ML20082M735

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Proposed Tech Spec Change 91-09 Re Rev of Containment Radiation Monitor Requirements
ML20082M735
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 08/27/1991
From:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20082M717 List:
References
NUDOCS 9109050351
Download: ML20082M735 (31)


Text

.

f ,

774 o" ,

TCj g cn TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

M$-Q 1

i _

5e s FNGINEERED SArE1Y FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRt2tENTATION ogi z

~

I '

N_E MINIMM TOTAL NO.. CilANNELS l mou88 Z l'UNCTIONAL UNIT

' y OF CIW{NELS TO TRIP CHANNELS APPLICABLE OPERABLE HDDES EiD.F f. AC110M N

Steam Line Pressure-tow 3/ steam line 2/ steam line 2/ steam line 1, 2, 3 # 17*

in any steam ggg3 line

2. EONTAINMENT SPRAY
a. Manual 2 1* % 2 1,2,3,4 g, b. 20 B Automatic Actuation 2 Logic 1 2 1, 2, 3, 4 15

~ c.

  • Containment Pressure-- 4 2 liigh-liigh 3 1,2,3 18
3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATICN j a. Phase "A" Isolation
1) Hanual 2 1 2 1.2,3,4 20 l 2) From Safety Injection

! yp 2 1 Automatic Actuation 2

. g logic 1, 2, 3, 4 15

< g

% M 4*

cn E o switcties must be operated simultaneously for actuation.

f $ o.*

  1. c CJ w

?

a -.

. i 1 - - .

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) . - .

b ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 8

4 g MINIMUM i '

TOTAL NO. ' CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE s

E FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION e b. Phase "B" Isolation

1) Manual 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 '20
2) Automatic (267 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 15 Actuation Logic
3) Containment 4 2 3 1,2,3 18 Pressu re-High-High 1

w c. Containment Ventilation D Isolation

1) Manual 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 19
2) Automn ic Isolation 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 15 Logic e -

/(

l bI)b$1b[91 .

- . ~ . . . ,

1

,,5 < '

_A j l - N A

[ 3)# Containment Purge Air Exhaust Monitor 2 1 1 1,2,3,4 194 e ty-Hig 4

EA o E3

5) Ca .tu

,_ _ ,_1

. . . .t Pu, t au

, 1 . . _ <

2 1 1 1, 2 , 2 , " l':

@ ' ' 'a ' ' * * ' ' 'J ***u .

i Two switches must be operated simultaneously for actuation- R67

%w CD N M*

I C'l 1

w

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

  1. Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below P-11 (Pressurizer gg Pressure B1cck of Safety Injection) setpoint.

Trip function automatically blocked above P-11 and may be blocked below R145 ggg when Safety Injection on Steam Line Pressure-Low is not blocked.

The channel (s) associated with the protective functions derived from the out of service Reactor Coolant Loop shall be placed in the tripped mode.

a The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the lotal p14'<

Number of Channels, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />; however, one N channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 16 - Deleted.

R145 ACTION 17 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />,
b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; one addi-tional channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for R145 surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

ACTION 19 - With less than the Minimum Channwnt.latica q RARIF, nnop tion may s i;;10tirDx continue provided the contain are maintained closed. Puut SuPPt.Y BND Exawsr w

ACTION 20 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the i.1 operable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

3/4 3-22 Amendment No. 63, 141 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 MAY 161990

7 *

.}

t .

. m TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued) -

i pj

<=

M ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP i >

I l . FUNCTIONAL UNIT

/  % TRIP SETPOINT

- ALLOWABLE VALUES 5  ? " ' :f -

.t C .: "--it:r 3 v -

m q .

":d!:xti . !'a :"

' 9.5 r ! f ,::  ;SE  !" 3 ,' * ' ;

~

A  %

3.X Containment Purge Air Exhaust i 8.5 x 10 ~3 pci/cc ~3 Monitor Radioactivity-Ilfgh $ 8.5 x 10 pti/cc r c_a_

N v

__a o_a r_..,_._

~

~ - -,t __ i n _5._,,,__

.{~] ,

' ~ ' ~ "

,,e

~~

._.,,S.,,,__

4. STE/Ji LINE ISOLATION m a. Hanual N Not Applicable Not Applicable
b. Automatic Actuation Logic Not Applicable Not Applicable
c. Containment Pressure-liigh-High 1 2.81 psig i 2.9 psig '
d. Steam Line Pressure--Low > 600 psig steam > 592.2 psig steam Tine pressure (Note 1) Tine pressure (Note 1)
c. Hegative Steam Line Pressure Rate--liigh R145

< 100.0 psi (Note 2) i 107.8 psi (Note 2)

5. TURBINE TRIP AND FEEIMATER ISOLATION
a. Steam Generator Water level--

M>E High-High < 81.0% of narrow range < 81.7% of narrow range Instrument span each steam

&k 3 generator Instrument span each steam generator k b. Automatic Actuation Logic M.A.

N. A.

.EE3co

  • O w

I

r, k.

& E y 5_i,Cpn39 eso)

- T ENGINEEREO 1AFETY FEA.TU,R&5 -- Rest.tNst

--- T!,H.E,S INITIATING SIGNAL AN.D _ FUNCTION -

,RE$PONSE

- TIMF. IN SECCNO$

10. Station Blackout
a. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 1 60(11)
11. Trip of Main Feedwater f s
a. Auxiliery Feedwater Pumps 00 01)
12. l.ess of Power
a. 6.9 kv Shutdown Board Degraded s 10(10)

Voltage or less of Voltage

13. RWST t.evel-low Ct, incident wip Containment Sumo Level-High and Safety Infection
a. Automatic Switchover tc Centainment Sump 1 250
14. Containment Purce Air Extaust Radioactivity - High
a. Centaineent Ventilation Isolation i 10(6) f'y 'y 3-r-t C: _"- 't:- N 7'~ ~~' x l',

E: ' N/ $~N e g 4 g etimit,. u4 p y

~__..._.t....,.,+-_ . u.

.. ... .... o_ ,.., a_ . _, +_ t ~ -

..H6

.m 1 C :- t 3 --et %9 am: * : te i + " u 4 a -

,g, t.

0:nt:' n;et '!:-tt' . tier he' 2tf or _INj

%_ s N.~ /

/

3-32 Amendment No. 29, 77 SEQUDYAH - UNIT 1

~

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) __

u, E ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION E SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 11

  • CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE E CHANNEL CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED Z FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK

~

3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
a. Phase "A" Isolation N.A. N.A. R 1,2,3,4 i) Manual N.A. M(1) 1, 2, 3, 4
2) From Safety Injection N.A.

Automatic Actuation Logic R51

b. Phase "B" Isolation

{ N.A. R 1, 2, 3, 4

1) Manual N.A.

y ,

N.A. N.A. M(1) I, 2, 3, 4

2) Automatic Actuation Logi:

R Q 1, 2, 3

3) Containment Pressure-- S High-High
c. Containment Ventilation Isolation N.A. N.A. R 1, 2, 3, 4
1) Manual RSI N.A. M(1) I, 2, 3, 4 y,
2) Automatic Isolation Logic N.A.

v v e ~ v

.;g gF N- v u , -

q 7. , _ . . ,

r,- u .:.__ c e 7,, ,

n,, - . - ,. ,.:..

n a A .

a .~

5

.F .

m~

r .

  • l

.l v>

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) .

x"s 8 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTR *JMENTATION s

x-SURVEILtANCE REQUIREN NIS

  • CHAl#4EL MODES IM intICH QiANNEL CilANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE E
  • -* CHECK CALIERATION TEST REQUIRED

_. FUt:CTIONAL UNIT H 1,2,3,4 h Containment Purge Air Exhaust Honitor Rrdio-S R activity-High / A' f V a = , , , ,

q r__. - - _ _ . o , _. r7 . , ., g , , ,

w

.; u: f_

4. STEAM LINE ISOLATION M.A. R 1, 2, 3
a. Manual N.A.

M.A. M(1) 1, 2, 3

    • b. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

Y S R Q 1, 2, 3

" c. Containment Pressure--

liigh-liich R Q 1, 2, 3 Steam Line Pressure-Low S

d. R145 S R Q 3
c. Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate--ifigh S. TURBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER Ty ISOLATI0la 1,2,3 2::. o S R Q

--< g a. Steam Generator Water

% g level--liigh-liigh CD S Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(1) 1, 2, 3 2 b.

CO o CO - 6. AUXILIARY FFED'n'ATER 1, 2, 3 O s N.A. N.A. R

" a. Manual N.A. M(1) 1, 2, 3 o.

" Automatic Actuation logic N.A.

b. ~

E \['D

TABLE 3.3-6 ~

M

@ RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION S

M MINIMUM

. CHANNEL 5 APPLICABLE ALARM / TRIP MEASUREMENT g

c-.

INSTRUMENT OPERABLE MODES SETPOINT RANGE ACTION

  • 1.

AREA MONITOR

  • II)

~1

a. Fuel Storage Pool Area 1 i 200 mR/hr 10 -104mR/hr 26 f64 ,

Rll6

2. PROCESS MONITORS
a. Containment Purge Air -3 pCi/cc 1 1, 2, 3, 4 & 6 5 8.5x10 10 - 107 cp 28
b. Containment R*
i. Gaseous Activity w

, u r _ , : 3 , , : _.

C V '

R16 8 '::' :t ' r 1 ^11 "^0re O_EIn"3 f i ':: 10 - 1r'7 7- o ea age A h # #

Detection 1 1, 2, 3 & 4 N/A 10 - 107 cpm 27 4

i ii. Particulate Activity i ' : t r--

",! 1 .,,.:__

, m., m,nec , r_,n -5 , . . , , , , _ ,n, ._ ., o

. y r-- ' --

! {F . Detection 1 1, ?, 3 & 4 N/A 10 - 107 cpm 27

@ c. Control Room I:olation 1 ALL MODES 5 400 cpm ** 10 - 107 cpm 29 j

oo i

-5 R116 Gz mP "With fuel in the storage pool or building

- ^^ Equivalent to 1.0 x 10 SpCi/cc ,.

. R116

~ .

k sf I

TABLE 3.3-6 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION ACTION 26 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, perform area surveys of the monitored area with portable monitoring instrumentation at  ;

least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 27 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, comply with the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.4.6.1. R16 ACTION 28 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirem Wompiv4(tti ther A ION equtrsmentyf-4pecif4ca 4 . 9. fnoor W Ruo 3.3.2 (mones 1; a,3 Awo O. gti -

ACTION 29 - ItR'the number LE channels less than required by the ,

Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> initiate  !

and maintain operation of the control room emergency ventilation system in the recirculation mode of operation.

Ril6 r

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-41 Amendment No. 12, 112 April 28 1989 l

1 TABLE 4.3-3 m

, @ RADIATION MONITORING INSTRtMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS j SE '

2-CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL CIANNEL FUNCTIONAL lR116 SORVEILLANCE E

~

INSTRUMENT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED

-o e_. 1. AREA MONITOR lt116

a. Fuel Storage Pool Area S R H *
2. PROCESS MONITORS R116
a. Containment Purge Air Exhaust 5 R H 1, 2, 3, 4 & 6 i
b. Containment

' w i. se > iv' s a -.:,..:-r-_,..:- .

c o . 1,. -~r.-

MMeM '

~

i j

w S R l', 2 M4 ii.

a { ul , , Actg y #

nT ^

'- P R 1, 2, 3, 4 f

c. Control Room Isolation 5 R M ALL MODES Ril6 i ^With fuel in the storage pool or building s

n *O

ia

~&

! ga

. e f.5 y

e C

~

i

, ,,-c--,~- - , , , . - ,--- ,. ,. . . , ~ . - , - , , - -. -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

REFUELING OPERATIONS i )

i BASES I

_y . , f __

~s Cevrnm nnNr Pan. Ortuwus.

3/4 9.9 CONTAINMENTVENTILATION_SYSTEtt_

, n- .y -- (.D u M N c. <

The OPERABILITY of this system ensur that the containment vent :nd- A '

-puege-penetrations will be automatically s.olated upon detection of higL ~',A radiation levels Wh4n the conta4emeek he OPERABIT.TTr6r thTMystem Ti re@tred'hltTict'ThrteteTiP0f radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment. l l

3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL AND SPENT FUEL PIT l l

The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water i depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis, i

3/4.9.12 AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM The limitations on the auxiliary building gas treatment system ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will i be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge M to the atmosphere. Cumulative operation of the system with the heater on for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> over a 31 day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses. ANSI H510-1975 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

I i-l t

R138 l

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-3 Amendment No. 134 -

April 2, 1990 l

1

. - - . - _ - . . _ _ , . _ . ~ . - . . . _ _ _ _ . , _ . . . . . - _ , ~ - . , - .-

T/.BLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

T,

$ ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTilATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 5

x e MINIPLH c TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE N00ES ACTION

$ FUNCTIONAL UNIT

3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION RSS
b. Phase "B" Isolation
1) Manual 2 1** 2 1,2,3,4 20
2) Automatic 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 15 Actuation Logic
3) Containment 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 18 Pressure-High-High

{

Y c. Containment Ventilation U Isolation

1) Manual 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 1 1
2) Automatic Isolation 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 15 i y -- ~
, 2, 2, " I:

?) C -t 9 :-t C:: I

": t: o >ir:ti 2:3 "if h ^ U Containment Purge 2 1 1 1,2,3,4 lj9 +

3}4)=

aE m

Air Exhaust Monitor Radioactivity-High a

,, a s) C # =1  :-t =- 2  : 1, 2, 2. -  ::

1 t: ";ti It) "Is

_A E> ~ **Two switches must be operated simultaneously for actuation.

Q$ RSS

(.

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) h ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 8 '

s*

MINDE.M TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE E FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION I -

n> S. TURBINE TRIP & R132{ s FEEDWATER ISOLATION

a. Steam Generator 3/ loop 2/ loop in 2/ loop in 1, 2, 3 17* n132l Water Level-- any oper- each eper-High-High ating loop ating loop
b. Automatic Actuation 2 1 2 1,2,3 23 RSS Logic
6. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER

$$ a. Manual Initiation 2 1 2 1,2,3 24 Y b. Automatic Actuation 2 1 2 1,2,3 23 ts Logic

c. Main Steam Generator l Water Level--Low-Low <
f. Start Motor-Driven Pumps j g a. Steam Gen. 3/Stm. Gen. 2/Stm. Gen. 2/Stm. Gen. 1, 2, 3 36*

R Water Level-- in any in each

! Low-tow operating operating o3 (Adverse) Stm. Gen. Stm. Gen. R132

((j 'z b. Steas Gen.

Water Level--

3/Stm. Gen. 2/Stm. Gen. 2/Stm. Gen. 1, 2, 3 36* l in any in each cza

"'^-

O Low-Low operating operating (EAM) Stm. Gen. Stm. Gen.

, u,

' , . ;}" c. RCS Loop AT 4(1/ loop) 2 3 1,2,3 37*

" w Z,

o v- v s- r__

. *T. ,,to s 7.-,

-,.,o 7 7_ - g _ g 7 ' _. .** . -.

1. _7g.. e:7_ l

& --r P ^ y

['" kj e

E

~e- /-

, , . o a

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) 4

_ TABLE NOTATION

  1. Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Block of Safety Injection) setpoint.

,, Trip function automatically blocked above P-11 and may be blocked below R1

,,gP-11 when Safety Injection on Steam Line Pressure-Low is not blocked.

  • The channel (s) associated with the protective functions derived from the

,out-of service Reactor Coolant Loop shall be placed in the tripped mode. ,

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, be in HOT STANDBY within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in hll3 COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1 provided the other channel )(13 --

is OPERABLE.

ACTION 16 - Deleted.

ACTION 17 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the '

Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied: ,

R13.

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.1. t ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition and t the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; one addi- f13 tional. channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

ACTION 19 - With less than the Minimum Channels continue provided the contat J1LEpeg ayves

rtf htf en hei-are maintained closed. Rcc Swepty %d Em ust

-ACTION 20 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STAND 3Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-22 Amendment No. 55,132 00T 3119S0

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

  • E o

8 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS Y FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES 3 .

w c

3

~

r__...-- _. r_ u__,.__

_o e _ ,o 3 ,. . , _ _ _m , , , ,

3 , . . , _
  • ;,_ ,i L _ . ; ;J;a _; -~~~

' ' ~ '

~' ~~

' ' ~ ' ' '

-- -- A s  % r

= 3.-4-) Containment Purge Air Exhaust ~3 -3 18.5 x 10 pct /cc 18.5 x 10 pCi/cc C--i:4 .--i "::i': 'ri:

-T c - ' -5 ~

.a_- -'? ? - 1"

C ' '

-> s j _

A ^  ;

4. STEAM LINE ISOLATION
a. Manual Not Applicable Not Applicable

{ b. Automatic Actuation logic Not Applicable Not Applicable

{ c. Containment Pressure--High-High m

12.81 psig 12.9 psig

d. Steam Line Pressure--Low >600 psig steam line >592.2 psig steam line pressure (Note 1) pressure (Note 1)
e. Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate--High 1100.0 psi (Note 2) 1107.8 psi (Note 2)

RI32

5. TURBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION
a. Steam Generator Water level-- <81% of narrow range <81.7% of narrow range o ,g High-High Instrument span each Tnstrument span each

\

C") E steam generator steam generator

--4 % b. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

Cm P. H.A. RSS 14 m (o u, O

e M

G7 fu

7 l

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued) j f

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES i

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS l i

10. Station Blackout j
a. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps I1I) R68 f 1 60
11. Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps l 3

R68 L

a. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 1 60(11)  !

r i

12. Loss _of Power R68
a. 6.9 kv Shutdown Board - Degraded < 10(10)

~

l Voltage or Loss of {

Voltage -!

13. RWST Level-Low Coincident with Containment Sump t Level-High and Safety Injection >
a. Automatic Switchover to j Containment Sump i 250
14. Containment Purge Air Exhaust Radioactivity - High
a. Containment Ventilation Isolation i 10(6)

's- -

15. C -t '- n-t c:: "r f tr V i ege .4 m< ty u4 9 g, c e _ .f_g. t o .. g4 3 34m. 7 g , 3 4 , ,,  ; ,n%

1E. E:-t '- :-i a:-t'ce' t; ^ct'->'tr "i f

. C a t:!- rt '!rt!': tier Irr ht'er  ; 'nN s^% .- ' R68 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-32 Amendment No. 79// 68 August 5, 1988

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

$c ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

% CtWiNEL MODES FOR WHICH E CllAN;;EL SURVEILLANCE 15

  • CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHECK TEST REQUIRED g FUNCTIONAL UNIT _ CALIBRATION m 3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

.i

a. Phase "A" Isolation N.A. N.A. R 1,2,3,4
1) Manual N.A. M(1) 1, 2, 3, 4
2) From Safety Injection N.A.

Automatic Actuation Logic

.R39

b. Phase "B" Isolation N.A. N.A. R 1, 2, 3, 4 m
1) Manual s 1, 2, 3, 4
2) Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(1)

[.

5 R Q 1, 2, 3 If, 3) Containment Pressure--

High-fligh

c. Containment Ventilation Isolation N.A. R 1, 2, 3, 4
1) Manual N.A.

N.A. N.A. M(1) I, 2, 3, 4 ;R39

2) Automatic Isolation Logic v v v r v

< . :. _ c ,.

p m_. ._z.. - - ,,,

^

A j J -l

%ir 33 39 ss v

m J

f

^

1 . 1 D

3 TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) - ,

j M i O ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION c- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS-l g CHANNEL

  • MODES FOR MIICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE I5 FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK TEST c CALIBRAT_ ION REQUIRED z

Z 3)4) Containment Purge Air S R M 1, 2, 3, 4 u Exhaust Monitor Radio-activity-High es ,.- . _ . _ - _ . - -

. _ , _ _ c o

.j;~.. 1?p'~~~~-~' "

X ' ~

- 4 STEAM LINE ISOLATION 1
a. Manual N.A. N.A. R 1,2,3 g39 l w b. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N. A.

A M(1) 1, 2, 3 m c. Containment Pressure-- S R J, High-High Q 1, 2, 3 i

d. Steam Line Pressure--Low 5 R i

Q 1, 2, 3

e. Megative Steam Line Pressure S R132 R Q 3 q Rate--High S. TURBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER

, ISOLATION i >

g a. Steam Generator Water 5 R g Level--High-High Q 1,2,3 e

Oh o

b. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(1) 1, 2, 3 j

i

_g y

6. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER h5 1

g a. Manual N.A. N.A. R 1, 2, 3 g39 i

5g CD

b. Automatic Actuation Logic N. A. N.A.

C3 M(1) 1, 2, 3 U

N e

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$ TABLE 3.3-6 8 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 5

  • MINIMUM CHANNELS APPLICABLE ALARM / TRIP MEASUREMENT RANGE ACTION E INSTRUMENI OPERABLE MODES SETPOINT

" 3102 m

1. AREA MONITOR
a. Fuel Storage Pool Area 1 1200 mR/hr 10'I - 10 4mR/hr 26 lR5Z

. R102

2. PROCESS MONITORS

-3 7

a. Contain.nent Purge Air 1 1, 2, 3, 4 & 6 18 5 x 10 Ci/cc 10 - 10 cpm 28 l
b. Containment
i. Ga ..__.:,.

o

.. _ v. .

h,.. , ,,, m,ne, _c c O,,3 ., . . , _ ,,,_,,7,._ c elect 5E I 1, 2, 3W N/A 10 - 10' cpm 2/

v YS

, >$-  !;- mnce n --

., t 1, -

2F age Detection 1, 2, 3 & 4 N/A 10 - 10 cpm 7

" All MODES < 400 cpm ** 10 - 10 cpm 29 2.102

c. Control Room Isolation 1
  • With fuel in the storage pool or building

-5 R102

    • Equivalent to 1.0 x 10 Ci/cc.

NN

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4 TABLE 3.3-6 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 26 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, perform area surveys of the monitored area with portable monitoring instrumentation at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 27 - With the number of OPERABLE channels lass than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, comply with the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.4.6.1.

ACTION 28 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE re iremen ntt nf % ciff (W(o)Vhwit)4ba

, o s .9. mone o 3.3.2AC 10N ACTION 29 - obs s 1,2,'3 to-Bumbe?~tT D RABLF Aun )4).h~.w channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERAB'" squirement, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> initiate and maintain operation vi the control room emergency ventiiation system in the recirculation mode of operation.

R102 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-42 Amendment No.102 April 28, 1989 m

e.

~

TABLE 4.3-3 M

j RADIATION 'juL'rRING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE IS CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED g INSTRUM{NQ hR102 Z 1. AREA MONITOR o

" M

a. Fuel Storage Pool Area S R
2. PROCESS MONITORS

{02 5 R H 1, 2, 3, 4 & 6

a. Containment Purge Air Exhaust
b. Containment w!S, : i , u 'l C LeaNgebet$ction N '

[ M IN,I& 4 u ui unnre

$ ,w R

- ,H 1, 2, 3 &

w C Leakage Detect. ion S S R H ALL MODES O c. Control Room Isolation R102 5E 8

Mee

  • With fuel in the storage pool or building.

[m E3

~

%e 4

REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES

__ y m y y -

DuRQtt, CONT 6 t NmNT SdC.HM \ -

3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM bf MQ Tio N 5 9 C CV v^v- -

~

W uh L.6 TION .[t.c(AT 173N The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment wet-and. A

-pege-penetrations radiati will be automatically isolated upon detection of high vels WMn the c-ortteim. cat 7 he'0PERAB111TYYthTs'T9Ttim is

/_s requ .'e atmosphere to to res~trITThTTehesthrf the environment. ra6 osctive material from the containment 3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER tEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL AND SPENT FUEL PIT The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumotions of the accident analysis, i

3/4.9.12 AUXLIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM The limitations on the auxiliary building gas treatment system ensure that all radioactive matetial released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. Cumulative operation nf the system with the heater on for O 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> over a 31 day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture

! on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The O HRASILTTY of this system and the resulting iodins removal capacity are consisterit with the assumpt .ns of the accident analyses. ANSI N510-1975 will be used as a procedural v .de for surveillance testing.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-3 Amendment No. 121 April 2, 1990

t ENCLOSURE 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CilANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET Nos. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SQN-TS-91-09)

DESCRIPTIOM AND JUST1FICATION FOR REVISION OF CONTAINMENT RADIATION MONITOR REQUIREMENTS

ENCLOSURE 2 l

Description of Chang TVA proposes to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2 technical specifications (TSs) to revise the Tables 3.3-3, 3.3-4, 3.3-5, 4.3-2, 3.3-6, 4.3-3, and the bases for TS 3.9.3. These revisions change the requirements for containment gas and particulate and purge air radiation monitors as follows:

1. The containment gas and particulate radiation monitors do not initiate a containment ventilation isolation (CVI) signal on high radiation and bases are revised to be consistent with this design.
2. Exception to the provisions of TS 3.0.4 is applied to the manual and containment purge air exhaust monitor instrumentation f or CVI.
3. The required action for nanual or containment purge air exhaust

.nonitor CVI instrumentation channels less than the minimum channels operable is to maintain the containment purge supply and exhaust valves closed.

4. The required actions for the containment purge air radiation monitoring instrumentation less than the minimum channels operable are clarified to apply the appropriate specification for the applicable mode of operation.

In addition to these changes, a minor correction to the notation for footnotes in TS Table 3.3-3 has been included.

Reason for Change The proposed TS changes are being requested for the following reasons:

1. The containment gas and particulate radiation monitors at SQN have been the source of many spurious CVI initiations that were not required for plant conditions. This deletion of the CVI signal for these monitors will reduce unnecessary challenges to engineered safety feature circuitry.
2. Of the three specifications, TS 3.3.2, TS 3.3.3.1, and TS 3.9.9, TS 3.3.2 is the only one that restricts mode change by the TS 3.0.4 requiremeat for containment purge air exhaust radiation monitor instrumentation inoperability. This requirement could create unnecessary delays in plant start-ups for a condition that provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. For this reason these monitors and the manual instrumentation channels should be extluded from the provisions of TS 3.0.4.
3. The action for containment purge air exhaust monitor or manual instrumentation inoperability for the 2VI feature requires maintaining all purge supply and exhaust valves closed and the containment gas and particulate radiation monitor valves closed. This requirement, while in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, disables the use of the lower containment ,

radiation monitor and places the unit in a condition outside the ,

allowances provided for reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage detection i

g ,

1

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. L sys tems - (TS --3'. 4.'6.1 ) . By revising this. action. the monitors will L remain available for containment radiation level monitoring and RCS leak detection while maintaining the purge system valves closed and

~

allowing the unit'to continue operation.

4. The action requiretunt for inoperable containment purge air-radiation

, monitoring instrumentation does not reference all specifications _that L could apply and does not clearly. indicate in which modes the respective specifications are necessary. This change will clarify the specifications that apply for this inoperability and in which modes

-they are.necessary.

(_ The_ footnote notation correction'has been included with this change ')

because most of the affected pages were already involved in this change.- (

This correction ensures clarity between the

  • notation for the exclusion to the provisions of TS 3.0.4 and the
  • or ** notation-for two switches being operated for actuation. This change utilizes only a ** notation for the later condition described above. .

I j Justification for-Change '

The justification for-the proposed TS changes is as follows:

L. The containment gas and particulate radiation monitors do not provide I

any primary safety functions for containment isolation as described in Chapter 15 of the SQN Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The ,

deletion of the CVI _ initiation signal f rom these radiation monitors  :

will reduce some' dive'rsity for CVI actuations but will not reduce any I redundancy or diversity in the safety analysis as described below.

l For CVI initiations, the bounding case for_offsite dose considerations i is-a large break-loss of ecolant accident (LBLOCA) as described in SQN l

-FSAR Section 15.4.1. For this event a release through the containment- )

ventilation lines is assumed to be unfiltered with the lines

-100 percent..open for five seconds. For the presence of high radiation, the qualified CVI signal is provided by the containment purge radiation monitors. In addition, the fuel handling accident inside containment,. described in FSAR Sections 15.4.5 and 15.5.6, does not take direct credit for the purge radiation monitors or any other device to isolate containment as a result of high radiation. The purge monitors provide conservatism for this event by isolating j ~i' containment via a CVI to_further reduce offsite releases and dose rates.

RCS breaks in the range from the smallest (3/8 inch) to the bounding

/ _LBLOCA will result in-isolation via the low pressurizer pressure, high-containment pressure, or high containment radiation with the high radiation isolation initiated by the containment purge radiation l.. monitors. All offsite releases are bounded by the LBLOCA. Since the-l only control function of the containment gas and particulate radiation l' monitors is the generation of a CVI signal and the safety analysis does not take any credit for this function, the deletion of this function is acceptable. These monitors will still provide indications of containment radiological conditions _during normal operations and off-normal conditions for use by the. Operations crew and to provide TS monitoring ior RCS leak detection. The associated bases changes for TS 3.9.3 are proposed to be consistent with this change and agree with the safety analysis requirements.

r - - --- - - - - - - - -- - - - - -

7----------------------------

.-- 3 l

~

2. Providing an.extlusion to=the requirements of TS 3.0.4 for the manual  !

and containment purge air exhaust monitor. instrumentation for CVIs is 1 justified by the NRC position documented in Generic Letter 87-09.--

" Sections 3.0 and 4.0 of:the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) '

-on the Applicability of-Limiting Conditions for Operation and  ;

Surveillance Requirements."' This position. states that when an acceptable level of safety _is provided for continued operation by the l action requirements TS 3.0.4 unduly' restricts facility operation. -;

This position is-consideredLvalid for a limiting condition of I

-operation that has action requirements permitting continued operation '

for_an unlimited period of time. For.the manual and containment purge i air exhaust monitor instrumentation, the action requirement is that-operatien may continue provided the CVI valves are maintained closed 3 with less than the minimum channels _ operable. This requirement is applicable to_the staff position that entry into an_ operational mode should be permitted in accordance with those action requirements. l Therefore, this. exclusion.to the provisions of_TS 3.0.4 is acceptable.-

J3. The-purpose:for maintaining the CVI valves closed when less than the-

_ minimum channels are operable is to ensure no containment release paths-to outside are-open when the reliability for CVI initiations is- ~}

significantly degraded. .The purge supply.and exhaust lines are the  ;

only CVI lines that-communicate with the outside air. The containment gas and particulate. radiation monitor _ lines only penetrate the  ;

containment building from the auxiliary building'where the monitors '

are located. These lines and monitors are located within the ,

auxiliary building. secondary containment enclosure, which has its .cnni filtered ventilation. system and isolation system. To provide i containment integrity, the vsives in these lines also receive a CVI by .

=the safety injection, manual containment Phase A, and manual -:

containment Phase B isolation signals. which are not af fected by these ,

changes. Therefore, the isolation of the containment gas and j particulate radiation monitor lines is not necessary when the CVI .;

initiation instrumentation is degraded. This will also provide for 'j monitoring of containment radiological conditions and allow the unit  :

to maintain >TS compliance-for'RCS leak detection during-this- f condition. Since the only other CVI lines are the purge lines, it is ,

acceptable to limit the action requirement to amintain the containment purge. supply and exhaust valves closed.

f4 .The action requirement for inoperable containment purge air radiation  !

monitoring instrumentation presently refers only-to the applicable i specification for Mode 6. To be consistent, this requirement should  !

also reference the applicable specification for Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. _

Since TS 3.3.3.1 for containment purge air is applicable in t Modes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, the action requirements should clearly l indicate the appropriate provisions for each mode. Even though this [

-action requirement has not referenced the applicable specification for l

. Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, the TS 3.3.2 requirements are sufficient to ensure TS compliance in the past. This change provides additional j

  • clarification of applicable action requirements for inoperable containment purge air radiation monitors to ensure consistent .

application of TS requirements.

{;

h i

1

.- # '.: 4

~ The footnote correction makes no changes to the TS requirements. This Echange only provides_ clarification of applicable footnotes without changing any intent of the-TSs. This is considered an administrative change to the TS_ notation for Table 3.3-3 footnotes.

Environmental Impact Eval 4ation The proposed change request does not involve an unreviewed environmental question because operation of SQN Units 1 and 2 in accordance with this change would not

1. Result in a significant increase in any adverse environmental impact previously evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) as-modified by the staff's' testimony to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, supplements to the FES, environmental impact appraisals, or J decisions of the Atomic: Safety and Licensing Board.

'2. Result in a significant change in effluents or power levels.

3. Result in matters not previously reviewed in the licensing basis for ,

. SQN that may have_a_significant environmental impact.

5

, . = . - _ _ . _ _ - ~ . _ . - -

l:,

e .s 1 t- ,~

Enclosure 3 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLbAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 i-T'OCKET NOS. 50-327 AND'50-328 (TVA-SQN-TS-91-09)-

DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION.

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  • "4 .

ENCLOSURE-3 .

Significant Hazards Evaluation 1

I TVA has evaluated the proposed technical specification (TS) change and has  !

determined that it does not' represent a-significant hazards consideration

  • based on criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Operation of Sequoyah l Nuclear Plant (SQN) in accordance with the proposed amendment w111 not; I al. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of ,

an accident previously evaluated.

- The proposed changes to SQN TSs involve equipment and the requirements i for the equipment that monitor containment radiation conditions and ,

initiate actions to mitigate significant releases of radiation to_  ;

offsite. Thisfequipment is not the source of any accident, andethese  ;

changes will not increase the probability of an accident previously [

. evaluated, i The removal of the containment ventilation isolation (CVI) initiation

, from the containment gas and particulate radiation monitors reduces ,

the diversified means for automatically isolating the purge and containment radiation monitor penetrations; however, the SQN safety .

analysis does not tr.ke credit for this additional function.

Therefore, this specification and bases change-will not increase the i offsite dose evaluation in the safety analysis and the change will not  :

significantly increase the consequences of an accident. The exclusion to TS 3.0.4 for manual and containment purge air exhaust monitors will >

maintain the requirement to ensure the isolation of containment i release paths to.outside-without limiting operation-mode changes when a an acceptable level of safety for continued operation is provided. By maintaining the containment purge line valves closed, there is no impact to_the safety analysis for offsite dose and no increase in the i consequences of an accident.

The change to,the action requirements for the CVI instrumentation still ensures closure of release pathways to outside environs. The  ;

linea for containment gas and particulate radiation monitors are not t required to be maintained closed because they are closed loops that -t are qualified to containment Phase A pressure, and they can only [

communicate with the secondary containment, which provides for  ;

filtering and isolation on high radiation. These lines cannot  ?

- communicate directly with outside and will isolate on safety injection "

and manual containment isolation Phase A and Phase B signals through the CVI logic. This action requirement change will allow operators to  ;

keep-containment radiation monitoring equipment in service to diagnose i potential accident conditions or equipment failures. This change will not affect the cffsite dose evaluations found in SQN's safety analysis  ;

j and therefore will not increase the consequences of an accident. The  !

clarification-of the containment purge air radiation monitor action  ;

requirements and correction of TS Table 3.3-3 footnote notation are  !

administrative in nature and do not change the intent er application [

of any TS. Therefore, there is no increase in the consequence of an i accident created by these administrative changes. l l E r

.,. y- , - ,---y,--y--,,m,..- ,._,. , -,,-,-,,,,-,,m,w,, ,,-,,,w,

v

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I 2.- Create the-possibility of a new or dif ferent Idnd of accident' f rom any .i previously analyzed.

The equipment and specifications involved-in'the proposed change

. provide for containment radiation monitoring and ihe actuation of  ;

dCCident mitigation devices to.!Imit Off81Le.do30 a4 ESsuaed iu the i safety analysis. This equipment is not a source of any accident. and these changes will not. modify any equipment or the eperation of any equipment such that a tun <- or dif ferent kind of accident is created.  ;

i

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.  ?

The margin of safety provided for cifs!te dass considerations by SQN's safety analys4.s is unaffected by these proposed changes. The [

radiation release paths for offsite dose evaluationa are maintained- f the same for the action requirer.ents, and. the CVI- actuations are the same as assumed in the safety analysis., Therefore, thera is no

-increase in the offsite dose for postulated acoloents and these .i changes will not involve a significant reduction'in any margin of l safety, j i

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-d 4 8 g 15 An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, a deviation or a violation. An unresolved item is discussed in Section 3.2.2 of this report.

8.2 Region Based Inspection Findings

- One Region based inspection was conducted during this inspection period, inspection findings were discussed with senior plant management at the conclusion of the inspection.

Da.ts Suhitq1 Rpt. # Inspector 7/8-12/91 Contractor QA Practices 91-20 D. Caphton 8.3 Enforcement Conference On July 2, NRC management conducted an Enforcement Conference with VY management representatives in the NRC Region I office. Recent NRC concerns in the area of physical security were discussed.

T f

,