ML20077D581
| ML20077D581 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 07/10/1983 |
| From: | Ernst M MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20077D576 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8307260576 | |
| Download: ML20077D581 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PETITION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH CROUP FOR EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL ACTION INTRODUCTION
- 1. This petition to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is brought by the Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group (MASSPIRG). The petition seeks immediate action to remedy serious deficiencies in the offsite emergency response plans for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, Mass.
DESCRIPTION OF THE PETITIONER
- 2. MASSPIRG is a non-profit citizens group concerned with safe energy, environmental issues and consumer protection. MASSPIRG has over 50,000 citizen members and over 40,000 student members across Massachusetts. 836 citizen members live in the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone for Pilgrim and another 1,809 live on Cape Cod. In 1977, MASSPIRG published a study of emergency response plans in Massachusetts entitled " Nuclear Evacuation Planning: Blueprint for-Chaos." MASSPIRG has just completed a follow-up report to the first study entitled " Blueprint for Chaos II: Pilgrim Disaster Plans Still a Disaster" (copy attached). This second report, based on a year-long investigation of the plans and telephone interviews with residents and institutions within the Pilgrim plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), forms the basis for this petition.
JURISDICTION
- 3. This petition is brought before the Commission pursuant to the authority 0
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granted to it in 42 USC82233(d), 2236(a), 2237 and 10 CFR Bs 2.204, 2.206(c)(1),
50.54, 50.100 and 50.109. ,
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- 4. The facts summarized in this petition are detailed in the attached MASSPIRC report, entitled " Blueprint for Chaos II: Pilgrim Disaster Plans Still A Disaster" (" Chaos II").
A.. Advance Information for Residents and Tourists
- 5. Advance public education of the emergency plans is necessary to avoid panic and mass chaos when an accident occurs and the sirens are activated. The 4
only method of public education utilized within the Pilgrim Emergency Planning l
Zone (EPZ) has been the distribution of pamphlets by mail. A MASSPIRC telephone survey of 100 residents in the EPZ discovered that only two-thirds had received the pamphlet and just one-sixth still had it available [ Chaos II, Appendix A,
- 23, #28]. 'Only 9% knew that when the sirens sounded they were supposed to tune in to an Emergency Broadcast System station (Chaos II, Appendix A, #16].
- 6. The Emergency Public Information pamphlets contain no information on
, where to find public shelters or public transportation or how to make ad hoc 1
l ' breathing filters which can substantially reduce the inhalation of radionuclides
[ Chaos II, p.12].
- 7. The Emergency Public Information pamphlet also contains inaccurate t
telephone numbers for four of the five local Civil Defense Directors in the EPZ
' [ Chaos II, p. 13) . The pamphlet'says evacuation transportation will be provided for nursing home residents, but the official plans say private automobiles will be used [ Chaos II, p.12].
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- 8. There is no effort to educate tourists about the plans.
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- 9. FEMA identified the failure to educate tourists and to update telephone numbers quarterly as "significant deficiencies." [" Interim Findings
- Joint State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Capabilities for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station" (" Interim Findings") FEMA, September 1982, p.6]
- 10. The failure to provide adequate public information on the emergency response plans to residents and tourists in the EPZ is a violation of 10 CFR I
e 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D.2, and evaluation criteria G.1, G.2, and P.10. of the " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants"
(" Evaluation Criteria"). NUREG-0654, Rev.1., November 1980 (these evaluation criteria are incorporated by reference into 10 CFR 8 50.47(b)].
B. Notification During an' Accident
- 11. The Pilgrim warning siren system is inadequate to alert the public l
within the EPZ.. Half the FEMA observers of the last siren test reported that the sirens were either not loud enough or could not be heard at all. [" Report on i
l the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Siren Test, June 19, 1982" (" FEMA Siren i
. ' Report"), FEMA, January 1983, p. 6] Over 90% of MASSPIRG survey respondents l who can hear the sirens complained of false alarms. [ Chaos II Appendix is, #19] i
- 12. There are insufficient sirens and inadequate back-up measures to complete initial notification of the public within the EPZ within about
.15 minutes. [ Chaos II, pp. 17-19]
- 13. There are no measures for alerting the deaf or those people within the EPZ with hearing impairments.- [ Chaos II, pp. 20-21]
- 14. FEMA has concluded that the siren system does not meet " minimum federal standards." FEMA' considers the inoperability of some sirens and lack of siren
- activation training as a "significant deficiency." (FEMA Interim Findings, p. 15]
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- 15. The failure to maintain the " capability te essentially complete the initial notification of the j public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes" is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.D.3.,
10 CFR H 50.47(b)(5) and Evaluation Criterion E.6.
C. Evacuation Plano
- 16. If there is inadequate time to evacuate a downwind area from the reactor before a major release of radioactivity, sheltering in basements or large buildings provides greater protection than a car on the road. The decision of whether to evacuate the population or order sheltering, therefore, requires accurate estimates of the time of a radiation release from the reactor and of the time necessary to evacuate downwind sectors.
- 17. The evacuation time estimates for the Pilgrim EPZ are unrealisticly low, because they ignore the probability of some panic, traffic disorder, traffic obstacles outside the EPZ and the fact that thousands of people outside designated evacuation zones will also evacuate [ Chaos II, pp. 23-15]. Evacuation time estimates are not provided for various adverse weather scenarios nor i
for various special institutions and population groups as required.
l 19. There are no workable plans for evacuating the physically disabled, nursing home residents, school- children, hospital patients, campers, inmates of l
correctional facilities, or people without 24-hour access to cars. [ Chaos II, pp. 28-31]
- 20. There are no written agreements with bus companies or bus drivers to L
provide transportation for thousands of people who cannot drive or may not have a car. [ Chaos II, pp. 27-28]
- 21. FEMA considers the failure to identify and provide transportation l
assistance for the " mobility impaired" and for other special population groups l
l "significant deficiencies." [ FEMA Interim Findings, pp. 6,11]
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- 22. The' failure to provide for adequate evacuation transportation for the physically disabled, nursing home tesidents, school children, hospital patients, campers, inmates or people without 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> access to cars-is a violation of 10 CFR E 50.47(b)(10) and Evaluation Criteria A.3., J.10.d.,
and J.10.g.
- 23. The failure to develop accurate evacuation time estimates in accordance with Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654 is a further violation of 10 CFR 8 50.47(b)(10) and Evaluation Criteria J.8., J.10.1. and J.10.m.
D. Medical Facilities
- 24. The only two hospitals listed in the plans for providing treatment for radioactively contaminated injured persons have a total capacity for treating just 8 or 9 such victims. One hospital is within four miles of the
!' reactor and the other has no staff trained for radioactively contaminated
' patients. [ Chaos II, Appendix C]
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- 25. FEMA recommends distribution of a drug 'to prevent thyroid tumors to i
persons in institutions who may not be evacuated. [ Evaluation Criteria, J.10.e. t and J.10.f.] There are no plans for~ distributing radioprotective~ drugs to institutionalized persons or anyone else within the Pilgrim EPZ.
- 26. The failure to provide adequate arrangements for medical care for contaminated injured individuals is a violation of 10 CFR 8 50.47(b)(12),
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,II.E and IV.E.7., and Evaluation Criteria L.1. and L.3.
E. The Emergency Planning ~ Zone
- 27. The Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is tha area around a nuclear power I plant for which detailed planning and emergency Ireparedness is needed to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public at risk from a serious accident. . The Environmental Protection Agency recom-
Pag? 6 mends. protective measures by the public when radiation exposure is likely 2
to exceed the EPA " protective action guide" of one REM. [ Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, EPA - 520/1-75-001, EPA, 1975]
- 28. NRC regulations require the exact size and configuration of each EPZ to be " determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries." Generally, the plume exposure EPZ should be about 10 miles in radius. [10 CFR 8 50.47(c)(2)]
- 29. The licensee of Pilgrim, Boston Edison, admits that the only factor used to create the Pilgrim EPZ was jurisdictional boundaries. [ Response of Boston Edison to Commonwealth of Massachusetts' First Set of Interrogatories i
on Emergency Planning, July 20, 1981, p.2]
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- 30. Cape Cod begins just 11 miles from Pilgrim and is connected to the mainland by only two bridges. There is no emergency planning for Cape Cod nor public education of protective measures nor warning sirens. Yet civil defense plans to close the Cape bridges to prevent evacuation if the wind blows toward Cape Cod. [ Chaos II, p. 32]
- 31. On the basis of preliminary CRAC (Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences) results obtained by the NRC staff for the Pilgrim site, the Attorney General of glassachusetts-has concluded that the size of the Pilgrim l EPZ is inadequate. [ Comments of Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti Relative to Off-Site Emergency Planning for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ("Commento l
! .of the Attorney General"), submitted to FEMA, August 1982]
- 32. The current size of the Pilgrim plume exposure EPZ violates 10 CFR l
l' 50.47(c)(2),10 CFR 8 50.54(q),10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, I. and 44 CFR
- l. e 350.7(b).
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STATEMENT OF THE LAW o
- 33. In addition to the regulations discussed previously, the Atosin Energy Act provides, in '42 USC 82236(a), for the revocation, suspension or midification' of a license if any information is disclosed from " report, record, inspection or other means which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an original application." This provision is incorporated into the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 850.100 and 10 CUR E50.54(d).
- 34. When issuing new emergency planning regulations after Three Mile Island, the Commission stated that " adequate emergency preparedness is an essential aspect in the protection of the public health and safety."
[45 Federal Register 55404, August 19, 1980]
- 35. 10 CFR 550.54(s)(2)(ii) provides that if, i after April 1, 1981, the NRC finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency and if the deficiencies are not corrected within four months of that-finding, the Commission will determine whether the reactor shall be shut down until such deficiencies are remedied or whether other enforcement action is appropriate.
- 36. The facts stated herein establish the existence of substantial l
. violations of NRC emergency planning regulations in the emergency plans i
and preparedness for PilgrimNuclear Power Station. The Federal Emergency l
Management Agency also detailed 73 deficiencies in the Pilgrim plans and preparedness. (FEMA Interim Findings]
- 37. Based on the numerous deficiencies in the emergency plans identified i . by FEMA and detailed in the attached MASSPIRG report, it is obvious that the f.
' state of emergency preparedness at Pilgrim does not provide reasonable 4
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, Prgs 8 assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the
' event of a radiological emerg'ency. The Attorney General of Massachusetts concurs with this conclusion. [ Comments of the Attorney General, p. 1]
, 38. Neither license-holders nor operators can avoid compliance with r
the NRC regulations, either directly or indirectly. The NRC Appeal Board has clearly held that no party, including the Staff, can justify the licensing of a reactor which does not comply with applicable standards.
s Further, the Appeal Board has stated:
Nor can they avoid compliance by arguing that, although an applicable regulation is not met, the public health and safety will still be protected.
4 For, once a regulation is adopted, the standards it embodies represent the Commission's definition of what is required to protect the public health and safety.
In the-Matter of Vermont' Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) ALAB-138, RAI-73-7, 520, 528.
By virtue of 42 USC 52236(a) and 10 CFR 550.100, this principle applies l
equally to operating reactors.
- 39. The commission has _ held that "public safety is the first, last and a permanent consideration in any decision on the issuance of a construction permit or a license to operate a nuclear facility." Power Reactor Development Corp. v. International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers (" Power i
l Reactor"), 367 U.S. 396, 402, 81 S.Ct. 1529(1961). The Supreme Court, in that case, also emphasized that even af ter a reactor is licensed for operation, the Commission will retain jurisdiction "to ensure that the highest safety standards are maintained." [ Power Reactor, supra, 367 U.S. at 402, 81 S.Ct.
at 1532]
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- 40. When violations of emergency planning regulations essential to the protection of the-pub,lic health and safety continue to exist more than two years after the NRC deadline, the Commission has the duty and responsibility to take immediate corrective action.
RELIEF REQUESTED
-41. For the reasons enumerated above, petitioners state that the following relief is required:
- a. The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation should immediately issue a finding that the state of emergency preparedness at Pilgrim does not provide reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological, emergency.
- b. The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation should immediately start the four-month time period for correction of all deficiencies in Pilgrim emergency plans and preparedness.
- c. The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation should determine whether the lack of emergency preparedness in conjunction with the poor safety record at Pilgrim and the high summer population in the EPZ and on Cape Cod warrants the immediate shut down or operation of Pilgrim at reduced power until the emergency plans and preparedness meet minimum federal standards..'[ Union'of Concerned Scientists' Petition for Emergency and. Remedial Action, CLI-78-6, 7 NRC 400 (April 1978)]
4 a P g, 10 By the Mascachusetts Public Interest Research Group, By their Attorney, 4 $W Michael D. Ernst MASSPIRC 37 Temple Place Boston, MA 02111 (617) 423-1796 I hereby affirm that the facts alleged are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
w/
Michael D. Ernst i
D'ated: ! July 20, 1983 J
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