ML20059H685

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Proposed Tech Specs by Removing Surveillance Requirement for ACI of SDC Sys Suction Isolation Valves
ML20059H685
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/03/1993
From:
BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20059H675 List:
References
NUDOCS 9311100171
Download: ML20059H685 (8)
v • d • e


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ATTACHMENT (1)  :

f UNIT 1 -

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REVISED PAGES 3/45-5 BASES 3/4 5-2 t

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9311100171 931103 PDR ADDCK 05000317 D@

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3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. At least once per REFUELING INTERVAL by:
1. Verifying actsmatic i::lat4en :nd %terlock action of the Shutdc r. Occling Sysieai frem the Resctor Ccolant Syste-' when t-hs Redctoi Coviant Syaiem pre 55sre is abovc 200 pM4.-.

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2. A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying _

that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.

3. Verifying that a minimum total of 100 cubic feet of solid granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.
4. Verifying that when a representative sample of 4.010.1 grams of TSP from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 3.5 + 0.1 liters of 77 + 10 F borated water from the RWT, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to > 6 _

within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

f. At least once per REFUELING INTERVAL, during shutdown, by:
  1. 1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection Actuation test signal.
2. Verifying that each of the following pumps str.rt automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Test Signal:
a. High-Pressure Safety Injection Pump.
b. Low-Pressure Safety Injection Pump. -

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l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 1/4 2-3 a.nenementNo.J'f[

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) i

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BASES pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

Portions of the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) System flowpath are comon to both subsystems. This includes the low pressure safety injection flow control valve, CV-306, the flow orifice downstream of CV-306, and the four low pressure safety injection loop isolation valves.

Although the portions of the flowpath are common, the system design is adequate to ensure reliable ECCS operation due to the short period of LPSI System operation following a design basis Loss of Coolant Incident prior to recirculation. The LPSI System design is consistent with the assumptions in the safety analysis.  ;

The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to > 7.0.

The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of RWT water provides assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post LOCA temperatures.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each g component ensure that as a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and the subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. The surveillance requirement for flow balance testing provides assurance that -

proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from -

exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. Minimum HPSI  !

flow requirements for temperatures above 355 F are based upon small break T LOCA calculations which credit charging pump flow following an SIAS. .

Surveillance testing includes allowances for instrumentation and system  !

leakage uncertainties. The 470 gpm requirement for minimum HPSI flow from i the three lowest flow legs includes instrument uncertainties but not system check valve leakage. The OPERABILITY of the charging pumps and the associated flow paths is assured by the Boration System Specification 3/4.1.2. Specification of safety injection pump total developed head ensures pump perfomance is consistent with safety analysis assumptions.

l Db IMERT A I

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'I CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No./1/[ l 1

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INSERT A The surveillance requirement for the Shutdown Cooling System open permissive interlock provides assurance that the shutdown cooling suction isolation valves are prevented from .

being remotely opened when the RCS pressure is at or above the SDC System design suction pressure of 350 psia. The suction piping' a .e Low Pressure Safety Injection pumps is the SDC System component with the limiting design pressure rating. The interlock provides assurance that double isolation of the SDC System from the RCS is presened whenever RCS pressure is at or above the SDC System design pressure. The 309 psia value .

specified for this suneillance is the actual pressurizer pressure at the instrument tap elevation for PT-103 and PT-103-1 when the SDC System suction pressure is 350 psia. The -

Surveillance Test Procedure for this suneillance will contain the required compensation to be applied to this value to account for instrument uncertainties. This test is performed using a simulated reactor coolant system pressure input.

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L ATI'ACHMENT (2)

UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REVISED PAGES 3/45-5 BASES 3/4 5-2 9

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3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. At least once per REFUELING INTERVAL by:
1. -Verifyiag entcinetic ischt4en-and-4nterlock action of-the- e Shtttdc n Cccling System fic; the Rescter Cooiani. 3ydem wiien

/ the-Reseter--Coolant Syst a-pr4ssure is above 300 psi .  ;

2. A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by '-

debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, -

etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.

3. Verifying that a minimum total of 100 cubic feet of solid granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets. ,
4. Verifying that when a representative sample of 4.0 1 0.1 grams of TSP from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 3.510.1 liters of 77 1 10*F borated water from the RWT, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to > 6 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
f. At least once per REFUELING INTERVAL, during shutdown, by:

a 1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection Actuation test signal.

2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Test Signal:
a. High-Pressure Safety Injection Pump.
b. Low-Pressure Safety Injection Pump.

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belM} /fieNec0 SA cl Sintu)2led ca aclua9 SCS feessu& slgnal

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 5-5 AmencmentNo./sp_ l

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3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

BASES Portions of the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) System flowpath are comon to both subsystems. This includes the low pressure safety injection flow control valve, CV-306, the flow orifice downstream of CV-306, and the four low pressure safety injection loop isolation valves. Although the portions of the flowpath are comon, the system design is adequate to ensure reliable ECCS operation due to the short period of LPSI System operation following a design basis Loss of Coolant Incident prior to i recirculation. The LPSI System design is consistent with the assumptions in the safety analysis.

The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to > 7.0. The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of RWT water provides assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post LOCA temperatures.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each '

component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and the subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. The surveillance requirement for flow balance testing provides assurance that a proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each' injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conoitions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. Minimum HPSI flow requirements for temperatures above 305 F are based upon small break LOCA calculations which credit charging pump flow following a SIAS.

Surveillance testing includes allowances for instrumentation and system leakage uncertainties. The 470 gpm requirement for minimum HPSI flow from the three lowest flow legs includes instrument uncertainties but not system check valve leakage. The OPERABILITY of the charging pumps and the associated flow caths is assured by the Boration System Specifications 3/4.1.2. Specification of safety injection pump total gh ,

1 developed head ensures pump performance is consistent with safety analysis assumptions.

BERT%At temperatures of 305 F and less, HPSI injection flow is limited to less than or equal to 210 gpm except in response to excessive reactor coolant leakage. With excessive RCS leakage (LOCA), make-up requirements could -

exceed a HPSI flow of 210 gpm. Overpressurization is prevented by 1 i

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3 3/4 3'-2 AmendmentNo.f4pj i

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i INSERT A i The surveihonce requirement for the Shutdown Cooling System open permissive interlock j provides assurance that the shutdown cooling suction isolation valves are prevented from '

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being remotely opened when the RCS pressure is at or above the SDC System design

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suction pressure of 350 psia. The cuction piping to the Low Pressure Safety Injection pumps  !

is the SDC System component with the limiting design pressure rating. The interlock provides assurance that double isolation of the SDC System from the RCS is preserved  !

whenever RCS pressure is at or above the SDC System design pressure. The 309 psia value i

specified for this surveillance is the actual pressurizer pressure at the instrument tap i elevation for PT-103 and PT-10t1 when the SDC System suction pressure is 350 psia. The j Surveillance Test Procedure for this surveillance will contain the required compensation to . -

t be applied to this value to account for instrument uncertainties. This test is performed using  !

a simulated reactor coolant system pressure input. l i

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