ML20091G865

Requests Assistance in Arranging Interviews W/Affiants of Affidavits Transmitted on 820629

ML20091G865
Person / Time
Site:	Midland
Issue date:	07/14/1983
From:	Lewis S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Garde B GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT
Shared Package
ML17198A223	List: IR 05000329/1981014 IR 05000329/1982013 IR 05000329/1983008 ML20090A052 ML20090A064 ML20090A067 ML20090A071 ML20090A076 ML20090A080 ML20090A090 ML20090A103 ML20090A106 ML20090A110 ML20090A367 ML20090A377 ML20090A397 ML20090A403 ML20090A447 ML20090A451 ML20090A456 ML20090A465 ML20090A481 ML20090A487 ML20090A491 ML20090A500 ML20090A504 ML20090A514 ML20090A517 ML20090A543 ML20090A547 ML20090A559 ML20090A590 ML20090A594 ML20090A600 ML20090A613 ML20090A614 ML20090A623 ML20090A626 ML20090A631 ML20090A637 ML20090A642 ML20090A656 ML20090A658 ML20090A673 ML20090A698 ML20090A703 ML20090A733 ML20090A741 ML20090A748 ML20090A751 ... further results
References
CON-BOX-09, CON-BOX-9, FOIA-84-96 NUDOCS 8406040389
Download: ML20091G865 (2)

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GLEN ELLYN, ILLINots 60137 l

July 14, 1983 Docket No. 50-329 Docket No. 50-330 Ms. Billie.P.

Garde Director, Citizens Clinic for Accountable Government Government Accountability Project 1901 Que Street, NW Washington, D.C.

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Dear Ms. Carde:

As part of its inspection on the matters raised in affidavits transmitted to the NRC by GAP on June 29, 1982, Region III requires at this time further information from two of the affiants. We request your assistance in arranging for interviews of these affiants by Region III personnel. Since their identities may not be matters of public kncwledge, I will not identify them in this letter. Please contact me by July 20, 1983 so that I may identify to you the affiants in question and you may institute arrangements for their i

interview.

Sincerely..

N. M Stephen H. Lewis Regional Counsel cc: See Attached List i

i 8406040389 840517 PDR FOIA RICE 84-96 PDR i

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4 Ms. Billie P. Garde 7/14/83 cc: DMB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)

Resident Inspector. RIII The Honorable Charles Bechhoefer. ASLB The Honorable Jerry Harbour ASLB The Honorable Frederick P. Cowan, ASLB

..i The Honorable Ralph S. Decker ASLB i

William Paton, ELD Michael Miller

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Ronald Callen. Michigan I

Public Service Consnission Myron Cherry Barbara Stamiris Mary Sinclair Wendell Marshall Colonel Steve J. Gadler (P.E.)

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'fi.GdVERNMENT ACCOUN%Dil.lTY PROJECT

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1901 Que Street. N.W., Wcshington. D.C. 20009 (202) 2a4 90 l

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Hencrable Ja:nes Gillnsky N

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missicners:

on % half of Mr. E. Earl Kent, who the Gover::ent Accountability Project (GAP) represents as counsel, we request that the cc:rnissicn review this analysis of the serious mishandling cf the NBC inspeeden/ investigation into allegatiens raised by our cid&nt of both specific and generic welding flaws at Sechtel constructed nuclear power plants, particularly the San Oncfra Nuclear Generating Stations (S"NGS Units 1, 2, and 3).

Further, we r.tquest that there be:

(1) a'legiti. ate inspection and technical analysis of Mr. Kent's welding defect concerns, and (2) an investigation into the outrageous handling of Mr. Kent's allegaticas by another govern. ent agency inspector general cr indapandent NRC investigatcrs answering directly to the Ccanissicners; or (3) h request frcm the Ccrmissicners for a G.:O investigation into Regica V's handling of this ins,::ectica and the deliberate or j

inadvertent violation of NBC inspection prccedures and policies j

threaghout the Region.

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P2CECND i

The Govern ent Accc6nd =4'ity Project is a project of the Institute for Policy Studies, Washingtcn, D. C.

The purpose of GAP's Citizens and Legal clinics are to brcaden the understanding of the vital role of the public er:ployee, corporate erplcyee, and private citzen in preventing waste, cor-ruption, or health and safety concerns. GAP also offers legal and strategic' i

6/22...To 0IA for Appropriate Action...Cpys to: Chm,Cmrs,PE,GC.EDO, Docket, i

SECY,0PA.. 83-1969 o iy.

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1 counsel to whistleblowrs, provides a unique legal education for law student t'

interns and public policy students, brings reaningful and significant refem i

to the ecver:: ent workplace, and ex:cses govarr.ent actions that are repres-sive; wasteful or illegal, or that pose a-threat to the health and safety of the American p*lic.

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4 Presently, GAP provides a program of nulti-level assistance for t

government enployees, corporate employees, and private citizens who report l

1 illegal, wasteful or improper actions. GAP also regularly monitors govern-i mental reforms, offers expertise to Executive Branch offims and agencies, i

and state and local governmental M as, and responds to requests by Congress and state legislatures for analysis of legislation to make goverment more accountable to the p 611c.

1 In March 1982, GAP's Citizen Clinic became actively involved with the Midland Nuclear Pcwer Plant.

The Lcme Tree Council had requested GAP to pursue allegations frcm workers of rajor problems at the Midland plant.

w After our preliminary investigatien, we capiled six affidavits Wdch we q

filed with the NRC on June 29, 1982. One of these affidavits was frtza

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Mr. E. Earl Kant: [(Exhibit 1).

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i Mr. Kent's allegations included concerns about two other nuclear

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power plants that he had worked crt -- San Onofre in California and Palisades, 4

also in Midtigan. In keeping with our policy of full disclosure, we included references to Mr. Kent's other allegaticms in his affidavit.

t After several renths of no action, Mr. Kent made a personal, trip I

to the NBC Region III headquarters to check on the status of the NBC 3

3 investigation into his allegaticms. Mr. Kent was so disturbed by the re-cepticn he remived that he called the GAP cffice frcm the first pay phone t

after he left the Pagion office.

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i owt., in a letter to the I detailed his concarns, as well as cur' Administrator Mr. James G. Kappler on i

Septacber 6,1982., (

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3 Mr. Kent also attanpted to indepdatly pursue his concerns about i

the San onofra facilities upon his return to California. He contacted ~the utility, "cuthern caWornia Ediscm, and also made direct contact with the site Quali_y control office in early and mid-Septenbar, t

Finally, after almost two years of working within the industry ard regulatory system, Mr. Tent agreed to talk to a reporter frcm the Ice 1

Angeles Times.

The reporter had learned of Mr. Kent's allegations fztsa the A111anos for Survival, a p*11e interest organization in Southern California.

On Octcher 13,14, and 15 there were nunerous news stories about Mr. Kent's allegaticms at the'three facilities.

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The day following the stories Mr. Kent was contactd by the Regica V inspectors who had previously ignore:1,' or remained ignorant, of his allegations. I?.ese NRC contacts ca.e after Mr. Kent had again I

offered his assistanos and infor: ration on serious welding flaws.

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Mr. Kent agreed to meet with the Region V inspectors and drove to meet with them on October 15,.1982. In a lengthy discussion with Mr.

Kent it was decided that a prerequisite for any detailed contact with the 4

NBC would be either a witness, a perscnal tape-recording, or the agreement I

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by the NRC inspection team to adhere to the advice of Mr. Kat's cotnsel and provide copies of the unaltered tapes and a transcript 'f the sans fr:rediately following the meeting. Further, it was agreed that Mr. Kent should not sign'a statement until it had been reviewed by counsel.

Two days later tr.c NPC inspectors appeared at Mr. Fant's home and insisted that he sign a 'five-page statement that they had prepared frca l-their notes of the octcber 15 meeting. Mr. Kent reviewed the statacent, j

made changes, however, he wisely delayed signing the statement price to 1

.eview by munsel.. (Exhibit 4) i l

1 After cur review of the statements, as well as receiving much nere l

detailed infomation fr:rn Mr. Fant, we informed the NRC - both Region III i

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and Region V - that Mr. Kent would be supplying an spenLa affidavit i

of his allegations. He, and his counsel, also made it quite clear to them i

that this affidavit would be 'forthecming after the tapes were received,and j

reviewed.

The tapes and the transcripts were alnest impossible to obtain.

Mr. Kent, after giving up cn the NBC's voluntary.ccrnpliance, had to file l

a Freedczn of Infxmaticn request.

(Exhibit 5).

The NBC IDIA office l

contacted me on Novenber 30 to apologize for the delay in the delivery of.

I the tapss. They were not maare of the fact that they had buur promised to i

Mr. Kent as part of the legal agreement bothen Regicn V imentigators and l

himself prior to the original interview.

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The office of Investigations (OI) indicated that there had been a l

misunderstanding between OI and the IE Regional office about the "ridtt of

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l Mr. Kent to have the tape." In fact, it had been the basic groundrulee of j.

Mr. Kent agreelag to talk to the NRC without counsel preeme*_

Maamhile, Fegion V officials mncluded their in 1-*I'm/ investigatica l

i into Kent's alle,.i.im. Uit.hout even the courtesy of notifying Mr. Kent i

ce_ his munsel, Region V released their inspection report at a much publicized press ccnference.

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y "The tape of the meeting and transcript are referred to in this letter as transcript."

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The sa.m day, Bechtel and Southam California Edia:n (SG) also issued a press release discrediting Mr. Kent's allegations, and warning i

other pctential whistlebicwrs frcm exposing inferration.

i release sends a clear rassage:

The Bechtel It would seern ines::apable that another product of the Kent affair s&hld be ' increased public ske'ptic'isn:

skepticism about the integrity.

and motives of so-called whistleb1mers and skeptician about the anti-nuclear groups that use both whistleblowers and the media.

Not until several days after the public press conference did GAP receive the Novenbar 30 inspection report. orthe transcript of the seven-i hour meeting.

Mr. Kent has since supplied us with in-depth inforsetion 1

and apprcprimtal technical data fran the professional codes that describe and detail his concerns.

Independent welding engineers and other experts have reviwed Mr. Kent's allegations frcza the technical application of his i

nere theoretical emoerns.

On Dec 2.,er 14 and 15, and on March 24, 1983, GAP filed, on behalf of Mr. Eent, five Freedcrn of Inferration (Fon) requests for documentation i

which could shed substantial light en both the allegations themselves and l

hcw the NRC care to its own swift conclusion.

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The ICR requests were for the folbwingbedies of informations f

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--FOR request 82-614: for the Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA) i i

investigation into the release of a draft inspection report to a licensee j

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in February 1982.

(Received).

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--!Om request 82-617: into a Decenbar 30, 1980 j

by Pagion III ancVcr Region IV's vendor inspection team into Systems Con

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Corpration and Magnetics, Inc. '(Referred to Departrent of Justice for prosecution.)

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- ICIA request 32-616:

Region III inspections at Midland.for all backgrcrrd infomation into two 1980 f (Peceived).

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- FOIA reques the Novenbar 30, 19.t 82-618: for all background informaticri connected with i.

82 "Special NBC Inspection at San Onofre." (Appeelad).

FOR request 83-154: for all documents developed in the processing i

i of ICIA 618 (Recei4ed).....

i The information obtained as a result of the Fon request, the list of

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doctrants withheld, and the FOR office's specific answers to questians have shed.significant light on how the NRC's massive it.spection effort managet i

to totally discredit Mr. Rent personally and professionally, as well as fail to resolve Mr. Went's allegatione.

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3 t Infor: nation cbtained further leads us to the conclusion that Region V itself (1) fails to reet even minin n standards of inspection and investi-gatien adequacy; (2) had seriously disregarded tha laws and policies of the Freedcrn of Informaticn Act, (EDIA) S USC 552, the Destruction of Ibcunents Act, and the legislative -intant of both (3) has violated cc:arission policies regarding prior ccmmnication about inspection findings to uti.lity t

personnel.

The later finding potentially affects the adequacy of NBC inspections and investigations at all nuclear pcuer plants in Region V during the past 22 months.

II.

REQUEST FOR AN INVESTIGATION BY THE GOVEENTNT MNrING OETICE IN EE NRC EEGICN V KENT INSPECTICN The Kent inspection effort is evidence of regulation and enforcement at its worst.

GAP urges the Ccmrission to put the credibility of the agency at-large above ecmnit:ent to an internal investigation section that has fosteral a deep distrust a.ong both agency empicyees and the public.

We urge the serious censideration of the C::cmission to voluntarily request an independent investigation of the inspection / investigation policies in Region V by either the G;O or another government agency Inspector General.1 A review of the mishandling of the Kent inspection / investigation will indicate the necessity for innediate reinspection effcrt.

s' NPC Report ncters 50-206/82-31, 50-361-82-31, dated Neverber 30, 1982, 3

and 362/82-27 dated Octcber 5,1982, doctnent the results of inspections j

conducted in Septarber 1982 and fecrn October 15 through No.erber 15, 1982 3

at the San 0:ufra Nuclear: Generating Stations (SCNGS).

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Dec=ents disecvered through a thcroughFreedcm of Information Search, Public Doctraents Ecca (PDR) search, and extensive intervicas with Mr.. Kent I

and other Bechtel e plcyees provide further details pertaining to Mr. Kent's allegations as well as the failure of the Regional office to conduct a minimUy adequate inspection into his charges.

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'Ihe NFC inseection racert ("IGmt reoot+") crevided inadacmata dcct.nentalien_. Our concerns abcut the Kent investigation can be divided into two categories. First, the allegations of generic welding problems within the Bechtel nuclear construction programs.

Mr. Eent's allegaticms, C

f although briefly :utlined in the affidavit that Mr. Ke:2 submitted through i-GAP to the NIC in June 1992 regarding the Midland plant, are c:rplicated I

and technical.

In lay tarms, we are finding that Bechtel welding codes, in scme instances, cb not meet the standards as set by the various professional

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associations.

As you know, cc.pliance with the professional codes is a baseline requirement of nuclear constructicn regulaticn.

.Lother government agencies have used this method to perform investigations' into their internal affairs when public credibility and a fair investigatica affort were required.

See Exhibit 6, Washington Post acocunt of the Department !

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of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) into the Inspector General of the Departnant of Agriculture.

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v The second category, although separate frcm the actual hardware issues, is the qmstion of the NPC's technical revie4 of the issues raised by Mr. Kent.' For exanple, althcugh Regicn V regested assistance frcm the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to evaluate the technical sq L

, details of Mr. Kent's allegaticns, it ap,oears that, in fact, no indeoendent

' review was done.

Under the Freedcm of Information Act we requested and t

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' received the a=munications, notes, rar:eranda, etc., that surrounded the i

issues raised by Mr. Kent.

Review of these dcctrnants found a circular trail of verification. that simply relied on the industry - heth Bechtel e

and Southern California allegatiens away.

Edison - to interpret and explain Mr. Kent's review by the NBC. He have found no evidence of independent analysis ci m

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. The Kent Report, issued by Pagion V on Nove.ber 30, 1982, ccmes to the conclusion that "no items of Non-conpliance were identified."

(Report, at 1).

This ccnclusion is allegedly based on 218 inspecticn hours by three i

r'egicmal inspectors and investigators "of allegations concerning design i

, inadequacies and deficiencies in inplementation of welding codes and standards"

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(Kent..Regert, at 1).

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Ugen review of the docptentatien crripiled by the agency as proof of j

its position, GAP discovered that regional inspc-hs/ investigators only

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documented - through tape recorded interviews - three of

- that were allegedly interviewed in their inspection effort.{a 47 witnesses

-These interviews were of Mr. E. Earl Kent, Mr. Donald Martin, and Mr. Woody Lahr.

',three intervieas, cnly the tape of Mr. Kent was transcribed at the request Of these 1

his counsel, and _cetained,only after an unacceptable delay (see pp The interview tine. made up approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> of interviewsof this '

letter).

3-4 conducted by three inspectors / investigators.

i Of the interviews with the reraining 44 witnesses, no interview notes were keot, or such notes were destroyed, or the interviess were never conducted..

the interviews were probably never conducted.In the case of 14 of 4

4 to our request through ICIA 618, we were told that:Through the final respcnse

"...the interviews mentioned in the report were ccnducted 413e i

the inspectors were in the plant, and that no separate written statements other than the three that have already been provided to you w.re prepared."

'Its draft of tid.s let.ter cbtained through FOIA 164 (Exhibit 7) explains much nere yrghically the reality of the casualness with which the NBC inspectors " gathered evidence" to disprove Mr. Kent's allegaticns:

. "the interviews mentioned in the report ware conducted while the~

inspectors were walking through the plant..." (emphasis added) Exhibit 8..

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. AThe Kent Report, Southern California Edison, University Mechanical Enginee 4

as ccmtacted. NBC letter March 21, 1983 frca J.M. Felts:n to Billie ~ Garde'in response to IDIA 82-618 identifies 14 other individuals, previously ' defined in the Kent Report as "other individuals" as six pipefitters, one pipe fitter -

supervisor, tuo welders, six Bechtel quality control welding ir.=r+$ -:s.

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. I In fact, the gestien of written interviess of the Fent inspectica remains a key issue in our request for an independent investigation into the handling of this inspection effort. Clearly the infomatica cbtained frczn all of the sources could have shed considerable light on the adequacy l

of the inspection.

Yet, if the intervices were conducted, there is to

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record of the staterents at all. If the Region V inspectors had not docu-mented any of their intervieas, the arge:ent that regional plicy prevental retentien of interviea notes would possibly have some credibility; however, the intervicas conducted of Kent, Lahr, and Martin all produced tapes, notes, t.

and an interview informaticn log.

The lack of substantial evidence leads us to believe there is no validity to the Regicnal inspeors claim that Yent's allegations were "not substantiated."

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The pub 1fc sirply cannot be expected to accept the Fent report as an adegate inspection effort.

Nor, should the m = ission itself tolerate an inspecticn effort that cbes not meet its cwn inspection standards.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Inspection and Enforcenent Manual, Chapter 1000"" Inspection Peports" states as its Policy (1005-02)

The basic policy is to provide a written record of inspecticos.

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'Ihe primary purposes of the written record are to:

(1) p'rovide a basis for enforce' ent action and convey the results of the m

inspection to the licensee or ve.%3r, and (2) provide infornetion for managsnent of the inspection program within the Office of Inspection and Enforc4:c=E. Secondary pur p ses are to provide l

infc=aticn to other NBC offices and to the general public.-

That state:ent is further clarified in a March 8,1983 letter to The Honorable Ederd J. Markey, Chaiman of the Subccmnittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Comnittee of Interior and Insular Affairs frcm NPC Chairman Nunzio Palladino.

In respcnse to the questicm: "Does the Comnission require written i

strraries of reetings related to an investigaticn, but not with persons who are the subject of that investigation?" the Comissioner replied:

"NRC policy requires written sur:maries of meetings with'repre-sentatives of organizations or individuals under investigation.

With respect to contacts with persons who are the subject of an investigatim or who nay have infomation relevant to the investi-gatica (interviewees), it is NIC po1 s

which relate w IGC investigaticus."{cy to docunent interviews 1

4'RC policies that differentiate between inspections hnd investigations do rot appear to be substantially different in the docaznentaticn requirements.

According to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement Director, Mr. Richard DeYoung, as explained at a public naeting (Farch 9,1983 re:

Regionalization)

It.E ingAs keep " detailed notes of their interviews which can be used r

for enforcement considerations."

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To illustrate the abuse of undcctrented interviews in the Kent report the folicwing exarple is included:

In the inspection into Mr. Kent's concerns about the abuse of scribe rarks en' piping for socket weld fit up measur,ements (Kent Report at 6), the followhg explanaticn stands as the sole doct=entation of their inspection j

effort:

i The inspector intervie ed several pipefitters to determine if l

pipe / tubing cutters were evar used by them or others on their

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crews to make socket weld scribe nerks. The pipefitters stated that none of them had ever used pipe cutter cr tubing cutters, nor...

had they ever seen one used cn site, or make the Wha marks used in socket weld fitup measurements. All of the fitters interviewed stated that they had received specific instructions, at the begin%.

of tneir ecployment ensite, that prchibited the use of pipe / tubing i.

cutters for making the socket weld fitup scribe marks. All pipe i ~. _,

fitters intervie md had worked at San Onofre since the 1974-1977 ti:ne period. Therefore, the inspector mnc bvlag that such use 4

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of pipe /ttbing cutters was not an establishes practice among the i

i crafts.

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i Not only are there no interviews, notes, logs, suunaries, or any other verificatica of what the above referenced pipefitters said, there is also no idea of how many pipe fitters there are at San Onofre, and hcw many pipefitters could have used pipe cutters. The inspector's conclusion does not stand i:p to the nest generous extension of inspecticn criteria. Unfortunately, the inspecters continued their urh==nted resrp through unidentified personnel piscing together a completely unsubstantiated conclusion. Had the inspectcrs kept interview logs and str:maries, it would be possible to make an -

intelligent overview of the adequacy of the inspection interviews. However, as the undccumented dialogue indicates, the inspectors relied solely on the -

word of enployees who were not under oath, did not have to produce h==ntaticm, i

did not have to sign a statsrent, did not have to even attach their name (with or without a request for confidentiality) and are cocpletely unaccountable for thdir statecents. Certainly nuclear whistleblowers such as Mr. Kent would never be allowed the type of lcoseness used in this repcrt to discredit serious Concerns

-Even nore incredible is the flippant use of the term " interview" in the Kent report to es'=h14=h the allegai "unsubstantiation" of Mr. Kent's charges:

"To daternia the practices and criteria used by in=I -tors in the inspection process of socket welded

• fittings, the inspector interviewed Welding QJality Centrol Engineers (WG2) and their Supervisors These interviews established that the E CEs did nct i

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utilize pit gages in all cases to verify empliance with the 5% of reminal wall criteria. These interviews also i

established that if the NCCEs observed cases where the scribe line locked excessively deep, a pit gage was used to determine

,.the depth of the rark and establish conformance with the 5% of

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. ncminal wall criteria.

l The W(EEs and crafts personnel were "kncwledgeable" of acceptance criteria and limits in the cond:ctof their particular activities."

j (Kent Report, at 6).

other examoles of the use of unhanted intezviews clearly demonstrate that the NPC inspectors relied on the tmsubstantiated information gained frcm other SCE/BechtEI employees to discredit Mr. Kent's charges:

" Discussions with cognizant Bechtel Quality Ccntrol inspectors indicated that arc strikes on the weldment are routinely renoved-as a matter of course because such welds dicentinuities inhibit weld examination."

(Report, at 19).

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and "Bechtel persennel state that M&OS maintains several different editions of the procedures and specifications and that it is tha' responsibility of the appropriate site discipline project engineer to order that edition which is to be used at eac:h pa.har. site."

(Peport at 30).

ma inclusion of unsubstantiated or und~'=nted interviews is an unacceptable inspectim er investigation nethcdology in any case. When i

the subject of the investigaticn is the safety of a nuclear power plant, the shoddy inspection practices utilized in this report are inexcusable.

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The search through the doctrnents provided under'the various Freeh of Inforration Requests as well as a thorough search of public documents available in the Public Documents Rocm indicate that Regicn V ofricials _

purposely or inadvertently violated the EDIA, S USC8552.

(1) On Dsc=uLer 14 we filed a Freedcm of Informaticn request for all documents" prepared by U.S. Goverment ecployees in ccnnection'with a Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Inspection and Enforcertent report dated Novenber 30, 1982 and entitlod "S~ ' ' Incpecticn of San Onofre #1, 2, and 3."'In particular Mr. Kent requests a.U. earlier full or partiil drafts and/or proposed supplanents

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to the report, as well as all records related.to any deletions, frcm its final versicn."

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. Cn January 13, 1983, G W received its first respense to m IA 82-618.

TM agency, in describing its answer as a partial response, provided 19 doct.. ents - rany of which were already public inferration.

On February 15, 19 we received a further restonse. This provided 25 cbcu:mnts. It also gave us the first indication that there was a serious prcble:n in the ability of the agency to provide the draft resorts which we had requested in our initial '

resp:nse. The letter stated:

"In your letter and in a telephone conversation with Carol Reed you requested info:ratica en drafts and final inspection report.

Ms. Reed has contacted Pagion V and has been info =ned that no drafts of the resort exist. The report was typed en a word processirs eachine and when the drafts were corrected and the new versions proofed, the old versions were destroyed."

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Through continuing conversations with MIA office and Pagion V perscnnel involved with the inspection, it becare increasingly clear that none of the substantiatirs dec:..ents would be prcduced voluntarily under our mIA request.

l That fear was confirred by the final agency response received Parch

'Ihat letter stated:

21, 1983.

"In a teleph:ne conversation on March 10, 1983 with Carol Am Peed, you again inquired about the existence of drafts of the report and also inquired about doctrentation for the interviews which were ccaducted in addition to the Kent, Lahr and Martin interviews. You specifically rentioned the reference to "several" interviews in the report.

"Mr. Echby Faulkenberry, Ceputy Regional Ad:ninistration, Region V, was contacted by telephone on March 10, 1983, and he has info =ned re that previous drafts cf the repcrt were destroyel at the time succeeding drafts were prepared. He also infor:ned ne that the intervieas rantioned in the report were conducted while the inspectors were in the plant, and that no separate written statements other than the three that have already been provided to you were prepared.

He further stated in reference to the ward "several" that the inspectors recall they talked to six pipe fitters, one pipe fitter supenrisor, two welders, and six Bechtel quality control welding inspectors.

The inspectors' notes, which are not agency records and which are rot required to be retaired by agency practice or procedures, were destroyed by the inspectors at the time the re;crt was finalized."

~

The position was clarified in a conference call on March 23, 1983 between Washington M IA officials, Region V officials and myself. At that time I requested a clarification'of the incensistent position taken cn the existence of drafts of the Kent report and interview sutraries or rotes of the other witnesses.

Pagion V acknculedged that there, in fact, had been interview notes

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and st.maries prepared of scoe of the individuals contacted, but that those notes had been destroyed. They also indicated that tMre had been at least two final drafts of the rescrt which were not destroyed un'g after the public issuance of the final report cn Dececber 10, 1982.

6 Afte'r an even nere therough review of the raterials provided to us

.i under ICIA, we have determined that other documents re p sive to' cur request nust still exist in Regicn V files. It have filed an appeal of the agency's ICIA decision on 618 today. Exhibit 9.

l (2) The destruction of agencv documents relative to inscection efforts.

The tr.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc=dssicn Inspection and Enforcement Manual states in Section 1005-20 " Disclosure to the Public," the followinJ in Paragraph 201:

j. -.

"Except for certain safeW inspections, all final inspection reports will be routinely disclcsed to the public. Althcugh draft inspection reports will not be disclosed cn a routine basis, they will be available to rerbers of the public tren recuest." (e.Tphasis aeded).

I Clearly the agency's cwn policies do not make provisiens for destruction k

of draft reports because the Regicnal Office has the convenient use of a word precessor.

If this were an isolated incident, perhaps the Goverment Accountability t

Project staff wculd not be as concerned about this cbvious violation of agency policy. However, Mr. Falkenberry s-dically indicated on at least two occasions that the destruction of draft reports and interview notes was

" regional policy."

[

(3) Release of draft recorts.

t Curiously, the other rajor item of ' concern about the inspection and i

investigaticn policies of Regica V also concern draft reports. But in the i

seccnd case the violation of agency policy centers around draft reports being l

given to licensees prior to the issuance of enforcement acticn. This led,

[

in at least one case, to the downgrading of enforcement acticn as a result of

?

prior agency notificaticn.

i l

D.P has a confidential witness who reviewed the report in draft form prior l

to issuance of the final agency report. Although our witness is not willing to go public at this time, he/she will agree to talk to government investigator who are looking into this if they are not NBC internal investigators.

~!

~ s 3

12-4.

The inspecticn and irr.'estigaticn practi s of Region V m:.:st be reviewed a.d brcught under centrol by the Comission.

It is highly suspect that the se.:ne.inspors and iny.estj.gators who find it appropriate to share enfercecent information with the targets of their investigations not even bother retaining inspecticn infor: ration atout allegations of serious defects and construction flaws.

In this instance, Mr. Kent h -==

the target of inspection / investigation rather than a source of informaticn.

Region V has turned the NRCs inspection and enforce::ent policies into a charade.

D.

Inadequate Site Tour t

On many occasions Mr. Kent volunteered to point out on both the SDNGS and the Midland site areas where the welding problems were nest extensive.

one instance of this was during the October

)

15, 1982 interview. At that,

time, Mr. Kent was told that nuclear witnesses are not pennitted cn,

construction sites for the purpcse of identifying prchlems. Finally on, October 25, 1982, at the request of the NRC, Mr. Kent was permitted to tour the site to indicate the exact locations regarding the welding inadequacies.

4 The tour was virtually meritless. Mr. Kent was accx::panied by an NBC ins:ector, a regional NRC supervisor, and NRC investigator and several staff members of SCE and Bechtel.

He was pennitted to tour only a preselected Furthen: ore, Mr. Kent was denied the use of any inspection tools

~~

area.

including a ladder, fillet weld gages, notes, measuring eqaignent, pen, pencil, etc.

If the NRC had wanted an illustrative site tour by Mr. Kent to identify '

4 specific exa::ples of problens, then they would have provided him with the necessary doca.=ents, equipnent, and time. On the contrary, they provided him with a walk throtsh tour which a:nounted to a public relations sham, i

2 Even at that, Mr. Kent identified problems to both industry and NBC inspectors. These included:

I transition slopes frcrn the body of nuclear valves (and ottar equiprent) to the connecting pipes were tco steep an incline.

The actual slope was abcut a 45 degree angle, shareas the AS:2 code m4m= at the time the

'centracts were signed, was less tlan 20 degrees maxirman l

t

[.

- Mr. Yet.. :inted cut that MTa"Y JOINrS STIII EXIST AS PARTITnY

[

NELDED, UNDOUBIEILY IN TICUSANDS G' PUGS. VANY OF ThESE JOINIS DID Nor HAVE THE REQUIRED EiD RETUR1S ON THE NEIDS. SIE WERE EVIN FOUND CRITICAL COOLING !W.ER PIPE SUPIORrS.

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E.

Evidence of Malice and Deliberate Undermining of 10 C.F.R. Part 19 by OI Investigator Owen Shackleten (Region V) and James Foster JRecion III.

(1).10 C.F.R. Part 19 states:

The NRC is amending its regulations in regard to job protection for ecployees who provide informaticn to the F

Comission. These amndments emphasize to employers - that j

is, licensees, pemittees, applicants, and their contractors i

j-and subcontracters - that temination or other acts of job discrimination against employees who engage in activities furdwring the purposes of the Atcmic Energy Act and the Energy Reorganization Act is prohibited.

3 On Septerber 7,1982, Mr. Kent talked to Bechtel officials. On Septertber 12l 1982, SCE and Bechtel notified the NIC about the allegations and the.NRC

,j.

- resolutions. On October 6,1982, Region V was contacted by Mr. John O' Dell of the Les Anceles Times regarding Mr. Kent's allegations. On October 13, 1982,I 1

Mr. Owen Shackleton cmtar.ted Mr. James Foster, Regica III OI. The hand-i written notes of that traeccm (Exhibit 10) are'particularly enlightening and shed light en the eentual outcome of the Region V investigation, and potentially the Region III investigation. A review of these notes are l

j particularly disquieting. Some coments, listed below, prove to be the basis for Mr. Shackleton's entire line of gastioning with Mr. Kent at his s h 15, 1982 interview.

j (2) Cements by Foster, as written by Shackleton (A++ehment B-4' to IDIA 618):

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1

" Spent a great deal of tine investigating Kent's allegations."

a.

This is simoly not true. The only time Mr. Foster spent on Mr. Kent's

{

allegaticns was during a Marc.h 1982 conference call and when Mr. Kent cam cm his own initiative to the Region III office in August 1982 and spent apprcocinatel:

two hours with Foster. Foster asked no gaestions rinfuding specific dera H m or concerns about Midland, bey:nd the affidavit provided to the NRC.

ij Prior to that, the only Region III inspection into Kent's allegations was

.l

' before Kent left the Midland site were dismissed at the time, but are under a conducted in March 1982 by Mr. Kevin Ward. Three of the four issues raised i

j second review by Ragien III. Further, a large nurber of Kent's Midland i

j allegations dealt with the untrained and uncertified welders, and with the j -

refusal of Bechtel g:* inspectors to identify the prchlems and-issue ccrrective actica (NCRS). Both of these problems were stated recently in Mr. J. G. Kappler

's Ietter of Notification notifying Consuters Power Cbmpany of a $120,000 fine against the utility as a result of a " quality assurance implementation breakdown, *

(b) '" People consider him strange."

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5 This state::ent, pessibly libelous, again inplies that Kent is sinply a troubler 2Aer,regardless of the rx:rits of his allegations.

c. '.Mr. Kent Is Sucocsed 'D3 Be a h'eldirg Encineer.

i This statement is neither relevantnoraccurate. Mr. Kent }rlds a Diplcna -

in Structural Engineering, has had forty years of practical experience in

]

engineering and welding.

(See sunnary of Mr. Kent's experience.) He was a nember of the American Society for Quality control until his M=m4===1 fra Bechtel. Regardless, Mr. Kent is required by both federal law and industrial il policy to re, cort all violations of construction regulations. It is both crude and inappropriate for the NRC to attack his personal qualifications, as the means to discredit his allegations.

l d,

Industry slander included in NRC investigative file.

i-The GAP investigation revealed eviden that the NBC actively sought or i

incorporated unsubstantiated inforration regarding Mr. Kent. In a telephone memorandun fra O. Shackleton, Tom Bishop advised that Burns and Roe Engineers stated that:

" Kent was fired at Litton Industries because his performance was atrocious and he had high absenteeisn. When fired Kent i

rade a seventeen-page telegram to President Nixon alleging that ships were sa full of faults they would make a bunch of Navy widws."

(Exhibit 11.)

GAP's independent investigaticn into the Burns and Poe allegations reveal that their attack on Mr. Kent was itself doubtful. Burns and Roe are heavily

}

involved withpany Bechtel construction projects, including San Onofre.

(

Suffica it to that it is obvious that the ccmnants suppled by Mr. Foster to Mr. Shackletcn poisoned the Region V investigation frm r.he beginning. A

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review of Shackleton's questions is evidence that he first " destroyed" Mr. Katt,

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using techniques and gossip tidbits frm Fester.

(See in particular the first' 50 pages of the' Transcript.M I

y.

'Ihe Kent inspection was Curtailed and Prejudiced at the Onset by SCE and Bechtel Influence.

A review of the internal correspci-4ence regarding the NIC's inspection of Kent's allegaticms gives chilling insight into the mindset with which the NRC began the Fent investigation / inspection effort..

Examples are listed below:

- Meeting notes, 10/14/82, from a Region V meeting, state ha following (Exhibit 12).,

_1/ The 257-page transcript of the NRC/ Kent meeting is available in the PDR under IOIA request no. 618.

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i (1)

Interviev Kent for all his concerns.

(2) Need full investigative support.

(3) Technical positions in Region III and V have to be the sare.

(Engelken)

(4) Have NRR reaffirm their position on the AS:E Code (e55 asis added).'

i (5) Call Fitzgerald/ Ward and discuss the matter'with him. (Exhibit 12).

J l

Peport #82-27, Oct. 5,1982, was the' initial (pre-publicity) NRC review l

'of Southern California Edison's questions to resolve Kent's allegations.

l The rep rt states:

i "We inspector revieded the licensee's acticns to resolve these allegations by discussions with licensee personnel

'and examination of docunentaticn.

}

The licensee appeared to have taken corprehensive investigation i

i action and adequately addressed all issues. The licensee's j

' investigation did not substantiate any allegation."

Unfortunately[ it is this' cursory review of the licensee's sel.f-I examination that provides the basis for the NIC's position.'

In a Ncnenber 17, 1982, Memo for Thcmas M. 2 vade from William K. Johnston,

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Subject:

Allegations by Earl Kent concerning adequacy of weld:nents at San Onofre Units 1, 2 and 3," the folicwing statement confirms the lack of independent analysis of Mr. Kent's technical concerns.

"The review has included:

(1) interviewing the people win i

acc:mpanies Mr. Kent on a walk-through tour of the plants...,

(2) repeating the tour and inspecting thosa welds which he pointed out were of concern to him, (3) review of the Am==nts provided by the applicant denenstrating ecnpliance with the applicable codes.

4 We conclude that there is no merit in the allegations made by Mr., Kent, and rec.um..id that no further action be taken. The Bechtel Power Corporatico (BPC) provided dccJnantation to refute the allec;ations by Mr. Kent. This doctznantation was gathered and assachlal without BPC having the specific allegations by Mr. Kent

~

as e:gressed in his statements. The dccznantation was thorough, i

and refuted all of the allegations."

i i

The recent " Request for Technical Assistance," October 29,1982, fran Jesse L.' Crews, Director, Divisiat of Pasident, Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs to Mr. Darrell Eisenhut, Director of the Division of Licensing, states

- the inspection priorities of the NBC.

(Exhibit 13).

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• pI I

d the inspection priorities of the NRC.

(Exhibit 13)

"R 's ox intention to have a satisfactory resolution on all

,o,f the allegations by Mr. Kent prior to license issuance for

' San Onofre Unit 3, tentatively'estinated by Region V as November 15, 1982.

appreciated."

Your assistance in this tina frame would be C.wiously Kent's inspection had a predetermined timeframe!

j III.

The specific technical mncerns raised by Mr. Kent have not been adequatel investigated or they have haan cbfuscated by NRC rhetoric which ignores key issues that Mr. Kent is raising Mt welding at nuclear pcwer plants.

in the "KENr retort" issued November 30th by Region V.The follo After each allegation a review of tM inspection's effort is provided.

been develo-ed by engineers frcm several disciplines, as well as reviewed code vio1'ation concerns. representatives of the professional organizations involve of tM evaluation of the data provided:Mr. Miguel A. Pulido, a rechanical Allegaticru jls 8.a.

" Pipe fitters scretires use pipe cutters to reke scribe narks for f

socket weld fit-up reasurenents.

These scribe rarks caused grooves in both stainless and carbon steel pipes about 1 inch back frcza the 1

weld area.

I am ccnoerned that these grooves might cause stress c

raisers.

in Units Z and Y, and possibly a few in Units 1 and 2.The j

I tiates this allegation in the NRC's own report. Contrary to the NRC 3

"One' instance was identifias, to the inspectcc, where a pipe cutter i

had been used to scripe a pipe."

This is a perfect example of what the allegatica refers to. In~this particular case, a Ncnconformance Paport0CR) No. P-3330 was generated.

I

• pipe in questica here was part of the Auxiliary Feedaatar System at Unit 3 The

. has been repaired....

Poor investi this allegatico..gative practices are demonstrated in the additional response to

~ "several of the fittings'.*The investigator crtly measured the depth of scribe marks o (Pg. 8, ' fourth paragraph, last sentence).

S2CS has thousands of su3i welds and nore than several should have been ins

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for notch depths. Ntznerous complaints have been made by our organization abcut items required tthe NE"s lack of using statistical sa::plirs rathods to determine the results of that sanple,o take an accurate sarple, and the techniques used to jsdge the i

. A large portion of the response to the allegation deals with the 54 witarion limit.

by notches haviis this 54 depth would be within code design m This entire approach does not address the allegaticn. - The all tion did not conterd that a-

._54. notch. depth _wouldyiolate.the code. The allega stated::

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"I am concerned that these grooves might cause l

stress raisers."

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There is no question that they cause stress raisers.

j What the NRC investigator ~shbuld have done is to inspect a reasonable sample of socket welded fittings and examine all of those.

i fittings to determine the depth of the marks (grooves or notches).

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Allegation:

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8.b.

"Bechcel designers use fillet welds on connections of beams in pipe supports and tray hangers and do not weld all around the joint to restrain forces in all directions.

I feel this is a code violation.

[l No prototype tests to my perr9nal knowledge were conducted to verify the adequacy of welds.

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fore, the actual structural strength of the electrical

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tray hanger / tube steel welds used or the actual mate-rial at SONGS may not be truly known.

This also ap-

i plies to the pipe supports.

I also feel that the i.

of ten partial joint strength (less than full joint integrity) and failure to weld all around the joint 4

is a generic problem.

Unfortunately, and in my opinion, the codes do not always demand full strength welding, l

whether all around or not."

i This allegation concerns three separate issues:

(1) fillet welds;

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(2) i the failure to weld 100% around the joints; and (3) prototype testing.

The NRC determined that these allegations were deemed to be " unsubstantiated."

Yet, the NRC Regional report deals only. with the failure to weld all around joints and does not discuss either the fillet welds problem or prototype, testing.1/ The NRC report clearly refers to the NRR report -

as justification for Staff reso-lution of the. allegations raised in paragraph 8 Yet, upon review, the NRR report deals only with the fillet weld and not with the failure to weld 100% around the joints.

Neither the NRC report nor the NRR review cites any professional codes which contradict Mr. Kent' 1/ n fact, the report (p. 10) does substantiate Mr. Kent'~s I

allegation that no prototype testing was done.

"The alleger's con-tentien that no prototype testing was conducted...was substantiated."

The Staff, however, adopts the judgment and explanation of the designt without question.

Yet, both the ASME and ANS professional codes we have reviewed clearly state that prototype testing is a requirement, not an option of construction engineering.

The Bechtel/SCE explanatic does not even refer to ASME/AWS codes, the codes that fir. Kent p6ints out have been violated, but instead to. the American Institute of Stee."

Construction (AISC) Manual.

And even the sections of the AISC Manual referred to as justification do not address the prototype testing I

allegations specifically, but discuss failure modes not welding requirements.

~

- en I

i violated the codes, but also the health and safet imposed by the NRC.

In essence, the NRC Region V and NRR Staff have taken a great le have put 'the judgment concerning dangerous code violations with t

at.

They who have a direct interest in the vindication of th seriou:

ope joint would make the weld integrity greater.Mr. Kent's allegati e

mine weld adequacy by looking at average stress distribution across i

the joint instead of realistically considering peaks.

of the welding requirements by Bechtel.This aliegation takes a

on

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~Allecation:

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8.c.

"The ASME Code requires adequate root penetration of fillet welds.

I recall that some of the vendor supplied welded hardware appeared to not have ade-i' quate root penetration.

"Zack," I believe a supplier of HVAC equipment.The one ven remember one instance on a piece of Zack hardwareI where a fillet weld with inadequate welding was iden-tified during inspection on site.

This instance was tion in the plant. subsequently corrected by weld repair after inst

,1, I do recommend that the NRC examine the beginning and end of fillet welds to assure root penetration at these areas and verify that all craters are filled, and conduct destructive testing mine if other fillet welds and groove welds have i

i quate root penetration or other codes violations."

l approach to discredit Mr. Kent.In this instance the Region V report sophomoric a mock exacerbated search of the SONGS vendor to find follows:

"Zack Company."

I Simply reading the transcript of Mr. Kent's 7-hour interview j

reveals that all L:.cc- ::RO/ Region V and OI inspectors should have b well aware that Mr. Kent's Zack allegations were in reference to tions _they asked about the Midland plant.

ques-Further, one of the reasons ik. Kent did not sign the 6 page(Transcript, p prepared by Region V investigators was because they had grossly mis statement stated his factual allegations.

the. serious problems of welding done by the Zack Ccmpany in MidlM Michigan.

To misstate his clear knowledge is inexcusable.

and, l'

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Finally, although the Region V inspection-would have the public ij believe that there were "no items of noncompliance or deviations identified" in relation to allegation Se, nothing could be further from the truth.

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The Zack Company has caused innumerable problems in Region III.

At Midland all Zack welders were laid off on December 2,1982, and aga in May 19?3, because they were trained by a testing agency not on the 4

Approved Vendors List (AVL).

The Zack problems at Midland Tel to a

$38,000 fine in 1981, and are now the subject of a major Region IV vendor inspection investigation, an Office of Investigations (OI) in-6 vestigation, and a Region III IE inspection.

It is unclear how many of the 218 hours0.00252 days <br />0.0606 hours <br />3.604497e-4 weeks <br />8.2949e-5 months <br /> were spent on looking-

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for a Zack Company that didn't exist at SONGS.

Had the IE inspectors 1

referred to the transcript in which the allegation was made, they coulc!

j have saved that time, i

Allegation:

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8.d.

1. i steel bracket would be placed, I was told, between a Unit 1 hydrogen line on trip for steam generator.

This was done because the hydrogen line had worn i

i thin due to rubbing with another line.

I believe j.

maintenance people at the site, who were working j

during the period when damage due to the Unit 1 diesel generator fire was being corrected, would

)

remember and be able to locate the design change and 1

spacer.

I don't recall the exact location of the hydrogen line.

To the best of my recollection, there i

wasn't equipment within ten feet.

I don't remember

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if there was any nuclear safety-related equipment nearby, and about the potential for loss of human r-life and fire, should this line rupture.

I recom-i mend NRC conduct an examination of this hydrogen line and make certain it has sufficient wall thickness to be safely operated.

Mostly likely, I prevented a.

major fire in Unit 1 and probably save the lives of s

i several (or more) working here!"

j i

Although the NRC concluded that there was no substantiation to this allegation, in fact, the report itself validates Mr. Kent's

+

concerns, i

j.

In" the course of the walkdown, the inspector identified the following:

Four line supports were missing.

I One support was not connected to the overhead anchor point and was hanging from the pipe.

The line was supported with baling wire at one point and with duct tape at another.

Mr. Kent's allegations clearly brought to the attention of both the utility and the MRC serious problems which require d repair and j

resolutions.

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Allegation 8.e.

"I am of the opinion that weld end returns are not required on Bechtel drawings.

This is in violation of ANS-Dl.1, Section 8, 1974 Edition, paragraphs 8.8.6, 8.3.6.1, a-d 8.8.6.2.

Th:aa conditions exist on details in many structural applications.

A two-page Bechtel Power Corporation table establishes

Tt certain pipe supports and other items must con-a to AWS Dl.1 requirements."

I 1

Mr. Kent contends that 'the word "shall" (see p.12, fourth line, NRC 1

Findin here. g) in this case means that there is no prerogative to be used

.+

Inspectors are given codes, rules and standards to inspect by.

this case Mr. Kent had a two-page table.

In i

1 that table (Exhibit 14 Attached is a copy of Quality Control Engineer. ), given to Mr. Kent by Mr. E. Puckett, j

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This table clearly calls out certaLn codes and specifications.

does not allow for the substitution of Bechtel specifications It inspector stated (at p.14,1. 9)

The that:

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It, therefore, appears that Bechtel specifications correctly assign code jurisdictional boundaries and provide for appropriate inspection criteria within those jurisdictional boundaries.

4 This, however, is not the issue.

dance with the two-page table, and identified numerous missing en returns.

Bechtel claims that it can confirm to the code and simul-i taneously drop end returns, as long as they satisfy the intent of the

'i cod e.

Bechtel.further claims the intent of the AMS D.l.1 1974 8 9 i

code is best expressed by the AISC Construction Manual, 7th Edition.

In any event, Mr. Kent was an inspector,. inspecting in accordance i

with the two-page, table that was provided.

Obviously, he is not the only Bechtel inspector.Under that criteria, was right.

investigating this issue it is not clear how many other inspectors

-In the NRC questioned or if any of the others had that two-page table A proper investigation would cover the important issues being raised here about implementation of the codes.

-Allehation:

8.g.

"Bechtel generated (I was told) a 92 page NCR on b

i:

electrical tr'ay hangers.

I question whether the welds made on electrical supports prior to the NCR resolution were adequately or completely fixed."

j.

Some history is in order in addressing this allegation.

and the directions, i.e.and Mr. Lahr found that the acceptance criteria for: fl Mr. Kent confusion that this shans,iwadrawings, were not clear.

There was such I

NCR was developed.

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m, This NCR did result in a revision of Bechtel specifications (see p. 20) 1 to clarify the matter.

However, by that point in time there were hundreds of welds that were not filled, ~i.e.,

flush.

Bechtel's calcu-4

}

lations (p. 21, para. 3) to determine if tease incomplete, non-flush j

welds were theoretically acceptable.

They concluded, and the NRC j

concurs, 'that the existing conditions,could be "dispositioned." (Note that 15 tube steel supports were reworked as a result of this NCR,' *.

I

p. 21. )

Mr. Kent's allegation questions the adequacy of this disposition.

The NRC inspector examined 14 supports, and found 3 that were not i

filled to flush.

He concluded that this was acceptable since it was covered by the NCR resolution (p. 22, para. 2).

However, 4

1)

If more supports are examined, it is likely that some are not covered by the NCR.

I i

2)

In the entire " investigation" by the NRC there is i,

no analysis performed independently of Bechtel on this point.

The adequacy of the NRC's effort on this part is both substantively weak, and empirically flawed.

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Allegations l

l 8.h.

"Bechtel has not, in my opinion, com lied with the requirements of AWS D. l.1 (1974) edi ion), paragraphs I

5.12.1. 5 (2). (b) and 8.15.1.3 regarding filling of

(

open weld craters on tray hangers and other items l

to crossection of the weld."

4 l

The NRC simply) restates the Bechtel position.

(See p. 23 of the Bechtel Paper.

In essence, Bechtel's position paper admits that 3

Mr. Kent's allegation is substantikted.

Their justification for not substantiating it is that cases that don't meet the code, ~i.e.,

"under filled,"' are analyzed based on conservative criteria.

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l Whether their analysis is conservative or not is not the issue.

i Mr. Kent's concern is that the code is clearly being violated --

i not that there is a degree of violation.

k l

There is no analysis of the subject here by the NRC.

Again, the j

NRC simply reste.*== a+chtel's position.

Allegations 8.i.

"Bechtel has not, in my opinion, removed all arc strikes or blemishes from base metal on pipe sup-l ports or structural steel as required by AWs D1.1 i

paragraph 4.4."

j.

In reality, the investigation performed by the NRC here really consisted of:

"The inspector examined portions of several safety-(

related piping systems and did not observe any are strikes."

(At p.25.)

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"The inspector could not find any-arc strikes in the field which had not already been identified and dis-

'. ' positioned by Bechtel."

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There is no indication of how many pipe supports were examined, nor the methodology of the examinations.

The remainder of the NRC response to this issue does not even address the allegation.

1 Allegations l

83 "I observed instances where run off plates had not been udWd as required by AWS Dl.1 paragraph 4.6 on groove weld terminations.

I cannot recall any specific locations, but I do recall observing this condition on beam and i

girder splices, as supplied by at least one vendor."

The " investigation" in this case consisted of 1

1, "The inspector examined several exposed strutural steel beams and_ columns and did not identify any instances of improper run-off plate use."

The remainder of the response simply mentions where and why run-off plates should be used.

In the opinion of the professional engineer',s working with GAP on this report, this is not an adequate inspecticn. effort.

Allegation:

I 8.k.

"I believe that a spacer plate is missing on the upper inside door hinge of the Unit 2 containment personnel hatch because I observed a gap in the weld joint of about 1/4 inch.

I brought this to the attention of w. super-visor (name) who also shared that belief.

I believe that by bringing this condition to the attention of my super-visor I had properly performed by duty to identify this condition.

I did not compare the drawing requirements to the installed condition in ' making this determination of a missing spacer plate because my supervisor had indicated to me that it was the vendor's problems to correct it and I had other work to do immediately."

Like many of Mr. Kent's other allegations this item has been clearly substantiated.

Bechtel's own audit (Exhibit 15)1 identifies a " gap" in the exact location that Mr. Kent-identified the gap during his employment at SONGS some two years ago.

Clearly the item was an important oversight then,.and required both engineering analysis and a revision in the design blueprints to justify not requiring rework.

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i With this allegation, as with numerous others, the NRC has 1

decided to discredit and dismiss Mr. Kent's concerns instead of 1

honestly reporting that Mr. Kent brought a matter to the attention of both the agency and the licensee that required technical resolu-

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tion.

1 Allegation:

8.1.

"I believe that Bechtel has misinterpreted the require-ments of the ASME Section III welding standards regarding i

socket weld engagement length without initiating a code case and obtaining appropriate code relief.

The ASME code requires a gap between the pipe end and the fitting i

l of "approximately 1/16 inch."

I believe that the code i

.should provide a more definitive acceptance criteria than merely "approximately 1/16 inch."

Clarification of this allegation is not necessary.. _1/16 inch j

is the minimum acceptable from separation.

Yet a Bechtel memo

' which Mr. Kent has provided to his private attorney, Mr. Melvin Belli, allows this distance to become "0".

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Allegation:

i 8.m.

"Bechtel Specification WQ-2, sheet 20 note 1, requires i

"shall not exceed 1/3 inch..." rega,rding maximum groo e I

weld reinforcement at Midland, Michigan's Twin. Nuclear -

f, Plant.

This re 1/8 inch..."quirement -should read "shall not exceed j

I' as required by the ASME Section III code j

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en groove weld reinforcement.

This 1/3 inch height may i

be, also, mistakenly implemented at San Onofre."

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Mr. Kent's allegation in this instance is proven on page 25, j

part~3 where Bechtel admits the 1/3 inch is a " typo".

I If Bechtel is r.ot going to weld in accordance with the code, 4

l the appropriate professional society should make a determination i

as to the acceptability.

A "ggo" that mistakenly denotes 1/8 of i

an inch for 1/3 of an inch is a good example of the type of error jl; that cannot be tolerated in nuclear plant' construction.

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Allegation:

8.o.

j "The alleger indicated that Bechtel Power Corporation at the San Onofre-2 (1) low hydrogen weld rod to be ~in open a/3 site allows:

ir for eight hours prior to uses (2) that Bechtel does not place low hydro' gen electrodes in-a l

drying / holding oven'after removal from the hermetically sealed cans; and (3) 'that the Bechtel site procedures Allow the issuance of weld rod upon removal from the hermetically sealed can."

Here Mr. Rent claims again that Bechtel is violating' the code.

Through tests Bechtel claims 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> are justified, and the NRC.

concurs.

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m Yet, the code allows 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

In order to determine if what Bechtel has done is acceptable, engineers advising GAP believe there would have to be a consultation with representatives from the; coverning code organizations.

If.what Bechtel has done in unacceptable, then virtually every i

weld on the site may be unacceptable.

Allegation:

8.r.

"The alleger, during the tour of the site on October 25, 1982, identified instances in the Low Pressure and High Pressure Safety Injection Systems and the Component Coolir Water System where he believed the tapering requirements

.-of the ASME B&PV Code had been violated in the welding of piping to certain valves.

As examples of the concern the alleger pointed out two Unit ~3 pipe to valve attachmer welds which had a section on the valve body that approache a 1:1 slope instead of the 3:1 slope that he believed should exist to conform to ASME Code requirements."

This is an important and relatively simple allegation to be re. solved.

(See pg.166 of the Bechtel Position Paper.)Mr. Kent claims one th l

The diagram, which supports the NRC response, is simply not what Mr. Kent is concerned about.

Instead, he is concerned that Bechtel L

has been using the wrong number, possibly across the country.

.This allegation is also substantiated, but disputed.

(Exhibit

)

The technical concerns listed above represent an overview'and technical analysis of Mr. Kent's allegations at San onofre..

Our own review of the Bechtel and Southern California Edison'justifica-tien discover that their efforts are largely defensive and avoid

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the key issues raised by Mr. Kent.

Unfortunately for the public, the NRC has chosen to regurgitate "

the utility's self-examination.

There can be no confidence in an 1

agency that refuses to conduct even the minimum of independent analysis on serious technical' concerns.

Therefore, we are requesting-an independent technical analysis of the issues raised by Mr. Kent, as wellRas a second investigation' effort on behalf'of the NRC by another agency.

It is not.enough for the NRC to accept Bechtel's justification of its own arrogant disregard for the professional codes that govern nuclear power plant construction.

To illustrate the dangers of this,i the following excerpts are incorporated from an independent design i

and construct;.pn verification program (IDCVP)

Power Plant. 2 -

at. the Midland Nuclear

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D' The Midland Nuclear Power Plant, Units.1 and.2,.has Bechtel as the designer, engineer, and constructor ~.

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The first monthly report of the IDCVP audit of the Auxiliary Feedwater System found several examples of Bechtel codes not

=eeting professional codes or contract specifications.

For example, I

TERA confirmed item report C-028 which states that:

1 "The AFW system design may not meet a B&W interface requirement that auxiliary'feidwater temperature be at least 400 F.

B&W's BOP criteria for AFW (Ref. 1) requires a 400 F minimum AFW temperature.

Thi's criterion in consistent with the B&W document for reactor coolant i

system analysis (Ref. 2) which' is used in analysis of reactor coolant system components.

Bechtel calculation FM-4117-28 (Ref. 3) uses a 320 F temperature as a worst case vinter temperature.

The recommendation contained in the original was implemented, but no addition analyses were i

, identified.

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Item C-045 states:

i "1.

Manufacturer's recommended storage instructions require ' otor shaf t rotation every two weeks while motor i

m I

is in storage (Ref:

Vendor Doc. No. 7220-M14-68).

2.

Bechtel procedure governing in-place' maintenance (F-10-247) requires rotation of motor shaft every 90 days, exceeding the maximum duration between shaft rotations,

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as recommended by the vendor, by a factor' of 6.

And finally item C-046 states that 1.

Pump manufaqturer's recommended storage instructions require pump to be stored.

under. vacuum with VPI crystals (dessicant) to maintain Relative Humidity at less

'than 50%.

f 2.

Bechtel Procedure for stora;s of pumps, Proc. JF-10-118, does not require vacuum nor humidity check per item #1 above.

3 Further to concern, review of. records indicates pump h' ave been open, subject to flooding 5.other damage, 5 several NCR's, remain open against the AFW pump turbine These have been included as Exhibit'16.

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IV.

Narbut Report In response to our FOIA request 4614, we received an CIA investigation into alleged violations of NRC regulations by a Region j

V inspector, Paul Narbut, in the spring of 1982 concerning the' ' -

release of a draft investigation / inspection report.

Upon review of the OIA report ("Narbut report") it is clear that from at least 1981.

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to 1982 Region V had a policy about sharing draft inspection /investi-gation reports with licensees -- a policy that is in direct conflict with NRC regulations.

Although the resolution of that problem came

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i in an April 1982 memorandum to all Region V personnel from Mr.

Engleken. following the Hayward Tyler Pump incident in Region IV, the f act' remains that for almost be, years Region V manageme.nt had,

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a policy that was indirectly violating federal regulations.F j

At a minimum this raises serious qu.estions about the, judgment i

and competence of the Regaional Administration.

However, even more i

l serious is the way that oIA administrators handled the very clear findings contained in the Narbut report.

(Exhibit 17)

The Narbut case involves a draft inspection report being released to a licensee,-

specifically a draft inspection report to the Washington Public Power Supply System in April 1982.

However, other cases discovered in the OIA investigation included i

a Region V release of a draf t report to Southern California Edison l'

" concerning security problems at San onofre (SONGS) in March, 1982, which resulted in.--- apparently -- planned escalated enforcement

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action being dropped.

f In a June 22, 1982 letter to Mr. James Cummings, Director of the office of Inspector & Auditor, the investigator who directed the i

Narbut investigation registered his dissent about the' internal edit by his superiors.

(Exhibit 17)

"I am not questioning your authority in overruling me on this matter, nor do I feel that you were obliged to mention my views to the Commission.

HoweveY,,I do believe that the memo improperly states that there 'was unanimity in its recommendations... "

Details of the San onofre case In the course of' investigating the'Narbut case, CIA j

asked Region V. staff whether they knew of other cases where draft ' ep6rt had been released..The most detailed.

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l and significant ' example given by the NRC staff involved 1

a March 8, 1982 release of virtually an entire draft i

inspection report concerning safeguards deficiencies i

at the San onofre site in San Clemente, California.

The release occurred with the knowledge and approval of.the Regional Enforcem.ent, Director (Allen D. Johnson),and,the 1/

An October 21, 1981 Procedure for Initia'ing, Conducting and

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t Reporting Enforcement Conferences " clearly directed Region V's personnel to provide licensees with a draft notice of violation in advance of any enforcement."' (OIA Report, page 48.).This contradicts Section 04 of the IE Manual, Chapter 1025, dated April 17, 1981, that states:

" Advance copies of inspection / investigation reports provided to Headquarters in support of. escalated enforcement action should not be sent to licensee / vendors for review in accordance with this chapter until the documents initiating the enforcement action have been signed and issued."

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' cognizani Division Director (George S. Spencer).

Further-more, it took place at a time when escalated action was l

being actively considered.

This particular fact is important because NRC rules, as stated in the IE Manual, apparently indicate that no reports--drafts or final--

should be given to licensees until after the enforcement action has been fully determined'. "

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In this case, however, it appears that a planned, s

L escalated enforcement action was cancelled partly because i

l of the release of the draft report.

Because of a prompt written response by Southern California Edison to Region V's l

l concerns, no escalated enforcement action.was taken.

The matter is complicated because of a March 9, 1982 change l

t in NRC's enforcement policy establishing somewhat different j

criteria for.wbot violations require civil penalties.

Nevertheless, prior to releasing the draft report, prior 4

to meeting with the licensee and prior to receiving the

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licensee's responses to NRC's concerns, Region V staff i

had planned to propose a fine of $20,000. p Conclusion l

The results of the NARBUT investigation into Region V's inspection policies, coupled with the handling of the KENT l-allegations,. leave the Commission no choice but to take immediate gtrong action to restore public confidence in the NRC's Region V l

office.

This can be ddne only by an independent investigation of both Mr. Kent's allegations and the NRC inspectica of his~ charges.

4 We look forward to the direction of the Commission on this item in the near future.

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Sincerel h00U T Billie Pirner Garde I

citizens Clinic Director e

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