ML20070K139

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Proposed Tech Specs Changes to Require Safety Injection Tank Operability Throughout Mode 3 & Revise Supporting Surveillance Requirements to Be Consistent W/Revised Mode Applicability
ML20070K139
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/07/1991
From: Creel G
BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20070K113 List:
References
NUDOCS 9103180320
Download: ML20070K139 (17)
v • d • e


Text

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i INDEX LIMITING CON 0!TIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVip. LANCE REQUIREHENTS SECTION 9 AGE >

3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER...............................,.............. 3/4 4-5 3/4.4.S STEAM GENERATORS.......................................... J/4 4-6 3/4.4.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE Le ak a g e Detec ti on Sys tems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/ 4 4- 13 3 Reactor Coolant System Leakage........................... 3/4 4-14 1

3/4.4.7 CH EM I STRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/f; 4 16 i

s 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY........-................................ 3/4 4-19 -

3/4.4.9 i

PRESSURE /TCMPERATURE LIMITS .

Reactor Cool ant Sys tem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 4-23 i P res s u ri z e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/ 4 4- 26 Cverpressure Protection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/A 4-25a 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

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ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 Components...................w. 3/4 4-27 3/4.4.11 CO RE BA RREL M0V EM ENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 29

?/4.4.12 L ET DOWN L IN E EXCE S S FL0W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 4-31 3/4.4.13 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 4. 32 I 3/4.S EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS-(ECCS) 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-1 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - b pnWJ.d9f!.(Er.A.9.?.l.t '.V.C. .T,*.D. 3/4 5-3! -

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3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Q < =%9.1P.D.H.?h M9.?,NfM Y. . 3/4 5-6 3/4 S.4 R E FU E L I N G WAT E R T AN K . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 / 4 S- 7 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 -V Amendment No. #,[fh 9103180320 910307 PDR ADOCK 05000317 P PDR

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W l fhGENCv CORi lC N D SYSTEMS (ECCSJ Ele chu gt 0A N 5 fo[ )j SAFETY _IN RCT10N TANXS Fn'dnd,e*cak,

),IMITING CONDITION FOR OPEPATION _ _

3.5.1 Each reactor ceclent system safety injection tank shall be OPERABLE with:

a. The isolation vahe open, -
b. A centained borated water volume uf' between 1113 and 1179 cub.ic feet of i; orates water (equivalent to tank 1-veis of btween 187 and 199 inches, cispectively).
c. A bcron concentracion of between 2300 2nd 2700 pps, and
d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 200 and 250 psig. .

APPLICABilfTY: h00ES 1, 2 2nd 3.

AC7 ION:

a. With one safety injection tMk inoperable, except es a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable tank to OPEMELE status within one hour _ or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. '
b. With one safety injection tank inoperable due to the isolation valve being classd. either immediately open the isolation v&ive or be in HOT STANDSY witn'in one hour and he in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

iURVEll!,LN(f 3fUl015tEMENTS -___ _ _ _ _ _ , _

. - - ~ _ _ . - .-. 2 4.5.1, Each safety inje.ction tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a, At least once per 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.t b/:

, 1. Verifying the cor.taina j iorated water volema and nitrogen j cover-pressure in the tanks, and a 2. Verifying that each !afety injection tank isolation valve is open.

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il l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNti 1 'J/4 5 - 1 Amendment No. /S, 55,'140 I

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( EMERGENCY _CORf_CQQLE'G_ SYSTEMS 5_URVEILLANCE REOUTREMENTS JContinued) , ,{

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b. At least once rer 31 days by verifying the t>oron concentration of the safety injection tank solution,
c. At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 2000 psig, by i

verifyirs that power to the isolation valve operator is removed by main-taining the feeder breaker pper} under administrative control.

i enterin.s MODE 3 fem MobE # ' "JV

! d. Witt.in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to E- : r!-- ?? M L_- ; 11:-. !?: by verifying, vir local indication at the va!ve, that the tank isolation valve is open. '

5

e. At least once per refueling interval by verifying that each safety injection tank isolation valve oper.' automstically under each of the following condi.

tions:

1. When the RCS pressure exceeds 300 pria, and
2. Upon receipt of a safety injection test signal.
f. Within one hour prior to each increase in solution volume of h 1% of l normal tank volume by verifying the boron concentration at the operating high pressure safety injection pump discharge is between 2300 and 2700 ppm.

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5 2 Amendment No.///h/ 3

, . . . - . ~ . , , - , ,-c.,

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~ EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 1 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Q !. M' ffMobE5 1,7.i AsJh 3 (t- l'150 PS/ A) 8.lMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a. One OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump,  ;
b. One OPERABLE low pressure safety injection pump, and
c. An OPTTC.BLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refuciing water tank on a Safety injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3*.

ACTION:

a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
b. In the event the ECCS is ctuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 t,ithin 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date, i

With pressurizer pressure 2 1750 psia.

Il CALV PT ELIFFS UNIT 1 3/4 5-3 Amendment No.

1

4 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS O .s  ;;f}) obE s 3 [< r1ro PSI A) ANb 4 LIMITING CD!!DITION FOR OPERATION _

3 5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERADLE:

a. One# OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump, and
b. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the.. -

refueling water tank on a Safety injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the contairment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal.

APPLICA91LITY: MODES 3* and 4.

ACTION:

a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />,
b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and

( submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 i within 90 : lays describing the circumstances of the actuation

and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

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With pressurizer pressure < 1750 psia, 0 0

  1. Between 350 F and 327 F, a transition region exists there the .

OPERABLE HPSI pump will be placed in pull-to-lock on a cooldown and restored to automatic status on a heatup. At 3270F and less, the required OPERABLE HPSI pump shall be in pull to lock and will not start automatically. At 327 F0 and less, HPSI pump use will be conducted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.9.3.

CALVERT CLIFFS ' UNIT 1 3/4 5 6 Amen 5nt No. 7//Jf)/J/J/[/)I,

3/4.5 [MERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS UCCS)

[ASES 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS .

The OPERABILITY of each c:' the RCS safety injection tanks ensure _5 that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced Tnto

[, therector) core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS \

r c,b ',)~ pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injection tanks. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

  1. k The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration enj bb pressure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection in the accident analysis are met.

The safety injection tank power operated isolation valves are considered to be " operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE StJ.

279 1971, which r9 quires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. It addition, as these safety injection tank isulation valves fail to mee*.

single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with a. safety injection tank inoperable fcr any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time expoture of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one safety injection tank is not availa*

and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

3/4,5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS _

The OPERABILITY of two separate ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in p.e j event of a LOCA Assuming the loss of one subsystem through any singir_/

failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in ennnectionw ith the l safety injection tanks is capable of_ supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the couble ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward, in addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

Portions of-the low pressure saf2+.y injection (LPSI) system flowpath are common to both subsystems. This includes the low pressure safety injection flow control valve, CV-306, the flow orifice downstream cf CV-306, and the- four low pressure safety injection loop isolation valves.

Although the portions of the flowpath are common, the system design is adequate to ensure reliable ECCS operation due to the short period of LPSI system operation following a designb to recirculation.

l oss of Coolant incident prior l The LPSI system design is conristent with the assumptions in the safeti analysis.

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 AmendmentNo.103h

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- i l - INSERT for BA8E8 Section 3/4.5.1, " SAFETY INJECTION TANK 8" The high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps are restricted in j use during low temperature overpressure potential conditions, and -

i i, may not be available to automatically start. Therefore, the safety injection tanks are required to provide immediate injection of borated water into the core in the event of an accident, allowing adequate time for operator action to manually.

d start a HPSI pump.

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, - , - - , ,, ,, w . - , - . ,, -, e.+-- ,,.,.v.- ~.-.nr--..+-,-..,-.~-, ..,,+-v.J,-.<,,,,, ---n., ..--a ,-,-,-,,,v.,,--,,-, + - , - , ~ , - +---rn-->v.m.- --~,.+v

. - - - - _ - . . - . .=. _ _ - . - - . - - - - . .-. ._ _

EPE GEM ' f *> E COCi!N' S<STEuS HEL.

The trisodiu . phosphate dodec4 hydrate (TSP) stored in dissching baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibil't :f corrosion cracking of certain metal components during I operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection i by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to 2 7.0. The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of RWT water provides assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post LOCA temperatures.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that as a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and the subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. The surveillance requirement for flow balance testing provides assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper Flow split between injection points in accordar ce with the assumptions used in tie ECCS LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS LOCA analyses. Minimum

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KPSI flow requirements for taperatures above 327;f ar break LOCA calculations which credit charging pump flow following@in

( SIAS. Surveillance testing includes allowances for instrumentation system leakage uncertainties. The 470 gpm requirement for minimum HPSI flow from the three lowest flow legs includes instrument uncertainties but not system check valve leakage. The OPERABILITY of the charging pumps and the associated flow paths is assured by the Boration System Specification 3/4.1.2. Specification of safety injection pump total developed head ensures pump performance is consistent with safety af sis assumptions, 3

Ngh less # than 0 At temperatures of 327 f and less, HPSI injection flow is limited to or equal to 210 gpm except in response to excessive reactor icootant leakage. With excessive RCS leakage (LOCA), make up requirements l

couSd exceed'210 gpm. Overpressurization is prevented by controlling l other parameters, such as RCS pressure and subcooling. This provides overpressure protection in the low temperature region. An analysis has been performed which shows this flow rate is morpthan adequate to meet erre cooling safety analysis assumptions. HPSI auto start when the RCS is in the MPT enable co&are ndition.not reauired_lo The Safety p ,,,p3 Injection Tanks previde imediate injection of borated water into the

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core in the event of an ac a to take action to startHPSipum a{ridttttujlowing adequate time for an oper l

Surveillance testing of HPSI pumps is required to ensure pump operability. Some surveillance testing requires that the HPSI pumps deliver flow to the RCS. To allow this testing to be done without increasing the potential for overpressurization of the RCS, either the RWT must be isolated or the HPSI pump flow must be limited to less than or equal to 210 gpm or an RCS vent greater than 2.6 square inches must be provided. l M egtal k CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5 2 AmendmentNo.J//JJ//JJJ/JfGffg,

!NDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.4.4 P RE S S UR I Z E R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/ 4 4- 5 3/4.4.5 ST EAM GEN E RATO RS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 4- 6 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE Leakage Detection Systems................................ 3/4 4-13 Reactor Coolant Sys tem Leakage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 4-14 3/4.4.7 CH EM I ST R f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/ 4 4 - 16 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY........................................ 3/4 4-19 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS Reactor Coolant System................................... 3/4 4-23 P re s s u r i z e r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 4-2 7 Overpressure Protection Systems.......................... 3/4 4-27a 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ASME Code Clas s 1, 2 and' 3 Components. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 4-28 3/4.4.11 CORE BARREL M0VEMENT..................................... 3/4 4-30 3/4.4.12 LETDOWN LINE EXCESS FL0W................................. 3/4 4-32 3/4.4.13 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS....................;........ 3/4 4-33 3/4.5 -EMENENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)  %

3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJ ECT ION TAN KS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS -hygr 300*F). Wff la $F.M. f.')M.P.5.'.h. 3/4 5-3 3/4.5.3 ECCSSUBSYSTEMS-(yg7 300*F). 4".t.4(f. 7[fl'lO?.P5.'!n.\ he.tl. 3/4 5-6 b

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WAT.ER [SI0RAGO TANK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 5-7 c

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT E V Amendment No. Shf/h

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3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) f SAFETY INJECTION TANKS ,

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1 Each reactor coolant system safety injection tank shall be OPERABLE with;

a. The isolation valve open,
b. A contained borated water volume of between 1113 and 1179 cubic feet of borated water (equivalent to tank levels of
  • between 187 and 199 inches, respectively),
c. A boron concentration of between 2300 and 2700 ppm, and
d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 200 and 25'O psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2and3.D ACTION:

a. With one safety injection tank inoperable, 6.xcept as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 houn.
b. With one safety injection tank inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either imediately open the isolation valve or be in HOT STANDBY within one hour and be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1 Each safety injection tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:-

a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:
1. Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and'
2. Verifyin9 that each safety injection tank isolation valve is open.

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@tth pressur4ter--;rt:ter- "50 ;;udh k (f,A L y E A T "; f r r i - U R [ h M h.;;ra .t . '" ,dE;%

CALVERT LLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. H . SS y//,

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4 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURYEILLANfE_ REQUIREMENT 3 fContinued)

b. At least once per 31 days by verifying the boron concentration of the safety injection tank solution, c.

At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressurt is above 2000 psig, by verifying that power te the isolation valve opt ator is removed by main.

talning the feeder breaker open under adminiltrative control, enkeriq ftobE 3 trem MobE 4

d. Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to "---~ ~'-- '- ~ -

-~~~---"'^~~-k verifying, via local indication at the valve, that the tank isolation valve is open, c.

At least once per refueling interval by verifying that each safety injection tank isolation valve opens automatically under each of the following condi-tions:

I. When the RCS pressure exceeds 300 psla, and

2. Upon receipt of a safety injection test sigrst.
f. Within one hout prior to each increase in solution volume of a 1% of normal tank volume by verifying the boron concentration at the operating high pressure safety injection pump discharge is between 2300 and 700 ppm.

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(c4L-vt*T-cum _iunT iF- ~ 3/4 5-: g - u n m . t.< / L = 4 #

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT :

Amendment No,'g/g/@///h 4

4 EMERGENCY CORE C00L1 H SYSTEMS l ECCS SUBSYSTEMS thygl 000:QI4bri I,2, Anb 3 (t rito P.s t4 LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION _,

3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of: .

s. One OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump,
b. One OPERABLE low pressure safety injection pump, and
c. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the .

refueling water tank on 'a Safety Injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal.

APPLICAb!Llh: MODES 1, 2, and 3*.

ACTION:

a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT SHLfTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Comission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

With pressurizer pressure 21750 psia.

l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 5 3 Ameint No.

- . - . , , . , , . . . , . - , , ._ m. , _ , , . , - . , - .

botGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS lievgM000}) #10bC5 3(c two psi Ah ANb (

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPL' RATION 3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the ft1;owing shpil be OPERABLE: V.-

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a. One8 OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump, and
b. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water tank on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3* and 4.

ACTION:

a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.
b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing thw circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated at,uation cycles to date.

(

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS , 4.5.3.1 'The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERAP'i per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of Specification . .2.

4 izer pres f WithpressugFand305gure<1750 Between 350 psia.region exists where the F, a transition OPERABLE HPSI pump will be placed in pull to-lock on a cooldown and restored to automatic status on a heatup. At 3050 f and less, the required OPERABLE HPSI pump bhall be in pull-to-lock and will not start automatically. At 305 F and less. HPSI pump use will be conducted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.9.3.

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 5 6 Amencient No. JJ/M/j

r- __ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ - . . _ _ _ . _ . . . . .

3 - ,W EMERGENCY CORF COOLING SYSTEMS Y*

REFUELING WATER TANK

+ m /

(IMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION 3'.5.4 'The refueling water tank shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A minimum contained borated water volume of 400,000 gallenh,.
b. A boron concentration of between 2300 and 2700 ppe, -

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c. A minimum water temperature of 400 F, and
d. A maximum solution temperature of 100 0F in MODE 1.

APPLICABillTY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. -

EllM With the refueling water tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE st:tus within I hour or be in at least HOT STAND 8Y within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SW1DOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

$RYELU,MC.E RE0VIR_EMENT$

4.5.4 The RWT shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:
1. Verifying the contained borated water vo.lume in the tank, and
  • '2 . Verifying the boron concentration of the water.-
b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWT temperature when the outside air temperature is < 400 f.

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 5 7 Amendment Ni. 77,38 ww e

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1 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYS1 EMS (ECCS) i BASES

$ 3/4.S.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERA 8ILITY of eachof the RCS safety injection ta'nks ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be imediately forced into the reactor co e through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS i pressure falls below tie pressure of the safety injection, tanks. This

initial surge of water into the core.provides the initial cooling
.nsen r mechanism during large RCS pipe rupteres. '

\ ved pr The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration and

par y "'f l pressure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection in the accident analysis are met.

The safety injection tank power operated isolation valves are considered to be " operating bysasses* in the context of IEEE Std. 279 1971, which requires that sypasses of a protection function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. In addition, as these safety injection tank isolation valves fail to meet

single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with a safety injection tank inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures, if a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately ~

opened, the full capability of one safety injection tank is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

,3/4.5.2 d d 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS '

The OPERABILITY of two separate ECCS subsystems ensure that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with j the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward, In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode

[ during the accident recovery period, i Portions of the low pressure safety injection, LPSI) ystem flowpath are common to both subsystems. This includes the essure safety injection flow control valve CV 306, the flow orifice downstream of-CV 306,' and the four low pres,sure safety injection loop isolation valves.

Although the portions of the flowpath are comon, the system design is adequate to ensure reliable ECCS operation due to the short period of LPSI system operation following a design basis Loss of Coolant-Incident prior to recirculation. The LPSI system design is consistent with the assumptions in the safety analysis.'

CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 2 B 3/4 5 1_ AmendmentNo,h r-r.7 awv y -- 3n-..r, w-y w--,-- e,---.m.-- , - -.--.,--m --.,y,.,--r-#-,,- ,, ..,,.+w,---<.b.--ww.-cwo,ciwe ww - *--wn +- emew e-a-4

INSERT for BASE 8 Section 3/4.5.1, " SAFETY INJECTION TANES" The high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps are restricted in use during low temperature overpressure potential conditions, and may not be available to automatically start. Therefore, the safety injection tanks are required to provide immediate ,

injection of borated water into the core in the event' of an accident, allowing adequate time for operator action to manually start a HPSI pump.

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  • EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS pg [m f, BASES The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving 1 in the containment basement is provided to miniMze the .,

baskets located'cgrrosion possibility oaf cracking of certain metal conponents durihg operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raisW to 2 7.0. The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of RWT water prevides assurance t;1st the stored TSP will dissolve ...

in borated water at the postulated post LOCA temperatures. ,

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPUIAB!t.ITY efAach component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and the subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. The survelliance requirement for flow balance testing provides assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS LOCA analyses. Minimum HPSI flow requirements for temperatures above 305 0F are based upon small l break LOCA calculations which credit charging pump flow following a SIAS.

Surveillance leakage uncertainties. testing includes The 470allowances spa requirement for instrumentation for minimuu HPS! andflow" system Y '

from the three lowest flow legs includes instrument uncertainties but not i system check valve leakage. The OPERA 8ILITY of the charging pumps and' '.

the associated flow paths is assured by the Boration System - ""-

Specifications 3/4.1.2. Specification of safety injection pump total developed' head ensures pump performance is consistent with safety analysis assumptions.

0 l At temperatures of 305 F and less, HPSI injection flow is limited to i

less than or equal to 210 gpm except in response to excessive reactor coolant leakage. With excessive RCS leakage (LOCA), make-up requirements could exceed a HPSI flow of 210 g>m. Overpressurization is prevented by controlling other parameters, sue:1 as RCS pressure and subcooling. This provides over>ressure protection in the low temperature region. An analysis has seen performed which shows this flow rate is more than

' adequate to meet core cooling safety analysis assum)tions. HPSI pumps are not required to auto start when the RCS is in tia MPT enable condition. The Safety Injection Tanks provide immediate injection of borated water into the core in the event of an accident, allowing -

adequate time for an operator to take action to start a HPSI pump.

Surveillance testing of HPSI pumps is required to ensure pump operability. Some surveillance testing requires that the HPSI pumps deliver flow to the RCS. To allow this testing to be done without increasing the potential for overpressurization of the RCS, either the RVT must be isolated or the HPSI pump flow must be limited to less than o equal _to 210 gpm or an RCS vent greater than or equal to 2.6 square inches must be provided.

CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 2 B 3/4 5 2 Amendment No. J.VJJ/JJ,131

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