ML20085D154

Expresses Appreciation for Informing of Hydrogen & Oxygen Problem That Developed in Connection W/One of Commission-operated Reactors & for Recommending That Licensee Review Design

ML20085D154
Person / Time
Site:	Saxton File:GPU Nuclear icon.png
Issue date:	01/28/1963
From:	Neidig R SAXTON NUCLEAR EXPERIMENTAL CORP.
To:	Lowenstein R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
Shared Package
ML20083L048	List: ML20085C449 ML20085C452 ML20085C455 ML20085C458 ML20085C461 ML20085C464 ML20085C467 ML20085C472 ML20085C477 ML20085C480 ML20085C483 ML20085C490 ML20085C500 ML20085C501 ML20085C504 ML20085C508 ML20085C513 ML20085C517 ML20085C540 ML20085C543 ML20085C546 ML20085C583 ML20085C586 ML20085C590 ML20085C592 ML20085C602 ML20085C605 ML20085C616 ML20085C620 ML20085C622 ML20085C625 ML20085C628 ML20085C630 ML20085C633 ML20085C634 ML20085C637 ML20085C805 ML20085C809 ML20085C826 ML20085C835 ML20085C840 ML20085C844 ML20085C904 ML20085C913 ML20085C966 ML20085C973 ML20085D041 ML20085D048 ML20085D052 ML20085D059 ... further results
References
FOIA-91-17 NUDOCS 9110150300
Download: ML20085D154 (2)

Text

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flLUi.is.9, Mr. Roberi lavenstein, Director -

Division cf Licensing and Regulation O.S. Atontic Energy Commission 6" Libertesy,.,uss JAN3 01%)* 7' .-

Wuhington 25, D.C. ggy 4,, &

Dear Mr. Iowenstei.nl y q d We want to thank you for ytur letter of January 18 informing us of the hyd ogen and oxygen probleen that devolcped in connection with one of the Camtssion-operat.ad reactors and for reoclamendirq that we review the design of the Saxton facility for similar conditions.

I have learned that our operating personnel and the Saxton Safety Cosatittee have been kept informed frca various sources about the incident that you referred to in your letter. Based on information that has been l received, a review has been made of the Saltou design and steps have been taken to monitor the presence of hydrogen and orygen in several locations in the cont ainment vessel. N '.oestions being monitored it.clude the oeiling area of the primary compartaant above the pressuriser, the area under the concreta shielding blocks in the reactor well, and the main operating floor.

These areas are beir$ monitored frequently during periods rhen the reactor is in ope ation. Monitoring of these areas during initial power operation, which had consisted of 30- to h0-hour runs at power levels up to rated power level of 20 MWt, has not revaaled any accumulation of hydrogen or oxygen.

Conserfative calculations indicate that a =ali percentage concen-tration of hydrogen and oxygen could accuanlate in the reiector well frce the radiolytic decomposition of the neutron shield water. Although valves in -

the primary oogertment are either back-seated when ful.1 open or have packing leak-offs connected to a closed vsnt system discharging to the discharge tank i

I in the containment vessel, there is a possibility that combustible gases in the pressuriser vapor phase and in other main ecsolant systems and instrument lines could leak into the primary compartment.

Car operating personnel are now well aware of the possibility of I

hydrogen and oxygen occumulating in the contairusent vessel from the sources i

mentioned in your letter ard as mentiored above, aM they will continue to I monitor the contairment vessel for the presence of those gases. In the event that concentratiorJ approaching explosive mixtures of such gases are dia-covered in the contairument vessel, steps _ vill be taken to correct the 9110150300 910424 (

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January 28, 1963 Mr. Robert Lowenstein situation. It may be possible to vert these gases to the ventilating system >

daring operation and if this is not possible, the reactor will be shut down end stepe vill be taken to ventilate the various compartmenta and purge the containment vessel.

While there was no specific design policy regarding the use of arplosion-proof electrical devices in the conteirstent sessel, we f eel that '

there is a minium of this type of arposure in the areas where explosive gases might accumulate. However, we will give this matter further review and if it is possible to reduce this hasarc; by the installation of e.plosion-proof motors or switches, such corrective action will be taken.

We would, of course, prefer to try to control this situation by frsquent senitoring and by further evaluation of this potential problem before making extent,ive electrical m>difications.

I want to thank you again for alerting us to this potential hasard, and to assure you that we also have considerable concern for the safe operation of thc Sarton reactor and will take the necsesary steps to try and prevent an occurrence similar to the one described in your letter.

Sincerely yours,  ;

Oe ' '

P. E. Neidig, President RIN DS 4

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