ML20087M966
| ML20087M966 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1984 |
| From: | LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20087M967 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-3, NUDOCS 8404020238 | |
| Download: ML20087M966 (271) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ - - _ _ _ _ - _ s [ ,_ LILCO, March 30, 1984 EEL / ~ TD CCiESPONDENCE l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION sf 'Q Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board . gr
'bf.f' In the Matter of ) N 4b
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'h i 'Q l LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3TfC;. '
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) (Emergency Planning l (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Proceeding) '
1 Unit 1) ) LILCO TESTIMONY ON CONTENTION 11 (CONFLICT OF INTEREST) PURPOSE Contention 11 alleges that LERO, which is composed most- , i ly of LILCO employees and officials, might not give an appro-priate protective action recommendation promptly in a ra-diological emergency because LILCO employees would find that their loyalty to the utility interfered with their duty to pro-tect the public. This testimony shows that the contention is wrong, for several reasons:
- 1. This alleged " conflict of interest" could in theory affect any decisionmaker charged with protecting the public, whether he be an elected official or an employee of a private company.
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- 2. Boiled down to its essence, Contention 11 says nothing more than that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should not trust an ele *ctric utility to make safety decisions. In fact, virtually every aspect of the regulation of nuclear power plants depends upon utility personnel providing information and utility personnel making decisions. There is no reason to be-lieve LILCO would be any less responsible about disclosing safety information than any other utility. Nor is there any reason to believe that LILCO would be less conscientious about making protective action recommendations than about making other decisions, or reporting other information, in connection with the operation of Shoreham.
- 3. Contention 11 alleges that "LILCO has failed to in-stitute appropriate measures to ensure the independence of LERO personnel." This is incorrect. As this testimony shows, the LERO organizational structure has several features designed to ensure independence. For example, LERO personnel are not asso-ciated with the operation of the Shoreham plant in their every-day jobs, and LERO personnel in the Emergency Operations Center are of equal or superior rank in their regular jobs at LILCO to the site response personne: at the EOF. Moreover, protective action recommendations are governed by strict procedures, and LILCO has taken pains to be sure that appropriate governmental authorities and the press are kept informed about events as an emergency progresses. Logs are kept of important decisions and-other steps along the way during an emergency, and everyone in b . . . . . . . . , . .. . . . . . . . . . . .
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= . _ _ . _ . - _ _ .- _ . - _ - .
j s LERO is aware that any accident at a nuclear power plant will be closely scrutinized afterward. Accordingly, there is every incentive to take the actions most appropriate to the public interest.
- 4. Also, various other entities besides LILCO would be involved in an emergency response. The Department of Energy would have a role in making dose projections and a representa-1 tive in the EOC. The press would be provided for. The NRC l would be present. And, if County and State officials are worried about a conflict of interest, they can also take part; LILCO has provided for that contingency as well.
- 5. Finally, it is simply not true that there is a
" conflict" between protecting LILCO and protecting the public.
As this testimony shows, it is in LILCO's corporate interest to make the best possible decisions in behalf of the public. 1 Attachment 1 - OPIP 3.6.1 (pp. 1-3) Attachment 2 - OPIP 3.5.2 (pp. 1-20) Attachment 3 - OPIP 3.5.1 (pp. 1-9) Attachment 4 - OPIP 3.3.4 Attachment 5 - OPIP 3.8.1 (pp. 1-4) Attachment 6 - OPIP 3.8.2 (pp. 1-7) i Attachment 7 - OPIP 4.1.2-i
' Attachment 8 - Lesson Plan #1
-Attachment 9 - Training Workbook Module No. 17~
l l l
LILCO, March 30, 1984 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Proceeding)
Unit 1) ) LILCO TESTIMONY ON CONTENTION 11 (CONFLICT OF INTEREST)
- 1. Q. Please state your names and business addresses.
A. [Cordaro) My name is Matthew C. Cordaro; my ad-dress is Long Island Lighting Company, 175 East Old Country Road, Hicksville, New York, 11801 [Mileti] My name is Dennis S. Mileti; my address is Department of Sociology, Colorado State Univer-sity, Fort Collins, Colorado, 80523. [Weismantle] My name is John A. Weismantle; my ad-dress is Long Island Lighting Company, 100 East Old Country Road, Hicksville, New York, 11801. l [Wofford) My name is Andrew.W. Wofford; my busi- l ness address is Long Island Lighting Company, 175 1 East Old Country Road, Hicksville, New York,=11801. l l l
l
- 2. Q. Please state your professional qualifications.
A. [Cordaro] I am Vice President, Engineering, for LILCO. I am on this panel to provide the LILCO management perspective on emergency planning, and to answer any questions pertinent to management. My role in emergency planning for Shoreham is to ensure that the needs and requirements of emergency planning are being met and that the technical di-rection and content of emergency planning are being conveyed to corporate management. I accomplish this by supervising the development and imple-mentation of the offsite emergency response plan for Shoreham; the Manager of the Local Emergency Response Implementing Organization (LERIO) reports directly to me. [Mileti] I am Associate Professor of Sociology and Director of the Hazards Assessment Laboratory at Colorado State University. [Weismantle] I am employed by LILCO as Manager of the Local Emergency Response Implementing Organiza-tion (LERIO). I am responsible for developing and implementing the offsite emergency response plan for Shoreham. 4
[Nofford] I am employed by LILCO as Vice President - Purchasing and Stores, and in an emer-gency I am one of those designated to become Direc-tor of Local Response. [All witnesses] Statements of our professional qualifications are being separately offered into evidence as part of the document entitled "Profes-sional Qualifications of LILCO Witnesses."
- 3. Q. What is Contention ll?
A. (All witnesses] Contention 11 reads as follows: Preamble to Contentions 11-14. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A re-quires emergency plans to describe the organization for coping with radiological emergencies, including definition of au-thorities, responsibilities, and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's emergency organization and identification of the State and/or local officials re-sponsible for planning for, ordering, and controlling appropriate protective ac-tions, including evacuations. In the LILCO Transition Plan, in place of " State and/or local officials," LILCC employees (including in the case of the " Radiation i Health Coordinator," an unidentified LILCO " Contractor" which, for purposes of these contentions is included in-the term "LILCO employees") are identified as being responsible for planning for, or-dering, and controlling the entire offsite emergency response. Thus, all. the command and control functions, as well as all management and coordination of the entire emergency response, are to be performed by various LILCO employees. (Plan, at 3.1-1; OPIPs 2.1.1, 3.1.1,
v 3.6.1). Accordingly, the "offsite au-thorities responsible for coordinating and implementing offsite emergency maa-sures," with whom the LILCO onsite emer-gency coordinator must exchange informa-tion (see 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.2.c), are fellow LILCO em-ployees. In Contentions 11-14 below, the In-tervenors contend that there cannot and will not be offsite emergency prepared-ness that provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a ra-diological emergency at Shoreham because LILCO employees are not able to exercise effectively the command and control responsibilities necessary to plan for, order, manage, coordinate and control ap-propriate protective actions. Each of the deficiencies identified in Conten-tions 11-14 results in noncompliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3), Part 50 Appendix E, Sectica IV, and NUREG 0654 Section II.A. Contention 11. The LILCO employees in command and control positions under the LILCO Plan may experience a conflict between LILCO's financial and institu-tional interest and the public's inter-est, which may substantially hamper their ability to perform the functions assigned to them in a manner that will result in adequate protection of the public. The intervenors contend that LILCO employees will have a strong incentive to minimize the public's perception of the potential or actual danger involved in a ra-diological emergency in order to avoid engendering public or LILCO shareholder disapproval of LILCO, or anti-Shoreham sentiment. Thus, for example, they may not recommend an appropriate protective action in a prompt manner because to do so would be contrary to LILCO's financial l interest in maintaining a public percep-l tion that Shoreham is not a source of j danger. LILCO has failed to institute l appropriate measures to ensure the
e independence of LERO personnel. Accord-ingly, there is no assurance that correct and appropriate command and control deci-sions will be made by LILCO employees.
- 4. Q. Who are the "LILCO employees in command-and-control positions under the LILCO Plan"?
A. [Cordaro, Weismantle] The LILCO employees desig-nated to fill the LERO command-and-control posi-tion, Director of Local Response, are the follow-ing: LERO TITLE LILCO TITLES Director of Local Vice President - Transmission Response & Distribution Vice President - Employee Relations Vice President - Purchasing and Stores
- 5. Q. Mr. Wofford, are you one of those people?
A. [Wofford) Yes. I am designated to be Director of Local Response in an emergency. I am one of the people who are alleged to be subject to a " conflict of interest."
- 6. Q. Would you let LILCO's corporate interests interfere with your duty to protect the public?
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A. [Wofford] No. I have been an employee of public utility companies since leaving the military ser-vice in 1947. The tradition of public service and responsibility to the public safety and convenience has been one of the mejor objectives of these util-ity companies throughout this period, and to the i best of my knowledge this dedication began when the industry was in its infancy. As has been demon-strated many times as a result of hurricanes, ice storms, and other disasters that disrupted service and had the potential for causing loss of power or unsafe conditions, the effort to keep the lights and power on for the benefit of the public has out-weighed any concern about cost or convenience to the utility or its employees. Unlike a conventional industry or business, the utility cannot pick up its poles, distribution and transmission lines, and power plants and move to another area. Our relationship with a community, by necessity, is a long-term relationship, and thus each of our decisions must recognize the reality of living with that.docision for a long time. In a trua sense, there is no conflict between the best possible advice and instructions to the public and j the best interests of LILCO. ,
In addition, I have considerable pride in my pro-fessional career, dealing with public officials, police officers, contractors, major companies, the public, fellow employees, and neighbors. I cannot conceive of making a decision at this late stage of my career which would damage my reputation or ; pride.
- 7. Q. Dr. Mileti, have there been cases where the people who delayed telling the public about an emergency were the same people who had caused or contributed to the emergency?
A. [Mileti) Yes. There have been cases in'which the people or organization responsible for causing or contributing to an emergency were open about it and shared the information with others, and other cases where this may not have been the case.
- 8. Q. Is this phenomenon limited to technological einergencies?
A. [Mileti] No , " conflict of interest" is not a phe-nomenon that is limited to emergencies caused by technologies; it has also ocettrred in emergencies caused 'e natural events. That is,_there have been cases in which people have delayed giving out 1 l' i
l l 1 public information (or downplayed the threat) about natural disasters as well as technological emergencies.
- 9. Q. Ccn you give some illustrations?
A. [Mileti] There is at least one case of which I am aware in which information about an impending di-2 saster was shared by the owners of the faulty tech-nology with public officials, who in turn decided not to share the information with the public. Sometime during the 1970's it was discovered that a new high-rise building in New York City could easi-
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ly be blown over by a very strong wind. The build-ing was still under construction when this flaw in its design was discovered. Officials were immedi-ately alerted, as were disaster respcnse groups f like the American Red Cross. Work was intense to fix the structure because the hurricane season was rapidly approaching. In 1972, the South Dakota School of Mines conducted a weather modification experiment, seeding clouds to see if it could increase rainfall. The wind stopped, the seeded clouds remained. stationary, and a catastrophic flood ensued in which over 230 peo-ple lost their lives. (Days after the flood, 1 I
scientific studies concluded that the experiment had not contributed to the rainfall that caused the flood, but this was not known at the time of the flood.) Flood warnings in Rapid City were inade-quate for a variety of reasons. (For example, ini-tial messages downplayed the threat.) In this case, sharing information about the " experiment" with the National Weather Service and others in-volved in the public warning function would have been useful.
- 10. Q. Have there also been cases where people responsible for an emergency reported the emergency promptly?
A. [Mileti) Yes, there have been cases in which those responsible for or associated with the cause of a problem did not delay in sharing accurate informa-tion about an emergency with responsible officials and the public. In the late 1960's a serious crack was discovered in a dam above the community of-Baldwin Hills in Los Angeles. The owners of the dam immediately notified officials, and the public was subsequently notified, even before it was clear that the dam would eventually give way. As the threat became real,-people were evacuated. The public in Los Angeles viewed most of the affair on television. I 1
More recently, in the early 1980's, the Pacific Gas
& Electric Company learned that one of its natural gas pipelines had broken and was leaking near the Embarcadero Center in downtown San Francisco. The company and officials immediately made the news public, and an evacuation of the high-rise struc-tures at risk was quickly and effectively accom-plished. Company employees assisted in the evacua-tion.
- 11. Q. What is the significance of these examples?
A. [Mileti] Obviously there are emergency-related ex-amples in history where private companies with an interest resisted the urge to cover-up, and cases where openness was less than it could have been; there are also examples of both sorts involving public officials. What is important, however, is not that there have been emergency-related cases in which downplaying the risk has happened and cases where it has not, but rather that we have knowledge about why it happens. This knowledge allows us to address the phenomenon in emergency plans and to develop plans that minimize the chance it will hap-pen in the future, should the plans ever be acti-vated. Delays in issuing public warnings'or d B
l otherwise sharing threat information, downplaying the threat in the information that is shared, and other manifestations of " conflict of interest" can be minimized in plans so as to help ensure the transmittal of timely and accurate threat informa-tion.
- 12. Q. How do you design a plan to minimize this problem?
A. [Mileti) This goal can be accomplished if a plan provides for the removal of the effects of individ-uals' personalities, fears, biases, beliefs, no-tions, and so on, both from the decisions and from the process that links discovering the threat to seeing information about the threat conveyed to other responsible officials and to the public.
- 13. Q. Can you be more specific?
A. [Mileti) The possibility of " conflict of interest" hindering an emergency response can be minimized if (1) key decisions and transmittal instructions in reference to threat information are formalized (for example: "given event x at probability p, call y and say z"); (2) the substance, process, and spacing of public information are. formalized in ad-vance (for example: given A, read message B to
person C and then to the public every D minutes); (3) participants in the system know that they are expected to carry out these tasks in the specified manner; and (4) they know that there will be a post-event audit by some review group that will hold them accountable if they do not.
- 14. Q. Where did these recommendations come from?
A. [Mileti) This list of recommendations rests on, in part, the findings of sociological research over the years that has investigated the sharing of
" risk" information among organizations and, then, with the public, as well as post-event audits (done by, for example, federal agencies) of emergencies in which this sharing of information was addressed.
- 15. Q. But you can't reduce an smergency plan to a series of formulas, can you?
A. [Mileti] At the same time the emergency planner addresses the recommendations I have just made, he must realize that too much formalization of proca-dure and performance in any part of any emergency plan can be counterproductive. Some room must re-main for allowing professionals to make profession-l al judgments on the basis of the particular 1 i i 1
circumstances that define the actual emergency sit-uation. Otherwise, one of the principal elements of a good emergency plan -- flexibility -- will be lost. The fact of the matter is that a plan must be con-structed so as to allow judgments to be made in times of emergency (thus making the plan flexible), and yet still provide clear guidance to deci-sionmakers, which helps to prevent their judgments from being adversely influenced by consideration of things like " corporate image," whether they will get reelected, " conflict of interest," or their personal perceptions about the world.
- 16. Q. Has LILCO done the four things Dr. Mileti recom-mends above? For example, have you formalized the decisions and transmittal instructions as he recom-mends?
A. [Cordaro, Weismantle] Yes. The information on which protective action recommendations are based is stipulated by the New York State radiological emergency data form. Most of the radiological and meteorological data on this form are taken off in-struments that have recorded outputs and can be checked subsequent to the emergency for accuracy.
i 1 l The emergency classification is based upon NRC NUREG-0654 plant initiating conditions. Shoreham
- has developed plant-specific emergency action lev-els (EAL's). These EAL's, which have been reviewed by the NRC, detail actual gauge and meter readings that when exceeded mandate the declaration of the emergency at A particular level -- that is, Unusual Event through General Emergency. Because these data are nondiscretionary, there is no opportunity for " conflict of interest" to arise.
P Also, the procedure for making protective action recommendations is quite precise. Under OPIP 3.6.1 (Attachment 1) the Radiation Health Coordinator, who is not a LILCO employee but rather a consul-tant, is responsible for advising on protective ac-tion determinations based on recommendations pro-vided by the onsite staff at the Shoreham Station and, if time permits, on an independent development of protective action recommendations based on dose projections or offsite radiological monitoring sur-vey data. See OPIP 3.6.1 Section 2.0. Among other things, OPIP 3.6.1 contains a procedure to make an independent assessment of the appropri-ate protective action by the use of a
l Hewlett-Packard 85 computer, which is programmed to
" walk" the user step-by-step through the calcula-tion. Sample output sheets are contained in OPIP 3.6.1. The final result will be a listing of rec-i ommended protective actions for the affected zones.
- 17. Q. Then one piece of information used by the Radiation Health Coordinator is the onsite recommendation?
A. [Cordaro, Weismantle) Yes. The Radiation Health Coordinator receives a recommendation from the onsite Response Manager, which is not at issue here because it is a " Phase I" (onsite plan) matter.
- 18. Q. And who gives the Radiation Health Coordinator the information besides the onsite staff?
. A. [Cordaro, Weismantle] The Radiation Health i
Coordinator takes dose projections completed in ac-cordance with OPIP 3.5.2 or offsite dose levels measured by survey teams in accordance with OPIP 3.5.1 (or procedural equivalents). The required information for OPIP 3.5.2 (Attachment 2) is the responsibility of the DOE RAP Team Captain. See OPIP 3.5.2 Step 2.2. The offsite survey teams that collect the data under 3.5.1 (Attachment 3) are likewise provided by DOE.
- 19. Q. If the Radiation Health Coordinator is not a LILCO employee and his information comes from the onsite emergency plan or from DOE, where does the " con-flict of interest" alleged by Contention 11 come in?
A. [Cordaro, Weismantle) Well, in reality it doesn't. But what the contention appears to claim is that the Director of Local Response might ignore the recommendation from his Radiation Health Coordinator, or delay passing the recommendation on to the public, or ignore or downplay information from DOE, because of his desire to protect LILCO. This is totally implausible. The information from DOE will be recorded, as will the recommendation from onsite. Likewise the Radiation Health Coordinator's recommendation to the Director will be put into writing. Under these circumstances no Director could hope to disregard the recommendation , or delay action without it becoming known, even as-suming (unrealistically) that he wanted to.
- 20. Q. Is the Radiation Health Coordinator in a " command and control position" in the LERO organization?
7 A. [Cordaro, Weismantle] No.
- 21. Q. Might the Radiation Health Coordinator let some
" conflict of interest" interfere with his duties?
A. [Cordaro, Weismantle] Not in our judgment. He is a trained professional. He undergoes LERO training. He knows that the significant decisions in an emergency and the data underlying those deci-sions are recorded for later inspection. And he knows that his job in an emergency is to contribute to sound protective action decisions, not to pro-tect some hypothetical corporate or financial in-terest of LILCO.
- 22. Q. Getting back to Dr. Mileti's first recommendation, have you formalized the process of getting informa-tion to the public?
A. [Cordaro, Weismantle] Yes. Responsibilities for specific decisions, actions, and transmittal in-structions are set out in three implementing proce-dures in the LILCO Transition Plan that deal spe-cifically with communications to tha public (OPIP 3.3.4, 3.8.1, and 3.8.2, Attachments 4, 5, and 6). An important example is that the activation of the emergency broadcast system and transmittal of
i I emergency messages is directly determined by the emergency classification and the protective action recommendation. As provided in OPIP 3.8.2, whenever an Alert (when schools are in session), Site Area, or General Emergency has been declared, the EBS system will be activated. There is no discretion on the part of any LERO member as to.whether to activate the EBS stations once a decision to recommend a protective action has been made.
- 23. Q. What about Dr. Mileti's second recommendation?
Have you formalized the substance, process, and spacing of public information? A. [Cordaro, Weismantle] Yes. While the actual mes-sage released, of course, will depend on what pro-tective actions are recommended, the substance of the emergency broadcast messages has been predeter-mined as much as possible by the development-of the sample messages in OPIP 3.8.2. These messages serve two purposes. First, they include all the stylistic and informational elements identified by i Dr. Mileti as being necessary for effective emer-gency notification. Second, they-provide a well-developed basis upon which messages specific to the I
1 emergency situation can be developed rapidly for I transmission to the participating EBS stations. l l As for spacing, the EBS messages will be repeated every 15 minutes.
- 24. Q. And Dr. Mileti's third recommendation? Have you made sure that participants in all parts of the in-formation system know that they are expected to carry out their emergency tasks in the specified manner?
l A. [Cordaro, Weismantle, Wofford] Yes. All personnel associated with the development, review, and trans-mission of the EBS messages have been trained and have participated in drills and exercises. The radio station personnel are experienced in their own station procedures and will participate in a simulated manner during an exercise.
- 25. Q. How about Dr. Mileti's fourth point? Do the par-i ticipants know that there would be a post-event l audit in which they v;nld be held accountable?
A. [Cordaro, Weismantle, Wofford] Yes. The proce-dures used by LERO strongly emphasize the necessity of maintaining emergency logs. OPIP 4.1.2, Step 5.4.1 (Attachment 7), identifies the following personnel as maintaining logs: 9
Director of Local Response Manager of Local Response Health Services Coordinator Evacuation Coordinator Support Services Coordinator l Coordinator of Public Infor- . c e. , 1 l Because LERIO is an offsite organization, it would not be required to file an incident report as the onsite organization would. This does not mean, however, that there would not be post-emergency scrutiny. Due to media coverage, such as at TMI and Ginna, there would be extensive analysis of the emergency response. In addition, government inves-tigations such as reported in the Kemeny Report after the TMI event and the MRC Report (NUREG-0909) after the Ginna event would undoubtedly analyze the offsite emergency response efforts. As a result, all senior members of LERIO are well aware of the significance of their positions and the public scrutiny that they would be under.
- 26. Q. Might governmental officials and not just utility employees and officers experience a " conflict of interest"?
A. [Mileti) Yes. " Conflict of interest" is as appli-cable to the public sector as it is to the private sector. For example, it has sometimes happened
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that public officials have delayed giving out threat information (or downplayed it) because of uncertainty in the scientific information about the severity or probability of the event. Also, public officials have sometimes been reluctant to " cry wolf," fearing, for example, that there might be some political backlash if the event did not happen or was less severe than anticipated. For the same reasons, public warnings have sometimes been " soft-peddled"; that is, the threat may be downplayed in the information given to the public. Delays or the downplaying of the threat in public warnings, or both, have also been the result of misplaced and unfounded fears in the minds of public officials, for example, that the public would " panic" once they heard the news about the threat. I might add that what the County is alleging in Contention 11 is simply another application of " role conflict" between different kinds of roles from those that have previously been discussed in this proceeding. Lewis Killian's 1952 article, for example, addressed a type of conflict of loyalties between the loyalty of employees to "the company" as an organization and to fellow employees as friends and human beings. Killian says this:
' The most common, almost universal, reaction was to think of the men first and the plant later.
One plant official, active in rescue work in spite of a broken arm and numerous lacerations, described his reaction to the sudden, dramatic conflict be-tween loyalty to the company and loyalty to the workers as follows: Property! Nobody gave a damn for property! All that was important was life. I've often wondered just how it would be to walk off and let a plant burn up. That was the way it was. We didn't even consider fighting the fire. There were exceptions. One man, who scarcely knew his workers, described his first reaction in terms that suggested he was most concerned about the com-pany's property. (It is not at all clear from Killian's article, however, that this man was actu-ally faced with a choice between saving people and saving property; he was simply asked by an assis-tant superintendent what the superintendent should-do.) But this reaction was, as Killian says, "ex-ceptional." l [All witnesses] Anyone, including any public offi-
- cial, could in theory be afraid of bringing l
t I l
discredit on himself or his organization by making the wrong decision and advising the public to do the wrong thing. This could be a problem no matter which decision is made, and no matter what person is making it. Take, first, the decision itself. The contention is that LERO decisionmakers might err in the direc-tion of not advising evacuation, because to start an evacuation is to subject the community to the costs and disruption of relocating large numbers of people. But with at least equally forceful logic the contention could be made that LERO would err in the direction of advising evacuation too readily, because the risk of not starting the evacuation would be to subject the community to radiation. In the assessment of risks, it is safe to say that the damage to LERO's, and LILCO's, interests is greater if LERO errs and people are exposed to radiation than if LERO errs and people needlessly leave their homes. Now consider the decisionmaker rather than the de-cision. The contention is that his judgments may be affected by the knowledge that if he makes a mistake he or his organization will be criticized. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ E
This of course is something that could be true of any decisionmaker in any organization. If a utili-ty company official may fear that he will make his company look bad, it is at least as likely that an elected official will fear to make himself look bad and get turned out of office by enraged voters at the next election. In fact, there are examples of l this very phenomenon. There is simply nothing pe-culiar about utility companies that makes their of-ficials especially susceptible to this sort of pressure. It is just as real for public officials in emergencies.
- 27. Q. Would LILCO be peculiarly susceptible to " conflict of interest" because it would have'" caused" the emergency?
A. [Mileti] Several observations suggest that this concern is unfounded. First, most people would have to conclude that the Three Mile Island acci-dent was the most studied and scrutinized emergency in the history of our nation, and that another emergency at a nuclear power plant would likely also be the object of extensive and detailed post-audits. This image of accountability is most like-ly higher for utilities in communities like Suffolk
County, where local opposition seems to be great and where post-emergency accountability would, con-sequently, almost certainly be great also. This suggests, therefore, that " conflict of interest" -- to the extent that it might operate in an emergency at a nuclear power plant -- would less negatively impact response to an emergency at Shoreham than it might somewhere else. Second, the nuclear power industry is subject to many regulations and guidelines. It is almost im-possible to imagine a scenario in which substantial radiation were released from a plant without anyone finding out. There seems, therefore, nothing to be gained and everything to be lost if " conflict of interest" kept a utility from being frank and time-ly about an accident and the public safety. Third, LILCO is no more " peculiarly susceptible" to
" conflict of interest" because it would have
" caused" the emergency than other utilities which l operate nuclear power plants.
Susceptibility to " conflict of interest" is no more l an issue for some persons than others in an emer-gency. It is simply a problem that can constrain good emergency public information in any sort-of 1 l l i
l l emergency, regardless of the actions involved, if not taken into account in plans; the means do ! exist, however, to remove it as a constraint to good information through emergency planning. [Cordaro, Weismantle] We might add that all ra-diological emergency plans for commercial nuclear power plants are dependent on information from the utility that operates the plant. If " conflict of interest" by utilities were really a serious prob-lem, then no commercial nuclear plant, and no emer-gency plan, could be trusted anywhere.
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- 28. Q. But the contention seems to say that LILCO's pro-prietary interest in the plant is what makes the difference. The charge is that LILCO people will suppress information tending to make Shoreham seem unsafe or its operators unskillful. What do you say to that?
A. [Mileti] The reason why proprietary interests might lead to " conflict of interest" for a nuclear power plant does not seem different from the owners of a pipeline system in San Francisco, a building in New York City, or a dam in Los Angeles, for ex-ample, as discussed in the answer to questions 10-and 11 above. At the same time, why " conflict of
4 interest" could occur and what is the basis for it (for example, a proprietary versus a political in-terest) do not alter the steps that plans should take to ensure that it does not detract from the transmittal of sound and timely information during an emergency.
- 29. Q. What is LILCO's real " interest" if a radiological emergency threatens? Is it in LILCO's interest to a
delay telling people to take protective actions? A. [Cordaro,.Weismantle) No. It is obviously in LILCO's best interest, from a public relations standpoint if nothing else,~ to recommend the appro-priate protective actions as quickly as possible. As mentioned above, LILCO will not be able to con-ceal the presence and quantity of radiation. It is true that the effect of a radiological disaster on LILCO's corporate interests would be severe; but the effect of having attempted to " cover up" such a disaster would be far worse. In any event, the knowledge that severe NRC penal-ties would be imposed for covering up or disre-garding safety information would induce anyone with LILCO's interests at heart to act responsibly. In-deed, the charge that utility employees might fail _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ - - - - - - - _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - J
I to discicae safety information because to disclose it would put a nuclear plant or the nuclear indus-l i' try in a bad light could be leveled at any aspect cf operating a nuclear plant. But there is no evi-dence that LILCO employees would conceal, disre-gard, or misuse safety information any more than employees of any other NRC licensee would. Nor is there anything to suggest that LILCO employees in LERO would fail to disclose safety information in an emergency with offsite consequences, any more than there is anything to suggest that LILCO em-ployees would fail to disclose more routine safety
~
information about the plant.
- 30. Q. How does the LERO organizational structure help en-sure independence of command-and-control personnel?
A. [Cordaro, Weismantle, Wofford] The following as-pects of the LERO organization help to ensure inde-pendence:
- 1. No LERO personnel are associated with the Shoreham plant in their every day jobs.
- 2. LERO personnel in the EOC are of equal or superior rank in their regu-lar jobs at LILCO to the site re-sponse personnel at the-EOF.
- 3. Department of Energy. personnel, knowledgeable about radiation, are an l
integral part of LERO and will be represented'at the EOC. l
I
- 4. All procedures and protective actions are prepared in advance to the extent possible.
- 31. Q. How are LERO command and control personnel made conscious of the need to protect the public first and foremost?
A. The trhining program makes it clear that protection of the public is the purpose of offsite prepared-ness. See attached Transcript of Lesson Plan #1 (Attachment 8) and Training Workbook Module No. 17 (Attachment 9).
- 32. Q. Does the LILCO Transition Plan call for the notifi-cation of State and local government officials early in an accident?
A. [Cordaro, Weismantle] Yes. Notification from the site to LERO is through the Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS). Both New York State and Suffolk County are part of this system. The emergency phones located at the State and County-facilities will ring any time the site is making an emergency notification.
- 33. Q. If Suffolk County officials wanted to serve as a check on LILCO's offsite decisionmaking~in a real emergency, does the emergency plan permit them to do so?
l 4 A. [Cordaro, Weismantle] Yes, Suffolk County could participate in the implementation of protective ac-tions. Page 1.4-1 of the LILCO Transition Plan states that "should Suffolk County, New York State or Federal governments choose to implement actions consistent with their respective legal authorities to protect the health and safety of the public, those actions will take precedence over LERO ac-tions." It would be difficult for Suffolk County officials to take part in the decisionmaking pro-cess without training, but they could certainly keep an eye on what other decisonmakers were doing, if they wanted to. Certainly no one from LILCO would prevent them from being in the EOC.
- 34. Q. Apart from Suffolk County officials and personnel, what other outside agencies, independent of LILCO, would be involved in the decision to advise the public to take protective actions?
A. [Cordaro, Weismantle] New York State would receive over the Radiological Emergency Communications Sys-tem line the information necessary to do dose as-sessment and protective action calculations. In addition, the NRC would be receiving information direct from the Control Room by means of a I 1
- dedicated phone called the HPN (Health Physics Net-work). The NRC would use this information to as-sess the situation until its own Region I personnel could arrive from King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.
As is stated on pages 84911-12 of the Federal Register of December 23, 1980, the interim National Radiological Emergency Preparedness / Response Plan for Commercial Nuclear Power Plant Accidents (Mas-ter Plan) provides in section III.A.1 as follows:
- 1. Technical Support. Federal technical support is a combination of the on- and off-site radiological monitoring and assessment activities and an evaluation of the conditions of the nuclear power plant. DOE.will coordinate all off-site radiological monitor'.ng, evaluation, assessment and reporting activities of participating Federal agencies. DOE will be responsible for supplying this information to the NRC's Direc-
- tor of Site Operations (DSO), other appropriate Federal agencies and to the appropriate State / local agency.
Radiological data collected by the. licensee for the NRC will'be fur-I nished to DOE's Off-Site Technical Director to be included in his evalu-ation of off-site radiological condi-tions. The NRC will integrate the off-site radiological data and evaluation provided by DOE with their evaluation of the on-site situation-into an overall assessment of the accident. (- The NRC, in coordination ~with FEMA, l will report this assessment to the
- Governor orLthe agency designated in-l the State' plan. Included in this. l
' l l
i 1 assessment will be any recommenda-tions regarding protective measures required of the populace. j 35. Q. Can you summarize why you feel that the LILCO em-ployees in command-and-control positions would not let their loyalty to LILCO's interests interfere with making the appropriate protective action deci-sions? A. [Cordaro, Weismantle) There are independent out-siders involved in the emergency response. Proj-ected dose rates from the onsite staff are indepen-dently recalculated by personnel from the Department of Energy, who are represented at the EOC. DOE also makes independent protective action recommendations. Furthermore, in the case of an actual release of radiation, Department of Energy personnel in the field would monitor it and report-the results to DOE. It would therefore be impossi-ble for LILCO personnel to conceal the presence of radiation or to avoid making appropriate protective action decisions. Also, all the calculations, recommendations, etc. during an emergency are recorded, leaving a " paper trail" that will allow events to be reconstructed I I after the fact from log books, message forms, press l l i I I . . -
l t i ' ATTACHMENT 1 m O
Attachment 1 EPC
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OPIP 3.6.1. Page 1 of 44 Approved: .( . i Effective Date OPIP 3.6.1 PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides guidance for making protective action decisions to mitigate the consequences of a radiological release in the plume exposure pathway. The reculting guidance derived by using this procedure is i intended to assist the Director of Local Response in making a protective action dacision. It is intended that sound judgment along with a personal assessment of the progress of events will be supplemented with the guidance found in this procedure. . 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY 2.1 The Radiation Health Coordinator'is responsible for advising on Protective Action Determinations based upon ( . recommendations provided by SNPS and if time permits, an independent development of Protective Action Recommenda-tions based upon dose projections or offsite radiological T monitoring survey data. I t 2.2 The Radiation Health Coordinator is responsible for j relaying Protective Action-Recommendations from the i DOE-RAP Team to the Director of Local Response following I , an independent and final review. l. 2:3 The DOE-RAP Team is responsible for performing. protective : action calculations and determining protective action recommendations using the procedures and worksheets cootained in this OPIP or equivalent. 3.0 PRECAUTIONS 3.1 The dose-saving effectiveness of protective actions can be influenced by many variable factors such as expected i duration of releases, involved population, weather condi-tions, projected evacuation times, and plant conditions. Whenever possible, thesa factors should all be considered prior to the recommendation of protective actions. i O k ' Rev. 2 10/17/83
OPIP 3.6.1 Page 2 of 44 3.2 Sheltering is the preferred protective action if suffi-cient protection is offered by sheltering, or if no addi-tional benefit is gained by evacuation. The evacuation of hospitals and nursing facilities should be sought as a last means since sheltering is the least disruptive to the patients. 4.0 PREREQUISITES l i 4.1 The Shoreham Nuclear Power Station has declared a General ! Emergency. I 4.2 Dose projections have been completed in accordance with IRDAM, OPIP 3.5.2--Assessment and Dose Projection, or offsite dose levels have been measured in accordance with '; OPIP 3.5.1, Downwind Surveying, or with procedural equivalents. ( - Rev. 2 10/17/83 i.
OPIP 3.6.1 Page 3 of 44 { 5.0 ACTIONS ! l AIRBORNE RELEASE - HP-85 OPERATIONAL - SECTION 5.1 AIRBORNE RELEASE - HP-85 INOPERATIVE, MANUAL METHOD WITH TI SECTION 5.2 AIRBORNE RELEASE - PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SPECIAL FACILITIES - 3ECTION 5.3 WATERBORNE RELEASE - SECTION 5.4 j 5.1 Airborne Release - HP-85 Operational 5.1.1 If the HP-85 has been set up, proceed to Step 5.1.2. Otherwise, perform the following steps:
- a. Connect power cord to HP-85 and plug into f outlet. Insert cassette into front slot and
( turn it on. (Power switch is located on the
- rear of the machine on the right hand side.)
The system will load programs into memory and then respond with the following display: SNPS - 0FFSITE DOSE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM Autost ***LILCO/ENTECH Kl: INFO = PROVIDE COPY OF GENERAL l INFORMATION AND COMMENTS K2: CONTIN = CONTINUE (SELECT OPTION - PRESS KEY) INFO CONTIN k Rev. 3
.-- . _. ~ . . - - e ATTACIIMENT 2 e
Attachment 2 EPC OPIP 3.5.2 Page 1 of 56 ( Approved: , Effective Date OPIP 3.5.2 ASSESSMENT AND DOSE PROJECTION 1.0 PURPOSE To describe the procedure used for assessing the radiological consequence of an emer{;ency at SNPS and predicting offsite dose commitments from actua.. or projected releases of airborne and/or waterborne radioactive materials. 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY 2.1 The Radiation Health Coordinator (RHC) is responsible for assuring that this procedure or its technical equivalent is implemented and keeping the Health Services Coordinator and the Director of Local Response informed of the assess-ment of the radiological emergency. 2.2 The RAP Team Captain is responsible for collecting the required information for assessment and dose projection ( - and providing Protective Action Recommendations (OPIP. 3.6.1) to the Radiation Health Coordinator (RHC) . 2.3 The Dose Assessment Function is responsible for the calculation of the projected dose (whole body and thyroid). 3.0 PRECAUTIONS 3.1 Dose projection calculations resulting from the imple-mentation of this procedure are predictions and should be verified by actual field measurements as time permits. 3.2 Airborne dose projections are dependent cn1 weather condi-tions and source term. Therefore, a change in any para-meter reauires a review and probable recomputation of the dose projections. 4.0 PREREQUISITES 4.1 An airborne or waterborne release of radioactive material is in progress or is imminent. b Rev. 2 10/24/83 _ __ _ a
OPIP 3.5.2 Page 2 of 56 {~ 5.0 ACTIONS l l 5.1 Discussion j 5.1.1 Upon arrival at the Local EOC, the RAP Team Captain performs the following functions: l i
- a. Obtain and review the available information on the Radiological Emergency Data Form, Attachment 1.
- b. Hold a brief discussion with the Director of Local Response or Manager of Local Response, if either is available,
- c. Determine the number of Dose Assessment Function available.
- d. As the situation permits: .
~
- 1. Conduct a briefing for the Dose Assessment Function and Environmental Survey Function (ESF).
- 2. Make ready the dose assessment computer.
- 3. Establish contact with the SNPS Dose Assessment respresentative at the EOF.
- e. Initiate the following procedures in conjunc-tion with this procedure:
- 1. OPIP 3.5.1, Downwind Surveying
- 2. OPIP 3.6.1, Protective Action Recommenda-tion 5.1.2 The dose calculations are based upon finite cloud analyses and/or water analyses. The RAP Team Captain can have several different people doing this calculation for different distances simul-taneously. The RAP Team Captain will coordinate the Assessment Staff's manpower assignments to l perform this procedure in an efficient and timely l manner.
l 5.1.3 Topics covered in this procedure:
-5.2 Airborne Release - Manual Method with -
Programmable Calculator (TI-59) 10/24/83
OPIP 3.5.2 I Page 3 of 56 l 5.3 Airborne Release - Manual Method 5.4 Waterborne Release 5.5 Thyroid Dose Commitment - Manual Method with Programmable Calculator (TI-59) 5.6 Thyroid Dose Commitment - Manual Method i i 5.2 Airborne Release - Manual Method with Programmable Calculator (TI-59) 5.2.1 Dose Assessment Function will obtain a copy of Part I, II, III of the Radiological Emergency 1 1 Data Form from the RAP Team Captain, see
' Attachment 1, and the Dose Projection Worksheet, Attachment 2.
5.5.2 Using the Dose Projection Worksheet, Attachment 2, record the name of preparer, current date, and time. 5.2.3 Obtain wind speed and wind direction for both 150 . C ft. and 33 ft. tower levels from Part III - Plant Parameters, Attachment 1. Convert wind speed to 1 appropriate units (item 1 and 2, respectively). 5.2.4 Determine affected downwind sector, item 2, by referring to the following table: Indicated Wind Affected Downwind Direction Sector , 348.75 to 11.25 S 11.25 to 33.75 SSW 33.75 to 56.25 SW 56.25 to 78.75 WSW 78.75 to 101.25 W 101.25 to 123.75 WNW 123.75 to 146.25 NW 146.25 to 168.75 . NNW 168.75 to 191.25
~
. N 191.25 to 213.75' NNE 213.75 to 236.25 NE 236.25 to 258.75 ENE' 258.75 to 281.25 E 281.25 to 303.75 ESE 103.75 to 326.25 SE l
,26.25 to 348.75 SSE' 348.75 to 11.25
(- S Rev. 2 10/24/83 l
- - - =. -- - - .. - _ _
l OPIP 3.5.2 ( Page 4 of 56 5.2.5 Obtain atmospheric stability class from Part I - General Information, item lle, on Attachment 1, and circle the appropriate letter in item 3, on the Dose Projection Worksheet, Attachment 2. 5.2.6 Obtain the type of release (ground-level or
- elevated) from Part III - Plant Parameters, Attachment 1. Circle the release type, item 4, on the Dose Projection Worksheet, Attachment 2.
5.2.7 Determine the distance to downwind receptor, item 5.
~
NOTE: Use judgment when picking receptor points at which to perform dose projection. Take into account factors such as wind speed, stability class, affected areas, and popu-lation density. Dose projection can only be done for distance given in Attachment
- 3. Several calculations can be performed simultaneously at different distances.
For ground release, proceed directly to C Section 5.2.11. 5,2.8 Determine receptor elevation, item 6, above mean sea level (MSL) by using Attachment 3 along with the downwind sector at the 150 ft. level, item 2, and distance to downwind receptor, item 5.
- 5.2.9 Obtain the plume rise, item 7, from Part III -
Plant Parameters, Attachment 1. 5.2.10 Calculate the effective plume height above receptor, item 8, and then choose the tabulated plume height, item 9, closest to this value. 5.2.11 Determine the type of exposure, item 10, by circling the system affected, see Part III - Plant ' Parameters, Attachment 1, for the affected system l (station vent or RBSVS) . . NOTE: If release occurs from both station vent and RBSVS, determine doses from each system and add doses together. Use two Dose Projection Worksheets, Attachment 2. Rev. 0
. 5/11/83 l 1
( OPIP 3.5.2
\ Page 5 of 56 ,
I l 5.2.12 Determine the atmospheric dispersion factor for type of exposure (whole body gamma and/or thyroid) as follows:
- a. Select the gaussian puff gamma Xu/Q tables, Attachment 6, for the whole body exposure or plume centerline concentration Xu/Q rables, Attachment 7, for thyroid exposure.
. b. From type of release, item 4, and tabulated plume height, item 9, choose the proper table for whole body and/or thyroid exposure.
- c. Find the proper Xu/Q value using the-stability class, item 3, and distance to downwind receptor, item 5. Record the Xu/Q value, item 11, on the Projected Dose Work-sheet, Attachment 2. -
5.2.13 Obtain the radiation monitor reading, item 12, for the affected station system (station vent or RBSVS) from Part III - Plant Parameters, Attach-( _ ment 1. - NOTE: If the radiation monitor reading is not given, use Xe-133 and I-131, Dose Equiva-lents from Part III - Plant Parameters, Attachment 1. If not available, contact the communicator to obtcin from SNPS the radiation monitor reading or Dose Equivalents.
- a. If monitor reading is not available, convert the Xe-133 and I-131 dose equivalents (uCi/cc) to dose equivalent release rates (uCi/sec) using item 12d.
l 5.2.14 Based upon specific radiation monitor reading, item 12, select the proper nomograms, Attachment 7, and circle the nomograms selected on the Dose Projection Worksheet, item 13. NOTE: If Dose Equivalent release rates are used in place of monitor reading, any on-scale i nomogram will suffice. 4 L Rev. 0 5/11/83
j i OPIP 3.5.2 ( Page 6 of 56 Nomogram No. Description 1 Statio,n vent routine effluent
' monitor
. noble gas release
. wholebody gamma dose 2 Station vent high-range monitor
. noble gas release
. wholebody gamma dose 3 RBSVS low-range monitor
. noble gas release
. wholebody gamma dose 4 RBSVS low-range monitor l . potential halogen release rate
- . potential thyroid dose rate
! 5 RBSVS intermediate-range monitor
. noble gas release
. wholebody gamma dose
~ ~ ~
6 RBSVS intermediate-range monitor
. potential halogen release rate
. potential thyroid dose rate 7 RBSVS high-range monitor
. noble gas release
. wholebody gamma dose 8 RBSVS high-range monitor
. potential halogen release rate
. potential thyroid dose rate i
5.2.15 Obtain the airflow at the duct sampled or moni-tored, item 14, and time of reactor scram, item 15, from Part III - Plant Parameters, Attachment
~
- 1. Determine time since reactor scram.
I NOTE: If reactor is not yet' shut down,.the time i since reactor scram is zero. ! 5.2.16 . Using the. TI-59 with the printer,- follow the instructions for running the nomogram program, Attachment 4. Record appropriate output informa-tion from TI-59 program on the Dose - Projection Worksheet, Attac' ament 2. l. t Rev. O 5/11/83
- - ,- - -- -. -. - - . - . ...u. - ..
OPIP 3.5.2
- Page 7 of 56 5.2.17 Obtain the release duration, item 17, from Part II - Radiological Assessment Data, Attachment 1.
5.2.18 Complete item 19 to determine whole body and thy-
. roid dose for the point of interest. Record them
', on the Dose Projection Worksheet, Attachment 2., 5.2.19 Determine airborne protective actions by initiat-i ing OPIP 3.6.1, Protective Action Recommendations, Section 5.1. 5.3 Airborne Release - Manual Method 5.3.1 Obtain a copy of Part I, II, III of the Radio-logical Emergency Data Form from the RAP Team Captain, see Attachment 1, and the Dose Projec-tion Worksheet, Attachment 2. 5.3.2 Using the Dose Projection Worksheet, Attachment 2, record the name of the preparer, current dath, and time. 5.3.3 Obtain wind speed and wind direction for both 150 ( ft. and 33 ft. tower levels from Part III - Plant Parameters, Attachment 1. Convert wind speed to appropriate units (item 1 and 2, respectively). 5.3.4 Determine affected downwind sector, item 2, by referring to the following table: Indicated Wind Affected Downwind Direction Sector 348.75 to 11.25 S 11.25 to 33.75 SSW 33.75 to 56.25 SW 56.25 to 78.75 WSW 78.75 to 101.25 W 101.25 to 123.75 WNW 123.75 to 146.25 NW 146.25 to 168.75 NNW 4 168.75 to 191.25 N 191.25 to 213.75 NNE l 213.75 to.236.25 NE l 236.25.to-258.75 ENE 258.75 to 281.25 E , l 281.25 to 303.75 ESE 303.75 to 326.25 SE 326.25.to 348.75 SSE i/ 348.75 to 11.25 S !( Rev. 2 10/24/83 i e
I OPIP 3.5.2 C ' Page 8 of 56 ' 5.3.5 Obtain the atmospheric stability class from Part
, I - General Information, item lle, on Attachment 1, and circle the appropriate letter in item 3, on the Dose Projection Worksheet, Attachment 2.
5.3.6 Obtain the type of release (ground-level or elevated) from Part III - Plant Parameters, Actachment 1. Circle the release type, item 4, on the Dose Projection Worksheet, Attachment 2. 5.3.7 Determine the distance to downwind receptor, item 5. NOTE: Use judgment when picking reception points
~
at which to perform dose pro- jection. Take into account factors such as wind speed, stability class, affected areas, and population density. Dose projection can only be done for distance given in Attachment 3. Several calculations can be performed simultaneously at different distances. For ground release, proceed directly to Section 5.3.11. 5.3.8 Determine receptor elevation, item 6, above mean sea level (MSL) by using Attachment 3 along with the downwind sector at the 150 ft. level, item 2, and distance to downwind receptor, item 5. 5.3.9 Obtain plume rise, item 7, from Part III - Plant Parameters, Attachment 1. 5.3.10 Calculate the effective plume height above recep-tor, item 8, and then choose the tabulated plume height, item 9, closest to this value. , i 5.3.11 Determine the type of exposure, item 10, by circling the system affected; see Part III - Plant Parameters, Attachment 1, for the affected system (station vent or RBSVS). i
. +
l C Rev. O' 5/11/83
m l l OPIP 3.5.2 { , Page 9 of 56 NOTE: If release occurs from both station vent and RBSVS, determine doses from each system and add doses together. Use two Dose Project Worksheets, Attachment 2. ' 5.3.12 Determine the atmospheric dispersion factor for type of exposure (whole body gamma and/or thyroid) as follows:
- a. Select the gaussian puff gamma Xu/Q tables, Attachment 6', for the whole body exposure or plume centerline concentration Xu/Q tables, Attachment 7, for thyroid exposure.
- b. From type of release, item 4, and tabulated plume height, item 9 for whole body and/or; thyroid choose the proper table exposure. ,
- c. Find the proper Xu/Q value using the stability class, item 3, and distance to downwind re-ceptor, item 5. Record the Xu/Q value, item 11, on the Dose Projection Worksheet, Attach-( . ment 2.
5.3.13 Obtain the radiation monitor reading, item 12, for the affected station system (station vent or RBSVS) from Part III - Plant Parameters, Attach-ment 1. NOTE: If the radiation monitor reading is not given, use Xe-133 and I-131, Dose Equiva-lents from Part III - Plant Parameters, Attachment 1. If not available, contact the Communicator to obtain from SNPS the radiation monitor readings or Dose Equivalents.
- a. If monitor reading is not available, convert the Xe-133 and I-131 dose equivalents to dose equivalent release rates (uCi/s(uci/ce) ec) '
- using item 12d.
5.3.14 Based upon specific radiation monitor reading, item 12, select the proper nomograms, Attachment 7, and circle the nomograms selected on the Dese Projection Worksheet, item-13. 4 Rev. 0
.. 5/11/83
- OPIP 3.5.2 C Page 10 of 56 NOTE: If Dose Equivalent release rates are used 1 in place of monitor readings, any on-scale nomogram will suffice.
Nomogram Number Description 1 Station vent routine effluent monitor
. noble gas release
. wholebody gamma dose 2 Station vent high-range monitor
. noble gas release
. wholebody gamma dose 3 RBSVS low-range monitor
. noble gas release
. wholebody gamma dose ,
4 RBSVS low-range monitor
. potential halogen release rate
. potential thyroid dose rate RBSVS intermediate-range m'onitor ~
5
. noble gas release
. wholebody gamma dose 6 RBSVS intermediate-range monitor
. potential halogen release rate
. potential thyroid dose rate 7 RBSVS high-range monitor
. noble gas release
. wholebody gamma dose 8 RBSVS high-range monitor
. potential halogen release rate
. potential thyroid dose rate l
5.3.15 Obtain the airflow at the duct sampled or moni-tored, item 14, and time of rea.ctor scram, item 15, from Part III - Plant Parameters, Attachment
- 1. Determine time since reactor scram.
NOTE: If reactor is not yet shut.down, the time since reactor scram is zero. L Rev. 0
, 5/11/83
i OPIP 3.5.2 .( l , Page 11 of 56 l 1 5.3.16 Use the selected nomogram (s) to compute the following information at the downwind receptor:
- t. Gross Release Rates (items 16a and 16c)
- Inputs l Monitor reading (item 12)
Vent flow (item 14) Time since reactor scram (item 15)
- b. Dose Equivalent Release Rates (items 16b and 16d)
Inputs , Monitor reading (item 12) Vent flow (item 14) . Time since reactor scram (item 15) NOTE: If Dose Equivalent is used, re_ cord item 12d in items 16b and 16d. Dose Rates"-{ items 17a and 17b)~ e. Inputs Monitor reading (item 12) Vent flow (item 14) Time since reactor scram (item 15). Ground or elevated wind speed (item 1) Dispersion coefficient (item 11) 5.3.17 Determine Release Rate (Gross Noble Gas or Radio-iodine - items 16a and 16c).
- a. Locate the monitor reading on the left-hand axis.
- b. Move horizontally to the right until the slanted line. corresponding to the flow rate is intercepted.
- c. Move vertically down until slanted line.
corresponding to time after reactor shutdown
- is' intercepted.
k Rev. 0 5/11/83
. , . _ . - - - _ - - ,- _ . _ .- y-__y ,,_,- , ...,,.,y.., - - - -
r- -
~
("
\
OPIP 3.5.2 Page 12 of 56 l
- d. Move horizontally to the left and read off '
the release rate. 5.3.18 Determine Release Rate (Xe-133 or I-131 Dose Equivalents - items 16b and 16d).
- a. Locate the monitor reading on the left-hand axis.
- b. Move horizontally to the right until the slanted line corresponding to the flow rate
. is intercepted.
- c. Move vertically up until slanted line corres-ponding to time after reactor shutdown is intercepted.
- d. Move horizontally to the left and read off i the release rate.
5.3.19 Determine Dose Rates (items 17a and 17b). ({ .
- a. Locate the monitor reading.on the left-hand axis. If monitor reading is unavailable, enter nomogram on the upper left-hand side with Xe-133 or I-131 dose equivalent and pro-ceed with step d below.
- b. Move horizontally to the right until the slanted line corresponding to the flow rate is intercepted.
- c. Move vertically up until slanted line corres-ponding to time after reactor shutdown is intercepted.
l
- d. Move horizontally to the right until slanted line corresponding to wind speed is inter-cepted.
NOTE: For elevated releases, use elevated wind speed; for ground releases, use ground wind speed.
- e. Move vertically down until the slanted line corresponding to the atmospheric dispersion factor is intercepted.
b Rev. 0 5/11/83-
i OPIP 3.5.2 3 Page 13 of 56 l
- f. Move horizontally to the right and read off l the dose rate.
. 5.3.20 Obtain the release duration, item 18, from Part
- II - Radiological Assessment Data, Attachment 1.
- 5.3.21 Complete item 19 to determine whole body and i thyroid dose for the point of interest. Record
- them on the Dose Projection Worksheet, Attachment 2.
j 5.3.22 Determine airborne protective actions by initiat-i ing Procedure 3.6.1, Protective Action Recommen-i dations, Section 5.1. . l 5.4 Waterborne Release h 5.4.1 This section will provide instruction for calcu-lation of projected whole body (WB) any okin , j doses received while swimming in or boating on Long Island Sound water contaminated by a radio-l active release from SNPS. '( 5.4.2 Dose Assessment Function will contact the RAP Team Capt.ain and obtain a copy of Part II and ! Part III of the Radiological Emergency Data Form, see Attachment 1. l
- 5.4.3 Obtain the Liquid Release Worksheet, Attachment
- 8, record the name of preparer, current date and i
time. l 5.4.4 Using Part II - Radiological Assessment Data, i Attachment 1, fill in the date of release, item , 1, time release started, item 2, duration of j release, item 3, (if duration is not given, then j subtract the time of termination from the. time
- started to obtain duration), volume of release, i item 4, and the radioactive concentration, item l
5, on Liquid Release Worksheet, Attachment 8. ! 5.4.5 Using the above items, calculate the projected-l whole body-dose for swimming. Multiply radio-i active concentration, item 5 , times the duration,
- item 3, times a conversion faction of 96.4, enter
. the results into item 6. . To find the Projected ! Dose in rems divide item 6, by 1,000. 4 ! Rev. 2 l 10/24/83 J
*, ,e, - . + . . - - , - . .
.y<-,,- . ,p-, - - . . . . . ~ . . , _ - , , . - - , , , _ . .-,,.,,,y,,,y %.% ,
OPIP 3.5.2 Page 14 of 56 5.4.6 To calculate the projected skin dose for swimming, multiply radioactive concentration, item 5, times the duration, item 3 times a conversion factor 133. Enter the results into item 7. To find the Projected Dose in rems, divide item 7, by 1,000.
- 5.4.7 To calculate the projected whole body dose for boating, multiply radioactive concentration, item 5, times the duration, item 3, times a conversion factor 48.2. Enter the results into item 8. To find the Projected Dose in rems, divide item 8, by 1,000.
5.4.8 Using the Projected Dose, determine the protec-tive action by initiating OPIP 3.6.1, Protective Action Recommendations, Section 5.3. 5.5 Thyroid Dose Commitment - Manual Method with TI-59 , 5.5.1 Dose Assessment Function will obtain the Thyroid Dose Commitment Worksheet, Attachment 9, and record the name of preparer, current date end time.
~
5.5.2 Obtain all data for item 1 of the Thyroid Dose
- Commitment Worksheet, Attachment 9, from the Environmental Survey Function (ESF).
5.5.3 Contact the RAP Team Captain and obtain a copy of
, Part II and Part III of the Radiological Emergency Data Form, Attachment 1. Using Attachment 1, fill in if core or fuel damage has 3
occurred, item 6, time of reactor shutdown, item 2 7, time the release started, item 9, and the release' duration, item 13, on Thyroid Dose Commitment Worksheet, Attach- ment 9 i NOTE: If reactor is not shut down, use time the l l release started'as time of reactor 1
- shutdown.
5.5.4 When the above items have been obtained, calcu-late the remaining items on the worksheet:
- a. Subtract sample collection and time, item if,.
from sample collection start time, item le. Enter the result, called sample collection interval, as item 2. i Rev. 2 10/24/83 e
. - . , , . , , , -,-,,.,.-.,,..-,,g . y,..-
l OPIP 3.5.2 jC - Page 15 of 56 l
- b. Add the starting flow rate, item Ig, and the j ending flow rate, item in, then divide by 2.
Enter the result called air sample flow rate as item 3.
- c. Subtract bare canister reading, item Im, from
, the background reading, item lj . Enter the results called net bare canister reading as item 4. , d. Subtract filter canister reading, item ik,
, from bare canister reading, item Im. Enter
, the result, called net filter absorber reading, as item 5.
1
- e. Subtract time of reactor shutdown, item 7, from time of air sample measurement, item In. Enter the result, called . time between shutdown and measurement, as item 8.
i f. Divide distance from reactor to sample site, item ic, by ground or elevated wind speed j t ( _ (mph) from Attachment 1. Enter the result, called plume travel time, as item 10.
- g. Add time release started, item 9, to plume
. travel time, item 10. Enter the result, called time exposure started, as item 11.
- h. Subtract time exposure started, item 11, from time of reactor shutdown, item 7. Enter the result, called time after shutdown exposure started, as item 12. -
5.5.5 Using the TI-59 with the printer, . follow the !
' instructions for calculating the thyroid dose '
using the Thyroid Dose Commitment Program, Attachment 10. Record the thyroid dose commit-i ment, item 15, on the Thyroid Dose Commitment Worksheet, Attachment 9. 5.5.6 Utilize results of data for input to OPIP 3.6.1, Plume Exposure Pathway Protective Action Recom- , I mandation, Section 5.1.lh. i !(_ Rev.-0 !. 5/11/83
, .m-- .a, -,,-r--m--
^
l l l OPIP 3.5.2 Page 16 of 56 ( I 5.6 Thyroid Dose Commitment - Manual Method ! 5.6.1 Dose Assessment Function will obtain the Thyroid Dose Commitment Worksheet, Attachment 9, and record the name of preparer, current date and time. 5.6.2 Obtain all data for. item 1 of the Thyroid Dose Commitment Worksheet, Attachment 9, from the i Environmental Survey Function (ESF) . 5.6.3 Contact the RAP Team Captain and obtain a copy of Part II and Part III of the Radiological Emergency Data Form, Attachment 1. Using
. Attachment 1, fill in if core or fuel damage has occurred item 6, time of reactor shutdown, item
. 7, time the release started, item 9, and the release duration, item 13, on Thyroid Dose Commitment Worksheet, Attachment 9.
NOTE: If reactor is not shut down, use time the
- release started as time of reactor
,{ shutdown. _
5.6.4 When the above items have been obtained, calcu-late the remaining items on the worksheet:
- a. Subtract sample collection and time, item lf, from sample collection start time, item le.
Enter the result, called sample collection . interval, as item 2.
- b. Add the starting flow rate, item ig, and the ending flow rate, item in then divide by 2.
l Enter the result called air sample flow rate as item 3. ! c. Subtract bare canister reading, item Im, from
- the background reading, item lj . Enter the 4
results called net bare canister reading as item 4.
- d. Subtract filter canister reading, item ik, from bare canister reading, item lm. Enter the result, called net filter absorber reading, as item 5.
4 Rev. 2 10/24/83 l e __ .-
gr OPIP 3.5.2 s Page 17 of 56
- e. Subtract time of reactor shutdown, item 7, from time of air sample measurement, item In. Enter the result, called time between shutdown and measurement, as item 8.
- f. Divide distance from reactor to sample site, item 1c, by ground or elevated wind
- speed (mph) from Attachment 1. Enter the
! result, called plume travel time, as item ! 10.
- g. Add time release started, item 9, to plume travel time, item 10. Enter the result,
) called time exposure started, as item 11.
- h. Subtract time exposure started, item 11, from time of reactor shutdown, item 7.
Enter the result, called after shutdown exposure started, as item 12. . 5.6.5 Determine bare canister component, item 14a, and filter / canister component, item 14b, by using the ( nomogram, Attachment 11, and the instructions below: 5.6.6 Bare Canister Component
- a. Locate the net bare canister iodine measure-ment, item 4, on the lower left-hand axis of the Thyroid Dose Commitment Nomogram, Attach-ment 11. Move horizontally to the ' right until the slanted line marked BARE CANISTER is intercepted.
- b. Move vertically up until the time between reactor shutdown and measurement, item 8, is intercepted; for time values greater than 72 hours, use the line marked I-131.
- c. Move horizontally to the right until the time between reactor shutdown and start of expo-sure,-item 12, is intercepted; if the start of radiation exposure coincides with the time of measurement, move to the line marked Te =
Tm. L Rev. 0 5/11/83
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OPIP 3.5.2 C Page 18 of 56
- d. Move vertically down until the time between reactor shutdown and time of measurement, item 8, is intercepted; if the start of radiation exposure coincides with the time of measurement, move to the line marked Te = Tm. ,
- e. Move horizontally to the right until duration of exposure, item 13, is intercepted.
- f. Move vertically up until the sample collection interval, item 2, is intercepted.
- g. Move horizontally to the right to read off the thyroid dose commitment for the bare canister. Record this in item 14a on the Thyroid Dose Commitment Worksheet, Attachment-9.
5.6.7 Filter Component NOTE: If core or fuel damage has not occurred, no iodine release in particulate form is ( , expected and any filter radioactivity will b.e void of iodine. The total dose commit-ment value, item 15, will be the bare canister component only. Otherwise, com-plete the steps below.
- a. Locate the net filter adsorber reading,. item 5, on the lower lef t-hand axis of the Thyroid
. Dose Commitment Nomogram, Attachment 11.
Move horizontally to the right until the slanted.line corresponding to the number of hours between reactor shutdown and time of measurement, item 8, is intercepted.
- b. Move vertically up until the time between react 6r shutdown and measurement, item 8, is intercepted; for time values greater than 72 hours, use the line marked I-131.
- c. Move horizontally to the right until the' time between reactor shutdown and start of expo-sure, item 12, is intercepted; if the start of radiation exposure coincides with the time of measurement, move to the line marked Te =
Tm. L Rev. 0 5/11/83
OPIP 3.5.2 C Page 19 of 56 c d. Move vertically down until the time between reactor shutdown and time of measurement, item 8, is intercepted; if the start of
' radiation exposure coincides with the time of measurement, move to the line marked Te = Tm.
- e. Move horizontally to the right until duration of exposure, item 13, is intercepted.
- f. Move vertically up until the sample collection interval, item 2, is intercepted.
- g. Move horizontally to the right to read off the thyroid dose commitment for the filter adsorber. Record this in item 14b on the Thyroid Dose Commitment Worksheet, Attachment i,
9. 5.6.8 Obtain total thyroid dose commitment, item 15, by adding bare canister component, item 14a, and the filter / canister component, item 14b. _ ( _ 5.6.9 Utilize results of data for input to OPIP 3.6.1, Plume Exposure Pathway Protective Action Recom-mendations, Section 5.1.1h. 3
6.0 REFERENCES
6.1 OPIP 3.5.1, Downwind Survey 6.2 OPIP 3.6.1, Protective Action Recommendations 7.0 ATTACHMENTS
- 1. Radiological Emergency Data Form
- 2. Dose Projection Worksheet (Airborne)
- 3. Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Terrain Heights (Meters)
- 4. TI-59 Instructions - Nomograms
- 5. Xu/Q Tables - Gaussian Puff Gamma l
i Rev. O l 5/11/83
- , , , . - ,, .-p,-. --
, . - - y ,
\
l OPIP 3.5.2 1 C , Page 20 of 56 1 .
- 6. Xu/Q Tables - Plume Centerline Concentration
- 7. Nomograms
- 8. Liquid Release Worksheet f
- 9. Thyroid Dose Commitment Worksheet
- 10. TI-59 Instructions - Thyroid Dose Commitment Program
- 11. Thyroid Dose Commitment Nomogram e
O O e O A . l I Rev. 0 l 5/11/83 l
ATTACHMENT 3
Attachment 3 EPC OPIP 3.5.1 Page 1 of 53 C Approved: , Effective Date ,, OPIP 3.5.1 DOWNWIND SURVEYING 7 1.0 PURPOSE To describe the procedure to be followed for the conduct of !
- Offsite Radiological Surveys. DOE-RAP Team personnel may use j th2ir own procedures.
2.0 RESPONSIBILITY The Offsite Radiological Survey (ORS) Team is responsible for , , implementation of this procedure or its technical equivalent. , 3.0 PRECAUTIONS . 1 Maintain frequent communications contact at regular intervals. 4.0 PREREQUISITES . ( 4.1 An Alert or higher emergency classification has been declared at SNPS, the Local EOC is activated, and the i communication links between DOE-RAP at the Brookhaven Area Office (BRO) and the Offsite Radiological Survey (ORS) Teams are established. 4.2 The ORS Teams have been mobilized in accordance with OPIP 3.3.3, Standby and Mobilization. 5.0 ACTIONS 5.1 Team Briefing 5.1.1 ORS Team members report to the staging area at BHO or the Local EOC for a briefing by the Environmental Survey Function (ESF) or the RAP . Team Captain.
- a. If direct deployment is required from the !
staging area at BHO, then the ESF will brief ORS Teams via telephone or ra,dio communica-tions-from the Local EOC. h
-Rev. 2 4
10/18/83
, ,-- .--.e .,. ..-..e , -- ,,,,,-,+-,.a -e
l l
- OPIP 3.5.1 Page 2 of 53
- b. If the ORS Teams are not directly deployed 1 from BHO, then the ORS Teams will pick up their Offsite Radiological Survey Kits and i i
report to the Local EOC for their briefing , unless otherwise instructed by the ESF or the . RAP Team Captain. 1 5.1.2 Ensure that the ESF or the rip Team Captain will include the following items (as a minimum) in the - briefing for the ORS T.eams:
- a. Team identification '
- b. Communications equipment and channel
- c. Protective equipment (including use of KI)
- d. Authorized exposure limits
- e. Survey locations
- f. Survey equipment
- g. Type of data (air sample, soil sample, water, vegetation, feed, dairy products, and foodstuffs) 5.1.3 The ORS Team members will complete Offsite Radio-f logical Survey (ORS) Briefing Form, Attachment 1,
,( ,,
from briefing information provided by the ESF or the RAP Team-Captain. 5.2 Equipment Check / Team Preparation 5.2.1 Assemble protective equipment as checked off on i the Offsite Radiological Survey (ORS) Briefing - Form, Attachment 1, and obtain Offsite Radio- ! 4 logical Survey (ORS) Kits from the staging area ! at BHO; two ORS Kits are located at BHO and two . I ORS Kits are kept at the Local EOC. 5.2.2 Perform equi Survey (ORS)pment check using Kit Inventory, Offsite Radiological Attachment 3. Observe I' , proper meter response and see that equipment cal-ibration stickers are valid (see equipment opera . tion attachments). Se sure to remove the control TLD from the ORS Kit and leave at the Local EOC or BHO, as directed by the ESF. 5.2.3
~
Log predeployment personnel dosimeter readings onto the Offsite Radiological Survey Briefing Form, Attachment-1, Item 11. C. Rev.-2 10/18/83 1 ..
1 OPIP 3.5.1 j( Page 3 o,f 53 l 5.2.4 Use an AC source to check the TCS EAS-1 Air j Sampler motor. Do not put on the filter canister. 5.2.5 If the ESF advises that potassium iodide (KI) administration is required, fill out Attachment 9, then take one KI tablet (130 mg) at this time. Inform the ESF or the RAP Team Captain when this is done. 5.2.6 Perform communication check with the ESF at the i Local EOC. Maintain proper communication prac-tices and always identify both parties, e.g.,
"Offsite Radiological Survey Team #1 to ESF."
5.2.7 Put on appropriate protective clothing (see Attachment 6, Donning Protective Clothing) and dosimetry equipment (see Attachment 8, Use of Direct-Reading Dosimeters and TLDs), as outlined in ORS Briefing Form, Attachment 1, Item 9. l 5.2.8 Proceed to the survey vehicle. Check for a full tank of gas, operating cigarette lighter socket, jf ' lights, and operability of the battery. Start ( - the engine and with it on, plug in the cable of the TCS EAS-1 Air Sampler, without the filter, into the cigarette lighter socket and observe sampler operating (it should sound like a small vacuum cleaner). If the emergency vehicle is not equipped with a cigarette lighter socket, use the vehicle battery with jumper cables to facilitate connection of the DC adapter directly to the battery terminals (ensure correct polarity when installing cables). . 5.2.9 Inform the ESF that the Offsite Radiological Survey (ORS) Team is now ready and is starting its mission. 5.3 Survey . 5.3.1 Proceed to the designated survey points, as listed
- on ORS Briefing-Form Attachment 1, Item 6b, using l
the Preselected Sampling Locations List, - Attach-ment 10, and the Offsite Survey Map, Attachment 11, located in the ORS Kit. b Rev. 2 10/18/83
! OPIP 3.5.1 Page 4 of 53
,[
. 1 5.3.2 While enroute to the survey point, keep the RO-2A and RM-14 with HP-270 probe on (see equipment operation, Attachments 4 and 5) and begin record-ing periodicall reading on the RM-14 greater ,
than 1200 cpm (y 1 mR any/hr) on the Offsite ! Radiological Survey Data Sheet, Attachment 2. , Assign a number to any non-fixed points, mark the location on the map,'then enter the point number assigned and the exposure rate on the ORS Data Sheet, Attachment 2. 5.3.3 Record any abnormal events or conditions which you observe on the Offsite Radiological Survey Data Sheet, Attachment 2. 5.3.4 If plume tracking is not required, proceed to Step 5.3.6. 5.3.5 Based on the survey data to be collected as indicated on the ORS Briefing Form, Attachment 1, Item 10, drive from point to point noting and reporting the following:
'( a. Plume boundaries are described by a dose rate of 1 mR/hr. (This is equivalent to approximately 1200 cpm on the RM-14 with
, HP-270 probe.)
. b. Plume centerline is described as the point at which the RM 14 with HP-270 probe (open window) reading peaks and begins to decrease.
j Return to the peak concentration area.,
- c. At the alume centerline, report the maximum i plume whole body dose rate measured with the RO-2A instrument at 4 feet above'the ground and the measurement location'to the ESC immediately after measurement (see Attachment i 4, Operation of Eberline Model RO-2A). Mark .
the location on the map and ORS Data Sheet, Attachment 2.
- d. If plume centerline air sam Attachment 1, Item 10 (2),collect pling is an required, air sample using Step 5.3.7.
5.3.6 At the survey location, perform the following:
- a. Obtain gamma (closed window of RO-2A)' measure-( ments at 3 inches and 4 feet above the ground Rev. 2 10/18/83
. . . ._. . =_ .
( OPIP 3.5.1 Page 5 of 53 and record these readings on Attachment 2. (If the 4 foot reading is noticeably higher than the 3 inch reading, it should be assumed that the predominant gamma source is the
- airborne plume).
- b. If readings increase with decreasing height I 4
above the ground, assume that the source is on the surface. In this case, take several smear samples (with gloves) over a 4" x 4" area of the ground and/or a soil sample when conditions permit.
. c. Use a plastic bag for the soil sample and fill out a label to tag the bag. Label all samples with proper ID information: sample number, sample location, initials, date, time, and team ID. .
i
- d. When monitoring, periodically check beta (open window of RO-2A) reading at 3 inches and 4 feet above ground. Record any readings C significantly different from the window-closed readings.
, 5.3.7 At the survey location, take an air sample, as required by the Radiological Survey Briefing Form, Attachment 1, Item 10 (2), as follows:
- a. plug in Leaving the vehicle the TCS-EAS-1 engine running,for air sampler. Run it about a 1/2 minute, warm-up period without the filter / canister installed.
~
- b. Qpen the TCS EAS-1 one quart can containing che canister. Inspect the canister for visi-ble defects; the canister is not acceptable for use if the moisture check dot is' blue. -
- c. Turn off the warmed-up sampler, center the canister over the suction opening on the side
~
of the sampler. S.tretch the elastic retainer over the' outer and of the canister, making sure the fit is tight.
- d. Position the air sampler 4 feet above-the ground, as far away from the vehicle exhaust pipe as the cable will allow. ,
Rev. 0 5/12/83 g- p - -e , --+e
l i ({ . OPIP 3.5.1 Page 6 of 53
- e. . Adjust the flow rate to approximately 5 CFM.
Set the timer to 25 = 5 minutes. LTR (Rotate dial past the 5-minute mark, then turn back.)
- f. Start the sampler and record the starting flow rate on the ORS Data Sheet, Attachment
- 2. Use a stop watch to verify the run time.
- g. When the air sample time is completed, record the final flow rate reading on the ORS Data Sheet, Attachment 2. Carefully remove the canister from the sampler and put it in a
- plastic bag. Avoid contact with the white i filter cloth wrapped around the outside and i the bare filter. Be sure to record start /stop times and flow rates on the ORS Data Sheet, Attachmenc 2.
ll
- h. Connect the brass-shell GM-1 probe cable to
( , the RM-14 count rate meter to " DETECTOR" input connection (seeRM-14) Attachment eration of 5, Op' RESPONSE" to Eberline Model . Switch
" SLOW". In this position, allow 20 seconds meter response time for each measurement,.
i
- i. Using the above setup, measure the background at 4 feet above the ground or inside the
. vehicle. Record this background cpm on the ORS Data Sheet, Attachment 2.
J. Insert the GM-1 probe into the center hole of the canister and adjust the scale of the RM-14 as necessary. Record the stabilized filter / canister reading (cpm) on the ORS Data Sheet, Attachment 2. Remove the GM-1 probe. .
- k. Carafully remove the white fiber cloth which is wrapped around the canister by pulling the.
i red tape on the top rim of the -:anister. Hold the canister in the plastic bag while doing this to avoid' contacting the cloth and to prevent silver zeolite crystal bits from i falling out after the cloth wrapping is. l removed. Return the fiber cloth to the quart I can. I
- Rev. 0 5/12/83-
_ -. - - - . - . . =.,
4 OPIP 3.5.1 Page 7 of 53
- 1. Insert the GM-1 probe into the center hole of the canister and record the stabilized bare canister reading and time of measurement on the ORS Data Sheet, Attachment-2.
- m. Place the bare canister with the plastic bag
! into the quart can and label the can with the following information: 4 ' Date and time of sample Map location Start and stop time Starting and ending flow rate Sample number (sequential) Team ID
- n. Place the quart can inside a plastic sample bag and ensure that a label is attached.
- o. Report the ORS Data Sheet information for the air sample to the ESF.
5.3.8 Report dosimeter readings to the ESF at regular C _. intervals (see OPIP 3.9.1, Dosimetry and Exposure ' Control) . ! 5.3.9 Immediately report any equipment or supply shortages to the ESF. 5.3.10 Repeat Steps 5.3.2 through 5.3.8 as necessary for l other survey locations. 5.3.11 When all survey and sampling activities are com-pleted and the team receives no further requests from the ESF or the team is relieved by a second } team, return to the Emergency Worker Decontamina-tion Center, in Brentwood, unless instructed otherwise by-the ESF or the RAP Team Captain. 5.3.12 D'o not remove protective clothing or respirator. t until instructed by Emergency Worker-Decontamina-tion Facility personnel (see Attachment 6, Section 5.5, Removing Protective Clothing; Attachment 6, Section 5.7, Step-off Pad Use; Attachment 7, Section 5.5, Removing Respirator) . Rev. 2~ 10/18/83
I l OPIP 3.5.1 l Page 8 of 53 l 5.4 Decontamination / Sample Return 5.4.1 When all survey and sampling activities are com-pleted, the team will return to the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility, in Brentwood. The decontamination facility has the capability to decont'aminate emergency workers and equipment in the event of a radiological release at SNPS. 5.4.2 When the ORS Teams arrive at the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility, they notify the ESF of ; their arrival and proceed to the Vehicle Decon- '
- tamination Area. The ESF or designee will meet the ORS Teams there and have the ORS personnel monitor the sample bags and data sheets with the RM-14 and HP-210 probe. If the plastic bags with the samples inside and/or the data sheet are not contaminated, then.the ESF will bring them into the EOC for future analysis. If they are con-taminated, then the ORS personnel will put the samp'le bags and/or data sheet into " clean" bags before being brought by the RAP Team Captain or designee into the EOC for future analysis.
C. - 5.4.3 The ORS Team members will then enter the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility and follow the instructions of the monitoring and decontamination personnel. Be sure to take along your dosimeters, exposure record card, ORS Briefing Form, Attach-ment 1, and KI Record Sheet and Consent Form, Attachment 9. All other equipment will remain in the vehicle until the equipment and vehicle has gone through monitoring and decontamination. 5.4.4 Record post survey dosimeter readings on the ORS Briefir; Form, Attachment 1. 5.4.5 The ESF or designee will examine all records, l data sheets, and samples turned in by the ORS . Teams, making copies of those items needed for i dose assessment, and forward all samples for lab analysis. 5.4.6 Before the Offsite Radiological Survey Team returns the Offsite Radiological Survey Kit, make sure that all supplies and any contaminated equipment removed from service is replaced. Rev. 2 10/18/83
1 l (( OPIP 3.5.1 Page 9 of 53 e
6.0 REFERENCES
6.1 OPIP 3.3.3, Standby and Mobilization 6.2 OPIP 3.9.1, Dosimetry and Exposure Control 6.3 OPIP 3.9.2, Radiological Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and Evacuees 7.0 ATTACHMENTS
- 1. Offsite Radiological Survey (ORS) Briefing Form
- 2. Offsite Radiological Survey (ORS) Data Sheet
- 3. Offsite Radiological Survey Kit Inventory ,
- 4. Operation of Eberline Model RO-2A Ion Chamber
- 5. Operation of Eberline Model RM-14
- 6. Use of Protective Clothing and Step-Off Pads
]{
- 7. Use of Full Face Respirators
- 8. Use of Direct-Reading Dosimeters and TLDs
- 9. Potassium Iodide Distribution
- 10. Preselected Sampling Locations
- 11. Offsite Survey Map W
Rev. 0-5/12/83
_A I i ATTACHMENT 4 e E 'l l l I i
Attachmsnt 4 EPC OPIP 3.3.4 Approved: Effective Date
+0 PIP 3.3.4 PROMPT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM ACTIVATION l
1.0 PURPOSE This procedure describes the actions necessary to activate the Prompt Notification System. 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY 2.1 The Director of Local Response is responsible for imple-menting this procedure. 2.2 The Customer Service Supervisor is responsible for -l implementing this procedure in a General Emergency involving immediate protective action recommendations if l the Director of Local Response is not available. 3.0 PRECAUTIONS ( 3:1 If a General Emergency requiring immediate protective - action recommendations is the first notification-of the l emergency, the Customer Service Supervisor will implement this procedure if contact with the Director of Local Response cannot be made within 10 minutes of the receipt of notification. i 3.2 The activation of the Prompt Notification System must be coordinated with the activation of the Emergency Proadcast System. 4.0 PREREQUISITES A decision to activate the Prompt Notification System has been made in accordance with OPIP 3.1.1, Command of Emergency Operations. 5.0 ACTIONS 5.1 System Activation 5.1.1 The Director of Local Response will: I
~
Rev. 3
- ,,. .-- ,. ,,-.,.-.- ..-- , , .we
OPIP 3.3.4 Page 2 of 7 f a. Upon the decision to activate, ensure that the Coordinator of Public Information has prepared an Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) message, has transmitted it to WALK-FM Radio, and that they are prepared to broadcast it.
- b. Direct the Coordinator of Public Information o activate EBS.
l
- c. Activate the Siren System using the encoder located at the Local EOC.
In the unlikely event that, prior to the activation of the EOC, notification from the 1 plant is a General Emergency and includes a recommendation for sheltering or evacuation, the following procedure will be used:
- 1. At the direction of the Director of Local Response, the Coordinator of Public Information contacts WALK-FM (EBS) Radio i Station over commercial telephone. He r will explain that there is an immediate
;(
emergency and that the Local EOC has not, as yet, been activated and therefore the i dedicated phone normally used for a radiological emergency is not currently accessible. i 1 - The Coordinator of Public Information will then indicate to the station to l broadcast the protective response actions as recommended by the utility using a preestablished message format shown in OPIP 3.8.2, EBS System Activation. If the Director cannot. reach the Coordinator of Public Information, the Director will' contact-WALK-FM and l implement OPIP 3.8.2, EBS System Activation. k Rev. 3
~ -- ,-,n-, , -e., os,,- v --m ,,--, -, --g- , -- -. ,..e.- ,, ,,2.- g% ,. ,e"-.r- ,--,.r---r-- ,e---
OPIP 3.3.4 4 Page 3 of 7 [
- 2. The Director of Local Response then instructs the Emergency Director, via the !
Customer Service Operator to activate the , sirens using the encoder located in the l SNPS Control Room and notify the Coast Guard if the protective action affects ji the Long Island Sound. . NOTE: A back-up encoder is located at the Brookhaven Substation. Should the Customer Service operator not be able to reach the appropriate indi-vidual'who has the authority to activate the Prompt Notification System and give direction to the general public within ten (10) minutes of the receipt of notification, inform the Customer Service - Supervisor. The Customer Service Supervisor shall notify the SNPS Emergency Director and request that the Control Room activate the prompt notifi-cation system (sirens). The Customer (s- Service Supervisor will also implement ' OPIP 3.8.2, EBS System Activation. 5.2 System Verification 5.2.1 The Coordinator of Public Information at the EOC will:
- a. Direct a staff member to verify the activa-tion of EBS by monitoring a tone alert radio and a commercial radio located in the EOC.
- b. Report the status of EBS to the Director of Local Response.
- c. Contact Marketing Evaluations Inc. and l request them to verify activation of sirens.
- d. Note the siren number of inoperative sirens i
and report them to the Manager of Local Response. l l (. - Rev. 3 1 l
OPIP 3.3.4 Page 4 of 7 [ 5.2.2 The Manager of L'ocal Response will:
- a. Upon notification of a failure of any or all sirens, direct the Evacuation Coordinator to initiate route alerting (Step 5.3) for the areas covered by no.n-activated sirens. _
5.3 Route Alerting 5.3.1 The Evacuation Coordinator will direct the Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator to initiate route alerting. 5.3.2 The Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator
. will:
- a. Obtain the listing of all non-activated sirensg from the Coordinator of Public Information. i
- b. Contact the appropriate Lead Traffic Guide l and direct that route alert drivers be dispatched to the areas requiring warning.
/ Inform the Lead Traffic Guide which sirens (, are located in the downwind zones and direct that the Route Alert Drivers be dispatched to these zones before sending drivers to the other zones.
- c. When teams have been dispatched, notify the .'
Evacuation Coordinator. 5.3.3 Lead Traffic Guide will: ;
- a. Obtain the alerting packets for the non-activated sirens and distribute the packets to the drivers.
- b. Brief the Route Alert Drivers on their assignments.
- c. Ensure that the drivers are issued dosimetry.
d.. Deploy the Route Alert' Drivers to their assigned route s, instructing them to follow the Route Alete Drivers Procedure (Attach-- ment 1). Complete the Route Alert Driver Dispatch Log (Attachment 2) for each Route Alert Driver. (. - Rev. 3-
OPIP 3.3.4 Page 4A of 7 l
- e. If notified that a Route Alert Driver has received a dose of 3.5R, arrange to have an alternate driver relieve him in the field and finish notification of the area.
- f. When all drivers have been dispatched, notify the Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator.
5.3.4 Route Alert Drivers will:
- a. Report to the Staging Area in accordance with OPIP 3.3.3, Standby and Mobilization.
- b. Obtain Dosimetry Equipment from the Record Keeper and don this equipment immediately.
- c. Receive instructions from the Lead Traffic Guide. .
- d. Obtain a route alert packet from the Lead Traffic Guide.
~
( e. Proceed with Steps 1 through 6 of the Route ( - Alert Drivers Procedure (Attachment 1).
- f. When directed by the Lead Traffic Guide, leave the staging area and proceed to the start of the route.
- g. Proceed with Steps 7 through 10 of the Route Alert Drivers Procedure.
5.4 Deaf Notification 5.4.1 The Evacuation Coordinator will direct the Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator to initiate notification of that portion of the deaf population within zones requiring protective actions. -
- a. If sheltering is the recommended protective action, dispatch available Route Alert Drivers to notify both ambulatory and non-ambulatory deaf people,
- b. If evacuation is the recommended protective action, dispatch available Route Alert Drivers to notify only the ambulatory deaf people.
Rev. 3
> OPIP 3.3.4 Page 4B of 7 l
[ 4 i NOTE AMBULANCES /AMBULETTE VANS ARE DIS-PATCHED TO THE NON-AMBULATORY DEAF. THIS WILL SERVE AS NOTIFICATION. t 5.4.2 The Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator i will:
^
- a. Obtain the listing of deaf population for the i
affected zones from Home Coordinator.
- b. Contact the Lead Traffic Guide (s) and direct that Route Alert Drivers be dispatched to the homes listed and contact the listed individuals in person.
- c. When drivers have been dispatched, notify the e Evacuation Coordinator.
,( _
5.4.3 Lead Traffic Guide will:
- a. Based upon the list of the deaf residents received from the Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator, obtain the proper alerting packets.
- b. Brief the Route Alert Drivers.
~
- c. Ensure that the drivers are issued dosimetry.
- d. Deploy the Route Alert Drivers to the homes of the deaf, instructing drivers to follow their procedures. Complete the Route Alert Driver Dispatch Log, Attachment 2, for each Route Alert Driver.
5.4.4 Route Alert Drivers will: , s. Report to the Staging Area in accordance with l OPIP 3.3.3, Standby and Mobilization. l b. Obtain Dosimetry Equipment from the Record l Keeper and don this equipment immediately. (. Rev. 3
- -- , -+ ,w- i,
x - 4 OPIP 3.3.4 , {'
, Page 5 of 7
- c. Receive instructions from the Lead Traffic :
Guide. l
- d. Obtain an alerting packet fron the Lead Traffic Guide,
- e. Proceed with Steps 1 through 4 of the Action Checklist (Attachment 1).
- f. When directed by the Lead Traffic Guide, leave the staging area and proceed to the homes of the' deaf.
- g. Proceed with Steps 7 through 10 of the Action Checklist.
6.0 REFERENCES
6.1 OPIP 3.8.2, Emergency Broadcast System Activation 7.0 ATTACHMENTS
- 1. Route Alert Drivers Procedure
- 2. Route Alert Driver Dispatch Log l
I . 1 Rev. 3 r-
l . OPIP 3.3.4 { 4 Page 6 of 7 Attachment 1 1 i Page 1 of 2 l l ROUTE ALERT DRIVERS PROCEDURE , 1. Inventory emergency kit before beginning route alerting. This i kit consists of: 1
- a. Packet containing
Route Alert Drivers Procedure Route Maps
- b. Public Address System and prerecorded message (for siren failure only)
- 2. Receive dosimetry equipment from the Record Keeper, consisting of 1 direct-reading dosimeter (0-200 mR),1 direct-readin dosimeter (0-5 R) and 1 thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD)g. . Don '
this equipment immediately .
- 3. Complete Part I of all Dosimetry Forms required, retaining a Daily Dose Record Card and a copy of a Permanent Dose Record
{ 4. Form. , Attend the Lead Traffic Guide briefing to receive your routes 4 and dire tions on your assignment and/or your routes.
- 5. Mount and test,the Public Address System in the vehicle.
! 6. Upon notification from the Lead Traffic Guide, proceed to your l route alerting assignment.
- 7. a. Upon reaching the' starting point of the route, drive at approximately 5 mph and activate the Public Address System for Broadcast of prerecorded messages.
- b. Upon arrival at the home of a deaf person, contact person and hand them either a sheltering or evacuation message as appropriate (for deaf notification only).
8.- If readings go beyond the scale on the 0-200 mR dosimeter, inform i the Lead Traffic Guide by telephone and read the 0-5 R dosimeter. I Rev. 3
OPIP 3.3.4 ( Page 6a of 7 Attachment 1 Page 2 of 2 l ROUTE ALERT DRIVERS PROCEDURE l (continued)
- 9. At a reading of 3.5 R (3500 mR), inform the Lead Traffic Guide of dosimeter readings and prepare to leave the area. If directed to leave the area, or at a reading of 5 R, whichever occurs first, return to the Local EOC/ Emergency Worker Decontamination Center at Brentwood for monitoring and possible decontamination.
- 10. Notify the Lead Traffic Guide when your assignment and/or route l is complete. Report to the Emergency Worker Decontamination Center at the Local EOC in Brentwood for monitoring and possible '
decontamination. m+ Rev. 3
OPIP 3.3.4 Page 6a of 7 C Attachment 1 Page 2 of 2 ROUTE ALERT DRIVERS PROCEDURE
, (continued)
- 9. At a reading of 3.5 R (3500 mR), inform the Lead Traffic Guide of dosimeter readings and prepare to leave the area. If directed to leave the area, or at a reading of 5 R, whichever occurs first, return to the Local EOC/ Emergency Worker Decontamination Center at Brentwood for monitoring and possible decontamination.
- 10. Notify the Lead Traffic Guide when your assignment and/or route l is complete. Report to the Emergency Worker Decontamination Center at the Local EOC in Brentwood for monitoring and possible '
decontamination. S
~ - - . , .
so e 9 - t n Rev. 3' ___m________ _ . _ _ - . _ _ - '
OPIP 3.3.4 Page 7 of 7 C Attachment 2 Pag'e 1 of 1 l ROUTE ALERT DRIVER DISPATCH LOG i
- Staging Area: ,
I i Staging Area Coordinator: i Date: Page of 2 Route Alert Driver's Name Assignment t 0 l
=
1 2 { l e l Rev. 2
- 10/18/83
, - , - - , , - r- ,, , - - - . - , - , , - . -
A_ _ . , . , ma _ ,e. 4 .__. m- - - __ --a ,.e.,a f i i i ATTACHMENT 5 i l - S } 1 i
' ' '~ - - - - -_ -. __. . ___, _ .._ . _ ._,._ _
Attachmnnt 5 1 EPC OPIP 3.8.1 Page 1 of 23 C Approved: . l Effective Date OPIP 3.8.1 PUBLIC INFORMATION l 1.0 PURPOSE i To provide the Local Emergency Resp.onse Organization (LERO) with a method for the coordination and dissemination of public i information during, and the preparation of educational materials i to the public prior to, an incident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS). 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY The Coordinator of Public Information will be responsible for implementing this procedure during an incident at SNPS. 3.0 PRECAUTIONS None 4.0 PREREQUISITES None 5.0 ACTIONS 5.1 Coordinator of Public Information 5.1.1 Prior to an incident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, under the direction of the Emergency Planning Coordinator the Coordinator of Public Information will:
- a. Assure that all educational materials released. co the public in the EPZ are reviewed by LERO on a continuous basis to '
prepare the population within the EPZ for an incident at the plant.
- b. Issue a news announcement concerning the distribution of the Emergency Plannning Brochure.
i Rev. 3 . i
- w. . _ . . . . . , - , < - . . -,,..r. , , . - - - - =,
i l
, OPIP 3.8.1
'[ Page 2 of 23
- c. Coordinate all activities closely with the l LILCO Office of Public Affairs.
- d. Coordinate with the LILCO office of Public .
Affairs to develop an annual orientation program for members of the news media. This _ program will address general principles of nuclear energy and emergency planning. 5.1.2 During an emergency at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, the Coordinator of Public Information will:
- a. Activate the Emergency Broadcast System (see
. OPIP 3.8.2, Emergency Broadcast System Activation).
- b. Report to the Local Emergency Operations Center. Upon activation of the Emergency News Center (ENC), dispatch two Public Information Staff Members to establish a working office at the ENC in the Quality Inn, Old Mill, Ronkonkoma. Desk space and C telephones to accommodate the various representatives of the news media will be
- provided at the ENC. This will consist of 60 telephones, 30 typewriters,.and work space
, for approximately 100 people. Additionally, there is a second floor conference room of about 3,000 square feet which has space for approximately 300 press people. This room will be employed for joint news conferences and has raised platforms for TV coverage.
- c. Confer with the Director of Local Response and the Public Information Staff at the ENC on a regular basis to maintain consistent information content.
- d. Prepare and disseminate press releases as appropriate. In preparing press releases:
4 Rev.-3 e m+ y w w --: y- w 4a---- w -is- ,ie e*r'e'eA-- + w -Nm -+Nw- -- + 4w
OPIP 3.8.1 Page 3 of 23 [ o Obtain u'p-to-date information regarding offsite emergency response. o Utilize established press release format, if possible (reference Attachment 1, Sample Press Releases). o Upon completion of a press release, verify its content with the Director of Local Response. o Incorporate changes into a final press release. o After receiving approval from the Director of Local Response, telecopy a press release to the ENC and direct a , staff member to ensure distribution of press releases to the utility and any government Public Information Officers (PIOS). Obtain their acknowledgement by means of a sign-off.
. o Distribute approved press release.
- e. Assign persennel to monitor media and radio broadcasts for incorrect information.
- f. Control misinformation by providing current information for LILCO Rumor Control personnel an,d answering any questions regarding local response.
- g. Direct an Administrative Assistant to maintain a log of all events in the Public Information Office and establish a file for all press releases, Emergency Broadcast System messages and-rumors received. ,
S.2 Public Information Support Staff , S.2.1 Prior to an incident at the Shoreham Nuclear. Power ! Station, the Public Inform.ation Support Staff will l L Rev. 3 l
_ _ ~ . _ _ _
~
S OPIP 3.8.1 Page 4 of 23 l {" assist the Coordinator of Public Information in development of all public information materials for the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). The staff shall coordinate closely with the LILCO Office of Public Affairs in the development of these materials. 5.2.2 During an incident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, members of the Public Information Support Staff will:
- a. Report to the EOC and then, upon direction of the Coordinator of Public Information, two staff members proceed to the ENC.
- b. Establish and maintain contact between the EOC and the ENC, via dedicated telephones, and supply the Coordinator of Public Information with information as the incident develops.
- c. Assist the Coordinator of Public Information in developing press releases (see Attachment C -
1, Sample Press Releases).
- d. Upon approval of the Coordinator of Public Information, release and ensure distribution of press releases.
- e. Assist at the ENC during press conferences by supplying any information needed during the course of the conference.
- f. Supply the Rumor Control Staff with the most correct information available.
- g. Assist the Coordinator of Public Information,.
as necessary, throughout the course of the
' incident.
6.0 REFERENCES
. 6.1 OPIP 3.8.2, Emergency Broadcast System Activation 7.0 ATTACHMENTS
- 1. Sample Press Releases l
(L Rev. 3
7 ATTACHMENT 6 @ W
+-
O
Attachmant 6 EPC OPIP 3.8.2 Page 1 of 38 ( Approved: - l Effective Date
+0 PIP 3.8.2 EMERGENCY BROADCAST SYSTEM ACTIVATION 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure describes the actions necessary to activate the Emergency Broadcast System.
2.0 RESPONSIBILITY The Coordinator of Public Information is responsible for imple-menting this procedure. 3.0 PRECAUTIONS For Site Area Faar;cncy and General Emergency classifications, i OPIP 3.3.4, Prompt Notification System Activation (Siren Activation) must be implemented. 4.0 PREREQUISITES [ An Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency condition is in progress and has been verified. 5.0 ACTIONS 5.1 EBS Activation CAUTION FOR A SITE AREA EMERGENCY OR GENERAL EMERGENCY, THE ACTIVATION OF EBS MUST BE COORDINATED WITH THE SIREN SYSTEM ACTIVATION TO ENSURE THAT THE ' PUBLIC WILL RECEIVE PROMPT INSTRUCTIONS. RADIO STATION WALK, WHICH BROADCASTS SIMULTANEOUSLY ON AM AND FM, WILL BE THE PRIMARY DIRECT COM-MUNICATION LINK TO THE PUBLIC AFTER ACTIVATION OF THE PUBLIC NOTIFICATION SYSTEM. I 5.1.1 In the event of a radiological emergency involving ' the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS), the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) can only be
. Rev. 3
OPIP 3.8.2 Page 2 of 38 l ( activated by communication with Radio Station WALK (97.5 FM) located in Patchogue, New York, from one of the following initiators: o Director of Local Response or his authorized representative o Coordinator of Public Information o Customer Service Supervisor 5.1.2 The initiator will first call WALK-FM on the EOC dedicated phone line or using commercial telephone and request immediate connection with the EBS operator on duty. The initiator will provide the EBS operator with the following information to be recorded on the appropriate EBS Message Form (see Attachment 1): o Name and title of the initiator o Authentication number The authentication number is a specific nine-digit C number with a controlled circulation and provides for positive identification of the caller. The EBS operator will immediately proceed to check the authentication number indicated by EBS j message originator against the authentication number available at the radio station at a l predesignated location, sealed in a special envelope. CAUTION ' THE SYSTEM CAN BE ACTIVATED ONLY THROUGH THE ' AUTHENTICATION NUMBER PROVIDED BY THE INITI-ATOR. AUTHORIZED LERO PERSONNEL ARC IN POSSESSION OF THE AUTHENTICATION NUMBER AS ARE PERSONNEL AT WALK-FM RADIO STATION. 5.1.3 The EBS operator will record the message as read by the initiator. The EBS operator will only then be authorized to begin radio transmission of f the EBS message. -
- (
Rev. 3 l .-. -- - _
OPIP 3.8.2 { Page 3 of 38 l : 1 CAUTION 3 FOR SITE AREA AND GENERAL EMERGENCY, THE EBS MESSAGE WILL BE READ OVER THE AIR ONLY AFTER THE PROMPT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM (SIRENS) HAS BEEN ACTIVATED. 5.1.4 Once an authenticated message is received by the EBS operator and is authorized for broadcast, Radio Station WALK-FM will transmit the message to the relay stations. During the siren sounding, the EBS will be activated to alert tha public and the relay stations that an emergency message is forthcoming regarding the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. The method used will consist of broadcasting the standard EBS signal by WALK-FM, which activates the network station monitors of relay stations and of tone alerts throughout Suffolk County. Radio station WALK C will broadcast on 97.5 FM and simultaneously on 1370 AM. Upon the completion of the siren sounding, the operator on duty will play the l recorded EBS message. Once this procedure is
, carried out, the message is repeated a second time, five minutes later. The relay stations will be equipped to record the message or to broadcast simultaneously.
NOTE RADIO STATION WALK-FM HAS A BACKUP POWER I i SYSTEM TO ENSURE CONTINUOUS OPERATION IN THE ' l EVENT OF A POWER LOSS. f 5.2 Message Preparation ( EBS Messages are.provided for three accident classifica-tions by radiological conditions and protective action recommendations. Rev. 3 4
, - - , , w- p .- ,-g--
. l I OPIP 3.8.2 Page 4 of 38 l i ( t 5.2.1 Mes' sage Selection Select a message for the appropriate accident classification, radiological conditions, and protective action recommendations from the following and modify to reflect actual circumstances:
- a. EBS Activation Advisory Read Message A (Attachment 4).
- b. Alert (No Release of Radiation)
Read Message B (Attachment 4). l
- c. Alert (Release of Radiation)
Read Mesage C (Attachment 4). l
- d. Site Area Emergency (No Radiological Release)
_- Read Message D (Attachment 4). I
- e. Site Area Emergency (Sheltering)
Read Message E (Attachment 4).
- f. General Emergency (Sheltering)
Read Message F (Attachment 4). I
- g. General Emergency (Sheltering and Evacuation)
Read Message G (Attachment 4). l
- h. General Emergency (Evacuation)
- Read Message H (Attachment 4). -
l
- 1. De-escalation of Emerge *ncy Read Message I (Attachment 4).
- j. Termination of Emergency Message Read Message J (Attachment 4). I jk-j Rev. 3
l . OPIP 3.8.2 (~ Page 5 of 38
- k. Test Message for EBS
( Read Message K (Attachment 4). I
- 1. Spurious Activation of Prompt Notification System Message -
i Read Message L (Attachment 4). I 5.2.2 Message Assembly once a message is selected in Step 5.2.1 various information must be inserted into the appropriate locations in the messages.
- a. Time l Obtain from Item 1, Part I - Radiological Emergency Data Form.
- b. Names and Titles of Emergency Response Officials -
C Obtain names, titles, and organizational affiliation from the persons present at EOC (for Messages B - J). g
- c. Time of Release Obtain from Item 15A or ISB, Part II -
Radiological Emergency Data Form (for Messages C, E, F, G, H).
- d. Amount of Radiation Released Obtain from Item 16B, Part II - Radiological Emergency Data Form (for Messages E, F, G, H).
l
- e. Zones Affected and Descriptions Obtain affected zones from Item 10C, Part I Radiological Emergency Data Form. Obtain area description from Attachment 5. I
- f. Schools If the schools have already initiated early dismissal, do not recommend other protective actions. ,i
{ Rev. 3 1
OPIP 3.8.1 t Page 6 of 38 {' - j 5.3 Testing the EBS Operation 5.3.1 Communication Drills Communication drills will be conducted periodi- ! cally to test the communications between the EOC and the Radio Station WALK-FM. Notification of l i such a test will originate with the Director of Local Response or his designee by telephone call to the Radio Station WALK-FM in Patchogue, New York. The WALK-FM operator on duty will receive the call and will complete the Communication
- Drill Form, EBS-2,(see Attachment 2) entering the name and title of the caller and acknowledge the
- drill. Verification will be by means of checking the authentication number. The completed Communications Drill Form will then be filed as a permanent record of the drill. There will be no broadcast in the communications drill.
I 5.3.2 Test Message for EBS
/* Notification to test the EBS will originate with I ( the Director of Local Response or his designee by telephone call to Radio Station WALK-FM in Patchogue, New York. The WALK-FM operator on duty will receive the call and will complete the Test Message Form, EBS-3 (see Attachment 3),
entering the name and title of the caller and acknowledge the test. Verification of the call will be by means of checking the authentication number, which will also be entered on the Test Message Form. Then the EBS tone will be broadcast along with the Test Message K. (This test message of the EBS system may be prerecorded). During the actual test, the phrase "This is a test" must precede and follow the message. The ' completed Test Message Form will then be filed as a permanent record of the test. 5.4 Spurious Activation of Prompt Notification System Notification to broadcast the message for the spurious activation of the prompt notification sirens (Message L) l will originate with the Director of Local Response or his designee by telephone call to Radio Station WALK-FM in j k Rev. 3
l OPIP 3.8.2 Page 7 of 38 ( i Patchogue, New York. The Director of Local Response or designee will read the message to the EBS operator for recording. Then the EBS operator will broadcast the EBS tone and Message L will be played back. l
6.0 REFERENCES
6.1 OPIP 3.3.4, Prompt Notification System Activation. 7.0 ATTACHMENTS I 1. EBS Message Form for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, EBS-1 i 2. Communications Drill Form for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, EBS-2
- 3. EBS Test Message Form for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, E3S-3
- 4. EBS Sample Messages, A through L l S. Description of Planning Zones / Areas for Suffolk County _. l e
9
/"
j % Rev. 3 s
- ,. , + - - .
4 ATTACHMENT 7 4 4 4
Attechment 7 EPC OPIP 4.1.2 C Approved: Effective Date OPIP 4.1.2 LOCAL EOC DOCUMENTATION AND RECORDKEEPING 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to describe the methods for the logging in and handling of all incoming and outgoing messages to, from, and within the Local EOC at Brentwood. 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY 2.1 The LERO Lead Communicator is responsible for implementing this procedure. 2.2 The LERO Coordinators are responsible for maintaining - logs throughout the emergency. 3.0 PRECAUTIONS ({ . All incoming, outgoing, or internal calls should be recorded'in writing by the originator on the EOC Message Form. 4.0 PREREQUISITES None 5.0 ACTIONS 5.1 Originator, complete the EOC Message Form (Attachment 1) for all EOC messages. 5.1.1 At the top of the form,. enter the following in-formation in the designated spaces:
- a. Date l b. Time (use 24-hour clock)
- c. Your name and EOC group
- d. Addressee's name and EOC group _ to which he l belongs 1
- e. Whether message is incoming or outgoing
(. Rev. 0 5/5/83
- _ - - . - -. - - - . . _ _ _ ~ .
4 ( OPIP 4.1.2 ( Page 2 of 4
- f. Message number (sender only)
- g. Precedence
- 5.1.2 Record the message.
- 5.1.3 Retain the blue copy for your records.
5.1.4 Forward the yellow copy to the LERO Lead Communi-Cator. 5.1.5 Forward the white copy to the addressee. 5.2 LERO Lead Communicator perform the following: 5.2.1 Assign the message a journal number and record the number in the upper righthand corner of the Message Form. , 5.2.2 Retain the yellow copy for your records. 5.3 Addressee perform the following: (. 5.3.1 Answer the originator on a new form, noting the ' receipt of the message, message number, actions taken and/or any needed information. 5.3.2 Retain the white copy for your records. 5.4 Emergency Logs 5.4.1 The following LERO personnel will maintain emer-gency logs:
- a. Director of Local Response j b. Manager of Local Response Health Services Coordinator c.
i
- d. Evacuation Coordinator
- e. Support Services Coordinator
- f. Coordinator of Public Information 5.4.2 The following information shall be recorded on the log:
- a. Time notification was received l I
- b. Time of arrival at EOC l
C. - Rev. 0
- 5/5/83 -
,, .n 1 - n- y , -- - - , - - - - e n,, - w
OPIP 4.1.2 Page 3 of 4
- c. Summary of all telephone conversations, in-cluding time of call --
- d. Any actions taken or directed, including time --
of action
- e. Time and name of second shift relief -
- f. Time of closeout of the emergency
6.0 REFERENCES
None 7.0 ATTACHMENTS
- 1. Message Form m
em m m m m m mm.h 4 m M
)R iY.
4 Rev. 0
*5/5/83
6 l l l I
~ 1 1
I ATTACHMENT 8 G l 1 i
1 Attachment 8 LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW A, 2 General Knowledge Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration S.1 Fade up f rom black I (Question asked off camera) What are you l medium shot waist-up of I going to do in the case of a nuclear on the street inter- I emergency? viewer - male 30-40 l [ Answer by interviewee] years of age i S.2 Cut to couple together I (Question asked off camera) What will you 40+ in age. ECU of I do in event of nuclear emergency?. couple 1 [ Answer by interviewee] S.3 Cut to woman w.ith young I (Question asked off camera) What will you child in arns. Tight I do ir. case of a nuclear emergency? shot including child I [ Answer by interviewee] S.4 Cut to man 45+ in age 1 (What will you do in case of a nuclear waist up - medium shot I emergency? I [ Answer by interviewee) - S.5 Disolve to Mr. Acker i Lack of direction, general unpreparedness, seated at desk in his I no specific plan of action. These are office - medium long I quite common responses'to questions N shot. Zoom in to mediumi dealing with emergency preparedness. shot as Mr. Acker ad- 1 Americans in general, find it uncomfort-I 1 dresses camera (Restor- l able to plan for any type of disaster. l ation Plan Book on desk)l l
.a i
f The onsite zone, the plume exposure pathway zone, and the ingestion exposure pathway zone. Each zone has specific actions and procedures that will be implemented in case of an emet incy. These Protective Actions have been submitted, reviewed and approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Together, the plans and procedures provide for the basis for the overall emergency response plan. This plan details both onsite as well as offsite actions by the utility, local, state and federal ( government agencies. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of this emergency plan, each year a utility must conduct a drill. l Page 1 of 27 l . - . ..
. LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW A,2 General Knowledge Visual Display /
Staging Directions Narration S.6 Super Mr. Acker name andl Bello, my name is Joe Acker and I'm a Vice title l President of LILCO. S.7 Zoom into MCU of Mr. I At LILCO, we have always believed that Acker - drop title I emergency preparedness is essential to I protect the health and safety of the I community we serve. , S.8 Cut to medium side shot i Over the years, LILCO has developed a i of Mr. Acker. His head I number of contingency or emergency plans turns toward camera and I to deal with natural events such as: continues his narration.1 He picks up Restoration l Plan Book. 'l S.9 Cut away ice storm Io Ice Storms i S.10 Cut away blizzard . Io Blizzards S.11 Cut away hurricane Io Hurricanes S.12 Cut away of racing fire i We also have plans to deal with other engine I potential disasters such as fires at power I stations, S.13 Cut away of LILCO crew I downed power lines, working on power line i S.14 Cut away USGC at oil I oil spills, spill l Page 2 of 27
, LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW Az General Knowledge Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration S.15 LILCO gas crew in emer- I and gas explosions. gency gear i S.16 Mr. Acker seated on edgel Today, I would like to acquaint each of of desk - medium shot. I you with another LILCO contingency plan. He addresses camera l The plant that would be used if there was I a Radiological Emergency at our Shoreham l Nuclear Power Station. S.17 Disolve to Shoreham I We recognize that despite the stringent plant site. Establish I saf ety standards under which Shoreham was shot I built and operates, that there is a need I for an emergency plan to protect the I people in our commmunity. S.18 4-way of: l Our radiological response details all the
- a. LILCO employee l actions and activities to protect our guidf.ng traffic l neighbors, that we would initiate in the
- b. LILCO employee on I unlikely event of radiological material telephone I being released into the environment.
- c. Rad monitor team 1
- d. Man on radio LILCO l car l l
Page 3 of 27
- LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW A,
2 General Knowledge Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration S.19 Start Studio talent ! It was in response to that need that LILCO voice. Pans of news I first signed a memorandum of understanding articles on memo of I with Suffolk County on Emergency Planning understanding with I with respect to the Suffolk County, 1 S.20 Cut to plant under l Shoreham Nuclear Power Station in June of construction slide 1 1976. S.21 Cut to shot of I This memorandum addressed their respec-4 memorandum I tive responsibilities in the event of an
~
'l incident at S hor eham.
S.22 Slow disolve into TMI I A lot has changed since 1976. footage ! I On March 28, 1979 at 4 AM, outside l Harrisburg, Pennsylvania at the Three Mile 1 Island Nuclear Power Station, an accident. I occurred.
.I Pause.
I As a result of the lessons learned from I that incident, our perspective of I preparing for, radiological emergencies at I i l Page 4 of 27
- LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW A. General Knowledge - i Visual Display /
Staging Directions Narration l Nuclear Power Plants has been expanded. S.23 Shot of published i One of the conclusions following numerous studies I studies of the incident was the need f or i additional emergency planning. The
! Presidents Conmiission stated that S.24 Shot of Shoreham i " Emergency plans must clearly and Super copy on S.24 l consistently detail the actions public
" Emergency plan ... I officials and utilities should take in the release of radioac- I event of offsite radiation doses resulting tivity." I from release of radioactivity."
S.25 Narrator is studio MS I As a result, new emphasis has been.placed I on emergency preparedness and numerous new I regulations have been generated. l The regulations contain three major I changes f rom past practices. These are: S.26 Build slides (disolves) l In order to continue operations or receive Utility Emergency Plan I an operating license, a licensee is I required to submit its emergency plans, I as well as plans for a l I Page 5 of 27
r l
- LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW A,
2 General Knowledge Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration l S.27 Build S.26 - l local emergency response to the Nuclear Local Plan i Regulatory Commission, NRC S.28 Visual of books repre- I they must be satisfied that the emergency i senting plans I plans are adequate and capable of being Disolve to man reviewingl implemented. Emergency Plan book l S.29 MS Talent in studio 1 The key words here are adequate and I capable of being implemented. S.30 MS Talent in studio l The second change was to expand the areas l for which detailed emergency pl'anning is
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side shot I done, to extend emergency planning l l considerations in to 10 and 50 mile S.31 Supercopy Emergency i Emergency Planning Zones. Planning Zones over MS l talent in studio - lose i super on narration que l l S.32 Slow zoom to ECU of l The third major change was to require that talent in studio I detailed emergency planning implementing I procedures be submitted to the NRC for l review. l S.33 Disolve to motion 1 One of the major problems with pre-TMI footage Control Room I emergency plans;was that the planning simulation I efforts of the utility and various Page 6 of 27
LESSON PLAN I I ! EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW L General Knowledce Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration I agencies were not coordinated and did not
- I provide a common basis for actions in 1
I response to an emergency.
! To improve the coordination and I communication between the various groups I responsible for an emergency response, the
.i 1 emergency classification system has been 1 revised and standardized fact sheets have l _ l been introduced. S.34 Disolve into studio 1 The purpose of the emergency classifica-talent I tion system i's to classify the severity of I an emergency and to eliminate situations
, I like the one we're about to witness.
S.35 ECU motion. Man answers! Hello, local emergency preparedness office. I phone at desk in office 1 S.36 Cut to ECU operation in l This is Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1. Control Room i We have had an initiation of Emergency l Core Cooling System. l I i I l ' l Page 7 of 27 l --- - - - ___ ._. t _ .. _ _ _ _ __,_ _
LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW h General Knowledge Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration S.37 Cut to talent in studio 1 0.K. This is a potential safety problem. I Let's now see how a typical County I official may have responded to this I potential emergency telephone call prior I to the revised emergency classification I system. S.38 Cut to local emergency 1 An emergency with what? the core cooling official (showing con- I system. Isn't that big trouble at the
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f.usion, not, panic) l nuclear plant? , What do we have to,do? S.39 Cut to MS talent in 1 As we can see here the operator at the studio I plant is not communicating with the 1 official responsible for the protective I actions. Oh they are talking to each I other alright, but they are not both I getting the same information f rom what is I being said over the phone. I Let's now replay this scene, only this time i both the operator and the local emergency I official will use the proper emergency I classification level and notification fact I sheets. . Page 8 of 27
, LESSON PLAN I l i
1 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW As General Knowledge Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration S.40 Cut to local emergency i Hello, Local Emergency Preparedness Office. 4 official at desk in ! office i S.41 Cut to operator in planti This is Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1. reading from an Emer- l Please take out your emergency gency Notification Fact 1 Notification Fact Sheet Part I. Sheet i Pause.
- a. Local emergency off- 1 0.K. Ready.
icial's voice over 1 -
'~ ~
phone l Item 1. This message is transmitted on
- b. Cut to operator in I March 29 at 04:15 hours.
plant reading f rom anl Item 2. This is Nuclear Power Station Emergency Notifica- 1 Unit No. 1. tion Fact Sheet i Item 3. This is being reporte'd.by John I Edson, the Unit No.1 Control Room i Communicator. Our phone number is
]
l 516-454-8000. 1 Item 4. This is not an exercise. 1 Item 5. The emergency classification is I an Unusual Event. 1 Item 6. This classification was declared I on March 29 at 04:10 hours. ' Page 9 of 27
- LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW A,
2 General Knowledge Visual Display / t Staging Directions Narration i Item 7. We had an initiation of emergency I core cooling system at 04:00 hours this I morning. The reactor tripped at 04:01 l hours. 1 Item 8. As of 04:10 hours, there has not I been a release of radioactivity. l Item 9. is not applicable. 1 Item 10. There is no need for Protective 1 1 Actions outside the site boundary. l Item 11 - Weather: , I The wind speed is 15 mph. l The wind direction is 350*. l The stability class is A. I The general weather conditions are fair. l This is the end of the message. I Will you please read it back to me. C.42 Cut to local emergency i Item 1. The message was transmitted on official at desk reading! March 29 at 04:15 hours. from a Fact Sheet ! Item 2. It is Nuclear Power Station Unit l No. I transmitting the report. 1 Item 3. It is being reported by John Page 10 of 2".
. LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW Az General Knowledge Visual Display /
Staging Directions Narration l Edson, the Unit No.1 Control Room 1 Communicator. Your phone number is i 516-454-8000. 1 Item 4. This is not an exercise. l The lead emergency official would continue S.43 Disolve to talent in I reading back the information on the studio MS I notification f act sheet, verifying that he I had the correct information. I Now the operator at the plant and the I official responsible for protective I actions are communicating. l By the training he has received, the S.44 MS Talent in studio I operator recognizes the Emergency Core Insert slide of oper- I Cooling System initiation as a potential ation upper it. corner I safety problem not requiring any offsite Operation in classroom I protective action, and classifies it in Lose super insert I accordance with well defined guidelines, I as a Notification of' Unusual Event. I I r ' Pag'e 11 of 27 i I
- l
- LESSON PLAN I > EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW A,
2 General Knowledoc Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration S.45 MS Talent in studio l And by the training he has received, the Insert slide of local I official recognizes the Notification of emergency official upperl Unusual Event as meaning a potential it.. corner Official in I safety problem, not requiring any off site classroom. Lose super I protective action. insert i S.46 Slow zoom into ECU l By using the emergency classification talent I system as a means of communicating... and , I writing the procedures to direct the I actions to be taken f or each emergency I classification, those men f rom different I technical backgrounds can successfully I coordinate their response to the incident I at the plant. S.47 Build visual. Emergency l Now lets look at the emergency Classification System I classification system. I There are four emergency classifications. I I I
. I l
Page 12 of 27l
. LESSON PLAN I
> EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW A, General Knowledge 2 Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration S.48 Build NUE: S.47 l- Notification of Unusual Event S.49 Build Alert: S.47-48 1- Alert S.50 Build SAE: S.47,48,49 l - Site Area Emergency S.51 Build GE: S.47,48,49,501 - and General Emergency S.52 Disolve to talent in ! In each of these classes, the studio MS 1 S.53 Supercopy over talent I LILCO Onsite Emergency Response Organiza-onsite Emergency Resp. I tion would respond to the problem as Org. Lose super I needed.
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l S.54 Bold MS of talent from I A Notification of Unusual Event class, is S.52 Super NUE l declared when unusual events have occurred I which could indicate a safety problem, and I there has been no releases of radiation I f rom the plant, but we want to notify the I I I
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I l Page 13 of 27 _ _ _ ~ _ , , , - . . , _ _ _ _ , . ~ - _ _ , _ . , , . . - - ,.,,..._.ms. _,,r w. .
- r. gyn..,,.
i - L LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW A2 General Knowledge ' l l Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration I offsite officials, of the potential I problem. S.55 Super Alert. Copy over l An Alert class is declared when there is talent I an actual or potential safety problem. I There may be some release of radiation, I but the amounts at this point is not I significant. S.56 Slow zoom into ECU of I When we declare this emergency class, we Talent I are telling the offsite officials to have
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l their emergency perronnel readily I available to respond if the problem I becomes more serious. S.57 Cut to slide of site - l A Site Area Emergency is declared when Burn copy: " Site Area l there are actual or likely major failures Emergency" on slide 1 of plant functions needed for protection 1 of the public. There may be releases of I radiation, but they are not expected to I exceed government limits except near the I site boundary. I I Page 14 of 27
.,w -- - , - - . . , ___ . . , . _ , . , . . . ,, u , ,
LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW
. A2 General Knowledge Visual Display /
Staging Directions Narration S.48 Build NUE: S.47 l- Notification of Unusual Event S.49 Build Alert: S.47-48 l- Alert S.50 Build SAE: S.47,48,49 l - Site Area Emergency S.51 Build GE: S.47,48,49,501 - and General Emergency S.52 Disolve to talent in ! In each of these classes, the studio MS I S.53 Supercopy over talent l LILCO Onsite Emergency Response Organiza-onsite Emergency Resp. l tion would respond to the problem as Org. Lose super I needed. 1 S.54 Bold MS of talent from I A Notification of Unusual Event class, is S.52 Super NUE l declared when unusual events have occurred I which could indicate a safety problem, and I there has been no releases of radiation i from the plant, but we want to notify the i I I I I l
' Page 13 of 27 l l
., - - - e -- - - - e- w-
LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW A2 General Knowledge Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration I offsite officials, of the potential I problem. S.55 Super Alert. Copy over l An Alert class is declared when there is talent I an actual or potential safety problem. 1 There may be some release of radiation, I but the amounts at this point is not I significant. i S.56 Slow zoom into ECU of I When we declare this emergency class, we Talent I are telling the offsite officials to have i their emergency personnel readily I available to respond if the problem I becomes more serious. S.57 Cut to slide of site - l A Site Area Emergency is declared when Burn copy: " Site Area i there are actual or likely major failures Emergency" on slide 1 of plant functions needed for protection I of the public. There may be releases of I radiation, but they are not expected to I exceed government limits except near the I site boundary. I I Page 14 of 27
)
LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW A. General Knowledge i i Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration S.58 Cut to MS talent in I When we declare this emergency class, the studio I offsite officials would be manning their i emergency positions offsite radiation I survey teams would be dispatched and the i public would be notified of the situation. , S.59 Cut to site shot - l A General Emergency is delcared when the Burn copy General I situation involves actual or imminent Emergency" over slide I substantial core damage and radiation I releases can be expected to exceed the
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l government limits for more than the ~ l immediate site area. S.60 Cut to MS of talent i When we declare a General Emergency, the in studio I offsite officials would consider the I pre-planned protective actions such as I sheltering or evacuation, depending on the I situation, and provide updates for the I public. S.61 Talent turns to address l Earlier we mentioned that one of the camera. . Slow zoom in I changes from past practices was to extend I emergency planning considerations to . I emergency plan zones. l Page 15 of 27
LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW Az General Knowledge Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration i ! What are these zones? l How were they established? and what kinds I of planning is done for each zone? S.62 Cut to map of plant i The first zone, is the plant site. Show first zone i S.63 Disolve to highlight l This is the land that the utility owns LILCO property outline I around the actual plant. In the event of in first zone I an emergency, the onsite emergency I response organization would be responsible I for the emergency actions onsite. S.64 Cut to Control Room l These actions would include an operational panel with operator I assessment, figuring out what went wrong, I and S.65 Three men reviewing i the operational response, figuring out how design drawings I to fix the problem, S.66 Disolve to shot of I and fixing it. Additionally, l repair crew l l they would notify the offsite officials as S.67 Cut to operator on red I to the specific problem and emergency hotline phone I classification. l l Page 16 of 27 i l
LESSON PLAN I
- EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW A,
2 General Knowledge l Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration S.68 Cut to computer screen I They would pe,rform radiological assessment with plume plot I with onsite equipment, S.69 Cut to Environmental l and onsite radiatica monitor crews. Monitoring team l S.70 Cut to workers in Anti l They are also responsible for protective i "C" gear I measures for personnel onsite. S.71 Cut to ambulance leaving! In this responsibility, the are aided by ! site i such local organizations S.72 Cut to hospital crew I as ambulance corps and hospitals. during a radiation drilli S.73 Cut to talent MS in l In the event of a Site or General studio l Emergency, they would also coordinate the 1 information flow to the public. l This last item is very important, so I 1 would like to spend a few moments I reviewing this public ~information activity S.74 Cut to clip from IP #2 l One of the most important aspects of any l news conferences i emergency planning is the flow of I information to the public in a timely I manner. To accomplish this, the utility, I as well as federal, state and local Page 17 of 27
LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW As General Knowledge l Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration I governments work together. Located in the
! Emergency News Centers, representatives of I each agency act as spokespersons to report I developments to the public as they may I occur. Let's now return to our discussion I of the various zones.
S.75 Cut to map indicating i The second zone is called the plume l exposure pathway. You might ask: 10-mile EPZ I What is a plume? S.76 Cut to shot of plume 1 Well you may be f amiliar with smoke coming f rom a smoke stack i out of a stack, we refer to the shape of I that smoke cloud as a plume. S.77 Disolve through of I If there was a release of radiation f rom a several plume movement 1. nuclear plant, it would behave just like shots over ground I that cloud of smoke, being heavy at the i point of release and dispersing into the I air as it gets further away until it is I diluted to such a low level that it is not i even visible. The only differences is I that you can see a smoke plume, but not a i radiation plume. I I Page 18 of 27
LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW As General Knowledge Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration S.78 Cut to map with plume ! The plume exposure pathway emergency exposure pathway I planning zone is the area in which the i population would be subject to exposure I f rom the passing radioactive airborne I plume and f rom -material deposited on the I ground. S.79 Cut to show a person l The major risk or danger would come f rom with handkerchief over 1 inhalation particles or breathing the face i radioactive gases. S.80 Cut to chart of exposurel As you can see; the amount of exposure, if vs. distance I there was a release of radiation, drops I off as you get f urther f rom the plant. S.81 Disolve to cloud in l The reason for that is that a radiation dispersion I c1'oud, just like the smoke cloud is I dispersed by the winds. S.82 MS Studio talent i The criteria for establishing the size of I this zone was the amount of radioactive I material that could be released in the i event of an accident. I I Page 19 of 27-l L
LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW A,2 General Knowledge Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration S.82a. Cut back to S.80 l As we see from the chart, past 10 miles chart I the projected dose from the radiation I could would drop off and very few if any I people beyond this distance would receive I a radiation dose from a plume exposure I above the established government I guidelines. S.83 Supercopy: Protective l These guidelines are called the Protective Action Guidelines - l Action Guidelines. S.84 Visual of 10-mile EPZ l A 10-mile radius around the plant was with moving around to I established as the plume exposure pathway indicate 10-mile EPZ l with the exact size and configuration I determined by local emergency ' response I needs and capabilities. S.85 MS Studio talent l The distances for the emergency planning I zones had to be large enough so that all I the plants in the county would meet the I criteria. I So that a common planning basis could be I established. t i Page 20 of 27
LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW A, 2 General Knowledge Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration S.86 Disolve through of plumel If we look at what would happen to the overlays on EPZ to show I radiation cloud we see that most of the path of plume i plume exposure pathway is not effected. S.87 Cut to ECU of studio l To assure that protective actions can be talent I taken quickly to protect the people at I greatest risk of exposure we subdivide the l Plume Exposure pathway into Emergency l Planning Zones. I Any protective action would be implemented I f or specific zones and not for the whole I plume exposure pathway or 10-mile zone. S.88 MS Talent turns to l Let's now turn our attenti0n to the camera 1 emergency planning responsibilities in the l'10-mile EPZ. S.89 Cut to shot of Public l The utility has the responsibility to Information mailing I annually provide the public within the
' Brochures" l zone with emergency planning information I to educate them on how they would be I notified and what their initial actions I should be in the event of an emergency.
Page 21 of 27
. l LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW j A General Knowledge Visual Display /
Staging Directions Narration S.90 Cut to shot of siren l They also must assure that the government I has the ability to promptly notify the i public within 15 minutes. This can be I accomplished with sirens S.91 Cut to shot of tone I and tone alert radios (sound of track of alert, with voice of I tone alert signal). This has been a test EBS announcer following 1 of the emergency broadcast system. If tene alert signal voice I there had been a real emergency...
~~ ~
fading off I S.92 Disolve to 4-way build 1 The local government normally has the
. County Building I responsibility for protecting the health
.10-Mile zone map I and safety of the public with the 10-mile
. Brick home l EPZ, for determining the appropriate
. Man guiding traffic 1 protective actions, such as sheltering, I partial evacuation or complete evacuation,.
I and implementing those actions. S.93 Build 3-way allow l To assist the local government in their
. Local gover'nment I decision, both the State and the utility l l
. State i provide local officials with
. Utility I recommendations for protective action and Recommendations in cen- l any additional information they may need.
l ter of 3-way I l - Page 22 of 27i
LESSON PLAN I , l EMERGENCY PREPAREDNL5S OVERVIEW A, 2 General Knowledge visual Display / Staging Directions Narration S.94 Disolve to 3-way l The Federal and State governments will
. 3 men talking i also provide technical advice, manpower
. Monitoring team I and equipment support to the local l
. Radio I government.
S.95 Disolve show map with l The third and final zone is called the burn title Ingestion 1 ingestion exposure pathway. Exposure Pathway 1 Shot of food chain cycle! The ingestion exposure pathway is the area
. Cows -
1 in which the food chain could be
. Produce I contaminated.
. Water I S.96 Disolve through l The major risk or danger would be from
. Water I ingestion or intake of contaminated water
. Milk I or foods such as milk or fresh vegetables.
. Fresh vegetables l As build 3-way l S.97 Cut to MS studio talent i The criteria for establishing the size of I this zone was, as with the plume exposure i pathway, to assure that very few if any I people would receive a radiation dose f rom I contaminated foodstuffs f rom within the i area, above the Protective Action Guidelines.
Page 23 of 27
i
- - LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW .
A General Knowledge Visual Display / ,
- Staging Directions Narration S.98 Cut to shot of 10-mile i A radius of about 50 miles around the and 50-mile EPZ map. I plant was established as the ingestion Highlight 50-mile circlel exposure pathway.
S.99 Cut to State of NY logo l In this planning zone, the State would I normally have the primary responsibility I for protective actions. S.100 Cut to title Environ- l These actions would involve environmental mental Surveillance i surveillance such as: S.101 Build 4-way l informing owners of livestock to place
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. Woman talking to I animals on stored feed, f armer - f armer on I control of water supplies, tractor I monitoring and control of milk and diary
. Worker taking water i products as well as sample I monitoring and control of produce.
. Woman checking milk I with counter I
( . Man checking produce l with counter i S.102 Cut to MS studio talenti Now let's tie everything together. I Emergency plans are developed to clearly detail the actions to be taken in the l Page 24 of 27
1 LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW A General Knowledge i Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration I event of a radiological emergency. The i plans are supported by detailed procedures I which specify how those actions are to be I taken. S.103 Cut to copy build in l The actions to be taken are keyed to the Emergency Classifica- I emergency classification action levels. tions I Which are: S.104 Notification of Unusuall o Notification of Unusual Event Event i . S.105 Alert Io Alert ._ S.106 Site Area Emergency Io Site Area Emergency S.107 General Emergency Io General Emergency S.108 Cut to build 3-way l Regardless of the classification, both the arrow I LILCO onsite emergency response LILCO onsite org. I organization and the local emergency local emer. org.1 response organization would initiate I specific plans or action based on the response. I extent of the emergency. i emergency plan l l Page 25 of 27'
- LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW l l
A General Knowledge Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration S.109 Cut to copy build i The planning is done on the basis of three 1 zones.
- the onsite zone 1 The onsite zone, i
S.110 - the plume exposure I the plume exposure pathway zone, pathway zone 1 S.111 - the ingestion expo- l and the ingestion exposure pathway zone. sure pathway zone l S.112 Cut to show book l Together, the plans and procedures provide containing procedures I for the basis for the overall emergency I response plan. This plan details both I onsite as well as offsite actions by the I utility, local, state and federal I government agencies. S.113 Show man reviewing i The plans and procedures have to be Emergency Plan I submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory 1 Commission for review and must be approved I as a condition for the nuclear power i plants operating license. l S.114 Cut to way of man at 1 In order to obtain the NRC approval, it news center podium I must be demonstrated that the plans are I capable of being implemented. l l Page 26 of 27 l l l
. . - _- _ . . _ _ _ . . - - - - _ _ - _ _ _ - = _ =
e
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LESSON PLAN I EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW A General Knowledge ! Visual Display / Staging Directions Narration l This must be done annually and is done by I conducting a drill. S.115 Cut to show 2 men l This practice axercise also allows all the i wearing controller arm I agencies to evaluate their effectiveness bands with clip boards I and plan for improvements. Watch S69 in backgroundl ' S.116 Cut to MS studio talentl I've enjoyed our presentation today on l General Emergency Preparedness and look i forward to seeing you in future sessions. I i I I I I I I I I l I l
- Page 27 of 27
\
l -l e ATTACHMW T 9 4 ] i l 1 1 I 1
at u R Bb M s & R B W II K G L"[elelEGM Attachment 9 COMMAND & COE'fROL MODULE O. 17
, This module applies toi. .
ut,,~ . o Director of Local Response o Manager of Local Response o Health Services Coordinator o Evacuation Coordinator o Lead Communicator o Support Services Coordinator o Coordinator of Public Information - i Your Name LERO Title
.k Company Title
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f TABLE OF CONTENTS dl i . Subiect Page Training Objectives iii Introduction 1 A. Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures 5 B. Emergency Classification 7 C. Emergency Response Facilities 11 , D. Emergency Organization 19 I E. Manpower and Timing 26 F. Communications 34 ; G. Emergency Piarning Zones _. 35 i H. Dose Assessment 43
- 1. Protective Actions 54 J. Emergency Response Management 73 K. Public Information & Public Notification 89 l
e L l i
MBBBL%BearRB11111Kc1alsKelEM TABLE OF CONTENTS
, (Continued)
Figures Page
- 1. Local Emergency Operations Center 13
- 2. Local Emergency Operations Center Functional Layout 14 - 15
- 3. Local Emergency Response Organization 21 - 24
- 4. Persons / Groups / Organizations Notified For Standby or Mobilization l Unusual Event 27 l Alert 28 - 30 l Sita Area Emergency 31 - 33
- 5. Plumz Exposure Pathway EPZ -
36
'(, 6. Ingestion Exposure Pathway EPZ 37
- 7. Zones Within 10-Mile EPZ 41
- 8. Dose Projection Basis 48
- 9. Plume Releases 49
- 10. Atmospheric Dispersion Process 50
- 11. Action and Health Effects vs.
Exposure Pathways 64
- 12. Protective and Restoration Actions for Nuclear Incidents in Airborne Releases 79
- 13. Initiation Times for Protective Actions 80 t
ii
MBRERwaQMMIIMMsKMK TRAINING OBJECTIVES l l At the completion of this module the individual should have a
- complete und'erstanding of the following areas of emergency planning and be able to demonstrate this understanding by:
l A. Explaining the need for emergency planning and describing the basic purpose and objectives of the SNPS Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan and associated implementing procedures. B. Listing and describing the four emergency classifications, l ranking them in order of their relative severity and indicating protective actions linked to the classification. C. Explaining the basic assessment, corrective and protective actions for the four emergency classifications; including discussions on dose assessment field teams, potassium iodide, and staging area / emergency worker decontamination f acilities. D. Listing the location, name, and purpose of the LERO Emergency Response Facilities. E. Stating the basic manpower and timing considerations for key LERO personnel and how they are activated in relation to the emergency classification. F. Describing the communications capabilities of LERO. G. Explaining the concept, pu rpose, and distances related to the plume exposure and ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zones. H. Stating the values and associated actions for the plume exposure pathway protective action guidelines, recalling general protective action responses for the ingestion pathway. f I. Recalling the basic concepts of operation for the public notification and information processes. l 111 l l l
iWB B B B Ms21 HAIBIIK G QEE01c W A % INTRODUCTION What is emergency planning? It is as the term implies, just that, planning emergency response organizations, developing procedures, laying out support facilities, training personnel, and stockpiling equipment to be able to effectively respond to emergency events. Whether it is in the commercial nuclear power industry or any other field, the best planning efforts can only account for the known possible accident contingencies. However, with the proper emergency planning program as a foundation, with an emergency organization developed and trained to respond for the expected events, then flexibility and adaptability will exist to judge and enact the necessary alterations to cope with the unexpected. Within the general framework of any emergency response, a numb.e: of '( possible alternatives for action are usually availabis, Tha basic criterion to employ, however, is to minimize the numbec c* possible responses so that available resources are expended only on viable solutions and actions for the emergency response. A well-defined emergency preparedness program drastically reduces tha inef fectual demands on resources that are not needed or that thwart the overall recovery effort. To this end, the SNPS Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan has been devised to effectively coordinate an immediate response to a broad spectrum of emergency situations. It provides answers to such questions as: How would the public be protected from an incident at SNPC? 1 1 Who would be notified? , What are the proper responses for offsite emergency personnel?
,(. Page 1 of 89
l
)
What protective actions are justified for various emergency situations? It is your responsibility as one of the senior LERO members to ensure that the resources of LERO are properly applied and managed to achieve a successful solution to the accident situation at hand. In order to ef fectively manage an organization as large and complex as LERO, it is necessary for you to have a well-rounded understanding of LERO, the Emergency Response Plan and its Implementing Procedures, and your responsibility within the accident management process. This workbook module is designed to provide you with an overview of the key f acets of the of f site emergency planning efforts related to LERO. In addition, you should refer of ton to the SNPS Local Of f site Radiological Emergency Response Plan and the Implementing Procedures to acquire an understanding of the commitments and concepts established for implementing a response by LERO. - 9 Page 2 of 89 LOCAL EMERGENCYRESPONSEORGANIZADON
& n '
SENECA'S P.ROVERB DEMQNSTRATES THE NECESSITY- '
. FOR AN EMERGENCY PLANNING OBJECTIVE n
$1, IF A MAN DOES NOT KNOW WHAT HARBOR HE'S HEADED FOR, NO WIND IS THE RIGHT ONE ---
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A. EMERGENCY PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES The purpose of an emergency plan is to provide a mechanism to be utilized in making decisions in the event of an emergency and to ensure that the necessary personnel, equipment, supplies, and essential services are available to implement those decisions should they be required. The objectives of the SNPS Local Of f site Radiological Emergency I Response Plan are to: Establish an effective method to activate and mobiliza an emergency organizacion to direct and conduct the emergency response activitee. Outline a method to evaluate and recommend protective actions. l( - Outline the most effective course of action required to saf'eguard the general public and emergency workers. Establish the interface between emergency response locations and organizations. Provide for the maintenance of the emergency preparedness p rog ram. l The SNPS Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan is i divided into five chapters: o Chapter 1 - Introduction o Chapter 2 - Organization 1 o Chapter 3 - Concept of Operation o Chapter 4 - Facilities & Equipment o Chapter 5 - Maintenance of the Planning Effort Page 5 of 89
# W B R E m a nE W A IfII K m ! MMMlHMA 1
Before moving on in this module, spend some time with your copy of the Emergency Plan. Become familiar with its layout and the information it provides. This document can be an excellent ) reference source to you, both during the training program and when responding as a senior member of LERO. Where the Emergency Plan outlines the concepts and commitments to be employed in carrying out the off site responsibilities for emergency planning, the SNPS Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures provide the detailed, step-by-step instructions for carrying out the concepts and commitments of the Emergency Plan. As indicated earlier, the Emergency Plan may be considered a reference document which can be referred to during a recuense; however, the Implementing Procedures must be utilized by all responding LERO members to ensure all actions are carried out correctly and in the proper sequence. As a senior LERO member, one of your primary responsibilities is to ensure that all l members of your group are f amiliar with their respective procedures and that the procedures are out and in use during any LERO response. Again, before moving on, take time now and familiarize yourself with your copy of the Implementing Procedures. Pay particular attention to the procedures that relate to your group's activities. Page 6 of 89 l
L J f MODULE 17 EMERGENCY PLAN & IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES l MODULE REVIEW PART 1 l Name: LERO
Title:
Company Title 4
- 1. The SNPS Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan provides the concepts and philosophies of LERO, whereas the Implementing Procedures provide the detailed step-by-step instructicns to be followed by LERO members in carrying out their actions.
C True or False
- 2. Which chapter of the Emergency Plan provides information related to the protective actions employed by LERO?
- a. Chapter 1, Section 1.3
- b. Chapter 3. Section 3.6 .
- c. Chapter 4, Section 4.3
- d. Chapter 5, Section 5.1 1
- 3. Indicate which Implementing Procedure details the process for controlling documents and records at the Local EOC.
l; OPIP - t h- , Page.1 of 2 I L _ _ ;
L i
- 4. A foldout map showing the 10 EPZ and the 19 zones within the EPZ can,be found in OPIP -
- 5. Your responsibility as a senior LERO member is to ensure that all members of your group have memorized the steps listed in the Implementing Procedures so that the ' Implementing Procedures can be used only occasionally to refresh their memory during an eme rgency.
True or False i Page 2 of 2 LOC 4L EMEMEhCYRESPOVSEOMANIZADCW
TMBBB%axalsMI2IIKC51ali[031HMA e-l% B. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY l As a result of the Three Mile Island emergency, a standardized emergency classification system was devised to facilitate ef fective communication between the various responding emergency organizations. Onsite and off site plans and procedures aJe written so that required response actions are keyed to the emergency classification. By using the emergency classification system, plant operators can communicate the level of seriousness of an emergency to non-technical oriented energency cenponse personnel without having to describe une cpecific equipment problem. Chapter 3, Section 3.2, of the SMPS Local Offsite Radiclogical Emergency Besponse Plan discusses the emergency classification system as it relates to LERO.
, (.
There are four emergency classifications. They are, in order of increasing severity: Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Eme rgency, and General Eme rgency. A brief description of each classification follows. Notification of Unusual Event is the occurrence of an event or events which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Generally speaking, an unusual event involves no abnormal release of radioactive material. The purpose of the unusual event classification is to: Provide current information when unusual events or l occurrences transpire. k. Page 7 of 89 L t
L l l )l Assure that the first step in' any response of the emergency organization is carried out. Provide for periodic testing of emergency communications. l Ale rt is the occurrence of an event or events which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of l safety of the plant. l This level of classification may include events involving a ' limited release of radiation onsite. The purpose of the alert classification is to: I Provide current status information to of f site authorities and agencies. Assure that emergency personnel are readily available to respond if the situation becomes more serious. Provide testing of response center activation. Site Area Emergency is the occurrence of an event or events which involve actual or likely major f ailures of plant functions needed to protect the public. This classification includes the type of events whers there may be some radiation exposure to the "near site" public. i The purpose of the site area emergency classification is to: l Provide current information for, and clarification with,
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offsite authorities and the pub 1ic. 1 - t Page 3 of 89 irgB3gG 33Gi7m@2RSR3r - _ _ _ _ _ _
l e W B B h i @ n n r W A I B I I M e w W c { e 3 hT W A e r-l Assure that emergency response centers are manned. l l
- Assure that personnel required for evacuation of "near site" t
I areas are at their duty stations.
- Assure that radiation monitoring field teams can be dispatched both onsite and offsite.
- Provide for testing of response capabilities of the entire emergency organization.
General Emergency is the occurrence of an event or events ) which involves actual or imminent core degradation and/or the potential for loss of containment integrity with a large l radioactivo release potential. 1 This classification includes events where large amounts of C- radioactive material could be released causing a hazard to the general public. 1 The purpose of the general emergency classification is to: I
- Provide current information for, and consultation with, offsite authorities and the public.
- Recommend and implement pre-determined protective actions for the public. l l
l
- Provide continuous monitoring of the situation.
! - Initiate additional measures as indicated by event releases or potential releases. I , l h: Page 9 of 89 l 4
BRiFREK M M AIflIKC182i[TCTWA% i It is importa'nt for you, as a senior LERO member, to have an appreciation for the dif f erence in magnitude of the severity of an incident associated with each of these classifications. Look again at the types of events which fall into each classification. For an unusual event, you should note that no abnormal release of radioactive material is involved. For an alert, any release of radiation must be limited to an area onsite. Only when the situation progresses to a Site Area or General Emergency is there an actual radiation release potential which involves of f site consequences and protective actions. It should also be pointed out that it is quite possible to find the nuclear power plant in any of the four classification situations with there having been no release of radiation. Examples of this type of situation would be fires of varying ! degree or earthquakes of varying magnitude requiring classifi-cation of the event from an Unusual Event through a" General i Emergency, based on their involvement or magnitude. As a senior LERO member, you need to become very f amiliar with this emergency classification system. While progressing through the remainder of this workbook module, and in fact the remainder of the training program, pay particular attention to the various actions and activities that are keyed to each of the four classification levels. Page 10 of 89}}