ML20073G284

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Proposed Tech Specs Change 79,reducing Low Reactor Water Scram (Level 3) Setpoint from 12.5 Inches to 4.5 Inches
ML20073G284
Person / Time
Site: Cooper Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/25/1991
From:
NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML19312B429 List:
References
NUDOCS 9105030225
Download: ML20073G284 (17)
v • d • e


Text

._. _ ._ . . .. . - . _ _ _ . . . . . ._ .

Attachment 1 to NLS9100109 Page 8 of 8 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES 9105030225 910425 PDR- ADOCK 05000298 P PDR

I SAFETY LIMITS J -LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINCS _ , ,

2,1.A.1 (Cont'd).

d. APRM Rod Block Tric Setting 1

The APRM rod block trip setting shall be:

Spys 0.66 W + 42% - .66 AV where:

Sp3 - Rod bioch setting in percent of rated thermal power  ;

(2381 MVt)

W and AW are defined in Specification 2.1.A.1.a.

In the event of operation with a _-

maximum fraction' of limiting power density (MFLPD) greater than the fraction of rated power (FRP), the -

setting shall be modified as follows:

S s g (0.66 W + 4?% 0.66 AW) ,,R J_,

MFLPD where, FRP - fraction of rated thermal power _(2381 MWt) _

MFLPD maximum fraction of

1imiting power density.

where' the limiting power density is;13.4 KW/f t for BP8X8R and 1988 LTA fuel.:

,and 14.4 KW/ft for CE8X8NB and Gell LTA fuel.

The ratio of FRP-to.ItFLPD shall'be-set equal to 1.0.unless the actual operating value is . lesa chan the design value of.-l.0, in which case-the actual operating..valun will be used.

2. nenetor Water Low Level scrnm and Isolation Trio Settine (excent MSIVi 2 +4.5 in, on vessel icvel j instrumenta. ,

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. ._ -.. -_ _ ..m._._.___ . . _ _ _ . . _ ._ . . , .

l 2.1 Bases: (Cont'd)

2. Reactor Water Low Level Scram and isointion Trin Settine (excent MSIV)

The setpoint for low reactor water level scram is established at Level 3 to ensure that during normal power operation the bottom of the separator skirt is not uncovered (this protects available reactor recirculation pump NPSH fr om carryunder) . This level has been used in transient and accident analyses dealing with coolant inventery decrease. The results reported in USAR sections XIV 5 and XIV 6 show that when scram is initiated at Level 3, the fuel and process barrier are adequately protected because MCPR remains well above the MCPR fuel cladding integrity limit in all cases, and reactor coolant system pressure does not reach the sat'ety valve settings. The scram setting is approximately 30 inches below the normal operating range and is thu= adequate to avoid spurious scrams.

3. Turbine Sten Valve Closure Scram Trin Setting The turbine stop valve closure scram trip anticipates the pressure, neutron flax and heat flux increase that could result from rapid closure of the turbine stop valves. With a scram trip setting of $10 percent of valve closure from full open, the resultant increase in surface heat flux is limited such that MCPR remains above the HCPR fuel cladding integrity limit even during the worst case transient that assumes the turbine bypass is closed. This scram is bypassed when turbine steam flow is below 30% of rated, as measured by turbine first stage pressure.
4. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Scrnm Trin Setting The turbiae control valve fast closure scram anticipates the pressure, neutron flux. and heat flux increase that could result from fast closure of the turbine control valves due to load rejection exceeding the capability of the bypass valves. The reactor protection system initiates a scram when fast closure of the control valves is initiated by the loss of turbine control oil pressure as sensed by pressure switches. This setting and the fact that control valvo closure time is approximately twice as long as that for the stop valves means that resulting transients, while similar, are less severo than for stop valve closure, No significant change in MCPR occurs. Relevant transient analyses are presented in Section XIV 5.1.1 of the USAR. l l

20

_-_-__-__--_m_-__

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION TABLE 3.1.1 I REACTOR PROTECTION SYS"1 INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS

!!inimurs Number Action Required of Operable When Equipment Applicabiliry Condfrions Channels Per Operability is Mode sultch Position Trip Level Reactor Protect. ion shutdown Startup i< e fue l Run Settine Trip Systems (1) Not Assured (1)

Svstem Trio Function 1 A 4 X(7) X X X Itode Switch in Shutdown i 1 A j i

X(7) X X X j t1anual Scram 3 A X(7) X X (5) s 120/125 of in-IR!! (17) dicated scale Iligh Flux 3 A Inoperative X X (5) 2 C X s (0.66U+54%-0.66AU) ~ FRP AP!UI (17) (14)(19)(20) 11FLPD liigh Flux (Flow biased) 2 A X(7) X(9) X(9) (16) 5 15% Rated Power Ifigh Flux 2 A X(9) X(9) X (13)

I li Inoperative A

2 i

Daunseale (12) (12) (12) X(11) 2 2.5%

f s 1045 psig 2 A j  !  ;

X(9) X(10) X

!!igh Reactor Pressure l l

'mi-PS-55 A,B,C, 6 D s  :

J

$ 2 psig 2 A or D liigh Drywell Pressure X(9)(8) X(8) X PC-PS-12 A,B,C, &D s A or D React or Lov Vater level X X X 2 + 4.5 in. Indi- 2

[

!E I - LI S - 101 A , B , C , & D cated level f I

3 (18) A  :

Scran Discharge Instrument Voluee X X(2) X s 92 inches l I, .

liigh Water I.evel j l CUD-1.5-231 A & B ,

CPD-1.S-234 A 6 B -

l CRD-LT-231 C & D 1 CRD-1.T-234 C & D t

I COOPER NUCLEAR STATION f TABLE 3.2.A (Page 1) l I

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR VESSEL ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION Minimum Number Action Required <

of Operable When Component i Components Per Operabi.11ty is j ,

Instrument Trip System (1) Not Assured (2)

I.D. No. Setting Limit instrument t .

j 2 A or B { i

!!ain Steam Line liigh Fl!P-RM-251, A,B,C,6D 5 3 Times Full Power Rad. .

2(4) A or B  ;

A,B,C,6D #1 244.5 in. Indicated Level 4

I Reactor Lou Unter Level NSI-LIS-101 f

2 A or B

^

Reactor Lou Lou Lou Water NBI-LIS-57 A 6 B #1 2-145.5 in. Indicated Level Level NBI-LIS-58 A & B #1 fis -TS - 121, A , B, C ,6D 5 200*F 2(6) B

!!ain Steam Line Leak Detection 122, 123, 124, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150 c,

2(3) B l  ;

flain Steam Line Illgh f!S-dPIS-116 A,B,C,6D 5150% of Rated Steam Flou l l Flou 117, 118, 119  !

l i l ! 2(5) B MS-PS-134, A,B,C,6D 2 825 psig .

!!ain Steam Line Lou j j Pressure A or B i PC-PS-12 A,B,C,6D 6 2 psig 2(4) ,

liigh Dryuell Pressure  !

1 D  ! j RR-PS-128 A 6 B s 75 psig

!!igh Reactor Pressure t 4 A or B  !

2 7" lig (7) 2 {

Itain Condenser Lou  !!S- PS-103, A, B ,C,6D t Vacuum  !

C  !

Reactor Water Cleanup EWCU-dPIS-170 A & B $ 200% of System Flow 1 .

l Syst em liigh Flou 1

i

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e N: . -. . -. . . . _ . . . < . ... . . .. .____. _.._ ..

. NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2.A (cont'd.)-

Crcup 2- - ..

Isolation Signals:-

1. Reactor Low Water-Level.(24.5 inches) l .

' 2.- .

High Dry Well_ Pressure ($ 2 psig) l 1

Isolations:

.14 RHR Shutdown Cooling System . l

- 2. Drywell floor and equipment drain sump discharge lines. l 3.. - TIP ball-valves '

' 4.

- - Group 6 isolation relays

! Group 3 l

. Isolation Signals:

1. Reactor Low Water Level (24.5 inches) . . .
2. Reactor Water Cleanup System High Flow (s200% of system flow).

3.'- Reactor Water Cleanup System High Area Temperature ($'200'F)

Isolationst 1

1. Reactor Water Cleanup System -

' Group 4

.' Isolation Signala; Provided by instruments on' Table 3.2.B (HPCI)'

Isolations:

~

Is'olates. the HPCI steam line GroupI5'

Isolation' Signals: ,

. Provided by instruments on Table 3.2.B (RCIC)'

n:

'JIsolations : 1

- Isolates:the-RCIC steam line.

9. . 'G roup - Isolation: Signals:

1

1.  :

Group 2' Isolation Signal

2. Reactor ~ Building H&V Exhaust Plenum High Radiation ((100 mr/hr)

. 52a-w

COOPER llUCLEAR.STATIOff i

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TABLE 3.2.B (Page 4)

IIPCI SYSTEft CIRCUITRY REQUIRE!!ENTS Minirnum Number of Action Required When Operable Components Component Operability Instt%

_ Setting Limit Per Trio System (1) Is Not Assured Instrument I.D. No.

2 A 4

Reactor Low Low Uater NBI-LIS-72, A, B ,C , 2-37 in. Indicated Level level & D g3 i

2(2) A I

Reactor liigh Unter NBI-LIS-101, B & D $+58.5 in. Indicated Level ,

l' Level #2 2(2) A PC-PS-101 A.B C, 6 D $2 psig liigh Dryvell Press.

1(2) A IIPCI Turbine Illgh IIPCI-PS-97, A & B $150 psig Exhause Pressure ,

1(2) A IIPCI - PS 1 615" Ilg vacuum g, llPCI Putnp Low e, Suction Press.

1(2) A e IIPCI- FS-78 2400 gpm llPCI Pump Low

!, Discharge Flow I' 2(2) A IIPCI Low Steam IIPCI-PS-68, A, B,C 2100 psig j 3 Supply Pressure &D I  !

A  ; +

IIPCI Steam Line llPCI-dPIS-76 130 sS$210" 117 0 I '

!!igh AP llPCI-dPIS-77 -130 2S2-210" II20 2(4) A ,

llPCI-TS-101, A,B,C 6 s200*F f IIPCI Steam Line Space !!i Temp. D -102, 103, 104, i  ;

llPCI-TS-125,126,127.128 l RI!R-TS-150,151.152,153 )I 154,155,156,157.158,159 f

i 160,161 l -

4 f

1(2) A  ;

Emerg. Cond. Storage HPCI-LS-74 A 6 B 20" 11,0 (10,000 gal . I e

IIPCI-LS-75 A & B usable remaining) ,

Tank feu 1.evel i

r

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COOPER NUCLEAR-STATION f- _

TABLE 3.2.B (Page 7) :i :8^

~

. AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTE!! (ADS). CIRCUITRY REQUIRE 11ENTS +

Minimum Number of _ _ Action Required When. J m

, " Instrument? _ .

Operable Components Component Operabi1Pb l Instrument I.D.'No. Setting Limit Per Trio System (1) Is Not Assured ,

I lj Rescror. Low Water NBI-LIS-83, A 6 ' B _ ' 2 +4.5 in. Indicated 1 B _

.i Level Level *;

i l; >

!. l React.or Low Low' Low- NBI-LIS-72, A,B,C & D 2 -145.5 in. Indicated .2 A-

'l-

i Water Level: Level; -i" '

L= ,

I. . ADS Timer .MS-TDR-K5, A 6 B f 120 sec. 1 B' -

l

! Low-Lou Set NBI-PS-51,'A,B,C 6 D 51-A Open low Valve 2 B <

1015110 psig.(Increasing)'

l  !

B Close low Valve l- ,_

j -g ' 875110 psig (Decreasing)

  • i

(., 51-C' Open liigh Valve

, 1025110 psig.(Increasing) ..

i i

I 51-D Close Illgh Valve -

875110 psig-(Decreasing)  ;-

l  ; -j - t

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'3.2 MEE.E .

In addition to reactor protection instrumentation which initiates a reactor _ scram, protective instrumen_tation has been prov_ided 4 'ch initiates action to mitigate the consequences of accidents which are beyond the operator's ability to control, ,

or terminates operator errors before they result in serious consequences; This --

set -of specifications provides the limiting conditions of operation for the

primary system isolation function, initiation of the core cooling systems, control rod block and standby gas treatment systems. The objectives of the specifications are (1) to assure the effectiveness of the protective instrumentation when required _even during periods when portions of such systems are out of service for maintenance, and (2) to prescribe-the trip settingu required to assure adequate- i When - necessary, one channel may be rade inoperable for brief performance.

intervals to conduct required functional tests and calibrations.

Some of the settings _on the instrumentation that initiate or control core and j

= containment cooling have colorances explicitly stated where the high and low values are both critical and_ may have a substantial effect on safety. The on points .of other instrumentation, where only the high or low end of the setting has 1 a direct bearing on safety, are chosen at a level away from the normal operating range to prevent -inadvertent actuation of the safety system involved and exposure l

- to abnormal situations. _

A. Primarv Containment-Isolation Functions Actuation of primary containment valves is initiated by protective instrumentation shown in Table 3,2. A which senses the conditions for which isolation is required.

Such instrumentation must be available whenever primary containment integrity is required.

-The instrumentation which initiates primary system isolation is connected in a-dual bus arrangement.

- The low water level instrumentation, set to trip at 168.5 inches (+4.5 inches) above the top of the active fuel, closes all isolation valves except those in Groups 1, 4, 5,_and 7. Details of valve grouping and required closing times are given'in Specification 3.7. For valves which isolato at this level this trip setting is' adequate to prevent core uncovery in the case of a break in the largest line assuming-a'60 second valve closing time. Required closing times are less than this.

- The low low low reactor water level instrumentation is set to trip when the water

~ 1evel is 19 inches _( -145.5_ inches) above the top of the active fuel. This trip l_~

. closes Groups.1 and 7 Isolation Valves (Reference 1), activates the. romainder of f

. the CSCS subsystems, and starts the emergency diesel generators. These trip level

- settings were chosen to be high enough to prevent spurious actuation but low

. enough to - initiate CSCS operation and primary system isolation so that post

- accident cooling can be accomplished, s

w^.u

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