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Category:GENERAL EXTERNAL TECHNICAL REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20196K5421999-03-22022 March 1999 Rev 2 to VC Summer Nuclear Station,Training Simulator Quadrennial Certification Rept,1996-99, Books 1 & 2. Page 2 of 2 Section 2.4.4 (Rev 2) of Incoming Submittal Were Not Included ML20117F2811996-02-29029 February 1996 Non-proprietary, VC Summer Residual Heat Removal Data Review & Monitoring Criteria Development ML20094C4691995-06-30030 June 1995 Seismic Activity Near VC Summer Nuclear Station, for Perid Period of Apr-June 1995 ML20094C4591995-03-31031 March 1995 Seismic Activity Near VC Summer Station, for Period of Jan-Mar 1995 ML20081J0901995-03-23023 March 1995 VC Summer Training Simulator Quadrennial Certification Rept 1992-1995 ML20064H4551994-03-0707 March 1994 Rev 2 to VC Summer Charging/Safety Injection Pump Runout Flow Evaluation L-93-036, Licensing Submittal to Support Replacement SG TS Changes for Vsns1993-10-31031 October 1993 Licensing Submittal to Support Replacement SG TS Changes for Vsns ML20062K6441993-04-30030 April 1993 VC Summer Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis Considering Boraflex Shrinkage & Gaps ML20045F9561993-01-14014 January 1993 Non-Proprietary, VC Summer Nuclear Station SG TSP Interim Tube Plugging Criteria. Presentation Matls for Nrc/Sce&G/ Westinghouse Meeting on 930114 ML20090G9101992-02-29029 February 1992 Application for Approval to Incinerate Oil Contaminated W/ Very Low Levels of Licensed Radioactive Matl ML20082P2431991-07-31031 July 1991 Nuclear Physics Methodology for Reload Design ML20070R6561991-03-26026 March 1991 VC Summer Training Simulator Initial Certification Rept ML20062G1031990-10-31031 October 1990 Safety Evaluation for VC Summer Nuclear Station Upgrade to Westinghouse 17X17 Vantage+ Fuel ML20059D7021990-06-30030 June 1990 Technical Rept 90-02, Seismic Activity Near VC Summer Nuclear Station for Apr-June 1990 ML20005F4551990-01-0202 January 1990 Application for Approval to Incinerate Oil Contaminated W/ Very Low Levels of Licensed Radioactive Matls. ML19351A6741989-08-25025 August 1989 Cycle 5 Core Operating Limits Rept. ML20246C7731989-05-0202 May 1989 1988 Computer Mathematical Study of Thermal Plume in Monticello Reservoir Generated by VC Summer Station ML20154J5251988-05-31031 May 1988 Safety Evaluation for VC Summer Nuclear Station Transition to Westinghouse 17x17 Vantage 5 Fuel ML20148L3261987-12-31031 December 1987 Seismic Activity Near VC Summer Nuclear Station for Period Oct-Dec 1987 ML20214P2081987-03-0303 March 1987 Rev 1 to Crdr Summary Rept ML20135G6001985-09-16016 September 1985 Discussion of Proposed Control Logic Change for Steam Generator Power-Operated Relief Valves ML20135C0551985-09-0404 September 1985 Method of Analysis & Safe Shutdown Philosophy, 10CFR50, App R Compliance Review ML20115G4031985-04-15015 April 1985 Control Room Design Review Program Plan Rept for VC Summer Nuclear Station ML20115G4231985-04-15015 April 1985 Summary Rept on Reg Guide 1.97,Rev 3,Post-Accident Monitoring Sys ML20101S4381985-01-21021 January 1985 Rev 2 to Control of Heavy Loads at VC Summer Nuclear Station ML20091A8051984-04-30030 April 1984 Virgil Summer Deletion of Reactor Trip on Turbine Trip Below 50% Power,Apr 1984 ML20083Q0641984-04-0909 April 1984 Rev 1 to Licensing Rept on Spent Fuel Storage Racks ML20083H6381983-12-31031 December 1983 Draft Licensing Rept on High Density Spent Fuel Racks for VC Summer Nuclear Station ML20079P4051983-12-31031 December 1983 Licensing Rept on New Fuel Storage Racks ML20081M5301983-11-30030 November 1983 Seismic Confirmatory Program Equipment Margin Study, Final Rept ML20078R4761983-11-30030 November 1983 Draft Final Rept, Seismic Confirmatory Program - Equipment Margin Study ML20081H7281983-10-18018 October 1983 Draft Equipment Required for Cold Shutdown Aslb/Acrs Active Balance of Plant Equipment & Westinghouse Supplied Valves on Piping ML20071F1371983-03-31031 March 1983 Addendum to Experimental Investigation of Relative Response of Accelerograph Pad,Free Field & Structural Foundations at Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station ML20071F5071983-01-17017 January 1983 Divers Rept:Svc Water Intake Tunnel Insp ML20027C6011982-10-15015 October 1982 Independent Seismic Design Verification:Turbine Driven Portion Emergency Feedwater Sys, Final Rept.One Oversize Drawing Encl.Aperture Card Is Available in PDR ML20065G2581982-09-30030 September 1982 Independent Seismic Design Verification Turbine Driven Section Emergency Feedwater Sys,Vc Summer Nuclear Station, Draft Final Rept ML20063P0591982-09-30030 September 1982 Nonproprietary Version of Interim Power Operation Evaluation Rept ML20062D6601982-07-30030 July 1982 Pressurizer Relief Sys Piping & Support Evaluation Rept for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Sc Electric & Gas Co in Response to NUREG-0737,Item II.D.1 ML20054M4751982-07-0909 July 1982 Independent Seismic Design Verification,Turbine Driven Section Emergency Feedwater Sys, Status Rept ML20050B3541982-03-26026 March 1982 Revised Pages to Human Factors Engineering Evaluation & Improvement of VC Summer Nuclear Station Control Room,Phase 1. ML20041C6121982-02-23023 February 1982 to Fire Protection Evaluation ML20041C9171982-02-19019 February 1982 Nonproprietary Version of Revision 4 to Environ Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment Per NUREG-0588. ML20039F5591982-01-0707 January 1982 Floor Response Spectra from 1979 Monticello Reservoir Event Vs Original SSE Floor Spectra. ML20038A6621981-10-30030 October 1981 Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants. ML20009G0991981-07-31031 July 1981 Model Study of Reactor Containment Sump Flow Characteristics. ML20009G1511981-07-29029 July 1981 Corrected Pages to Control of Heavy Loads at Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station Unit 1, Revision 1 to 6-month Rept on NUREG-0612 ML20005A9841981-06-26026 June 1981 Control of Heavy Loads at Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station Unit 1. ML20126J8671981-03-18018 March 1981 Reactor Bldg Integrated Leak Rate Test (Type a) Final Technical Rept ML19351F4931981-01-31031 January 1981 Comparison of Mgt/Technical Resources to Regulatory Guidance. ML19341A1661981-01-31031 January 1981 Human Factors Engineering Evaluation & Improvement of VC Summer Nuclear Station Control Room,Phase 1. Prepared for Util 1999-03-22
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217D6401999-10-31031 October 1999 Rev 2 to WCAP-15102, VC Summer Unit 1 Heatup & Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation RC-99-0202, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With ML20216J4191999-09-24024 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re 990806 Abb K-Line Breaker Defect After Repair.Vendor Notified of Shunt Trip Wiring Problem & Agreed to Modify Procedure for Refurbishment of Breakers RC-99-0180, Special Rept on 990807,electric Driven Fire Pump XPP0134A Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Pump Discharge Relief Valve Failing to Open as Normally Expected.Two Temporary Fire Pumps Were Installed to Provide Backup Suppression1999-09-0808 September 1999 Special Rept on 990807,electric Driven Fire Pump XPP0134A Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Pump Discharge Relief Valve Failing to Open as Normally Expected.Two Temporary Fire Pumps Were Installed to Provide Backup Suppression RC-99-0183, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20211K6161999-08-31031 August 1999 Rev 2 to VC Summer Nuclear Station,Colr for Cycle 12, Dtd Aug 1999 RC-99-0168, Special Rept:On 990804,electric Driven Fire Pump XPP0134A & Diesel Driven Fire Pump XPP0134B,were Removed from Svc to Allow for Plant Mod.Fire Pumps Were Returned to Operable Condition on 990818,after Mod Was Completed1999-08-19019 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990804,electric Driven Fire Pump XPP0134A & Diesel Driven Fire Pump XPP0134B,were Removed from Svc to Allow for Plant Mod.Fire Pumps Were Returned to Operable Condition on 990818,after Mod Was Completed ML20210M7071999-07-31031 July 1999 Rev 1 to VC Summer Nuclear Station COLR for Cycle 12 ML20211C2201999-07-31031 July 1999 Rev 1 to WCAP-15102, VC Summer Unit 1 Heatup & Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation RC-99-0163, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With RC-99-0137, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With RC-99-0122, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With ML20206H2971999-05-0505 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Common Mode Failure for magne-blast Breakers.Vc Summer Nuclear Station Utilizes These Breakers in Many Applications,Including 7.2-kV EDG Electrical Buses RC-99-0103, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With ML20206K2421999-04-30030 April 1999 Rev 0 to COLR for Cycle 12 for Summer Nuclear Station RC-99-0087, Part 21 Interim Rept (SSH 99-0001) Re 990218 Failure of Circuit Breaker Located in Cubicle 14 of XSW1DB to Close During Surveillance Testing.Caused by Positive Interlock Angle Was Incorrect.Breaker Was Returned to GE Factory1999-04-15015 April 1999 Part 21 Interim Rept (SSH 99-0001) Re 990218 Failure of Circuit Breaker Located in Cubicle 14 of XSW1DB to Close During Surveillance Testing.Caused by Positive Interlock Angle Was Incorrect.Breaker Was Returned to GE Factory RC-99-0083, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With RC-99-0063, Special Rept:On 990302 & 16,meteorological Site Number One 10 Meter Temp Element Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Erratic Operation.Cabling & 10 Meter Electrical Connectors Were Replaced1999-03-26026 March 1999 Special Rept:On 990302 & 16,meteorological Site Number One 10 Meter Temp Element Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Erratic Operation.Cabling & 10 Meter Electrical Connectors Were Replaced ML20196K5421999-03-22022 March 1999 Rev 2 to VC Summer Nuclear Station,Training Simulator Quadrennial Certification Rept,1996-99, Books 1 & 2. Page 2 of 2 Section 2.4.4 (Rev 2) of Incoming Submittal Were Not Included RC-99-0055, Special Rept:On 990302,Meteorological Site Number One 10 Meter Temp Element (RTD) Was Declared Inoperable Due to Erratic Operation.Cause of Original RTD Failure Is Unknown. Equipment Was Declared Operable on 9903121999-03-16016 March 1999 Special Rept:On 990302,Meteorological Site Number One 10 Meter Temp Element (RTD) Was Declared Inoperable Due to Erratic Operation.Cause of Original RTD Failure Is Unknown. Equipment Was Declared Operable on 990312 RC-99-0050, Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Units 1.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Units 1.With ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified ML20203F4511999-02-12012 February 1999 SER Finding Licensee Adequately Addressed GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves, for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables ML20206R5241998-12-31031 December 1998 Santee Cooper 1998 Annual Rept RC-99-0052, Vsns 1998 Annual Operating Rept. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 Vsns 1998 Annual Operating Rept. with RC-99-0004, Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20206R5191998-12-31031 December 1998 Scana Corp 1998 Annual Rept ML20198F4241998-12-18018 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request for Approval to Repair ASME Code Class 3 Service Water Piping Flaws in Accordance with GL 90-05 for VC Summer Nuclear Station RC-98-0223, Special Rept 98-001:on 981130,steam Line High Range Gamma Monitor (RMG-19C) Was Declared Inoperable Due to Indeterminate Alarm.Caused by Failures in Detector & Meter Reset Circuitry.Established Preplanned Alternate Method1998-12-16016 December 1998 Special Rept 98-001:on 981130,steam Line High Range Gamma Monitor (RMG-19C) Was Declared Inoperable Due to Indeterminate Alarm.Caused by Failures in Detector & Meter Reset Circuitry.Established Preplanned Alternate Method RC-98-0222, Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20155G4551998-11-0404 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to Use Code Case N-416-1 with Licensee Proposed Addl Exams RC-98-0208, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20207J5701998-10-31031 October 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to WCAP-14955, Probabilistic & Economic Evaluation of Rv Closure Head Penetration Integrity for VC Summer Nuclear Plant ML20154Q9571998-10-21021 October 1998 SER Accepting Request Seeking Approval to Use Alternative Rules of ASME Code Case N-498-1 for Class 1,2 or 3 Sys ML20154K7901998-09-30030 September 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 0 to WCAP-15101, Analysis of Capsule W from Sceg VC Summer Unit 1 Rv Radiation Surveillance Program RC-98-0184, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.With ML20154K8041998-09-30030 September 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 0 to WCAP-15103, Evaluation of Pressurized Thermal Shock for VC Summer Unit 1 RC-98-0166, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With1998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20237A7181998-08-13013 August 1998 SER Accepting Util Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves RC-98-0153, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 11998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1 RC-98-0131, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station1998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station ML20248J0191998-06-0404 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Inservice Testing Program Interim Pump Relief Request Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3) (II) RC-98-0113, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 11998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1 RC-98-0100, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 11998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20217G7411998-04-22022 April 1998 Rev 1 to VC Summer Nuclear Station COLR for Cycle 11 RC-98-0076, Final Part 21 Rept Re a DG EG-B for Vsns,As Followup to .Power Control Svcs of Engine Sys,Inc Provided Response on 980318.Evaluation Concludes That Failure of EG-B Is one-time non-repeatable Failure1998-04-17017 April 1998 Final Part 21 Rept Re a DG EG-B for Vsns,As Followup to .Power Control Svcs of Engine Sys,Inc Provided Response on 980318.Evaluation Concludes That Failure of EG-B Is one-time non-repeatable Failure RC-98-0084, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 11998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20212H1421998-03-0202 March 1998 Interim Part 21 Rept SSH 98-002 Re EG-B Unit That Was Sent to Power Control Svcs for Determination of Instability & Refurbishment of a Dg.Cause of Speed Oscillations Unknown. Completed Hot Bore Checks on Power Case 1999-09-08
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? STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION I
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I INDEPENDENT SEISMIC DESIGN VERIFICATION TURBINE DRIVEN SECTION EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM V.C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION STATUS REPORT: JULY 9, 1982 I
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- 1. INTRODUCTION:
1.1 GENERAL SCOPE Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) was engaged by I South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) to perform an independent review of the seismic design for the Turbine Driven portion of the Emergency Feedwater System at V.C. Summer Nuclear I Station, Unit No. 1. The review consisted of three major tasks, specifically; I 1) 2)
Field Walkdown: Verification of the as-built piping configuration Stress Analysis and Evaluation: reanalysis of the as-built piping system, review of stresses and support loads, and I 3) Design Control Audit: review of the design control pro-cedures and implementation thereof by Gilbert Associates Incorporated (GAI), the designer of V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1.
1.2 STONE & WEBSTER QUALIFICATIONS AND INDEPENDENCE SWEC has extensive experience in the engineering, design, con-struction and startup operations for nuclear power plant projects as well as special expertise involving seismic design analysis, field verification efforts, and pipe stress and support reanalysis required by recent NRC I&E Bulletins. SWEC also has extensive experience in Quality Assurance aspects of the nuclear power in-dustry and in auditing of large highly technical and complex pro-jects. Stone & Webster is justifiably proud of its record and large staff of capable and experienced personnel.
SWEC, its parent company Stone & Webster, Inc., its affiliated companies and all personnel assigned to this evaluation are in-dependent of South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.
Work performed by Stone & Webster and its affiliated companies for SCE&G represents only a miniscule portion of Stone & Webster's business. All key technical personnel assigned to the project I signed disclosures (Attachment 1-1) . Table 1-1 lists personnel assigned to the various tasks. Dr. P. Dunlop, Project Manager, has overall responsibility for the project. Dr. K. Y. Chu is Project Engineer responsible for the technical evaluation (Tasks 1 and 2) and is independent of Mr. J. H. MacKinnon who is respon-sible for auditing the GAI design control program (Task 3).
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1.3 EVALUATION PROCESS All work was performed in accordance with project procedures I (Table 1-2) . Whenever a reviewer noticed anything outside the criteria, or had any question about the information or data, the reviewer highlighted this. Specific procedures for highlighting questions were different for each of the three major tasks and I are explained in the task specific project procedures (Table 1-2).
1.3.1 Field Walkdown (as-boilt verification)
All field measurements were recorded directly on piping isometrics.
Whenever the measured values differed from the isometric values by more than the criteria presented in VCS-1 Field Walkdown Procedure, the recorded values were circled on the isometrics and also recorded on Difference List (DL) Forms. Copies of the marked-up isometrics and DL forms were provided to SCE&G at the end of the Field Veri-fication Effort.
1.3.2 Stress Analysis and Evaluation All analyses are to be performed in conformance with VCS-3, Analysis and Evaluation Procedure and VCS-4, Analysis and Evaluation Criteria.
These provide the procedures and criteria for performing the piping I reanalysis. Procedures for highlighting differences are defined in Procedure VCS-3. Questions raised by the stress analysts are for-mally recorded and resolved. A two step procedure is used. An Open Item Report (OIR) is initiated for all items requiring clarification or confirmation. If a satisfactory resolution is received, the OIR is formally closed out. If a possible error or inconsistency is confirmed a Potential Discrepancy (PD) is written. These PD's will I be formally transmitted to SCE&G for their revier and evaluation.
1.3.3 Design Control Audit Of the three tasks the procedures and resolution of items for this task are more subjective. The personnel assigned to this effort were certified auditors and performed the audit in conformance with gen-I eral Stone & Webster standards for such audits.
2.O PROGRAM STATUS As of July 9, 1982, SWEC has completed Tasks 1 and 3. Task 2 is currently in progress. To date nothing has been found which would require the initiation of a 10CFR21 review. The detailed status of each task is given below.
Task 1: Field Walkdown - verification of the as-built piping geometry. This task has been completed and all Difference List (DL) items have been forwarded to SCE&G for their review and information.
The following is a brief description of the differences identified.
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srons a wassrun
(1) Gaps between piping and support steel larger than criteria -
two occurrences. The largest of these was 9/32 inch whereas the criteria allowed only 5/32 inch.
(2) Clearances between piping and structural components - three occurrences. Two instances of small clearance between pipe and structural component (0 and 7/64 inch) to be reviewed during stress analysis. A sleeve through a wall was also fo.und to be partially grouted. This was subsequently deter-mined to have been identified by SCE&G (ECN 2316) and the grout had been removed when SWEC field personnel again visited the site on June 7, 1982.
(3) Struts at angles other than identified on the isometrics -
three occurrences of struts more than 3 degrees from the values on the isometrics. The maximum difference was 11 degrees.
s (4) Dimensional data outside the criteria specified for SWEC's field walkdown effort - 15 occurrences. The maximum difference was 5.3 inches for a span of 11.6 feet. All dimensional differences were within SWEC's standard criteria.
(5) Drafting Errors - five occurrences. These were confirmed by reviewing the support or piping drawings.
All field measured dimensions will be input to the stress analysis in Task 2. Any impact of the above on the stress analysis will therefore be obtained.
Task 2: Stress Analysis and Evaluation - reanalysis of the piping system with as-built geometry, comparison of pipe stress with allow-ables and support loads. This task which consists of coding piping /
support geometry and design criteria into the NUPIPE program is currently in progress. No detailed results have yet been obtained to compare with the piping allowable stress or with the original design loads for supports. Three inconsistencies were identified during correspondence with GAI relative to design criteria. These are:
(1) During the field walkdown and subsequent data review it was found that several supports on subsystem EF-01 were in the Diesel Generator Building. This subsystem therefore should be analyzed considering seismic response spectra from the Diesel Generator Building. The piping isometric does not indicate this requirement.
(2) During reivew of data received an inconsistency in jet orientation and jet location was identified.
(3) In one instance the target area of a jet impingement in the design document (1902) appeared to be inappropriate.
Subsequent communication indicates that the jet need not be included in the' analysis because shield installation negates this break load.
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I It is not known what impact these inconsistencies might have on the detailed stresses and support loads in the piping reanalysis. This task is expected to be complete by July 27, 1982.
Task 3: Design Control Audit - This task consists of three parts.
These are:
(1) Review of the GAI design control program (2) Verification of program application (3) Confirmation that the structural dynamic analysis output was consistent with response spectra provided to Teledyne
' Engineering Service (TES) for analysis of the turbine driven portion of the Emergency Feedwater System.
The above three parts of this task have been completed. The following are SWEC's conclusions based on the design control audit.
Procedural Program An adequate Design Control Program, meeting the requirements of I 10CFR50 Appendix B, was in place for the transmittal and utili-zation of input data for pipe stress analyses of subsystems EF-01, 02, 03 and 22 of the Emergency Feedwater Piping System.
Only one instance was observed in the existing program where there was no formally approved procedure. Although formal procedures were available for indexing of design and procure-I ment specifications, the maintenance and distribution of a mechanical specification index was performed using an undated, uncontrolled instruction with no evidence that the instruction had been approved. Although unapproved, the procedure was adequate and was being implemented.
Program Implementation The procedures associated with the activities reviewed during the audit were adequately implemented except that the utilization I of inputs to pipe stress analysis in some cases was not con-sistent with program requirements. The instances are apparently documentation problems that would not affect the design.
I The pipe stress analysis package for subsystem EF-01 did not utilize Figure 64 response spectra as specified on the isometric. Although GAI had approved the deletion of Figure I 64 in a request for information (RFI) there was no evidence I 4 STONE & WEBSTER
that the isometric had been marked-up to indicate that Figure 64 should be deleted nor was there documentation in the pipe stress analysis package that justified the I deletion of Figure 64 (such approved RFI) .
as by reference to the GAI o There was no documentation in the pipe stress analysis package for EF-22 that the differences between the thermal movements utilized in the analysis and the movements on the isometric had been evaluated. A letter to GAI from TES I initiated as a result of this audit indicated that the {
differences had been evaluated when the analysis was per-formed and that reanalysis was not necessary.
o (The project scope was expanded to include SI-09 because of l the difference noted in EF-22 above). The pipe stress analysis package for subsystem SI-09 apparently utilized ancher movement information from aWestinghouse letter rather than the movements identified en the isometric. There was no evidence that GAI had approved or transmitted this information for use. In addi-I tion, the pipe stress analysis package did not identify that the movements utilized were different than the isometric and the reasons for the differences. A letter submitted by TES to GAI as a result of the audit indicated that the Westinghouse anchor movement information had been used in the analysis.
o The nozzle loadings in pipe stress analysis packages were noted lI i
as acceptable by " trade-off". There was no documentation in l l the pipe stress analysis packages that identified the method or l t
the acceptability of the method. There were approved RFI's l I in GAI files that addressed load trade-offs, but they were not referred to in the packages.
l Another area that was not clearly documented was the application of damping factors. Although the application of damping factors complied with the PSAR, this could not be discerned unless reference was made collectively to the PSAR, Specification 702, pipe stress analysis !
packages, a GAI study, and minutes of a meeting. The underlying cause of this condition was apparently due to not updating Specification 702 to reflect the issuance of Amendment 26 to the FSAR.
Response Spectra Consistency The response spectra utilized in the pipe stress analysis was consistent with the dynamic (structural) analysis output. In some cases additional spectra were utilized when it did not appear necessary. Utilization of these additional spectra adds to the I conservatism of the design.
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4 l' ATTACHMENT l-1 I, ,/
J.O. 14236 i ,.
. INDEPENENTSEISMICDESIGNVERIFICATION V.C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT N0. 1 I ' SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & CAS CO.
/,
, Statement Regarding Potential or Apparent
, ,, Conflicts of Intercot l,
ia , Te,: Stone'& Webster Engineering Corporation 1 .i
<W reas, the undersigaed employee ("E=ployee") understands that he or she
'is assigned as a partic3 pant to provide services to Sot.th Carolina Electric. f. Cas Company Nith , respect to the Design Verification Program for the'V . St,z:mer huclear Station; and Whereas E=gloyee onderstands that it is necessary that the participan.ts be screened for eny potential or apparent conflicts of interest with respect ':o this ansignment;
',l ,
Thereforji f o r th< abov,e stated purposes Employee makes the following representations tc. Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation:
- 1. h.mployeehasnotyn[agedinanyworkorbusinetsinvolvedwith or related to the engineer,ing or design of the V.C. Su==er Nuclear Station yrher than.this Deqign Verification Program;
- 2. Neither Employee, nor any members of his or her i= mediate family, own any beneficial interest in the_ South Carolina Electric &
Gas Company, including but not limited to common or preferred stock, bonds or other securities issued on behalf of the South Carolina Electric & Cas' Company; and
- 3. None' of ths rembers of Employee's immediate family are employed I by South Carolina Electric & Gas Company.
This statement is based upon the Employee's best information and belief and any exceptions to the representatioas contained herein have been described on the reverse side of this document.
, j Dated
. Signature _ g ,
Y ll .,
'i % - , Print Name i -
.,- . .. . . . . A 4
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TABLE l-1 PROJECT PERSONNEL Project Manacer: Peter Duninp
. Proiect Encineer: K. Y. Chu . Desien Control Audit Manacer:
. Assistant Proiect Encineer: J. F. Pa:n J. H. MacKinnon TASK 1 FIELD WALKDOWN TASK 3 DESIGN CONTROL AUDIT N. Roth D. Malone I K.
J.
D.
Anderson Y. Chen Loffa R. Twigg A. Moss j L. Peterson l V. Saleta TASK 2 STRESS ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION T. Wei D. Loffa J. Y. Chen J. Chiang Y. Chin J. Chu I
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STONE & WEBSTER
TABLE l-2 PROJECT PROCEDURES (A) TASK SPECIFIC PROCEDURES FIELD WALKDOWN EFFORT VCS-1 Field Walkdown Procedure STRESS ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION VCS-3 Analysis and Evaluation Procedure VCS-4 Analysis and Evaluation Criteria l
DESIGN CONTROL AUDIT Design Control Verification Plan (B) PROJECT CENERIC PLANS / PROCEDURES Quality Assurance Plan Document Control Procedure - VCS-2 Quality Assurance Records Procedure - VCS-5 Engineering Assurance Audit Program I
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