ML20063A208
| ML20063A208 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1982 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16134A675 | List: |
| References | |
| DPC-RD-2001, DPC-RD-2001-R01, DPC-RD-2001-R1, NUDOCS 8208240239 | |
| Download: ML20063A208 (59) | |
Text
,
4 x 4
k Duke Power Company Oconee Nuclear Station Oconee Unit 3, Cycle 7 Reload Report DPC-RD-2001 Revision 1 July 1982 1
r V
82082403'59
OCONEE UNIT 3, CYCLE 7
- Reload Report -
DPC - RD - 2001 Revision 1 July, 1982
, Duke Power Company Steam Production Department P. O. Box 33189 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242
l l
CONTENTS Page
. . 1-1
- 1. INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY
. . 2-1
- 2. OPERATING HISTORY . . . . . . . .
. . . . . 3-1
- 3. GENERAL DESCRIPTION . . . . .
4-1
- 4. FUEL SYSTEM DESIGN . . . . . . . . . .
4.1. Fuel Assembly Mechanical Design . . . . . . . . 4-1 4.1.1. Mark B5 Fuel Assembly 4-1 Fuel Rod Design . . . . . . . . . . 4-2 4.2. . . .
Cladding Collapse . . . . . . . 4-2 4.?.1. . .
4.2.2. Cladding Stress . . . . . 4-3 4.2.3. Cladding Strain . . . . . . 4-3 Thermal Design . . . . . . . . . 4-3 4.3. . . . .
Material Design . . . . . . . . . . 4-4 4.4. . . .
- 5. NUCLEAR DESIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 5.1. Physics Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 5.2. Analytical Inp'ut . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 5.3. Changes in Nuclear Design . . . . . . . . . 5-2
- 6. THERMAL-ifYDRAULIC DESIGN . . . . . . . . 6-1
. . . . . 7-1
- 7. ACCIDENT AND TRANSIENT ANALYSIS . . .
7.1 General Safety Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1 7.2 Accident Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . 7-1
. . 8-1
- 8. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
. . A-1 REFERENCES . . . . .
- ii -
List of Tables Page Table Fuel Design Parameters and Dimensions . . . . . 4-5 4-1.
Linear ifeat Rate to Melt Analysis. . . . . . 4-6 4-2.
Oconee 3 Physics Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3 5-1.
Shutdown Margin Calculation for Oconee 3, Cycle 7 . . . 5-5 5-2. 6-3 6-1. Thermal-Hydraulic Design Conditions . . . . .
Rod Bow DNBR Penalty Justification - Batch 7 6-4 6-2 6-5 6-3 Rod Bow DNBR Penalty Justification - Batch 8 7-1. Comparison of Key Parameters for Accident Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3 LOCA Limits, Oconee 3, Cycle 7, After 50 EFPD . . 7-4 7-2.
LOCA Limits, Oconee 3, Cycle 7, 0-50 EFPD . . . 7-4 7-3.
List of Figures Figure Core Loading Diagram for Oconee 3, Cycle 7 . . . . 3-2 3-1.
3-2. Enrichment and Burnup Distribution for Oconee 3, Cycle 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3 Control Rod Locations for Oconee 3, Cycle 7 . . . . 3-4 3-3.
3-4. BPRA Enrichment and Distribution for 3-5 Oconee 3, Cycle 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mark B5 Upper End Fitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7 4-1.
Mark B5 Holddown Spring Retainer. . . . . . . . . 4-8 4-2.
Mark B5 Fixed Control Component Spider. . . . . 4-9 4-3. .
4-10 4-4. Mark B5 Coupling - Spider Assembly. . . . . . . . . .
4-5. Mark B5 Fixed Control Component Spider /
4-11 Upper End Fitting Interaction . . . . . . . . .
5-1. BOC Cycle 7 Two-Dimensional Relative Power Distribution -
Full Power, Equilibrium Xenon, Normal Rod Positions 5-6 Core Protection Safety Power-Imbalance Limits . . . 8-2 8-1.
Core Protection Safety Pressure-Temperature Limits. . 8-3 8-2.
Core Protection Pressure-Temperature Limits . . . 8-4 8-3.
Maximum Allowable Power-Imbalance Setpoints . . . . . 8-5 8-4. 8-6 8-5. Operational Power-Imbalance Limits 0-50 1 18EFPD . .
8-6. Operational Power-Imbalance Limits 50 1 20 g 200 8-7 1 10 EFPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8-8 8-7. Operational Power-Imbalance Limits After 200 1 10 EFPD.
Control Rod Position Limits, 4 Pumps, 0-50 i 18 EFPD. . 8-9 8-8.
8-9. Control Rod Position Limits, 4 Pumps, 50 18-200
. . . . . 8-10 10 EFPD . . . . . . . . . .
8-10. Control Rod Position Limits, 4 Pumps, After 200 10 EFPD. 8-11 8-11. Control Rod Position Limits, 3 Pumps, 0-50 1 18 EFPD. . 8-12 8-12. Control Rod Position Limits, 3 Pumps, 50 18-200 8-13 10 EFPD . . . . . . .
8-13. Control Rod Position Limits, 3 Pumps, Af ter 200
. . . . . . . 8-14 1 10 EFPD . . . . . . .
- iii - (Rev. 1)
~ - --- - - - -_ ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
List of Figures (cont)
Figure Page 8-14. Control Rod Position Limits, 2 Pumps, 0-50 & 18EFPD. . 8-15 8-15. Control Rod Position Limits, 2 Pumps, 50 i T8-200 1 10 EFPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-16 8-16. Control Rod Position Limits, 2 Pumps, After 200 1 10 EFPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-17 8-17. APSR Position Limits, 0-200 1 10 EFPD . . . . . . 8-18 8-18. APSR Position Limits, After 200 1 10 EFPD . . . . . . 8-19
=
- iv -
- 1. INTRODUCTION AND SUr1 MARY This report justifies the operation of the seventh cycle of Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3, at the rated core power of 2568 MWt. Included are the required analyses as outlined in the USNRC document " Guidance for Proposed License Amendments Relating to Refueling," June 1975.
To support cycle 7 operation of Oconee Unit 3, this report employs analytical y
techniques and design bases established in reports that were previously sub-mitted and accepted by the USNRC and its predecessor (see references).
A brief summary of cycle 6 and 7 reactor parameters related to power capabi-All of the accidents analyzed lity is included in section 5 of this report.
in the FSAR 1 have been reviewed for cycle 7 operation. In those cases where cycle 7 characteristics were conservative compared to those analyzed for pre-vious cycles, no new accident analyses were performed.
The Technical Specifications have been reviewed, and the modifications required for cycle 7 operation are justified in this report.
Based on the analyses performed, which take into account th2 postulated effects of fuel densification and the Final Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems, it has been concluded that Oconee Unit 3 can be operated safely for cycle 7 at the rated power level of 2568 MWt.
1-1
- 2. OPERATING llISTORY The referenced fuel cycle for the nuclear and thermal-hydraulic analyses of _
Oconee Unit 3, cycle 7, is the currently operating cycle 6. Cycle 5 was ter-minated after 309 EFPD of operation. Cycle 6 achieved initial criticality on flarch 12, 1981 and power escalation commenced on ;1 arch 14, 1981. The fuel cycle design length for cycle 7 - 440 EFPD - is based on cycle 6 length of 350 EFPD. No operating anomalies occurred during previous cycle operations t' hat would adversely affect fuel performance in cycle 7.
Cycle 7 will operate in a feed-and-bleed mode for its entire design length, as did cycle 6.
2-1 (Rev. 1)
- 3. GENERAL DESCRIPTION The Oconee Unit 3 reactor core and fuel design basis are described in detail in Chapter 3, of the FSAR.1 The cycle 7 core consists of 177 fuel assemblies, each of which is a 15 by 15 array containing 208 fuel rods, 16 control rod guide tubes, and one incore instrument guide tube. The fuel consists of dished-end, cylindrical pellets of uranium dioxide clad in cold-worked fuel Zircaloy-4. The fuel assemblies in all batches have an average nominal loading of 463.6 kg uranium. The undensified nominal active fuel lengths, theoretical densities, fuel and fuel rod dimensions, and other related fuel parameters are given in Table 4-1.
Nineteen of Figure 3-1 is the core loading diagram for Oconee 3, cycle 7.
the batch 7 assemblies will be discharged at the end of cycle 6 along with batches SB, and 6. The remaining 37 batch 7 assemblies, designated "7B,"
and the fresh batch 9 FAs - with initial enrichments of 2.80 and 3.18 wt
% 235 U, respectively - will be loaded into the central portion of the core.
Batch 8, with an initial enrichment of 3.07 wt % 23sU, will occupy primarily the core periphery. Figure 3-2 is an eighth-core map showing the assembly burnuf. and enrichment distribution at the beginning of cycle 7.
Core reactivity con-Cycle 7 will operate in a rods-out, feed-and-bleed mode.
trol is supplied mainly by soluble boron and supplemented by 61 full-length In addi-Ag-in-Cd cont.rol rods and 64 burnable poison rod assemblies (BPRAs) .
tion to the full-length control rods, eight partial-length axial power shaping rods (APSRs) are provided for additional control of axial power distribution.
The cycle 7 locations of the 69 control rods and the group designations are indicated in Figure 3-3, The cycle 7 locations and enrichments of the BPRAs are shown in Figure 3-4.
3-1
l FIGURE 31. CORE LOA 0 LNG OIAGRAM FOR OCONEE 3 CYCLE 7 X
NO3 G14 ' NOS G02 N13 A 8 8 8 8 8 M04 F05 M14 M02 Fil 8 9 8 9 8 B 8 9 8 9 K04 K12 F03 H07 K08 F13 8 9 8 C 8 9 8 9 8 --9 8 9 A09 008 BOS H13 A07 M08 B11 8 9 8 8 9 7B 9 0 8 9 8 9 78 9 C13 010 006 C03 A06 NO2 A10 '
7B 7B 7B 9 78 9 8 9 ,'
9 8 9 7B 9 A08 GIS M10 C04 G01 H01 PO4 C12 M06 78 9 8 8 9 78 9 78 9 8 9 78 9 78 8 007 P09 F02 B10 FIS P07 009 F01 8 7B 9 8 9 G 78 9 78 9 7B- 9 9 8 9 8
P10 002 B04 H05 005 E04 N11 H11 P12 N14 M12 9 8 8
" 8 8 9 8 78 7B 9 7B 9 7B 7B 8 B09 L14 i L15 N07 N09 LO1 P06 807 9 8 9 8 8 9 78 9 7B 9 7B 9' 7B 8 9 004 H15 K15 E10 K01 R08 B12 012 E06 7B 9 7B 9 8 8 L 78 9 78 9 78 9 8 8 9 013 C10 C06 003 R06 014 R10 78 7B 9 7B 9 8 9 M 9 8 9 78 9 78 R09 H03 P05 008 R07 E08 P11 9 8 8 9 78 9 8 9 8 9 78 9 8
G04 G12 LO3 G08 H09 L13 8 9 8 9 8 9 8 0 8 9 8 9 E12 LOS E14 E02 L11 8 9 8 9 8 8 9 8 9 003 K14 011 K02 013 R 8 8 8 8 8 Z
11 12 13 14 15 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 XX PREVIOUS CYCLE LOCATION X BATCH NO.
32
l ENRICHMENT AND BURNUP DISTRIBUTION FOR OCONEE 3, CYCLE 7 FIGURE 3-2.
13 14 15 10 11 12 8 9 3.07 3.18 3.07 3.07 2.80 3.18 2.80 2.80 13659 0 13692 13628 20132 0 11633 11637 3.18 3.07 3.18 3.07 2.80 3.18 2.80 K 0 14069 0 12671 20128 0 11702 2.80 3.18 3.07 3.07 2.80 3.18 14780 0 13637 11003 L 14935 0 2.80 3.18 3.07 3.18 M 12995 0 13949 0 3.07 3.18 3.07 N 14105 0 9631 3.07 0 13259 S
L P
R X.XX INITI AL EN RICHMENT, wt % 235U XXXXX BOC BURNUP, mwd /mtU 3-3 (REV.1)
FIGURE 3 3. CONTROL R00 LOCATIONS FOR OCONEE 3, CYCLE 7 X
A 3 7 3 B
1 6 6 1 C
7 8 4 8 7 0
1 5 2 2 5 1 E
3 8 7 5 7 8 3 F
6 2 4 4 2 6 G
5 3 5 4 7 Y H W- 7 4 2 4 4 2 6 K 6 3 7 5 7 8 3 L 8 M 1 5 2 2 5 1 7 8 4 8 7 N
6 i
0 1 6 1 g
P 3 7 3 R
Z 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1 2 GROUP NO. of ROOS FUNCTION 1 P SAFETY X GROUP NO- 2 E SAFETY 3 9 SAFETY 4 8 SAFETY 5 8 CONTROL 6 8 CONTROL 7 12 CONTROL 8 8 APSRs
FIGURE 3-%. BPRA ENRICHMENT AND DISTRIBUTION FOR OCONEE 3, CYCLE 7 13 14 15 11 12 9 10 8
I4 H 1.4 1.4 0.2
- 1. 4 K
0.5 1.4 L
1.0 M
0.2 N
0 SL P
R X.X BPRA CONCENTRATION,wt % B 4C IN Al 023 3-5
- 4. FUEL SYSTEM DESIGN 4.1 Fuel Assembly Mechanical Design The types of fuel assemblies and pertinent fuel design parameters for Oconee 3, cycle 7, are listed in Table 4-1. All fuel assemblies are identical in concept and are mechanically interchangeable. Four regenerative neutron sources will be used: two will be contained in MK B5 fuel assemblies and two in MK B4 assemblies. Retainer assemblies will be used on the two MK B4 FAs containing the regenerative neutron sources. The justification for the design and use of the BPRA retainers is described in reference 3 and 21, which is also applicable to the RNS retainers of Oconee 3, cycle 7.
The batch 9 Mark B5 fuel assemblies have redesigned upper end fittings which provide a positive holddown of BPRAs. Section 4.1.1 describes the design features of this end fitting. All 64 BPRAs will be inserted into batch 9 fuel assemblies.
Other results presented in the FSAR I fuel assembly mechanical discussions and Duke in previous reload reports are applicable to the reload fuel assemblies.
ribed below, which envelope has performed generic mechanical analyses, the cycle 7 design. All methods are consit - with the approved methodolo-gies of Reference 16 except where specifically stated.
4.1.1 Mark B5 Fuel Assembly Batch 9 fuel assemblies are Babcock & Wilcox Mark B5 fuel assemblies (FA's).
The Mark B5 assembly is identical to the Mark B4 except that its upper end fitting has been developed to provide a positive holdown of fixed control components such as burnable poison rod assemblies, neutron source rod assemblies, and orifice rod assemblies (should reinsertion of orifice rod assemblies be desirable to miniraize core bypass flow). The B4 and B5 FA's function identically with existing handling equipment and movable control components, such as control rod assemblies and axial power shaping rod assemblies.
A spring loaded retainer assembly, references 3 and 21, is used with the Mark B4 FA design to insure positive holddown of the fixed control components at all design flow conditions. A locking-ball coupling attaches the control components to the FA.
4-1
The Mark B5 upper end fitting, Figure 4-1, provides four open slots that align and allow designed movement of the holddown spring retainer, Figure 4-2, and the B5 fixed control component spider, figure 4-3 and 4-4. The holddown spring used in the B5 FA will provide positive holddown capability, with or without a fixed control component installed, for all design flow conditions. l The holddown spring is preloaded through a stop pin, welded to an car on each side of the upper end fitting. In core, the spider feet _are captured between the holddown spring retainer and the upper grid pads on the reactor internals as shown in Figure 4-5. This arrangement retains the B5 fixed control com-ponents at all design flow conditions.
Mark B5 fixed control component assemblies are not compatible with B4 FA's for in core operation and vice versa. Cycle 7 has been designed to preclude mixing of control component designs and this will be verified by video prior to plenum l
installation. i It has been determined that no special treatment of the B5 assembly is required for core reload design analyses. The upper end fitting form loss coefficient remains significantly unchanged, and the fuel rod design remains unchanged.
Therefore, the thermal-hydraulic and fuel rod mechanical analyses are un-affected.
! 4.2 Fuel Rod Design The mechanical evaluation of the fuel rod is discussed below.
4.2.1 Cladding Collapse The fuel of batch 7B is more limiting than other batches due to its longer previous incore exposure time. The batch 7B assembly power histories were analyzed, and the most limiting assembly was used to perform the creep collapse analysis using the CROV computer code and procedures described in 1
topical report BAW-10084, Rev. 2.2 The TACO S code was used to calculate The col-internal pin pressures and clad temperatures used as input to CROV.
lapse time for the most limiting assembly was conservatively determined to be more than 35,000 EFPil, which is greater than the maximum projected residence time of cycle 7 fuel (Table 4-1). i .
l l
l 4-2 (Rev. 1) l
= .
_ . _ . _ . _ , _ _ - I
4.2.2 Cladding Stress Duke has performed a generic and conservative fuel rod cladding stress analy-sis. This analysis is consistent with the methodology described in Reference 16 with the following exception: the fuel rod total stress (primary plus secondary) was permitted to exceed the unirradiated yield strength. Two times the minimum unirradiated yield strength (2.0 Sy) has been used as a criterion for the total stress calculation, as permitted by Section III, Article NB-3000 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel-Code. Approximately 0.35 Sy margin remains in this total stress calculation.
Primary membrane plus primary bending stresses are limited to 1.0 Sy, and primary membrane stress is limited to 2/3 Sy. Substantial margin exists in 1 both of these evaluations.
The following conservatisms exist in the generic cladding stress calculation:
Specification cladding dimensions which result in highest stress a low internal pressure (HZP);
a high external pressure (110 percent of design pressure);
a large through wall cladding temperature gradient (fuel melt conditions), and BOL grid loads for worst grid cell type (based c.o as-built cladding diameter and spacer grid cell size) 4.2.3 Cladding Strain Duke has performed a cladding strain calculation using TACO in accordance with
'he approved methodology.16 This analysis demonstrated that the uniform, cir-cumferential strain of the cladding was within 1.0%.
4.3. Thermal Design All fuel in the cycle 7 core is thermally similar. The fresh batch 9 fuel in-serted for cycle 7 operation introduces no significant differences in fuel thermal performance relative to the other fuel remaining in the core. The linear heat rate to melt capability based on centerline fuel melt was determined separately for each batch of fuel using the TACO computer code. The individual fuel para-meters used to determine the fuel melt limits are shown in Table 4-2.
4-3 (Rev. 1)
The input shown includes the following conservatisms:
1
- 1. LTL initial density
- 2. LTL initial pellet diameter.
- 3. A maximum gap based on as-fabricated pellet and cladding data.
- 4. Maximum incore densification based on resinter test results.
fuel The burnup dependent linear heat rate (LHR) capability and the average temperature for each batch are shown in Table 4-2.
Reference 16, Section 4.6, states that "no credit is taken for fuel relocation in LilRTH analyses". This is an error. Fuel relocation is assumed in these analyses in that relocation is an integral part of the TACO model. However, credit for restructuring is not assumed in these analyses, in accordance with Reference 4.
Fuel rod internal pressure has been evaluated using TACO with a conservative pin power history, and the maximum pressure is less than the nominal reactor coolant (RC) system pressure of 2200 psia.
4.4. Material Design The batch 9 fuel assemblies are not unique in concept (excluding the upper end fitting design modification of the *: ark B5 feel assembly), nor do they utilize different component materials. Therefore, the chemical compatibility of all possible fuel-cladding-coolant-assembly interactions for the batch 9 fuel assemblies is identical to those of the present fuel.
i 4-4 (Rev. 1)
p -.
l Table 4-1. _ Fuel Design Parameters and Dimensions Batch No.
7B 8 9 Mark B4 Mark B4 Mark B5 FA type 37 68 72 No. of FAs Fuel rod OD, in. 0.430 ~~' O.430 0.430 Fuel rod ID, in. 0.377 0.377 0.377 Flex spacers, type Spring Spring Spring Rigid spacers, type Zr-4 Zr-4 Zr-4 142.2 141.8 141.8 Undensif active fuel length, in.
Fuel pellet OD (mean 0.3695 0.3686 0.3686 spec), in.
Fuel pellet initial 94.0 95.0 95.0 density (mean spec),
%TD 2.80 3.07 3.18 Initial fuel enrich-ment, wt % 235U 26,376 18,960 10,560 Est residence time, EOC 7, EFPil
>35,000 >35,000 >35,000 Cladding collapse time, EFPli d
4-5 (Rev. 1)
Table 4-2. Linear lleat Rate to Melt Analysis Batch No. ,,
7B 8 9 93.50(a) 94.66 94.58 Initial density, % TD Max. In-reactor 1.25 1.85 densification, % TD 2.65(a) 3964(a) 2784 3317 Burnup corresponding to max. densification, mwd /mtU 0.3691(b) 0.3683 0.3682 Initial pellet diameter, in. 0.3776 0.3773 Initial clad ID, in. 0.3770(b) 0.4300(b) 0.4306 0.4303 Initial clad OD, in.
5.73 5.74 5.74 Average linear heat rate @
100% of 2568 MW, kW/ft 20.5 20.5 Linear heat rate capability ( ) 20.5 from 0-10,000 MWD /MTU, kW/ft 21.5 21.5 Linear heat rate capability ( } 21.5
>10,000 MWD /MTU, kW/ft 1250(c) 1240 1240 Average fuel temp. @ nominal linear heat rate, F (a) Basis: Batch specific pellet resinter data (b) Basis: Pellet and cladding as-fabricated dimensions (95/95 tolerances)
(c) Basis: TACO, 96.5% TD @ 4000 MWD /mtU, nominal pellet and cladding dimensions (d) These values are utilized as fuel design limits for Cycle 7.
4-6 (Rev. 1)
FIGURE 4-1 MARK B5 UPPER END FITTING (SIDE VIEW)
SLOT
/ si \ ,;'/
T HOLE i
/c r ,
, , s&
Y 9
(
t j
n, ,-, - -- ,
r l
e r- y l
.O a .
I 4-7
l l
l l
1 FIGURE 4-2 MARK B5 HOLDDOWN SPRING RETAINER 1
FOOT ARM
{
V STOP PIN LECGE
, f RING
\
a - , <
u w'
D 4-8
a- _a--_
FIGURE 4-3 MARK B5 FIXED CONTROL COMPONENT SPIDER (TOP VIEW) ese o6 FOOT LEG T r "Y" ARM
% o o
O j O TRAIGHT ARM O O O O L 3 l v y I I l il lI l j J '
\ l' 'u
- H UB O O O O fb 4-9
N FIGURE 4 4 MARK B5 COUPLING SPIDER ASSY -SIDE VIEW (SECTION) l vs ,
ex N N N ~N N \
N N SPICER
\ >\
4 4
s -
4-10
FIGURE 4 5 MARK B5 FIXED CONTROL COMPONENT SPIDER / UPPER ,
END FITTING INTERACTION h
k UPPER GRID PAD COUPLING-SPIDER ASSEMELY STOP PIN l
)
/' I
/
Y
/ {NT~--
f ri
<r-N/,_[
r HOLCD07iN SPRING RETAINER
< , m_; / ( ,) moLocceN ee1Ne h
. w j ;
N x ~
i i
-a x /- '
Y /
LUE, EAR 4-11
i
- 5. NUCLEAR DESIGN 5.1 Physics Characteristics Table 5-1 compares the core physics parameters of design cycles 6 and 7; the 3, 15 values for cycle 6 were generated by B&W using PDQ07 while the values for cycle 7 were generated by Duke Power Company using methods described in Reference 16. Since the core has not yet reached an equilibrium cycle, differences in core physics parameters are to be expected between the cycles. The longer cycle 7 will produce a higher cycle burnup than that for the design cycle 6. Figure 5-1 illustrates a representative relative power distribution for the beginning of the seventh cycle at full power with equili-brium xenon and normal rod positions.
The initial BPRA loading, longer design life, different shuffle pattern, and different control rod pattern for cycle 7 make it difficult to compare the physics parameters with those of cycle 6. The BOC critical boron concentrations for cycle 7 are higher because the additional reactivity necessary for the longer cycle is not completely offset by burnable poison. The control rod worths differ between cycles primarily due to changes in control rod patterns.
I Calculated ejected rod worths and their adherence to criteria are considered at all times in life and at all power levels in the development of the rod position limits presented in section 8. All safety criteria associated with these rod worths are met. The adequacy of the shutdown margin with cycle 7 stuck worths is demonstrated in Table 5-2. The following conservatisms were applied for the shutdown calculations:
- 1. Poison material depletion allowance.
- 2. 10% uncertainty on net rod worth.
I 1
- 5-1
1 Flux redistribution was explicitly accounted for since the shutdown analysis l was calculated using a three-dimensional model. The reference fuel cycle shutdown margin is presented in the Oconee 3, cycle 6 reload report.5 l
l The cycle 7 power deficits, differential boron worths, and effective delayed neutron fractions differ from those of cycle 6 because of the longer cycle length and differences in core loading.
5.2 Analytical Input The cycle 7 incore measurement calculation constants to be used to compute core power distributions were obtained in a similar manner for cycle 7 as for the reference cycle, however, CASM0 17 was used to verify the F-factors derived from B&W's codes.
5.3 Changes in Nuclear Design There are only two significant core design changes between the reference 1
cycle and the reload cycle. The cycle lifetime is increased to 440 EFPD requiring an increase in the number of fresh fuel asseablies and BPRAs.
Duke Power calculational methods te are used to obtain the important nuclear design parameters for this cycle.
l l
l 5-2 (Rev. 1)
I
Table 5-1. Oconee 3 Physics Parameters "
Cycle 6 '} Cycle 7(#}
Cycle length, EFPD 376 440 Cycle burnup, mwd /mtU 11,766 13,752 Average core burnup, EOC, mwd /mtU 20,231 21,608 Initial core loading, mtU 82.1 82.1 Critical boron - BOC (no xenon), ppm HZP, group 7 at 100% WD, 8 at 37.5% WD 1471 1623 HFP, group 7 at 87% WD, 8 at 25% WD 1282 1440 Critical boron - EOC (equilibrium xenon), ppm HZP, group 7 at 100% WD, 8 at 37.5% WD 385 396 HFP, group 7 at 87% WD, 8 at 25% WD 78 11 Control rod worths - HFP, BOC, % Ak/k Group 6 0.98 1.22 Group 7 1.36 1.47 Group 8 (25% to 100% WD) 0.50 0.33 Control rod worths - HFP, EOC, % Ak/k Group 7 1.48 1.65 Group 8 (25% to 100% WD) 0.54 0.29 I Max ejected rod worth - HZP, % Ak/k BOC, (N12) groups 5-8 inserted 0.38 0.74 EOC, (N12) groups 5-8 inserted 0.51 0.82 Max stuck rod worth - HZP, % Ak/k BOC (N12) 1.39 1.50 EOC (N12) 1.52 2.06 Power deficit, HZP to HFP, % Ak/k BOC 1.39 1.76 EOC 2.22 3.12 Doppler coeff - BOC, 10 s (Ak/k *F) 100% power (no xenon) -1.49 -1.32 Doppler coeff - EOC, 10 ~5 (Ak/k *F) 100% power (equilibrium xenon) -1.62 -1.68 5-3 (Rev. 1)
Table 5-1. (Cont'd) > ., -
Cycle 6(') Cycle 7(#)
Moderator coeff - IGP, 10 ~4 (Ak/k *F)
BOC (no xenon, 1370 ppm, group 8 ins.) -0.65 -0.34 EOC (equilibrium xenon, 15 ppm, group 8 ins.) -2.82 -2.85 Boron worth - liFP, ppm /% Ak/k BOC (1058 ppm) 116 121 EOC (50 ppm) 102 108 Xenon worth - IfFP, % Ak/k BOC (4 days) 2.61 2.49 EOC (equilibrium) 2.74 2.70 ,
l l
Effective delayed neutron fraction - !!FP BOC 0.00628 0.00628 EOC 0.00526 0.00518
("} Cycle 7 data are for the conditions stated in this report. The cycle 6 core conditions are identified in reference 5.
(b) Based on a 299-EFPD cycle 5. (Actual cycle 5 length 309 EFPD).
(c) Based on 350-EFPD cycle 6. (Actual cycle 6 length 349 EFPD).
I l
l l
l 5-4 (Rev. 1)
Table 5-2. Shutdown Margin Calculation for Oconee 3, Cycle 7 BOC, EOC,
% Ak/k % Ak/k Available Rod Worth Total rod worth, HZP 8.21 9.07
-0.42 -0.42 Worth reduction due to poison burnup Maximum stuck rod, HZP -1.50 -2.06 ,
y
- 4 6.29 6.59 Net worth -0.66 Less 10% uncertainty -0.63 5.66 5.93 Total available worth Required Rod Worth Power deficit, HFP to HZP 1.76 3.12 Max inserted rod worth, RFP 0.23 0.55 Total required worth 1.99 3.67 Shutdown Margin 3.67 2.26 Total available worth minus total required worth Note: Required shutdown margin is 1.00% Ak/k.
5-5 (Rev. 1)
FIGURE 51 OCONEE 3 CYCLE 7 TWO DIMENSIONAL '
RELATIVE POWER DISTRIBUTION ,
HFP,004 EFPD, EQXE NOMINAL ROD POSITIONS 11 12 13 14 15 8 9 10 1.074 1.174 1.307 1.039 0.561 H 0.814 1.025 1.031 1.129 1.094 1.260 1.217 1.232 0.556 K 0.854 0.986 1.178 1.003 1.309 0.944 0.433 L
1.098 1.240 1.082 0.888 M
1.082 1.065 0.507 N
0 0.542 S
L P
R 5-6 (REV.1)
- 6. THERMAL-HYDRAULIC DESIGN The incoming batch 9 fuel is hydraulically and geometrically similar to the fuel remaining in the core from previous cycles. The thermal-hydraulic de-sign analysis supporting cycle 7 operation was performed by Duke Power Company and employed the methods and models described in references 1, 5, 9 and 16.
The maximum core bypass flow for cycle 6 was 8.1% of the total system flow.
For cycle 7 operation, 64 BPRAs will be inserted, and four assemblies contain regenerative neutron sources. The number of open assemblies is 40, and the maximum core bypass flow is reduced to 7.6.%. The cycle 6 and 7 maximum design conditions are summarized in Tab.e 6-1.
A net rod bow DNBR penalty of 0.0% was calculated for cycle 7, taking credit for the flow area reduction hot channel factor used in all DNBR calculations.
The penalty was based on the highest batch 9 assembly burnup, 17,500 MWD /MTU.
An analysis was performed to conservatively determine the minimum allowable reduction in pin peak as a function of burnup required to of fset rod bow DNBR penalty, reference 18. The result was used to demonstrate that the increase '
in DNBR associated with the lower pin peaks (relative to the limiting batch 9 l
assembly) for the limiting batch 7 and 8 assemblies more than offsets the I
increased rod bow DNBR penalty that would be calculated for the higher assembly burnups of batch 7 or 8 fuel.
The reduction in pin peak (relative to the limiting batch 9 assembly) and the minimum allowable reduction in pin peak are given in Tables 6-2 and 6-3 for batch 7 and 8 fuel, respectively. The required minimum reduction in pin peak was determined for the limiting assembly burnup as a function of time rather than on the basis of the maximum EOC assembly burnup which is overly conservative.
6-1 (Rev. 1)
For cycle 7 operation a flux to flow setpoint of 1.08 is maintained. The minimum DNBR value determined by the flux to flow setpoint analysis is above the design minimum DNBR of 1.30. All other plant operating limits based on DNBR criteria include a minimum of 10.2% DNBR margin from the B&W-2 correlation design limit of 1.30.
l l
( 6-2 i
Table 6-1. Thermal flydraulic Design Conditions Cycle 6 Cycle 7 2568 2568 Design power level, MWt 2200 2200 System pressure, psia 106.5 106.5 Reactor coolant flow, % design flow 8.1 7.6 Core bypass flow, % total flow 555.6/602.4 555.6/602.4 Vessel inlet / outlet coolant temp at 100% power, F 1.71 1.71 Ref design radial-local power peaking factor 1.5 cosine 1.5 cosine Ref design axial flux shape 1.011 1.011 llot channel factors: Enthalpy rise 1.014 1.014 Heat flux 0.98 Flow area 0.98 (a) (a)
Active fuel length, in.
176 176(b)
Avg heat 100% power, 103 Blu/h-ftagxat BAW-2 BAW-2 CllF correlation 2.05 >2.05 Min DNBR with densification penalty
(")See Table 4-1.
(b) Heat flux based on densified length of 140.3 in., which is a con-servative minimum value.
t 6-3
Table 6-2. Rod Bow DNBR Penalty Justification - Batch 7 Max. Peak Pin Power 1.43 Max. Assembly Burnup 17.5 GWD/MTU Min.
Peak Pin Assembly ABU APP Allowable EFPD Power BU GWD/MTU % APP, %
0 1.20 20.1 2.60 16.1 0.60 4 1.20 20.2 -- 2.70 16.1 0.62 -
12 1.20 20.4 2.90 16.1 0.67 25 1.20 20.d 3.30 16.1 0.76 50 1.21 21.5 4.00 15.4 0.92 100 1.22 22.9 5.40 14.7 1.24 150 1.24 24.4 6.90 13.3 1.59 200 1.25 26.0 8.50 12.6 1.96 250 1.27 27.6 10.1 11.2 2.32 300 1.26 29.4 11.9 11.9 2.74 350 1.24 31.1 13.6 13.3 3.13 400 1.21 32.8 15.3 15.4 3.52 421 1.20 33.5 16.0 16.1 3.68 440 1.19 34.1 16.6 16.8 3.82 ABU = the change in fuel assembly burnup relative to the maximum batch 9 assembly burnup APP = the percent reduction in peak pin power relative to the maximum batch 4 9 peak pin power Min. Allowable APP = the minimum permissible reduction in peak pin power
= 0.23 x ABU (GWD/MTU), reference 18 6-4 (Rev. 1)
Table 6-3. Rod Bow DNBR Penalty Justification - Bat.ch 8 Max. Peak Pin Power 1.43 Max. Assembly Burnup 17.5 GWD/MTU Min.
Assembly ABU APP Allowable Peak Pin APP, %
Power EU GWD/MTU %
EFPD 4
0 1.40 14.1 4 1.39 14.3 12 1.38 14.6 25 1.37 15.1 50 1.36 16.1 1.33 18.0 0.50 6.99 0.12 100 19.9 2.40 8.39 0.55 150 1.31 21.7 4.20 9.79 0.97 200 1.29 23.5 6.00 11.2 1.38 250 1.27 25.2 7.70 12.6 1.77 300 1.25 27.0 9.50 14.0 2.19 350 1.23 28.7 11.2 15.4 2.58 400 1.21 29.5 12.0 15.4 2.76 421 1.21 30.2 12.7 16.1 2.92 440 1.20 s
ABU = the change in fuel assembly burnup relative to the maximum batch 9 assembly burnup APP = the percent reduction in peak pin power relative to the maximum batch 9 peak pin power Min. Allowable APP = the minimum permissible reduction in peak pin power
= 0.23 x ABU (GWD/MTU), reference 18
' The limiting assem'oly burnup is less than 17.5 GWD/MTU, the max. batch 9 assembly burnup. The rod bow DNBR penalty is therefore less than that for batch 9.
6-5 (Rev. 1)
- 7. ACCIDENT AND TRANSIENT ANAI.YSIS 7.1 General Safety Analysis Each FSARI accident analysis has been examined with respect to changes in cycle 6 parameters to determine the effect of the cycle 7 reload and to ensure that thermal performance during hypothetical transients is not degraded. The effects of fuel densification on the FSAR accident results has been evaluated and are reported in reference 9. Since batch 9 reload fuel assemblies contain fuel rods with a theoretical density higher than those considered in reference 9, the conclusions in that reference are still valid.
No new dose calculations were performed for the reload report. The dose con-siderations in reference 20 are conservative for Oconee 3 cycle 7 based upon comparisons of core average burnup for the two cycles.
7.2 Accident Evaluations The key parameters that have the greatest effect on determining the outcome of a transient can typically be classified in three major areas: core thermal pa rame te rs , thermal-hydraulic parameters, and kinetics parameters , including the reactivity feedback coefficients and control rod worths.
Fuel thermal analysis parameters for each batch in cycle 7 are given in Table 4-2. Table 6-1 compares the cycle 6 and 7 thermal-hydraulic maximum design conditions. Table 7-1 compares the key kinetics parameters from the FSAR and cycle 7.
A generic LOCA analysis for the B&W 177-FA, lowered-loop NSS has been per-formed using the Final Acceptance Criteria ECCS Evaluation Model. This study is reported in BAW-10103, Rev. 1.11 The analysis in BAW-10103 is generic since the limiting values of key parameters for all plants in this category were used. Furthermore, the combination of average fuel temperature as a 7-1
function of LilR and the lifetime pin pressure data used in the BAW-10103 LOCA limits analysis itet2 is conservative compared to those calculated for this re-load. Thus, the analysis and the LOCA limits reported in BAW-10103 provide #
conservative results for the operation of Oconee 3, cycle 7 fuel. '
.i Table 7-2 shows the bounding values for allowable LOCA peak LilRs for Oconee 3 cycle 7 fuel after 50 EFPD. The LOCA kW/f t limits have been reduced for the first 50 EFPDs. The reduction will ensure that conservative limits are maintained while a transition is being made in the fuel performance codes that provide input to the ECCS analysis 1D in order to account for mechanistic fuel densification. The limits for the first 50 EFFD are shown in Table 7-3.
From the examination of cycle 7 core thermal properties and kinetics proper-ties with respect to acceptable previous cycle values, it is concluded that this core reload will not adversely affect the safe operation of the Oconee 3 plant during cycle 7. Considering the previously accepted design basis used in the FSAR and subsequent cycles, the transient evaluation of cycle 7 is con-sidered to be bounded by previously accepted analyses. The initial conditions of the transients in cycle 7 are bounded by the FSAR and/or the fuel densifi-cation report.9 7-2
Table 7.1. Comparison of Key Parameters for Accident Analysis FSAR 3 Predicted -
Parameter value cycle 7 value BOC Doppler coeff, 10~5, Ak/k/ F -1.17 -1.32 EOC Doppler coeft, 10 ~5 Ak/k/ F -1.33 " -1.68
!!OC moderator coeff, 10~4, Ak/k*F + 0 . 5 (I' -0.34 EOC moderator coeff, 10~4, Ak/k/ F- -3.0 -2.85 AlI rod bank worth,llZP, % Ak/k 10.0 9.07 g floron reactivity worth, 70 F ppm /1% Ak/k 75 83 Max, ejected rod worth,IIFP, % Ak/k 0.65 0.20 Dropped rod worth, HFP, % Ak/k 0.46 0.12 Initial boron conc, llFP, ppm 1400 1440(C}
(" -1.2 x 10 ~5 Ak/k/F was used for steam-line analysis.
-1.3 x 10 ~5 Ak/k/F was used for cold water accident. (pump start-up).
' +0.94 x 10~4 Ak/k/F was_used for the moderator dilution accident.
(c)The combined effect of boron concentration and boron worth is conservative for Cycle 7.
7-3 (Rev. 1)
Table 7-2. LOCA Limit s , Oconee 3, Cycle 7, After 50 EFPD Elevation, 'i1R limits, ft _
kW/ft ,
2 15.5 4 16.6 6 18.0 8 17.0 10 16.0 Table 7-3. LOCA Limits, Oconee 3, Cycle 7 0-50 EFPD Elevation, LIIR Limits ,
ft kW/ft 2 14.5 4 16.1 6 17.5 8 17.0 10 16.0 7-4
- 8. PROPOSED t10DIFICATIONS TO TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS The Technical Specifications have been revised for cycle 7 operation in accordance with the methods of reference 16 to account for minor changes in inherent with a transition to 18-month, power peaking and control rod worths lumped burnable poison cycles. Cycle 6 Technical Specifications were generated in accordance with the methods described in Reference 14.
Based on the Technical Specifications derived from the analyses presented in this report, The Final Acceptance Criteria ECCS limits will not be exceeded, nor will the thermal design criteria be violated. Figures 8-1 through 8-18 are revisions to previous Technical Specification limits.
8-1
i Figure 8-1 Core Protection Safety Powcr-Irbalance Limits THERMAL POWER LEVEL. %
M1 = 0 529 -120
(-32.5,112.01 (33.0.112.0) i i M2= -1.864 1 495.1030). I 4 p(I yp '
CPERATICN -100 l l
(-32.51.90.64) (33 OIO 64)
I i I
1 ACCEPTABLE
(-49 5.81 641: 1 3 3 4 pyyp I (49 5,81.25)
-80 s
I I OPE R ATION I I i l
(-32.d63.26) (33.0 63.26) 3 -60 I h (49.5.59.89) l ACCEPTABLE I
(-49.5.54.76) ' i 2.3. & 4 PUMP I I OPERATION I I l
' l
' -40 1 I
1 I I o149.5.32.51)
I I I I I I I -20 ,
I I
I I I l
40 40 -20 20 40 60 RE ACTOR POWER IMBALANCE;%
8-2 (Rev. 1)
Figure 8-2 Core Protection Safety Pressure-Temperature Limits 2400 ACCEPTABLE OPERATION 2200
.g ._.
q g 2000 z
8 e
0
/
1800 / UNACC'EPTABLE OPERATION 1600 580 600 620 640 660 Reactor Coolant Core Outlet Temperature, F
Figure 8-3 Core Protection Pressure-Temperature Limits 2400 I
i ACCEPTABLE //
OPERATION 2200 / //
/
cn
'$ 4 PUMP g f g /
ct 2000 /
/
/ 2 PUMP 1
i 2 3 PUMP /
0 l
/
1800 77 f UNACC EPTABLE OPERATION 1600 580 600 620 640 660 Reactor Coolant Core Outlet Temperature, OF PUMPS COOLANT POWER TYPE OF LIMIT OPERATING F LOW (GPM) (% FP) 4 374,880(100%) 112.0 DNBR >
3 280,035(74.7%) 90.7 DNBR l 2 183,690(49.0%) 63.63 DNBR/ QUALITY
- 8-4 4
_ _. ,. n - , - - . - _ ,- - _ . _ . .-
I Figure 8-4 Maximum Allowable Power-Imbalance Setpoints 1
THERMAL POWER LEVEL %
j i
M1 = 0.755
(-10.5.108.01 (16.5,108.0) M2= -1.89 i ACCE> TABLE 4 i PUMP CPE R ATION8 4 i -100 8 8
I I
4 t
(-33.5.00.6) i I
I I e a
t-10.5L80.61 (16.5t80.6)
- 5U
[ ,
I i s (33.5,75.9)
ECCEP1 ABLE 3 & J IPUMPC PERATION'I I
I l-33.5.63.2) < 1 y
1 -60 l i (-10.9.52.9) (16.5 52.9)
+ ECEPT BLE 2.3, &'4 g 0(33.5.48.5)
PUMP QPE R ATIONI
- I I 40 i I
(-33.5.35.5)' , i i i i i i 1 I I . H33.5.20.8) 20 e I e I a i 8
I I i
. . i l I ,
60 -40 20 20 40 60 i-I REACTOR POWER IMBALANCE %
i I
i j 8-5 (Rev. 1) 4
., . - - - . . - , . . , , - % . e , ,- - -_ . , - - _ . ,,m--
Figure 8-5 Operational Power-Imbalance Limits 0-50 IhEFPD REACTOR POWER,%FP
[
(25.0,102.0)
(-22.2,102.0) 7 ,
(-24.5,92.0) i ACCEPTABLE (30.0,92.0)
OPERATION
/
(-30.0,80.0) - 80
(
- 60 RESTRICTED OPERATION RESTRICTED OPERATION
- 40
- 20 i
i i i i e i i i i
i 0 20 40 60 80 100
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 IMBALANCE,%
8-6 (Rev. 1) i
Figure 8-6 Operational Power-Imbalance Limits 50 I O - 200 I O EFPD REACTOR POWER,%FP
(-28.3,102.0) (25.0,102.0)
_g
(-30.0,92.0) A9P ABL (30.0,92.0)
OFER ON
- 80
- SO RESTRICTED OPERATION RESTRICTED OPERATION
- 40
- 20
, . . . . . . . i i
-100 -80 - 60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 IMBALANCE,%
8-7 (Rev. 1)
Figure 8-7 Operational Power-Imbalance Limits After 200 I 10 EFPD REACTOR POWER,%FP
(-30.0,102.0) (25.0,102.0)
(-35.0,92.0) ACC P ABLE (30.0,92.0)
OpER O
- 80
- 60 RESTRICTED OPERATION RESTRICTED OPERATION
- 40
- 20 I 5 I 5 5 g i I I I
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 IMB ALANCE,%
8-8 (Rev. 1)
i Figure 8-8 Control Rod Position 1.imits, 4 Pumps, 0-50 + Ig EFPD r
POWER LEVEL (300,102)
(150,102) CUTOFF =100% FPJQ0L _ y.
100-(275.92)
SHUTDOWN (270,80) 80 MARGIN LIMIT R EST RICTED OPE R ATION I
- e. 60 -
T
$ UNACCEPTABLE 2 OPE R ATION ) 50) 8 G 40 5
a ACCEPTABLE OPERATION i
20-(40,15) (90.15)
(0,10)
(0.5) 0, , , ,
50 100 150 200 250 300 0
ROD INDEX,%WD 0 25 50 75 100 i t f I f 0 25 50 75 100 BANK 5 t l i t t 0 25 50 75 100 BANK 6 f I f f i
BANK 7 8-9
Figure 8-9 Control Rod Position Limits, 4 Pumps, 501Ig-200t10EFPD POWER LEVEL +
(150,102) CUTOFF =100% FP (275,102) 100-(260,92)
SHUTDOWN MARGIN LIMIT (250,80)
RESTRICTED OPE R ATION I UNACCEPTABLE
- j. 60 - OPERATION t
o
' ( - I (200,50) 8 b 40 -
0 2
ACCEPTABLE OPERATION 20 -
(40,15) (90,15)
(0,10)
(0,5) 0, , ,
300 100 150 200 250 0 50 ROD INDEX,%WD 0 25 50 75 100 f
t i 1 I 25 50 75 100 BANK 5 0 t l i f f 0 25 50 75 100 BANK 6 t f I t I O
BANK 7 8-10
Figure 8-10 Control Rod Position Limits, 4 Pumps, Af ter 200 + 10 EFPL)
POWER LEVEL CUTOFF =100% FP (220,102) (275.102)(300.102) .,
100-(260,92) 80 - (250.80)
R ESTRICTED UNACCEPTABLE OPERATION OPE R ATION I
e 60-(160,50) (200.50) 8 b 40 -
3 E
SHUTDOWN ACCEPTABLE MARGIN OPERATION LIMIT 20 -
(100,15)
(0.5) 0, , . i 100 150 200 250 300 0 50 ROD INDEX,%WO O 25 50 75 100 t t I i 1 0 25 50 75 100 BANK 5 i e t i s
25 50 75 100 BANK 6 f f f f e
BANK 7 8-11
f Figure 8-11 ,
Control Rod Position Limits, 3 Pumps, 0-50+IgEFPD 100 -
(130,77) (263,77) i
- e. 60 -
[
w UNACCEPTABLE RESTRICTED
$ OPERATION (200,50) o- (90.50) OPE R ATION 1
0 y 40 -
w E SHUTDOWN ACCEPTABLE MARGIN OPERATION LIMIT g 10 -
(30,15) (90.15)
(0,10) <
(0.5) 0i , ,
250 300 50 100 150 200 0
ROD INDEX,%WD 0 25 50 75 100 I I f I I 25 50 75 100 BANK 5 0 I i 1 1 1
0 25 50 75 100 BANK 6 f f I I i
BANK 7 8-12
Figure 8-12 Control Rod Position Limits, 3 Pumps, 50+Ig-200+10EFPD i
100-(130,77) (245,77)
'a a
o.
UNACCEPTABLE
)g60 - OPERATION w R ESTRICTED OPERATION h
- <*.sm a00.50) s S 40 -
y SHUTOOWN MARGIN ACCEPTABLE
OPERATION N
20 -
(30,15) (90,15)
(0,10)
(0.5) 0, , , , , ,
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 ROD INDEX,%WD 0 25 50 75 100 I t I 1 i BA:4K 5 0 25 50 75 100 i f f 1 I BANK 6 0 25 50 75 100 l I i i t BANK 7 i
l t
8-13
t j
Figure 8-13 Control Rod Position Limits, 3 Pumps, After 200 + 10 EFPD i
i 100 -
RESTRICTED OPERATION 80 - I * '7 73 (210,77) 3 (245,77)
I J. w -
5 3
(160,50) (200,50)
P y UNACCEPTABLE o OPERATION U 40 3
x SHUTDOWN ACCEPTABLE MARGIN OPERATION LIMIT 20 -
(100,15)
(0,5) +
0, , , , ,
100 150 200 250 300 i 0 50 ROD INDEX,%WD i
0 25 50 75 100 I f f f a BANK 5 0 25 50 75 100 f i f f f r
BANK 6 0 25 50 75 100 1 1 1 t l BANK 7 i
8-14
. I l
1 l
Figure 8-14 Control Rod Position Limits, 2 Pumps, 0-50+IgEFPD l
100 -
80 -
I
- e. w w
<205.52) (300.52g 8 (B0,52, e (200.50) e p 40 -
w RESTRICTED C SHUTDOWN OPERATION MARGIN ACCEPTABLE LIMLT OPERATION 20 - UNACCEPTABLE OPE R ATION (50,15) (90.15)
(0.10)
(0.5) 0, , , , , ,
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 ROD INDEX,%WD
! 0 25 50 75 100 t f I f I
! BANK 5 0 25 50 75 100 l e i f i BANK 6 0 25 50 75 100 i f I l t BANK 7 8-15
Figure 8-15 Control Rod Positiots Limits, 2 Pumps, 50tlg-200i10EFPD 100 -
80 -
I
- g. 60 -
W (203.52) (300,52) 3
$ (80,52) m a00,50) 8 h 40 -
$ RESTRICTED SHUTDOWN MARGIN OPERATION ACCEPTABLE LIMIT OPERATION 20 - UNACCEPTABLE OPERATION (50,15) (90,' )
(0,10)
(0,5) 0, i i i a 3 50 100 150 200 250 300 0
ROD INDEX,%WD 0 25 50 75 100 i i i e i BANK 5 0 25 50 75 100 t t i f 0 25 50 75 100 BANK 6 l t f 1 l
BANK 7 8-16
Figure 8-16 Control Rod Position Limits, 2 Pumps, After 200 + 10 EFPD l
i 100-1 s
EO.
I a- RESTRICTED ,
OPERATION
% 60 -
5 (203.52) (300.521 I $ (170.52) ,
$ UNACCEPTABLE (200,50) o OPERATION U 40 -
5 m
SHUTDOWN ACCEPTABLE i MARGIN OPERATION LIMIT
- 20 -
(110,15)
(0.5) 0, , ,. , , ,
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 ROD INDEX,%WD 0 25 50 75 100 t f f f f I
BANK 5 0 25 50 75 100 t f f f f l
I BANK 6 0 25 50 75 100 t t I t i BANK 7
?
I 8-17 1
i_.. . - _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ , - . . .
_- . ~ . _ . . . - - - . - _ _ . - . _ _ _ - - _ . _ - . . _ . . _ . _ - . . _ . - , . _ _ . _ , - . . . . - - -
l l
Figure 8-17 APSR Position Limits, 0-200 I 10 EFPD 0 0,102) ,(40.102) 100 -
(6.0.92)
(40.80) 80 - (0.80)
RESTRICTED OPER ATION
~
(60.60) d 60 -
2 K
o O ACCEPTABLE OPERATION (100,40)
< 40 -
E 20 -
0 20 APSR POSITION,%WD 8-18 (Rev. 1) l
Figure 8-18 APSR Position Limits, After 200 t 10 EFPD l
,(39 0.102) 100 -
16.0.92) 80 * (0.80) - (40.80)
RESTRICTED CPERATION o.
7 d 60 - < 60.60) 5 2
5 40 ACCEPTAB LE OPER ATION (100,40) x 20 -
0 . . . . .
0 20 40 60 80 100 APSR POSITION %WD l
8-19 (Rev. 1)
REFERENCES 1 Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Final Safety Analysis Report, Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287.
1 2 Program to Determine In-reactor Performance of B&W Fuels - Cladding Creep Collapse, BAW-10084A, Rev. 2, Babcock & Wilcox Co., Lynchburg, Virginia, '
October 1978.
3 BPRA Retainer Design Report, BAW-1496, Babcock & Wilcox, May 1978.
4 TACO - Fuel Performance Analysis, BAW-10087A, Rev. 1, Babcock & Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia, August 1977.
5 Oconee Unit 3, Cycle 6 - Reload Report, BAW-1634, Bibcock & Wilcox, August 1980.
6 B&W Version of PDQ07 Code, BAW-10117A, Babcock & Wilcox, January 1977.
7 Core Calculational Techniques and Procedures, BAW-10118, Babcock & Wilcox, October 1977.
- Assembly Calculations and Fitted Nuclear Data, BAW-10116_A, Babcock & Wilcox, Pla y 19 7 7.
'3 Oconee 3 Fuel Densification Report, BAW-1399, Babcock & Wilcox, November 1973.
1" L. S. Rubenstein (NRC) to J. H. Taylor (B&W) Letter, " Evaluation of Interim Procedure for Calculating DNBR Reductions Due to Rod Bow," October 18, 1979.
13 ECCS Analysis of Il&W's 177-FA Lowered-Loop NSS, BAW-10103, Rev. 3, Babcock
& Wilcox, July, 1977.
12 J. H. Taylor (B&W) to S. A. Varga (NRC), Letter, July 18, 1978.
ta Power Peaking Nuclear Reliability Factors, BAW-10119, Babcock & Wilcox, January 1977.
A-1 (Rev. 1)
14 Normal Operating Controls, BAW-10122, Babcock & Wilcox, August 1978.
15 Verification of the Three-Dimensional FLAME Code, BAW-10125A, Babcock &
Wilcox, August 1976.
16 Oconee Nuclear Station Reload Design Methodology Technical Report NFS-1001, Rev. 4, Duke Power Company, Charlotte, North Carolina, April 1979.
17 CASMO - A Fuel Assembly Burnup Program, AE-RF-76-4158, Studsvik Energiteknik AB, June 1978.
18 W. O. Parker, Jr. (Duke) to H. R. Denton (NRC), Letter, October 16, 1981.
19 J. H. Taylor (B&W) to L. S. Rubenstein (NRC), Letter, September 5, 1980.
20 Oconee Unit 2, Cycle 6 - Reload Report, BAW-1691, Babcock & Wilcox, August 1981.
21 J. H. Taylor (B&W) to S. A. Varga (NRC), Letter, "BPRA Retainer Reinsertion," January 14, 1980.
(
A-2
__ - - ___