ML20082K809

Proposed Tech Spec Pages Re Borated Water in Boric Acid Tanks

ML20082K809
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	08/27/1991
From:	BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20082K798	List: ML20082K796 ML20082K809
References
NUDOCS 9109030043
Download: ML20082K809 (7)

Text

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KITACllMENT L TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES )

TO IIE REISSUEI)  !

i Unit 1. Delete Page 3/4 6 9e. i nis requires only reissuing overicaf Page 3/4 6 9d i with no changes. l r

Unit 2. Delete Page 3/4 6-9b. I Since this page has no overleaf, it can sirnply be deleted. ,

i TECilNICAL SI'ECIFICATION llASES l' AGES .

TO llE REVISEI) l Unit 1. Pages B3/412 and B3/413 Markups enclosed.

i Unit 2. Pages 03/412 and B3/413 Markups enclosed.

7 Nk kDO P

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM 5 BASES .

3/4.1.1.5 MINIMUM TTMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than SlgoF. This limitation is required to ensure 1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analy ed temperature range, 2) the protettive instrumentation is within its nomal operating range, 3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 4) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RTt ;g7 temperature.

3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The system also provides coolant flow following an 51A5 (e.g., during a Small Break LOCA) to supplement flow from the Safety injection System. The Small Break LOCA analyses assume flow from a single charging pump, accounting for measurement uncertainties and flow mal-distribution cffects in calculating a conservative value of :harging flow actually delivered to the RCS. The components required to perform this function include 1) borated water sources, 2) charging pumps, 3) separate flow pathi, 4) boric acid pumps, 5) associated heat tracing systems, and 6) en emergency power supply from CPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200 F, a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems inoper-abl e. Allowt.ble out-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility _

safety from injection system failures during the repair period, pyg y The boration capability of either system is sufficien to provide a SHUT-DOWN MRGIN from all operating conditions of 3.0% ak/k a er xenon decay and cooldown to 2000F. The maximum boration capabilitv re irement occurs a_t EOL i gfull power equilibrium xenon conditions and r.4 res = s m v'l-G t r. N boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks or 55,527 gallons of 2300 J ppm borated water from the refueling water tank. However, to be consistent with the ECCS requirements, the RVT is required to have a minimum contained volume of 400.000 gallons during MODES 1, 2. 3 and 4. The maximum boron concentration of the refueling water tank shall be limited to 2700 ppm and the maximum boron concentration of the boric acid storage tanks shall be limited to 81 to preclude the possibility of boron precipitation in tie core durin.g long term ECCS cooling.

With the RCS temperature below 2000F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection system bersmes inoperable.

Re visd \g NEC LcO er da4ed -.

CALVEF1 CLIFTS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-2 Amendment No. 27. M. M,104

' REACIVITY C0rm SYSTEMS BASES The boron caoability recuired below 200'T is8 based upon providing a 31 t.k/k SHUTDO, N MAR 31ti af ter xenon decay and cooldown froM00'T to 140'F. This condition recuiret eitherge: I M c' ' M coric acid solution from the boric acid tents.or 9.6 a gT1ons of 23no opm borated water from the refuelin; water tant ~g y g 7 6 ';

The OPERABILITY c' one boron injectier. system during REFUEL 1N3 eni,ures that tnis system is available for reactivity control while in MODE E.

3 /4.1. 3 MOVABLY COWPOL LSSEBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of a CEA ejection accident are limited to acceptable levels.

The ACTION statements wnich pemit limited variations from the basic requirements are accorapanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original criteria are cret.

The ACTION statements applicable to a stuck or untrippable CEA and to a large misalignment (> 15 inches) of two or more CEAs, require a prompt shutdown of the reactor since either of these conditions may be indicative of a possible loss of mechanical functional capability of the CEAs and in the event of a stuck or untrippable CEA, the loss of SHUT-DOWN MARGIN.

For small misalignments (< 15 inches) of the CEAs, there is 1) a small degradation in the peakiiig factors relative to those assumed in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints for DNBR and linear heat rate, 2) a small effect on the time dependent long tenn power distributions rela-tive to those used in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints for DNBR and linear heat rate, 3) a small effect on the available SHUTDOWN MARGIN, and 4) a small effect on the ejecter' CEA worth used in the safety analysis. Therefore, the ACTION statement associated with the small misalignment of a CEA permits a one hour time interval during which attempts may be made to restore the CEA to within its alignment require-ments prior to initiating a reduction in THERMAL POWER. The one hour time limit is sufficient to (1) identify causes- of a misaligned CEA, (2) I take appropriate corrective action to realign the CEAs and (3) minimize the effects of xenon redistribution.

Revised b 3 NEC Leder dded . l CALVERT CLIFF 5 - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. M. Myg 127

INSEl(13 For ik>th Units 1 and 2 IIASES 3/4.1.2

'Iloration Systems" INSERT 'N the concentration and volume of which are met by the range of values given in Speelfications 3.1.2.8 and 3.1.2.9, INSERT 'B' the requirements of which are met by Specification 3.1.2.73

REACTIVITY C0fl1ROL SYSTEMS

{ BASES <

3/4.1.1.5 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICAllTY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical

• with the Reactor C0niant System average temperature less than 515nF. This limitation is required to ensure 1) the noderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) the pressurizer is capabic of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 4) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RT NDT temperature.

3/4.1.2 BORAT!0N SYSTEMS U ~

The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The system also provides coolant fluw following a SIAS (e.g., during a Small Break LOCA) to supplement flow from the Safety Injection System. The Small Break LOCA analyses assume i

flow from a single charging pump, accounting for measuremer,t uncertainties and flow maldistribution effects in calculating a conservative value of charging flow actually delivered to the RCS. The components required to perform this I

function include 1) borated water sources, 2) charging pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid pumps, 5) associated heat tracing systems, and 6) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200 F, a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure r: enders one of the systems inoper-ible. Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety.from injection system failures during the repair period. jgg y' The boration capability of either system is sufficient a provide a SHUT-DOWN MARGIN frog, all operating conditions of 3.0% t.,k/k a er xenon decay and cooldown to 200 F. The maximum boration capability re irement occurs at E0L from_ full power equilibrium xenon conditions and ree res U W

% ' G boric acid solution from tne boric acid tanks or 55,627 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water tank. However, to be consistent with the ECCS requirements, the RWT is required to have a minimum contained volume of 400,000 gallons during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. The maximum boron concentration of the refueling water tank shall be limited to 2700 ppm and the maximum boron concentration of the boric acid storage tanks shall be limited to 8% to preclude the possibility of boron precipitation in the core during long term ECCS cocling.

With the RCS temperature below 200 F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity

! condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE l

, ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

l hvised by NRC Le ner dded .

Il CALVERT CLIFFS - UNii 2 B 3/4 1-2 Amendment No. 31, 29 123 l

REACTIVITY C0f! TROL SYSTDis I l

i BASES The boron capability reauired below 200 F is based uoon providing a 3t ak/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN af ter xenon decav_yd coolcown frotiOO*F to 140'F. This condition requires either U M = = m.

' :Jooric acid solution f rom the boric acid tanks or 9.W ea11ons of oJU ppm borated water from tne refueling water tank.

} pggg %

The OPERABILITY of one boron injection system durin; REFUELINC ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLECD:fRptASSEMBLIES L

The specifications of this section easure that (1) acceptable t/swer distribution limits are maintained (2) the minimum SHUT;0WN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of a CEA ejection accident are limited to acceptable' levels.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations f rom the basic recuirements are accompanied by additional restrictions wnich ensure that

'he original criteria are met.

(

The ACTION statements applicable to a stuck or untriocable CEA and to a large misali ment t (> 15 inches) of two or more CEAs, recuire a prompt shutdown of tne reactor since either of these conditions may be indicative of a possible loss of mechanical functional cacability of the CEAs and in the event of a stuck or untrippable CEA, the loss of SHUT-DOWN MARGIN.

For small misalignments (< 15 inches) of the CEAs, tnere is 1) a small degradation in the pesking factors relative to those assumed in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints for DNBR and linear heat rate, 2) a small effect on the* time dependent long term power districutions rela-tive to those used in generating LCOs and LSSS setooints for DNBR and linear heat rate, 3) a small effect on the available SHUTCOWN MARGIN, and 4) a small effect on the ejected CEA worth used in the safety analysis. Therefore, the ACTION statement associated witn the small misalignment of a CEA permits a one hour time interval during which attempts may be made to restore the CEA to within its alignment require-ments prior to initiating a reduction in THERMAL POWER. Tne one hour time limit is sufficient to (1) identify causes of a misaligned CEA, (2) take appropriate corrective action to realign the CEAs anc (3) minimize tne ef fects of xenon redistribution.

Revisd by NEC Leuer claked .

O CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3 Arendment No. 6. 7y , /199 i23

INSElrIS For lloth Units I and 2 IIASES 3/4.1.2 "lloration Systems" INSERT 'A' the concentration and volume of which are met by the range of values given L" Specifications 3.1.2.8 and 3.1.2.9, INSERT '13' the requirements of which are met by Specification 3.1.2.7,

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