i nc i ar.in a system for the I. lent i f I rat Isus of neuil si- . atitutioneller.1 ludi videaals. 1 Prowlsion for their evacuat last i -nInn nat I f f rat ines of I ns t l e est lans. I e nesc.le.l. i i I 1
.s e a e
FT. CAIJIfM181 ISCI. EAR PenfER STATinst EMEstCISE-RetteElllAl. ACTinels . Deceshe r 6-7. 1981 Page 12 of.29 C n g Q" n"
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o a ar m m $ e. { . NN ItAC hecuer endat tua Carrective Actlam State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTitel) $* 0 8 IMSA Evaluation of State / County Response "j"E. I lU{o mMod K.1.a 27. 1.ou-range (0-200 eft) and permanent record doelmeters were not avall-able. Doelmeters were read on an hoeir ly has t e, this is not frequent eno.igh un.ler certain circue-stances. Iow-range. direct-read anel permanent record doelmetera - are nee.le.l . The laterval between rea.IIe gm of the dnetmeterm is depen. lent upees tina dose rate to wl.ith sl e workers are esposed. An leit er val al 5% minist ea or even more frequent ennld be required in high radiation fielde (greater than i R/li) . Changes to Instruc-tione provided with dosimeters ohneilJ las canaldered. . Inus State EtK: U.l.h 24 All organisat ions having emnergency responst hilit ies and Identified les the plan 418 not participate in tins esercine. Eacle organisation shall establish procedures for alert ing. nnt if ying, an.1 anhills-Ing esmorgency tempanse personnel.
l e a FT. CAIJIstilet IslClf.AR PfitJEst STAfinst EXEstCISE-REMEDIAL. ACTInetS
, Deccal.er 6-7. 1981 Page 13 of 29 C n g 2" -
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'N NAt: leccus send.etlun Currectivu Action State (S)/ County.(C) Respona.e (ACTlHil) d' O $ FEMA Evalisation of State /Comenzy itesponse
"#" EUfa E M O .'I W h. une aften systen was activated at 0915 last the ESS messane broad-cast was delayed sentil 8005. Pro-ced. ores nee.1 to ; he eleveloped to ensure prompt broadcast of EAS e messages initowing alten activa- "
tion.
.l.10.e. 10. Maps or displays of popealat ion .l.10.h density by evacuation area, and relocation centers were not posted. Maps aluswi ng popeal at lun c distribustion aroun.1 time neoclea r fact 188y 1.y evariaatinn areas. and maps slu. wing relocation centers in 1.om e areas alumel.l he prepare.1 and posted. .1.10. l. 11. The current state plan was discow -
e rcal en i.e in error t elent i f ying slie neemt.e r of faellies residing - within the 2 mile EPZ in Potta- - wat t aale Cnienty. Ylio plan shonald be up.lat e.1 t o Indicate the cos tect nuel.cr of familles reelding wittiin earle em rgency pl.saning sone. . J.10.e 12. Designatlaie for the maem r a.Il e-logical =>ni t o r i ng al:e differe.1 hetween Ilie nat illa y and tien state. Time difference apparently c reat eil confuelon. Ilie est i li t y and ulne t ie stato slo.ne ld use a co mmun designater inr ra.llologica l seuil-torfgg siten.
fl 68-1 (I) eastdaant
-(3) sattdaos uo333y
- e. ISTPaest n
qs. o
- 7. (I) stentsprut e (V) asenbspy
?'
a. asuodsag e C
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E h as
~. . I wi o
3 I _ a.s. .
.13
.a3sq \
- uoisagdmos 1 pesodon
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e N E - = l e.=t M. 4 me.4 5 - W 4
& w S 40 -
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- 5
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- =
m
..I W4i e .2 eTTe e e e e ** t. I S* **I &5 M eoa=
ts = swA 4 S =meee4
- w- .E -e e=
to w C 3 4 s O. as e =e. to eg
.S 3 C to a
'T 3-g
.e s -
s
. w w v .,. w. = .,
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- w's*7mEve-2=aI es a= e-*- ~~f?ts-
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% = = 3 sa
- l. &. . =. .=. =e . .a.w
- - : .z T u ., 6
-sm
*$ w, ye = ,= .
W , e .s 4eswe t 4 - m e. g e-4 = . g b e =. e Wu
- 3 3 T . .g ., =ga - w t 3
w e *
- e.
asc- g w n.
- 4 ' = s t
gg L.osa .w
-as= as t
w e -*se m=w e 2 . a a
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. 'I a FT. CAIJ10efel MICI. EAR pHWER STATined EXERCISE-BF. MEDIAL. ACTIOllS Decesher 6-7. 394)
Page 15 of 29 . C n a Q"
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nam
'%' dBAC RecumsenJat ion Currectlwe Actlun k' State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTI(111) o p R"(3 FDIA Evaluati. n of State / County Response j4E"
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d%UIo com a "{ eEMOS Field Nonsterleht twitles I I.S. 16. The Blue team was not certain of , Cl.2.4 the proper collectice procedures e 0.4.c for, and calculatione of redle-Iodine concentratione in the-field. 1he written procedures lead teen afsplaced. TI.e Blue- team requires more training in emer-
' gency response and radiolostral
! mennitoring procedures. A clieck, print to deployment, for all eq.ilpment and proce.he ral manasale .i elue.al.1 he verlfle.1 on a c#eecklist.
- Lil, 17. The Blue team's air sampling l 1.4 equipment was noscope rable because .
no power supply for Slee ai r piemp was available. The plan slices t 4 l spectly an.1 Ident if y . the require- - ment for an air sampler power- ,, supply in time clieck list. I F 18. Following deployment, the ~ radle- . IngicAl monlturing teSee were not prow l .ic.1 ui t te perin.lle espdates of plant al.itus and meteorology. The field team coordinator slumild prnwl le periodic up.la t es of plant 7 status an.1 m tenrningy to f le t.1 j ~tcans. 1 i 4 - -- -
~
4O p. m"nu*.4a0d x{u eUM 9 2 2sIE f o 6 1 . . E" e g A'Q v aj.j P a .a:I" e s n o p 8 s e R y t n u t . o C
/
a t
. a t
S f o n o i t S a l e u a l l a T v C E A A I. M A E l F n E M E - R a3uAp80 g E M I
.o2e$ .
C R1 E4 ) N 9 N E 1 O I 1 0 , T 0 7 C 8 - A 7 6 ( 4 7 r e 5 e s b n R m o E e p - 1W c s f e e P D R R ) A C ( F. C1 y A t I R n u a N o C 01 / 0 J
)
I S A ( C e
. t
- T a F t S
e- egen-m d'- d esl m1 t s d t. d s pi nsap n at tii ai ee i l s oiff etl hi ac aal eanl eeereaa e a a i o t g i eyaige inrta uq srf np i nntelgo t g y ri&r t ee s e t w A t c g ne b rl n t i i t . a a i mo n i lr o mcr e oa c de mr nes e ed gnidpi r a r r l i h t el afae d o f P ss n
^J e rt o
l l u a . l r ee i v s t r u 1 a s e Inqr t s en a un i e l e i lel e s h ie s i gs n en e t it lt o af n r t gt ed a n e n a r li s.me e c ni s nf i a a e owst ti e ai i fd n r o b r i r m ei ds e a at di ren ar la f a m r rrd d e i dt o vent o l eie d l er h l raom a l e n ee A ere C al d A ei deh u t e h erf n cl e i i c df t l. e f a e t t m a f i sm t t a . gmu orl trd l e oi l. l i l maa u .nel c a e e oar s h ae e i d id ohirp duh nt w iF leleg l t l a l f p o m er mat a nt ipw rss eo e a c J t ri s igel rut r e rpo cbol B d d n n l t r e cg .d h m ni a l. ano et tleomn ne . f er ont n e a.ns u pre a ce o am u n r s a el e e ys loan r on a t s o et e r ow s nl s t o1 s e ees d tnnt l . c er nh l t ed ecn l r1 r
- l. s e h eet ae e e l oiese n a. neot oe r h Twmol r em A ncrura s R papt aJh C
A . . . N 9 0 8 1 4 4
-l.d . .1 d. a. h.
ps*k N. 9 1 I. 2 1 8 8 8 FN K
' f ,ii .j,I ,j' ; ; 1' j1 ' I. .!: i < Tdiil
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FT. CAI.lentsee basCESJu FinEu STATinst Itur.uCisE-aFJEElbl Al. ACTIGetS isece sher 6-7 ISA) Page 17 of 29 G n. a Q~
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'd NAC becuamendation Currective Action' ' State (S)/Cuesnty (C) Itcupunue ( ACTitee) tutA Evalisation of State /Cosamty Besponse j j"E lU .'iu asM K.%.a. 42. Radiological field. monitoring K.%.h teams- were act proficient in determining Llie need and means f or -
dernntmalnotina. . of amurgency w personnel, supplies, equipment. 6e and contaminated weete disposal. Field tease regist re additlanal tralning in time areas of deter-mining alie need and means for
- decontaalnatinen of emergency pe a meanic I . mupplies, and egesIp-mees t , anel - f ar
- Aleposal of cont aminat ed wast es.
Forward _ Caesayl_ Foot-Radladon Teae 0.l*!!"Uf"*!L 4.1 41. Neuenge Inandling and diat t t but ion were i nadeq.sa t e, reene t t inel In t hee temo cuerdinat or not being costrent - one 46 latest developmente. Tine , Ia;aira ence and ienction of ahe field team coordinator sliould be clearly ele f i ne.1 la the plan. Al t houais the coordination of field teman Is a state function, tlee laterf are viele the IICEssc etional.8 he ~ clartile.l. The fiel.1 tese coverill-natur alumalJ have adequate adel ni st rat i ve autliori t y to perform his .functler. Clestcal
- supinos t lur tien teae enordinator-wenild Im desirable.
~
.s i
' FT. CAIJitMIN 158CI RAR PrtfER STATIO01 EEFRCISE-BFWDI Al, ACTIGIIS Decceher 6-7, 1941 1 Page la of 29- i
^
n
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L' 8 83" h. lid itAC Recuamin:nJatlosi Currect Ivu Act duas Stata (S)/ County (C) Bempanso (ACTitel) . R"k U c 8,w.FEMA Evalisation of State / County Besponse o nun 4E~ w $ ~ ~f - IUIo aIMON
,8.10.a 44. Visual aide were lacking eacept j for. maps of the plume EF2 and .
radiological monitoring 'altes. Hope of redinlogical . monitoring N altee were laconalst ent in flee
- p locat tna and identificatlan of the .
j elten. The necessary visual aide . an.1 mape aluna14 ha dewe1oped anel { pon t e.1 la the . lose assessment
- ares. Furalier, the states and the j utility alumal .1 agree on a e namun
, map of - radiological sunni t or ing l sites an.l Identillere int alunee l mites, e I F.I.4, 4%. Commeanicatlan with ' the radiolog-f 1.4 leal monit oring . teams was not adeqisa t e. A direct form of casameni cat ines between the field a conrelinat or and the field - } monituting t eaams ahoisid he. - ! estahllstcd through. upgraded j espel pment .
**3 3 ** 3. 8"PI"8' L L.I.) 4fa. The Hl ussnar l Valley' lluepital .llJ 4
not leave 4Je.luate radiological monitoring instruments. Hi ne<me r i j V418ey Henspital bloonald aceluire j appropriate inst rueceit a to be able to raji.alogically mani t or cewet am-l > I nat eel :=trasmas. .
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r' j FT. CAIJirMIN IG8Cif.AR ITlefEst $74T1000 l'XEkCISE-kEMElll AI. ACTieMIS .. ^ '
/
[ ' Deceshe r 6-7, its 3 # *
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Page 19 of 29
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$s kAC Betoaus:nd.stle se Opraectivu Actlues State (S)/ County (C) Respoense (ACTilllt) E G g3 FEMA Ev.alisatlun of State /Cou6.ty Besponse j 3" NNON CI. 2. c 47. A practice.1 procealiste for adalt-
- ting radiolay.fcally cont aani mat ed. *
, Injured persosse was not evident at .y i tie Missouri Valley llespital. t,s Pri.ce.lurce aloalJ be developed and , a elenmons t a at e.1 ior ahe a rest ment , of s .s ts.llologically contaminated viction at - tlie . Hlesonert Valley . Hospital. A.ldi t t naal training of l hanpital staff may. he ancessary. Hercy lbopital la Cedar Raptle Isas a widentapa of procediares whi cle might pr aeve useful. The staging of a me.llral drill would test pro-i. re.l. ores ciers ent ly describe.l. Ilarrinna County Et$ j .A.2.a 44. Cneman.l a ml rewit rol of ik 188)W. { van not effectively demonstrated. , i The nDS representative officially ) in charge was acciapt ed with ' communication functions.
~
The HCEssC mNnst.1 elesignate a deputy to I
- manage the EOC during times winen 3
- he is unavailable.
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s g c Irr. CAIJssulal sascifAR PalWER STATinal EXEltCESE-BIMEDIAl. ACTinitS Ds:cemine r 6-7, 1983-Page 20 of 29 A n, a 2" n"
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Se 1 2 2" **3 - .:
**X Has a e En "f Y g State (S)/Cosanty (C) Nesponse ( AL.Tlt31)
R"f u. .tutA Evalisation of State /Conanty Responase saw o sI* G ga III I u i s.a MAC Netus a:sidat lun Currective Act ion "I f "3 ENO? . 4.1.a. 49. The leCMC provided 'a presa C.4.s briefing .luriseg alae esercise. The spokesperseue was ret s h inately t ralne.1 regarding contact witti Else y prese anel speci f i c agency ~ respon- - & athlittles. Tlee HCEdC eleoisl4 i designate' t eie points of contact anel playsical locations f or use by i l l.a news see.lla Aering an marrgency an.1 la censpliance wi tle slee Pl an.
- Fu r t he r . a synkeeperman slumalet lur designate.1 and t rained to , interact wItle i1.c ar.11.a.
1.14.4 50 TI.e itCEnc staf f were not ampare of
- t i.e locat ions of mobilit y-impai re
- I an.1 mper l .e 4 neeJa persons. The llCEHC mS ust.1 compile a list of .
sushi l i t y-i mpai re.1 and special necele pernons. Provisluna elinield ' 8.e developed int tlee protectinst or evaceaat Iown of cliene persons desting , 5 .e re.Ilological emergency. 1 { g.).e 51. nuly Belgte-range (0-200 R) j Jostmeters were- available for i emergency tanth e rs. lana-range (0-l' 200 mR) poc ket Joelmeters and T1.Ds ulunald la- available for emergency . I workers wlwa enter ra.ll at lan fiel.la. { I I e
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- FT. cal.alfailli INICI. EAR POWe!R STATInIg EMENCISE-SEMEntAI. ACTipels :y
- s * * . s, Decembe r 6-7, 1981 >
4.-. Page 21 of 29 Y - Q
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Sta't e (S)/ County (C) pysponse (ACTitel) M r3
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NAC Recos m;nd.st lun Currect ive Act is.:n ., ,, IT.80A dvaluation of State /Coety stesponoe .E"l *2a w ii O
.es c< e, -R .,
- n. ...m . a n . -
A.2.a 52 A copy of ti.e current state plan- ,s .,.
' ? 1,< ' '
was not available. .Confuelen in .
~
N x a s.ermansee t an.1 responelbility < resen t t ed. A copy of the costrent -> .4 plan sluusid I.e . maintained in the ve llCEnc. Key at af f ' members shoisld .~ 1 he thormaghly f amiliar . with t 8:el t "
- I reopertlwe responsibilities.
, r. s/
nit %). Tl.e 34CE6C st atism board sees not- % ad.rqu.a r e . The haard was too small t o poe t slie ne. emmary plant statsse ' Iofutmatlon. 1ThehHCEfaC should *
.. design a status heard i which will .
Ident i f y ' e l.n entrent ens:s Mer.c y ,
/ ,
f. clamelltration levels ' I nc lesde - ~~- ' e f fect i ve times for protective - action . elecisions; .and a brief '* -
.lenc ript ions of protectlwu actions ,
en effect. - t A.2.4 54. Some personnel reported to the [ MCEfC when s licy had no emergency rueronalhllities. Apparently the d call leur In use in no longer up t o lat e. An up-t o-Jat e ca l l list ident if ying peraners with eastgency , responelhalleles cons! stent with t lw- . current plan shoes td in pre-pared.
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FT. CAIJelittli IS8Cif.AR rinfEE STAfl81el EXERCISE-REEDI AL ACTittetS December 6-7, Ita) . Page 22 of 29
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State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTitet) R"f u. o aOE FEMA Evalueston of Seate/ County Response jj~' d e ~f 15 U NAC lieto eweasl t 1..a Carsect Iwe Act lam lURu
.e 4 3 5 -
rr M. leerd copies of the content of ESS messages, press rolesees. ' aaJ protective action recnearnJations were not evallable at the leCEric y kr a. nee el.e re was ne telefas eachine. T1.e procurement of a telefse llah with the HItC anJ the ISEIC woulit enhaare the canelatent JIssealnat ion of emergency-related iniurent inee to the llCDC stelf. rya swet t set e, Ca.ent y Ett A.2.a %. The .llrectnr of enamnenications wee In charge of time FCOIC. bt thle role was not clearly la the plea. The PCEtt alumalJ epeelfy the function and reopensibility for bey ladtwt.luals by title for caemand and reatrut.. , A.I.h M. The PfYst staff Jid not have epeelfic wri t t en procedures or clieck b l et int their respective assigned datlee. Tl.e PCFIC shoulJ Jewetop ustaten proceAsree or thecklists ta alJ tb encry.ency response staff la effectively perf arelnet al.elt Jeetles. e
n FT. CAIJesNIst 181CI. EAR Pfadl!N STATInst EXERCISg.gtrHElll AI. ACTinels December 6-7. 198) Page 21 of 29' g 2~ J we ~3 S. E 3% "33 -
.3 it " o. 83 ,: t "
w o-( 3 o n o- w v
.{ "h{ N kAC Netus n:sid.st ion Currective Act f ua State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTICIt) sI* 8 Fthl4 Evaluation of State / County Responsa j 2" lUgo oc M u .'$ .
.l.lo.a. 54. No sneps or displays were posted l.lo.h Indicating evacuation t oist es .
relocat ion centere.' access cont rol pointe, re.Ilologi cal monituting y N pointe, or swalaslat ion density. by evaroest isms are a. Tlie pcEnc shoistd d tvalop more or displays identify-Ing everenat t sui, preselected ra.Ilo-Ingical meet.I t ag - and monitoring points, relocation centere la host are.am. : and populat ion ellet rilmat ion ~ a r sman.l the nuclear facility .hy evacuation area. F.I.4 %9. No dirers comsminicat ione caps-1.llity with the DW was cheerved. Provision for cumsmuilcot t one twtween the Ilrensee's near-ette EnF an.1 alie lunC siwnstd be made.
.l .14.e. 64. The Put t avat t amie Count y Sheri f f 's -
.I.10.f Department ha.1 no kaunaledge or
, prnce l. ores regarding . the a.imI n t e-tration af KI. Prowlelo.nas for the wee of reelloprotect i ve st rugs ,
particularly f or emergency workers sluweld he o.ade , inclu.Ilng elaant i-ties, ma nrage . m.eans of dist rl tus-tion, an.1 ti.e pre.letermine.1 c.widl-tions un.le r whi rls nearla struge may he essed 1.y essergesary workers.
. _ . _ .- _ m._. ,
6 # e
+
. FT. CAIJinistl IAlcl.F.AA FinlER STAfinal EXENCISE-NFJIEnlAl. ACTinIIS .
Elecember 57 G 981 Page 24 of-29 ,
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wo-{ M i.I BA(; kecue 'm:ndat lun ' Correct a ve Act asus State (S)/ County (C) Itespanse (ACTlall) FEMA Evaluatloa of State /Conanty Reeponse I4:
. $* O s3
"*" {UN ou{?
m K .1. b ' 6 8. Tlie Pot t avat a male Count y . Slieri f f 'a delmetles were not t ralmed in the name or periodic reading- and y recosding of personal doelmeters. CD The PCEsW: shneeld ensure that
- danterters are read at appropriate ire.luencien and prowlite for main-talning dame recorde for emergency wushers.
E.8E f E'*fl.'.Ytf_* LI one Faci I I t g A.2.a in2. Decision matting and recommenda-tions f eer protect t we ~ act ions uere not aluays anJe acentding to time proce. lures spectiled la tlie. Plan. AJeli g ional training la seecessary
- In men. gement and decleton mak ing r espona list li t ies. Familiarlaation uit te s lee procedures in the plan -
alu:ulit he emplias t aed. Il 61. The IN was (no small to be assed . effectively. Adeqisate emergency facillelen an.1 equipment to mispport B liot emergency almonald D= prowlled. The single office sham 15 Int e s pande.g. .
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t FT. CAIJWWIN lasci. EAR ren#Eu STATIoss EMENCisE-arJer.IsI Al. ACTIEMIS Deceehar 6-7. 19i1
- Page 26 et 29 O .- -
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p. WAC Necuseend.st ion cursect ivie Act ion Stater (S)/O.unty (C) keepense (ACTlaW) tg-
$* u 3 ta n ea y M *.I
. FDIA Evaluation of State / County Response I E "j" EU o E 4 u{b F. I ..I 67. Congnaalcatione equipment - was - not j adequate for the lous representa-tives. TI.e leva representatives ,
; sha sid lee provided ultin reliable o
- primary an.l hackup means of-j casse enicat lami between the DW and 1
atste an.1 local EOCs an.l raJio-
- logical anont toring teams.
J Informat inn Anthent Scat ton Center E.4.1, fi8 8he occanlon, the . countent of l E.5-7 mesmar,re selcased . by the IAC vere d found to be erronense or confessing. Provisions elineeld 1e o.a.le for more carefeat a.ithentica-
' t iene of tlac content of messages release.1 to a lie media and t hee .
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,Page 28 of'29 G e
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es o .% * *y - 4 4 cee as .n p *., M sj kAC Nets.amenJat lun Currett ive ActIseen Statu (5)/ County (C) itemposene ( ACTliel) ep
$* u 3 at: u s.: e
^ 6TMA Ev.alisatinn of State / County Respossue j4E IU&0 SNO? ? 'ia.1!= "*8aaat.csnter. C 7tl. Mape anet Jieplays to facilitate dieseminettose of infsersation at CD alie Mac were maall and generally i ne.leapsa t e. Agreements have biten reached wi t ti W hranka to upgrade I I.e MitC wtonal alda. It was not
; clear if ale new vtauals vuesl.t include the affected port ione of
- t ene4. The siew winneal alete for time MkC shamsl t depict the enttre planning area surremendlag the Port-Calhoun facility, incles.llag 4
af fected twertions of Iowa. E.4.1, 78. Ea3 bron.lcasts alumal.1 he monitored l C.2.c In Elie MaC to evalisate the accesra- ! ry of the Information the public i le receiving. Procedures to cor- - rect arrancamos information were .s i not Jewelope.t. Installation of an ' i ant ensia wenil.t enhance raJIo recep-tlews an.I al lene fur the moni t earing 1 of E R*: smnaarce. Proce.beres alunald i he eleveloped to correct erroneous br um.Icas t e. e i e 1 ? ~ b
_O , 4 6 FT. CAIJ1(NIN lelCl F.AR POWER STA7tfMI EXERCISE-RFJIElll AI. ACTl8 MIS Inecember E-7. 1981 Page 29 of 29 t. p. a
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'N NAC kecs,arwndatisena Caersect lwar Actlam State (S)/ County (C) Ecuponse (A(Titel) $ 3 awn FEMA Evaluation of State / County Response E E sIUIu o- {
.I M 8 'i
- M.5.F. 72. Overall. the geseli t y of puhile l C.4.b last ruc t ism and news releasen van i na.leetisa t e (see also Sec. 2.5.2)
Here t ralnleig in the aset hent i ca- # tina and quality of pulille Infor-motion le suggested. Procedures f ar coordinating and reviewing tiee I contents of public I nst riect ions - a rer swe. led. E.6; 11. The timing nf snablic lastrucalon App.). was ele laye.1 an.1 not well-c.2.e. coor.lt no t e.1 wi tis the public R.1 alerting process (see also Sec. l 2.1.1). Procedu res to expedite t ime broa.lcast of the ER* aussages, cInsely f allensing the activation
- ni t i.e alerting alsnal are nee.Ir.l.
l 4 i 4 o 4 i
_ _~_.. ,__ _ __. .._. _ . . . . . , 1
~
/j REGIONAL DIRECTOR'S EVALUATION I. INTRODUCTION i
@+ j
# A. Area Description
- 1. . Facility and Surroundings 1 :
l _ The Fort Calhoun Nuclear Power Station (FCNPS) has one pressurized water
- i reactor. The facility is located near Blair, Nebraska on the western bank of the Missouri: River in a predominantly rural area. It is owned and operated by the Omaha Public Power District of Omaha, Nebraska. \
- 2. Governments within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone
( The 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) is split by the Missouri River and includes parts of Nebraska and Iowa.- In Nebraska, the towns of Blair, Kennard, and Fort Calhoun in Washington County. and Fremont in Dodge County are located within the EPZ. -In Iowa, there are no towns located within the 10-mile EPZ. Portions of Pottawattamie and Harrison counties are within the 10-mile EPZ.
- 3. Governments within the 50-mile Emergency Planning Zone The 50-mile ingestion emergency planning zone includes port!ons of eastern Nebraska and western Iowa. All or part of the following 10 counties in Nebraska are within 50 miles of the station: Burt, Cuming, Thurston, Dodge, J
Washington, Saunders, Douglas, Lancaster, Cass, and Sarpy. In Iowa, all or part
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(' of the following 10 counties are within 50 miles of the station: Pottawattamie, Woodbury, Mills, Montgomery, Fremont, Harrison, Shelby, Cass, Monona, and Crawford.
- 4. - Special Circumstances and Considerations y
7 a) Two states are within both the plume and ingestion pathway exposure E i EPZ;
. b) The segment of the Missouri River in the EPZ carries commercial waterborne traffic and is a prime area for recreational boating and fishing; \
s c) The majority of the land in the plume expost.re EPZ is used for cash grain production. qy B.. Emergency Planning Authority and Organization
- 1. ' The authority for the Nebraska Radiological Emergency Response Plan is contained in the Reissued Revised Statutes of Nebraska of 1943 as follows:
Chapter 23, Interlocal Cooperation Act; Chapter 70, Definitions of Public Power District; Chapter 71, Radiation Control Act; Chapter 81,' Nebraska t Disaster and Civil Defense Act,'as amended; Chapter 85, Regional Radiation Health Center; and Chapter 84, Vital Resources Emergencies. Pursuant to state statute, the Nebraska Civil Defense Agency has the lead responsibility for the plan, full- notification authority and a partial implementation mandate to l protect the health and safety of the populations. Other Nebraska State i agencies assist in accident incident response. The Nebraska Department of l Health provides radiological monitoring, recommends protective actions, and
^
- ^ -: 7
, . _ - L :-- -~
3 ' I3 monitors public water systems. The University of Nebraska provides radiological monitoring and laboratory support. The Nebraska State Patrol
~
provides traffic control, back-up law enforcement, support for emergency : A
. response. activities in the ingestion pathway'EPZ, and communication support. .-
The Department of Aeronautics provides state aircraft resources. - The
. Department of Agriculture provides agricultural field support for monitoring, 4
recommends actions to prevent food product contamination and collects land use data. The Department of Roads provides manpower and equipment to
.i.
support operations. The Department of ' Welfare arranges for emergency services for evacuees. The Nebraska National Guard provides needed manpower to other state agencies. Most state agencies participate to so'nt,e degree, with a common objective to protect the public health and safety, b 2. - The authority for the Iowa Emergency Plan is contained in the Constitution of the State of Iowa, Amendment of 1952, Section 19, Gubernatorial Succession, and in the Code of Iowa as follows: Disaster Services and in the Public l:i Disorders, Chapter 29C, Code,1975, as amended; Contingent Fund use for State losses or governmental subdivisions disaster aid. Pursuant to state statute, the Iowa Office of Disaster Services has the lead responsibility for the plan, full' notification authority, and a partial implementation mandate to protect the safety and health of the population. Other Iowa State agencies assist in accident / Incident response. The Iowa Department of Health provides and acts as clearing ~ house for technical information and recommends protection actions. The University 'of Iowa, thiversity Hygienic Laboratory directs radiological monitoring. The Iowa Department of Water, Air, and Waste Management controls public water supplies. The Iowa Highway Patrol provides field team support. The Department of Transportation controls road, rail, and 4
4
/ dir' traffle. The Secretary of Agriculture controls food distribution. The Iowa National Guard ;provides needed . manpower to other state agencies. The Commissioner of Social Services and the Red Cross provide assistance with the many needs of emergency workers and evacuated citizens. Most state agencies-participate' to some degree, with a common objective to protect the public hesith'and safety.
2 C. History and Status of Planning and Preparedness. t
- 1. Plan Development 4
i . 1 ~ a.: . The State of Nebraska Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plant incidents (NRERP) provides for the means for state and local . s (. government emergency response in Nebraska. The plan currently in effect is dated April 15, 1983 and supersedes one dated March 1,1982. NRERP is [ a basic plan for state emergency operations and control and outlines , functional responsibilities at the state level. The general state plan is supported by two site-specific radiological emergency response plans for Dodge County and Washington County, and a reception and care plan for Sarpy County. Each of the county plans was revised in Dec.,1982.
- b. The Iowa Emergency Plan -(IEP) outlines the radiological emergency response in the State of Iowa. The plan currently in effect is dated March 1983. IEP encompasses a basic plan for state emergency operations and
, control and outlines functional responsibilities at the state level. The current Harrison and Pottawattamie County Plans are not in compliance with NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, criteria and therefore are ; i e
,. . .2 . . . . _ . ; an ,_ _ _ _. _ _ ,._ 1,, _ __. _ ;unn .c._;_ a _. ._ _ _ ; . 1. _2.. . _. ; ;_. ;_ _._
._.<a 4
l ,
#) inadequate as emergency plans. The State of Iowa has assumed responsibility for emergency management and has adapted the Compensatory Measures Plan to Chapter 12 of the State- Plan. The Compensatory Measures Plan will provide guidance to the counties until the appropriate county plans are finalized.
2.- Public Meetings n
- A public meeting concerning the NRERP and county plans was held in Blair,
+ Nebraska on August 4,1981. A public meeting concerning the IEP was held in Council Bluffs, Iowa on February 29, 1984. A list of. those attending and a transcript of these meetings is appended as Tabs to this report.
;y te 3. Exercises 1
. Three exercises in Nebraska and Iowa- have been conducted to evaluate the adequacy of state and local emergency plans and response capabilities in the
- event of an emergency at FCNPS. The first two exercises involving both states following publication of NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. I were held on July 22, 1981, and Sept. 15, 1982. The exercises were evaluated by observers from the' Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region VII, other Federal agencies represented on the Region VII Regional Assistance Committee (RAC),
and qualified Federal contractors. Public critiques of the exercises were held on. July 23, 1981, and Sept. 16, 1982, in Blair, Nebraska and Council Bluffs, Iowa, respectively. The most recent joint exercise was conducted on Dec. 7,
- r. . 1983. Members of the Region VII RAC, FEMA Region VII staff, and Federally-
; J contracted evaluators observed the exercise. A public critique of the exercise y y a , ,- , . . .m.-, - - , . , , - - - . , , , , , . ,,__-..,,,,,,o-,,n,,-,,,n,,,,,,,,n,,
r. 6
)- was held on December 8,1983 in Council Bluffs, Iowa. It was the consensus of
' the Federal evaluators that no major deficiencies were identified although other
.' deficiencies which require a schedule of corrective actions were noted. The scenarios and final reports for these three exercises are appended to this report.
J D. Documenting Evidence Available for Examination
- 1. -" State of Nebraska Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Incidents," April 15,1983.
L 2. " Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Incidents for Dodge County," December 1983. \ s
- 3. " Radiological Emergency Response Plan for. Nuclear Power Plant Incidents for Washington County," December 1983.
T. 4. RAC. reviews of State' of Nebraska and Washington and Dodge County plans, March 9,1984.
- 5. State of Nebraska's response to RAC plan review, April 25,1984.
- 6. FEMA Region VII response to Nebraska's suggested schedule of corrections to state and county plans, May 8,1984.
< 7. "The Iowa Emergency Plan Book II: Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response," March 1983.
4
- 8. RAC reviews of State of Iowa RERP: November 4,1983 and April 24,1984.
. 9. Letters from State. of Iowa Office of Disaster Services to the Regional y Director of FEMA Region VII responding to plan deficiencies as noted in RAC reviews: December 2,1983; February 8,1984; March 9,1984; and March 23, 1984 and exercise deficiencies:. April 27,1984.
, 10. Final exercise reports of July 22, 1981, September 15, 1982, and December 7, 1983 exercises.
. . . - . . . - _ . . - ~ . . . . . - . - - - . - . - , . . . - . _ _ . - - , . _ . - _ _ . . . . - - ..
7
'[ j
- 11. Transcript on the public meeting for Nebraska, site-specific to Ft. Calhoun Nuclear Station, August 4,1981.
- 12. Transcript on the hearing for the Iowa state radiological emergency response
, . plan, site-specific to Ft. Calhoun Nuclear Facility, February 29,1984.
5 I,
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8
. ,j
. II. EVALUATION OF PLANS AND EXERCISES ,
A. Assignment of Responsibility (Organizational Control)
- 1. State of Nebraska The state plan does not show the minimum number of people needed to staff the EOC, nor how the EOC interacts with the Field Command Post.1 The radiological laboratory should be able to demonstrate a capability to s
function over a prolonged period.2
- 2. Washington County, Nebraska ic, It was not clear to what extent the HAM and REACT volunteer radio operators would be available in the event of an actual emergency.3 Letters of agreement are not included in _the county plan but have been promised for inclusion in the second quarter calendar year 1985 plan revisions.4 See State of Nebraska's response to RAC plan review, April 25, 1984.
- 3. Dodge County, Nebraska No deficiencies.
7 J
9
;, n N ..j 4. State of Iowa During the 1983 exercise, the compensatory plan staff assigned to the
.- . Pottawattamie County EOC (PCEOC) did not h,.ve specific written procedures or checklists for their respective duties.5 The Iowa State Plan needs to address the state's responsibility in the following areas: actual evacuation of a contaminated area, security in contaminated
~
areas, fire' services / decontamination, search and rescue operations, initial traffic control and communleations, reporting of incidents to the Office of
\
Disaster Services (ODS), providing emergency medical services, determining social service needs and notifying state social services, assisting Department of Water, Air, and Waste Management in decontamination, assisting in gathering
. (N samples in support of University Hygenic Laboratory (UHL), keeping routes open in poor weather and . winter conditions, assisting the State Department of Agriculture in disseminating emergency response information to farmers, maintaining dose records of county / local emergency workers and volunteers,
. and making local distribution of KI.6 The State of Iowa has since responded to FEMA clarifying the state's responsibility in letters dated December 2,1983, February 8,1984, and April 27, 1984. The response has been determined to be sufficient, but should be included in the plan. During the 1983 exercise, the ODS representative officially in charge of the Harrison Co. EOC (HCEOC) was occupied with communications between the HCEOC, the EOF, and the ISEOC and was unable to demonstrate command and (]' . control at the County EOC level.7 Key staff did not possess a copy of the current state plan, resulting in confusion among them concerning their
- i. -
10 I-) rasponsibilities.8 Finally, some personal reported to the HCEOC who no longer had any emergency responsibilities under the compensating measures plan apparently as a result of the use of an out-dated calllist.9 It was noted during the 1983 exercise that the leadership role of the director of communications at the PCEOC was not clearly delineated in the plan.10 The Iowa State Plan needs letters of agreement between the state and agencias/ support organizations providing resources to, the response effort.II Subseque'ntly, Iowa has sent adequate documentation to FEMA in a letter dated February 8,1984 and will include this information in a subsequ'ent plan revision. During the 1983 exercise, it was noted that message handling and distribution at w t,c the Forward Command Post were inadequate, resulting in the field team coordinator not being current on the latest developments.12
- 5. Combined State Operations It was noted during the 1983 exercise that the Iowa representatives at the EOF were not sufficiently trained to perform their function well. Message logging and - handling were incomplete and telephones were sometimes left unanswered.13 There did not appear to be any support staff to handle these functions.14 Also at the EOF, decision making and recommendations for protective actions were not always made according to the procedures specified in the plan.15 h B. On-site Emergency Organization (Not Relevant to State and County Functions)
11
/j - C. Emergency Response Support and Resources
- 1. State of Nebraska
- The state plan does not list the resources for supporting the Federal response teams. However, the state has not yet been informed of what resources the Federal response teams need as FEMA is currently compiling such a list.16 g, State of Nebraska's response to RAC plan review, April 25,1984.
- 2. - Washington County, Nebraska i
1 The county plan states that letters of agreement are on file. They should be included in the plan. The state has promised that the appropriate letters will be included in the second quarter calendar year 1985 update of the county plans.II See State of Nebraska's response to RAC plan review, April 25,1984.
- 3. Dodge County, Nebraska No deficiencies.
- 4. State of Iowa In the plan, EPA is expected to provide laboratory assistance. The assistance noted is not that described in the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan. FEMA is currently compiling a list of resources for all
/' agencies.18 d
6 - -m-, .- --,,a.wn._-,-,w-..-,,,,,--p,-,... ,,,,,.,w_-. ,,,e,
l 12 ( Letters of agreement and a signature sheet listing agencies / individuals providing emergency assistance are missing from the plan.18 Subsequently, the state has provided FEMA with appropriate documentation in letters dated December 2,1983 and February 8,1984 and will include this information in a subsequent plan revision. Information is needed in the plan on laboratory analysis capabilities and response times.20 D. Emergency Classification System s i
- 1. State of Nebraska
/
-t No' deficiencies.
l l-
- 2. Washington County, Nebraska L-l A misunderstanding of the emergency classification existed between the County Sheriff Dispatcher and the CD Director. This caused a delay in staff notification and activation.21 i
- 3. Dodge County, Nebraska t
No deficiencies. l
- 7. -. ,
.x) l
, , - . . - - .-,-,-u---,,--_..,~w..a , , . . ~. , , .---e,n, w. - , . , - .,- . , .,e,. .__.n,.e,-ewm,e--wr,w.w,n.nm-un-n.,, ~,,
13
'(',<J .
- 4. - State of Iowa t
There are no procedures in the plan wh'ch details the actions each state agency 4 to take at each of the established emergency action levels (EAL). It is not clear whether or not state agencies have a phased step-up in readiness conditions in responsa to increasingly severe stages in EAL.22 E. Notification Methods and Procedures
- 1. State of Nebraska s
1 No deficiencies.
. ( ,% ,
i- 2. Washington County, Nebraska No deficiencies.
- 3. Dodge County, Nebraska No deficiencies.
- 4. State of Iowa The state plan does not tie alert notification to EAL. It is also not clear at which point all state agencies and nongovernm sntal organizations are
.- notified.23 ';)
t
- , , - . . . . - _ _ . _ , - . . - - , - - . . - . ~ - - - .
14 {j The state plan j has no ~ established procedures for alerting, notifying, and i y ' mobilizing emergency response personnel.24 I
, During the'1982 and 1983 exercises the timing of public instruction was delayed and not well-coordinated with the public alerting sirens.25 Also, the state plan falls to discuss the estimated time required for notifying and providing prompt E
. instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway.26 4
5.- Combined State Operations i e On . occasion, -the content of messages released by 'the Information
- Authentication Center and the Media Release Center (MRC) during the 1983 exercise were found to be erroneous or confusing.27 Furthermore, the content
.(v \ of the messages released was not always consistent with information contained in the public information brochure.28 4
F. Emergency Communications
- 1. State of Nebraska
.1 - 1D Before deployment,' the Nebrasua field team was not briefed on current plant or meteorological conditions.29 Prior to field team deployment, the field team provided to the State by the Cooper Nuclear Station was not briefed on plant or meteorological conditions ; nor was the team kept informed of these conditions throughout. The team also f] was not in communication with the mobile State Field Command Post (CRUSH),
.-, . . - - . - _ . . - - , ._--__,,_-....-..._..-r.,,. -_,_,.,..,._,m,,-..._m_ ,,._.m,_,,--_n_,--,- .
l a 15 h- located adjadent to the EOF, while the team was at the decontamination center.30
.- 2. Washington County, Nebraska .
No deficiencies.
- 3. Dodge County, Nebraska 1
No deficiencies. s
\
- 4. State of Iowa 1
f .
- t. During the 1982 and 1983 exercises, it was noted that the communication link to
. the field monitoring teams was indirect, through the state police escort accompanying them. This system was very inconvenient and only functioned marginally.31 Field team members were not equally proficient with hand-held field radios.32 Prior to deployment, the teams were briefed on plant status and - -
meteorology, however, no further updates were provided following deploy-ment.33 ,
-During the 1983 exercise, it was observed that no direct communications link existed between the Pottawattamie County EOC and the EOF.34 Also, the communications at the EOF used by the Iowa representatives to contact the state and local EOCs and the radiological monitoring teams were not adequate.35
([)
16-([) The state plan does not ensure that there is a coordinated communication link for mobile medical support facilities. Furthermore, the plan also. does not discuss the communications link with fixed medical facilities.36 G. Public E *ucation and Information
- 1. State of Nebraska No deficiencies.
1
- 2. Washington County, Nebraska g No deficiencies.
-S J
- 3. Dodge County, Nebraska No deficiencies.
- 4. State of Iowa The state plan identifies points of contact for use by the news media, but further clarification is needed as to the location, staffing, and function of the Media Release Center.37 During the 1983 exercises, the Harrison County EOC provided an initial press
' v(') . briefing prior to . activation of the Media Release Center (MRC). The spokesperson referred the press to the MRC and was very familiar with the r
1 17 h' equipment to be used for monitoring and the State's current role in thie plan. , However, some refresher training is needed to familiarize the spokesperson with new agency names and responsibilities.38
- 5. Combined hitate Operations During the 1983 exercise, it was observed that maps and displays to facilitate dissemination of information at the MRC were small and generally inadequate.
Agreements have been reached with Nebraska to upgrade the MRC visual aids. It was not clear if the new visuals would include the affected portions of
\
Iowa.39 \ H. Emergency Facilities and Equipment b,
- 1. State of Nebra-ka.
The sodium lodide scintillation counter with multichannel analyzer was not functional and was not used during- the 1983 exercise. The four-wheel drive field vehicle was suitable for most terrain but experienced an electrical problem which required that it be jump-started whenever the engine was turned off. The Nebraska field team was well-equipped although the equipment available was not consistent with the plan. The field team from the Cooper Nuclear Power Station did not have charcoal cartridges for air sampling. The team also did not acquire a hand-held portable radio.41 (o.)
,. y N s g '
18
-s x .
(I ,. fisckup equipment for analyzing media samples was not present.42 ( s
' '. x
- 2. Washington County, Nebraska 1
% .s ,
a
\ s No defiele[cles.
'\
- y +
- 3. Dodge County, Nebraska No deficiencies.
- 4. State of' iowa g
,' Procedures should be provided in the plan to assure timely activation and 7-E staffing of the stake EOC, the Forward Command Post, the county EOCs, and the Media Release Center. These procedures should specify at what emergency action level the EOC goes on full operational status and estimate the time it takes to mobilize personnel.43 s c hs The .tist of radiological monitoring equipment to be used by the Iowa Highway Patrol (IHP) is inconhistent in the plan. The equipment list for the IHP is not consistent with what<ls specified in the plan. Also, telephone numbers for the EPA are incorrect.4h w '
- 5. Combined State Operations s . N N \
.\
si
') During the 1983 exercise space and equ!pment for EOF personnel were set aside, but were limited. No visual.afds or maps identifying EPZ sectors and evacuation routes were displayed.45
.a 19
' ([] - I. . Accident Assessment
^
- 1. State of Nebraska .
During the 1983 exercise, delays of up to'45 minutes were encountered in the
- receipt of utility data at CRUSH. Thus, independent dose calculations by the
~ state were too late for useful decision making. On one occasion incorrect data was suppl _ led to CRUSH from the utility resulting in state dose projections that
- were significantly different from the utility's. No apparent attempt was made by the state to resolve this data discrepancy as another check in a system of
\
checks and balances.46 The source terms used during the 1983 exercise was not compatible with the
; ),
~
- field data provided. Also, field data supplied to the field teams were not in the proper form; the data provided w'ere calculations derived from the field data.47 p Conversion from mR/hr to Cl/cc was accomplished using a chart and i a interpolating between table values; this method was not in the plan.48 The Nebraska field team was not properly directed to obtain useful plume Information.48 The Cooper Nuclear Power Station monitoring team was not used effectively for. tracking the plume because only two plume monitoring points were sampled.50
- 2. Washington County, Nebraska i~
m No deficiencies. li
=
-4 - 20 o.
Ik,k 3. Dodge County,' Nei>raska
'} No deficiencies. .
- 4. ' State of Iowa An appendix referred to in the state plan listing the members of the radiological 4
response team is missing. Also, the state plan states the field data will be
' collected at the county EOC level. Since the state is taking compensating measures for county activities they should address how this function will now be
\
handled by the state in their Ft. Calhoun site-specific plan. s I More detail is 'needed in the state plan concerning alert notification and v activation of radiological monitoring teams; specifically' with regards to transportation arrangements of the teams to the site and provisions for radiological monitoring activities in the 4-6 hours before the teams are expected to arrive.52 J During the 1983 exercise, one of the radiological monitoring teams was not certain of the proper collection procedures for, and calculations of, radiolodine
~
concentrations in the field. The written procedures had been misplaced.
- _ Furthermore, the -team's air sampling equipment was nonoperable because no power supply for the air pump was available.53 Finally, because equipment and procedures used by each of the two field monitoring teams are different,it may be helpf'21 for all personnel to be proficient in using the equipment and ff procedures of both teams.54
_J l
. . . . . - -_= .. -_-- - . . . . - . . . - . . - . - - . . - - _ . . . - . . . . . - . .
21 () There is inadequate detail in the state plan on the methodology for relating measured decontamination levels to dose rates for radionuclide exposure in terms of PAGs. The necessary reference material is in the plan but procedures are needed to apply the reference material.55 J. Protective ResNnse
- 1. State of Nebraska The state plans make no reference to the requirement that monitoring of Individuals should be accomplished within 12 hours of arrival'a,t the relocation center. . Changes have been promised in the first quarter of calendar year 1985.56 See State of Nebraska's response to RAC plan review, April 25,1984.
g: ;
. u .-
The authorization for the administration of KI during the 1983 exercise was not based on the appropriate guidelines or consistent with the plan. The use of KI was not justified by dose projections and was not observed . until air concentrations were actually declining.57
- 2. Washington County, Nebraska Special issues relating to the evacuation of schools and the mobility impaired y/ .
~
have not been adequately addressed.58
- 3. Dodge County, Nebraska
'()]
, No deficiencies.
22
- r 1,
'J 4. State of Iowa The state plan should reference the FDAs current PAGs as well as listing the county contacts (including phone numbers) in the 50-mile ingestion pathway EPZ.59 During the 1983 exercise, it was observed that maps or displays of population density by evacuation area and relocation centers were not posted at the state EOC.60 Also, at the Pottawattamie County EOC during the 1982 and 1983 exercises no maps or displays were posted Indicating evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control points, radiological monitoring points, or population density by evacuat!on area.61 s
\
Some confusion was noted during the 1983 exercise at the state EOC and the s forward command post because designations for the same radiological monitoring site differed between the utility and the state.62 Also during the 1983 exercise, it was discovered that the current state plan has not been updated to indicate the correct number of families residing within the 2-mile EPZ in Pottawattamie County.63 In the state plan, provisions for transportation of handicapped people at risk in Pottawattamie County need to be made in the event of an evacuation.64 Also, during the 1983 exercise, the Harrison County ECC staff wu unaware of the locations of mobility-impaired and special-needs people.65 The Ft. Calhoun site-specifie plan does not discuss storage and distribution of G; KI. The state plan only states that this is a county function, but includes no specific details.66 This lack of planning was evident at the 1983 exercise since
. o. .
'. 3 e j -
the supply of K! at the state EOC was not adequate to cover all emergency workers.67 Also, the Pottawattamie County Sheriff's Department had no knowledge of procedures regarding the administration of KI.88 In addition, the recommendation to administer KI was not based on the appropriate guidelines or justified based on the dose projections made by the field team coordinator. . ' Furthermore, the recommendation was made too late.0I The state plan does not identify nor provide for potential impediments (e.g., seasonal impassibility of roads, etc.) to the use of evacuation routes.N
\.
i' The state plan does not include the basis for choosing appropriate protective actions.71 1
'; u The state plan is deficient in addressing procedures for estimating contamination dose conse:;uences. The maps required for this are missing.
Also, a list of food ar.d milk processors should be included in the plan.72 There is no reference in the state plan to the contamination monitoring of evacuees at relocation centers.73
- 5. Combined State Operations During the 1983 exercise it was observed at the EOF that maps or displays P- indicating population distribution, sampling points, EPZ sectors, and relocation centers were absent.74
- a
^
9
24 () K. Radiological Exposure Control
- 1. State of Nebraska The state and local plans should improve dosimetry and dose records procedures. Corrections are to be finished in first quarter calendar year 1985.75 See State of Nebraska's response to RAC plan review, Apell 25,~ 1984.
During the 1983 exercise, the staff at the CRUSH and one of the field teams were issued an insufficient number of simulated TLDs which raised concerns as to whether a sufficient number of real TLDs could actually be'm,ade available in a real emergency. The questicn is whether the number of emergency. workers have been identified and the corresponding number of TLDs made available.76
.~,
(/- Low range dosimeters were not available for the Nebraska field team and familiarization was not evident with regard to maximum dose allowed without authorization, and what procedures should be implen ented if an excess dose was received.77 Only low range dosimeters (0-1 R) were available for the Cooper field team. Permanent record devices were simulated.78
- 2. Washington County, Nebraska Low range (0-200 mR) and permanent record dosimeters were not available.
. Dosimeters were read on an hourly basis; this is not frequent enough under certain circumstances.80
25 f] 3. Dodge County, Nebraska No deficiencies.
- 4. State of Iowa Confusion in the state plan exists regarding who will maintain dose records for emergency workers. The state plan states this function will be handled by the county health department, but under the compensatory plan, the county health departments are not part of the operation.81
\
During the 1983 exercise, only high-range dosimeters (0-200 R).were available at the Harrison County EOC for emergency workers.82 Also, neither the q radiological monitoring team personnel nor the Pottawattamie County Sheriff's c"':< deputies regularly read and recorded dose values from their personal dosimeters. This observation was also made at the 1982 exercise.83 The state plan needs to establish a decision chain for authorizing emergency workers to incur exposures in excess of the EPA general public PAGs.84 The
- _ state has subsequently responded to this deficiency in letters to FEMA of March i
i 23, 1984 and February 8,1984 citing a future plan change to correct this I deficiency. The sectlin of the state plan addressing action levels for determining the need for decontamination references Table 6 on p. F-2-8, which is missing from the plan.85 Also, during the 1983 exercise, the radiological field monitoring teams
- b. were not proficient in determining the need and means for decontamination of emergency personnel, supplies, equipment, and contaminated waste disposal.86 I
I
f . l 26 L. Medical and Public IIealth Support
- 1. State of Nebraska
-The Blair ambulance crew was not provided with radiation monitoring
- equipment, dosimetry, protective clothing, adequate communications, and radiation training.87
- 2. Washington County, Nebraska
, i No deficiencies. 1
, 3. Dodge County, Nebraska C'
No deficiencies.-
- 4. ' State of Iowa Arrangements need to be made by the state to provide for local and backup hospital and medical services having the capability for evaluation of rac'lation exposure and uptake.88 Recently, Iowa has made arrangements with Mercy Hospital in Council Bluffs to handle contaminated victims. A team of individuals from the Iowa State Department of Health will perform monitoring of Individuals at the site of an accident or at reception centers. The IHP will also provide transportation of victims. The details are explained in a letter to
.\'[j FEMA from the State of Iowa dated March 23,1984.
, . s.
27 s .
. . During the 1983 exercise, it was observed that the Missouri Valley Hospital did ;
l not have adequate radiological monitoring instruments.89 l
, M. Recovery and Reentry Planning and Post-Accident Operations
- 1. State of Nebraska
. No deficiencies.
- 2. Washington County, Nebraska
\
No deficiencies. s
- 3. ' Dodge County, Nebraska No deficia;ncies.
- 4. State of Iowa Reentry procedures in the state plan should be expanded to specify means for L informing members of the response organizations that a recovery operation is to be initiated, or notifying them of any changes in organization structure which may occur.90 '
A method for periodically estimating total population exposure should be addressed in the plan.8I b u .. _
'4 23 h' N. Exercises and Drills
~
. l. State of Nebraska No deficiencies.
' 2. Washington County, Nebraska No deficiencies.
- 3. Dodge County, Nebraska
\
t No deficiencies.
,m U 4. State of Iowa In the state plan, it is difficult t'o ascertain the degree of involvement of the counties from the letters of agreement. The plans should include anticipated involvement of local organizations and personnel.92 The state has subsequently responded to this deficiency in letters to FEMA of February 8,1984 and March 9,1984 and this response has been determined to be adequate.
During the 1983 exercise, several agencies having emergency responsibilities as identified in the plan did not participate.93 More information is needed in the plan concerning how the required
.Q communication drills will be ' accomplished.84 Also, more information concerning the conduct of medical emergency drills should be included.95
.-- . .. .- - - . - -- .. . . .. .._.. . . .. - .-..~ . - - - .. - .. .
4 - 1 39 f)- . O. Radiological Emergency Response Training 1.' ' State of Nebraska No deficiencies.
- 2. Washington County,. Nebraska and
' 3. Dodge County, Nebrash Neither - plan makes reference to the annual retraining of personnel with emergency response responsibilities. Corrections have been\ promised in the , first quarter of calendar year 1985.96 See State of Nebraska's response to RAC plan review, April 25,1984.
k_k
- 4. State of Iowa No deficiencies.
l P. Responsibility for the Planning Effort l l
- 1. State of Nebraska No deficiencies.
- 2. Washington County, Nebraska and
/. 3. Dodge County, Nebraska
'J w,-ye-y *rer*---T-w--wwe-g-s've$ g- yeDw*e'-t-g-t'-TWFM t""Nt- tJN+T' 't-# t f v'1" *5/1M'D**
30 Neither plan states that they will annually certify the currency of the plans. Corrections have been promised in the first quarter of calendar year 1985.87
~
See State of Nebraska's response to RAC plan review, April 25,1984. Neither plan provides for dating and marking of individual pages to indicate changes. Corrections have been promised in the first quarter of calendar year 1985.98 .See State of Nebraska's response to RAC plan review, April 25,1984. i
- 4. State of Iowa s
The plan indicates that the individual in each organization who has overall authority for radiological emergency response / planning is the one indicated on the sign-off sheet, which was missing. Subsequently, the state has sent a copy of the sign-off sheet in a letter to FEMA dated December 2,1983.88 j The state plan needs a detailed listing of standard operating procedures, support l plans, etc., from other organizations and agencies. Furthermore, these support 1 plans need to be reviewed by FEMA and coordinated with the state plan.100 i
.s b
. . i 31
[} EVALUATION REFERENCE MATRIX Nebraska Iowa Reference- RAC RAC Exercise Appiicable NUREG-0654
-Number Review Review Report RERP Criteria I 1983, p. 14 Nebraska State II.A.1.b; A.2.a 2 1983, p. 23 Nebraska State II.A.4 3 1983, p. 27 Washington Cty II.A.2.a 4 3/9/84, p. 1 Washington Cty I I . A'. 3 5 1983, p. 45 Iowa State II.A.1.b 6 11/4/83, p. 2 Iowa Stat'e , II.A.2.a 7 1983, p. 42 Iowa State II.A.2.a 8 1983, p. 43 Iowa State II.A.2.a
- ,m C! 9. 1983, p. 43 Iowa State II.A.2.a 10 1983, p. 45 Iowa State II.A.2.a 11 11/4/83, p. 3 Iowa State II.A.3 4/23/84, p. 1 12- 1983, p. 38 Iowa State II.A.3 f
13 1983, p. 49 Iowa State II.A.2.a 14 1983, p. 48 Iowa State II.A.4 15- 1983, p. 48 Iowa State II.A.2.a 16 3/9/84, p. 1 Nebraska State II.C l.c
~ 17 3/9/84, p. 1 Washington Cty - II.C.4 18 - 11/4/83, p. 3 Iowa State II.C.1.c 4/23/84, p. 1 19 11/4/83, p. 3 Iowa State II.C.4 . c5 20 11/4/83,p.3 Iowa State - II.C.3 J 4/23/84, p.1
- 21. 1983, p. 27 Washington Cty II.D.3;D.4 e e --++w e- g-w-y--e e a- w g- erv w w- s --+cm-t-en-- v-r-e+t mt w*w tvc e w-4e*4-w we saw m e e-+~www wees
32 EVALUATION REFERENCE MATRIX (Cont'd) Nebraska Iowa
' Reference RAC RAC Exercise Applicable NUREG-0654 Number Review Review Report RERP Criteria 22 11/4/83, p. 4 Iowa State II.D.4 4/23/84, p. 1
-23 11/4/83, p. 4 Iowa State II.E.1 4/23/84, p. 1 24 11/4/83, p. 4 Iowa S. tate II.E.2 4/23/84, p. 1 25 -1982, p. 6 Iowa State II.E.5;E.6 1983, pp. 32,53 26 11/4/83, p. 4 Iowa State s II.E.6 4/23/84, p. 2
-27 1983, pp. 50,53 Iowa State II.E.5;E.7
.{, 28 1983, p. 50 Iowa State II.E.6;E.7 29 1983, p. 19 Nebraska State II.F.1 l 30 1983, p. 22 Nebraska State II.F 31 1983, p. 38 Iowa State II.F.1.d 32 1983, p. 38 Iowa State- II.F.1.d 33 1983, p. 35 Iowa State II.F l34 ' 1983, p. 46 Iowa State II.F.1.d 35 1983, p. 49 Iowa State II.F.1.d-36 11/4/83, p. 5 Iowa State II.F.2 4/23/84, p. 2 3'7 11/4/83, p. 5 Iowa State II.G.3.a 4/23/84, p. 2 38 1983, p. 42 Iowa State II.G.3.a; G.4.a j -39 1983, p. 53 Iowa State II.G 40 1983, p.19 Nebraska State II.H.10
. _ w _ . _
4 33-EVALUATION REFERENCE MATRIX (Cont'd)
~
Nebraska Iowa , Reference RAC RAC Exercise Applicable NUREG-0654
.- Number Review Review Report RERP Criteria 41 1983,-p. 22 Nebraska State II.H.7;H.10
- l42 1983, p. 24 Nebraska State II.H.10 43 11/4/83, p. 5 Iowa State II.H.4 4/23/84, p. 2 44~ 11/4/83, p. 5 Iowa State II.H.7 4/23/84, p. 2
;45 .1983, p. 48 Iowa State II.H 46 1983, p. 16 Nebraska State II.I.8;I.10 47 1983, p. 17 Nebraska State II.I.1 1983, p. 22
- {., . 48 Nebraska State II.I.7 49 - 1983, p. 20 Nebraska State II.I.8 50 1983, p. 22 - Nebraska State II.I.8 51- 11/4/83, p. 6 Io'wa State II.I.7 4/23/84, p. 2 52 11/4/83, p. 7 Iowa State II.I.8 4/23/84, p. 3 53 1983, p. 35 Iowa State II.I.8 54 - 1983, p. 36 Iowa State II.I.8;I.9; I.11 55 11/4/83, p. 8. - Iowa State II.I.10
- 56 3/9/84, p. l'. Nebraska State II.J.12.
- 57. 1983, p. 17 Nebraska State II.J.10.f-58: 1983, p. 28 Washington Cty II.J.10.d
" J - 59 , 11/4/83, p. 8 Iowa State II.J.9 4/23/84, p. 3 y 60 1983, p. 33 Iowa State II.J.10.b p*v+F T - y-- p - ,ve- ==eed-- g---+-,w w- -W--g-- -+ ewe-=w- --
,-m--g- -ewtvi.-p-t -, s. +- - w = m -w g +"e ,mm--- eww+-*,cewwe-e r e e s-r w w- w-w* wo- e e - gwy-w m g +-we--,.gme' -g-w
s 34 p' Aj- EVALUATION REFERENCE MATRIX (Cont'd) Nebraska Iowa.
-Reference- RAC RAC Exercise Applicable NUREG-0654
. Number -Review' Review Report RERP Criteria 611 1982, p. 5 Iowa State II.J.10.a 1983, p. 45 J.10.b 62 1983, pp. 33,38 Iowa State II.J.10.a 63 1983, p. 33 Iowa State II.J.10.b 64 11/4/83, p. 8 Iowa State II.J.10.d 4/23/84, p. 3 65 1983, p. 33 Iowa State II.J.10.d s
66 11/4/83, p. 8 ' Iowa State II.J.10.e 4/23/84, p. 3 67 1983, p. 33 Iowa State II.J.10.e [
'1 68 1983, p. 46 Iowa State II.J.10.f 69 1983, p. 33 Iowa State' II.J.10.e; J.10.f'
~70- 11/4/83, p. 8 Iowa State II.J.10.k 4/23/84, p. 3 71~ 11/4/83, p. 8 Iowa State II.J.10.m 4/23/84, p.'3
~ 72 ; 11/4/83, p. 9 Iowa State II.J.11
, 4/23/84, p. 3
.73 11/4/83, p. 9 Iowa State II.J.12 4/23/84, p. 3 p,
7<4 1983, p. 48 Iowa State II.J.10.a; J.10.b
-75 3/9/84, p. 2 Nebraska State II.K.3.b
;76 ,1983, p. 16 Nebraska State II.K.3.a
'i~Ji
~'
77 '1983, p. 20 Nebraska State II.K.3.a K.5.a 78 1983, p. 22 Nebraska State II.K.3.a
._. .. -____._,;.__..__._.____ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . . ~ . _ . _ . . . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ .
35 _ EVALUATION REFERENCE MATRIX (Cont'd) Nebraska Iowa Reference- RAC- RAC Exercise Applicable NUREG-0654 Number Review Review Report RERP Criteria 79 1983, p. 24 Nebraska State II.K.3.a 80 1983, p. 28 Nebraska State II.X.3.a 81 11/4/83, p. 9 Iowa State II.K.3.a 4/23/84 . 82 1983, p. 42 Iowa State II.K.3.a Y 83 1982, p. 9 Iowa State II.K.3.b 1983, pp. 36,46 6 84 11/4/83, p. 9 Iowa State II.K.4 5 4/23/84, l' pp. 13, 15-17 L , 85. -11/4/83, p. 9 Iowa State II.K.5.a [r 4/23/84, p. 3 86 1983, p. 36 Iowa State II.K.5.a; K.S.b 87 1983, p. 25 Nebraska State II.L 88 11/4/83, Iowa State II.L.1; pp. 31, 33 L.3; L.4
' 89 _ 1983, p. 39 Iowa State II.L.1; L.3 L- _90 11/4/83, p. 10 Iowa State II.M.3 l 4/23/84, p. 3 i 91 _11/4/83, p. 10 Iowa State II.M.4 4/23/84, p. 3 L: 92- 11/4/83, p. 11 Iowa State II.N.1.b 4/23/84, p. 4 93 1983, p. 32 Iowa State II.N.1.b
_94 11/4/83, p. 11 Iowa State II.N.2.a l (j-m 4/23/84, p. 3 r- 95: 11/4/83, p. 11 Iowa State II.N.2.c ! 4/23/84, p. 4 I
.t' 36 EVALUATION REFERENCE MATRIX (Cont'd)
. Nebraska Iowa Reference RAC' RAC Exercise Applicable NUREG-0654
, Number Review Review Report RERP Criteria
~
4 96 3/9/84, p. 2 Nebraska State 11.0.5 97 3/9/84, p. 2 Nebraska State II.P.4
- 98. 3/9/84, p. 2 Lebraska State II.P.5 99 11/4/83, p. 11 Iowa State II.P.2 4/23/84, p. 4 100 11/4/83, p. 11 Iowa State II.P.6 4/23/84, p. 4 5
- \
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,[ 37 e
III. REGIONAL DIRECTOR'S
SUMMARY
On the basis of the information presented in the foregoing evaluation, I am' of the
, opinion that the State of Nebraska, Dodge County, and Washington County and the State
. of. Iowa, -Harrison County and Pottawattamie County are prepared to protect the population' within the 10-mile EPZ in the event of a radiological accident at the Ft.
Calhoun Nuclear Power Station. In the November 4,1983 RAC review of the State of
-Iowa plan, several class A deficiencies were noted. However, the State of Iowa has since responded satisfactorily to each of these deficiencies. There were no class A deficiencies noted in the State of Nebraska, Dodge County or Washington County plans.
However, of the areas- for improvement note'd in these findings, no'nq merit priority attention,' but correction of the areas noted will improve the plans and the emergency response capability.-
,3 kS/
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Federal Emergency -Management Agency Region VII 911 Walnut Street
. . Kansas City, Missouri 64106 - .~
l 9 MAR 9B l v Major General James Carmona Adjutant Gen-ral and Director for Nebraska Civil Defense Agency National Guard Center 1300 Military Road 1.incoln, Nebraska 68508
Dear General Carmona:
It has come to our attentio . that while we were attempting to obtain a joint (Nebraska /lova) 350 package for the Fort Calhoun Station, we neglected to return the Regional Assistance Com=ittee (RAC) Review to you for your comments and schedule of corrections. This is inexcusable on our part. We to by all parties. realize that deadlines must be established and adhered never happens again. We are reviewing our records to ensure that this
,- Since the Scate Plan is generic for both the Cooper Nuclear Station and the Fort Calhoun Station, your comments stand on record for the State .
c ' has identified for the Nebraska local plans for. Please Fort Calhoun review these and respond with a letter indicating a schedule of corree-tions, if possible, by May 1,1984.
~
If you should have any questions concerning these ite=s or the schedule of corrections, feel free to contact Eric Jenkins at (816) 374-2161, or (FIS) 758-2161. Sincerely, Patrick J. Breheny Regional Direcor l FEw.A - Region VII j Enclosure n v ' NQi:Carro Ibje 3/8/84 2161 Begley CarroA
. kC , eD OM p Q ! i ' - Fort Calhoun Nebraska State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans o FORMAL REVIEL' A.2.a-The. State Plan has no table or key individuals by title. A.3
' The. Washington County Plan's letters of agreement are for plan approval
~only.- Actual letters of agreement between city / county and response organizaticas are missing. Is the hospital fully committed to respond-ing during an accident? What-is its capacity? C:n it undertake neraal emergencies, too?
C.I.c The State and Local Plans do not address the required inventories and resources for the support of Federal response teams. Although the Federal teams _have not stated their requirements, this remains a deficiency until cooperative resolutions occur. t
.C.4
,~~ County Plan states that the agreements are on file only - they are not
.in the documents. The Plan does not. show local agreements with anyone.
E.5 The County Plans include sample EBS messages but they do not state a/ whether the State or local governments will alert EBS and the text . does.not mention EBS activation. Washington County Plan (p. 9, not referenced). notes that if immediate sheltering or evacuation is required the' plant may notify both the Washington County Sheriff's Department and the EBS. KE.6 Neither the State nor the Local Plans take any reference to the time required for notifying and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
- . C.1
!- The special needs of the handicapped are not included in plans for ( annual disse =ination of information. G.;.c
'IAC is established to minimize rumors, and a hot line is established initially to deal with rumors. It is not clear if the het line will
- assume a message.taking role with PIO follow-up during a news relea'se or what the situation is.
(- L J.9 l' The references to TDA's PAGs for accidental radioactive contacination of Lhuman food and animal feed and reco==endations for potassiuc iodide usage need to be updated.
-J.10.c The reference in the Local Plans is not geared to meeting the needs of the transient-population.
'J.12 ,
- / The State and County Plans make no ref erence to the requirement that l monitoring of individuals should be acer.plished within twelve hours
( - of arrival at the relocation center. i: I.
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s
,_s K.3.b
=
State and Local Plans should improve dosimetry and dose records proceduras. K.4 In Neither the State nor the Local Plan is a chain of command estab-
-lished for authorizing exposures in excess of EPA PAGs.
K.5.b Tables reflecting equipment and supply inventories should be included Table 1. Annex F Attachment 7, to be published during Pirst Quarter 1984 should resolve t}iis. L.4 The Local Plan does not state that they are capable of transporting ~ contaminated patients effectively. It is not clear how the transpor-2ation would be coordinated. K.2.c The Dodge County Relocation Plan addresses this issue in order to meet the requirements. The others do not. 0.5 The Local Plan makes no reference to the annual retraining of person-nel with emergency response responsibilities. P.4 \ Local Plans do not state that they will annually certify the currency of the plan. P.5 The Local Plans do not provide for dating and marking of individual pages to indicate changes. P.8 The Local Plans do have a table of contents but did not have a current c cross reference. This would have made the review much easier. An older cross reference was used which often gave approximate reference point s. Suggest that cross references sheets also be dated to corres-pond with submission and updates. r. I i t I l -' f . ' . v i _, , , . _ . , . _ , . . _ _ . _ . . , , ~ . - . . . . . _ , . . _ , . . _ , . . - . , _ . _ ~ . _ . , _ , ,
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A FORT CALHOUN NUCLEAR STATION IOWA STATE AND LOCAL COMPENSATORY
. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS
~
INTERIM FORMAL REVIEW
, 4Hlas .
A.1.b. . Although the State Plan is adequatc, the compensatory (Chapter . XII) is weak in addressing how the local governments will interface with the State. Even though the plan has been-written to function as though there were no local governments, the fact is, that there is one. Letters of Agreement have been y signed
, between the State and the County Boards of Supervisors, Sheriffs and communications. Each of the parties. to the Agreements has become signatory to providing assistance to the State, as requested. What assistance can they provide? intat staff -
resources and material resources are available? You can't request l what isn't there. If support. is requested, what is the system, l who do you ask, where are the resources, in what quantity? What , l .
. is the relationship of the locals to the total effort?
A.1.c. ' The State Plan provides adequate diagrams indicating interrelationships at the State level. Is the chart provided for , the locals a communications schematic or does it also indicate l relationships and command and control? l
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'A.2.a. The Generic Stat plan has addressed those areas which needed to be P.
-V Class A- addressed at .the State level. Page VI-31 of the State plan Deficiency assigns responsibilities to local governments. Since the State is assuming the local role in response, it would be reasonable to expect that the state will make provisions for conducting these activities or will coordinate with other action agencies who will
. in a letter of Agreement, indicate that they will perform the functions to an acceptable level. Either Letters of Agreement or provisions in the State Plan are required for these areas: ,
Actual Evacuation of the Contaminated Area. ,
- Security of Contaminated - Areas
- Fire Services / Decontamination Search and Rescue Operations a .o
- m. .-
Initial traffic control and communications Reporting of incidents to ODS Providing Emergency Medical Services Determine Social Services needs and notify State Social Services L Assist DEQ in decontamination Assist in gathering samples in support of UHL Keeping routes open in poor weather and winter conditions Assist State Departs at of Agriculture in public dissemination of response to farmers. Maintain does records of County / local Emergency Workers and volunteers. Make local distribution of KI (Page VI-6) N}
~
b _ A.3 Due to the fact that the State has assumed the role of primary
. responders, many more agreements will be necessary between the State and those Agencies / Activities which will be providing resources to the response effort. Those areas of Local / Municipal responsibilities identified in A.2.a. above will, in many cases, require Letters of Agreement to insure availability and adequacy of resources.
C.1.c. 'Dae EPA is expected to provide laboratory assistance. The assistance noted is nos that described'in the Fede,ral Radiological 1 Monitoring and Assessment Plan. Support facilities for use by Federal agencies are not described. 2 C.3 Information is needed on laboratory analysis capabilities and response times. -
'C.4.- From the State _ Plan, it is not possible to determine who can be f
Class-A relied upon. Agreements are present with the County Boards of m Deficiency Supervisors, County Sheriffs and Communications, but what about l other volunteer organizations and State Agencies. Without a L ~ signature page, it is not possible ascertain whether or not adequate coordination with those other State Agencies involved has-I [ been accomplished. , L v
~
i D.4 There is no description in the majcrity of State response assignments which ties the response to the established Emergency
. Action Levels. It is not clear whether or not other state agencies have a phased step-up in readiness conditions in response to increasingly severe stages in Emergency Action Levels.
-E.1.'
The State Plan does not tie alert notification to emergency action levels. At what point is the decision made to notify other state agencies and non-governmental response organizations? The URL is erroneously shown for follow-up notification.
\
E.2. There are no established procedures for alerting, notifying and mobilizing emergency response persor.nel.
. E.6.- Reference to Chapter VII, 1-4 should be deleted. It has nothing to do with Fort Calhoun. Page XII-2 states that at " Site Emergency, the Sheriff's Department's 24-hour communications centers will automatically activate'the siren system." Are the Sheriffs' Departments thoroughly briefed? Have the Sheriffs' Departments acknowledged their role in the notification process?
It would be best to get such acknowledgement in writing. The plan fails to discuss the estimated time required for notifying and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway.
}
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li
-T.2. The State plan does not ensure that there is a coordinated 3 .
a 1- communication link for mobile medical' support facilities. The
. plan further does not discuss the communication link with fixed medical facilities unless the reader infers that communications is accomplished by telephone based on the fact that the listing of hospitals includes a telephone number.
t' G.3.a. Points of contact have been identified. There are, however, no physical locations designated for the use of the news media. Page VIII-2 discusses the JPIC for news conferences, but surely is not - the physical location designated for the news media to set up. If i it is, then a great deal of amplification is require'd in order that use of the JPIC is clear. s H.4 No procedures are provided to assure the timely activation and I. [- staffing of the State EOC, Forward Command Post, County EOC's er l- ! JPIC. At what point are they named? Are they manned all at once or are they manned incrementally as the situation deteriorates and . readiness levels increase? At what Emergency Action level does L the EOC go on full operational status? What is the time estimated for alert notification to operatj^nal status?
.H.7. On paper, the plan is extremely inadequate. However, it is known that the local governments have some capability even if the plan does not address it. Chapter III of the plan is not adequate to 1 substitute for local plans. Equipment lists reveal some
. .x inconsistencies; Page VI 18 indicates the Iowa Highway P ta rol will
.v.
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~4 have the following equipment: two officers from each of the Q
j fourteen posts to have complete civil defense survey meter kits. Each of..the 28 officers will have 1 CDV-138 and 1 CDV-730 dosimeter. Each _of the fourteen posts will have one dosimeter charger. The resource list, however, (Chapter V, app. C) indicates that the Iowa Highway Patrol will have 6984 CDV-742 dosimeters and 280 CDV-759 chargers. What is correct? The table on Page III-T3-32 reflects an incorrect number for EPA, the correct number 816/374-6525 during working hours and 913/236-3778 during off-duty hours. i
*H.10. This area is a problem which is inherent in a State' Compensatory Class A Plan. There are no provisions for regular inspections, D eficiency inventories and operational checks for equipment at the i s th A,
County / municipal level. Although there is agreement with the Board of Supervisors that they will make equipment available as requested, there is no way of insuring that the equipment will be accessible or if- accessible, whether it will function properly. It will be necessary to' identify equipment which may be required from local sources, and make adequate provisions for its
-availability and maintenance.
'H.11. An exhaustive listing of Radiological monitoring equipment has Class A been provided, but nothing can be determined of the status of Deficiency emergency kits for protective equipment, communications equipment and emergency supplies. This ties directly in with comments from p ,.c 'H.10. Local equipment will very likely be required. A Letter of
,w .
7 Agreement with'the Board of Supervisors to support the State l .,q
- j. ! response means nothing unless it is known what resources the county can provide in support. These resources need to be included in emergency kit lists with the State Resources lists,
.and availability and maintenance of that equipment and supporting materials, along with qualified operators must be agreed to and established in written agreement.
I.7. Reference V-1 refers to an appendix (that could be found) containing a list of radiological response team members. V-6 indicates field data will be collected at the County EOC. This
\
does not track with Chapter XII. The Highway Patrol monitcc_ng ,
-equipment is not shown in the Resource list. The plan does not g .,
provide for the use of Duane Arnold Energy Center equipment, is
'(j it available for use?
I.8. The plan gives inadequate details for alert notifications and activation of teams. Details of transportation to the site are deficient. . Th'e plan indicates only one radio equipped vehicle for communications. Who provides it? One car is insufficient to support a minimum of two radiological teams. -What are the provisions for coverage before the arrival of the teams which is estimated as four to six hours?
.
- g y
m I.10. . Inadequate detail is available on methodology for relating measured decontamination levels to dose rates for radionuclide exposur'e in terms of PAG's. Although necessary reference material is -included in the plcn, the procedures needed to apply tite
. reference material are missing.
J.9 FDA current PAG's should be referenced and county cont / acts in the 50-mile radius should be listed with phone numbers. J.10.d.- The Plan basically assumes that handicapped persons will be moved by family members, friends, etc. if they are not
\
institutionalized. What happens when that person wito would nomally do that is at work, on vacation, or indisposed for any
, other. reason? What is the contingency plan for movement of these ;.g .k.. ' ' handicapped persons?
J.10.e. The Generic State Plan makes counties responsible for distribution of KI, however, Chapter XIII does not discuss how this will e- tur now that a compensatory plan is effect.
- J.10.k.- The State plan totally ignores identification of and means for dealing with potential impediments (e.g. Seasonal impassability of roads) to use of evacuation routes, and contingency measures.
J.10,m. l The plan does not include the . basis for choosirig appropriate protectiva actions.
. . . . _ . ~ . . _ . _ , . _ . - . _ . . _ . _ _ _ . _ . - . - _ . _ . _ . . _ _ _ . _ . . . _ . . _ . . . . _ . . _ _ _ . _ . _ . . . . . .
l 9 ,
~.
J.tt.. A list of food processors and milk processors should be included in'the plan. The plan is :eficient i.: addressing procedures for . t
. . estimating contamination dose consequences. The maps required !
- have.not been included in the plan. !
J.12. Although reception / registration procedures are discussed, there is no reference to all to monitoring of evacuees. Obviously, ( i therefore, there is no reference to monitoring all registrants within a twelve hour period.
'K.3.a. Confusion exists as to who will maintain Dose records for s
' ClassLA ' Emergency workers. The plan says it will be the County Health Deficiency Department, but under the compensatory plan, the Health Department
, ,.- isn't part of the operation. Who is accomplishing this task? t -
- NA
'K. 3.b . The Letters of Agreement with County Boards of Supervisors,
. Class A Sheriffs and communicators lead to the assumption that there will Deficiency be County Emergency Workers. Who will read their dose meters at appropriate frequencies and who will maintain dose records?'
*K.4 The decision chain for authorizing emergency workers to incur Class A exposures in excess of the EPA PAG's is not a clear cut one. This Deficiency must be clearly established.
-K.5.a. Table 6, Page F-2-8 reference on VI-11 is missing.
-r,
- .-. . . . ,- _. _.._ _ ._ . - - , _ _ _ _ . . - - _ , - - . - - , _ . - . - . - . _ . _ , . ~ , . _ , , . - _ . _ , _ . , , . . _ . . . _ , . . , . . , . _ . -
IC
.K.5.b. Means' for decontamination are only minimally outlined.
.m-
' _[:
l Methodology for estimating or measuring internal contamination is missing. eL.1. Organization have not made arrangements for local and backup Class A hcspital and medical services having the capability for evaluation u Deficiency of radiation exposure and 2ntake.
'L.3 The hospital list appearing in the plan seems to identify every Class A hospital or medical facility in the area. There appears to be no Deficiency attention given to special radiological capabiliti,es, ..e. trained personnel and ability to radiologically monitor contaminated personnel.- .
(;:*X't 'L.4. The Plan totally ignores arrangements for transporting victims of Class A radiological accidents to medical support facilities. Deficiency
- M.3 Reentry procedures need to be expanded in order that reentry will
- t. be as clearly Laplemented as evacuation. No system was indicated s in the plan for informing members of response organizations that recovery operations are to be initiated, or notifying them of any changes in organization structure.which may occur.
l .M.4. Estimates of exposure is not addressed in referenced material. l . j/$ Q '!
, II N.1.b. 'There is no way to ascertain the degree of involvement of the
~ .. counties , from the letters of agreement. Plans should include anticipated involvement of local organizations and personnel.
4 6 N.2.a. The intent should be to describe how commuaications drills will be
- accomplished, not simply restate criteria. How can the State i
ensure communications drills will occur at the local level? I N.2.c. This area has been ignored in the plan. Medical emergency drills are important and must be a part of the plan.
\
P.2. The plan indicates that the individual in each organization who - has overall authority Tor radiological Emergency response / planning , , -~ , is the one indicated on the sign off sheet. There is no sign off h sheet! ' P.4 The plan needs to also address certification and recertification. P . 6.~ Beferences are very weak. Where are references to SOP *s, support y plans, etc., from other organizations and agencies? Are the
- counties going to implement their basic emergency plan? How about Red Cross response plan, etc. These need to be reviewed, t
coordinated with, and referenced by the State Flan.
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9i ^ . - FORT CALHOUN NUCLEAR STATION f u-IOWA STATE AND LOCAL COMPENSATORY
< ,1 e ; -
.. _ ^^
_f. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS-e , . _ ' ~-
& . \c., k 4 & v +- f a.s < + .- fNy/
A. I .b '-. Although the State Plan is adequate, the compensstory (Chapter XII)- is weak in addressing how the local-gevernments will interface with the State. Even though.the plan has teen written to function as though there were no local governments, the_ fact is, that there is one. Letters of Agreement have been signed between the State.and the County Board of Supervisors, Sheriffs and communications. Each of the parties-to the Agreements has become signatory to providing assistance to the State, as requested.--t? hat assistance can they. provide? What staff resources and material resources are available?
!You can't request what isn't there. If. support is requested, what is the system, who do you ask, where are the resources, in what -
quantity? What is the relationship of the locals to the total effort? A.I.c. The State Plan provides adequate diagrams indicating interrelation-
-ships at the State level.- Is.the chart provided for che t locals a communications schematic or does it also indicate relahionships and
- cotanand and control? i A.3.- Due to the_ fact that the State has assumed the role of primary responders, many-more agreements will be necessary between the State
#("_, and those Agencies / Activities which will be providing resources to i '
the response effort. . Those areas of Local / municipal responsibilities identified in A.2.a. above will, in many cases, require Letters of Agreement to insure availability and adequacy of resources. C.I.c. The EPA is expected to provide laboratory assistance. The assistance noted is not that described in the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan. _ Support ~ facilities for use by Federal agencies are not described. - C.3. Information is needed on laboratory analysis capabilities and response times. D.4. There is no description in the majority of State response' assignments which tie the response to the established Emergency Action Levels. It is not clear whether or not-other' state agencies have a phased l step-up in readiness conditions'in response to increasingly severe stages in Emergency Action Levels.
- E.1. The State Plan'does not tie alert notification to. emergency action
- ' levels. At what point is the decision made to notify other state -
agencies and non-governmental response organizations? The UHL is L' erroneously shown for follow-up notification. ' E.2.= There are no established procedures for alerting, notifying and-
.(: - mobilizing emergency response personnel.
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e ('h # ~ FORT CALHOUN NUCLEAR STATION IOWA STATE AND LOCAL COMPENSATORY
. t~ x.. - m ,_
f-M EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS
. u . .
A%' ~ ( b ;.c ,j g & . n t( a I N ytjd) si Atl.b. Although the State Plan is adequate, the compensatory (Chapter XII) y ,- is-weak in addressing how the local governments will interface with the State. Even though the plan has been written to function as though there were no local governments, the fact is, that there is one. ' Letters of Agreement have been signed between the State and
- -the' County Board of Supervisors, Sheriffs and communications. Each of the parties to the Agreements has become signatory to providing assistance to the State, as requested. What assistance can they-provide? What staff resources and material resources are available?
You.canft request.what isn't there. If support is requested, what is the system, who do you ask, where are the resources, in what quantity? -What is the relationship of the locals to the total effort? A.1.c. The State Plan provides adequate diagrams indicating interrelation-
- ships at the State level. Is.the chart provided fork the locals a 4 -- communications schematic or does it also indicate rela'tionships and consnand and control?
A.3. Due to the fact that the State ha.s assumed the role of primary responders, many more' agreements will be necessary between the State
.: and those Agencies / Activities which will be providing resources to the response effort. - Those areas of Local / municipal responsibilities identifiud in A.2.a.-above will, in many cases, require Letters of Agreement to insure availability and adequacy of resources. .
'C.l.c. The EPA is' expected to provide laboratory assistance. The assistance noted is not that described in the Federal Radiological Monitoring and-Assessment Plan. Support facilities for use by Federal" agencies are not described.
C.3. .Information is needed on laboratory analysis capabilities and response-times.- D.4.- There is no description in the majority of State response assignments which tie the response to the established Emergency Action Levels. It is not clear whether or not other state agencies have a phased
. step-up_in readiness conditions in response to increasingly severe stages in Emergency Action Levels.
E.1. _ The. State Plan does not tie alert notification to emergency action
. levels.._At what point-is the decision made to notify other state agencies and non-governmental response organizations? The UHL is erroneously shown for. follow-up notification.
E. 2.~ There are no established procedures for alerting, notifying and
- mobilizing emergency response personnel.
d
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2) pw . u E.6. Reference to Chapter VII, 1-4 should be deleted. It has nothing to
~
do voch Fort Calhoun. Page XII-2 states that at " Site Emergency,
' the Sheriff's. Department's 24-hour communications centers will' auto -
matically activate the siren system." Are the sheriff's Departments thoroughly briefed? .Have the Sheriff's Departments acknowledged their role in_the notification process? It would be best to get such ack-nowledgement in writing. The plan fails to discuss the estimated ~
~' time required for notifying and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway.
F.2. The State plan does not ensure that there is a coordinated communi-cation link for mobile medical support facilities. The plan further does not discuss the coinnunication link with fixed medical facilities unless the reader infers that communications is accomplished by tele- _ phone based on the fact that the listing of hospitals includes a telephone number. C.3.a. Points of contact have been identified. There are, however, no physical. locations designated for the use of the news media. Page VIII-2 discusses t.e JPIC.for news conferences, but surely is not the~ physical loca.lon' designated for the news media to set up. If it is, then a great deal of amplification is recuired in order that use of'the JPIC is clear. H.4. No procedures are provided to assure the timely.activitation and
' staffing of the State EOC, Forward Command' Post, County EOC's and JPIC._ At what point are they manned? Are they manned all at once.
or are they. manned'incrementally as the situation ~ deteriorates and-readiness levels increase? At what Emergency Action level does the i EOC go on-full operational status? What is the time estimated for alert notification to operational status?
'H 7. On paper,: the plan is extremely inadequate. However, it is known i that the-local governments have some capability even if the plan does not address it. ' Chapter XII of the plan is not' adequate to substitute for local plans.. Equipment lists reveal some inconsist-
~
encies; Page VI-18 indicates the Iowa 91ghway Patrol will have the following equipment: two officers from each of the fourteen posts to have complete civil defense survey meter kits. Each of the 23 L. officers.will have one CDV-138 and one CDV-730 dosimeter! Each of D the fourteen. posts will have one dosimeter charger. The resource L list, however,-(Chapter V, app. C) indicates that the Iowa Highway ? Patrol will have 6984 CDV-742 dosimeters and 280 CDV-759 chargers. [ , What is correct?.'The table'on Page XII-T3-32 reflects an incorrect number for EPA, the correct number 816/374-6525 during working hours and 913/236-3778 during off-duty hours, b L I . 7 .' Reference V-1 refers to an appendix (that could not be found) con-
., p 'taining a list of radiological response team members. V-6 indicates i : q=f*%
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- i _. .track field data will be; collected at the County EOC. This does not with Chapter XII. The Highway Patrol monitoring equipment
[ _11 m, m i -42 is not'shown.in the Resource list. The plan-does not provide for
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the use of Duane Arnold Energy Center equipment, is it'available l g, - ' for uses-t. i r... .- -. -
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- The plan gives~ inadequate details for alert notification and activa-
" tion of_ teams. Details of transportation to the site area are
- deficient. LThe plan indicates only one radio equipped vehicle for
' communication. Who provides it? One car is insufficient to support aLuinimum'of-two radiological teams. What are the provisions for
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coverage before the arrival of the teams which is estimated as four to six hours? u... _J.9,
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' FDAcurrentPAG'sshouldbereferencedandcountycont/actsinthe
. 50-mile -radius should be listed with phone numbers.
.J.10.d. -The Plan basically assumes that handicapped persons will be moved by family. members, friends, etc. if they are not institutionalized.
What happens when that person who would normally da that is at work,
.on vacation or~ indisposed for any other reason? What is the contin-sency plan for-movement of these handicapped persons?
. J .10'. e . The Generic State 9,mak s~ counties responsible for distribution of K1, however, Ch eh XII does not discuss how this will occur-now that a compensatory p an is in effect. t J.10.k. The State plan totally ignores identification of and means for dealing with potential impediments (e.g. _ Seasonal impassibility of
. roads) to use of evacuation routes, and contingency measures.
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, * ~ J.10.m. The plan does not include the basis for choosing appropriate protect-il ' ,;, 9 ive actions.
-J.11. _- A list of
- food processors and milk processors should be included in the' plan. The plan is deficient in addressing procedures for estimating contamination dose consequences. The maps required have not bcen included in the plan.
J.12. 'Although reception / registration procedures are discussed, there is no. reference at all to monitoring of evacuees. Obviously, there-fore, there is no reference to monitoring all registrants within a twelve hour period.,
.K.5.a. -Table 6, Page-F-2-8 reference on'VI-Il is missins.
4K.5.b. -Means for decontamination are only minimally outlined. Methodology for estimating or measuring internal contamination is missing. M.3. Reentry-procedures need to'be expanded in order that reentry will be as clearly implemented as evacuation. 'No system was indicated in the plan for informing members of response organizations that
- recovery operations are to be initiated, or notifying them of any changes in organization structure which may occur.
M.A. Estimates of exposure is not. addressed in referenced material.
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(. 3 N.I.b. There is no way to ascertain the degree of involvement of the counties from the letters of agreement. Plans should include anticipated involvement of local-organizations and personnel. N.2.a.
'The intent should be to describe how communications drills will be
- accomplished, not simply restate criteria. How can the State ensure communications drills will occur at the local level?
N.2.c,
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. This area has been ignored in the plan. Medical emergency drills are important and must be-a part of the plan.
7.2. The plan indicates that the individual in each organization who has overall authority for radiological Emergency. response / planning is the one indicated on the sign off cheet. There is no sign off sheet! P.4. The plan needs to also address certification and recertification. P.6. References are very weak. Where are references to SOP's, support plans, etc., from other organizations and agencies? gAre the counties i going to implement their basic emergency plan? How about Red Cross response plans, etc.- These need to be reviewed, coordinated with, and referenced by the State Plan. g + S P
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