ML20072M250
Text
_.
10 ~ k 04 pc 7 s
WA G
/M
,--..,k UNITED STATES fi NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION
\\
WAspeNOTord. D.C. SOM6 OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 2/21/92 FOR OPERATIONS NOTE TO:
Ken Brockman, OCM/IS Jack Scarborough, OCM/
Dave Trimble, OCM/JC Jack Guttman, OCM/FR Eileen McKenna, OCM/GdeP FROM:
James L. Blaha, A0/0ED0 Enclosed is a letter sent to John C. Brons, President and Chief Operating Officer of the Powr r Authority of the State of New York, the licensee for the James A. FitzPatrick h elear Power Plant, discussing some staff concerns with the IPE done for FitzPatrick.
This' letter is being sent to assist you in preparing for the March 10, 1992 Commission Briefing on Risk-Based Regulations Transition Strategy.
l w'
Ji ies L. Blaha l
cc:
J. Taylor, EDO d
l J. Sniezek, DEDR W. Bateman, OEDO
~
R. Lobel, OEDO R. Capra, NRR
- ~
SECY I
s P
fl
\\
9409010247 940629 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR
~
n February 6, 1992 l
P j
Docket No. 50 333 Mr. John C. Brons President and Chief Operating Officer Power Authority of the State of New York j
hhite Plains, New York 10601 l
Dear Mr. Brons:
l The findings documented in our rscent Diagnostic Evaluation Team Report for the i
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant have raised questions about the validity of some j
of the models and data that form tila basis of the FitzPatrick Individual Plant Examination (IPE).
In particular, we are concerned that the weaknesses identi.
l fied in your engineering evaluations, design activities and configuration control may have resulted in IPE models that are inaccurate or incomplete representations of the FitzPatrick systems and operations.
In addition, because the plant data used to compute failure probabilities was derived from records of a period in the early 1980s, we are concerned that the_ operability problems and procedural deft-ciencies recently identified by the diagnostic evaluation may indicate incom-I plate knowledge and documentation of equipment failure rates actually experienced during that period. These issues cause us to question the unusually low core damage frequency (CDF) estimate produced by the FitzPatrick IPE.
In order to satisfy the objectives of the IPE program, your IPE should reflect j
as much as possible the current knowledge of the plant and its operations. There-fore, we request that you review the accuracy of its underlying evaluations and
(
conclusions and reconcile them with the findings of our Diagnostic Evaluation j
Team. Please submit your response on the docket for inclusion in our review j
of your IPE.
i i
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. Should you have any questions about our concerns in this matter, we would be pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely, Original sismed by ThamasE. 2 rley Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DISTRIBUTION 5ee next page
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE OFC RA8:DREP:hAR
- BC RAB DREP
- DD DREP:NRR
- D DREP:NR
- ADT
- PDl.1
......:................:..............:..............:.........[R..,:..............:........
NAME
- SLongsbw/ age W8eckner EButcher
- FCongel y V WRussell 38McCabe4
.....................................:........................j...........................
DATE 201/16/92*
301/16/92*
301/17/92*
201/21/92 201/22/92*
o2 A3 /92 0FC
- D PDl-1
- D:
I/II 1ADPR NRR 2AD QMRP n
......:..... #.T.c,
......g rf.',.........:.........
NAME RCapra em
- JPartio F
1a
- Tilurley
.........:.............. y..f.........:.. 7.........:........-
DATE
- 2/m7/92 arwo.: #/92 '
37/h/92 rt Ks /92 h/w /92 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name BRONS LTR h U cl/064/=f9
\\V
l 03-3-92 M.*
AM FiOX CEQUOYAH CO. nmd
+-
..c
-m....
4 pegg,Qg AR 10 '32 12 It s
(A statement to district pewspapers by Rep. Mike Synar of Oklahoma.)
f
/
A CONGRESSMAN'S PERSPECTIVE ON SEQUOYAH FUELS i
On October 3, 1991, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory commission (NRC) ordered the Sequoyah Fuels Corpora tion (SFC) to shut down l
its plant near Gore to address a number of management and j'
operational problems.
This is not the first time that there has I
been controversy over this plant, but as I talk to people in the i
1, area it's clear that this latest occurrence is the most publicly i
divisive.
1 Some of our citiz.ene, who have beer,, keeping tabs on the l
plant, believe that these new problems are the proverbial " straw that broke the camel's back" and that.the plant should be shut N
down permanently, The management at the plant argues that the i
pechlems have been corrected, that the plant is ready to resume operation, that they are committed to uking SFC a model 1
l operation, and that they are committed to reexamining l
controversial practices of the past lik producing fertiliser from chemical Wastes.
Many others may $e less certain of al'. of j
thetechnicaldetails,butareconcernedabouttheeconomic 3
consequences of a shutdown.
i On March 17, the NRC is scheduled to discuss whether or not i
to allow the plant to restart.
The NRCis decision will not i
satisfy everyone.
Eitherway,therewi{1stillbeaneedto clean-uptheenvironmentalcontaminatiodat the plant.
There will still be questions about the extent to which Federal laws i
03-10-s !!:12AM F20M S1000YAH 00. fin I
'd * * * "6em
~~~
s_
i
!-l e
t i
1 i
and regulations may have been violated.. There will.still be a i,
need to reconcile the divisions within our community over heartfelt beliefs of people who have different views on the risX 2
of losing dobs and the risks of contaminating the environment.
s 4
Aschairmanofacongressionalsubdommitteewiththe responsibility to oversee the NRC, I ha e a special obligation to l
make sure that the NRC does its job to protect the health and 1
l safety of ernployees who work at nuclear f acilities and the j
citizens who live near them -- a respondibility that' applies to j
overy nuclear plant in the country, not' dust-to SFC -- and I have told the Chairman and staff of the NRC t;he same thing.
I have i
l told them that Eg job is to make sure,,that they do their job.
l They are to do it fairly, rigorously, and professionally. -And if i
they do not, they will be explaining, under oath before my subcosmittee, why they have not.
After the 1986 release of fourteen tons of uranium hexafluoride and the death of a worker i
i at the plant, that is exactly what I required the NRC to do.
4 i
I There are some people who think that I am actually trying to 1
i shut down the SFC plant.
I am not.
Thore are others who would actually h me to get the NRC to shut down the plant.
That is not spy debt that is a complex, safety-rdlated decision to be made l
l by the NRC.
The NRC is an independent regulatory agency Which is l
supposed to be insulated frem political pressure.
The public
)
4
23-10-92 li "dAR y.Wy. nuww. W. tWf 62'Ii 26/Ibto u
,ee ril a san ave, I
PAGE.04 MAR 10 '92 12:11 I
J 4
i rightly expects tusse agencies to be independant and not pawns to i
the political procasa.
Justlookatal}ofthecontroversyover allegations that Members of Congress meddled improperly in the regulation of individual savings and loan associations.
l l
What Congress can do, and has an chligation to do, is to I
make sure that Federal agencies are carrying out their responsibilities.
Congress cannot issu a license renewal or l
order a licensee to change the way it rdna a nuclear facility, but we do examine those decisions and the way in which they are And, if there are probleme with the way NRC is regulating I
made.
thenuclearindustry,wehaveadutytojholdNRCaccountablein I
l public hearings and we can pass new law to change the rules under which they operate.
IamexaminifgNRC'sactionsregarding SFC in great detail.
If,afterreviewijgtheevidence,Ithink that the facts don't support their decidions, then they will hear I
from me.
And they know it.
J When I say this, some who want me to shut down the plant Let will criticiza me for having too much confidence in the NRC.
memakeitclearthatIdoD21havefulkconfidenceintheNRC.
l If the NRC had been doing its job properly all along, we would not have the situation at Src that we have today!
That is why I have followed this matter so closely and why I will continue to do so.
I I
The day after the NRC notified me df the contamination at
- n i
03-:H2
- !2AM !!,0M SEQUOYAH 00. TIMIS h
PAGE.95 MAR 10 '92 12:12 0
the plant in 1990, I asked NRC to conduc t an investigation of this problem.
Since then, my staff and I have been briefed periodically by NRC on the situation at 8FC.
Every NRC inspection report and order concerning ! FC is sent to ny office and to my subcommittee, and so is every report by the company to the NEC.
We have also reviewed the scatus and findings of the NRC's investigations into possible violations at SFC of NRC regulations and Federal laws.
Some supporters of the plant may believe that this continuing interest on ny part is the galz reason that the NRC i
has been paying so much attention to tho' plant.
That isn't true.
And Mr. Ivan Selin, the new chairman of the NRC, will also tell you that its not true.
All the same, some folks think that I am paying too much attention to SFC and so too the NRC.
Td those people, let me I
repene something Mr. Selin told me.
Its Mr. Selin's opinion that if the nuclear industry is going te survive, the public needs to have confidence that the regulatory system is going to work and that nuclear power and nuclear plants are going to be safe.
I couldn't agree with him more, I
i 4