ML20076D623

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-333/91-12 on 910603-06.Corrective Actions:Upgraded Respiratory Protection Equipment Requirements,Added HEPA Ventilation & Conducted Addl ALARA pre-plan Meeting

ML20076D623
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	07/22/1991
From:	Radford Converse POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
JAFP-91-0426, JAFP-91-426, NUDOCS 9107300081
Download: ML20076D623 (7)

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• Jomo's A. FluPatrick fdurlost Power Plant P o B04.t1 f.ycomng Naw York 13D93 315 34MV.40

1. b NewYorkPower 4# Authority July-22, 199:

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JAPP-91-0426 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coe. mission Mail Station P1-137 Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK SUDJECT: RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION -

INSPECTION 91-12 (DOCKET 50-333) Il

REFERENCE:

1. USNRC Letter Dated June 21, 1991 Sub-jact: Inspection Report 50-333/91-12 In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, the Authority is submitting our response to bonendix A ,lLqtice of._ViolatlQn transmitted by your letter (Reference 1), dated June 21, 1991.

This refers to the inspection conducted by Dr. Sami Sherbini June 3 through 6, 1991 at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.

It should also be noted that the inspection report stated that the air sample results showed an activity of 9700 times MPC. That value is incorrect. The correct activity was 97 times MPC.

Very_truly[yours,

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RA FORD J. CONVERSE RESIDENT MANAGER IUC/JAS/ bas cc: R. Leedle (WPO) J. Joyner, NRC Region E. Liceno Dr. S. Sherbini, G. Vargo NRC Region I NRC Sr. Resident Inspector - JAF RMS-11 (WPO)

J. Ellmers (WPO) Document Control Center CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REOUESTED C4 gb A[

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4 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 22,1991 ATTN Document Control Desk- JAFP-91-0426  ?

Docket 50-333/ Inspection No. 91-12 Page 2 of 7 ENCLOSURE 1 1

NOTICE., OF VIOI AT2QH As a result of the inspection conducted on June 3-6, 1991, and in accordance with the Nnc Enforcement Policy (10 CFR 2, Appendix C) the following violation was identified:

1 10 CFR 20.201(b) requiren, in part, that each licensee shall make or cause to be made such surveys as may be nncessary and reasonable  ;

to ensure compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20.

10 CFR 20.201(a) defines survey, in part, as evaluation of the radiation hazards incident to the presence of radioactive materials under a specific set of conditions. When appropriate, such an evaluation includes a physical survey of material and equipment and neasurements.of levels of radfation present.

Contrary to the above, on May 23, 1991, six workers were allowod to work in the Torus Room and the Drywell Entrance area without adequate evaluation of the potential hazards from airborne radioactivity that was generated during conduct of their work, and without provision of adequate protective measures or engineering controls to mitigate the effects of the airborne radioactivity hazard.

This is a Sever,ity Level IV violation (Supplement IV).

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_UI.ited States Nuclear Regu,latory Commission July 22, 1991 ATTN: Document Control Desk JAFP-91-0426 Docket 50-333/ Inspection No. 91-12 Page 3 of 7 The Authority agrees with the violation.

QAug.g_gi,the Violation:

The cause of this violation was inadequate job planning and implementation of existing procedures and programs. Enaineering controls to maintain concentrations of radioactive material in air as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) were inappropriately downgraded.

On May 22, 1991 radiation protection personnel were requested to support the removal of insulation on RHR piping in the torus room.

This request consisted of a marked-up sketch of the piping indicating where the insulation was to be removed. A Radiological Technician (RT) performed a survey of the RHR piping as indicated on the sketch. During the ALARA pre-plan meeting, wor W identified that the scope of the insulation removal was large~

indicated on the original sketch. As a result, the survt, incomplete and continuous coverage by a RT was specified.

The ALARA review for the job recommended the use of HEPA ventilation to control airborne radioactivity during insulation removal.- The only proper way to provide HEPA ventilation would have been to remove a floor plug to the torus room that was near the work area. Removal of this floor plug would require several hours. Faced with this delay, the use of the HEPA ventilation was viewed by the Chief'RT in the radiation protection office as too time consuming to pursue. The Chief RT in the radiation protection offico did not attend the ALARA pre-job meeting and based his recommendation on the incomplete survey of the work site. He presented his recommendations to a radiological supervisor for approval. This radiological supervisor had not attended the ALARA pre-job meeting. After they notified the ALARA group, the Chief RT and the radiological supervisor, acting on inadequate survey data, modified the ALARA review to delete this recommendation.

Following this, work was allowed to proceed -without further evaluation of the adequacy of the remaining engineering controls and respiratory protection. When the insulation was removed, elevated radiation readings (R/hr) were observed and the area was evacuated. Airborne radioactivity up to 97 times the MPC value was encountered.

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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 22, 1991 ATTNr Dcoument-Control Desk JAFP-91-0426 Docket ~50-333/ Inspection No. 9 b12 page 4 of 7 Immediate corrective Actions:

The immediate-corrective actions for this event included upgrading respiratory _ protection. equipment requirements, adding HEPA ventilation and conducting an additional ALARA. pre-plan meeting before resuming work. Full coupliance was achieved on May 22, 1991. Training on- this event -was provided to all Radiolog. cal Technicians and the event and associated problems were discussed in department meetings.

Weaknesses Identified 'and corrective Aqj;. ions that Will be Taken ts Prevent Further Violations:

1 The Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES) developed by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) was used to evaluate this event. The Authority's evaluation of this event revealed three- major weaknesses: 1) written / verbal communication; 2) work organization and supervisory methods and 3) work practices. This evaluation also -identified arean for improvement in program implementation.

1.- Written and verbal communication problems:

Weaknesses: .;

.. The. scope of work was not communicated adequately

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to radiation protection personnel. The sections of irisulation shown on the marked up sketch were surveyed adequately, however, the marked-up drawing did not include all of the insulation that was to re remeved.

. - NARA - group personnel- discounted information presented by workers as to the possible condition of the insulation. After their concerns were discounted, the workers were reluctant to-express

, further concerns about protective clothing l requirements for the insulation removal.

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United States Huclear Regulatory Commission July 22, 1991 ATTN! Document Control Desk JAFP-91-0426 Docket 50-133/ Inspection No. 91-12 Pago 5 of 7 Corrective Actions:

• The practico of accepting incomplete RWP requests is being discontinued. The data nooded to support performing adequato survnys and ALARA reviews in advance of the start of work is required to be submitted. The nood to question and verify tho scope of work hse boon stressed to radiological protection personnel.

• Personnel in the ALARA group have boon counsoled as to the importance of taking worker input and suggestions into consideration when developing recommendations and engineering controls.

2. Work organization and supervisory methods problems:

Weaknesses

. The AIARA group porcob od their role as a load organization for wor!: planning and expedit.ing, rather than focusing on adequato radiological controls to minimizo worker exposures. This perception resulted from the lack of job planning input from the work groups during the amergent maintenance work oncountered in the plant outage.

• The original radiation work pormit (RWP) request used to prepare the ALARA review did not adequately describe the scope of work to be performed. As a result, the original radiological survey used to prepare the RWP was inadequato.

• The original (i.e., incompleto) survey data was used by a radiological supervisor and technician, not ci.roctly associated with the job, to downgrado the requiremont for HEPA ventilation. This inappropriato decision by technician and supervisor resulted from porceived schedulo pressures.-

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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 22, 1991 ATTN Document Control Desk JAPP-91-0426 Docket 50-333/ Inspection No. 91-12 Pago 6 of 7 Corrective Actions:

• The results of the HPES ovaluation used to analyze this event have boon presented to radiological protection personnel to ensure their understanding of the problems that resulted in this violation.

• The importanco of maintaining their responsibility for radiological protection regardless of schedule or production considerations has been stressed in mootings with radiological protection personnel.

• The practice of accepting incomplete RWP requests is being discontinued. The data nooded to support performing adequato surveys and ALARA reviews in i

advance of the start of work is required to be I submitted.

• The Chief RT and radiological supervisor involved in the downgrading of the protective requirements have boon counseled as to the nood for maintaining a conservativo and questioning attitudo.

• The policy on A1 ARA reviews has boon clarified to require that revisions to AIARA reviews receive the same level of management approval as the original review.

3. Work practices problems:

Weaknesses:

• Work practicos in the preparation of the AIARA review for this job indicato a lack of attention to detail and a questioning attitudo. The AIARA review did not caphasize concern for insulation removal in areas that potentially woro wetted by reactor water.

• The ALARA review failed to consider the potential impact of air currents and drafts to nearby air spaces for possible airborne radioactivity problems.

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,l United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 22, 1991 ATTH: Document Control Desk JAFP-91-0426 Docket 50-333/ Inspection No. 91-12 Page 7 of 7 Corrective Actions:

• The personnel involved in the preparation of the AIARA review have been counseled as to their responsibility for thoroughness.

• The AIARA review checklist will be revised to address the potential for the spread of airborne radioactivity to adjacent rooms and spaces.

4. Related Issues:

weakness:

• The AIARA review is perceived by radiological protection personnel as being subordinate to the RWP rather than-the two being given equal weight in achieving good radiological controls.

Corrective Action:

• The Radiological and Environnental Services Superintendent has reemphasized to radiological protection personnel the complimentary roles of the AIARA review and the RWP. The AIARA . review is the radiological work planning- document that may specify engineering controls and recommend work practices. The RWP is the document used to achieve radiological control on the job. . The policy clarification to require full review and re-approval of AIARA review changes will strengthen this relationship. This policy change, however, does not' relieve tne RT on the- job from maintairing a conservative and questioning attitude toward job Coverage.

Those correctiva actions not already completed will be completed by September 1, 1991.

The inspection report contains one significant error._ The airborne radioactivity concentration in the work area following-removal of

'the insulation was 97 times the MPC established in 10 CFR 20 Appendix B, not 9700 as indicated in the inspection report. This error appears to be the result of a missing unit (9700% = 97 times MPC).

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